May 28, 1998

Mr. Gregory M. Rueger, Senior Vice President
and General Manager
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Nuclear Power Generation N9B
P. O. Box 770000
San Francisco, California 94177

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS FOR DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NO. 1 (TAC NO. MA0397) AND UNIT NO. 2 (TAC NO. MA0398)

Dear Mr. Rueger:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 125 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-80 and Amendment No. 123 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-82 for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated December 23, 1997.

These amendments change the combined Technical Specifications (TS) for the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Unit Nos. 1 and 2 to revise TS 3/4.7.11, Table 3.7-1, "Maximum Allowable Power Range Neutron Flux High Setpoint With Inoperable Steam Line Safety Valves." The power range (PR) neutron flux high setpoints would be revised based on revised calculational methodologies for 1, 2, or 3 inoperable main steam safety valves (MSSVs) per steam generator (SG). The TS change would lower the PR neutron flux high setpoints when 2 or 3 MSSVs are inoperable per loop such that the maximum power level allowed would be within the heat removing capability of the remaining operable MSSVs. Although the method for calculating the maximum power level allowed when one MSSV per loop is inoperable has been revised, the results have not and the limit remains the same. The associated Bases have also been revised.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,
Original Signed By
Steven D. Bloom, Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-2
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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Docket Nos. 50-275
and 50-323

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 125 to DPR-80
2. Amendment No. 123 to DPR-82
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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DFO1

DOCUMENT NAME: DCA0397.AMD

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-275

DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 125
License No. DPR-80

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Pacific Gas and Electric Company (the licensee) dated December 23, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-80 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 125, are hereby incorporated in the license. Pacific Gas and Electric Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance to be implemented within 30 days of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Steven D. Bloom, Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-2
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 28, 1998

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-323

DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 123
License No. DPR-82

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Pacific Gas and Electric Company (the licensee) dated December 23, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-82 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 123 , are hereby incorporated in the license. Pacific Gas and Electric Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance to be implemented within 30 days of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Steven D. Bloom, Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-2
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 28, 1998

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENT NO. 125 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-80

AND AMENDMENT NO. 123 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-82

DOCKET NOS. 50-275 AND 50-323

Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE	INSERT
3/4 7-2	3/4 7-2
B 3/4 7-1	B 3/4 7-1
-	B 3/4 7-1a
B 3/4 7-2*	B 3/4 7-2*

*No changes were made to this page. Reissued to become a one-sided page.

3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE

SAFETY VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.1 All main steam line Code safety valves associated with each steam generator shall be OPERABLE with lift settings as specified in Table 3.7-2.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a. With one or more main steam line Code safety valves inoperable, operation in MODES 1, 2 and 3 may proceed provided, that within 4 hours, either the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status or the Power Range Neutron Flux High Trip Setpoint is reduced per Table 3.7-1; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.1 No additional requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

TABLE 3.7-1

MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER RANGE NEUTRON FLUX HIGH SETPOINT WITH INOPERABLE STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES

MAXIMUM NUMBER OF INOPERABLE SAFETY VALVES ON ANY OPERATING STEAM GENERATOR	MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER RANGE NEUTRON FLUX HIGH SETPOINT (PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER)
1	87*
2	47*
3	29*

*Unless the Reactor Trip System breakers are in the open position.

3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE

3/4.7.1.1 SAFETY VALVES

The primary purpose of the main steam safety valves (MSSVs) is to provide overpressure protection for the secondary system. The MSSVs also provide protection against overpressurizing the reactor coolant pressure boundary by providing a heat sink for the removal of energy from the reactor coolant system if the preferred heat sink, provided by the condenser and the circulating water system, is not available.

Five MSSVs are located on each main steam header, outside containment, upstream of the main steam isolation valves. The MSSV design includes staggered setpoints, according to Table 3.7-2 so that only the needed valves will actuate. Staggered setpoints reduce the potential for valve chattering that is due to steam pressure insufficient to fully open all valves following a turbine reactor trip.

The design basis for the MSSVs comes from ASME Code Section III, and its purpose is to limit the secondary system pressure to less than or equal to 110% of design pressure. This design basis is sufficient to cope with any anticipated operational occurrence or accident considered in the design basis accident and transient analysis. The tolerance on the MSSV setpoints assures that the secondary system will not be overpressurized if the MSSVs lift at the high end of their tolerance band, and assures that the steam generators (SGs) will not be overfilled during a SG tube rupture if the MSSVs lift at the low end of their tolerance band. A minimum of two OPERABLE safety valves per SG ensures that sufficient relief capacity is available for the allowable THERMAL POWER restriction in Table 3.7-1.

STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION is allowable with safety valves inoperable within the limitations of the ACTION requirements on the basis of the reduction in Secondary Coolant System steam flow and THERMAL POWER required by the reduced Reactor trip settings of the Power Range Neutron Flux channels.

The Reactor Trip Setpoint reductions applied in TS Table 3.7-1 are derived on the following bases:

One MSSV Inoperable

The limiting FSAR Condition II accident for overpressure concerns is a loss of external load/turbine trip. The event is analyzed with the RETRAN-02 computer program to demonstrate the adequacy of the MSSVs to maintain the main steam system lower than 1210 psia, or 110% of the 1085 psig SG design pressure.

In a PG&E calculation, the transient is reanalyzed to determine the effect of only four MSSVs per SG being available. The analysis assumes a 3% tolerance for all the available MSSVs. The MSSV on each SG with the lowest nominal setpoint was assumed unavailable, and the Unit 2 model is used because of its higher thermal rating. The results of the calculation show that the peak pressures in the SGs are lower than 1210 psia, or 110% of the 1085 psig SG design pressure.

3/4.7.1.1 SAFETY VALVES (Continued)

Thus, with one MSSV inoperable per SG, the remaining MSSVs are capable of providing sufficient pressure relief capacity for the plant to operate at 100% RATED THERMAL POWER (RTP). However, the value applied to the high neutron flux trip setpoints must be lowered an additional 6% RTP to account for instrument and channel uncertainties. The instrument uncertainties are derived from "Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection Systems, Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2, 24 Month Fuel Cycle Evaluation," WCAP 11082, Revision 5. This adjustment results in a setpoint of 94% RTP; however, the setpoint will remain at 87% RTP for additional conservatism.

More than One MSSV Inoperable

For more than one MSSV on each loop inoperable, the following Westinghouse algorithm contained in NSAL 94-001 is used:

$$\text{Hi } \Phi = (100/Q)\frac{(w_s h_{fg} N)}{K}$$

where:

Hi Φ = Safety Analsysis PR high neutron flux setpoint, percent

Q = Nominal NSSS power rating of the plant (including reactor coolant pump heat), MWt

K = Conversion factor, 947.82 (Btu/sec)/MWt

w_s = Minimum total steam flow rate capability of the operable MSSVs on any one SG at the highest MSSV opening pressure including tolerance and accumulation, as appropriate, in lb/sec. For example, if the maximum number of inoperable MSSVs per SG is three, then w_s should be a summation of the capacity of the operable MSSVs at the highest operable MSSV operating pressure, excluding the three highest capacity MSSVs.

h_{fg} = heat of vaporation for steam at the highest MSSV opening pressure including tolerance and accumulation, as appropriate, Btu/bm

N = Number of loops in plant

For the case of two and three inoperable MSSVs per SG, the setpoints derived are 53% and 35% RTP, respectively. However, the values applied to the high neutron flux trip setpoints must be lowered an additional 6% RTP to account for instrument and channel uncertainties, which results in setpoints of 47% and 29% RTP, respectively.

3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

BACKGROUND

The Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System automatically supplies feedwater to the steam generators to remove decay heat from the Reactor Coolant System upon the loss of normal feedwater supply. The AFW pumps take suction from the condensate storage tank (CST) (TS 3/4.7.1.3) and pump to the steam generator secondary side via separate and independent connections to the main feedwater (MFW) piping outside containment. The steam generators function as a heat sink for core decay heat. The heat load is dissipated by releasing steam to the atmosphere from the steam generators via the main steam safety valves (MSSVs) (TS 3/4.7.1.1) or atmospheric dump valves (TS 3/4.7.1.6). If the main condenser is available, steam may be released via the steam bypass valves and recirculated to the CST.

The AFW System consists of two motor driven AFW pumps and one steam turbine driven pump configured into three trains. Each motor driven pump provides 100% of AFW flow capacity, and the turbine driven pump provides 200% of the required capacity to the steam generators (ref. 3), with "100% capacity" as defined in the AFW design basis accident analysis (loss of normal feedwater) (ref. 1). The pumps are equipped with independent recirculation lines to prevent pump operation against a closed system. Each motor driven AFW pump is powered from an independent Class 1E power supply and feeds two steam generators, although each pump has the capability to be manually realigned to feed other steam generators. The steam turbine driven AFW pump receives steam from two main steam lines upstream of the main steam isolation valves. Each of the steam feed lines will supply 100% of the requirements of the turbine driven AFW pump.

The turbine driven AFW pump supplies a common header capable of feeding all steam generators with vital AC powered control valves actuated to the appropriate steam generator by remote manual action. One pump at full flow is sufficient to remove decay heat and cool the unit to residual heat removal (RHR) entry conditions. Thus, the requirement for diversity in motive power sources for the AFW System is met.

The AFW System is capable of supplying feedwater to the steam generators during normal unit startup, shutdown, and hot standby conditions.

The AFW System is designed to supply sufficient water to the steam generator(s) to remove decay heat with steam generator pressure at the setpoint of the MSSVs. Subsequently, the AFW System supplies sufficient water to cool the unit to RHR entry conditions, with steam released through the ADVs.

The AFW System actuates automatically on steam generator water level--low-low by the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) (TS 3/4.3.2). Other conditions that actuate the motor driven or the turbine driven AFW pumps include: loss of offsite power, safety injection, trip of all MFW pumps, ATWS (Anticipated Transient Without Scram) Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) signal, and transfer to diesel.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 125 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-80

AND AMENDMENT NO. 123 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-82

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-275 AND 50-323

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated December 23, 1997, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (or the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (Appendix A to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-80 and DPR-82) for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2. The proposed changes change the combined Technical Specifications (TS) for the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Units 1 and 2 to revise TS 3/4.7.11, Table 3.7-1, "Maximum Allowable Power Range Neutron Flux High Setpoint With Inoperable Steam Line Safety Valves." The power range (PR) neutron flux high setpoints would be revised based on revised calculational methodologies for 1, 2, or 3 inoperable main steam safety valves (MSSVs) per steam generator (SG). The proposed TS change would lower the PR neutron flux high setpoints when 2 or 3 MSSVs are inoperable per loop such that the maximum power level allowed would be within the heat removing capability of the remaining operable MSSVs. Although the method for calculating the maximum power level allowed when one MSSV per loop is inoperable has been revised, the results have not and the limit remains the same. The associated Bases are also revised.

By letter dated January 20, 1994, Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Westinghouse) issued Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter (NSAL) 94-001, which notified the licensee of a deficiency in the basis of the TS 3/4.7.1.1, which allows the plant to operate at reduced power levels with a specified number of MSSVs inoperable. Westinghouse determined that the maximum allowable power range neutron flux high setpoints given in TS Table 3.7-1 may not be low enough to prevent a secondary side overpressurization during a loss of load/turbine trip. In NSAL 94-001, Westinghouse reported their determination that the maximum allowable initial power level is not a linear function of available MSSV relief capacity. It was further determined that the current TS provisions for reduced reactor power levels with inoperable MSSVs may not preclude the secondary side pressure from exceeding 110 percent of its design value during a loss of main feedwater transient, particularly at lower power levels. The licensee proposed to amend this section of the TS as recommended by Westinghouse to specify the correct maximum allowable reactor thermal power operation with inoperable MSSVs.

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2.0 DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION

There are 20 MSSVs on each unit or 5 for each SG. The MSSVs provide emergency pressure relief for the SGs following an imbalance between the reactor power and turbine load. The MSSVs are designed to prevent steam pressure from exceeding 1210 psia, or 110 percent of the 1085 psig SG design pressure. The MSSVs have a rated capacity of 105 percent of the design steam flow at an accumulation pressure not exceeding 1210 psia.

With a reduced number of operable MSSVs, TS 3.7.1.1, Action a., allows the plant to operate at a reduced power level as determined by TS Table 3.7-1. This reduction in the allowed power level is dependent upon the number of inoperable MSSVs, and is based on the reduced heat removal capacity.

The events that challenge the relieving capacity of the MSSVs are those characterized as decreased heat removal events, of which loss-of-load/turbine trip (LOL/TT) is the limiting anticipated operational occurrence and may result in overpressurization of the main steam system when operating in accordance with TS 3.7.1.1. This event is analyzed in Chapter 15.2.7 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

Westinghouse states in NSAL 94-001, that at lower initial power levels a reactor trip may not be actuated early enough in the transient. An overtemperature ΔT trip is not generated since the core thermal margins are increased at lower power levels. A high pressurizer pressure trip is not generated if the primary pressure control system functions normally. The reactor eventually trips on low steam generator water level, but this may not occur before steam pressure exceeds 110 percent of the design value if one or more MSSVs are inoperable in accordance with the current TS. This may occur due to the longer time in which primary heat is transferred to the secondary side before the trip.

Westinghouse recommended reducing the maximum power level (heat input from the primary system) allowed for operation with inoperable MSSVs below the heat removing capability of the operable MSSVs. This will prevent exceeding 110 percent of the design pressure of the secondary system.

Using RETRAN-02 and the Westinghouse algorithm provided in NSAL 94-001, the licensee calculated reduced power levels for TS Table 3.7-1. The new PR neutron flux high setpoints of 53 percent and 35 percent rated thermal power (RTP) (without instrument and channel uncertainties), corresponding to 2 and 3 MSSVs unavailable per SG, respectively.

The MSSVs are assumed to have two active and one passive failure modes. The active failures are spurious opening and failure to close once opened. The passive failure mode is failure to open on demand. At Diablo Canyon, the passive failure is not postulated to occur for the first 24 hours following an accident. Therefore, when developing the algorithm and determining the required reduction in power level, Westinghouse does not assume that an MSSV fails to open on demand after the PR neutron flux high trip setpoint is reduced.

The original algorithm was based on a linear function which did not bound the actual power versus steam flow curve at all points. The revised algorithm bounds the curve at all points and results in conservative PR neutron flux high trip setpoints. The revised Westinghouse algorithm calculated a maximum allowable PR neutron flux setpoint of 89 percent RTP (without instrument and channel uncertainties) when all MSSVs are available. To resolve this issue, PG&E performed an overpressure protection analysis using RETRAN-02.

The limiting FSAR Condition II accident for overpressure concerns is a LOL/TT. This event was reanalyzed using RETRAN-02 for 1 MSSV inoperable per SG. The analysis indicated that the remaining 4 operable MSSVs per SG are sufficient to protect the SG and main steam system from overpressurization. Therefore, there is no need to reduce the maximum allowable power for one inoperable MSSV per SG. However, the licensee proposed to maintain the current maximum allowable PR neutron flux high trip setpoint of 87 percent RTP for one inoperable MSSV per SG. The 13 percent RTP conservatism envelopes instrument and channel uncertainties, which are estimated to be 6 percent in Westinghouse WCAP -11082, Revision 5, "Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection Systems, Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2, 24 Month Fuel Cycle Evaluation."

The licensee recalculated the maximum PR neutron flux high trip setpoints for 2 and 3 inoperable MSSVs based on the revised algorithm. Incorporating the instrument and channel inaccuracy of 6 percent RTP, the maximum allowable PR neutron flux high trip setpoints would be reduced to 47 percent RTP and 29 percent RTP for 2 and 3 inoperable MSSVs per SG, respectively.

The staff has reviewed the TS changes and finds that the new setpoints for the neutron flux high reactor trip setpoints are lower, more conservative, and provide a greater margin of safety than the current setpoints and are therefore acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the California State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments change a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (63 FR 19975). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: S. Bloom

Date: May 28, 1998