

March 1, 1996

Mr. Gregory M. Rueger
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
NPG - Mail Code A10D
P. O. Box 770000
San Francisco, California 94177

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS FOR DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT,
UNIT NO. 1 (TAC NO. M94379) AND UNIT NO. 2 (TAC NO. M94380)

Dear Mr. Rueger:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 110 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-80 and Amendment No. 109 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-82 for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated December 27, 1995.

These amendments would revise the combined Technical Specifications (TS) 3/4.6.1.1, Containment Integrity; 3/4.6.1.2, Containment Leakage; 3/4.6.1.3, Containment Air Locks; 3/4.6.1.6, Containment Structural Integrity; 3/4.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves; their associated Bases; and adds Specification 6.8.4 j., Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program to implement the performance based leakage rate testing program as permitted by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. These changes will support the implementation of the performance based testing of Option B to Appendix J, for Type A, B, and C containment leakage rate testing and the appropriate rescheduling of testing.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By
Steven D. Bloom, Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-2
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-275
and 50-323

- Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 110 to DPR-80
 2. Amendment No. 109 to DPR-82
 3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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WBateman	HWong, RIV WCFO
KPerkins, WCFO	CMH2 (SE)
SBloom	EPeyton
CBerlinger	JDyer, RIV

DOCUMENT NAME: DC94379.AMD *See Previous Concurrence Sheet

OFC	PDIV-2/LA	PDIV-2/PM	NRR:SCSB*	OGC*
NAME	EPeyton	SBloom:ye	CBerlinger	CMarco
DATE	2/21/96	2/21/96	2/1/96	2/1/96

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Mr. Gregory M. Rueger

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March 1, 1996

cc w/encls:

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-275

DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 110
License No. DPR-80

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Pacific Gas and Electric Company (the licensee) dated December 27, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-80 is hereby amended to read as follows:


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(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 110, are hereby incorporated in the license. Pacific Gas and Electric Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Steven D. Bloom, Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-2
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 1, 1996



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-323

DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 109
License No. DPR-82


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Pacific Gas and Electric Company (the licensee) dated December 27, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-82 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 109, are hereby incorporated in the license. Pacific Gas and Electric Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Steven D. Bloom, Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-2
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 1, 1996

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENT NO. 110 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-80

AND AMENDMENT NO. 109 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-82

DOCKET NOS. 50-275 AND 50-323

Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE

3/4 6-1
3/4 6-2
3/4 6-3
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3/4 6-6
3/4 6-9
3/4 6-16
B 3/4 6-1
6-15c

INSERT

3/4 6-1
3/4 6-2
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6-15c

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.1 CONTAINMENT

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

Without CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations* not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions, except for valves that are open under administrative control as permitted by Specification 3.6.3.
- b. By verifying that each containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.

*Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment and are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceeding 1.0 L_a, within 1 hour initiate action to be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Restore the overall integrated leakage rate to less than or equal to 0.75 L_a, and the combined leakage rate for all penetrations subject to Type B and C tests to less than or equal to 0.60 L_a prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200°F.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.2 The containment leakage rates shall be demonstrated at the test schedule and shall be determined in conformance with the criteria specified in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.3 Each containment air lock shall be OPERABLE with both doors closed except when the air lock is being used for normal transit entry and exit through the containment, then at least one air lock door shall be closed.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

- a. With one containment air lock door inoperable:
 1. Maintain at least the OPERABLE air lock door closed and either restore the inoperable air lock door to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or lock the OPERABLE air lock door closed,
 2. Operation may then continue until performance of the next required overall air lock leakage test provided that the OPERABLE air lock door is verified to be locked closed at least once per 31 days,
 3. Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours, and
 4. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
- b. With the containment air lock inoperable, except as the result of an inoperable air lock door, maintain at least one air lock door closed, restore the inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.3 Each containment air lock shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. By verifying leakage rates in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
- b. At least once per 6 months by verifying that only one door in each air lock can be opened at a time.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.6 The structural integrity of the containment shall be maintained at a level consistent with the acceptance criteria in Specification 4.6.1.6.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the structural integrity of the containment not conforming to the above requirements, restore the structural integrity to within the limits within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.6.1 Containment Surfaces The structural integrity of the exposed accessible interior and exterior surfaces of the containment, including the liner plate, shall be determined during shutdown by a visual inspection of these surfaces. This inspection shall be performed in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program to verify no apparent changes in appearance or other abnormal degradation.

4.6.1.6.2 Reports Any abnormal degradation of the containment structure detected during the above required inspections shall be reported to the Commission in a Special Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 15 days. This report shall include a description of the condition of the concrete, the inspection procedure, the tolerances on cracking, and the corrective actions taken.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.7 One purge supply line and/or one purge exhaust line of the Containment Purge System may be open or the vacuum/pressure relief line may be open. The vacuum/pressure relief line may be open provided the vacuum/pressure relief isolation valves are blocked to prevent opening beyond 50° (90° is fully open). Operation with any two of these three lines open is permitted. Operation with the purge supply and/or exhaust isolation valves open or with the vacuum/pressure relief isolation valves open up to 50° shall be limited to less than or equal to 200 hours during a calendar year.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With a containment purge supply and/or exhaust isolation valve open or the vacuum/pressure relief isolation valves open up to 50° for more than 200 hours during a calendar year or the Containment Purge System open and the vacuum/pressure relief lines open, or with the vacuum/pressure relief isolation valves open beyond 50°, close the open isolation valve(s) or isolate the penetration(s) within 1 hour; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.7.1 The position of the containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves and the vacuum/pressure relief isolation valves shall be determined closed at least once per 31 days.

4.6.1.7.2 The cumulative time that the purge supply and/or exhaust isolation valves or the vacuum/pressure relief isolation valves have been open during a calendar year shall be determined at least once per 7 days.

4.6.1.7.3 The vacuum/pressure relief isolation valves shall be verified to be blocked to prevent opening beyond 50° at least once per 18 months.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.3 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the isolation valve(s) inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and:

- a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or
- b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or
- c. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange; or
- d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

*Locked or sealed closed valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.3.1 Each containment isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of a cycling test, and verification of isolation time.

4.6.3.2 Each containment isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by:

- a. Verifying that on a Phase "A" Isolation test signal, each Phase "A" isolation valve actuates to its isolation position;
- b. Verifying that on a Phase "B" Isolation test signal, each Phase "B" isolation valve actuates to its isolation position; and
- c. Verifying that on a Containment Ventilation Isolation test signal, each containment ventilation isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each testable power-operated or automatic containment isolation valve shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.6.3.4 Each containment ventilation isolation valve, except the air sample supply and return valves, shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 24 hours after each closing of the valve, except when the valve is being used for multiple cycling, then at least once per 72 hours by verifying leakage rates in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.6.1 CONTAINMENT

3/4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the safety analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation, will limit the SITE BOUNDARY radiation doses to within the dose guideline values of 10 CFR Part 100 during accident conditions.

3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

The limitations on containment leakage rates specified in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program ensure that the total containment leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the safety analyses at the peak accident pressure, P_a . As an added conservatism, the measured overall integrated leakage rate is further limited to less than or equal to $0.75 L_a$ during performance of the periodic test to account for possible degradation of the containment leakage barriers between leakage tests.

The surveillance testing for measuring leakage rates as specified in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.163 dated September 1995, and the requirements of Option B of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix J.

3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

The limitations on closure and leak rate for the containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and containment leak rate. Surveillance testing of the air lock seals provide assurance that the overall air lock leakage will not become excessive due to seal damage during the intervals between air lock leakage tests.

3/4.6.1.4 INTERNAL PRESSURE

The limitations on containment internal pressure ensure that: (1) the containment structure is prevented from exceeding its design negative pressure differential with respect to the outside atmosphere of 3.5 psig, and (2) the containment peak pressure does not exceed the design pressure of 47 psig during LOCA conditions.

The maximum peak pressure expected to be obtained from a LOCA event is less than 47 psig, which is the maximum design pressure of containment. This includes the limit of 1.2 psig for initial positive containment pressure. The total pressure is less than design pressure and is consistent with the safety analyses.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.6.1.5 AIR TEMPERATURE

The limitations on containment average air temperature ensure that the overall containment average air temperature does not exceed the initial temperature condition assumed in the safety analysis for a LOCA.

3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to ensure that the containment will withstand the maximum pressure in the event of a LOCA. The visual examination of the concrete, liner, and the Type A leakage test are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

Use of the containment purge lines is restricted to two of the three following lines: (1) a supply line, (2) an exhaust line of the purge system, and (3) the vacuum/pressure relief line to ensure that the SITE BOUNDARY dose guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident during containment purging operations. The vacuum/pressure relief valves must be blocked to open no more than 50° because these valves have not yet been qualified to close under accident conditions.

Operation will be limited to 200 hours during a calendar year. The 200-hour limit shall not become effective until after initial criticality. The total time the Containment Purge (vent) System isolation valves may be open during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 in a calendar year is a function of anticipated need and operating experience.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

PROCEDURES AND PROGRAMS (Continued)

- 6) Limitations on the operability and use of the liquid and gaseous effluent treatment systems: to ensure that the appropriate portions of these systems are used to reduce releases of radioactivity when the projected doses in a 31-day period would exceed 2 percent of the guidelines for the annual dose or dose commitment conforming to Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50,
 - 7) Limitations on the dose rate resulting from radioactive material released in gaseous effluents from the site to areas at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY shall be limited to the following:
 - a. For noble gases: Less than or equal to a dose rate of 500 mrem/yr to the whole body and less than or equal to a dose rate of 3000 mrem/yr to the skin, and
 - b. For Iodine-131, for Iodine-133, for tritium, and for all radionuclides in particulate form with half-lives greater than 8 days: Less than or equal to a dose rate of 1500 mrem/yr to any organ.
 - 8) Limitations on the annual and quarterly air doses resulting from noble gases released in gaseous effluents from each unit to areas beyond the SITE BOUNDARY conforming to Appendix I to 10 CFR part 50,
 - 9) Limitations on the annual and quarterly doses to MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC from Iodine-131, Iodine-133, tritium, and all radionuclides in particulate form with half-lives greater than 8 days in gaseous effluents released from each unit to areas beyond the SITE BOUNDARY conforming to Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50, and
 - 10) Limitations on the annual dose or dose commitment to any MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC due to releases of radioactivity and to radiation from uranium fuel cycle sources conforming to 40 CFR Part 190.
- h. Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program

A program shall be provided to monitor the radiation and radionuclides in the environs of the plant. The program shall provide (1) representative measurements of radioactivity in the highest potential exposure pathways, and (2) verification of the accuracy of the effluent monitoring program and modeling of environmental exposure pathways. The program shall (1) be contained in the RMCP, (2) conform to the guidance of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50, and (3) include the following:

- 1) Monitoring, sampling, analysis, and reporting of radiation and radionuclides in the environment in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ERMP,

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

PROCEDURES AND PROGRAMS (Continued)

h. Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program

- 2) A Land Use Census to ensure that changes in the use of areas at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY are identified and that modifications to the monitoring program are made if required by the results of this census, and
- 3) Participation in a Interlaboratory Comparison Program to ensure that independent checks on the precision and accuracy of the measurements of radioactive materials in the environmental sample matrices are performed as part of the quality assurance program for environmental monitoring.

i. Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Inspection

Inspect each reactor coolant pump flywheel in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Position c.4.b of Regulatory Guide 1.14, Revision 1, August 1975.

j. Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program

A program shall be established to implement the leakage rate testing of the containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions. This program shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program, dated September 1995".

The peak calculated containment internal pressure for the design basis loss of coolant accident, P_a , is 47 psig.

The maximum allowable containment leakage rate, L_a , at P_a , shall be 0.10% of containment air weight per day.

Leakage rate acceptance criteria are:

- a. Containment overall leakage rate acceptance criterion is $\leq 1.0 L_a$. During the first unit startup following testing in accordance with this program, the leakage rate acceptance criteria are $\leq 0.60 L_a$ for the Type B and Type C tests and $\leq 0.75 L_a$ for Type A tests;
- b. Air lock testing acceptance criteria are:
 - 1) Overall air lock leakage rate is $\leq 0.05 L_a$ when tested at $\geq P_a$.
 - 2) For each door, leakage rate is $\leq 0.01 L_a$ when pressurized to ≥ 10 psig.

The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 do not apply to the test frequencies specified in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

The provisions of Specification 4.0.3 are applicable to the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 110 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-80
AND AMENDMENT NO. 109 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-82
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2
DOCKET NOS. 50-275 AND 50-323

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated December 27, 1995, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (or the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (Appendix A to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-80 and DPR-82) for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2. The proposed changes would revise the Technical Specifications to reflect the approval for the licensee to use 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 containment leakage rate test program.

2.0 BACKGROUND

Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J provides assurance that the primary containment, including those systems and components which penetrate the primary containment, do not exceed the allowable leakage rate values specified in the Technical Specifications and Bases. The allowable leakage rate is determined so that the leakage assumed in the safety analyses is not exceeded.

On February 4, 1992, the NRC published a notice in the Federal Register (57 FR 4166) discussing a planned initiative to begin eliminating requirements marginal to safety which impose a significant regulatory burden. Appendix J, "Primary Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors" to 10 CFR Part 50, was considered for this initiative and the staff undertook a study of possible changes to this regulation. The study examined the previous performance history of domestic containments and examined the effect on risk of a revision to the requirements of Appendix J. The results of this study are reported in NUREG-1493, "Performance-Based Leak-Test Program".

Based on the results of this study, the staff developed a performance based approach to containment leakage rate testing. On September 12, 1995, the NRC approved issuance of this revision to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, which was subsequently published in the Federal Register on September 26, 1995, and became effective on October 26, 1995. The revision added Option B "Performance-Based Requirements" to Appendix J to allow licensees to voluntarily replace the prescriptive testing requirements of Appendix J with testing requirements based on both overall and individual component leakage rate performance.

Regulatory Guide 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak Test Program," was developed as a method acceptable to the staff for implementing Option B. This Regulatory Guide states that the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) document NEI 94-01, "Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J" provides methods acceptable to the staff for complying with Option B with four exceptions, which are described therein.

Option B requires that Regulatory Guide 1.163 or another implementation document used by a licensee to develop a performance based leakage rate testing program must be included, by general reference, in the plant technical specifications. The licensee has referenced Regulatory Guide 1.163 in the Diablo Canyon combined technical specifications.

Regulatory Guide 1.163 specifies an extension in Type A test frequency to at least one test in 10 years based upon two consecutive successful tests. Type B tests may be extended up to a maximum of 10 years based upon completion of two consecutive successful tests and Type C tests may be extended up to 5 years based on two consecutive successful tests.

By letter dated October 20, 1995, NEI proposed technical specifications for implementing Option B. After some discussion, the staff and NEI agreed on a set of model technical specifications which were transmitted to NEI in a letter dated November 2, 1995. These technical specifications are to serve as a model for licensees to develop plant specific technical specifications in preparing amendment requests to implement Option B.

For a licensee to determine the performance of each component factors that are indicative of or affect performance such as an administrative leakage limit must be established. The administrative limit is selected to be indicative of the potential onset of component degradation. Although these limits are subject to NRC inspection to ensure that they are selected in a reasonable manner, they are not technical specifications requirements. Failure to meet an administrative limit requires the licensee to return to the minimum value of the test interval.

Option B requires that the licensee maintain records to show that the criteria for Type A, B and C tests have been met. In addition, the licensee must maintain comparisons of the performance of the overall containment system and the individual components to show that the test intervals are adequate. These records are subject to NRC inspection.

3.0 EVALUATION

The licensee's December 27, 1995, letter to the NRC proposes to establish a "Primary Containment Leakage Rate Program" and proposes to add this program to the technical specifications. The program references Regulatory Guide 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak Test Program" which specifies methods acceptable to the staff for complying with Option B. This requires a change to existing Technical Specifications 3.6.1.2, 3.6.1.3, 4.6.1.1, 4.6.1.2, 4.6.1.3, 4.6.1.6.1 and 4.6.3.4 and the addition of the program to section 6.8.4.j of the technical specifications. The changes to the existing TS add

references to the Containment Leak Test Program, delete criteria no longer applicable with option B, and delete specific criteria for surveillance and frequency that are to be controlled by the TS containing the program.

Option B permits a licensee to choose Type A; or Type B and C; or Type A, B and C; testing to be done on a performance basis. The licensee has elected to perform Type A, B and C testing on a performance basis.

The staff finds that the technical specifications changes proposed by the licensee meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B and, are consistent with the model technical specifications included in the staff's November 2, 1995, letter to NEI and are therefore acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the California State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (61 FR 3502). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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