



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
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August 26, 2002

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**SUBJECT: DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT - ERRATA TO NRC INTEGRATED
INSPECTION REPORT 50-275/02-06; 50-323/02-06**

On August 15, 2002, NRC Inspection Report 50-275/02-06; 50-323/02-06 was mailed to you. Subsequently, we learned of an error in the report on page 2 of the Summary of Findings. The original text stated that there were two green findings, whereas only one such finding existed. Enclosed is a corrected page for the Summary of Findings. We regret any inconvenience that this may have caused you.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Charles S. Marschall, Chief
Engineering and Maintenance Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

Dockets: 50-275; 50-323
Licenses: DPR-80; DPR-82

Enclosure: As stated

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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000275; -323/02-06; Pacific Gas and Electric. Co.; 06/24-07/11/2002; Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2; safety system design and performance capability.

The inspections were conducted by six regional inspectors and one contractor. The inspectors identified one green finding that did not involve a violation of NRC regulations. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined by using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process (SDP)." Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply are indicated by "No Color" or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html>.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

- Green. The plant electrical distribution consisted of a design where the three redundant 4160 V safety buses and a non-safety bus were supplied from a common transformer winding during both normal and emergency operation. The 4160 V buses were interconnected by conductors so that a voltage disturbance on any part of the system would affect the entire system. The system had a high resistance grounding design to limit the magnitude of ground faults and to enable continued operation of a faulted load. The grounding resistor admits sufficient fault current to prevent severe over-voltages that could occur. However, if the grounding resistor developed an open circuit, the entire system would be susceptible to over-voltage. The licensee was periodically checking the continuity, but not the actual resistance of the grounding resistors and, thus, assumptions in the design were not being verified. The licensee issued Action Request A0561002 to evaluate the preventive maintenance program of the high resistance grounding program.

This issue did not involve a violation of NRC requirements, but was considered to be a finding because it revealed a vulnerability in the licensee's design and maintenance that could result in a safety problem. However, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because there was no evidence that the grounding resistor had ever been degraded and that the probability of a grounding resistor failure in combination with a sparking ground fault was very small (50-275; -323/0206-01) (Section 1R215.b).