

August 10, 1992

Docket Nos. 50-275
and 50-323

Mr. Gregory M. Rueger
Nuclear Power Generation, B14A
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
77 Beale Street, Room 1451
P.O. Box 770000
San Francisco, California 94177

Dear Mr. Rueger:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS FOR DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT,
UNIT NO. 1 (TAC NO. M82649) AND UNIT NO. 2 (TAC NO. M82648)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 73 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-80 and Amendment No. 72 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-82 for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated December 26, 1991 (Reference LAR 91-08).

These amendments revise the combined Technical Specifications (TS) for the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP), Unit Nos. 1 and 2, to relocate TS Table 3.6-1, "Containment Isolation Valves," to the DCPP procedures, which are subject to the change control provisions in the Administrative Controls Section of the TS. This license amendment is being made in accordance with the guidance provided in Generic Letter (GL) 91-08.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

Harry Rood, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate V
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 73 to DPR-80
2. Amendment No. 72 to DPR-82
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Harry Rood".

Harry Rood, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate V
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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See next page

Mr. Gregory M. Rueger
Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Diablo Canyon

cc:

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-275

DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 73
License No. DPR-80

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Pacific Gas & Electric Company (the licensee) dated December 26, 1991, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-80 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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PDR

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 73, are hereby incorporated in the license. Pacific Gas & Electric Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, and shall be fully implemented no later than 30 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Theodore R. Quay, Director
Project Directorate V
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: August 10, 1992



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-323

DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 72
License No. DPR-82


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Pacific Gas & Electric Company (the licensee) dated December 26, 1991, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-82 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 72 , are hereby incorporated in the license. Pacific Gas & Electric Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, and shall be fully implemented no later than 30 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Theodore R. Quay, Director
Project Directorate V
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: August 10, 1992

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENT NO. 73 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-80

AND AMENDMENT NO. 72 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-82

DOCKET NOS. 50-275 AND 50-323

Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change. Overleaf pages are also included, as appropriate.

REMOVE

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1-2
3/4 6-1
3/4 6-15
3/4 6-16
3/4 6-17
3/4 6-18
3/4 6-19
3/4 6-20
3/4 6-21
3/4 6-22
3/4 6-23
3/4 6-24
3/4 6-25
3/4 6-26
3/4 6-27
B 3/4 6-4

INSERT

ix
1-2
3/4 6-1
3/4 6-15
3/4 6-16
3/4 6-17
3/4 6-18

B 3/4 6-4

INDEX

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>SECTION</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
<u>3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS</u>	
3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS.....	3/4 5-1
3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T_{avg} GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 350°F...	3/4 5-3
3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T_{avg} LESS THAN 350°F.....	3/4 5-7
3/4.5.4 DELETED	
3/4.5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK.....	3/4 5-11
<u>3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS</u>	
3/4.6.1 CONTAINMENT	
Containment Integrity.....	3/4 6-1
Containment Leakage.....	3/4 6-2
Containment Air Locks.....	3/4 6-5
Internal Pressure.....	3/4 6-7
Air Temperature.....	3/4 6-8
Containment Structural Integrity.....	3/4 6-9
Containment Ventilation System.....	3/4 6-10
3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS	
Containment Spray System.....	3/4 6-11
Spray Additive System.....	3/4 6-12
Containment Cooling System.....	3/4 6-13
3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES.....	3/4 6-15
3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL	
Hydrogen Analyzers/Monitors.....	3/4 6-17
Electric Hydrogen Recombiners.....	3/4 6-18

INDEXLIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS</u>	
<u>3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE</u>	
Safety Valves.....	3/4 7-1
TABLE 3.7-1 MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER RANGE NEUTRON FLUX HIGH SETPOINT WITH INOPERABLE STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES.....	3/4 7-2
TABLE 3.7-2 STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES PER LOOP.....	3/4 7-3
Auxiliary Feedwater System.....	3/4 7-4
Condensate Storage Tank.....	3/4 7-6
Specific Activity.....	3/4 7-7
TABLE 4.7-1 SECONDARY COOLANT SYSTEM SPECIFIC ACTIVITY SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS PROGRAM.....	3/4 7-8
Main Steam Line Isolation Valves.....	3/4 7-9
Steam Generator 10% Atmospheric Dump Valves.....	3/4 7-9a
3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITATION.....	3/4 7-10
3/4.7.3 VITAL COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM.....	3/4 7-11
3/4.7.4 AUXILIARY SALTWATER SYSTEM.....	3/4 7-12
3/4.7.5 CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM.....	3/4 7-13
3/4.7.6 AUXILIARY BUILDING SAFEGUARDS AIR FILTRATION SYSTEM.....	3/4 7-16
3/4.7.7 SNUBBERS.....	3/4 7-18
FIGURE 4.7-1 SAMPLE PLAN 2) FOR SNUBBER FUNCTIONAL TEST.....	3/4 7-23
TABLE 4.7-2 SNUBBER VISUAL INSPECTION INTERVAL.....	3/4 7-23
3/4.7.8 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION.....	3/4 7-24
<u>3/4.7.9 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS</u>	
Fire Suppression Water System.....	3/4 7-26
Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems.....	3/4 7-28
CO ₂ System.....	3/4 7-30
TABLE 3.7-3 CO ₂ SYSTEM.....	3/4 7-31
Halon System.....	3/4 7-32
Fire Hose Stations.....	3/4 7-33

1.0 DEFINITIONS

The defined terms of this section appear in capitalized type and are applicable throughout these Technical Specifications.

ACTION

1.1 ACTION shall be that part of a Specification which prescribes remedial measures required under designated conditions.

ACTUATION LOGIC TEST

1.2 An ACTUATION LOGIC TEST shall be the application of various simulated input combinations in conjunction with each possible interlock logic state and verification of the required logic output. The ACTUATION LOGIC TEST shall include a continuity check, as a minimum, of output devices.

ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST

1.3 An ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall be the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY of alarm, interlock and/or trip functions. The ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall include adjustments, as necessary, of the alarm, interlock and/or trip setpoints such that the setpoints are within the required range and accuracy.

AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE

1.4 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE shall be the difference in normalized flux signals between the top and bottom halves of a two section excore neutron detector.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION

1.5 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel such that it responds within the required range and accuracy to known values of input. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel including the sensors and alarm, interlock and/or trip functions and may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel steps such that the entire channel is calibrated.

CHANNEL CHECK

1.6 A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel behavior during operation by observation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and/or status with other indications and/or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.

DEFINITIONS

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST

1.7 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be:

- a. Analog channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions, or
- b. Bistable channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the sensor to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

1.8 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

- a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
 1. Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system, or
 2. Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except for valves that are open under administrative control as permitted by Specification 3.6.3.
- b. All equipment hatches are closed and sealed,
- c. Each air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3,
- d. The containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2, and
- e. The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, bellows or O-rings) is OPERABLE.

CONTROLLED LEAKAGE

1.9 CONTROLLED LEAKAGE shall be that seal water flow supplied to the reactor coolant pump seals.

CORE ALTERATIONS

1.10 CORE ALTERATIONS shall be the movement or manipulation of any fuel, sources, or reactivity control components within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe conservative position.

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.1 CONTAINMENT

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

Without CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations* not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions, except for valves that are open under administrative control as permitted by Specification 3.6.3.
- b. By verifying that each containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3; and
- c. After each closing of each penetration subject to Type B testing, except the containment air locks, if opened following a Type A or B test, by leak rate testing the seal with gas at greater than or equal to P_a , 47 psig, and verifying that when the measured leakage rate for these seals is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.2d. for all other Type B and C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less than or equal to $0.60 L_a$.

*Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment and are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to:

- a. An overall integrated leakage rate of:
 - 1) Less than or equal to L_a , 0.10% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at P_a , 47 psig, or, as applicable,
 - 2) Less than or equal to L_t , 0.0472% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at a reduced pressure of P_t , 25 psig.
- b. A combined leakage rate of less than or equal to $0.60 L_a$ for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests when pressurized to P_a .

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With either the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceeding $0.75 L_a$ or $0.75 L_t$, as applicable, or the measured combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests exceeding $0.60 L_a$, restore the overall integrated leakage rate to less than or equal to $0.75 L_a$ or less than or equal to $0.75 L_t$, as applicable, and the combined leakage rate for all penetrations subject to Type B and C tests to less than or equal to $0.60 L_a$ prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200°F.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.3 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the isolation valve(s) inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and:

- a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or
- b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or
- c. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange; or
- d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

*Locked or sealed closed valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.3.1 Each containment isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of a cycling test, and verification of isolation time.

4.6.3.2 Each containment isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by:

- a. Verifying that on a Phase "A" Isolation test signal, each Phase "A" isolation valve actuates to its isolation position;
- b. Verifying that on a Phase "B" Isolation test signal, each Phase "B" isolation valve actuates to its isolation position; and
- c. Verifying that on a Containment Ventilation Isolation test signal, each containment ventilation isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each testable power-operated or automatic containment isolation valve shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.6.3.4 Each containment ventilation isolation valve, except the air sample supply and return valves, shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 24 hours after each closing of the valve, except when the valve is being used for multiple cycling, then at least once per 72 hours, by verifying that when the measured leakage rate is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.2d. for all other Type B and C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less than or equal to $0.6 L_a$.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL

HYDROGEN ANALYZERS/MONITORS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.4.1 Two independent containment hydrogen analyzers/monitors shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

- a. With one hydrogen analyzer/monitor inoperable, restore the inoperable analyzer/monitor to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.
- b. With both hydrogen analyzer/monitors inoperable, restore at least one analyzer/monitor to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.4.1 Each hydrogen analyzer/monitor shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days by performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION using a zero and span gas.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

ELECTRIC HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.4.2 Two independent Hydrogen Recombiner Systems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

With one Hydrogen Recombiner System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.4.2 Each Hydrogen Recombiner System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 6 months by verifying, during a Recombiner System functional test, that the minimum heater sheath temperature increases to greater than or equal to 700°F within 90 minutes. Upon reaching 700°F, increase the power setting to maximum power for 2 minutes and verify that the power meter reads greater than or equal to 60 kW; and
- b. At least once per 18 months by:
 - 1) Performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of all recombinder instrumentation and control circuits,
 - 2) Verifying through a visual examination that there is no evidence of abnormal conditions within the recombinder enclosure (i.e., loose wiring or structural connections, deposits of foreign materials, etc.), and
 - 3) Verifying the integrity of all heater electrical circuits by performing a resistance to ground test following the above required functional test. The resistance to ground for any heater phase shall be greater than or equal to 10,000 ohms.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS

3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Containment Spray System ensures that containment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

The Containment Spray System and the Containment Cooling System are redundant to each other in providing post accident cooling of the containment atmosphere. However, the Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere and therefore the time requirements for restoring an inoperable Spray System to OPERABLE status have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment.

3/4.6.2.2 SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Spray Additive System ensures that sufficient NaOH is added to the containment spray in the event of a LOCA. The limits on NaOH minimum volume and concentration ensure a pH value of between 8.0 and 9.5 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics. These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the safety analyses.

3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the containment fan cooler units ensures that: (1) the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, (2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the containment spray systems during post LOCA conditions, and (3) adequate mixing of the containment atmosphere following a LOCA to prevent localized accumulations of hydrogen from exceeding the flammable limit.

The Containment Cooling System and the Containment Spray System are redundant to each other in providing post accident cooling of the containment atmosphere. As a result of this redundancy in cooling capability, the allowable out of service time requirements for the Containment Cooling System have been appropriately adjusted. However, the allowable out of service time requirements for the Containment Spray System have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment since the Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment. Containment isolation within the time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

A list of the TS controlled containment isolation valves is maintained in the Diablo Canyon plant procedures. The administration of the list shall be conducted in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50 and the provisions in the Administrative Controls Section of the TS. Records of the changes to the valve list are maintained and an annual report is made which includes a brief description of changes and a summary of the safety evaluation of each in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.

The opening of locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves on an intermittent basis under administrative control includes the following considerations:

- 1). stationing a person, who is in constant communication with the control room, at the valve controls,
- 2). instructing this person to close these valves in an accident situation, and
- 3). assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment.

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL

The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with: (1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water, and (3) corrosion of metals within containment. These Hydrogen Control Systems are functionally consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a Loss-of-Coolant Accident," Revision 2, November 1978.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 73 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-80
AND AMENDMENT NO. 72 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-82
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2
DOCKET NOS. 50-275 AND 50-323

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated December 26, 1991 (Reference LAR 91-08), Pacific Gas and Electric Company (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Technical Specifications (TS). The proposed amendments would relocate the list of containment isolation valves from the TS to plant procedures. The modified TS would state the requirements for these valves in general terms, in accordance with the guidance of Generic Letter 91-08, dated May 1, 1991. The NRC staff has reviewed the proposed changes and finds them acceptable. The staff's evaluation is given below.

2.0 EVALUATION

The licensee has proposed the removal of Table 3.6-1, "Containment Isolation Valves," that is referenced in TS 3/4.6.3. With the removal of this table, the licensee has proposed to include the following statement in the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) under TS 3.6.3:

Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.

In addition, the licensee has revised the definition of Containment Integrity in TS 1.8, TS 4.6.1.1, the action requirements under TS 3.6.3, and TS 4.6.3.1 through 4.6.3.3, to remove all references to Table 3.6-1. The definition of Containment Integrity and TS 4.6.1.1 refer to TS 3.6.3 for an exception that is now covered by a footnote to the LCO rather than by the table removed from the TS. With the removal of the reference to Table 3.6-1, the licensee has proposed to state the exception as:

. . . , except for valves that are open under administrative control as permitted by Specification 3.6.3.

The surveillance requirements of TS 4.6.3.1 through 4.6.3.3 have been revised to state "Each containment isolation valve shall . . ." or ". . . each testable power operated or automatic containment isolation valve shall . . ." rather than stating the requirements in relation to the valves specified in Table 3.6-1.

With the removal of the table of containment isolation valves, the operability requirements have been stated in general terms to apply to all containment isolation valves including those that are locked or sealed closed. These valves are locked or sealed closed consistent with the regulatory requirements for manually operated valves that are used as containment isolation valves. Because opening these valves would be contrary to the operability requirements of these valves, the following footnote to the LCO has been proposed:

Locked or sealed closed valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

This change is consistent with the guidance in Generic Letter 91-08 and is, therefore, acceptable.

In addition, the licensee proposed to change the Bases Section of TS 3.6.3 to define the appropriate considerations for opening locked or sealed closed valves on an intermittent basis.

This change is consistent with the guidance of GL 91-08 and is, therefore, acceptable. Finally, the licensee has confirmed that component lists removed from the TS have been updated to identify all components for which the TS requirements apply and are located in controlled plant procedures.

On the basis of its review of this matter, the staff finds that the proposed changes to the TS for Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, are primarily administrative changes that do not alter the requirements set forth in the existing TS. However, the applicability of the operability requirements will extend to all containment isolation valves as noted in this evaluation. Overall, these changes will allow the licensee to make corrections and updates to the list of components for which these TS requirements apply, under the provisions that control changes to plant procedures as specified in the Administrative Controls Section of the TS. Therefore, the staff finds that the proposed TS changes are acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the California State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments change a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (57 FR 13135).

Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: C. Regan

Date: August 10, 1992