

January 31, 1994

Mr. Gregory M. Rueger
Nuclear Power Generation, B14A
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
77 Beale Street, Room 1451
P.O. Box 770000
San Francisco, California 94177

Dear Mr. Rueger:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS FOR DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT,
UNIT NO. 1 (TAC NO. M87045) AND UNIT NO. 2 (TAC NO. M87046)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 87 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-80 and Amendment No. 86 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-82 for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated July 6, 1993, as supplemented December 29, 1993.

These amendments revise TS 3/4.3.2, "Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation," to relax the slave relay test frequency for certain slave relays from quarterly to once per 18 months during refueling or extended cold shutdowns. The affected slave relays cause isolation of the charging and letdown portions of the chemical and volume control system, and actuate charging pump suction valves associated with volume control tank and refueling water storage tank isolation. In addition, these amendments delete the list of effective TS pages.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Sheri R. Peterson, Project Manager
Project Directorate V
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 87 to DPR-80
2. Amendment No. 86 to DPR-82
3. Safety Evaluation

NRC FILE CENTER COPY

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Docket File
DHagan, 3206
JRoe
CGrimes, 11E22
Region V (8)
KPerkins, RV

NRC & Local PDRs
EBarnhill
GHill (4), P1-37
OC/LFDCB, 4503
ACRS (10), P-315
PDV Reading File

EAdensam
OPA, 2G5
TQuay
OGC, 15B18
SPeterson

SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE*

OFFICE	PDV/LA	PDV/INTERN	PDV/PM	OGC	/HICB	PDV/D
NAME	EBarnhill	AWilford	SPeterson	RBachman	JWermeil	TQuay
DATE	9/10/93*	9/10/93*	9/15/93*	9/30/93*	9/29/93*	1/14/93

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FOI
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Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Diablo Canyon

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-275

DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 87
License No. DPR-80


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Pacific Gas & Electric Company (the licensee) dated July 6, 1993, as supplemented December 29, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-80 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 87, are hereby incorporated in the license. Pacific Gas & Electric Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.

3. This license amendment is effective for cycle 7 and after.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Theodore R. Quay, Director
Project Directorate V
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: January 31, 1994



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-323

DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No.86
License No. DPR-82


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Pacific Gas & Electric Company (the licensee) dated July 6, 1993, as supplemented December 29, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-82 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 86 , are hereby incorporated in the license. Pacific Gas & Electric Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.

3. This license amendment is effective for Cycle 7 and after.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Theodore R. Quay, Director
Project Directorate V
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: January 31, 1994

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENT NO. 87 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-80

AND AMENDMENT NO. 86 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-82

DOCKET NOS. 50-275 AND 50-323

Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change. Overleaf pages are also included, as appropriate.

REMOVE

Page 1 of 6
Page 2 of 6
Page 3 of 6
Page 4 of 6
Page 5 of 6
Page 6 of 6
3/4 3-32
3/4 3-33
3/4 3-35

INSERT

-
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-
3/4 3-32
3/4 3-33
3/4 3-35

TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

- (1) Diesel generator starting delay not included because offsite power available.
- (2) Notation deleted.
- (3) Diesel generator starting and loading delays included.
- (4) Diesel generator starting delay not included because offsite power is available. Response time limit includes opening of valves to establish SI path and attainment of discharge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps (where applicable). Sequential transfer of charging pump suction from the VCT to the RWST (RWST valves open, then VCT valves close) is included.
- (5) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included. Offsite power is not available. Response time limit includes opening of valves to establish SI path and attainment of discharge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps. Sequential transfer of charging pump suction from the VCT to the RWST (RWST valves open, then VCT valves close) is included.
- (6) The maximum response time of 48.5 seconds is the time from when the containment pressure exceeds the High-High Setpoint until the spray pump is started and the discharge valve travels to the fully open position assuming off-site power is not available. The time of 48.5 seconds includes the 28-second maximum delay related to ESF loading sequence. Spray riser piping fill time is not included. The 80-second maximum spray delay time does not include the time from LOCA start to "P" signal.
- (7) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included. Sequential transfer of charging pump suction from the VCT to the RWST (RWST valves open, then VCT valves close) is not included. Response time limit includes opening of valves to establish SI flow path and attainment of discharge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps, SI, and RHR pumps (where applicable).
- (8) Does not include Trip Time Delays. Response times include the transmitters, Eagle-21 Process Protection cabinets, Solid State Protection System cabinets and actuation devices only. This reflects the response times necessary for THERMAL POWER in excess of 50% RTP.

TABLE 4.3-2

**ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS**

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALI- BRATION</u>	<u>CHANNEL OPERA- TIONAL TEST</u>	<u>TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERA- TIONAL TEST</u>	<u>ACTUATION LOGIC TEST</u>	<u>MASTER RELAY TEST</u>	<u>SLAVE RELAY TEST</u>	<u>MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED</u>
1. Safety Injection, (Reactor Trip Feedwater Isolation, Start Diesel Generators, Containment Fan Cooler Units, and Component Cooling Water)								
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q(4)	1, 2, 3, 4
c. Containment Pressure-High	S	R	Q	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
d. Pressurizer Pressure-Low	S	R	Q	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
e. DELETED								
f. Steam Line Pressure-Low	S	R	Q	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
2. Containment Spray								
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q	1, 2, 3, 4
c. Containment Pressure-High-High	S	R	Q	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

**ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS**

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALI- BRATION</u>	<u>CHANNEL OPERA- TIONAL TEST</u>	<u>TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERA- TIONAL TEST</u>	<u>ACTUATION LOGIC TEST</u>	<u>MASTER RELAY TEST</u>	<u>SLAVE RELAY TEST</u>	<u>MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED</u>
3. Containment Isolation								
a. Phase "A" Isolation								
1) Manual	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
2) Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q(4)	1, 2, 3, 4
3) Safety Injection								
b. Phase "B" Isolation								
					See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.			
1) Manual	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
2) Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q	1, 2, 3, 4
3) Containment Pressure-High-High	S	R	Q	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
c. Containment Ventilation Isolation								
1) Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q	1, 2, 3, 4
2) Plant Vent Noble Gas Activity-High (RM-14A and 14B) ^(a)	S	R	M(2)	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
3) Safety Injection								
4) Containment Ventilation Exhaust Radiation-High (RM-44A and 44B) ^(b)								
					See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.			
	S	R	M(2)	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4

(a) The requirements for Plant Vent Noble Gas Activity-High (RM-14A and 14B) are not applicable following installation of RM-44A and 44B.

(b) The requirements for Containment Ventilation Exhaust Radiation-High (RM-44A and 44B) are applicable following installation of RM-44A and 44B.

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALI- BRATION	CHANNEL OPERA- TIONAL TEST	TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERA- TIONAL TEST	ACTUATION LOGIC TEST	MASTER RELAY TEST	SLAVE RELAY TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
4. Steam Line Isolation								
a. Manual	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q	1, 2, 3
c. Containment Pressure-High-High	S	R	Q	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
d. Steam Line Pressure-Low	S	R	Q	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
e. Negative Steam Line Pressure Rate-High	S	R	Q	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	3(3)
5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation								
a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q	1, 2
b. Steam Generator Water Level-High-High	S	R	Q	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
6. Auxiliary Feedwater								
a. Manual	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q	1, 2, 3
c. Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low								
1) Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low	S	R	Q	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
2) RCS Loop ΔT	N.A.	R	Q	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

**ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS**

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALI- BRATION</u>	<u>CHANNEL OPERA- TIONAL TEST</u>	<u>TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERA- TIONAL TEST</u>	<u>ACTUATION LOGIC TEST</u>	<u>MASTER RELAY TEST</u>	<u>SLAVE RELAY TEST</u>	<u>MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED</u>
6. Auxiliary Feedwater (Continued)								
d. Undervoltage - RCP	N.A.	R	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1
e. Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.							
7. Loss of Power								
a. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Level 1	N.A.	R	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
b. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Level 2	N.A.	R	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
8. Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Interlocks								
a. Pressurizer Pressure, P-11	N.A.	R	Q	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
b. Deleted								
c. Reactor Trip, P-4	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3

TABLE NOTATIONS

- (1) Each train shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.
- (2) For the Plant Vent Activity-High monitor only, a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be performed at least once every 31 days.
- (3) Trip function automatically blocked above P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure Interlock) setpoint and is automatically blocked below P-11 when Safety Injection on Steam Line Pressure-Low is not blocked.
- (4) For Units 1 and 2, Cycle 7 and after: Except relays K612A, K614B, K615A, and K615B, which shall be tested, at a minimum, once per 18 months during refueling and during each Cold Shutdown unless they have been tested within the previous 92 days.

INSTRUMENTATION

3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

RADIATION MONITORING FOR PLANT OPERATIONS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.1 The radiation monitoring instrumentation channels for plant operations shown in Table 3.3-6 shall be OPERABLE with their Alarm/Trip Setpoints within the specified limits.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-6.

ACTION:

- a. With a radiation monitoring channel Alarm/Trip Setpoint for plant operations exceeding the value shown in Table 3.3-6, adjust the Setpoint to within the limit within 4 hours or declare the channel inoperable.
- b. With one or more radiation monitoring channels for plant operations inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-6.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.1 Each radiation monitoring instrumentation channel for plant operations shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-3.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 87 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-80
AND AMENDMENT NO. 86 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-82
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2
DOCKET NOS. 50-275 AND 50-323

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter of July 6, 1993, as supplemented December 29, 1993, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (or the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Technical Specifications (TS). The proposed amendments would revise TS 3/4.3.2, "Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation," Table 4.3-2, "Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements," to add Table Notation 3. The notation would relax the slave relay test frequency from quarterly to at least once per 18 months during refueling or extended cold shutdowns. The affected slave relays cause isolation of the charging and letdown portions of the chemical and volume control system (CVCS), and actuate charging pump suction valves associated with volume control tank (VCT) and refueling water storage tank (RWST) isolation.

The supplemental letter dated December 29, 1993, provided clarifying information and revised the effective date of the amendments and did not affect the initial Federal Register Notice and proposed no significant hazards consideration.

2.0 EVALUATION

The solid state protection system (SSPS) is designed to actuate plant Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) components when it receives the appropriate input signals. The SSPS consists of two redundant, electrically independent trains. Non-redundant ESF components can be actuated by either SSPS train. Redundant ESF components are arranged so that one SSPS train actuates one of the components, and the other SSPS train actuates the other component.

ESF components are actuated by slave relays in the SSPS. The slave relays are actuated by master relays, which are actuated by the logic circuits of the SSPS. Each slave relay actuates multiple ESF components. Actuation of four particular slave relays currently results in the actuation of ten valves in the charging and letdown portions of the CVCS, as well as additional ESF components. The ten CVCS valves are actuated by either a safety injection

(SI) signal or a Phase A containment isolation signal. A Phase A containment isolation signal is generated as a subset of any SI signal. The ten CVCS valves of concern perform the following functions:

- CVCS-8149A/B/C: These three valves are parallel letdown orifice isolation valves. Letdown flow rate during normal operation is regulated by opening one or two of these valves. These valves serve as containment isolation valves and will close upon receipt of a Phase A containment isolation signal. They will also automatically isolate a high energy line break outside containment upstream of the letdown heat exchanger due to high heat exchanger room temperature.
- CVCS-8152: This valve is the letdown isolation valve outside containment. It is located downstream of the letdown orifice stop valves. This valve closes upon receipt of a Phase A containment isolation signal.
- CVCS-LCV-112B/C: These two valves are VCT isolation valves in series. The valves are located between the VCT and the suction of the charging pumps. The valves close on an SI signal to isolate the VCT from the suction of the charging pumps when the suction of the charging pumps is automatically realigned to the RWST.
- SI-8805A/B: These two valves are parallel valves that open on an SI signal. They provide a flowpath from the RWST to the suction of the charging pumps for emergency core cooling.
- CVCS-8107/8108: These two valves are isolation valves in series that isolate the normal charging line upon receipt of an SI signal to assure that all water discharged from the RWST via the charging pumps is directed through the emergency core cooling flow path.

To support a relaxation in the test frequency, the licensee will implement a design change to move the 10 CVCS valves to spare slave relays. Phase A slave relay K612A will actuate valves CVCS-8149A/B/C. Phase A slave relay K614B will actuate CVCS-8152. SI slave relay K615A will actuate CVCS-8107, CVCS-LCV-112B, and SI-8805A. SI slave relay K615B will actuate CVCS-8108, CVCS-LCV-112C, and SI-8805B.

The licensee tests the SSPS as part of the ESF Actuation System (ESFAS) surveillance. The actuation logic test verifies the reactor trip and ESF logic signal output given simulated input signals to the SSPS. A master relay test energizes each master relay and verifies the continuity of the circuit through each slave relay coil associated with the particular master relay. Slave relay coil continuity is demonstrated by a reduced voltage test signal, which is sufficient to light a test lamp, but not sufficient to cause actuation of the slave relay. Finally, a slave relay test is performed that

actuates each slave relay. Each slave relay is actuated via a test switch that applies normal voltage to the associated slave relay. The slave relay is then verified operable through a continuity check or actuation of associated testable components.

The proposed changes to the TS would require that Phase A slave relays K612A and K614B, and SI slave relays K615A and K615B, which will actuate only the subject 10 CVCS valves, be tested once every 18 months during refueling or an extended cold shutdown. The master relay test, which verifies the continuity of the slave relay coil, will remain at its current monthly staggered test frequency.

The licensee claims that test data and operating experience have shown that the charging and letdown lines experience thermal transients as a result of the containment isolation test. In order to avoid these transients, the licensee proposes that the quarterly tests be revised so that the valves are not stroked.

In addition, the licensee has experienced reactivity and hydraulic transients during quarterly SSPS testing of the ten CVCS valves. In order to test the charging pump suction realignment from the VCT to the RWST, normal letdown is isolated and charging flow is reduced to the minimum flow required to maintain a stable supply to the RCP seals. Excess letdown is placed in service to control pressurizer level. The slave relay is actuated, causing the suction valve realignment. Even though the operators are instructed to immediately restore the valves to normal configuration upon completion of the test, a significant amount of RWST water with a nominal boron concentration of 2300 parts per million (PPM) is injected into the RCS through the RCP seals. The resulting transients in average reactor coolant temperature are common, particularly at the end of core life. Additionally, restoration of normal letdown following testing causes hydraulic transients, including actuation of letdown line relief valves.

The slave relays proposed for the relaxed test frequency are identical in design to other slave relays in the SSPS. Since only 6.25 percent of the total number of slave relays are proposed for the relaxed test frequency, there is a high level of confidence that if a failure due to a generic design defect or application were present, it would be discovered during the quarterly tests of the other slave relays. Additionally, the continuity of the slave relay coils will continue to be verified monthly during SSPS master relay testing.

The licensee also proposes to delete the list of effective TS pages added to the license. The list of effective TS pages has proven to be an unnecessary administrative burden that adds no value to the TS. This change is an administrative change and, therefore, is acceptable.

Based on the above, the staff finds the proposed TS amendment acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the California State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments change a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (58 FR 43929). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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