July 6, 1998

Mr. Gregory M. Rueger, Senior Vice President
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Nuclear Power Generation N9B
P.O. Box 770000
San Francisco, California 94177

SUBJECT: DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES CHANGE (TAC NOS. MA1932 AND MA1933)

Dear Mr. Rueger:

The staff has incorporated the revision of the technical specification Bases provided by your letter of May 1, 1998, into the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 combined Technical Specifications.

The staff has reviewed the changes to identify existing requirements for operability of the auxiliary saltwater system pump room drain check valve and find the revisions to the associated technical specification Bases to be acceptable. The overleaf page is provided to maintain document completeness.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By

Steven D. Bloom, Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-2
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-275
and 50-323

Enclosure: Bases Page

cc w/encl: See next page

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3/4.7.1.7 MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATING, BYPASS AND ISOLATION VALVES (Continued)

or feedwater line rupture, thereby limiting the Reactor Coolant System cooldown and limiting the total energy release to the containment; or (2) a feedwater system malfunction, thereby limiting Reactor Coolant System cooldown.

The analysis of excessive RCS heat removal due to a feedwater system malfunction assumes that a control system malfunction or operator error causes a MFRV and associated bypass valve to open fully, resulting in a step increase in feedwater flow to one steam generator. The analysis assumes a feedwater isolation signal is generated by a high-high steam generator level. Feedwater isolation is assumed to occur as a result of the MFRV and associated bypass valve closing as a result of the feedwater isolation signal.

Rupture of a steam line is analyzed to calculate the response of the reactor core and to determine the resulting mass and energy releases. Two separate analyses are performed since conservative assumptions for the core response analysis are different than the conservative assumptions for the mass and energy release analysis. The core response analysis credits feedwater isolation as a result of the safety injection signal which results in a feedwater isolation signal. Feedwater isolation is assumed to occur as a result of closure of all MFRVs and MFRV bypass valves.

The mass and energy release analysis consists of several cases. The analysis assumes feedwater isolation occurs as a result of the safety injection signal which results in a feedwater isolation signal. Some cases are analyzed that assume a MFRV fails and feedwater isolation occurs as a result of closure of the MFIV. For cases with other single failure assumptions, feedwater isolation is assumed to occur as a result of closure of all MFRVs and MFRV bypass valves.

The core response and mass and energy releases that would result from a rupture of a main feedwater line are bounded by the analyses of the rupture of a main steam line.

The OPERABILITY of the MFIVs, MFRVs, and MFRV bypass valves within the closure time of the surveillance requirements is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses. When these valves are closed, they are performing their safety function.

The APPLICABILITY of this specification is MODES 1, 2, and 3. The basis for this is that in MODES 1 and 2 there is significant energy and in MODE 3 there may be significant energy in the Steam Generators. With significant energy in the Steam Generators the valves are needed for isolation of the Steam Generators in the event of a secondary system pipe rupture.

The ACTION statement requires that an inoperable valve either be restored to an OPERABLE condition or closed within 4 hours. Closing the valve fulfills the safety function of feedwater isolation so the ACTION Statement can be

3/4.7.1.7 MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATING, BYPASS AND ISOLATION VALVES (Continued)

exited. If a MFRV or a MFRV bypass valve is inoperable, another option is available to isolate the inoperable valve with at least one closed valve within 4 hours. This option is not available for the MFIVs since the MFIVs are in the Class I feedwater piping and there are no other valves, other than check valves, in the Class I piping that could be closed to isolate the Class I portion of the feedwater line.

3/4.7.3 VITAL COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Vital Component Cooling Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.7.4 AUXILIARY SALTWATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Auxiliary Saltwater System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

Each auxiliary saltwater (ASW) pump room drain check valve is required to be OPERABLE for the associated ASW train to be OPERABLE. Both check valves are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that the ASW system can perform its required function if a design flood event occurred. In the event of a single failure, at least one ASW train will remain OPERABLE so that the plant can be shut down following the design flood event.

3/4.7.5 CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Control Room Ventilation System ensures that: (1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system, and (2) the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions. The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body, or its equivalent. This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A, 10 CFR Part 50. Operation of the system with the heaters operating to maintain low humidity using automatic control for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. ANSI N510-1980 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing, except laboratory testing of charcoal shall be performed in accordance with ASTM D3803-1989.