Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.
Millstone Power Station
Rope Ferry Road
Waterford, CT 06385

Dominion

AUG 12 2002

Docket Nos. 50-245
50-336
50-423
B18725

RE: 10 CFR 50, Appendix E
10 CFR 50.47(b)(5)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3
Revised Emergency Plan Procedures

The purpose of this letter is to inform the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that the following Emergency Plan Procedures have been implemented:

- MP-26-EPI-FAP01-001, "Control Room - Director of Station Emergency Operations (CR-DSEO)," Major Revision 1, Minor Revision 2, transmitted via Attachment 1;
- MP-26-EPI-FAP02-001, "Assistant Director Technical Support (ADTS)," Major Revision 1, Minor Revision 1, transmitted via Attachment 2;
- MP-26-EPI-FAP02-011, "Manager of Security (MOS)," Major Revision 0, Minor Revision 1, transmitted via Attachment 3;
- MP-26-EPI-FAP03, "Operational Support Center Activation and Operation," Major Revision 1, transmitted via Attachment 4;
- MP-26-EPI-FAP03-001, "Manager of Operational Support Center (MOSC) – TSC/OSC," Major Revision 1, transmitted via Attachment 5;
- MP-26-EPI-FAP03-002, "Assistant Radiation Protection Supervisor (ARPS)," Major Revision 1, transmitted via Attachment 6;
- MP-26-EPI-FAP03-003, "Manager Operational Support Center – OSC AA," Major Revision 1, transmitted via Attachment 7;
- MP-26-EPI-FAP03-004, "CBETS Operator," Major Revision 1, transmitted via Attachment 8;
- MP-26-EPI-FAP06-001, "Millstone Unit 1 Emergency Action Levels," Major Revision 1, transmitted via Attachment 9;
- MP-26-EPI-FAP06-002, "Millstone Unit 2 Emergency Action Levels," Major Revision 1, Minor Revison 2, transmitted via Attachment 10;
- MP-26-EPI-FAP06-003, "Millstone Unit 3 Emergency Action Levels," Major Revision 1, Minor Revison 2, transmitted via Attachment 11;

A045

- MP-26-EPI-FAP07, "Notifications and Communications," Major Revision 2, Minor Revision 1, transmitted via Attachment 12; and
- MP-26-EPI-FAP08, "Evacuation and Assembly," Major Revision 0, Minor Revision 5, transmitted via Attachment 13.

There are no regulatory commitments contained within this letter.

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please contact Mr. David A. Smith at (860) 437-5840.

Very truly yours,

DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.

J. Alan Price
Site Vice President - Millstone

Attachments (13)

cc: H. J. Miller, Region I Administrator (2 copies)
R. J. Conte, Chief, Operational Safety Branch, Region I

cc: w/o attachment

J. B. Hickman, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 1
J. R. Wray, NRC Inspector, Region I, Millstone Unit No. 1
R. B. Ennis, NRC Senior Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 2
NRC Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit No. 2
V. Nerses, NRC Senior Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 3
NRC Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit No. 3

Docket Nos. 50-245
50-336
50-423
B18725

Attachment 1

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3

Emergency Procedures Implementing (EPI) Functional Administrative Procedure (FAP) MP-26-EPI-FAP01-001, "Control Room - Director of Station Emergency Operations (CR-DSEO)," Major Revision 1, Minor Revision 2

02/13/02
Approval Date

02/14/02
Effective Date

Document Action Request

SPG # 020418-085110

A

Initiated By: Patti Luckey Date: 04/18/2002 Department EP Ext 2490

Document No MP-26-EPI-FAP01-001 Rev. No: 001 Minor Rev No. 02

Title: **Control Room Director of Station Emergency Operations**

B

For New Documents only → ☐ QA RI Title

Reason for Request (attach commitments, CR's, AR's, OEs etc)

AR 02001547-17

Select One if performing a change *See MP-05-DC-SAP01 sect 2.3 to determine type of change* Continued ☒

C

☐ Intent Change (SQR Independent, RCD, ENV Screen Required ☐ Edit Corr ☑ Non-Intent Change
(Other reviews may be required See MP-05-DC-FAP 01 1 Att 3 (Only Tech IR, SQR IR and Env signature Required)

D

Editorial Correction Approval

/
Plant Mngt Staff Member - Approval / Date

TPC Interim Approval

/
(1) Plant Mngt Staff Member Print/Sign/Date

/
(2) SM/SRO/CFH on Unit Print/Sign/Date

E

Procedure Request/Feedback Disposition

Priority: ☑ Perform Now ☐ Perform Later - See Comments

Activity: ☐ Revision ☑ Minor Revision (See DC-GDL01 for guidance) ☐ Cleanup Rev ☐ Biennial Review ☐ Cancellation ☐ Supercedure
☐ TPC ☐ OTC ☐ Place in Void

F

Reviews continued ☐	Print	Sign	Date	SQR Qualified Yes	SQR Qualified No	SQR Qualified Dept.	✓ If Comments
				☐	☐		☐
				☐	☐		☐
				☐	☐		☐
50.54(q) ☑	Kathleen Burgess	Kathleen Burgess	6/11/02	☑	☐	EPD	☐
Env Screen ☑	Kathleen Burgess	Kathleen Burgess	6/6/02	☑	☐	EPD	☐
Licensing Basis ☐							☐
Tech Independent ☑	John Fuller	John Fuller	5/8/02			NTD	☑

G

An NRRL update was required ? ☑ Yes

H

1. ☑ SQR Program Final Review and Appproval

Approval ☑ Disapproval ☐

16/14/02
SQR Qualified Independent Reviewer / Date

Department Head/Responsible Individual

6/24/02
Approval Date

☐ SORC Final review and Approval ☒ RI/DH (Ref Mans GDL's Handbook)

DH/RI Sign

Meeting No

SORC Signature DH / RI Signature

Approval Date

I

Effective Date 7/19/02

(PDR)
6/24/02
Approval Date

7/19/02
Effective Date

Control Room - Director of Station Emergency Operations (CR-DSEO)

NOTE

If the applicable unit is Unit 1, the Unit 2 SM/CFH will classify the event and become the CR-DSEO. ①

Section A: Emergency Response Immediate Actions

1. Evaluate the conditions using EPI-FAP06, "Classification and PARs."
   - ☐ Notify the SDO and Shift Technician (ST) to report to the control room and provide a briefing.
   - ☐ Review the EAL tables:
     - For Unit 1, EPI-FAP06-001
     - For Unit 2, EPI-FAP06-002
     - For Unit 3, EPI-FAP06-003
   - ☐ Evaluate the status of the fission product barriers.
2. Declare the emergency.
   - ☐ Announce the emergency declaration level and time to the CR staff and assume the role of CR-DSEO.

NOTE

Offsite notification shall be accomplished within 15 minutes of an emergency event classification.

   - ☐ Direct the ST to initiate offsite notifications per EPI-FAP07, "Notifications and Communications."

3. Go To the applicable section and perform the immediate actions.
   - ☐ Unusual Event ..... Section B
   - ☐ Alert ..... Section C
   - ☐ Site Area Emergency ..... Section D
   - ☐ General Emergency ..... Section E

Section B: Unusual Event Immediate Actions

1. Notifications

- ☐ Notify the unaffected unit control room of the event.

NOTE

During a security event, it may **NOT** be advisable to sound an alarm or make a PA announcement.

- ☐ IF the event involves a situation where site personnel should be sheltered, Refer To EPI-FAP08, "Evacuation and Assembly," Sheltering, and perform actions.
  - ☐ WHEN appropriate, announce termination of sheltering.
- ☐ IF sheltering actions are not being conducted, perform the following:
  - ☐ Activate the outside speakers.
  - ☐ Review the wording for the station notification message and announce the following over the station PA system:

    Attention all personnel; attention all personnel. An Unusual Event has been declared at (*Unit #*) due to (*brief description of event*). All members of the SERO stand by for further instructions. All other personnel continue with your present duties.

  - ☐ Repeat the PA message.
- ☐ Log time of announcement on EPI-FAP15-012, "SERO Log Sheet."
- ☐ Review and approve the Incident Report Form (IRF) for transmittal.
- ☐ Refer To EPI-FAP15-001, "DSEO/ADTS Briefing Sheet," and complete.
- ☐ IF the emergency event occurs off-hours (6:00pm to 4:00am) or on weekends, direct SDO to voice-record EPI-FAP15-001 information and fax completed form to EOF and TSC.

Section B: Unusual Event Immediate Actions

2. NRC Notification

   - ☐ Direct the SDO to notify the NRC via the ENS.
   - ☐ Verify the ST or SDO has contacted the resident inspector.

3. Loss of Power

   - ☐ IF event is Loss of Off-Site Power (LOP), evaluate what loads are being carried and what loads are necessary.
   - ☐ Within 4 hours of the LOP, evaluate the need to order emergency diesel generator fuel to extend on-site capacity and direct on-shift person to order fuel, as required.

4. IF no upgrade to classification is warranted, Go To Section F, "Routine and Follow-up Actions."

Section C: Alert Immediate Actions

1. Notifications

- ☐ Notify the unaffected unit control room of the event.
- ☐ Request Security to restrict site access and notify Waterford Police and CT State Police to prepare for a precautionary dismissal, as appropriate.

NOTE

Hazardous conditions or Security-related events may impact the ability to move personnel. If these conditions exist, it may be better to shelter personnel onsite.

During a security event, it may NOT be advisable to sound an alarm or make a PA announcement.

- ☐ IF the event involves a situation where site personnel should be sheltered, Refer To EPI-FAP08, "Evacuation and Assembly," Sheltering, and perform actions.
  - ☐ WHEN appropriate, announce termination of sheltering.
  - ☐ WHEN appropriate, conduct full SERO activation and precautionary dismissal, as applicable.
- ☐ IF sheltering actions are not being conducted, perform the following:
  - ☐ Activate the outside speakers.
  - ☐ Review the wording for the station notification message and announce the following over the station PA system:

    Attention all personnel; attention all personnel. An Alert has been declared at (*Unit #*) due to (*brief description of event*).

  - ☐ IF the designated emergency response facilities are available, announce the following:

    All on-duty SERO members report to your designated emergency response facility. All off-duty SERO members report to your designated Assembly Area.

  - ☐ IF either the EOF OR the TSC is unavailable, announce the following:

    The (EOF) (TSC) is unavailable at this time. All on-duty SERO members who report to the (EOF) (TSC), report to your backup locations. All off-duty SERO members report to your backup Assembly Area.

Section C: Alert Immediate Actions

- ☐ Repeat the PA message(s).
- ☐ Log time of announcement on EPI-FAP15-012.
- ☐ Review and approve the Incident Report Form (IRF) for transmittal.
- ☐ Refer To EPI-FAP15-001, "DSEO/ADTS Briefing Sheet," and complete.
- ☐ IF the emergency event occurs off-hours (6:00pm to 4:00am) or on weekends, direct SDO to voice-record EPI-FAP15-001 information and fax completed form to EOF and TSC.

2. NRC Notification

- ☐ Direct the SDO to notify the NRC via the ENS.
- ☐ Verify the ST or SDO has contacted the resident inspector.

3. Precautionary Dismissal

CAUTION

Precautionary dismissal may **NOT** be desired during certain events (e.g., Security-related). These actions should be reviewed periodically and implemented as quickly as possible after the threat has been resolved.

- ☐ IF precautionary dismissal is not desired due to the nature of the event (e.g., Security-related, weather), consider postponing until threat has been resolved.
- ☐ IF no constraints exist, Refer To EPI-FAP08, "Evacuation and Assembly," and conduct a precautionary dismissal, as events warrant.

4. IF no upgrade to classification is warranted, Go To Section F, "Routine and Follow-up Actions."

(2)

Section D: Site Area Emergency Immediate Actions

1. Notifications

- ☐ Notify the unaffected unit control room of the event.
- ☐ Request Security to restrict site access.

NOTE

Hazardous conditions or Security-related events may impact the ability to move personnel. If these conditions exist, it may be better to shelter personnel onsite. (2)

During a security event, it may NOT be advisable to sound an alarm or make a PA announcement.

- ☐ IF the event involves a situation where site personnel should be sheltered, Refer To EPI-FAP08, "Evacuation and Assembly," Sheltering, and perform actions. (2)
  - ☐ WHEN appropriate, announce termination of sheltering.
  - ☐ WHEN appropriate, conduct full SERO activation and evacuation, as applicable.
- ☐ IF sheltering actions are not being conducted, perform the following:
  - ☐ Activate the outside speakers.

CAUTION

Implementation of station evacuation shall not be delayed unless constraints are in place (e.g., Security-related) and doing so creates a threat to personnel safety. (2)

- ☐ Review the wording for the station notification message and announce the following over the station PA system:

  Attention all personnel; attention all personnel. A Site Area Emergency has been declared at (*Unit #* ___) due to (*brief description of event* _____).

- ☐ IF the designated emergency response facilities are available, announce the following: (2)

  All on-duty SERO members report to your designated emergency response facility. All off-duty SERO members report to your designated Assembly Area.

Section D: Site Area Emergency Immediate Actions

- ☐ IF the EOF OR TSC is unavailable, announce the following over the station PA system:

  The (EOF)(TSC) is unavailable at this time. All on-duty SERO members who report to the (EOF)(TSC), report to your backup locations. All off-duty SERO members report to your backup Assembly Area. ②

- ☐ Repeat the PA message(s).

- ☐ Log time of announcement on EPI-FAP15-012.

- ☐ Review and approve the Incident Report Form (IRF) for transmittal.

CAUTION

Station evacuation may not be desired during certain events (e.g., Security-related).

- ☐ IF station evacuation could endanger plant personnel, consider the following: ②
  - Defer actions until the threat has been resolved.
  - WHEN threat has been resolved, perform evacuation and accountability as quickly as possible.
- ☐ Refer To EPI-FAP08, "Evacuation and Assembly," and conduct evacuation.
- ☐ Refer To EPI-FAP15-001, "DSEO/ADTS Briefing Sheet," and complete.
- ☐ IF the emergency event occurs off-hours (6:00pm to 4:00am) or on weekends direct SDO to voice-record EPI-FAP15-001 information and fax completed form to EOF and TSC.

2. NRC Notification
   - ☐ Direct the SDO to notify the NRC via the ENS.
   - ☐ Verify the ST or SDO has contacted the resident inspector.
3. IF no upgrade to classification is warranted, Go To Section F, "Routine and Follow-up Actions."

Section E: General Emergency Immediate Actions

1. Notifications

- ☐ Notify the unaffected unit control room of the event.
- ☐ Request Security to restrict site access.

NOTE

Hazardous conditions or Security-related events may impact the ability to move personnel. If these conditions exist, it may be better to shelter personnel onsite. ②

During a security event, it may **NOT** be advisable to sound an alarm or make a PA announcement.

- ☐ IF the event involves a situation where site personnel should be sheltered, Refer To EPI-FAP08, "Evacuation and Assembly," Sheltering, and perform actions.
  - ☐ WHEN appropriate, announce termination of sheltering. ②
  - ☐ WHEN appropriate, conduct full SERO activation and evacuation, as applicable.
- ☐ IF sheltering actions are not being conducted, perform the following:
  - ☐ Activate the outside speakers.

CAUTION

Implementation of station evacuation shall not be delayed unless constraints are in place (e.g., Security-related) and doing so creates a threat to personnel safety. ②

- ☐ Review the wording for the station notification message and announce the following over the station PA system:

  Attention all personnel; attention all personnel. A General Emergency has been declared at (*Unit #* ___) due to (*brief description of event* _____ _____).

- ☐ IF the designated emergency response facilities are available, announce the following: ②

  All on-duty SERO members report to your designated emergency response facility. All off-duty SERO members report to your designated Assembly Area.

Section E: General Emergency Immediate Actions

- ☐ IF the EOF OR TSC is unavailable, announce the following over the station PA system:

  The (EOF)(TSC) is unavailable at this time. All on-duty SERO members who report to the (EOF)(TSC), report to your backup locations. All off-duty SERO members report to your backup Assembly Area. (2)

- ☐ Repeat the PA message(s).

☐ Log time of announcement on EPI-FAP15-012.

☐ Review and approve the Incident Report Form (IRF) for transmittal.

NOTE

The State must be notified within 15 minutes after a decision is made to issue a PAR.

☐ Review and develop PARs in accordance with EPI-FAP06, "Classification and PARs."

☐ IF PARs are warranted, issue them in accordance with EPI-FAP06-005, "Control Room Protective Action Recommendations."

CAUTION

Station evacuation may not be desired during certain events (e.g., Security-related).

☐ IF station evacuation could endanger plant personnel, consider the following: (2)

- Defer actions until the threat has been resolved.
- WHEN threat has been resolved, perform evacuation and accountability as quickly as possible.

☐ Refer To EPI-FAP08, "Evacuation and Assembly," and conduct evacuation.

☐ Refer To EPI-FAP15-001, "DSEO/ADTS Briefing Sheet," and complete.

☐ IF the emergency event occurs off-hours (6:00pm to 4:00am) or on weekends, direct SDO to voice-record EPI-FAP15-001 information and fax completed form to EOF and TSC.

2. NRC Notification

☐ Direct the SDO to notify the NRC via the ENS.

☐ Verify the ST or SDO has contacted the resident inspector.

Section F: Routine and Follow-up Activities

NOTE

The initial stages of any emergency may require CR personnel to perform several required tasks. If necessary, the CR-DSEO has the authority to reassign tasks (other than classification, PARs, and emergency exposure dose extensions) to other available CR individuals.

- ☐ 1. Log all activities and decisions on EPI-FAP15-012, "SERO Log Sheet."
- ☐ 2. IF a release of radioactive material is in progress or is imminent, direct the Chemistry Technician to perform initial on-shift dose assessment.
- ☐ 3. IF any of the following was deferred, consider performing at this time: (2)
  - SERO activation and/or facility activation
  - Precautionary dismissal
  - Evacuation
  - Accountability
- ☐ 4. Continuously evaluate or direct the evaluation of the EAL tables and fission product barriers for changes in event status.
- ☐ 5. Ensure the NRC is notified within 60 minutes of any event classification and whenever significant changes in conditions occur during the emergency.
- ☐ 6. Ensure follow-up notifications are routinely provided to the State and local agencies as appropriate.
- ☐ 7. IF the status of the fission product barriers or offsite radiological or meteorological conditions change, perform the following:
  - Evaluate the impact on PARs per EPI-FAP06, "Classification and PARs."
  - Provide changes to PARs to the State, as appropriate (non-delegable).
- ☐ 8. IF necessary, authorize extended emergency exposure limits (dose > 5 Rem is expected) in accordance with EPI-FAP09-001, "Increased Radiation Exposure Authorization," and log any extensions on SERO Log Sheet (non-delegable).
- ☐ 9. IF suspension of safeguards and §50.54(x) action is invoked, ensure that the NRC is notified of the departure as soon as possible (but within one hour) using the ENS.
- ☐ 10. Direct the RMT #1 to perform control room and plant habitability surveys and sampling.

Section F: Routine and Follow-up Activities

- ☐ 11. IF necessary, issue KI tablets in accordance with EPI-FAP09-003, "KI Tablet Issue Authorization and Tracking Sheet," and log time of issue on SERO Log Sheet (non-delegable). ①
- ☐ 12. Conduct periodic briefings with the control room staff.
- ☐ 13. IF events have been controlled to the point where termination of the emergency can be considered, Refer To EPI-FAP06, "Classification and PARs," for guidance.

Section G: Transfer of Command and Control

NOTE

Activation of the EOF and TSC/OSC should occur within 60 minutes of SERO notification.

During certain events (e.g., Security-related, toxic gases) immediate SERO activation may be deferred because of the threat to plant personnel. This could prevent activation of facilities within 60 minutes. (2)

The control room may transfer certain response functions (such as team dispatch, notification, etc.) to TSC or EOF individuals before the facilities are declared activated, provided command and control is maintained by the CR-DSEO.

It is preferred that turnover with the ADTS and the on-call DSEO be conducted at the same time but events may occur which require separate turnovers to be completed.

☐ 1. IF precautionary dismissal, and/or evacuation and accountability have been deferred due to certain constraints (e.g., Security-related, weather), perform the following: (2)

- Discuss constraints with the EOF DSEO and the ADTS.
- Consider whether deferred actions can be performed.

☐ 2. Conduct turnover with the EOF DSEO and the ADTS.

NOTE

For a Unit 1 event, the Unit 2 CR-DSEO becomes the MCRO. (1)

☐ 3. Upon formal relief by the DSEO, record turnover date and time in the logbook.

☐ 4. Conduct a briefing with the EOF DSEO and ADTS using EPI-FAP15-001, "DSEO/ADTS Briefing Sheet."

☐ 5. Go To EPI-FAP01-002, "Manager of Control Room Operations."

Prepared by: _____ _____ _____

Signature Print Date

Docket Nos. 50-245
50-336
50-423
B18725

Attachment 2

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3

Emergency Procedures Implementing (EPI) Functional Administrative Procedure (FAP)
MP-26-EPI-FAP02-001, "Assistant Director Technical Support (ADTS)"
Major Revision 1, Minor Revision 1

2/13/02
Approval Date

2/14/02
Effective Date

Document Action Request

SPG# 020418-081916

Initiated By: Patti Luckey Date: 4/23/02 Department: EPD Ext.: 5474

Document No.: MP-26-EPI-FAP02-001 Rev. No.: ~~000~~ 001 Minor ~~02~~ 01

Title: Assistant Director Technical Support KMA 7-9-02

For New Documents only → ☐ QA RI Title

Reason for Request/Action (attach commitments, CRs, ARs, OEs etc)

AR 02001547-17

Continued ☐

Select one if performing a change *(See MP-05-DC-SAP01 sect 2 3 to determine type of change)*

☐ Intent Change *(Tech IR, SQR Independent, RCD, Env Screen Required)* Other reviews may be required See MP-05-DC-FAP 01 1 att 3	☐ Edit Corr.:	☒ Non-Intent Change *(Only Tech IR, SQR IR and Env signature Required)*

Editorial Correction Approval

Plant Mgmt Staff Member - Approval

TPC Interim Approval

(1) Plant Mgmt Staff Member Print/Sign/Date

(2) SM/SRO/CFH Print/Sign/Date

Procedure Request/Feedback Disposition

Priority: ☒ Perform Now ☐ Perform Later

Activity: ☐ Revision ☒ Minor Revision *See DC-GDL01 for guidance* ☐ Cleanup Rev ☐ Biennial Review ☐ Cancellation ☐ Supercedure

☐ TPC ☐ OTC ☐ Place in VOID

Reviews continued ☒		Print	Sign	Date	SQR Qualified Yes	SQR Qualified No	SQR Qualified Dept.	✓ If Comments
	☐				☐	☐		
50.54(q)	☒	Kathleen Burgess	Kathleen Burgess	6/11/02	☒	☐	EPD	
Environmental	☒	~~Mark White~~ Kathleen Burgess	Kathleen Burgess	6/6/02	☒	☐	EPD	
Licensing Basis	☐							
Tech Independent	☒	John Fuller		5/8/02			NTD	✓

An NRRL Update Required ☒ YES

1. ☒ SQR Program Final Review and Approval

Approval ☒ Disapproval ☐

6/14/02
SQR Qualified Independent Reviewer / Date

Dept Head / Responsible Individual

6/24/02
Approval Date

2 Final Review and Approval

☐ SORC ☐ RI/DH *(Ref Mans, GDLs, Handbooks)*

DH / RI Sign

Meeting No

SORC Signature

DH / RI Signature

Approval Date

Effective Date: 7/19/02

7/9/02 pm 6/24/02
Approval Date

7/9/02
Effective Date

Assistant Director Technical Support (ADTS)

This form provides guidance to the ADTS for emergency response actions during a declared emergency that activates the SERO.

Section A: TSC/OSC Activation/Initial Actions

NOTE

TSC/OSC activation is not required to provide immediate support to the control room.

- ☐ 1. Key into TSC/OSC.
- ☐ 2. Sign in on TSC/OSC Staffing Board.
- ☐ 3. Obtain a copy of the Incident Report Form (IRF) from the fax machine or Control Room.
- ☐ 4. Obtain additional information from the following, as necessary:
  - Voice mail box
  - Additional faxes
- ☐ 5. Initiate a log of significant events and communications on EPI-FAP15-012, "SERO Log Sheet," and log date and arrival time.
- ☐ 6. Check TSC/OSC and OSCAA SERO response status as follows:
  - Verify minimum facility staff is present.
  - IF minimum staffing is not present, determine the ability of the SERO to activate as is and proceed as appropriate (i.e., all functional areas staffed).
- ☐ 7. Contact CRDSEO and discuss any significant changes since event declaration and obtain status of onsite protective actions and emergency team deployment.
- ☐ 8. Refer To EPI-FAP15-001 "DSEO/ADTS Briefing Sheet" and obtain a briefing from the control room (CRDSEO or MCRO) and the DSEO in the EOF.
- ☐ 9. Formally relieve the CRDSEO of emergency team deployment and onsite protective action responsibilities and log the date and time of relief.
- ☐ 10. Declare the TSC/OSC and OSCAA activated and record activation time on the SERO Log Sheet.
- ☐ 11. Brief the TSC/OSC on plant status and control room priorities.

Section A: TSC/OSC Activation/Initial Actions

NOTE

The CR-DSEO may have chosen *not* to perform a precautionary dismissal or evacuation due to the nature of the event (e.g., Security related). These actions should be implemented as quickly as achievable when the threat has been resolved. ①

☐ 12. IF the precautionary dismissal or evacuation was not performed by the CRDSEO prior to turnover and no constraints exist, Direct CR to implement EPI-FAP08, "Evacuation and Assembly." ①

Section B: Routine Activities

☐ 1. Track the response of additional On-Call and Subject-to-Call SERO personnel and direct the MOR to contact personnel for unfilled positions.

☐ 2. Direct non-assigned TSC/OSC personnel to go to the OSC Assembly Area.

☐ 3. Establish TSC/OSC priorities and direct the initial response.

☐ 4. Notify the DSEO of any recommended changes in event classification or barrier status.

- IF conditions change, Refer To EPI-FAP06, "Classification and PARs," for the affected unit and immediately recommend classification changes to the DSEO, as appropriate.
- WHEN the DSEO escalates the event classification, inform personnel in the TSC/OSC and OSC Assembly Area.

NOTE

An evacuation and assembly may not be performed if doing so poses a threat to personnel safety. Sheltering may be the desired response. ①

☐ 5. IF Site Area Emergency or General Emergency is declared and no constraints exist, Direct Control Room to implement EPI-FAP08, "Evacuation and Assembly."

☐ 6. Update the DSEO on the status and priority of assessment and repair activities.

Section B: Routine Activities

☐ 7. Direct and approve on-site PPADs considering the following:

- IF time permits, discuss logistics for the on-site PPADs with the MTSC, MOSC, MOS, and MRCA.
- IF there is a potential for an airborne radiological release affecting the TSC/OSC, announce that there will be no eating or drinking until further habitability is verified within the facilities.
- IF there is a localized emergency (security, high radiation, fire), include its type and location in an announcement and instruct personnel to stand clear of the area.
- Inform the DSEO of any implemented on-site PPADs.

☐ 8. Refer To EPI-FAP02-012, "TSC/OSC Emergency Repair/Procedure Change/ Assessment Recommendations," and authorize departure from normal station operations and maintenance procedures.

☐ 9. Develop strategies with the MTSC to address the following:

- Prevention of severe core damage
- Increasing time to core uncovery
- Prevention of containment failure
- Reduction and/or termination of radiological releases to the environment

☐ 10. Notify the MCRO of the following:

- Procedure development for outside design basis operations
- TSC/OSC Priorities
- Core thermal hydraulic analysis and time to core uncovery
- Entry into Severe Accident Management Guidelines
- Projected plant system degradation and event conditions

☐ 11. Establish the following emergency assessment and repair actions:

- Repair/evaluation priorities
- Estimated repair times
- Need to authorize mission specific emergency exposure upgrades to 25 Rem TEDE
- Authorization for work assignments and reentry

☐ 12. Notify the DSEO of §50.54(x) use and of the requirement to notify the NRC of the departure as soon as possible.

Section B: Routine Activities

- ☐ 13. Provide the DSEO with current and projected analyses of plant conditions and status on a routine basis.
- ☐ 14. Verify the MOSC has requested Site Fire Protection initiate monitoring of CO_2 levels in the TSC/OSC.
- ☐ 15. Brief the NRC Site Team of actions taken and planned upon their arrival in the TSC/OSC.

Section C: Emergency Exposure Controls

- ☐ 1. IF notified by the MRCA that implementation of EPI-FAP09, "Radiation Exposure Controls," is needed for emergency exposure increases or issuing KI to on-site SERO emergency workers, perform the following:
  - Evaluate the emergency condition.
  - IF KI is warranted, inform the DSEO that KI will be issued to on-site SERO emergency workers.
  - IF exposure upgrades up to 25 Rem are required, inform DSEO of increase.
  - IF exposure upgrades greater than 25 Rem are required, obtain DSEO approval.
  - Refer To EPI-FAP09-003 and sign and date appropriate form, indicating approval.
- ☐ 2. Coordinate the release of contaminated person from site to a designated decontamination location.

Section D: Event Termination and Recovery Actions

- ☐ 1. Monitor affected unit conditions and recommend termination to Recovery actions to the DSEO when appropriate.
- ☐ 2. IF long term damage to the plant has not occurred, perform the following:
  - Brief TSC/OSC on plant conditions allowing termination.
  - Direct TSC/OSC staff to return facilities to pre-emergency state of readiness.
  - Record SERO termination in logbook.
- ☐ 3. IF long term damage to the plant has occurred and Recovery option is selected, perform the following:
  - Brief TSC/OSC on plant conditions and entry into Recovery.
  - Refer To and implement EPI-FAP14, "Recovery."
  - Record SERO termination in logbook.

Prepared By: _____ _____ _____

Signature Print Date

Docket Nos. 50-245
50-336
50-423
B18725

Attachment 3

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3

Emergency Procedures Implementing (EPI) Functional Administrative Procedure (FAP)
MP-26-EPI-FAP02-011, "Manager of Security (MOS)"
Major Revision 0, Minor Revision 1

2/13/02
Approval Date

2/14/02
Effective Date

Document Action Request

SPG# 020418-082948

Initiated By: Patti Luckey Date: 4/23/02 Department: EPD Ext.: 5474

Document No.: MP-26-EPI-FAP02-011 Rev. No.: 000 Minor 01

Title: Manager of Security

For New Documents only → ☐ QA ☐ RI Title

Reason for Request/Action (attach commitments, CRs, ARs, OEs etc)

AR 02001547-17

Continued ☐

Select one if performing a change *(See MP-05-DC-SAP01 sect 2.3 to determine type of change)*

☐ Intent Change *(Tech IR, SQR Independent, RCD, Env Screen Required)* Other reviews may be required. See MP-05-DC-FAP 01.1 att 3	☐ Edit Corr.:	☒ Non-Intent Change *(Only Tech IR, SQR IR and Env signature Required)*

Editorial Correction Approval	**TPC Interim Approval**
Plant Mgmt Staff Member - Approval	(1) Plant Mgmt Staff Member Print/Sign/Date (2) SM/SRO/CFH Print/Sign/Date

Procedure Request/Feedback Disposition

Priority: ☒ Perform Now ☐ Perform Later

Activity: ☐ Revision ☒ Minor Revision *See DC-GDL01 for guidance* ☐ Cleanup Rev ☐ Biennial Review ☐ Cancellation ☐ Supercedure

☐ TPC ☐ OTC ☐ Place in VOID

Reviews continued ☒	Print	Sign	Date	SQR Qualified Yes	SQR Qualified No	SQR Qualified Dept.	✓ If Comments
Tech Independent ☒	John Fuller		6/12/02	☒	☐	NTD	
50.54(q) ☒	Kathleen Burgess	Kathleen Burgess	6/11/02	☑	☐	EPD	
Environmental ☒	Kathleen Burgess	Kathleen Burgess	6/6/02	☑	☐	EPD	
Licensing Basis ☐							
Tech Independent ☒	Lora Griffes		6/19/02			SEC	

An NRRL Update Required ☒ YES

1. ☒ SQR Program Final Review and Approval

Approval ☑ Disapproval ☐

6/14/02
SQR Qualified Independent Reviewer / Date

Patti A Luckey
Dept Head / Responsible Individual

6/24/02
Approval Date

2 Final Review and Approval

☐ SORC ☐ RI/DH *(Ref Mans, GDLs, Handbooks)*

DH / RI Sign

Meeting No

SORC Signature

DH / RI Signature

Approval Date

Effective Date: 7/19/02

6/24/02
Approval Date

7/19/02
Effective Date

Manager of Security (MOS)

This form provides guidance to the Manager of Security for emergency response actions during an event that activates the SERO.

Section A: Initial Actions

- ☐ 1. Key into the TSC/OSC and sign in on TSC Staffing Board.
- ☐ 2. Notify ADTS of arrival in TSC/OSC and obtain a status briefing.
- ☐ 3. Initiate a log of significant events and communications on EPI-FAP15-012, "SERO Log Sheet," and log date and arrival time.
- ☐ 4. Verify access control of affected areas and buildings has been established, as appropriate.
- ☐ 5. Contact SSS and receive a turnover.
- ☐ 6. Conduct an operational check of security base station radio in TSC.
- ☐ 7. Contact the CR-DSEO and determine if Security assistance is required.

NOTE

The Shift Manager may choose not to perform a precautionary dismissal or evacuation due to the nature of the threat (e.g., Security-related). These actions shall be implemented as quickly as achievable given the nature of the threat. (1)

- ☐ 8. Provide support for precautionary dismissal or evacuation actions to the CR-DSEO/ADTS, as requested.
  - a. IF alternate routes are being used, provide instructions to the CR-DSEO/ADTS.
- ☐ 9. Refer To and implement SEP 5041, "Security During Emergencies."
- ☐ 10. IF applicable, Refer To SDI 612, "Security Reports," and determine whether any NRC reportable conditions exist.
- ☐ 11. Establish an open line of communication with CAS and notify of any requirements in SEP 5041, "Security During Emergencies."
- ☐ 12. Establish and maintain security posts as directed by the ADTS and consult with MRCA regarding radiological conditions that might impact security operations.

Section A: Initial Actions

☐ 13. Indicate locations of "staffed" security posts on Site Map.

☐ 14. Dispatch security personnel with vital area keys to the OSCAA to provide security support for emergency teams, as necessary.

NOTE

Suspension of safeguards measures should only be instituted when no other means of security compensatory measures are available.

☐ 15. IF suspension of safeguards measures becomes necessary, perform the following: ①

- Consult ADTS on suspending safeguards measures.
- IF suspension of safeguards measures is approved, notify CAS and request the MOC notify the NRC.

Section B: Recurring Actions

NOTE

The ADTS may order sheltering, local area evacuation, site evacuation, or other protective actions in accordance with EPI-FAP08, "Evacuation and Assembly." Advance notice to the security force should be provided. Evacuation may be deferred during certain situations (e.g., Security-related) until the threat is resolved; it should be performed as quickly as possible thereafter based on the nature of the threat. ①

A L A R A

Security posts may become classified as high radiation areas.

☐ 1. IF no constraints exist, Refer To EPI-FAP08, "Evacuation and Assembly," and perform Accountability when directed by the ADTS or upon the declaration of a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency. ①

☐ 2. Consult with MRCA for appropriate protective measures where security posts are located, if necessary.

☐ 3. Determine need to provide appropriate radiological protection equipment (such as, protective clothing, respirators, and radiological monitoring devices) to security personnel stationed in radiological hazard areas. ①

Section B: Recurring Actions

☐ 4. Refer To and implement SEP 5041, "Security During Emergencies," and perform the following:

- Evacuate security posts that may become uninhabitable due to the event.
- Update "staffed" status markings on Site Map as necessary.

NOTE

Personnel accountability results may be requested by the ADTS periodically during SERO activation.

☐ 5. Direct CAS to maintain accountability of personnel in the Protected Area while SERO is activated.

☐ 6. Maintain open lines of communication with CAS for updates on accountability.

☐ 7. IF the duration of the event continues into the next security shift, perform the following:

- Direct CAS to prepare a security personnel shift rotation schedule.
- Provide security personnel shift rotation schedule to the MOR.

☐ 8. IF necessary, implement shift rotation schedule.

☐ 9. Review emergency worker shift relief and resource plans with the MOR, MRCA, and ADTS considering the following:

- The need to initiate access control to the site, (e.g., the gate outside the EOF).
- Relocation of workers
- Transportation and staging of workers and materials on site

☐ 10. Consult with the MRCA and ADTS to determine safe areas and conditions by evaluating the threat of hazard levels and hazardous area access restrictions.

Section C: Precautionary Dismissal and Site Evacuation

NOTE

A precautionary dismissal of personnel is automatically conducted at the Alert classification level unless constraints are in place. An evacuation will be automatically initiated at a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency unless constraints are in place. A Security-related event may dictate deferral of precautionary dismissal or evacuation until the nature of the threat has been determined.

☐ 1. IF constraints are in place, discuss the following with the ADTS: (1)

- Deferring precautionary dismissal or evacuation until the constraint has been resolved.
- Developing alternate evacuation routes as appropriate to the constraint.
- Sheltering actions in place.

☐ 2. Direct Security personnel to take positions at NAP/SAP to facilitate personnel egress from the Protected Area.

☐ 3. Consider the following:

- Staggering release in groups of 20 to 100 to minimize road congestion and exposure.
- Establishing traffic control at parking lots, on the access road, and at alternate egress locations, as applicable. (1)
- SERO personnel will be moving to and from the training/EOF area for about 2 hours following the Alert declaration.

☐ 4. Provide any special instructions to security personnel at NAP/SAP, or other defined areas of egress, to convey to personnel leaving the site. (1)

- Use bullhorns or parking lot speakers, as appropriate.

☐ 5. Direct Security personnel to monitor and report status of dismissals and evacuations (may use accountability reports).

☐ 6. Notify Local Police Dispatchers of a Site Evacuation.

☐ 7. IF personnel are not responding as expected, request the ADTS to repeat the plant page.

Section C: Precautionary Dismissal and Site Evacuation

- ☐ 8. Request Security personnel provide updates on the following:
  - Movement of personnel
  - Occupancy of sheltering
  - Assembly points
  - Potential or actual problems
- ☐ 9. Develop station reentry plan with the MRCA for SERO personnel requiring site access.

Section D: Search and Rescue Actions

- ☐ 1. IF personnel injuries are reported and off-site emergency assistance is requested, inform the ADTS of the situation.

NOTE

Only the MOSC can deploy, direct, or redirect emergency teams once this responsibility has been taken over from the CRDSEO/MCRO. ①

- ☐ 2. Ensure the following:
  - MOSC has sufficient security personnel for search and rescue teams.
  - Security support for entry into Vital Areas has been arranged.
- ☐ 3. IF notified of a station request for an ambulance, Refer To and implement SEP 5034, "Medical Emergencies."
- ☐ 4. Notify the ADTS of ambulance-related developments.

Section E: SERO Termination

- ☐ 1. WHEN authorized by the ADTS, restore normal station security operations.
- ☐ 2. Ensure all security personnel are notified of the following:
  - SERO termination
  - Normal station security operation restoration

Section E: SERO Termination

- ☐ 3. Record SERO termination in MOS log sheet.
- ☐ 4. Restore facility and equipment to pre-emergency condition.

Prepared by: _____ _____ _____

Signature Print Date

Docket Nos. 50-245
50-336
50-423
B18725

Attachment 4

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3

Emergency Procedures Implementing (EPI) Functional Administrative Procedure (FAP)
MP-26-EPI-FAP03, "Operational Support Center Activation and Operation"
Major Revision 1

02/13/02
Approval Date

02/14/02
Effective Date

Document Action Request

SPG # 020314-074939

Initiated By: Patty Luckey Date: 03/11/2002 Department EP Ext 5474

Document No MP-26-EPI-FAP03 Rev. No: 001 Minor Rev No. 00

Title: **Operational Support Center Activation and Operation**

B

For New Documents only → ☐ QA RI Title

Reason for Request (attach commitments, CR's, AR's, OEs etc)

Biennial Review AR 01000841-03
Forms FAP01-001, -003, -004 are included
-002

Continued ☒

Select One if performing a change *See MP-05-DC-SAP01 sect 2.3 to determine type of change*

C ☒ Intent Change (SQR Independent, RCD, ENV Screen Required) ☐ Edit Corr ☐ Non-Intent Change
(Other reviews may be required See MP-05-DC-FAP 01 1 Att 3) (Only Tech IR, SQR IR and Env signature Required)

D

Editorial Correction Approval

/
Plant Mngt Staff Member - Approval / Date

TPC Interim Approval

/
(1) Plant Mngt Staff Member Print/Sign/Date

/
(2) SM/SRO/CFH on Unit Print/Sign/Date

E

Procedure Request/Feedback Disposition

Priority: ☑ Perform Now ☐ Perform Later - See Comments

Activity: ☑ Revision ☐ Minor Revision (See DC-GDL01 for guidance) ☐ Cleanup Rev ☑ Biennial Review ☐ Cancellation ☐ Supercedure
☐ TPC ☐ OTC ☐ Place in Void

F

Reviews continued ☐	Print	Sign	Date	SQR Qualified Yes	SQR Qualified No	SQR Qualified Dept.	If Comments
Writer's Guide ☑	M Marquesci	M Marquesci	3/22/02	☐	☑	SPG	☐
Validation ☑	John Fuller	John Fuller	4/3/02	☐	☑	TTB	☑
50.54(q) ☑	Tom Rigney	Tom Rigney	6/19/02	☑	☐	EPD	☐
RCD ☑	Kathleen Burgess	Kathleen Burgess	5/14/02	☑	☐	EPD	☐
Env Screen ☑	Tom Rigney	Tom Rigney	6/19/02	☑	☐	EPD	☐
Licensing Bass ☐							☐
Tech Independent ☑	Kathleen Burgess	Kathleen Burgess	5/14/02			EPD	☒

G An NRRL update was required ? ☒ Yes

H

1. ☒ SQR Program Final Review and Appproval
Approval ☒ Disapproval ☐
6/25/02
SQR Qualified Independent Reviewer / Date
Patricia Luckey
Department Head/Responsible Individual
6/26/02
Approval Date

☐ SORC Final review and Approval ☒ RI/DH (Ref Mans GDL's Handbook)
DH/RI Sign
Meeting No
SORC Signature DH / RI Signature
Approval Date

I Effective Date 7/19/02

Functional Administrative Procedure

Millstone Station

Operational Support Center Activation and Operation

MP-26-EPI-FAP03

Rev. 001

Approval Date: 6/26/02

Effective Date: 7/19/02

STOP THINK ACT REVIEW

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. PURPOSE

1.1 Objective

This procedure provides guidance to Station Emergency Response Organization (SERO) personnel who report to the TSC/OSC and the OSC Assembly Area (OSC AA) during an event.

1.2 Applicability

Activation of the TSC/OSC and OSC Assembly Area is initiated upon declaration of an ALERT, Posture Code Charlie-One, or higher event.

1.3 Supporting Documents

EPI-FAP02, "Technical Support Center Activation and Operation"

EPI-FAP09, "Radiation Exposure Controls"

EPI-FAP15, "Common Forms"

C OP 200.3, "Response to Medical Emergencies"

WC 4, "Confined Space Entry"

1.4 Discussion

1.4.1 Upon declaration of an Alert (Charlie One) or higher, the goal for OSC/OSC AA activation (minimum staffing) is within 60 minutes of event notification.

1.4.2 OSC Assembly Area

a. OSC Assembly Area (Building 475, Cafeteria) is used to assemble SERO personnel until they are needed to perform assessment, repair, or search and rescue operations.

b. OSC Assembly Area is contacted via the direct ring down phone line or conference line from the TSC/OSC for status updates and to direct personnel be assembled for team formation.

c. In the event of degrading radiological conditions, personnel assigned to the OSC Assembly Area may be evacuated to an alternate habitable area.

1.4.3 Emergency Team Deployment

a. Emergency team deployment goal is 15 minutes from request. Emergency team deployment and entry into Radiological Controlled Areas must be authorized by the ADTS.

b. The MOSC should initiate team preparation and briefing prior to receiving ADTS deployment approval.

c. The ADTS may issue blanket deployment authorization while plant conditions are *not* constrained. However, team deployment and entry into Radiologically Controlled Areas must be authorized by the ADTS.

d. EPI-FAP15-010, "Emergency Team Briefing Sheet," replaces station AWOs and augments RWPs. Normal Station safety tagging processes remain in effect if possible.

e. Emergency teams may be deployed prior to TSC/OSC activation by the CR DSEO. The CR-DSEO will provide a status of deployed teams from the CR to the ADTS during turnover.

f. The ADTS should notify the MCRO of emergency teams deployed from the OSC AA.

1.4.4 Refer To Attachment 1 for Definitions/Abbreviations and Attachment 2 for applicable responsibilities.

2. INSTRUCTIONS

2.1 Refer To and complete the following, as applicable:

NOTE

Steps in the position specific checklists may be performed in any order, or more than once, as necessary.

- EPI-FAP03-001, "Manager of Operational Support Center (MOSC - TCS/OSC)"
- EPI-FAP03-002, "Assistant Radiation Protection Supervisor (ARPS)"
- EPI-FAP03-003, "Manager of Operational Support Center (MOSC - OSC AA)"
- EPI-FAP03-004, "CBETS Operator"

2.2 If an action is not appropriate under existing conditions or was not necessary for the event, enter N/A when completing documentation for submittal.

3. SUMMARY OF CHANGES

3.1 Rev. 001

3.1.1 Added acronym for OSC AA to steps 1.1 and 1.4.1.

3.1.2 Modified procedure number COP 200.3 in step 1.3.

3.1.3 Deleted reference to Unit 3 FSAR in step 1.3.

3.1.4 Added the OSC AA as requiring activation in 60 minutes to step 1.4.1.

3.1.5 Added a conference line as a contact point in step 1.4.2.b.

3.1.6 Changed "Operations" to "Operational" Support Center through the procedure.

3.1.7 Deleted reference to "PASS" and "PASS Team" in Attachment 1.

3.1.8 Added TSC/OSC to Attachment 2 (MOSC-TSC/OSC).

3.1.9 Added discussion on MOSC-OSC AA to Attachment 2.

3.1.10 Clarified OSC Assistant responsibilities in Attachment 2.

3.2 Rev. 000

3.2.1 Original issue

Attachment 1
Definitions and Abbreviations

(Sheet 1 of 1)

ADTS - Assistant Director Technical Support

ARPS - Assistant Radiological Protection Supervisor

Constraints - Conditions that prevent or interfere with the performance of actions.

Deploy - Send teams or materials to appropriate locations

MCRO - Manager of Control Room Operations

Minimum staff - Positions required in the facility staffing before activation may occur.

MOSC - Manager of Operational Support Center

OSC - Operational Support Center

PPAD - Personnel Protective Action Decisions

Site Fire Protection Leader - Fire Brigade Captain

Attachment 2
Responsibilities

(Sheet 1 of 2)

1. **Manager of Operational Support Center (MOSC-TSC/OSC)**

   The MOSC reports directly to the ADTS. The unaffected Unit MOSC will assume the lead role until the affected Unit MOSC arrives. For Unit 1 events, the Unit 2 MOSC will assume the lead role. The MOSC is responsible for the following:

   - Activation, command, and control of OSC
   - Initiating assembly of emergency teams
   - Evaluating plant equipment and conditions
   - Coordinating activities in accordance with the priorities assigned by the ADTS
   - Coordinating in-plant team activities/locations
   - Ensuring assigned staff are accounted for at all times during the event.

2. **Manager of Operational Support Center (MOSC-OSC AA)**

   The MOSC-OSC AA reports to the MOSC-TSC/OSC and is responsible for the following:

   - Activation, command, and control of OSC AA.
   - Briefing and debriefing of emergency teams.
   - Updating MOSC-TSC/OSC on data received from emergency teams.
   - Providing input to MOSC-TSC/OSC on repair priorities and activities.

3. **Assistant Radiation Protection Supervisor (ARPS)**

   The ARPS reports to the MRCA and coordinates with the MRCA on establishing radiological controls. The ARPS is responsible for:

   - Providing radiological controls within the TSC/OSC and OSC Assembly Area.
   - Conducting radiological briefings for emergency teams.
   - Providing radiological support for dispatched emergency teams.
   - Interfacing with RMT-1 on status of radiological conditions and teams dispatched from the Control Room.

Attachment 3
Responsibilities

(Sheet 2 of 2)

4. Operational Support Center (OSC) Assistants

The OSC Assistants report directly to the MOSC. They are responsible for OSC AA staffing and accountability, ensuring emergency teams are adequately briefed, maintaining communications with teams upon dispatch, and updating status boards.

5. CBETS Operator

The CBETS Operator reports to the MRCA. The position is responsible for tracking exposures of SERO personnel, dosimetry issuance, and assisting in the administrative activities for exposure upgrades and KI distribution.

Docket Nos. 50-245
50-336
50-423
B18725

Attachment 5

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3

Emergency Procedures Implementing (EPI) Functional Administrative Procedure (FAP)
MP-26-EPI-FAP03-001, "Manager of Operational Support Center (MOSC) – TSC/OSC"
Major Revision 1

02/13/02
Approval Date

02/14/02
Effective Date

Document Action Request

SPG # 020314-074939

Initiated By: Patty Luckey Date: 03/11/2002 Department EP Ext 5474

Document No MP-26-EPI-FAP03 -001 Rev. No: 001 Minor Rev No. 00

Title: **Operational Support Center Activation and Operation** - MOSC-TSC/OSC

For New Documents only → ☐ QA RI Title

Reason for Request (attach commitments,CR's,AR's,OEs etc)

Biennial Review AR 01000841-03
Forms FAP01-001, -003, -004 are included
-002

Continued

Select One if performing a change See MP-05-DC-SAP01 sect 2.3 to determine type of change

☒ Intent Change (SQR Independent, RCD ENV Screen Required (Other reviews may be required See MP-05-DC-FAP 01 1 Att 3 ☐ Edit Corr ☐ Non-Intent Change (Only Tech IR SQR IR and Env signature Required)

Editorial Correction Approval

/
Plant Mngt Staff Member - Approval / Date

TPC Interim Approval

/
(1) Plant Mngt Staff Member Print/Sign/Date

/
(2) SM/SRO/CFH on Unit Print/Sign/Date

Procedure Request/Feedback Disposition

Priority: ☑ Perform Now ☐ Perform Later - See Comments

Activity: ☑ Revision ☐ Minor Revision See DC-GDL01 for guidance ☐ Cleanup Rev ☑ Biennial Review ☐ Cancellation ☐ Supercedure

☐ TPC ☐ OTC ☐ Place in Void

Reviews continued ☐	Print	Sign	Date	SQR Qualified Yes	SQR Qualified No	SQR Qualified Dept.	✓ If Comments
Writer's Guide ☑	M Marzoughi	M Marzoughi	3/20/02	☐	☑	SPG	☐
Validation ☑	John Fuller	John Fuller	4/3/02	☐	☑	TTB	☐
50.54(q) ☑	Tom Rigney	Tom Rigney	6/19/02	☑	☐	EPD	☐
RCD ☑	Kathleen Burgess	Kathleen Burgess	3/14/02	☑	☐	EPD	☐
Env Screen ☑	Tom Rigney	Tom Rigney	6/19/02	☑	☐	EPD	☐
Licensing Basis ☐							☐
Tech Independent ☑	Kathleen Burgess	Kathleen Burgess	3/14/02			EPD	☑

An NRRL update was required ? ☒ Yes

1. ☒ SQR Program Final Review and Appproval
Approval ☑ Disapproval ☐
6/25/02
SQR Qualified Independent Reviewer / Date
Patrick Tulley
Department Head/Responsible Individual
6/26/02
Approval Date

☐ SORC Final review and Approval ☒ RI/DH (Ref Mans,GDL's,Handbook)
DH/RI Sign
Meeting No.
SORC Signature
DH / RI Signature
Approval Date

Effective Date 7/9/02

6/26/02
Approval Date

7/19/02
Effective Date

Manager of Operational Support Center (MOSC) - TSC/OSC

This form provides guidance to the MOSC for emergency response actions during a declared emergency that activates the SERO.

Section A: Initial Actions

- ☐ 1. Key into the TSC/OSC.
- ☐ 2. Sign in on TSC/OSC Staffing Board and log date and arrival time on the SERO Log Sheet.
- ☐ 3. Maintain a log of significant events and communications on the SERO Log Sheet.
- ☐ 4. Consult with ADTS or CR DSEO and receive a briefing on conditions, priorities and any teams dispatched by the control room prior to OSC activation.
- ☐ 5. Brief OSC staff on current plant and radiological conditions.
- ☐ 6. Designate OSC Assistant(s) to remain in OSC and dispatch remaining OSC Assistants to the OSC Assembly Area to coordinate resources and brief teams.
- ☐ 7. Obtain names and position titles of SERO personnel in OSC Assembly Area.
- ☐ 8. Verify OSC staff perform the following:
  - Key into TSC/OSC or OSC Assembly Area card reader.
  - Frisk upon entry to OSC, as applicable.
  - Enter name on minimum staffing board.
  - Maintain status boards and logs.
  - Establish and maintain communications with the OSC AA.
  - Maintain awareness of event classification and constraints.
- ☐ 9. Notify the ADTS when OSC activation staffing requirements are met.
- ☐ 10. Brief the OSC Assembly Area personnel on current plant conditions and classification.
- ☐ 11. Contact the OSC AA and request Site Fire Protection personnel report to the TSC/OSC and establish CO_2 monitoring.

Section A: Initial Actions

☐ 12. IF a site evacuation is initiated, perform the following:

- Provide Security the names, EIDs, and locations of emergency team personnel in the field.
- Notify OSC AA of the evacuation directive.

☐ 13 Consult with the ADTS or CR DSEO, as necessary, to determine the following:

- Description and priority of assignments.
- Authorization for deployment of emergency team.

☐ 14. Notify the ADTS of the time and location of emergency teams dispatched.

☐ 15. WHEN informed of a fire, hazardous material spill, or medical emergency inside the Protected Area, perform the following:

- Verify the control rooms and Site Fire Protection have been notified of the emergency, including the nature and location of emergency.
- Determine the need to dispatch an OSC Assistant or Health Physics Technician to the scene to interface with the Site Fire Protection Leader.
- Notify the ADTS.

Section B: Recurring Actions

NOTE

On-shift PEOs remain under the direction of the MCRO, unless released to the OSC.

- ☐ 1. Track the response of needed OSC/OSC AA SERO personnel and notify the ADTS when all positions are filled.

- ☐ 2. WHEN emergency team is requested, Perform the following:
  - Consult with the ADTS to determine the description and priority of the assignment, as necessary.
  - Notify the OSC AA to assemble a team, complete a EPI-FAP15-010, "Emergency Team Briefing Sheet," and initiate team briefing.
  - Obtain ADTS authorization and direct the OSC AA to dispatch the team.
  - Notify the ADTS of the emergency team dispatch time and destination once deployed.

- ☐ 3. Contact the OSC AA and verify the OSC Assistant has established communications with emergency team leader at 15 to 30 minute intervals (or as required by the situation) and is updating the team on plant and radiological conditions.

- ☐ 4. Update location and status of emergency teams on status board.

- ☐ 5. Direct OSC Assistant to perform the following when emergency teams return:
  - Complete the debriefing section of EPI-FAP15-010, "Emergency Team Briefing Sheet," and retain all forms when completed.
  - Contact the MOSC and brief on results (fax debrief form if appropriate).
  - Update log and status board.

- ☐ 6. Notify the ADTS of results of each emergency team assignment.

- ☐ 7. Consult ADTS periodically to review current conditions, priorities, and emergency team status.

- ☐ 8. Provide periodic updates to OSC and OSC AA staff on plant and radiological conditions and review roles and responsibilities.

- ☐ 9. Develop relief shift plan with MOR and OSC Assistants.

Section B: Recurring Actions

☐ 10. Arrange for delivery of the following OSC materials, as required, with MOR to sustain the following on-site operations:

- Repair equipment and supplies
- Radiological and decontamination supplies
- Protective clothing
- SCBA refills
- Fire-fighting equipment

☐ 11. IF the OSC AA is determined to be uninhabitable, consult with the MRCA and ADTS to determine an alternate location.

Section C: Termination

☐ 1. WHEN event termination is initiated by the DSEO, perform the following:

- Recall and debrief teams (ensure work is completed, systems/components are in a safe configuration and documented prior to securing activities).
- Record event termination on the SERO Log Sheet.
- Review log sheets and forms and ensure all appropriate entries have been made.
- Collect procedure sections and team briefing sheets.
- Place MOSC Notebook and materials on MOSC desk.

Prepared by: _____ _____ _____

Signature Print Date

Docket Nos. 50-245
50-336
50-423
B18725

Attachment 6

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3

Emergency Procedures Implementing (EPI) Functional Administrative Procedure (FAP)
MP-26-EPI-FAP03-002, "Assistant Radiation Protection Supervisor (ARPS)"
Major Revision 1

02/13/02
Approval Date

02/14/02
Effective Date

Document Action Request

SPG # 020314-074939

A

Initiated By: Patty Luckey Date: 03/11/2002 Department EP Ext 5474

Document No MP-26-EPI-FAP03 – 002 Rev. No: 001 Minor Rev No. 00

Title: **Operational Support Center Activation and Operation – ARP5**

B

For New Documents only → ☐ QA RI Title

Reason for Request (attach commitments, CR's, AR's, OEs etc)

Biennial Review AR 01000841-03
Forms FAP01-001, -003, -004 are included
-002

Select One if performing a change *See MP-05-DC-SAP01 sect 2.3 to determine type of change*

Continued ☒

C

☒ Intent Change (SQR Independent, RCD, ENV Screen Required ☐ Edit Corr ☐ Non-Intent Change
(Other reviews may be required See MP-05-DC-FAP 01 1 Att 3 (Only Tech IR, SQR IR and Env signature Required)

D

Editorial Correction Approval

/
Plant Mngt Staff Member - Approval / Date

TPC Interim Approval

/
(1) Plant Mngt Staff Member Print/Sign/Date

/
(2) SM/SRO/CFH on Unit Print/Sign/Date

E

Procedure Request/Feedback Disposition

Priority: ☑ Perform Now ☐ Perform Later - See Comments

Activity: ☑ Revision ☐ Minor Revision (See DC-GDL01 for guidance) ☐ Cleanup Rev ☑ Biennial Review ☐ Cancellation ☐ Supercedure
☐ TPC ☐ OTC ☐ Place in Void

F

Reviews continued ☐	Print	Sign	Date	SQR Qualified Yes	SQR Qualified No	SQR Qualified Dept.	✓ If Comments
Writer's Guide ☑	MMarcyeski	MMarcyeski	3/27/02	☐	☑	SDG	☐
Validation ☑	John Fuller	John Fuller	4/3/02	☐	☑	TTB	☑
50.54(q) ☑	Tom Rigney	Tom Rigney	6/19/02	☑	☐	EPD	☐
RCD ☑	Kathleen Burgess	Kathleen Burgess	3/14/02	☑	☐	EPD	☐
Env Screen ☑	Tom Rigney	Tom Rigney	6/19/02	☑	☐	EPD	☐
Licensing Basis ☐							☐
Tech Independent ☑	Kathleen Burgess	Kathleen Burgess	3/14/02			EPD	☐

G

An NRRL update was required ? ☒ Yes

H

1. ☒ SQR Program Final Review and Appproval
Approval ☑ Disapproval ☐ 6/25/02
SQR Qualified Independent Reviewer / Date
Patrick Luckey
Department Head/Responsible Individual
6/26/02
Approval Date

☐ SORC Final review and Approval ☒ RI/DH (Ref Mans GDL's Handbook)
DH/RI Sign
Meeting No.
SORC Signature DH / RI Signature
Approval Date

I

Effective Date 7/19/02

6/26/02
Approval Date

7/19/02
Effective Date

Assistant Radiation Protection Supervisor (ARPS)

This form provides guidance to the ARPS on emergency response actions to be taken during a declared emergency that activates the SERO.

Section A: ARPS Initial Actions

- ☐ 1. Key into the OSC Assembly Area.
- ☐ 2. Obtain current plant and radiological status briefing from one of the following:
  - a) MRCA
  - b) MOSC
  - c) ADTS
- ☐ 3. Enter date and arrival time on the Log Sheet.
- ☐ 4. Establish and maintain a log of activities.
- ☐ 5. Assess habitability of the OSC AA.
- ☐ 6. Contact the following facilities and verify AMS-3 or radiological monitor is operational:
  - TSC/OSC
  - EOF
  - NAP/SAP
  - CAS
  - SAS
- ☐ 7. Assess radiation protection support needed for emergency teams deployed from the Control Room.
- ☐ 8. Direct the CBETS Operator identify available exposures for RMTs and emergency team personnel.

Section B: Recurring Actions

- ☐ 1. Monitor habitability of the TSC/OSC and OSC Assembly Area.
- ☐ 2. Refer To EPI-FAP15-010, "Emergency Team Briefing Sheet," and provide the following to emergency teams awaiting dispatch:
  - Radiological briefing
  - Equipment
  - HP Support
- ☐ 3. Notify the MRCA if an exposure upgrade is needed for any team member.
- ☐ 4. Work with the CBETS Operator and track SERO exposure.
- ☐ 5. Monitor exposure and radiological conditions identified by emergency teams deployed from the OSC AA.
- ☐ 6. Coordinate the implementation of Personnel Protective Action Decisions with the MRCA and MOSC.
- ☐ 7. Identify the need for additional resources to the MRCA.
- ☐ 8. Notify the MRCA of on-site radiological conditions and accumulated dose as reported by the deployed teams.

Prepared by: _____ _____ _____

Signature Print Date

Docket Nos. 50-245
50-336
50-423
B18725

Attachment 7

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3

Emergency Procedures Implementing (EPI) Functional Administrative Procedure (FAP)
MP-26-EPI-FAP03-003, "Manager Operational Support Center – OSC AA"
Major Revision 1

02/13/02
Approval Date

02/14/02
Effective Date

Document Action Request

SPG # 020314-074939

A

Initiated By: Patty Luckey Date: 03/11/2002 Department EP Ext 5474

Document No MP-26-EPI-FAP03 – 003 Rev. No: 001 Minor Rev No. 00

Title: **Operational Support Center Activation and Operation – MOSC- OSCAA**

B

For New Documents only → ☐ QA RI Title

Reason for Request (attach commitments, CR's, AR's, OEs etc)

Biennial Review AR 01000841-03
Forms FAP01-001, -003, -004 are included

003

Select One if performing a change See MP-05-DC-SAP01 sect 2.3 to determine type of change

Continued ☐

C

☒ Intent Change (SQR Independent, RCD, ENV Screen Required) ☐ Edit Corr ☐ Non-Intent Change
(Other reviews may be required See MP-05-DC-FAP 01 1 Att 3) (Only Tech IR, SQR IR and Env signature Required)

D

Editorial Correction Approval

/
Plant Mngt Staff Member - Approval / Date

TPC Interim Approval

/
(1) Plant Mngt Staff Member Print/Sign/Date

/
(2) SM/SRO/CFH on Unit Print/Sign/Date

E

Procedure Request/Feedback Disposition

Priority: ☑ Perform Now ☐ Perform Later - See Comments

Activity: ☑ Revision ☐ Minor Revision (See DC-GDL01 for guidance) ☐ Cleanup Rev ☑ Biennial Review ☐ Cancellation ☐ Supercedure

☐ TPC ☐ OTC ☐ Place in Void

Reviews continued ☐	Print	Sign	Date	SQR Qualified Yes	SQR Qualified No	SQR Qualified Dept.	If Comments
Writer's Guide ☑	M Maryeshi	M Maryeshi	3/27/02	☐	☑	SPG	☐
Validation ☑	~~Tom Rigney~~ John Fuller	John Fuller	4/3/02	☐	☑	TTB	☐
50.54(q) ☑	Tom Rigney	Tom Rigney	6/19/02	☑	☐	EPD	☐
RCD ☑	Kathleen Burgess	Kathleen Burgess	3/14/02	☑	☐	EPD	☐
Env Screen ☑	Tom Rigney	Tom Rigney	6/19/02	☑	☐	EPD	☐
Licensing Bass ☐							☐
Tech Independent ☑	Kathleen Burgess	Kathleen Burgess	3/14/02			EPD	☐

G

An NRRL update was required ? ☒ Yes

H

1. ☒ SQR Program Final Review and Appproval

Approval ☒ Disapproval ☐

6/25/02
SQR Qualified Independent Reviewer / Date

Department Head/Responsible Individual

6/26/02
Approval Date

☐ SORC Final review and Approval ☒ RI/DH (Ref Mans GDL's Handbook)

DH/RI Sign

Meeting No.

SORC Signature DH / RI Signature

Approval Date

I

Effective Date 7/19/02

6/28/02
Approval Date

7/9/02
Effective Date

Manager Operational Support Center - OSC AA

This form provides guidance to the MOSC/OSC Assistants to coordinate OSC Assembly Area actions during a declared emergency that activates the SERO.

Section A: Initial Actions

☐ 1. Key into OSC Assembly Area.

☐ 2. Direct SERO staff to key in to the OSC Assembly Area.

NOTE

Minimum staffing requirements need to be met within 60 minutes. Due to a large number of SERO reporting to OSC AA, a second OSC Assistant may be needed to develop a list of personnel. The OSC Assistant developing the list of personnel needs to focus initially on mechanic, electrician, I&C technician positions, and GES because these are minimum staffing position requirements.

☐ 3. Ensure the following activities have been assigned to the OSC AA staff:

- Establishing and maintaining communications with the OSC.
- Updating status boards.
- Developing and maintaining a roster of names and titles of personnel in the OSC AA.
- Briefing and debriefing emergency teams.

☐ 4. Contact the OSC and provide names and position titles of SERO personnel in the OSC AA.

☐ 5. Instruct other assembled personnel to maintain accountability as follows:

- Key in to the OSC AA key card reader.
- Assemble by normal job function within the OSC AA.
- Limit noise to a minimum.

Section B: Recurring Actions

NOTE

Integrated briefings should be conducted prior to team deployment. Briefings should include operational, radiological, security, and any other specific information that relates to the assigned task(s).

EPI-FAP15-010, "Emergency Team Briefing Sheet," replaces station AWOs and augments RWPs. Normal Station safety tagging processes remain in effect if possible.

☐ 1. Assemble, brief, and deploy teams, as follows:

- Assign Team designator by use of sequential alphabetic letter (i.e. A, B, C,...)
- Complete EPI-FAP15-010, "Emergency Team Briefing Sheet."
- Conduct team briefing.
- Ensure the ARPS covers radiological information.
- IF team is entering containment, review OP 3212, "Containment Entry," and either RPM 2.7.1, "Entry to U2 Containment," or RPM 2.8.1, "Initial Entry to U3 Containment," for steps applicable to emergency situation.
- Provide the team a copy of the completed EPI-FAP15-010 form.
- Contact the OSC and verify the ADTS has authorized the team dispatch.
- Establish communications with the team at designated intervals.
- Notify OSC of time of team dispatch.
- Fax a completed copy of the EPI-FAP15-010 form to the OSC.
- Debrief the team upon return.
- Fax the completed debrief form to the OSC, as appropriate.
- Contact and update the OSC on results of debrief.

☐ 2. Ensure communications are maintained with the OSC and periodically review the following with assembled personnel:

- Event classification.
- General plant conditions and events in progress.
- Shift relief schedules and assignments.
- OSC Assembly Area habitability issues.

Prepared by: _____ _____ _____

Signature Print Date

Docket Nos. 50-245
50-336
50-423
B18725

Attachment 8

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3

Emergency Procedures Implementing (EPI) Functional Administrative Procedure (FAP)
MP-26-EPI-FAP03-004, "CBETS Operator"
Major Revision 1

02/13/02
Approval Date

02/14/02
Effective Date

Document Action Request

SPG # 020314-074939

Initiated By: Patty Luckey Date: 03/11/2002 Department EP Ext 5474

Document No MP-26-EPI-FAP03 -004 Rev. No: 001 Minor Rev No. 00

Title: Operational Support Center Activation and Operation -CBETS OPERATOR

For New Documents only → ☐ QA RI Title

Reason for Request (attach commitments,CR's,AR's,OEs etc)

Biennial Review AR 01000841-03
Forms FAP01-001, -003, -004 are included
-002

Select One if performing a change *See MP-05-DC-SAP01 sect 2.3 to determine type of change* Continued ☒

☒ Intent Change (SQR Independent RCD ENV Screen Required ☐ Edit Corr ☐ Non-Intent Change
(Other reviews may be required See MP-05-DC-FAP01.1 Att 3 (Only Tech IR,SQR IR and Env signature Required)

Editorial Correction Approval

/
Plant Mngt Staff Member - Approval / Date

TPC Interim Approval

/
(1) Plant Mngt Staff Member Print/Sign/Date

/
(2) SM/SRO/CFH on Unit Print/Sign/Date

Procedure Request/Feedback Disposition

Priority: ☑ Perform Now ☐ Perform Later - See Comments

Activity: ☑ Revision ☐ Minor Revision ☐ Cleanup Rev ☑ Biennial Review ☐ Cancellation ☐ Supercedure
See DC-GDL01 for guidance
☐ TPC ☐ OTC ☐ Place in Void

Reviews continued ☐		Print	Sign	Date	SQR Qualified Yes	SQR Qualified No	SQR Qualified Dept.	If Comments
Writer's Guide	☑	M Maryeski	M Maryeski	3/27/02	☐	☑	SPG	☐
Validation	☑	John Fuller	John Fuller	4/3/02	☐	☑	ITB	☐
50.54(q)	☑	Tom Rigney	Tom Rigney	6/19/02	☑	☐	EPD	☐
RCD	☑	Kathleen Burgess	Kathleen Burgess	3/14/02	☑	☐	EPD	☐
Env Screen	☑	Tom Rigney	Tom Rigney	6/19/02	☑	☐	EPD	☐
Licensing Basis	☐							☐
Tech Independent	☑	Kathleen Burgess	Kathleen Burgess	3/14/02			EPD	☐

An NRRL update was required ? ☒ Yes

1. ☒ SQR Program Final Review and Appproval
Approval ☐ Disapproval ☐
6/25/02
SQR Qualified Independent Reviewer / Date
John A Fuller for
Department Head/Responsible Individual
6/26/02
Approval Date

☐ SORC Final review and Approval ☒ RI/DH (Ref Mans,GDL's,Handbook)
DH/RI Sign
Meeting No.
SORC Signature DH / RI Signature
Approval Date

Effective Date 6/ 7/19/02

MP-05-DC-SAP01-001
Rev. 003-02
Page 1 of 1

6/26/02
Approval Date

7/19/02
Effective Date

CBETS Operator

This form provides guidance to the Computer Based Exposure Tracking System (CBETS) Operator for emergency response actions during an event that activates the SERO.

Section A: Initial Actions

- ☐ 1. Sign in on OSC AA Staffing Board.
- ☐ 2. Notify ARPS of arrival and obtain event conditions and status update.
- ☐ 3. Access CBETS and obtain current exposure records, as requested.
- ☐ 4. Refer To EPI-FAP09, "Radiation Exposure Controls," and log any current exposures for identified SERO personnel.
- ☐ 5. Notify ARPS of personnel who are restricted or limited to low exposures.

Section B: Recurring Actions

- ☐ 1. Refer To EPI-FAP09, "Radiation Exposure Controls," and issue emergency dosimetry, as necessary.
- ☐ 2. Ensure personnel assigned emergency activities (repairs, search and rescue, etc.) have the correct documentation for the exposure they are expected to receive during the activity.
- ☐ 3. Refer To EPI-FAP09, "Radiation Exposure Controls," and assist with emergency exposure control.
- ☐ 4. Update ARPS of radiation exposure assignments and potential issues.
- ☐ 5. When requested by the MRCA or MRDA, perform the following:
  - Review radiation exposure reports or logs to determine available personnel radiation exposures.
  - Refer To EPI-FAP09-004, "Emergency Worker Access and Exposure Control Log," and review personnel who have had an emergency exposure limit authorized.
  - Complete EPI-FAP09-003, "KI Issue Authorization and Tracking Sheet," and assist with the issuance of KI to the SERO.
- ☐ 6. Review CBETS and record exposures for the names of the personnel provided by the MRCA or MRDA.

Section B: Recurring Actions

NOTE

Manual entry is acceptable if it helps promote prompt deployment of teams, provided reports are eventually updated (10 CFR 20.1001).

If CBETS is not available, exposures must be listed manually.

If worker is not on dosimetry list, the MRCA must authorize access.

☐ 7. Include exposure received while performing emergency work in each worker's routine exposure record and history.

☐ 8. IF requested, assist in the issuance of dosimetry to emergency response personnel as appropriate:

- Thermoluminescent Dosimeter
- Low Range Pocket Ion Chamber (PIC)
- High Range PIC
- Extremity Dosimetry
- Electronic Personnel Dosimetry

☐ 9. Maintain dosimetry issue and radiation exposure control records.

☐ 10. WHEN each worker's dose results are received, enter it and other information on file.

☐ 11. Collect and maintain all approved EPI-FAP09-003 documents.

Section C: Use of EasyEPD2 to Modify EPD Setpoints

NOTE

The following instructions are to be used to modify EPD setpoints if the need arises.

☐ 1. Ensure either the ARPS or MRCA has authorized setpoint modifications.

☐ 2. Upon accessing the EasyEPD2 program from the icon, enter "cbets" (lowercase sensitive) for username and password.

☐ 3. Insert an EPD that is already logged onto RWP 32 from the OSC AA or TSC area.

Section C: Use of EasyEPD2 to Modify EPD Setpoints

☐ 4. As directed by the MRCA/ARPS, input the following values:

- Dose Alarm Thresholds (All three fields in that column should have the same value.)
- Rate Alarm Thresholds
  - Input the "On" values first. This is the value the dose rate alarm activates. (All three fields in that column should have the same value.)
  - Input the "Off" values last. This is the value that the dose rate alarm silences and is typically set to 90% of the "On" value. (All three fields in that column should have the same value.)

NOTE

The modified values will change to the color of blue to signify the edit mode.

☐ 5. Write the modified values to the EPD by performing the following:

- Select the "Write to EPD" toolbar icon (2nd from the left), or
- Select "File" and then select "EPD Write."

NOTE

Do *not* select any of the clear button functions. That will cause doses to zero.

☐ 6. Verify changes by reading the EPD by performing the following:

- Select the "Read EPD" toolbar icon (1st from the left), or
- Select "File" then select "EPD Read."

Section D: Termination

☐ 1. Subtract 10 CFR 50.47.b(11) emergency exposures from occupation exposure records and apply to individual's Planned Special Exposure record per 10 CFR 20.

☐ 2. WHEN final results are available, report total and available exposures to workers.

☐ 3. Secure computerized dosimetry system by closing window to PREM program after exiting PREM through the menu process.

☐ 4. Send all completed records to MRCA for review and processing by Health Physics.

Prepared by: _____ _____ _____

Signature Print Date

Docket Nos. 50-245
50-336
50-423
B18725

Attachment 9

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3

Emergency Procedures Implementing (EPI) Functional Administrative Procedure (FAP)
MP-26-EPI-FAP06-001, "Millstone Unit 1 Emergency Action Levels"
Major Revision 1

5/30/02
Approval Date

7/19/02
Effective Date

Millstone Unit 1 Emergency Action Levels

☐ UNUSUAL EVENT DELTA ONE ■ UNUSUAL EVENT DELTA TWO ■ ALERT CHARLIE ONE

IN-PLANT RADIATION	SECURITY THREAT/ DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA	FIRE / GASES	FUEL POOL EQUIPMENT FAILURE	UNPLANNED OFFSITE RELEASES	JUDGEMENT	CLASSIFICATION
RA1 REACTOR BUILDING RADIATION (D-AA2) 1. Area radiation monitor reading in Reactor Building or survey results indicate an UNCONTROLLED increase in radiation levels by 100 mR/hr that is not the result of a planned evolution AND impedes operation of systems needed to maintain spent fuel integrity. 2. Valid radiation monitor reading or survey results indicate greater than 15 mR/hr in areas required to be occupied 24 hours a day.	**TA1** SECURITY EVENT (D-HA1) 1. Any on-going or imminent security compromise to the safety of the plant. **TA2** DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA (N/A) An event that damages systems, structures, or components needed to maintain spent fuel integrity that may result in overexposure of site personnel or results in an uncontrolled decrease in the spent fuel pool water level or damage to spent fuel.			**OA1** OFFSITE DOSE (D-AA1) 1. Unplanned release of radioactivity (liquid or gaseous) to the environment ≥200 times REMODCM release limit for ≥15 minutes. 2. Grab sample analyses indicate unplanned gaseous release rate or liquid concentration ≥200 times the REMODCM limit for ≥15 minutes.	**JA1** JUDGEMENT (D-HA2) Any condition for which judgement indicates that the level of safety for the Reactor Building or other areas important for maintaining the integrity of the spent fuel is substantially degraded and which requires Station Emergency Response Organization (SERO) staffing.	**ALERT** CHARLIE ONE Events are in progress or have occurred which indicate an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant, to plant personnel, or to the safe storage of fuel in the spent fuel pool.
RU1 REACTOR BUILDING RADIATION (D-AU2) Area radiation monitor reading in Reactor Building or survey results indicate an UNCONTROLLED increase in radiation levels by 25 mR/hr that is not the result of a planned evolution.	**TU1** SECURITY EVENT (D-HU1) 1. Security events as determined for Station Safeguards Contingency Plan and reported by Security Shift Supervision. 2. A credible site-specific security threat notification. **TU2** DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA (D-HU3) 1. Earthquake detected per ONP 514C, Earthquake. 2. Report of tornado striking within the Protected Area (PA) that has the potential to affect equipment needed to maintain spent fuel integrity. 3. On-Site sustained wind speed >75 mph. 4. Explosion or visible damage to structures, systems, or components within the Protected Area with the potential to affect equipment required to maintain the integrity of the spent fuel. 5. Flood Level >19 Feet Mean Sea Level. 6. Vehicle crash within the PA that could potentially affect equipment needed to maintain spent fuel integrity.	**GU1** FIRE (D-HU3) Fire in the Reactor Building or other areas important to maintaining the integrity of the spent fuel NOT extinguished within 15 minutes of Control Room notification OR within 15 minutes of the fire alarm actuation in the Control Room. **GU2** TOXIC/FLAMMABLE GASES (D-HU3) 1. Life threatening toxic gases OR flammable gas concentrations as identified in C-OP 200.5, "Oil, Hazardous Material, Hazardous Waste and Mixed Waste Contingency Plan," affecting activities in areas needed to maintain spent fuel integrity. 2. Notification of a near-site release that may require evacuation of MP1.	**EU1** FUEL POOL LEVEL (D-SU1) Uncontrolled decrease in fuel pool level indicated by a low level alarm actuation with all spent fuel assemblies remaining covered by water. **EU2** FUEL POOL TEMPERATURE (D-SU1) Uncontrolled heatup of the spent fuel pool such that the bulk pool temperature exceeds 150° F.	**OU1** UNPLANNED RELEASES (D-AU1) 1. Gaseous effluent monitor in alarm for ≥60 minutes OR unplanned, unmonitored, or uncontrolled offsite liquid release ≥ 2 times REMODCM limits for ≥ 60 minutes. 2. Grab sample analyses indicate unplanned gaseous release rate or liquid concentration ≥ 2 times the REMODCM limit for ≥60 minutes.	**JU1** JUDGEMENT (D-HU2) Any condition for which judgement indicates the potential or actual degradation in the level of safety of the Reactor Building or other areas important to maintaining the integrity of the spent fuel.	**UNUSUAL EVENT** **DELTA TWO** **OR** **DELTA ONE** Events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

AREAS NEEDED TO MAINTAIN SPENT FUEL INTEGRITY

- Reactor Building - 4th and 5th Floors
- Reactor Building, Fuel Pool Pump Mezzanine - 2nd floor
- H&V Room - Lower Level (DHR)
- H&V Room - Roof - Coolers

1 C01

Millstone

Docket Nos. 50-245
50-336
50-423
B18725

Attachment 10

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3

Emergency Procedures Implementing (EPI) Functional Administrative Procedure (FAP)
MP-26-EPI-FAP06-002, "Millstone Unit 2 Emergency Action Levels"
Major Revision 1, Minor Revison 2

MILLSTONE UNIT 2 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

5/30/02
APPROVAL DATE

7/19/02
EFFECTIVE DATE

GENERAL EMERGENCY ALPHA | GENERAL EMERGENCY BRAVO | SITE AREA EMERGENCY CHARLIE-TWO | ALERT CHARLIE-ONE | UNUSUAL EVENT DELTA-TWO | UNUSUAL EVENT DELTA-ONE

BARRIER FAILURE	LOSS OF POWER	EQUIPMENT FAILURE	OFFSITE RELEASES	CLASSIFICATION
BG1 ALL THREE BARRIERS — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 See Barrier Failure Reference Table	**PG1** STATION BLACKOUT — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 Loss of Voltage on Buses 24C AND 24D AND ANY of the Following: • Restoration of Power to AT LEAST One Vital Bus is NOT Likely Within Four Hours • Core Exit Thermocouple Readings Indicate Superheat • Inadequate SG Heat Removal Capability as Indicated by SG Water Level ≤ 10% in BOTH SGs AND Inadequate Terry Turbine Feedwater Flow	**EG1** ATWS/INADEQUATE COOLING — Mode 1 Functional Recovery of Reactivity Control Ineffective AND EITHER of the Following: • RCS Heat Removal by Steam Generator Heat Removal SFSC Criteria Can NOT Be Satisfied • Core Exit TC Temperature Readings > 800°F	**OG1** OFFSITE DOSE — Mode ALL 1. MP2 Kaman Vent Monitor (RM-8168) Reading ≥ 2 µCi/cc for > 15 Minutes 2. MP2 WRGM Site Stack Effluent Activity (RM-8169) Reading ≥ 30 µCi/cc for > 15 Minutes 3. MSL Monitor (RM-4299/A/B/C) Reading ≥ 2 R/hr for > 15 Minutes 4. Measured Plume Dose Rate OnSite ≥ 1,000 mR/hr for > 15 Minutes 5. Rad Assessment Determines Integrated Dose Offsite ≥ 1 Rem TEDE OR ≥ 5 Rem CDE Thyroid	GENERAL EMERGENCY **ALPHA** OR **BRAVO** Events in Progress or Have Occurred Which Involve Actual or Imminent Substantial Core Degradation or Melting With Potential for Loss of Containment Integrity
BS1 ANY TWO BARRIERS — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 See Barrier Failure Reference Table	**PS1** STATION BLACKOUT — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 Loss of Voltage on Buses 24C AND 24D > 15 Minutes **PS2** LOSS OF DC — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 Loss of Voltage on DC Buses 201A AND 201B > 15 Minutes	**ES1** ATWS — Mode 1 Manual Reactor Trip Attempted At Panel C04 AND Reactor Is NOT Shutdown **ES2** INABILITY TO MAINTAIN HOT S/D — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 1. No RCS heat Removal Method Meets SFSC Criteria > 15 Minutes AND Shutdown Cooling is NOT In Service 2. RCS Boration Capability Unable to Eliminate Inadvertent Criticality **ES3** IN-VESSEL FUEL UNCOVERY — Mode 5, 6 Shutdown Cooling Has Been Lost AND ANY of the Following Conditions Exist: • Alternate Methods for Restoring RCS Inventory are NOT Effective • RVLMS Reading = 0% • Core Exit TC Temperature Readings Indicate Superheat **ES4** LOSS OF ANNUNCIATORS/TRANSIENT — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 Loss of Most (75%) MCB Annunciators AND BOTH of the Following • Significant Transient in Progress • Loss of SPDS AND ICC Instrumentation	**OS1** OFFSITE DOSE — Mode ALL 1. MP2 Kaman Vent Monitor (RM-8168) Reading ≥ 0.2 µCi/cc for > 15 Minutes 2. MP2 WRGM Site Stack Effluent Activity (RM-8169) Reading ≥ 10 µCi/cc for > 15 Minutes 3. MSL Monitor (RM-4299A/B/C) Reading ≥ 0.3 R/hr for > 15 Minutes 4. Measured Plume Dose Rate Onsite ≥ 50 mR/hr for > 15 Minutes 5. Rad Assessment Determines Integrated Dose Offsite ≥ 0.05 Rem TEDE OR ≥ 0.25 Rem CDE Thyroid	SITE AREA EMERGENCY **CHARLIE-TWO** Events in Progress or Have Occurred Which Involve Actual or Likely Major Failures of Plant Functions Needed for Protection of the Public
FUEL CLAD OR RCS BARRIER — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 See Barrier Failure Reference Table **BA2** STEAM LINE BREAK — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 Unisolable Steam Line Break Outside CTMT	**PA1** STATION BLACKOUT — Mode 5, 6 Loss of Voltage on Buses 24C AND 24D > 15 Minutes **PA2** SINGLE AC POWER SOURCE — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 Only One AC Power Source Available to Supply Buses 24C AND/OR 24D > 15 Minutes Such That Loss of That Power Source Would Result in a Station Blackout (Unit 3 Buses 34A/B CANNOT be Credited) ①	**EA1** AUTOMATIC Rx TRIP FAILURE — Mode 1, 2 Failure of Automatic Reactor Trip AND Manual Trip Was Successful **EA2** INABILITY TO MAINTAIN COLD S/D — Mode 5, 6 1. Uncontrolled RCS Temperature Increase > 10°F That Results in RCS Temperature > 200°F 2. Inadvertent Criticality **EA3** LOSS OF ANNUNCIATORS/TRANSIENT — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 Loss of Most (75%) MCB Annunciators > 15 Minutes AND EITHER of the Following: • Significant Transient in Progress • Loss of SPDS AND ICC Instrumentation	**OA1** OFFSITE DOSE — Mode ALL 1. MP2 Kaman Vent Monitor (RM-8168) Reading ≥ 0.02 µCi/cc for > 15 Minutes 2. MP2 WRGM Site Stack Effluent Activity (RM-8169) Reading ≥ 1 µCi/cc for > 15 Minutes 3. MSL Monitor (RM-4299A/B/C) Reading ≥ 0.03 R/hr for > 15 Minutes 4. Measured Plume Dose Rate Onsite ≥ 5 mR/hr for > 15 Minutes 5. Rad Assessment Determines Integrated Dose Offsite ≥ 0.005 Rem TEDE OR ≥ 0.025 Rem CDE Thyroid	ALERT **CHARLIE-ONE** Events in Progress or Have Occurred Which Involve an Actual or Potential Substantial Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant
BU1 CTMT BARRIER — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 See Barrier Failure Reference Table **BU2** RCS LEAKAGE — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 1. Pressure Boundary Leakage > 10 GPM 2. Unidentified Leakage > 10 GPM 3. Identified Leakage > 25 GPM **BU3** FUEL CLAD DEGRADATION — Mode ALL 1. RCS Activity > 60 µCi/gm I-131 DEQ 2. Dose Rate at One Foot from Unpressurized RCS Sample ≥ 2 mR/hr/ml	**PU1** LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER — Mode ALL Buses 24C AND 24D Are Powered from Emergency Generators AND Offsite Power NOT Restored Within 15 Minutes **PU2** LOSS OF DC — Mode 5, 6 Loss of Voltage on DC Buses 201A AND 201B > 15 Minutes	**EU1** LOSS OF COLD S/D FUNCTION — Mode 5, 6 1. Loss of Shutdown Cooling > 15 Minutes AND Refuel Pool Water Level < 35 Ft., 6 In. 2. Uncontrolled RCS Temperature Increase > 10°F 3. RCS Boron Concentration < Minimum Required **EU2** REFUEL/SPENT FUEL POOL LEVEL — Mode 6 1. Uncontrolled Spent Fuel Pool Water Level Decrease Causing Loss of Cooling Suction Flow 2. Uncontrolled Refuel Pool Water Level Decrease Requiring Containment Evacuation AND All Spent Fuel Assemblies in Safe Storage Locations **EU3** LOSS OF ANNUNCIATORS — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 Loss of Most (75%) MCB Annunciators > 15 Minutes AND SPDS OR ICC Instrumentation Available **EU4** LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS — Mode ALL 1. Loss of ALL Onsite Electronic Communications Methods 2. Loss of ALL Electronic Communications Methods With Government Agencies **EU5** SHUTDOWN LCO EXCEEDED — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 Unit NOT Brought To Required Mode Within Applicable LCO Action Statement Time Limits	**OU1** UNPLANNED RELEASE — Mode ALL Effluent Monitors in Alarm OR Unplanned, Unmonitored or Uncontrolled Offsite Release AND DELTA-TWO Posture Code Limits as Determined from EPI-FAP06, "Classification and PARs," Exceeded. Note: Effluent Monitors Indicate Release Above Alarm Setpoint Continuing > 60 minutes and Reportability Evaluations NOT Complete	UNUSUAL EVENT **DELTA-TWO** OR **DELTA-ONE** Events in Progress or Have Occurred Which Indicate a Potential Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant

NOTE: When two or more EALs apply, always choose the EAL of the highest incident classification; also always read from top to bottom in each category.

2
Millstone
CO2

MILLSTONE UNIT 2 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

GENERAL EMERGENCY ALPHA | GENERAL EMERGENCY BRAVO | SITE AREA EMERGENCY CHARLIE-TWO | ALERT CHARLIE-ONE | UNUSUAL EVENT DELTA-TWO | UNUSUAL EVENT DELTA-ONE

IN–PLANT RADIATION	SECURITY THREAT/ DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA	FIRE/GASES	JUDGEMENT	CLASSIFICATION
RG1 MAJOR FUEL DAMAGE — Mode ALL 1. RM-8240/8241 Reading > 1,200 R/hr 2. At Least 20% Fuel Clad Damage As Determined By Core Damage Estimate 3. Spent Fuel is Exposed from Water Loss from Open Vessel, Cavity, Or SF Pool AND BOTH of the Following: • Spent Fuel Has Decayed < 30 Days • CTMT Integrity is NOT Established OR Exposed Spent Fuel is Outside CTMT	**TG1** SECURITY EVENT — Mode ALL 1. Loss of Physical Control of the Control Room 2. Loss of Physical Control of Remote Shutdown Capability		**JG1** JUDGEMENT — Mode ALL Other Conditions Exist For Which Judgement Indicates: 1. Actual Or Imminent Substantial Core Degradation With Potential For Loss Of Containment, OR 2. Potential For Uncontrolled Radiological Releases. These Releases Can Be Reasonably Expected To Exceed EPA PAG Plume Exposure Levels Outside The Site Boundary	GENERAL EMERGENCY ALPHA OR BRAVO Events in Progress or Have Occurred Which Involve Actual or Imminent Substantial Core Degradation or Melting With Potential for Loss of Containment Integrity
RS1 SPENT FUEL DAMAGE — Mode ALL Spent Fuel is Exposed from Open Vessel or Cavity AND BOTH of the Following: • Spent Fuel Has Decayed < 30 Days • CTMT Integrity Established	**TS1** SECURITY EVENT — Mode ALL Intrusion into Vital Area by a Hostile Force	**GS1** CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION — Mode ALL Unit Control from Hot Shutdown Panel C-10 Or C-21 NOT Established Within 15 Minutes After Control Room Evacuation	**JS1** JUDGEMENT — Mode ALL Other Conditions Exist For Which Judgement Indicates Actual Or Likely Major Failures of Plant Functions Needed For Protecton Of The Public	SITE AREA EMERGENCY **CHARLIE–TWO** Events in Progress or Have Occurred Which Involve Actual or Likely Major Failures of Plant Functions Needed for Protection of the Public
RA1 SPENT FUEL ASSEMBLY DAMAGE — Mode ALL Spent Fuel is Exposed from Open Vessel, Cavity, or SF Pool AND Spent Fuel Has Decayed > 30 Days 2. Fuel Handling Accident Causing Damage to Spent Fuel, Indicated by Fuel Building OR Containment Radiation Monitors Increasing **RA2** PLANT RADIATION — Mode ALL 1. Radiation Readings > 15 mR/hr in Control Room OR Central Alarm Station OR Secondary Alarm Station 2. Radiation Reading > 5 R/hr in Areas Requiring Access for Safe Shutdown	**TA1** SECURITY EVENT — Mode ALL 1. Any on–going or imminent security compromise to the safety of the plant. (2) **TA2** DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA — Mode ALL 1. Seismic Event > 0.09g ZPA 2. Onsite Sustained Windspeed > 90 MPH 3. Visible Damage to Structures or Equipment AND Affecting Safe Shutdown 4. Vessel or Vehicle Collision AND Affecting Safe Shutdown 5. Missiles Affecting Safe Shutdown 6. Flooding Affecting Safe Shutdown	**GA1** CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION — Mode ALL Control Room Evacuation Initiated **GA2** FIRE/EXPLOSION — Mode ALL Fire or Explosion Affecting Safe Shutdown Area AND Damage to Structures OR Equipment Indicated **GA3** TOXIC/FLAMMABLE GASES — Mode ALL Life Threatening Toxic Gases OR Flammable Gas Concentrations as Identified in C–OP 200.5, "Oil, Hazardous Material, Hazardous Waste and Mixed Waste Contingency Plan" Affecting Areas for Safe Shutdown	**JA1** JUDGEMENT — Mode ALL Any Condition For Which Judgement Indicates That Safety Systems May Be Degraded AND Which Requires Emergency Response Organization Staffing	ALERT **CHARLIE–ONE** Events in Progress or Have Occurred Which Involve an Actual or Potential Substantial Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant
RU1 RAD MONITORS — Mode ALL 1. Uncontrolled Refuel Pool Water Level Decrease AND Rad Levels Require Evacuation of CTMT Or Spent Fuel Pool Area 2. Unexpected Area Rad Monitor Reading Offscale High OR > 1000 Times Normal Reading	**TU1** SECURITY EVENT — Mode ALL 1. Security events as determined for Station Safeguards Contingency Plan and reported by Security Shift Supervision (2) 2. A credible site specific security threat notification **TU2** DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA — Mode ALL 1. Seismic Activity Detected Per AOP-2562, Earthquake 2. Report by Plant Personnel of Tornado Striking Within Protected Area 3. Visible Damage to Structures or Equipment Within the Protected Area 4. Onsite Sustained Windspeed > 75 MPH 5. Explosion Within the Protected Area 6. Turbine Failure Causing Observable Casing Damage 7. Vessel or Vehicle Collision With Structures OR Equipment Required for Safe Shutdown 8. Flood Level > 19 Feet Mean Sea Level 9. Flooding in Areas Containing Safe Shutdown Equipment	**GU1** FIRE — Mode ALL Fire in Building OR Areas Adjacent to Areas Needed for Safe Shutdown NOT Extinguished Within 15 Minutes of Notification OR Verification of Control Room Alarms **GU2** TOXIC/FLAMMABLE GASES — Mode ALL 1. Life Threatening Toxic Gases OR Flammable Gas Concentrations as Identified in C–OP 200.5, "Oil, Hazardous Material, Hazardous Waste and Mixed Waste Contingency Plan" Affecting Normal Operation 2. Notification of a Near-Site Release That May Require Evacuation	**JU1** JUDGEMENT — Mode ALL Any Condition For Which Judgement Indicates Potential Degradation in the Level of Safety of the Plant	UNUSUAL EVENT **DELTA–TWO** **OR** **DELTA–ONE** Events in Progress or Have Occurred Which Indicate a Potential Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant

AREAS OF CONCERN FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN

Control Room	Switchgear Rooms
Cable Vaults	Intake Structure
Turbine Building	Switchgear Area
Penetration Areas	Coolant Tanks Area
RBCCW Rooms	Containment
Diesel Generator Room	DC Equipment and Battery Rooms
Charging Pump Cubicles	Safety Injection Pump Rooms
Switchyard	

NOTE: When two or more EALs apply, always choose the EAL of the highest incident classification; also always read from top to bottom in each category.

2 C03

Millstone

MILLSTONE 2 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS BARRIER FAILURE REFERENCE TABLE

IMMINENT - No Turnaround in Safety System Performance is Expected AND Escalation to General Emergency Conditions Will Occur Within 2 Hours

IDICATORS	FUEL CLAD BARRIER	RCS BARRIER	CTMT BARRIER
SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS/ FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY	FCB1 LOSS Not Applicable POTENTIAL LOSS P NO RCS Heat Removal Method Meets SFSC Criteria > 15 Minutes AND Shutdown Cooling System Is NOT In Service	RCB1 LOSS Not Applicable POTENTIAL LOSS P Uncontrolled RCS Cooldown AND RCS Pressure-Temperature To the Left Of the PTS Limit 200°F Subcooling Maximum Curve P NO RCS Heat Removal Method Meets SFSC Criteria > 15 Minutes AND Shutdown Cooling System Is NOT In Service	
CORE EXIT TC TEMPERATURES	FCB2 LOSS L Core Exit Thermocouple Readings > 1300 °F POTENTIAL LOSS P Core Exit Thermocouple Readings > 800 °F	RCB2 LOSS L RCS Subcooling < 30°F POTENTIAL LOSS Not Applicable	CNB1 LOSS Not Applicable POTENTIAL LOSS P Core Exit TC Temperature Readings >1300°F AND Do NOT Decrease Within 15 Minutes
PRESSURE		RCB3 LOSS Not Applicable POTENTIAL LOSS P Uncontrolled RCS Pressure Decrease and Increasing Containment Radiation Monitors	CNB2 LOSS L Rapid Unexplained CTMT Pressure Decrease Following Initial Increase L No CTMT Pressure Increase When Expectation Exists POTENTIAL LOSS P CTMT Pressure > 10 PSIG AND Increasing AND No Containment Spray Pump P CTMT H_2 Concentration $\geq$ 4%
COOLANT LEAKAGE		RCB4 LOSS L Reactor Coolant Leak > CVCS Capacity AND Entry Into EOP-2534, Steam Generator Tube Rupture POTENTIAL LOSS P Reactor Coolant Leak > CVCS Capacity AND Entry Into EOP-2525, Standard Post Trip Actions P Reactor Coolant Leak Rate >capacity of one (1) charging pump AND $\leq$ CVCS Capacity AND EITHER of the following: • Entry Into EOP 2534, Steam Generator Tube Rupture • Entry Into AOP 2569, Steam Generator Tube Leak	CNB3 LOSS L Primary to Secondary Leakage > Tech Spec Limits AND Unisolable Secondary Release to the Environment (Does NOT Include Normal Cycling of S/G Atmospheric Dump Valves or Safety Valves to Maintain Pressure/Temperature) L Failure of BOTH Isolation Valves AND a Pathway to the Environment Exists POTENTIAL LOSS P Entry Into EOP-2532, Loss of Primary Coolant, AND Leakage Exists Outside CTMT Requiring Local Isolation
RADIATION	FCB3 LOSS L RM-8240/8241 Reading > 300 R/hr L RM-8240/8241 Reading > 5 R/hr Without RCS Release Inside CTMT L At Least 5% Fuel Clad Damage As Determined By Core Damage Estimate L Dose Rate at One Foot from Unpressurized RCS Sample $\geq$ 28 mR/hr/ml POTENTIAL LOSS Not Applicable	RCB5 LOSS L RM-8240/8241 Reading > 5 R/hr Without Fuel Clad Barrier Loss POTENTIAL LOSS Not Applicable	CNB4 LOSS L Offsite Dose Plume Rate $\geq 10^{-6}$ Times RM-8240/8241 Reading if Release is to CTMT POTENTIAL LOSS P RM-8240/8241 Reading > 1,200 R/hr P At Least 20% Fuel Clad Damage As Determined By Core Damage Estimate
WATER LEVEL	FCB4 LOSS Not Applicable POTENTIAL LOSS P RVLMS Reading = 0%		CNB5 LOSS L No CTMT Sump Level Increase When Expectation Exists POTENTIAL LOSS Not Applicable
GEMENT	FCB5 Any Condition For Which Judgement Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of Fuel Clad Barrier Due to: • Imminent Barrier Degradation Based On Current Safety System Performance • Degraded Fission Barrier Monitoring Capability Making Barrier Status Indeterminate	RCB6 Any Condition For Which Judgement Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of RCS Barrier Due to: • Imminent Barrier Degradation Based On Current Safety System Performance • Degraded Fission Barrier Monitoring Capability Making Barrier Status Indeterminate	CNB6 Any Condition For Which Judgement Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of CTMT Barrier Due to: • Imminent Barrier Degradation Based On Current Safety System Performance • Degraded Fission Barrier Monitoring Capability Making Barrier Status Indeterminate



2

C04

Millstone

Docket Nos. 50-245
50-336
50-423
B18725

Attachment 11

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3

Emergency Procedures Implementing (EPI) Functional Administrative Procedure (FAP)
MP-26-EPI-FAP06-003, "Millstone Unit 3 Emergency Action Levels"
Major Revision 1, Minor Revison 2

MILLSTONE UNIT 3 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

5/30/02
APPROVAL DATE

7/19/02
EFFECTIVE DATE

GENERAL EMERGENCY ALPHA | GENERAL EMERGENCY BRAVO | SITE AREA EMERGENCY CHARLIE-TWO | ALERT CHARLIE-ONE | UNUSUAL EVENT DELTA-TWO | UNUSUAL EVENT DELTA-ONE

BARRIER FAILURE	LOSS OF POWER	EQUIPMENT FAILURE	OFFSITE RELEASES	CLASSIFICATION
BG1 ALL THREE BARRIERS — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 See Barrier Failure Reference Table	**PG1** STATION BLACKOUT — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 Loss of Voltage on Buses 34C AND 34D (Station Blackout Diesel cannot be credited) AND ANY of the Following: (2) • Restoration of Power to AT LEAST One Bus is NOT Likely Within Four Hours • Core Cooling - RED • Heat Sink - RED	**EG1** ATWS/INADEQUATE COOLING — Mode 1 Reactor Power > 5% Following Entry into FR-S.1 AND EITHER of the Following: • Core Cooling - RED • All SG Wide Range Levels < 29% (59% Adverse CTMT)	**OG1** OFFSITE DOSE — Mode ALL 1. MP3 Kaman Vent Monitor (RE-10A) Reading ≥ 0.8 µCi/cc for > 15 Minutes 2. MP3 SLCRS Gas Monitor (HVR*19A) Reading ≥ 30 µCi/cc for > 15 Minutes 3. MP3 Safeties or Steam Dump Monitor (RE-75/76/77/78) Reading ≥ 20 µCi/cc for > 15 Minutes 4. Terry Turbine Monitor (RE-79) Reading ≥ 50 µCi/cc for > 15 Minutes 5. Measured Plume Dose Rate Onsite > 1,000 mR/hr for > 15 Minutes 6. Rad Assessment Determines Integrated Dose Offsite ≥ 1 Rem TEDE OR ≥ 5 Rem CDE Thyroid	GENERAL EMERGENCY ALPHA OR BRAVO Events in Progress or Have Occurred Which Involve Actual or Imminent Substantial Core Degradation or Melting With Potential for Loss of Containment Integrity
BS1 ANY TWO BARRIERS — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 See Barrier Failure Reference Table	**PS1** STATION BLACKOUT — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 Loss of Voltage on Buses 34C AND 34D > 15 Minutes (Station Blackout Diesel cannot be credited) (2) **PS2** LOSS OF DC — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 Loss of Voltage on DC Buses 1, 2, 3 AND 4 > 15 Minutes	**ES1** ATWS — Mode 1 FR-S.1 is Entered Directly From E-0 **ES2** INABILITY TO MAINTAIN HOT S/D — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 1. Heat Sink - RED AND BOTH of the Following: • Required Feedwater Flow Can NOT Be Established Within 15 Minutes • RCS Feed and Bleed Can NOT Be Established 2. RCS Boration Capability Unable to Eliminate Inadvertent Criticality **ES3** IN-VESSEL FUEL UNCOVERY — Mode 5, 6 RHR Has Been Lost AND ANY of the Following Conditions Exist: • Alternate Methods for Restoring RCS Inventory Are NOT Effective • RVLMS Reading Decreasing Toward 19% Level (Plenum) • CET Readings Indicate Superheat Conditions **ES4** LOSS OF ANNUNCIATORS/TRANSIENT — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 Loss of Most (75%) MCB Annunciators AND BOTH of the Following: • Significant Transient in Progress • Loss of SPDS AND ICC Instrumentation	**OS1** OFFSITE DOSE — Mode ALL 1. MP3 Kaman Vent Monitor (RE-10A) Reading ≥ 0.1 µCi/cc for > 15 Minutes 2. MP3 SLCRS Gas Monitor ((HVR*19A) Reading ≥ 10 µCi/cc for > 15 Minutes 3. MP3 Safeties or Steam Dump Monitor (RE-75/76/77/78) Reading ≥ 0.8 µCi/cc for > 15 Minutes 4. Terry Turbine Monitor (RE-79) Reading ≥ 10 µCi/cc for > 15 Minutes 5. Measured Plume Dose Rate Onsite ≥ 50 mR/hr for > 15 Minutes 6. Rad Assessment Determines Integrated Dose Offsite ≥ 0.05 Rem TEDE OR ≥ 0.25 Rem CDE Thyroid	SITE AREA EMERGENCY CHARLIE-TWO Events in Progress or Have Occurred Which Involve Actual or Likely Major Failures of Plant Functions Needed for Protection of the Public
B1 FUEL CLAD OR RCS BARRIER — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 See Barrier Failure Reference Table **BA2** STEAM LINE BREAK — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 Unisolable Steam Line Break Outside CTMT	**PA1** STATION BLACKOUT — Mode 5, 6 Loss of Voltage on Buses 34C AND 34D > 15 Minutes **PA2** SINGLE AC POWER SOURCE — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 Only One AC Power Source Available to Supply Buses 34C AND 34D > 15 Minutes Such That Loss of That Power Source Would Result in a Station Blackout (Station Blackout Diesel CANNOT be Credited)	**EA1** AUTOMATIC Rx TRIP FAILURE — Mode 1, 2 Failure of Automatic Reactor Trip AND Manual Trip Was Successful **EA2** INABILITY TO MAINTAIN COLD S/D — Mode 5, 6 1. Uncontrolled RCS Temperature Increase > 10 °F That Results in RCS Temperature > 200 °F 2. Inadvertent Criticality **EA3** LOSS OF ANNUNCIATORS/TRANSIENT — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 Loss of Most (75%) MCB Annunciators > 15 Minutes AND EITHER of the Following: • Significant Transient in Progress • Loss of SPDS AND ICC Instrumentation	**OA1** OFFSITE DOSE — Mode ALL 1. MP3 Kaman Vent Monitor (RE-10A) Reading ≥ 0.01 µCi/cc for > 15 Minutes 2. MP3 SLCRS Gas Monitor (HVR*19A) Reading ≥ 1 µCi/cc for > 15 Minutes 3. MP3 Safeties or Steam Dump Monitor (RE-75/76/77/78) Reading ≥ 0.08 µCi/cc for > 15 Minutes 4. Terry Turbine Monitor (RE-79) Reading Of ≥ 1 µCi/cc for > 15 Minutes 5. Measured Plume Dose Rate Onsite ≥ 5 mR/hr for > 15 Minutes 6. Rad Assessment Determines Integrated Dose Offsite ≥ 0.005 Rem TEDE OR ≥ 0.025 Rem CDE Thyroid	ALERT CHARLIE-ONE Events in Progress or Have Occurred Which Involve an Actual or Potential Substantial Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant
BU1 CTMT BARRIER — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 See Barrier Failure Reference Table **BU2** RCS LEAKAGE — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 1. Pressure Boundary Leakage > 10 GPM 2. Unidentified Leakage > 10 GPM 3. Identified Leakage > 25 GPM **BU3** FUEL CLAD DEGRADATION — Mode ALL 1. RCS Activity > 60 µCi/gm I-131 DEQ 2. Dose Rate at One Foot from Unpressurized RCS Sample ≥ 2 mR/hr/ml	**PU1** LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER — Mode ALL Buses 34C AND 34D Are Powered From Emergency Generators AND Offsite Power NOT Restored Within 15 Minutes **PU2** LOSS OF DC — Mode 5, 6 Loss of Voltage on DC Buses 1, 2, 3 AND 4 > 15 Minutes	**EU1** LOSS OF COLD S/D FUNCTION — Mode 5, 6 1. Loss of RHR Cooling > 15 Minutes AND Valid PZR Water Level (LT 462) Reading < 40% 2. Uncontrolled RCS Temperature Increase > 10°F 3. RCS Boron Concentration < Minimum Required **EU2** CAVITY SEAL FAILURE — Mode 6 Refueling Cavity Seal Failure AND EITHER of the Following: • Valid PZR Level (LT 462) Reading < 40% • Valid SFP Level (LI 26) Reading = 0% **EU3** LOSS OF ANNUNCIATORS — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 Loss of Most (75%) MCB Annunciators > 15 Minutes AND SPDS OR ICC Instruments Available **EU4** LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS — Mode ALL 1. Loss of ALL Onsite Electronic Communications Methods 2. Loss of ALL Electronic Communications Methods With Government Agencies **EU5** SHUTDOWN LCO EXCEEDED — Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 Unit NOT Brought To Required Mode Within Applicable LCO Action Statement Time Limits	**OU1** UNPLANNED RELEASE — Mode ALL Effluent Monitors in Alarm OR Unplanned, Unmonitored or Uncontrolled Offsite Release AND DELTA-TWO Posture Code Limits as Determined from EPI-FAP06, "Classification and PARs," Exceeded. Note: Effluent Monitors Indicate Release Above Alarm Setpoint Continuing > 60 minutes AND Reportability Evaluations NOT Complete	UNUSUAL EVENT DELTA-TWO OR DELTA-ONE Events in Progress or Have Occurred Which Indicate a Potential Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant

NOTE: When two or more EALs apply, always choose the EAL of the highest incident classification; also always read from top to bottom in each category.

3 C05
Millstone

MILLSTONE UNIT 3 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

GENERAL EMERGENCY ALPHA | GENERAL EMERGENCY BRAVO | SITE AREA EMERGENCY CHARLIE-TWO | ALERT CHARLIE-ONE | UNUSUAL EVENT DELTA-TWO | UNUSUAL EVENT DELTA-ONE

IN–PLANT RADIATION	SECURITY THREAT/ DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA	FIRE/GASES	JUDGEMENT	CLASSIFICATION
RG1 MAJOR FUEL DAMAGE — Mode ALL 1. Valid RE04A/05A Reading > 2,000 R/hr 2. At Least 20% Fuel Clad Damage As Determined By Core Damage Estimate 3. Spent Fuel is Exposed from Water Loss from Open Vessel, Cavity, Or SF Pool AND BOTH of the Following: • Spent Fuel Has Decayed < 30 Days • Release Can Bypass CTMT	**TG1** SECURITY EVENT — Mode ALL 1. Loss of Physical Control of the Control Room 2. Loss of Physical Control of Remote Shutdown Capability		**JG1** JUDGEMENT — Mode ALL Other Conditions Exist For Which Judgement Indicates: 1. Actual Or Imminent Substantial Core Degradation With Potential For Loss Of Containment, OR 2. Potential For Uncontrolled Radiological Releases. These Releases Can Be Reasonably Expected To Exceed EPA PAG Plume Exposure Levels Outside The Site Boundary	GENERAL EMERGENCY ALPHA OR BRAVO Events in Progress or Have Occurred Which Involve Actual or Imminent Substantial Core Degradation or Melting With Potential for Loss of Containment Integrity
RS1 SPENT FUEL DAMAGE — Mode ALL Spent Fuel is Exposed from Open Vessel, or Cavity AND BOTH of the Following: • Spent Fuel Has Decayed < 30 Days • CTMT Integrity Established	**TS1** SECURITY EVENT — Mode ALL Intrusion into Vital Area by a Hostile Force	**GS1** CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION — Mode ALL Unit Control from Auxiliary Shutdown Panel NOT Established Within 15 Minutes After Control Room Evacuation	**JS1** JUDGEMENT — Mode ALL Other Conditions Exist For Which Judgement Indicates Actual Or Likely Major Failures of Plant Functions Needed For Protecton Of The Public	SITE AREA EMERGENCY **CHARLIE–TWO** Events in Progress or Have Occurred Which Involve Actual or Likely Major Failures of Plant Functions Needed for Protection of the Public
RA1 SPENT FUEL ASSEMBLY DAMAGE — Mode ALL 1. Spent Fuel is Exposed from Open Vessel, Cavity OR SF Pool AND Spent Fuel Has Decayed ≥ 30 Days Fuel Handling Accident Causing Damage to Spent Fuel, Indicated by Fuel Building OR Containment Radiation Monitors Increasing **RA2** PLANT RADIATION — Mode ALL 1. Radiation Readings > 15 mR/hr in Control Room OR Central Alarm Station OR Secondary Alarm Station 2. Radiation Reading > 5 R/hr in Areas Requiring Access for Safe Shutdown	**TA1** SECURITY EVENT — Mode ALL 1. Any on–going or imminent security compromise to the safety of the plant. ② **TA2** DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA — Mode ALL 1. Seismic Event > 0.09g ZPA 2. Onsite Sustained Windspeed > 90 MPH 3. Visible Damage to Structures or Equipment AND Affecting Safe Shutdown 4. Vessel or Vehicle Collision AND Affecting Safe Shutdown 5. Missiles Affecting Safe Shutdown 6. Flooding Affecting Safe Shutdown	**GA1** CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION — Mode ALL Control Room Evacuation Initiated **GA2** FIRE/EXPLOSION — Mode ALL Fire or Explosion Affecting Safe Shutdown Area AND Damage to Structure OR Equipment Indicated **GA3** TOXIC/FLAMMABLE GASES — Mode ALL Life Threatening Toxic Gases OR Flammable Gas Concentrations as Identified in C–OP 200.5, Oil, Hazardous Material, Hazardous Waste and Mixed Waste Contingency Plan Affecting Areas for Safe Shutdown	**JA1** JUDGEMENT — Mode ALL Any Condition For Which Judgement Indicates That Safety Systems May Be Degraded And Which Requires Emergency Response Organization Staffing	ALERT **CHARLIE–ONE** Events in Progress or Have Occurred Which Involve an Actual or Potential Substantial Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant
RU1 RAD MONITORS — Mode ALL 1. Containment OR Fuel Building Area Rad Monitor Alarms Indicate Cavity Seal Failure 2. Unexpected Rad Monitor Reading Offscale High OR > 1000 Times Normal Reading	**TU1** SECURITY EVENT — Mode ALL 1. Security events as determined for Station Safeguards Contingency Plan and reported by Security Shift Supervision. ② 2. A credible site specific security threat notification **TU2** DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA — Mode ALL 1. Seismic Activity Detected Per AOP-3570, Earthquake 2. Report by Plant Personnel of Tornado Striking Within Protected Area 3. Visible Damage to Structures or Equipment Within the Protected Area 4. Onsite Sustained Windspeed > 75 MPH 5. Explosion Within the Protected Area 6. Turbine Failure Causing Observable Casing Damage 7. Vessel or Vehicle Collision With Structures or Equipment Required for Safe Shutdown 8. Flood Level > 19.7 Feet Mean Sea Level 9. Flooding in Areas Containing Safe Shutdown Equipment	**GU1** FIRE — Mode ALL Fire in Buildings OR Areas Adjacent to Areas Needed for Safe Shutdown NOT Extinguished Within 15 Minutes of Control Room Notification OR Verification of Control Room Alarms **GU2** TOXIC/FLAMMABLE GASES — Mode ALL 1. Life Threatening Toxic Gases OR Flammable Gas Concentrations as Identified in C–OP 200.5, Oil, Hazardous Material, Hazardous Waste and Mixed Waste Contingency Plan Affecting Normal Operation 2. Notification of a Near-Site Release That May Require Evacuation	**JU1** JUDGEMENT — Mode ALL Any Condition For Which Judgement Indicates Potential Degradation in the Level of Safety of the Plant	UNUSUAL EVENT **DELTA–TWO** **OR** **DELTA–ONE** Events in Progress or Have Occurred Which Indicate a Potential Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant

NOTE: When two or more EALs apply, always choose the EAL of the highest incident classification; also always read from top to bottom in each category.

AREAS OF CONCERN FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN

- Containment Building
- Auxiliary Building
- Control Building
- Main Steam Valve Building
- Demineralized Water Storage Tank
- ESF Building
- Intake Structure
- Station Transformers
- Emergency Generator Enclosure
- Fuel Building

3 COG

Millstone

MILLSTONE 3 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS BARRIER FAILURE REFERENCE TABLE

IMMINENT - No Turnaround in Safety System Performance is Expected AND Escalation to General Emergency Conditions Will Occur Within 2 Hours

INDICATORS	FUEL CLAD BARRIER	RCS BARRIER	CTMT BARRIER
STATUS TREES	FCB1 LOSS L Core Cooling - RED POTENTIAL LOSS P Core Cooling - ORANGE P Heat Sink - RED AND BOTH of the Following: • Required Feedwater Flow Can NOT Be Established Within 15 Minutes • RCS Feed and Bleed Can NOT Be Established	RCB1 LOSS Not Applicable POTENTIAL LOSS P RCS Integrity - RED P Heat Sink - RED AND Required Feedwater Flow Can NOT Be Established Within 15 Minutes	CNB1 LOSS Not Applicable POTENTIAL LOSS P Containment - RED
CORE EXIT TC TEMPERATURES	FCB2 LOSS L Core Exit TC Temperatures > 1200 °F POTENTIAL LOSS P Core Exit TC Temperatures > 718 °F	RCB2 LOSS L RCS Subcooling < 32 °F Due to RCS Leak (115°F Adverse CTMT) POTENTIAL LOSS Not Applicable	CNB2 LOSS Not Applicable POTENTIAL LOSS P Entry Into FR-C.1, Response to Inadequate Core Cooling, or FR-C.2, Response to Degraded Core Cooling with RVLMS ≤ 19% (Plenum) AND Core Exit TC Temperatures Do NOT Decrease Within 15 Minutes
PRESSURE		RCB3 LOSS Not Applicable POTENTIAL LOSS P Uncontrolled RCS Pressure Decrease and Increasing Containment Radiation Monitors	CNB3 LOSS L Rapid Unexplained CTMT Pressure Decrease Following Initial Increase L No CTMT Pressure Increase When Expectation Exists POTENTIAL LOSS P CTMT Pressure ≥ 60 PSIA AND Increasing P CTMT H_2 Concentration ≥ 4%
COOLANT LEAKAGE		RCB4 LOSS L Entry Into E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture" AND Reactor Coolant Leak > Capacity of One Charging Pump POTENTIAL LOSS P Reactor Coolant Leak > Capacity of One Charging Pump AND ANY of the following: • Entry into E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection" • Entry into AOP 3555, "Reactor Coolant Leak" • Entry into AOP 3576, "Steam Generator Tube Leak" P Entry into E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture" AND Reactor Coolant Leak ≤ Capacity of One Charging Pump	CNB4 LOSS L Primary to Secondary Leakage > Tech Spec Limits AND Unisolable Secondary Release to the Environment (Does NOT Include Normal Cycling of S/G Atmospheric Dump Valves or Safety Valves) L Failure of BOTH Isolation Valves AND a Pathway to the Environment Exists L Entry Into ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment, Is Required AND Reactor Coolant Leakage is Verified POTENTIAL LOSS P Entry Into ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment
RADIATION	FCB3 LOSS L RE-04A/05A Reading > 500 R/hr L RE-04A/05A Reading > 5 R/hr Without RCS Release L At Least 5% Fuel Clad Damage As Determined By Core Damage Estimate L Dose Rate at One Foot from Unpressurized RCS Sample ≥ 30 mR/hr/ml POTENTIAL LOSS Not Applicable	RCB5 LOSS L RE-04/05A Reading > 5 R/hr Without Fuel Clad Barrier Loss POTENTIAL LOSS Not Applicable	CNB5 LOSS L Offsite Dose Plume Rate ≥ 10^{-6} Times RE-04A/RE-05A Reading if Coolant Loss is to CTMT POTENTIAL LOSS P RE-04A/05A Reading > 2,000 R/hr P At Least 20% Fuel Clad Damage As Determined By Core Damage Estimate
WATER LEVEL	FCB4 LOSS Not Applicable POTENTIAL LOSS P RVLMS ≤ 19% (Plenum)		CNB6 LOSS L No CTMT Sump Level Increase When Expectation Exists POTENTIAL LOSS Not Applicable
JUDGEMENT	FCB4 Any Condition For Which Judgement Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of Fuel Clad Barrier Due to: • Imminent Barrier Degradation Based On Current Safety System Performance • Degraded Fission Barrier Monitoring Capability Making Barrier Status Indeterminate	RCB6 Any Condition For Which Judgement Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of RCS Barrier Due to: • Imminent Barrier Degradation Based On Current Safety System Performance • Degraded Fission Barrier Monitoring Capability Making Barrier Status Indeterminate	CNB7 Any Condition For Which Judgement Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of CTMT Barrier Due to: • Imminent Barrier Degradation Based On Current Safety System Performance • Degraded Fission Barrier Monitoring Capability Making Barrier Status Indeterminate



MORE THAN ONE BARRIER AFFECTED

ONLY ONE BARRIER AFFECTED



3
Millstone

Docket Nos. 50-245
50-336
50-423
B18725

Attachment 12

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3

Emergency Procedures Implementing (EPI) Functional Administrative Procedure (FAP)
MP-26-EPI-FAP07, "Notifications and Communications"
Major Revision 2, Minor Revision 1

2/13/02
Approval Date

2/14/02
Effective Date

Document Action Request

SPG# 020312-085056

A

Initiated By: Patti Luckey Date: 5/20/02 Department: EPD Ext.: 5474

Document No.: MP-26-EPI-FAP07 Rev. No.: 002 Minor 01

Title: Notifications and Communications

For New Documents only → ☐ QA RI Title

B

Reason for Request/Action (attach commitments, CRs, ARs, OEs etc)

AR 02001547-17

Continued ☐

Select one if performing a change *(See MP-05-DC-SAP01 sect 2.3 to determine type of change)*

C

☐ Intent Change *(Tech IR, SQR Independent, RCD, Env Screen Required)* *Other reviews may be required See MP-05-DC-FAP 01 1 att 3*

☐ Edit Corr.:

☒ Non-Intent Change *(Only Tech IR, SQR IR and Env signature Required)*

D

Editorial Correction Approval

Plant Mgmt Staff Member - Approval

TPC Interim Approval

(1) Plant Mgmt Staff Member Print/Sign/Date

(2) SM/SRO/CFH Print/Sign/Date

E

Procedure Request/Feedback Disposition

Priority: ☒ Perform Now ☐ Perform Later

Activity: ☐ *Revision* ☒ *Minor Revision* *See DC-GDL01 for guidance* ☐ Cleanup Rev ☐ Biennial Review ☐ Cancellation ☐ Supercedure

☐ TPC ☐ OTC ☐ Place in VOID

F

Reviews continued ☒	Print	Sign	Date	SQR Qualified Yes	SQR Qualified No	SQR Qualified Dept.	✓ If Comments
☐				☐	☐		
Environmental Screen ☒	Kathleen Burgess	Kathleen Burgess	6/6/02	☒	☐	EPD	
50.54(8) ☒	Kathleen Burgess	Kathleen Burgess	6/11/02	☒	☐	EPD	
Licensing Basis ☐							
Tech Independent ☒	John Fuller	[signature]	5/31/02			~~EPD~~ NTD	✓ 6/12 JF

G

An NRRL Update Required ☒ YES

H

1. ☒ SQR Program Final Review and Approval

Approval ☑ Disapproval ☐

[signature] 6/14/02
SQR Qualified Independent Reviewer / Date

Patti A Luckey
Dept Head / Responsible Individual

6/24/02
Approval Date

2 Final Review and Approval

☐ SORC ☐ RI/DH *(Ref Mans, GDLs, Handbooks)*

DH / RI Sign

Meeting No

SORC Signature

DH / RI Signature

Approval Date

I

Effective Date: 7/19/02

Functional Administrative Procedure

Millstone Station

Notifications and Communications

MP-26-EPI-FAP07

Rev. 002-01

Approval Date: 6/24/02

Effective Date: 7/9/02



TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. PURPOSE

1.1 Objective

Provide guidance to the Shift Technician, or other qualified ENRS operator, for performing prompt notifications of reportable events classified as NRC and State Posture Code emergency events.

1.2 Applicability

Conditions exist which have been assessed by the Shift Manager/DSEO and classified as an emergency.

Conditions have been stabilized and the DSEO is preparing to terminate the emergency and enter into Recovery.

1.3 Supporting Documents

EPI-FAP06, "Classification and PARs"

EPA-REF08B, "Millstone Emergency Plan Resource Book"

1.4 Discussion

This procedure ensures timely completion of the following, in descending order of priority:

- Notification of the State of Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (DEP)
- Notification of other offsite entities (i.e., Local, State)
- Notification of the NRC
- Performance of additional notifications (Information Technology, ANI, Corporate etc.)
- Performance of administrative actions

Reporting time limits for NRC and State Posture Code emergency events are as follows:

- Regulations require that notification to CT State DEP, Division of Radiation, and to the local officials shall be accomplished within 15 minutes of an emergency event classification (e.g., Unusual Event and above).
- NRC regulations require the licensee to notify the NRC immediately after notification of state and local agencies, but not later than one hour after declaration of an emergency classification.

In situations involving multiple events at different units, the event classification reported shall reflect the most severe event. For example, if Unit 2 is experiencing an Alert (Charlie-One) event and Unit 3 is experiencing a Site Area Emergency (Charlie-Two) event, the event shall be reported as a Site Area Emergency (Charlie-Two) event. The lesser event shall be reported in an update radiopager message. Both events shall be reported to the NRC via the ENS.

The IRF is processed with the "Additional Information" section being filled in and recorded.

If an IRF is to be released and the circumstances or conditions which caused the report have already been corrected, only one IRF is required. The following applies:

- The event is self terminating with the release of the initial IRF.
- The "A further report will not be given" block shall be checked.

For events that activate the SERO, the on-shift Unit 3 Shift Technician may be relieved of notification responsibilities by an on-call Shift Technician in the EOF. In this case, a formal turnover of notification responsibilities from the control room to the EOF is required.

Definitions and abbreviations are contained in Attachment 1.

Responsibilities are contained in Attachment 2.

2. INSTRUCTIONS

2.1 Nuclear Incident Report Form (IRF) Radiopager Notification

2.1.1 Log onto the ENRS terminal.

2.1.2 Complete a written copy of EPI-FAP07-001, "Nuclear Incident Report Form (IRF)."

NOTE

1. Meteorological data is available from SPDS or OFIS.
2. If the release pathway is unknown, the Met Tower 142' elevation data should be used.
3. The CR-DSEO or the ADEOF should be consulted for the appropriate Met data for the release path.

2.1.3 Enter meteorological data as follows:

- IF data is available, verify the appropriate Met Tower level reading is being used and enter data in "Current Site Wind" and "Forecast Site Wind" sections.
- IF data is not available, enter NA in the "Current Site Wind" and "Forecast Site Wind" sections.

2.1.4 Obtain DSEO authorization signature on the written IRF.

2.1.5 Open "RapidReach Primary" folder and "RapidReach" icon.

2.1.6 At "RapidReach Login" screen, select user ID and enter the password.

2.1.7 Open "EasyView" icon.

2.1.8 At "EasyView Login" screen, select user ID and enter the password.

2.1.9 IF ENRS primary is not operable, Refer To Section 2.7 and perform backup or remote operation.

NOTE

A loss of the Flanders line will cause total loss of the ENRS primary server *and* loss of the local area network (LAN). ENRS can be activated using the backup server via a modem.

2.1.10 IF the Flanders line is lost, Go To Section 2.7.7 and perform backup from modem.

2.1.11 Enter IRF data, as follows:

a. Open "IRF" form.

b. Using the completed EPI-FAP07-001, enter the information into IRF template.

c. Print IRF and verify information is correct.

2.1.12 Obtain DSEO initials on the IRF printout.

2.1.13 Save IRF as follows:

a. Select "File" and "Print."

NOTE

Saving the IRF form to "Print-2-Image" attaches the fax to the radiopager message.

b. Select "Print-2-Image."

c. At the "Selection Configuration" box, select appropriate setup.

d. At the "Select Message to Fax" screen, select "Root" tree.

e. At the "Root" tree, select appropriate message (e.g., Emergency Call-Outs, etc.).

f. Maximize "RapidReach" screen

g. Select "microphone" icon ("Show Message Window").

2.1.14 Transmit IRF message as follows:

a. At "Root" tree, select appropriate message.

b. Listen to the "Alpha Pager Message" and verify information is correct (message may be recorded again, if necessary).

c. Maximize "EasyView" screen and select appropriate scenario.

d. Select the lightning bolt icon.

e. Select "Set Common Message."

f. At "Root" tree, select appropriate message (e.g., Emergency Call-Outs, etc.).

CAUTION

1. Failure to select the correct scenario (i.e., classification or group page) may result in unwarranted activation or the release of misinformation.
2. The scenario and message must be read and verified before selecting the "Start" button.

g. Stop and verify scenario and message are accurate.

h. At "Start of Scenario" screen, select "Start."

2.1.15 IF the wrong scenario has been chosen, perform the following:

a. Immediately terminate callout from EasyView.

b. Notify the appropriate SM/DSEO of the incorrect message.

c. Direct Security at SAS to transmit retraction to state and local responders and SERO using backup paging terminal.

d. Provide Security with a retraction message such as "DISREGARD PREVIOUS EVENT MESSAGE. A NEW PAGER MESSAGE WILL FOLLOW."

e. WHEN retraction message is received, Refer To Step 2.1.14 and transmit corrected message.

2.1.16 IF access to the EOF OR TSC has been restricted, notify SAS to transmit the following text message(s) to SERO responders: ①

- "Access to (EOF)(TSC) restricted. Report to backup location."
- "Do not report to site. Standby for more info."

NOTE

Recording the IRF audio message shall be completed immediately after transmitting the IRF message and prior to Step 2.1.19. ①

2.1.17 Record IRF data, as follows:

a. Maximize "RapidReach" screen.

b. Select "microphone" icon ("Show Message Window").

c. At "Root" tree, select "Informational Message."

d. At "Audio Message" screen, select "microphone" icon.

e. Record entire IRF.

f. Verify recorded information is satisfactory and select "OK."

NOTE

Attachment 3, "Notification Locations," provides information on which individuals and agencies are notified.

2.1.18 Verify radiopager sent, as follows:

a. Monitor the "RapidReach Overview" screen and select the most recent scenario number from call-out grid box (the top box) to verify appropriate groups or individuals have been paged.

b. Verify that the page message was sent to the control room console pager.

c. IF no responders call in within 5 minutes after release of the message, consider the transmission as failed and Refer To Section 2.8, "ENRS Failure."

d. Monitor "EasyView" and "RapidReach" screens as positions call back acknowledging page.

2.1.19 IF Alert or higher classification, Refer To Section 2.4 and activate the ERDS link.

2.1.20 Verify fax is received in respective control room or EOF, as applicable.

2.1.21 At "Overview" screen, print "Groups-in-Call-Out" callback verification report.

2.1.22 IF SERO is activated, fax initial CV report (SERO results) to the MOR.

2.1.23 IF call-out is complete or a new call-out needs to be initiated, select the red traffic light in "EasyView" to deactivate the call-out process.

2.1.24 IF ENRS is not operable, Refer To Section 2.8, "ENRS Failure," and EPA-REF08B, "Millstone Emergency Plan Resource Book," Section "Off-Site Town/Agencies," and manually fax notifications to state and local officials.

- End of Section 2.1 -

2.2 Callback Verification

NOTE

Attachment 3, "Notification and Callback Guidance," provides guidance for verification of required actions.

2.2.1 IF the following have not called in, attempt callback verification within approximately 15 minutes after event message has been transmitted:

- State of Connecticut DEP Dispatch
- State and local responders

NOTE

Callback verification via printed CV report can not be performed from a "client" server if the radiopager message was transmitted via "EasyView Remote." This information can be obtained from Building 475 server or EOF phone server only. (IT assistance required)

2.2.2 Print CV report (i.e., report by group) to document callback responses.

2.2.3 Refer To CV report and perform the following:

a. Document non-responders.

NOTE

1. Only one attempt is required for a UE backup notification.
2. The group RADIOPAGER number for State/Local pagers is 860-332-0059.

b. Refer To EPA-REF08B and attempt one backup notification of non-responders.

c. IF event is ALERT or higher and non-responders cannot be reached, perform the following:

1) Contact State Police Barracks Dispatcher (Troop E)

2) Request immediate assistance in notifying non-responders.

3) Request police confirm response to the message.

d. Perform backup notifications.

2.2.4 Print copy of SERO CV report only and fax to EOF.

2.2.5 Print the final ENRS CV report when initial and backup notifications have been completed.

- End of Section 2.2 -

2.3 NRC Notifications

NOTE

1. State of Connecticut posture codes, (e.g., Delta-One, etc.) shall not be used when notifying the NRC of reportable events.
2. It is good practice to notify the NRC of the next planned report, e.g., one hour.

2.3.1 Record applicable information for an event on EPI-FAP07-003, "NRC Event Notification Form."

2.3.2 Refer To and complete EPI-FAP07-002, "NRC Notification Checklist."

2.3.3 IF ENS is *not* operable, Go To Section 2.9, "ENS Failure."

- End of Section 2.3 -

2.4 Additional Notifications

NOTE

ERDS activation is required for an Alert or higher classification.

2.4.1 Activating the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS)

a. At plant process computer terminal for Unit 2:

1) Locate the Unit 2 PPC TOP_MENU display.

2) Select the SPDS button.

3) Select the Initiate ERDS button to activate ERDS transmission.

4) Select Yes to confirm activation.

b. At plant process computer terminal for Unit 3:

1) Select NSSS menu page 3 of 3.

2) Select Function F11 Activate/Terminate ERDS.

3) Select Function F1 to activate ERDS transmission.

4) Select Function F12 to confirm activation.

c. Verify ERDS activation as follows:

1) At the Unit 2 or Unit 3 TOP_MENU display of an OFIS terminal, select OFIS menu button.

2) Select ERDS Point List button.

3) Verify "Data Transmission to the NRC ERDS" is "INITIATED."

NOTE

"ERDS Status" shows the current status of the modem connection with the NRC. By design, the NRC will refuse the first connection request. ERDS send software will automatically retry the connection until a connection is established. If the connection is lost during an ERDS session, the ERDS send software will try to reconnect. The NRC should accept the second connection request.

4) Verify "ERDS Status" is "Link Active."

5) IF "ERDS Status" has not changed to "Link Active" after 3 minutes, notify IT of an ERDS connection failure.

NOTE

The time of the last data transmission should update every 15 seconds, as long as the link is active.

6) WHEN a "Link Active" status is obtained, verify "Time of Last Data Transmission to the NRC" has been updated.

d. Contact the NRC to verify ERDS data is being received.

2.4.2 Ensure American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) is notified.

2.4.3 IF an Unusual Event or higher, Refer To EPA-REF08B, "Millstone Emergency Plan Resource Book," and notify the Richmond Control Center Security Specialist.

- End of Section 2.4 -

2.5 Sending Additional IRF Messages

NOTE

The following "scenario message" should be used if SERO is activated and additional messages are required, including the event termination message, because the SERO is not required to call in once activated.

"SERO ACTIVATED – SEND ADD'L MESSAGES"

This scenario was designed to page BOTH groups (State and Local Officials and SERO) but only requires state and local officials to call in.

2.5.1 IF any of the following conditions occur, Refer To Step 2.1.2 and perform notifications:

- SERO is activated and additional messages are required. Select the "SERO Activated – Send Add'l Messages," scenario.
- Update or reclassification notifications are directed.
- The emergency has been terminated and was not closed out in initial report.

2.5.2 IF all existing events have been terminated and callback verifications have been completed, perform the following:

a. Refer To Section 2.6 and restore ENRS general default message.

b. Perform ENRS log-off.

- End of Section 2.5 -

2.6 System Restoration and Administrative Actions

2.6.1 Ensure all CV reports are finished.

2.6.2 IF all existing events have been terminated and callback verifications are complete, restore general default as follows:

a. Select "RapidReach."

b. Select "microphone" icon. ("Show Message Window")

c. At "Root" tree, select "Informational Message."

d. At "Audio Message" screen, select "microphone" icon.

e. Record the following message:

"There is no information presently available for Millstone Station."

f. Verify recorded information is satisfactory and select "OK."

g. From "Root" tree, select event message used ("Emergency Call-Outs," etc.).

h. Select red minus button in fax box on lower right of screen.

i. Select "Yes" to delete and observe "Same as alpha pager" in fax message box.

j. Close the following:

1) "RapidReach"

2) "EasyView"

3) "IRF" word document

2.6.3 Review IRFs and verify appropriate termination message has been issued.

2.6.4 Obtain original of the following documents for the applicable unit control room:

- EPI-FAP07-001, "Nuclear Incident Report Form (IRF)," and printout.
- EPI-FAP07-002, "NRC Notification Checklist," as applicable.
- EPI-FAP07-003, "NRC Event Notification Form."
- ENRS callback verification report printout (CV report).
- Any other completed attachments.

2.6.5 Send copies of the following documents to the Manager, Emergency Preparedness Department:

- EPI-FAP07-001, "Nuclear Incident Report Form (IRF)" and printout.
- EPI-FAP07-002, "NRC Notification Checklist," as applicable.
- EPI-FAP07-003, "NRC Event Notification Form"
- ENRS callback verification report printout (CV report)
- Any other completed attachments
- Condition Report (if applicable)
- Log entries, as applicable

- End of Section 2.6 -

2.7 Backup and Remote Operation

2.7.1 IF "RapidReach Primary" does not connect, open "RapidReach Backup."

2.7.2 IF "RapidReach Backup" connects, Refer To Section 2.10, "Switching Telephone Lines," and transfer the phones.

2.7.3 IF "RapidReach Backup" connects and phone lines transfer correctly, go to Section 2.1, and perform the same steps as for "RapidReach Primary" using "RapidReach Backup" and "EasyView Backup."

NOTE

If unable to connect to either the primary or backup via the LAN, "RapidReach" may not be used to fax or record the IRF into the "Informational Message." Faxes must then be sent via the SNET Faxworks. If time permits, it is preferable to use "EasyView Remote" to allow State and local officials and SERO to call in and provide a graphical display of the positions being filled.

2.7.4 IF "RapidReach Backup" using LAN does not connect (leaving the phone lines in primary), select the icon labeled "Modem to Primary Server."

2.7.5 IF the connection is made, select "EasyView Remote" from the "RapidReach Primary" folder and perform the following:

a. Select a scenario.

b. Select lightening bolt.

c. Set the common message.

d. Select "Start."

e. Refer To Step 2.8.3 and distribute IRF via SNET Faxworks.

f. IF access to the EOF OR TSC has been restricted, notify SAS to transmit the following text message(s) to SERO responders: ①

- "Access to (EOF)(TSC) restricted. Report to backup location."
- "Do not report to site. Standby for more info."

g. Refer To Section 2.4 and activate the ERDS link.

2.7.6 IF "EasyView Remote Primary" does *not* connect, open "RapidReach Backup" folder and select the icon labeled "Backup to EOF."

2.7.7 IF Flanders line is lost, open "RapidReach Backup" folder, and select the icon labeled "Backup to EOF."

2.7.8 IF the connection is made, open "EasyView Remote" from the "RapidReach Backup" folder and perform the following:

a. Refer To Section 2.10 and transfer the phones from primary to secondary server.

b. Select a scenario.

c. Select lightening bolt.

d. Set the common message.

e. Select "Start."

f. Refer To Step 2.8.3, and distribute IRF via SNET Faxworks.

g. IF access to the EOF OR TSC has been restricted, notify SAS to transmit the following text message(s) to SERO responders: ①

- "Access to (EOF)(TSC) restricted. Report to backup location."
- "Do not report to site. Standby for more info."

h. Refer To Section 2.4, and activate the ERDS link.

i. Monitor "EasyView Remote" screen as positions call back acknowledging screen.

j. IF the following have not called in, attempt callback verification within approximately 15 minutes after event message has been transmitted:

- State of Connecticut DEP Dispatch
- State and local responders

k. Refer To EPA-REF08B and attempt one backup notification of non-responders.

l. IF event is ALERT or higher and non-responders cannot be reached, perform the following:

1) Contact State Police Barracks Dispatcher (Troop E)
2) Request immediate assistance in notifying non-responders.
3) Request police confirm response to the message.

2.7.9 IF phone lines were transferred to the back-up phone server, perform the following:

a. Complete all call-outs.

b. Refer To Step 2.10.2, and restore phone lines to the primary system.

2.7.10 IF no connection is made, Go To Section 2.8 and notify Security.

- End of Section 2.7 -

2.8 ENRS Failure

2.8.1 Notify SAS to transmit a text message to both State and local officials and SERO responders to include the following:

- [Applicable unit] [NRC Classification] [State Posture code] [Major EAL heading] [Minor EAL heading (code)] "Report to facility."
- Example: [MP3] [GE] [Alpha] [Barrier failure] [BG1] "Report to facility."

2.8.2 IF SAS is not able to assist, perform the following:

a. Dial paging system using confidential group page codes for the State and Local Officials and the SERO.

b. When prompted, enter the password.

c. Refer To Attachment 4, "Unit Event Backup Codes," and enter numeric backup event code.

NOTE

1. This section is performed *only* when ENRS has failed or radiopager transmission was performed via "EasyView Remote."
2. A fax cover sheet is not required when distributing the IRF via SNET FaxWorks.

2.8.3 Distribute IRF via SNET FaxWorks as follows:

a. IF SNET FaxWorks is not operable, Refer To EPA-REF08B, "Offsite Towns/Agencies," and manually fax notification to State and local officials.

b. Place completed IRF in fax machine feeder tray.

c. Lift handset connected to fax machine, and enter SNET FaxWorks telephone number.

d. When prompted for password, enter SNET Faxworks password followed by an asterisk (*).

e. When prompted, enter "1" to send a fax.

f. When prompted for choice of fax transmission schedule, enter "1" for immediate dispatch.

g. When prompted for destination or distribution list number, enter "002" followed by an asterisk (*).

h. When prompted for next destination, enter pound key (#) to indicate there are no more destinations.

i. When a steady fax tone is heard, press the "Start" button on the telecopier.

j. Hang up handset of fax machine.

NOTE

ERDS is not activated for a Unit 1 event.

2.8.4 Refer To Section 2.4 and activate the ERDS link.

2.8.5 Verify all required call-in radiopager holders have received the radiopager message and fax as follows:

a. Document non-responders.

NOTE

1. Only one attempt is required for a UE backup notification.
2. The group RADIOPAGER number for State/Local pagers is 860-332-0059.

b. Refer To EPA-REF08B and attempt one backup notification of non-responders.

c. IF event is ALERT or higher and non-responders cannot be reached, perform the following:

1) Contact State Police Barracks Dispatcher (Troop E)

2) Request immediate assistance in notifying non-responders.

3) Request police confirm response to the message.

d. Perform backup notifications.

2.8.6 Refer To EPA-REF08B, "Millstone Emergency Plan Resource Book," and notify Information Technology of ENRS failure.

2.8.7 Refer To EPI-FAP07-002, "NRC Notification Checklist," and ensure NRC notifications have been performed.

2.8.8 Refer To EPA-REF08B, "Millstone Emergency Plan Resource Book," and notify the Richmond Control Center Security Specialist.

- End of Section 2.7 -

2.9 ENS Failure

NOTE

1. This section is performed only when dedicated ENS lines have failed.
2. In an emergency, with loss of other communications, the state or local police may be contacted by radio and requested to place a call to the NRC.

2.9.1 IF ENS has failed, select one of the following methods, as applicable:

- Commercial telephone line
- Cellular telephone (station management or personal vehicle)
- Radio (state or local police to place call)

2.9.2 Obtain NRC Operations Center number from one of the following:

- Label on ENS telephone
- EPA-REF08B,"Millstone Emergency Plan Resource Book"
- Other listing or directory assistance (alternate number)

2.9.3 WHEN NRC is contacted, provide the following information:

a. ENS is not operable

b. Information recorded in EPI-FAP07-003, "NRC Event Notification Form"

c. IF event is being terminated via the report, notice of event termination.

2.9.4 Refer To EPA-REF08B, "Millstone Emergency Plan Resource Book," and notify telecommunications personnel (not on-call) of ENS failure.

2.9.5 Log NRC communications.

- End of Section 2.9 -

2.10 Switching Telephone Lines

NOTE

If the ENRS primary phone server is down, a communication failure has occurred. Telephone lines will need to be switched to the secondary phone server.

2.10.1 Switching the Phone Server from Primary to Secondary

a. Lift the dedicated ENRS handset.

b. Press position "g" (blue button) labeled "Press for SERO Transfer."

c. Dial "2724."

d. Wait for confirmation tone (3 beeps).

e. IF confirmation tone is *not* heard, Go To Step 2.10.1.a.

NOTE

The light will stay on to indicate the successful transfer of telephone lines.

f. Hang up the handset and observe light on position "g" (blue button) illuminates, indicating transfer of SERO telephone lines.

g. Lift the dedicated ENRS handset again.

h. Press position "i" (red button) labeled, "Press for Transfer of State/Local to Back-up" and observe the following:

- Light on position "i" (red button) will illuminate for a few seconds and then turn off.
- Light on position "h" (yellow button) labeled, "Light 'ON' State/Local on Backup," will illuminate and stay on, indicating a transfer of State/Local lines.

i. Hang up the handset.

j. IF either OR both lights fail to illuminate, Go To Step 2.10.1.h.

NOTE

If the ENRS phone server is on the secondary system, green lights will be illuminated on the telephone.

2.10.2 Restoring the Phone Server from Secondary to Primary

a. Press position "g" (blue button) labeled "Press for SERO Transfer."

b. Observe that the light on position "g" (blue button) is not lit, indicating transfer of SERO lines.

2.10.3 Restoring the State/Local Lines to the Primary Server

a. Lift the dedicated ENRS handset.

b. Press position "j" (green button) labeled "Press to Restore State/Local to Primary" and observe the following:

- Light on position "j" (green button) labeled "Press to Restore State/Local to Primary" is lit.

NOTE

Lights on position "h" and position "j" will go out after illumination.

- Light on position "h" (yellow button) labeled "Light 'ON' State/Local on Backup" is not lit.
- Light on position "j" (green button) labeled "Press to Restore State/Local to Primary" is not lit.

- End of Section 2.10 -

2.11 Deactivating ERDS

2.11.1 At plant process computer terminal for Unit 2:

a. Locate the Unit 2 PPC TOP_MENU display.

b. Select the SPDS button.

c. Select the Terminate ERDS button to terminate ERDS transmission.

d. Select Yes to confirm termination.

2.11.2 At plant process computer terminal for Unit 3:

a. Select NSSS menu page 3 of 3.

b. Select Function F11 Activate/Terminate ERDS.

c. Select Function F2 to terminate ERDS transmission.

d. Select Function F12 to confirm termination.

2.11.3 Verify ERDS Termination as follows:

a. At the Unit 2 or Unit 3 TOP_MENU display of an OFIS terminal, select OFIS menu button.

b. Select ERDS Point List button.

c. Verify "Data Transmission to the NRC ERDS" is "TERMINATED."

d. Verify "ERDS Status" is "ERDS Link Not Connected."

e. Verify "Time of Last Data Transmission to the NRC" is no longer updating.

- End of Section 2.11 -

3. SUMMARY OF CHANGES

3.1 Revision 002-01

3.1.1 Added steps 2.1.16, 2.7.5.f, 2.7.8.g to provide notification to SERO if access to the EOF or TSC has been restricted.

3.1.2 Note 2.1.17, corrected typographical error.

3.2 Revision 002

3.2.1 Changed EPUG 08B to EPA-REF08B in section 1.3, step 2.1.18, 2.2.3.b, 2.4.3, 2.8.3.a, 2.8.5.b, 2.8.6, 2.8.8, 2.9.2, 2.9.4, and FAP07-002.

3.2.2 Added note and steps 2.1.10, 2.7.7, and 2.7.8 to provide instructions on responding to a loss of the Flanders line.

3.2.3 Clarified in step 2.1.15 that callout is terminated from EasyView.

3.2.4 Clarified in steps 2.1.17.e and 2.8.4 note that ERDS is activated for an Alert or higher.

3.2.5 Updated title in step 2.6.5 to the Manager, Emergency Preparedness Department.

3.2.6 Added step in 2.7.5 to distribute IRF via SNET Faxworks.

3.3 Revision 001-06

3.3.1 Added step 2.1.14 to describe actions if the wrong scenario has been chosen. (AR 01005566-09)

3.4 Revision 001-05

3.4.1 Added steps f and g to step 2.1.12 to clarify how to prepare the IRF for transmittal.

3.5 Revision 001-04

3.5.1 Moved Caution Box and steps g and h from step 2.1.14 to step 2.1.13.

3.6 Revision 001-03

3.6.1 Reversed the order of step 2.1.13 and 2.1.14.

3.6.2 Added Note Box preceding step 2.1.14 to record the IRF voice message immediately after transmitting the IRF.

3.6.3 Added Note Box after Section 2.4 for when ERDS is required to be activated.

3.7 Revision 001-02

3.7.1 Added step 2.1.15.e to activate the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) link.

3.7.2 Added step 2.7.5.d to activate the ERDS link.

3.7.3 Added step 2.8.4 to activate the ERDS link if there is an ENRS failure.

3.8 Revision 001-01

3.8.1 Added notification to Corporate in step 1.4.

3.8.2 Updated group radiopager numbers for state and local pagers in step 2.2.3 and step 2.8.4.

3.8.3 Added step 2.4.3 to notify Richmond Control Center Security Specialist if an Unusual Event or higher.

3.8.4 Added step 2.8.7 to notify the Richmond Control Center Security Specialist.

3.8.5 Deleted the reference to the trunk line to the Corporate exchange in step 2.9.1.

3.8.6 Added Richmond Control Center Security to notification locations in Attachment 3.

Attachment 1
Definitions and Abbreviations

(Sheet 1 of 2)

ADEOF - Assistant Director Emergency Operations Facility

CV - Callback Verification

Deactivate - To place a system, component, or organization in an inactive condition.

Incident Description - "Additional Information" section of the Incident Report Form (IRF) providing a simple description of the event.

Immediate Notification - Notification to the NRC of emergency, not to exceed 60 minutes of state verification.

Initial Report - The first notification to the NRC, State and Local Officials and Agencies, and applicable personnel that reports an NRC classification and State Posture Code emergency event.

Lead Unit - The unit which assumes classification responsibilities for reportable events. The lead unit may be any of the following:

- In unit specific events, the affected unit (For a Unit 1 event, Unit 2 is the lead unit until the DSEO and ADTS arrive).
- For non-unit specific events, (i.e., station security, hurricane, earthquake, fitness for duty, etc.) Unit 3 is the lead unit, unless otherwise designated.
- In situations involving multiple events, the unit experiencing the most severe event has the lead.
- For non-unit specific events (i.e., hurricane, earthquake, etc.), Unit 3 is the lead unit.
- A non-affected unit may be requested to assume the lead by the affected unit (e.g., loss of control room habitability).

Notification Time - The time at which the IRF message is released (reported on).

Prompt Notification - The official notification of State and Local Officials and Agencies is within 15 minutes following initial classification; official notification of the NRC is as soon as possible, but within 60 minutes of State notification via the ENS; and for reclassification of an NRC and State Posture Code emergency event. [State 22a-135-1]

Reclassification Report - A prompt notification, subsequent to the initial report, to State and Local Officials and Agencies, the NRC, and applicable personnel that reports an escalation or de-escalation of event classification relative to the previous report.

Attachment 1
Definitions and Abbreviations
(Sheet 2 of 2)

SM - Shift Manager

Termination Report - The final notification to State and Local Officials and Agencies, the NRC, and applicable personnel that reports termination of the event. For Unusual Event (Delta-Two) or lower events, the initial report may also serve as the termination report if the event has been corrected in time for the initial report or has self-terminated. The "Additional Information" section shall be completed in these instances with a termination message.

UE - Unusual Event

Update Report - A notification, subsequent to the initial report, to State and Local Officials and Agencies, the NRC, and applicable personnel, that reports additional information on the event, but does not escalate or de-escalate classification of the event. The Update Report is issued approximately 60 minutes after the Initial or Reclassification Report.

Attachment 2
Responsibilities

(Sheet 1 of 1)

1. The CR-DSEO is responsible for directing the Shift Technician (ST) to complete notifications and approving Incident Report Forms (IRFs) until relieved by the DSEO.

2. The ST is responsible for completing off-site notifications.

3. After the EOF has been activated, the DSEO is responsible for approving completed IRFs; the Manager of Communications (MOC) is responsible for NRC communications; and the Assistant Director of Emergency Operations Facility (ADEOF) is responsible for directing the on-call ST to update and terminate off-site notifications.

Attachment 3
Notification Locations

(Sheet 1 of 1)

Scenario: Unusual Event

Who is Paged:	SERO State and Local Officials (all)
Who is Faxed:	State and Local Officials (all) Unit 2 & 3 Control Rooms Richmond Control Center Security
Who is Called (automatic):	NNM, MRDA, MPI, all Unit ADTSs New London, Ledyard
Who Should Call-In:	14 required State and Local Officials NNM, MRDA, MPI, all Unit ADTSs

Scenario: Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency

Who is Paged:	SERO State and Local Officials (all)
Who is Faxed:	State and Local Officials (all) Unit 2 & 3 Control Room Richmond Control Center Security
Who is Called (automatic):	New London, Ledyard SERO (after 15 minutes)
Who Should Call-In:	14 required State and Local Officials SERO (all)

Attachment 4
Unit Event Backup Codes

(Sheet 1 of 1)

NOTE

If a Unit Event Backup Code notification (e.g., ID 101, 201, 301) is received, ENRS has failed.

Personnel on-call, or subject to call must immediately report to their emergency response facility for an Alert or higher classification. Table 1 indicates the event and unit involved for each designated code. For an Unusual Event, no call-in is required, however, personnel should standing by for further information.

Table 1: Unit Event Backup Codes

Event	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 3
Unusual Event	101	201	301
Alert	102	202	302
Site Area Emergency	N/A	203	303
General Emergency	N/A	303	403
Drill-Come In	777	777	777
Drill-Call In	888	888	888

Attachment 5
Notification and Callback Guidance

(Sheet 1 of 1)

ACTION (✓ = Required)	CLASSIFICATION			
	UE (Delta-1, 2)	ALERT (Charlie 1)	SAE (Charlie 2)	GE (Bravo) (Alpha)
Nuclear IRF:				
• Enter current meteorological data	✓	✓	✓	✓
• Enter "Additional Information" in first message	(a)			
• Enter "Additional Information" in update	✓	✓	✓	✓
• Issue termination in first message	✓(a)			
• Issue termination in update message	✓	✓	✓	✓
CALLBACK/BACKUP NOTIFICATIONS				
• Radiopager (EPI-07-03)	✓	✓	✓	✓
• REQUEST State Police call non-responding towns (EPI-07-03)	✓	✓	✓	✓
OTHER:				
• ENS notification to NRC (b)	✓	✓	✓	✓
• NRC Resident notification	✓	✓	✓	✓

NOTES:

a. An Unusual Event (Delta-One or Delta-Two) may be terminated in the initial report if additional information has been reported.

b. Due to notification to State of CT DEP.

Docket Nos. 50-245
50-336
50-423
B18725

Attachment 13

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3

Emergency Procedures Implementing (EPI) Functional Administrative Procedure (FAP)
MP-26-EPI-FAP08, "Evacuation and Assembly"
Major Revision 0, Minor Revision 5

2/13/02
Approval Date

2/14/02
Effective Date

Document Action Request

SPG# 020425-06 2946

A

Initiated By: Patti Luckey Date: 4/23/02 Department: EPD Ext.: 5474

Document No.: MP-26-EPI-FAP08 Rev. No.: 000 Minor 05

Title: Evacuation and Assembly

For New Documents only → ☐ QA RI Title

B

Reason for Request/Action (attach commitments, CRs, ARs, OEs etc)

AR 02001547-17

Continued ☐

Select one if performing a change *(See MP-05-DC-SAP01 sect 2.3 to determine type of change)*

C

☐ Intent Change *(Tech IR, SQR Independent, RCD, Env Screen Required)* Other reviews may be required. See MP-05-DC-FAP 01 1 att 3

☐ Edit Corr.:

☒ Non-Intent Change *(Only Tech IR, SQR IR and Env signature Required)*

D

Editorial Correction Approval

Plant Mgmt Staff Member - Approval

TPC Interim Approval

(1) Plant Mgmt Staff Member Print/Sign/Date

(2) SM/SRO/CFH Print/Sign/Date

E

Procedure Request/Feedback Disposition

Priority: ☒ Perform Now ☐ Perform Later

Activity: ☐ Revision ☒ Minor Revision (See DC-GDL01 for guidance) ☐ Cleanup Rev ☐ Biennial Review ☐ Cancellation ☐ Supercedure

☐ TPC ☐ OTC ☐ Place in VOID

F

Reviews continued ☒		Print	Sign	Date	SQR Qualified Yes	SQR Qualified No	SQR Qualified Dept.	✓ If Comments
	☐				☐	☐		
50.54(q)	☒	Kathleen Burgess	Kathleen Burgess	6/11/02	☑	☐	EPD	
Environmental Screen	☒	Kathleen Burgess	Kathleen Burgess	6/6/02	☑	☐	EPD	
Licensing Basis	☐							
Tech Independent	☒	John Fuller		5/8/02			NTD	✓

G

An NRRL Update Required ☒ YES

H

1. ☒ SQR Program Final Review and Approval

Approval ☐ Disapproval ☐

6/14/02
SQR Qualified Independent Reviewer / Date

Dept Head / Responsible Individual

6/24/02
Approval Date

2 Final Review and Approval

☐ SORC ☐ RI/DH *(Ref Mans, GDLs, Handbooks)*

DH / RI Sign

Meeting No

SORC Signature

DH / RI Signature

Approval Date

I

Effective Date: 7/19/02

Functional Administrative Procedure

Millstone Station

Evacuation and Assembly

MP-26-EPI-FAP08

Rev. 000-05

Approval Date: 6/24/02

Effective Date: 7/19/02



TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. PURPOSE

1.1 Objective

This procedure provides guidance for actions to protect and account for on-site personnel during an emergency.

1.2 Applicability

Any Unit 2 or 3 Shift Manager or the ADTS may initiate this procedure when warranted by actual or projected environmental, security, radiological, or operational conditions.

Activation of the Station Emergency Response Organization (SERO) is not required to use this procedure.

The affected unit will be the lead unit for implementation. Unit 3 is normally the lead unit for non-unit specific events.

1.3 Supporting Documents

MP-26-EPI-FAP01-001, "CR-DSEO Checklist"

MP-26-EPI-FAP02-001, "ADTS Checklist"

MP-26-EPI-FAP04-001, "DSEO Checklist"

MP-26-EPI-FAP15, "Common Forms"

MP-26-EPA-REF08B, "Millstone Emergency Plan Resource Book " (4)

C OP 200.6, "Storms and other Hazardous Phenomena"

1.4 Discussion

This procedure provides guidance for on-site protective actions for a wide range of events which may include one or more of the following:

- Radiological release
- Fire, steam, or explosion hazards
- Chemical release, including truck or rail accident
- Storm or flood related hazards
- Security-related event (5)

Protective responses to a hazard may include one or more of the following:

- Development of a coordinated plan of action
- Pre-deployment of Security or Health Physics personnel or both
- Early dismissal of selected (non-essential) personnel
- Local area evacuations
- Sheltering personnel
- Accounting for personnel
- Evacuating the protected area or the site

1.4.1 General

Selecting protective actions and coordinating the resources needed to implement those actions is best coordinated through the input and assistance from several groups. Security provides the logistics to facilitate any protective actions involving the movement of personnel; the unaffected unit needs to be informed of protective actions being implemented for operational considerations, and HP and/or Chemistry support the identification of hazardous areas in radiological events. (5)

The time required to complete actions is an important component of on-site protective actions. On-site protection action decisions should consider the following, as appropriate:

- Radiological exposure
- Transportation accidents
- Injury
- Safety and control of plant operations
- Evaluation of constraining conditions (i.e., radiological, security, or chemical threats)
- Consequences of premature or delayed actions

Any of the following protective actions are predicated on the assumption that the conditions support the actions. Since all possible scenario combinations cannot be predicted or proceduralized, timing and implementation of any protective action will be controlled by the SM or ADTS, as appropriate, for the specific situation at the time of the event.

1.4.2 Precautionary Dismissal of Non-Essential Personnel

A precautionary dismissal of non-SERO personnel occurs at the Alert level declaration unless constraints exist, and can be initiated from the Control Room or TSC. The ADTS or CR-DSEO can elect NOT to conduct the precautionary dismissal if the nature of the event warrants such judgement. (5)

A precautionary dismissal directs all non-SERO Millstone employees, contractors, and visitors to leave the site.

1.4.3 Evacuation

A site evacuation is automatically initiated at the Site Area Emergency or General Emergency classification levels unless constraints exist. Site evacuation may be called for at the Alert level classification; however, conditions which require a site evacuation are inherently defined as Site Area Emergency events and should be classified as such. Evacuation can be accomplished in about 30 minutes. (4) (5)

Evacuation can involve the movement of large numbers of personnel outside of the Protected Area by keying out of the turnstiles at the NAP or SAP. Evacuation may warrant station egress control by Security. Following discussion with the Connecticut State Police and the Waterford Police Departments, Security will provide specific instructions to personnel in the parking areas as requested by these off-site authorities. Following dismissal, station personnel may be directed to a specific location for monitoring and decontamination. Other situations which involve the evacuation of personnel from occupied localized areas onsite must be controlled on a case by case basis. (5)

If the main access road is restricted to traffic, alternate egress routes are available for evacuation.

Evacuation may be deferred if the nature of the threat (weather-related, security-related, radiological release) poses a threat to the safety of the evacuating population. (5)

1.4.4 Local Area Evacuation

Local area evacuation is an evacuation of a building, area, unit, or multi-units for the immediate protection of station personnel from a hazard within a limited exposure potential or a Security threat. A local area evacuation needs to be initiated anytime personnel in an occupied area may be at risk from an identified hazard. It is a standard response for control room personnel to take actions immediately upon acknowledging the hazard or threat. (5) (4) (5)

1.4.5 Sheltering

Sheltering is a short-term action taken in specific situations where there is insufficient time available to conduct an evacuation, where the hazard is short lived, or where evacuation would pose a threat to the safety of the evacuating population. If a release or hazard is projected to occur within 30–60 minutes, sheltering in place with subsequent staggered movement of personnel may be considered. (5)

Sheltering could prevent full SERO activation and Emergency Response Facility activation within 60 minutes of an event (i.e., security-related) because of constraints inside the Protected Area.

1.4.6 Relocation of EOF and TSC

Designated backup locations have been established for the EOF and TSC if either of these locations cannot be inhabited. These locations provide facilities for SERO members so that responsibilities can be performed.

EOF relocation will be to the upper level of the TSC (the mechanical room). EOF staff assemble in this location, receive a briefing of the event, and then relocate to the following areas:

Unit 3 Control Room

- DSEO
- MOC (affected unit)
- MPI (5)
- MRDA
- AMRDA (1)
- RAE (1)
- FTDC, after briefing RMTs #3, #4, #5

OSC AA

- ADEOF
- TICs
- MOR
- ST
- HP Tech
- MOC (unaffected unit)
- AMRDA (1)

- RAE (1)
- Rad Com
- Met Assistant
- ERC
- SEPR
- RL

The ADEOF may choose to relocate team members to another location in Building 475 (such as the video conferencing area on the 5th floor) where additional equipment, work space, and other capabilities already exist. Communication can then be established with Control Room SERO members. (5)

RMT #3, #4, #5 will be deployed from upper level TSC.

TSC relocation is the EOF. A designated workspace is provided with procedures, drawings, phone lines, and computers to support current SERO TSC members.

All TSC staff assemble in this location *except* for OSC Assistants. They will report to the OSCAA, establish communications to the relocated TSC, and perform duties from this location.

1.4.7 Assembly

Assembly occurs at the Alert emergency classification level or higher. Non-essential personnel are not involved in assembly activities. The Assembly Areas are used to coordinate the need for any immediate additional resources and to establish a SERO shift relief roster and schedule before personnel are dismissed from the area. (4)

There are two Assembly Areas, one located in the Bldg 475 Cafeteria and one located in the Simulator Foyer. These areas would be used by SERO personnel in the event of a declared emergency. The Cafeteria is designated for SERO personnel whose assigned emergency response facility (TSC, OSC, OSC AA, and Control Room) is inside the protected area. The Simulator Foyer is designated for SERO who report to the EOF. The Assembly Areas serve as "Holding Locations" for SERO personnel until such time as all necessary positions are filled, no need for special expertise or experience for the particular event has been identified, and second shift staffing rotations have been established. (4)

Backup to the Simulator Foyer is the OSC AA. (5)

1.4.8 Accountability

Accountability is automatically conducted at a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency. Accountability may be conducted at the Alert level following SERO activation and the completion of the precautionary dismissal, at the discretion of the SM or ADTS. (4) (4)

Accountability is the process of verifying the location of personnel who are inside the Protected Area. That is, any unaccounted for person that has keyed into the Protected Area (NAP/SAP) and is not keyed into a vital area, the TSC/OSC, or the OSC Assembly Area (cafeteria) will be identified as missing. Accountability is required to be completed within 45 minutes of its initiation (the names of any missing persons identified to the ADTS and announced over the PA).

Accountability targets from the time of the announcement are as follows:

- Personnel have keyed in or notified CAS within 15 minutes.
- Unaccounted personnel have been identified within 30 minutes.
- Names of unaccounted personnel have been announced within 45 minutes.
- Personnel accountability inside the protected area is continuously maintained for the duration of the event.

1.4.9 Definitions and abbreviation are contained in Attachment 1, "Definitions and Abbreviations." Responsibilities are contained in Attachment 2, "Responsibilities." ④

2. INSTRUCTIONS

2.1 Precautionary Dismissal

2.1.1 Assess the nature, probable cause, and duration of the hazard and perform the following: ④

a. IF event is security related and a Security assessment has *not* been completed, delay the dismissal until the assessment is completed by Security.

b. IF event requires sheltering instead of dismissal, Refer To Section 2.2, "Sheltering." ⑤

c. IF event is *not* security related OR a Security assessment has been completed, provide the SSS/MOS with all available information.

d. Consider the status of SERO activation prior to the dismissal of personnel.

2.1.2 Contact SSS/MOS and MRCA to discuss the following:

- Decision to shelter site personnel. ⑤
- Additional personnel assigned to the NAP and SAP to assist in the egress of large numbers of personnel as necessary.
- Use of alternate egress routes, if needed. ⑤
- Estimated time to pre-position personnel to support the dismissal.
- Existence of any local-area or site access restrictions. ④
- Need to sweep areas outside the protected area.
- Need for additional off-site support . ⑤

2.1.3 Notify the following of planned actions and announcements:

a. IF the SERO is in the process of activation, the DSEO and the ADTS.

b. The unaffected unit control room.

2.1.4 Perform the following:

a. Activate the outside speakers.

b. Select station public address system (priority page or 810).

c. IF alternate routes are being used for the dismissal, include instructions in announcement. ⑤

d. Announce the following:

Attention all personnel. Attention all personnel. All non-SERO employees, contractors and visitors leave the site at this time. (4) (5)

(IF alternate routes are being used, provide directions)

e. Repeat the announcement.

f. Log the time the announcement was completed.

2.1.5 IF the public address system is inoperable, consider using the following as alternatives for personnel notification:

- Security sweeps using bull horns (4)
- HP personnel
- O&M radios

2.1.6 WHEN the precautionary dismissal has been completed, DIRECT SSS/MOS to perform accountability. (2)

2.2 Sheltering

2.2.1 IF the event involves a situation where site personnel should be sheltered (i.e., Security-related, weather-related, fire, toxic gas, an evacuation is not possible), perform the following: (5)

a. Determine the nature of the constraint:

- Not enough time to conduct an evacuation (weather-related, rad release).
- Short-lived hazard (chemical, toxic gas)
- Radiological release
- Evacuation would threaten the safety of the evacuees
- Intrusion by a hostile force

b. IF SERO is staffed, contact the following to discuss course of action : (4)

- For radiological-related, MRCA
- For security-related, MOS
- EOF DSEO

c. Inform unaffected unit of the event and sheltering actions planned.

2.2.2 Refer To Attachment 3, "Examples of On-Site Protective Actions and Announcements," and prepare announcement.

2.2.3 Ensure outside speakers are activated.

2.2.4 Review the wording for the station notification message and announce the sheltering instructions. (5)

2.2.5 Repeat the PA announcement.

2.2.6 Log the time of announcement on EPI-FAP15-012, "SERO Log Sheet."

2.2.7 Refer To appropriate section of EPI-FAP01-001 and perform actions.

2.3 Evacuation

NOTE

Evacuation is automatically conducted at a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency unless constraints exist. Other situations which involve the evacuation of personnel from occupied localized areas onsite must be controlled on a case by case basis. (4) (1)

2.3.1 Assess the nature, probable cause, and duration of the hazard.

CAUTION

Movement of personnel should consider potential on-site and off-site constraints.

a. IF the station evacuation is constrained (i.e. security related, weather related, fire or toxic gases), consider delaying evacuation until an assessment has been completed. (5)

1) Notify SSS/MOS of decision *not* to evacuate.

2.3.2 Direct the SSS/MOS to perform the following: (5)

a. IF evacuation via the main access road is restricted, discuss the use of alternate egress routes.

b. Inform Waterford Dispatch of time and purpose of any planned on-site siren activation.

c. Establish and maintain traffic control with the Waterford and Connecticut State Police departments including alternate egress routes, as applicable. (5)

2.3.3 Perform the announcement over the public address system as follows : (5)

a. Activate the outside speakers.

b. Sound the Evacuation Alarm for 30 seconds.

c. Select station public address system (priority page or 810).

d. IF alternate evacuation routes are being used, include instructions in announcement. (5)

e. Announce the following:

Attention all personnel, Attention all personnel. All non-SERO employees, contractors, and visitors evacuate the site at this time. (IF alternate routes are being used, provide directions). **Security initiate accountability.** (4) (5)

f. Repeat the announcement.

g. Log the time of the announcement.

2.3.4 IF public address system is inoperable, consider using the following as alternatives for personnel notification:

- Security sweeps using bull horns
- HP personnel
- O&M radios

2.3.5 Direct the SSS/MOS to perform the following:

a. Coordinate security patrols to sweep the open areas, outdoors, and buildings outside the Protected Area to ensure the message has been received.

b. Verify personnel are moving as instructed and report back on the status.

c. Provide key search accountability results within 30 minutes if not previously conducted. (5)

2.4 Accountability

2.4.1 IF a site evacuation has been conducted, perform the following:

a. Upon declaration of a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency, direct CAS to implement accountability procedures. (4)

b. Within 15 to 25 minutes after station announcement, ensure CAS has run an area summary report or similar printout to account for personnel in the protected area.

c. Within 40 minutes of the announcement to conduct accountability, perform the following: (5)

1) Obtain the missing persons report.

2) Determine the approximate number of personnel who are unaccounted for by badge or telephone call.

3) Notify the ADTS of the results.

d. IF personnel are unaccounted for in the Protected Area, provide the ADTS with the following:

- Name of missing individual
- Last known location of missing individual
- Special access requirements for intended search and rescue route

NOTE

Announcement by name in 45 minutes fulfills the initial accountability commitment.

e. Announce the names of unaccounted personnel over station PA system.

f. Coordinate with the MOSC to initiate the dispatch of Search and Rescue Teams to locate any unaccounted for personnel.

g. Maintain continuous accountability of personnel within the protected area until directed otherwise by the ADTS.

2.5 Assembly

2.5.1 Dispatch the ERC to the Simulator Foyer Assembly Area.

2.5.2 Direct the ERC (in the Simulator Foyer) and the MOSC (in the OSC Assembly Area) to develop a roster of personnel which contains the following information:

a. Name

b. SERO position

c. Home or point of contact number

2.5.3 IF any minimum staffing positions are not filled, perform the following:

a. Obtain qualified personnel from the OSC Assembly Area or Simulator Foyer Assembly Area.

b. IF qualified personnel are not available from the Assembly Areas, Refer To MP-26-EPA-REF08B, "Millstone Emergency Plan Resource Book," and notify an individual for each unstaffed position. (4)

- Refer To EPI-FAP15-011, "Fitness for Duty Questionnaire," and determine if notified personnel are fit for duty.
- IF notified personnel are determined fit for duty, request personnel to report to the EOF.
- Upon arrival, coordinate access for the responders into the Protected Area with Security as necessary.

2.5.4 Determine if any of the emergency facilities require the assistance of additional personnel and coordinate their movement as necessary.

2.5.5 IF any augmented positions are not filled, perform the following:

a. Obtain qualified personnel from the OSC Assembly Area or Simulator Foyer Assembly Area.

b. IF qualified personnel are not available from the Assembly Areas, Refer To MP-26-EPA-REF08B, "Millstone Emergency Plan Resource Book," and notify an individual for each unstaffed position. (4)

- Refer To EPI-FAP15-011, "Fitness for Duty Questionnaire," and determine if notified personnel are fit for duty.
- IF notified personnel are determined fit for duty, request personnel to report to the EOF.
- Upon arrival, coordinate access for the responders into the Protected Area with Security as necessary.

2.5.6 Begin a first relief roster and schedule for the Emergency Response Facilities from the assembled personnel.

2.5.7 Release personnel from the Assembly Areas as soon as possible as follows:

a. Ensure personnel released from the Assembly Areas are directed to Stand-by their point of contact for further information and instructions.

b. Coordinate the release of personnel with the MOS (Security is in contact with local law enforcement for egress and access logistics).

c. Inform the DSEO when all personnel have been released from the Assembly Areas.

2.5.8 Discuss establishing a staging area for personnel and resources outside the 10 mile EPZ with DSEO as conditions warrant.

3. SUMMARY OF CHANGES

3.1 Revision 000-05

3.1.1 Added security-related events to Section 1.4.

3.1.2 Minor editorial change in step 1.4.1.

3.1.3 Clarified in step 1.4.2 that a precautionary dismissal occurs at the Alert level unless constraints exist.

3.1.4 Clarified in step 1.4.3 that a site evacuation is initiated at the Site Area Emergency (SAE) or General Emergency (GE) unless constraints exist.

3.1.5 Minor editorial change in step 1.4.3. Added information on alternate egress routes.

3.1.6 Clarified in step 1.4.4 that a local area evacuation may be the result of a Security threat.

3.1.7 Clarified in step 1.4.5 that sheltering may be chosen instead of evacuation.

3.1.8 Added steps 1.4.6 and 1.4.7 for information on relocated EOF, Backup TSC, and relocated assembly area for simulator foyer.

3.1.9 Added step 2.1.1.b, 2.1.2, and 2.1.4 to precautionary dismissal to provide reference to sheltering and use of alternate egress routes.

3.1.10 Modified step 2.2.4 and added steps 2.2.5 and 2.2.7 to clarify the sheltering procedure.

3.1.11 Added step 2.3.1.a.1) on sheltering.

3.1.12 Added steps 2.3.2.a and 2.3.3.d to provide information on alternate egress routes.

3.1.13 Clarified in step 2.3.5.c that key search accountability results are available within 30 minutes.

3.1.14 Modified step 2.4.1.c to identify missing persons in about 40 minutes in accordance with security procedures.

3.1.15 Clarified in Attachment 3, Security Event, that a follow-up action to sheltering is to conduct precautionary dismissal, evacuation, and accountability as deemed appropriate when the threat has been resolved. Added information on the classification level.

3.1.16 Various editorial comments.

3.2 Revision 000-04

3.2.1 Minor editorial changes.

3.2.2 Added Section 2.2, Sheltering.

3.2.3 Added definitions to Attachment 1, "Definitions and Abbreviations."

3.2.4 Added example to Attachment 3, "Examples of Onsite Protective Actions and Announcements," for situations which may require sheltering.

3.3 Revision 000-03

3.3.1 Deleted sentences directing SERO personnel to the Simulator Foyer in first paragraph under steps 1.4.3 and 1.4.6.

3.4 Revision 000-02

3.4.1 Changed the word "director" to "direct" in step 2.1.6.

3.5 Revision 000-01

3.5.1 Added the words "unless constraints exist" to clarify the evacuation.

3.6 Revision 000

3.6.1 Original issue

Attachment 1
Definitions and Abbreviations

(Sheet 1 of 2)

Accountability - Accountability is used to determine if personnel are missing. A census of personnel in the protected area completed within 45 minutes.

ADTS - Assistant Director Technical Support (4)

Affected Area - Location requiring protective response to include level, building, unit, open area, or site.

CAS - Central Alarm Station (4)

DSEO - Director of Station Emergency Operations

EPZ - Emergency Planning Zone

ERC - External Resources Coordinator (4)

Essential Personnel - Personnel directly engaged in actions required to safely operate, monitor plant functions, or mitigate accident events. Security, HP, and other personnel directed by managers. This includes emergency plan on-call and subject to call, on-shift security, HP and other personnel as directed.

MOS - Manager of Security

MRCA - Manager Radiological Consequence Assessment

NAP - North Access Point

Owner Controlled Area - All station property excluding the protected area.

PA - Protected Area (4)

Protected Area - The area inside the security fence where access is controlled by security.

Protected Area Evacuation - Leaving the protected area to a designated assembly area.

SAP - South Access Point

Attachment 1
Definitions and Abbreviations

Sheltering - Staying inside a structure with doors, windows, and exterior ventilation closed.

Site Evacuation - Leaving the protected area and existing the owner controlled property.

SM - Shift Manager

SSS - Security Shift Supervisor

TSC - Technical Support Center ④

Attachment 2
Responsibilities

(Sheet 1 of 1)

1. The Security Shift Supervisor/Manager of Security is responsible for coordinating accountability, site access control, traffic control, and assembly areas. ④

2. The HP Manager or MRCA is responsible for providing radiological assessment and guidance concerning protective recommendations.

3. The Manager of Resources is responsible for coordinating the control and release of personnel at the Assembly Areas.

4. The following managers and staff may be designated by the Shift Manager or DSEO to support implementation of this procedure:

   - MRCA (chemical release)
   - Shift Technician or alternate designee (announcements)
   - HP Technicians (decontamination at access and assembly points)
   - Security (accountability, crowd control)

Attachment 3
Examples of On-Site Protective Actions and Announcements

(Sheet 1 of 3)

Example 1: Approaching Hurricane (station-wide, late onset, long duration)

Objectives: a) Early release of all but essential personnel

b) Prepare essential personnel for long-term staffing during storm

Sample Announcement

ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL! ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL! Hurricane conditions are projected to reach the site within 24 hours. Personnel not on call or involved in plant safety, security, or operations may leave work at 2 pm today and are excused from regular work tomorrow. All on-call SERO and operations personnel: plan to report to your assigned locations by 10 am tomorrow for the duration of the storm. Additional information will be provided.

Follow-up: a) As storm approaches, warn all personnel to remain indoors.

b) Announce restoration of normal conditions when appropriate.

Example 2: Radiological or Chemical Release (onset <30 minutes, duration <30 minutes)

Objectives: a) Avoid affected areas

b) Prompt sheltering (no time to complete assembly)

Sample Announcement

ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL! ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL! A brief radiological (or chemical) release from the main stack is projected to start in 15 minutes. ALL PERSONNEL! Avoid the stack and the unit ____ turbine building. Take shelter indoors; secure windows, doors and unnecessary ventilation. STAND BY FOR ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS. ④

Follow-up: a) Ensure Environmental Laboratory, SGRP, other buildings outside fence are notified (security walk through or phone call)

b) Announce restoration of normal conditions when appropriate.

Attachment 3
Examples of On-Site Protective Actions and Announcements

Example 3: Radiological Release (onset >30 minutes, duration >30 minutes)

Objectives: a) Accountability within 45 minutes

b) Retention of essential personnel

Precondition: SERO activation already announced (Alert Charlie-One or higher declared)

Sample Announcement

ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL! ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL! A radiological release may occur in (x) hours. HP personnel assemble in the (cafeteria/NAP/SAP). Inside the protected area, evacuate now. All personnel remaining in the protected area - key in now.

Follow-up: a) Ensure Security uses bullhorn to retain HP, SERO, other crafts or trades at assembly areas as directed by MOR.

b) Ensure off-site notifications are performed.

c) Coordinate release of personnel from assembly points (NAP, SAP).

Example 4. Security Event (Intrusion by a hostile force) (Sheltering Actions)

⑤

Objectives: a) Avoid injury to station personnel

b) Prompt sheltering

ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL! ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL! An _____ has been declared at (Unit #). ④

(Unusual Event)(Alert)(Site Area Emergency)(General Emergency)

There is a [insert nature of constraint (e.g., Security event)] _____ occurring at the station.

Avoid the _____ until further notice. Take shelter indoors. Close windows and doors and stay clear of windows. Do not leave the building. Stand by for additional instructions. (SERO members report to your designated emergency response facility.) OR (SERO members take shelter.)

Follow-up: a) Warn personnel to avoid specific areas onsite and remain indoors.

b) When appropriate, announce termination of hostile situation.

c) WHEN the threat has been resolved, conduct SERO activation, precautionary dismissal, or evacuation and accountability as deemed appropriate. ⑤

Attachment 3
Examples of On-Site Protective Actions and Announcements

Example 5. Evacuation of Site (radiological release in progress, conditions degrading)

Objectives: a) Emergency event declared

c) Off-site notifications are performed

d) Security notified to allow evacuation

Sample Announcement

ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL! ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL! Plant conditions are degrading. A site evacuation has been ordered. Personnel at NAP will be released, in groups, by security. Personnel at SAP, stand by. Avoid all areas east and south of the main stack. All personnel remaining in the protected area - key in now.

Follow-up: a) Provide follow-up message and transportation for personnel at SAP who can not reach cars without passing release point (in this case, stack).