Docket No.: 50-275

NOV 10 1983

Mr. Philip A. Crane, Jr.
Assistant General Counsel
Pacific Gas & Electric Company
77 Beale Street
San Francisco, California 94106

Dear Mr. Crane:

Subject: Issuance of Amendment No. 7 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-76 (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1)

By letters dated December 29, 1982, May 2 and 23, 1983 and June 23, 1983, and supplemental letter dated September 12, 1983, the Pacific Gas & Electric Company requested changes to the Appendix A Technical Specifications for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. The changes would allow installation of two new inverters and their associated busses to increase the capacity of the class 1E instrument AC system; allow modification to the containment isolation system; require an additional firewater pump and modify the Halon system initiator replacement program; and change the time requirement for containment spray initiation. We have completed our review and evaluation of these proposed changes and conclude that they are acceptable.

As you know, notices were published in the Federal Register regarding the above requested changes. No contentions or petitions have been received with respect to any of the notices in connection with the actions covered in this amendment.

Accordingly, the Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 7 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-76 for Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1. A copy of the Safety Evaluation supporting this amendment is also enclosed.

Sincerely,

/S/

George W. Knighton, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 3
Division of Licensing

8312020028 831110
PDR ADOCK 05000275
P PDR

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 7 to Facility Operating License DPR-76
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls.: See next page

*NOTE: SEE PREVIOUS WHITE FOR CONCURRENCE

| DL:LB#3 | DL:LB#3 | DL:LB#3 | OELD | DL:LB#3 | DL/AD/L |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *JWilson/yt | *JLee | *BBuckley | *LChandler | *GWKnighton | TNovak |
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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-275

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 7
License No. DPR-76

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The applications for amendment by Pacific Gas and Electric Company (the licensee) dated December 29, 1982, May 5 and 23, 1983 and June 23, 1983 and supplemental letter dated September 12, 1983, comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-76 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 7, are hereby incorporated in this license. The Pacific Gas & Electric Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

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PDR ADOCK 05000275
P PDR

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

George W. Knighton, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 3
Division of Licensing

Date of Issuance: NOV 10 1983

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DL:LB#3 | DL:LB#3 | DL:LB#3 | OELD | DL:LB#3 |
| JWilson/yt | BBuckley | JLee | LChandler | GWKnighton |
| 9/28/83 | 9/30/83 | 9/30/83 | 9/ /83 | 9/30/83 |

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 7

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-76

DOCKET NO. 50-275

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. Also to be replaced are the following overleaf pages to the amended pages.

| Amendment Pages | Overleaf Pages |
|---|---|
| 3/4 - 3-28 | 3/4 - 3-27 |
| 3/4 - 3-30 | 3/4 - 3-29 |
| 3/4 - 6-18 | 3/4 - 6-17 |
| 3/4 - 6-20 | 3/4 - 6-19 |
| 3/4 - 6-21 | |
| 3/4 - 6-22 | |
| 3/4 - 6-24 | 3/4 - 6-23 |
| 3/4 - 7-36 | 3/4 - 7-35 |
| 3/4 - 7-42 | 3/4 - 7-41 |
| 3/4 - 8-8 | 3/4 - 8-7 |
| 3/4 - 8-11 | |
| 3/4 - 8-11a | |
| 3/4 - 8-12 | |

## TABLE 3.3-5

## ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES

| INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION | RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS |
|---|---|
| 1. Manual Initiation | |
| a. Safety Injection (ECCS) | Not Applicable |
| Feedwater Isolation | Not Applicable |
| Reactor Trip (SI) | Not Applicable |
| Containment Isolation-Phase "A" | Not Applicable |
| Containment Ventilation Isolation | Not Applicable |
| Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps | Not Applicable |
| Component Cooling Water Pumps | Not Applicable |
| Containment Fan Cooler Units | Not Applicable |
| Auxiliary Salt Water Pumps | Not Applicable |
| b. Containment Spray | Not Applicable |
| Containment Isolation-Phase "B" | Not Applicable |
| Containment Ventilation Isolation | Not Applicable |
| c. Containment Isolation-Phase "A" | Not Applicable |
| Containment Ventilation Isolation | Not Applicable |
| d. Steam Line Isolation | Not Applicable |
| 2. Containment Pressure-High | |
| a. Safety Injection (ECCS) | $\leq$ 27.0(1) |
| b. Reactor Trip (from SI) | $\leq$ 2.0 |
| c. Feedwater Isolation | $\leq$ 63.0(2) |
| d. Containment Isolation-Phase "A" | $\leq$ 18.0(4)/28.0(5) |
| e. Containment Ventilation Isolation | Not Applicable |
| f. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps | $\leq$ 60.0(1) |
| g. Component Cooling Water Pumps | $\leq$ 38.0(4)/48.0(5) |
| h. Containment Fan Cooler Units | $\leq$ 40(1) |
| i. Auxiliary Salt Water Pumps | $\leq$ 48.0(4)/58.0(5) |
| 3. Pressurizer Pressure-Low | |
| a. Safety Injection (ECCS) | $\leq$ 27.0(1)/12.0(4) |
| b. Reactor Trip (from SI) | $\leq$ 2.0 |
| c. Feedwater Isolation | $\leq$ 63.0(2) |
| d. Containment Isolation-Phase "A" | $\leq$ 18.0(4) |
| e. Containment Ventilation Isolation | Not Applicable |
| f. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps | $\leq$ 60.0(1) |
| g. Component Cooling Water Pumps | $\leq$ 48.0(1)/38.0(4) |
| h. Containment Fan Cooler Units | $\leq$ 40(1) |
| i. Auxiliary Saltwater Pumps | $\leq$ 58.0(1)/48.0(4) |

TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES

| INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION | RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS |
|---|---|
| 4. Differential Pressure Between Steam Lines-High | |
| a. Safety Injection (ECCS) | $\leq$ 13.0(4)/23.0(5) |
| b. Reactor Trip (from SI) | $\leq$ 2.0 |
| c. Feedwater Isolation | $\leq$ 63.0(2) |
| d. Containment Isolation-Phase "A" | $\leq$ 18.0(4)/28.0(5) |
| e. Containment Ventilation Isolation | Not Applicable |
| f. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps | $\leq$ 60.0(1) |
| g. Component Cooling Water Pumps | $\leq$ 38.0(4)/48.0(5) |
| h. Containment Fan Cooler Units | $\leq$ 40(1) |
| i. Auxiliary Saltwater Pumps | $\leq$ 48.0(4)/58.0(5) |
| 5. Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines - High Coincident with $T_{avg}$--Low-Low | |
| a. Safety Injection (ECCS) | $\leq$ 15.0(4)/25.0(5) |
| b. Reactor Trip (from SI) | $\leq$ 4.0 |
| c. Feedwater Isolation | $\leq$ 65.0(2) |
| d. Containment Isolation-Phase "A" | $\leq$ 20.0(4)/30.0(5) |
| e. Containment Ventilation Isolation | Not Applicable |
| f. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps | $\leq$ 60.0(1) |
| g. Component Cooling Water Pumps | $\leq$ 40.0(4)/50.0(5) |
| h. Steam Line Isolation | $\leq$ 10.0 |
| i. Containment Fan Cooler Units | $\leq$ 40(1) |
| j. Auxiliary Saltwater Pumps | $\leq$ 50.0(4)/60.0(5) |
| 6. Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines-High Coincident with Steam Line Pressure-Low | |
| a. Safety Injection (ECCS) | $\leq$ 13.0(4)/23.0(5) |
| b. Reactor Trip (from SI) | $\leq$ 2.0 |
| c. Feedwater Isolation | $\leq$ 63.0(2) |
| d. Containment Isolation-Phase "A" | $\leq$ 18.0(4)/28.0(5) |
| e. Containment Ventilation Isolation | Not Applicable |
| f. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps | $\leq$ 60.0(1) |
| g. Component Cooling Water Pumps | $\leq$ 38.0(4)/48.0(5) |
| h. Steam Line Isolation | $\leq$ 8.0 |
| i. Containment Fan Cooler Units | $\leq$ 40(1) |
| j. Auxiliary Saltwater Pumps | $\leq$ 48.0(4)/58.0(5) |
| 7. Containment Pressure--High-High | |
| a. Containment Spray | $\leq$ 48.5(6) |
| b. Containment Isolation-Phase "B" | Not Applicable |
| c. Steam Line Isolation | $\leq$ 7.0 |

TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES

| INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION | RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS |
|---|---|
| 8. Steam Generator Water Level--High-High | |
| a. Turbine Trip-Reactor Trip | $\leq$ 2.5 |
| b. Feedwater Isolation | $\leq$ 66.0(2) |
| 9. Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low | |
| a. Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps | $\leq$ 60 |
| b. Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump | $\leq$ 60 |
| 10. RCP Bus Undervoltage | |
| a. Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump | $\leq$ 60 |
| 11. Plant Vent Noble Gas Activity-High | |
| a. Containment Ventilation Isolation | $\leq$ 11 |

## TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

## TABLE NOTATION

(1) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included. Response time limit includes opening of valves to establish SI path and attainment of discharge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps, SI and RHR pumps (where applicable).

(2) Feedwater system overall response time shall include verification of each individual feedwater system valve closure time as shown below:

| Valve | Closure Time (not including instrumentation delays) |
|---|---|
| FCV-438 | ≤ 60 seconds |
| 439 | ≤ 60 seconds |
| 440 | ≤ 60 seconds |
| 441 | ≤ 60 seconds |
| 510 | ≤ 5 seconds |
| 520 | ≤ 5 seconds |
| 530 | ≤ 5 seconds |
| 540 | ≤ 5 seconds |

(3) Diesel generator starting and loading delays included.

(4) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays not included. Offsite power available. Response time limit includes opening of valves to establish SI path and attainment of discharge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps (where applicable).

(5) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included. Response time limit includes opening of valves to establish SI path and attainment of discharge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps.

(6) The maximum response time of 48.5 seconds is the time from when the containment pressure exceeds the high-high setpoint until the spray pump is started and the discharge valve travels to the fully open position assuming off-site power is not available. The time of 48.5 seconds includes the 28-second maximum delay related to ESF loading sequence. Spray riser piping fill time is not included. The 80-second maximum spray delay time does not include the time from LOCA start to "P" signal.

TABLE 3.6-1

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

| VALVE NO. | FUNCTION | ISOLATION TIME (Seconds) |
|---|---|---|
| A. PHASE "A" ISOLATION VALVES | | |
| FCV-151# | Steam Generator No. 1 Blowdown OC | ≤ 10 |
| FCV-154# | Steam Generator No. 2 Blowdown OC | ≤ 10 |
| FCV-157# | Steam Generator No. 3 Blowdown OC | ≤ 10 |
| FCV-160# | Steam Generator No. 4 Blowdown OC | ≤ 10 |
| FCV-244# | Steam Generator No. 4 Sample OC | ≤ 10 |
| FCV-246# | Steam Generator No. 3 Sample OC | ≤ 10 |
| FCV-248# | Steam Generator No. 2 Sample OC | ≤ 10 |
| FCV-250# | Steam Generator No. 1 Sample OC | ≤ 10 |
| FCV-253 | Reactor Coolant Dr. Tk. PP Disch. Isol. IC | ≤ 10 |
| FCV-254 | Reactor Coolant Dr. Tk. PP Disch. OC | ≤ 10 |
| FCV-255 | Reactor Coolant Dr. TK. Vent. Isol. IC | ≤ 10 |
| FCV-256 | Reactor Coolant Dr. Tk. Vent. Isol. OC | ≤ 10 |
| FCV-257 | Reactor Coolant Dr. Tk. Sample to GA OC | ≤ 10 |
| FCV-258 | Reactor Coolant Dr. Tk. Sample to GA IC | ≤ 10 |
| FCV-260 | Reactor Coolant Dr. Tk. $N_2$ Supply OC | ≤ 10 |
| FCV-361 | CCW Return from Excess Letdown HX OC | ≤ 10 |
| FCV-500 | Containment Sump Discharge Isolation IC | ≤ 10 |
| FCV-501 | Containment Sump Discharge Isolation OC | ≤ 10 |
| FCV-584 | Containment Instrument Air Supply OC | ≤ 10 |
| FCV-633 | Containment Fire Water Isolation OC | ≤ 10 |
| FCV-654 | Incore Cooler Chilled $H_2O$ Supply OC | ≤ 10 |
| FCV-655 | Incore Cooler Chilled $H_2O$ Supply IC | ≤ 10 |

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

| VALVE NO. | FUNCTION | ISOLATION TIME (Seconds) |
|---|---|---|
| FCV-656 | Incore Cooler Chilled $H_2O$ Return OC | $\leq$ 10 |
| FCV-657 | Incore Cooler Chilled $H_2O$ Return IC | $\leq$ 10 |
| 8029 | Primary $H_2O$ Supply to Pressurizer Relief Tk. OC | $\leq$ 10 |
| 8034A | Pressurizer Relief Tk. to GA IC | $\leq$ 10 |
| 8034B | Pressurizer Relief Tk. to GA OC | $\leq$ 10 |
| 8045 | Pressurizer Relief Tk. $N_2$ Supply OC | $\leq$ 10 |
| 8149A | Letdown Orifice RO-27 Outlet IC | $\leq$ 10 |
| 8149B | Letdown Orifice RO-28 Outlet IC | $\leq$ 10 |
| 8149C | Letdown Orifice RO-29 Outlet IC | $\leq$ 10 |
| 8152 | Letdown Line Isolation OC | $\leq$ 10 |
| 8871 | ECCS Check Valve Test Line IC | $\leq$ 10 |
| 8880 | Accumulator $N_2$ Fill OC | $\leq$ 10 |
| 8883 | ECCS Check Valve Test Line OC | $\leq$ 10 |
| 8961 | ECCS Check Valve Test Line OC | $\leq$ 10 |
| 9354A | Pressurizer Steam Space Sample IC | $\leq$ 10 |
| 9354B | Pressurizer Steam Space Sample OC | $\leq$ 10 |
| 9355A | Pressurizer Liquid Space Sample IC | $\leq$ 10 |
| 9355B | Pressurizer Liquid Space Sample OC | $\leq$ 10 |
| 9356A | RCS Hot Leg Sample IC | $\leq$ 10 |
| 9356B | RCS Hot Leg Sample OC | $\leq$ 10 |
| 9357A | Accumulator Sample IC | $\leq$ 10 |
| 9357B | Accumulator Sample OC | $\leq$ 10 |
| 8100 | RCP Seal Water Return OC | $\leq$ 10 |
| 8112 | RCP Seal Water Return IC | $\leq$ 10 |

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

| VALVE NO. | FUNCTION | ISOLATION TIME (Seconds) |
|---|---|---|
| B. PHASE "B" ISOLATION VALVES | | |
| FCV-356 | CCW Supply to RCP's and Support Coolers OC | NA |
| FCV-357 | RCP Thermal Barrier CCW Return OC | NA |
| FCV-363 | RCP Oil Cooler/Support Cooler CCW Return OC | NA |
| FCV-749 | RCP Oil Cooler/Support Cooler CCW Return IC | NA |
| FCV-750 | RCP Thermal Barrier CCW Return IC | NA |
| C. CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION VALVES | | |
| FCV-660## | Containment Purge Supply IC | ≤ 2 |
| FCV-661## | Containment Purge Supply OC | ≤ 2 |
| FCV-662 | Containment Vacuum/Pressure Relief IC | ≤ 10 |
| FCV-663 | Containment Pressure Relief OC | ≤ 10 |
| FCV-664 | Containment Vacuum Relief OC | ≤ 10 |
| FCV-678 | Containment Air Sample Supply IC | ≤ 10 |
| FCV-679 | Containment Air Sample Supply OC | ≤ 10 |
| FCV-681 | Containment Air Sample Return OC | ≤ 10 |
| RCV-11## | Containment Purge Exhaust IC | ≤ 2 |
| RCV-12## | Containment Purge Exhaust OC | ≤ 2 |
| D. MANUAL VALVES | | |
| AIR-I-1-585* | Instrument Air Supply to Containment (FCV-584 Bypass) OC | NA |
| AIR-S-1-200* | Service Air Supply to Containment OC | NA |

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

| VALVE NO. | FUNCTION | ISOLATION TIME (Seconds) |
|---|---|---|
| AXS-1-26* | Aux. Steam Supply to Containment OC | NA |
| CS-1-31D | Containment Spray to Misc. Equipment Drain Tank OC | NA |
| CS-1-32D | Containment Spray to Misc. Equipment Drain Tank OC | NA |
| FW-1-140# | Auxiliary Feedwater to Stm. Gen. No. 1 OC | NA |
| FW-1-147# | Auxiliary Feedwater to Stm. Gen. No. 2 OC | NA |
| FW-1-153# | Auxiliary Feedwater to Stm. Gen. No. 3 OC | NA |
| FW-1-157# | Auxiliary Feedwater to Stm. Gen. No. 4 OC | NA |
| MS-1-902# | Nitrogen to Steam Generators OC | NA |
| RCS-1-512D* | Miscellaneous Equipment Drain Tank Isolation Valve OC | NA |
| SI-1-161* | Isolating Valve FE-927 OC | NA |
| VAC-1-1* | Containment Hydrogen Purge Supply Fan No. 1 and External $H_2$ Recombiner to Containment OC | NA |
| VAC-1-2* | Containment Hydrogen Purge Supply Fan No. 2 and External $H_2$ Recombiner to Containment OC | NA |
| 8767 | Refueling Cavity to Refueling Water Purification Pump OC | NA |
| 8787 | Refueling Water Purification Pump to Refueling Cavity OC | NA |
| 8795 | Refueling Cavity to Refueling Water Purification Pump IC | NA |
| 8796 | Refueling Water Purification Pump to Refueling Cavity IC | NA |
| 8969# | Charging Pump to S.I. Test Line OC | NA |
| PEN-1-65A*# | Main Airlock Equalizing Valve to Atmosphere | NA |
| PEN-1-65B*# | Main Airlock Equalizing Valve to Containment | NA |

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

| VALVE NO. | FUNCTION | ISOLATION TIME (Seconds) |
|---|---|---|
| PEN-1-66A*# | Emergency Airlock Equalizing Valve to Atmosphere | NA |
| PEN-1-66B*# | Emergency Airlock Equalizing Valve to Containment | NA |
| E. POWER OPERATED VALVES | | |
| FCV-22# | No. 4 Stm. Gen. Mn. Steam Isol. Valve Bypass OC | NA |
| FCV-23# | No. 3 Stm. Gen. Mn. Steam Isol. Valve Bypass OC | NA |
| FCV-24# | No. 2 Stm. Gen. Mn. Steam Isol. Valve Bypass OC | NA |
| FCV-25# | No. 1 Stm. Gen. Mn. Steam Isol. Valve Bypass OC | NA |
| FCV-37# | Auxiliary FWP Turb. Steam Supply S/G No. 2 OC | NA |
| FCV-38# | Auxiliary FWP Turb. Stm. Supply S/G No. 3 OC | NA |
| FCV-41# | No. 1 Stm. Generator Mn. Steam Isol. OC | $\leq$ 5 |
| FCV-42# | No. 2 Stm. Generator Mn. Steam Isol. OC | $\leq$ 5 |
| FCV-43# | No. 3 Stm. Generator Mn. Steam Isol. OC | $\leq$ 5 |
| FCV-44# | No. 4 Stm. Generator Mn. Steam Isol. OC | $\leq$ 5 |
| FCV-235* | Containment $H_2$ Sample Supply IC | NA |
| FCV-236* | Containment $H_2$ Sample Supply OC | NA |
| FCV-237* | Containment $H_2$ Sample Return OC | NA |
| FCV-238* | Containment $H_2$ Sample Supply IC | NA |
| FCV-239* | Containment $H_2$ Sample Supply OC | NA |
| FCV-240* | Containment $H_2$ Sample Return OC | NA |
| FCV-658 | Containment Purge to Aux. Bldg. Filters/ Ext. $H_2$ Recombiners Supply IC | NA |
| FCV-668 | Containment Purge to Aux. Bldg. Filters/Ext. $H_2$ Recombiner Supply OC | NA |

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

| VALVE NO. | FUNCTION | ISOLATION TIME (Seconds) |
|---|---|---|
| FCV-659 | Containment Purge to Purge System Filters/Ext. $H_2$ Recombiners Supply IC | NA |
| FCV-669 | Containment Purge to Purge System Filters/Ext. $H_2$ Recombiners Supply OC | NA |
| FCV-760# | Steam Generator No. 1 Blowdown IC | NA |
| FCV-761# | Steam Generator No. 2 Blowdown IC | NA |
| FCV-762# | Steam Generator No. 3 Blowdown IC | NA |
| FCV-763# | Steam Generator No. 4 Blowdown IC | NA |
| FCV-696* | Reactor Cavity Sump Sample (Post LOCA) Supply IC | NA |
| FCV-697* | Reactor Cavity Sump Sample (Post LOCA) Supply OC | NA |
| FCV-698* | Containment Air Sample (Post LOCA) Supply IC | NA |
| FCV-699* | Containment Air Sample (Post LOCA) Supply OC | NA |
| FCV-700* | Containment Air Sample (Post LOCA) Return OC | NA |
| PCV-19# | Steam Generator No. 1 10% Atmosphere Steam Dump OC | NA |
| PCV-20# | Steam Generator No. 2 10% Atmosphere Steam Dump OC | NA |
| PCV-21# | Steam Generator No. 3 10% Atmosphere Steam Dump OC | NA |
| PCV-22# | Steam Generator No. 4 10% Atmosphere Steam Dump OC | NA |
| 8107# | Charging Line Isolation OC | NA |
| 8700A# | RCS Hot Leg to RHR Pump 1 OC | NA |
| 8700B# | RCS Hot Leg to RHR Pump 2 OC | NA |
| 8701# | RCS Loop 4 Hot Leg to RHR IC | NA |
| 8703# | RHR to RCS Hot Legs 1 and 2 IC | NA |
| 8716A# | RHR to RCS Hot Legs OC | NA |
| 8716B# | RHR to RCS Hot Legs OC | NA |
| 8801A# | Boron Injection Tank Discharge to RCS OC | NA |

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

| VALVE NO. | FUNCTION | ISOLATION TIME (Seconds) |
|---|---|---|
| 8801B# | Boron Injection Tank Discharge to RCS OC | NA |
| 8802A# | Safety Injection to RCS Hot Legs OC | NA |
| 8802B# | Safety Injection to RCS Hot Legs OC | NA |
| 8809A# | Residual Heat Removal to RCS Cold Legs 1 and 2 | NA |
| 8809B# | Residual Heat Removal to RCS Cold Legs 3 and 4 | NA |
| 8823# | Safety Injection Check Valve Test Line IC | NA |
| 8824# | Safety Injection Check Valve Test Line IC | NA |
| 8843# | Boron Injection Tank to Cold Leg Check Valve Test Line IC | NA |
| 8835# | Safety Injection to RCS Cold Legs OC | NA |
| 8885A# | RHR to Cold Leg Test Line IC | NA |
| 8885B# | RHR to Cold Leg Test Line IC | NA |
| 8982A# | Containment Sump to Residual Heat Removal Train 1 OC | NA |
| 8982B# | Containment Sump to Residual Heat Removal Train 2 OC | NA |
| 8980# | Refueling Water Storage Tank to RHR OC | NA |
| 9001A | Containment Spray Pump No. 1 Isolation OC | NA |
| 9001B | Containment Spray Pump No. 2 Isolation OC | NA |
| 9003A# | Residual Heat Removal to Containment Spray OC | NA |
| 9003B# | Residual Heat Removal to Containment Spray OC | NA |
| F. CHECK VALVES | | |
| 8028 | Relief Valve Outlets to Pressurizer Relief Tank IC | NA |
| 8046 | Primary Water to Pressurizer Relief Tank IC | NA |
| 8047 | Nitrogen to Pressurizer Relief Tank IC | NA |
| 8109 | Seal Water Return IC | NA |

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

| VALVE NO. | FUNCTION | ISOLATION TIME (Seconds) |
|---|---|---|
| 8368A thru 8368D | Seal Water to Reactor Coolant Pumps IC | NA |
| 8916 | Nitrogen Supply to Accumulators IC | NA |
| 9011A | Containment Spray IC | NA |
| 9011B | Containment Spray IC | NA |
| Check Valve | CCW Supply to RCP IC | NA |
| Check Valve | CCW Return from RCP (FCV-749 Bypass) IC | NA |
| Check Valve | CCW Return from RCP (FCV-750 Bypass) IC | NA |
| Check Valve# | Nitrogen Supply to Stm. Gen. IC | NA |
| Check Valve | CCW Supply to Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger OC | NA |
| Check Valve | Containment Hydrogen Purge Supply IC | NA |
| Check Valve | Containment Hydrogen Purge Supply IC | NA |
| Check Valve | Containment Air Sample (Post LOCA) Return IC | NA |
| Check Valve | Nitrogen Supply to Reactor Coolant Drain Tank IC | NA |
| Check Valve | Instrument Air Supply IC | NA |
| Check Valve | Service Air Supply IC | NA |
| Check Valve | Containment Air Sample Return IC | NA |
| Check Valve | Auxiliary Stm. Supply to Containment IC | NA |
| Check Valve | Containment Fire Water IC | NA |
| Check Valve | Containment $H_2$ Sample Return IC | NA |
| Check Valve | Containment $H_2$ Sample Return IC | NA |

*May be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control (Normally closed manual or remotely OPERABLE valves only)
#Not subject to Type C leakage tests
##The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

b. Stored sources not in use - Each sealed source and fission detector shall be tested prior to use or transfer to another licensee unless tested within the previous six months. Sealed sources and fission detectors transferred without a certificate indicating the last test date shall be tested prior to being placed into use.

c. Startup sources and fission detectors - Each sealed startup source and fission detector shall be tested within 31 days prior to being subjected to core flux or installed in core components or the core and following repair or maintenance of the source.

4.7.8.1.3 Reports - A report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission on an annual bases if sealed source or fission detector leakage tests reveal the presence of greater than or equal to 0.005 microcuries of removable contamination.

## 3/4.7.9 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS

### FIRE SUPPRESSION WATER SYSTEM

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.9.1 The fire suppression water system shall be OPERABLE with;

a. At least two high pressure pump, each with a capacity of 2250 gpm, taking suction from the firewater tank containing a minimum usable volume of 270,000 gallons, with its discharge aligned to the fire suppression* header.

b. Gravity feed to the fire suppression header from a raw water reservior with a minimum usable volume of 270,000 gallons.

c. An OPERABLE fire suppression header flow path through distribution piping with OPERABLE sectionalizing control or isolation valves to the yard hydrant curb valves, the last valve ahead of the water flow alarm device on each sprinkler, hose standpipe or spray system riser required to be OPERABLE per specifications 3.7.9.2 and 3.7.9.5.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With either one pump and its water supply or the raw water gravity feed water supply inoperable, restore the inoperable equipment to OPERABLE status within 7 days or, in lieu of any other report required by specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the plans and procedures to be used to restore the inoperable equipment to OPERABLE status or to provide an alternate backup pump or supply. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

b. With the fire suppression water system otherwise inoperable:

1. Establish a backup fire suppression water system within 24 hours, and

2. In lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, submit a Special Report in accordance with Specification 6.9.2;

a) By telephone within 24 hours,

b) Confirmed by telegraph, mailgram or facsimile transmission no later than the first working day following the event, and

c) In writing within 14 days following the event, outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.

*Except the suppression header check valve bypass valves shall be closed unless the gravity feed to the suppression header is inoperable, or inadequate to supply the system for fire protection purposes.

## TABLE 3.7-5

## $CO_2$ SYSTEM

a. Diesel Generator No. 11 flooding subsystem

b. Diesel Generator No. 12 flooding subsystem

c. Diesel Generator No. 13 flooding subsystem

d. Unit No. 1 cable spreading room flooding subsystem

e. $CO_2$ hose reel subsystem stations:

1) No. 1 or No. 2 in 4 & 12 kv switchgear room
2) No. 3 or No. 4 serving vital 4 kv cable spreading rooms
3) No. 5 or No. 6 serving vital 4 kv switchgear rooms
4) No. 8 serving vital 480 v load centers 1F, 1G, 1H
5) No. 10 serving battery rooms
6) No. 11 serving battery rooms

## HALON SYSTEM

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.9.4 The Protection and Safeguards Actuation System Room Halon System shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever equipment protected by the Halon system is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

a. With the above required Halon system inoperable, within one hour establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment for those areas in which redundant systems or components could be damaged. Restore the system to OPERABLE status within 14 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.9.4 The above required Halon system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 6 months by verifying Halon storage tank weight to be at least 95% of full charge weight and pressure to be be at least 90% of full charge pressure.

b. At least once per 18 months by:

   1. Verifying the system, including associated ventilation dampers, actuates manually and automatically, upon receipt of a simulated test signal.

   2. Performance of a flow test through headers and nozzles to assure no blockage.

c. Prior to the expiration of its service life and at least once per 5 years by replacement of the explosive initiator with an explosive initiator from a certified manufacturing lot.

## TABLE 4.8-1

## DIESEL GENERATOR TEST SCHEDULE

| Number of Failures in Last 100 Valid Tests* | Test Frequency |
|---|---|
| $\leq 1$ | At least once per 31 days |
| 2 | At least once per 14 days |
| 3 | At least once per 7 days |
| $\geq 4$ | At least once per 3 days |

*Criteria for determining number of failures and number of valid tests shall be in accordance with Regulatory Position C.2.e of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, August 1977, where the last 100 tests are determined on a per nuclear unit basis. For the purposes of this test schedule, only valid tests conducted of the OL issuance date shall be included in the computation of the "last 100 valid tests." Entry into this test schedule shall be made at the 31 day test frequency.

## TABLE 4.8-2

## LOAD SEQUENCING TIMERS
## ESF TIMERS

| | COMPONENT | TIMER SETTINGS (SEC) MINIMUM | NOMINAL | MAXIMUM |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| BUS F | Centrifugal Charging Pump No. 1 | 1.5 | 2 | 3 |
| | Safety Injection Pump No. 1 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| | Containment Fan Cooler Unit No. 2 | 9 | 10 | 11 |
| | Containment Fan Cooler Unit No. 1 | 13 | 14 | 15 |
| | Component Cooling Water Pump No. 1 | 17 | 18 | 19.5 |
| | Auxiliary Saltwater Pump No. 1 | 20.8 | 22 | 23.2 |
| | Auxiliary Feedwater Pump No. 3 | 24.5 | 26 | 28 |
| BUS G | Centrifugal Charging Pump No. 2 | 1.5 | 2 | 3 |
| | Residual Heat Removal Pump No. 1 | 5 | 6 | 7.5 |
| | Containment Fan Cooler Unit No. 3 | 9 | 10 | 11.5 |
| | Containment Fan Cooler Unit No. 5 | 13 | 14 | 15 |
| | Component Cooling Water Pump No. 2 | 17 | 18 | 19 |
| | Auxiliary Saltwater Pump No. 2 | 20.8 | 22 | 23.2 |
| | Containment Spray Pump No. 1 | 24.5 | 26 | 28 |
| BUS H | Safety Injection Pump No. 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| | Residual Heat Removal Pump No. 2 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| | Containment Fan Cooler Unit No. 4 | 9 | 10 | 11 |
| | Component Cooling Water Pump No. 3 | 12.5 | 14 | 15 |
| | Auxiliary Feedwater Pump No. 2 | 17 | 18 | 19.5 |
| | Containment Spray Pump No. 2 | 20.8 | 22 | 23.2 |

## 3/4.8.2 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION

### OPERATING

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.2.1 The following electrical busses shall be energized in the specified manner:

a. 4160 volt Vital Bus F
b. 4160 volt Vital Bus G
c. 4160 volt Vital Bus H
d. 480 volt Vital Bus 1F
e. 480 volt Vital Bus 1G
f. 480 volt Vital Bus 1H
g. 120 volt Vital Instrument A.C. Bus 11 energized from its associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus 11*.
h. 120 volt Supplemental Vital Instrument A.C. Bus 11A energized from its associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus 11.*
i. 120 volt Vital Instrument A.C. Bus 12 energized from its associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus 12*.
j. 120 volt Vital Instrument A.C. Bus 13 energized from its associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus 13*.
k. 120 volt Supplemental Vital Instrument A.C. Bus 13A energized from its associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus 13.*
l. 120 volt Vital Instrument A.C. Bus 14 energized from its associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus 12*.
m. 125 volt D.C. Bus 11 energized from Battery Bank 11.
n. 125 volt D.C. Bus 12 energized from Battery Bank 12.
o. 125 volt D.C.Bus 13 energized from Battery Bank 13.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With one of the required 4160 volt and/or associated 480 volt vital busses not energized, re-energize them within 8 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. With one Vital Instrument A.C. Bus not energized from its associated inverter, or with one inverter not connected to its associated D.C. Bus, re-energize the Vital Instrument A.C. Bus from an alternate source within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours

*Two Vital Instrument A.C. inverters or one Vital and one Supplemental Vital Instrument A.C. inverter may be disconnected from their D.C. Busses for up to 24 hours for the purpose of performing an equalizing charge on their associated battery bank provided (1) their vital busses are energized, and (2) the vital busses associated with the other battery banks are energized from their associated inverters and connected to their associated D.C. Buses.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION (Continued)

and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; re-energize the Vital Instrument A.C. Bus from its associated inverter connected to its associated D.C. Bus within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

c. With one D.C. Bus not energized from its associated Battery Bank, re-energize it from its associated Battery Bank witin 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

d. With one Supplemental Vital Instrument A.C. Bus not energized from its associated inverter or with its inverter not connected to its associated D.C. bus, re-energize the Supplemental Vital Instrument A.C. Bus from an alternate source within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; re-energize the Supplemental Vital Instrument A.C. Bus from its associated inverter connected to its associated D.C. Bus within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.2.1 The specified busses shall be determined energized in the required manner at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment and indicated voltage on the busses.

## LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.2.2 As a minimum, the following electrical busses shall be energized in the specified manner:

a. One 4160 volt and its associated 480 volt A.C. Vital Bus.

b. Two 120 volt Vital Instrument A.C. Busses and one 120 volt Supplemental Vital Instrument A.C. Bus energized from their associated inverters connected to their respective D.C. Busses.

c. One 125 volt D.C. Bus energized from its associated battery bank.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With any of the above required electrical busses not energized in the required manner, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, or movement of irradiated fuel, initiate corrective action to energize the required electrical busses in the specified manner as soon as possible.

## SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.2.2 The specified busses shall be determined energized in the required manner at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment and indicated voltage on the busses.

# SAFETY EVALUATION

## AMENDMENT NO. 7 TO DPR-76

## DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1

## DOCKET NO. 50-275

### Introduction

By letter dated December 29, 1982, as supplemented by letter dated September 12, 1983, the Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E, the licensee) proposed changes to the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Appendix A Technical Specifications. These proposed changes will allow the installation of two new 7.5 KVA inverters and their associated busses which are necessary to increase the capacity of the class 1E instrument AC System from 30 KVA to 45 KVA to accommodate loads associated with NUREG-0737 requirements.

By letter dated May 2, 1983, PG&E proposed additional changes to Table 3.6-1 of the technical specifications for Diablo Canyon. These changes reflect proposed containment isolation system modifications, and entail adding several valves to the table, deleting others, and revising the footnoting in the table.

In a letter dated May 23, 1983, PG&E proposed changes to the technical specifications concerning fire suppression systems at Diablo Canyon. A requirement for an additional fire water pump is being added to the operability requirement and the requirements for replacement of Halon system initiators has been revised to specify an achievable initiator replacement program.

By letters dated June 23, and July 24, 1983, PG&E proposed still other changes to the technical specifications for their Diablo Canyon plant. These proposed changes would change the time requirements for containment spray initiation.

### Evaluation

New Inverters and Associated Busses

The licensee is installing two new vital AC busses with their associated inverters. The proposed change increases the capacity of the Class 1E instrument AC system from 30 to 45 KVA, and was necessitated to accommodate loads associated with TMI (NUREG-0737) requirements.

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The supplemental inverter and associated bus loading configuration is such that equipment assigned to these busses is not required for ECCS actuation or safe shutdown. These changes do not alter the fundamental design of the system. Each inverter is independently connected to its respective instrument distribution panel so that loss of an inverter cannot affect more than one distribution panel. The inverters operate normally on both the 480 VAC and 125 VDC systems. If either system is interrupted, the inverters will be supplied from the remaining source without interruption. With the additional DC inverter loads on the existing batteries, the capacity is such that at least a two hour station blackout margin exists as provided in the previous design. In addition, a single 120 VAC backup power source can be switched to any one of the vital busses. Each distribution panel can receive power from the 120 VAC backup source under operator control. The transfer breakers are mechanically interlocked to prevent paralleling the inverters with the backup power source. Therefore no single failure in the instrumentation and control power supply system or its associated power supplies can cause a loss of power to more than one of the redundant load groups.

The staff concludes that the proposed modification and associated technical specification changes meet the requirements of Criteria 17 and 18 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 and are, therefore, acceptable.

Containment Isolation System

The licensee is installing a Post Accident Sampling System, requiring the installation of six containment isolation valves (FCV-696 through FCV-700 and a check valve in series with FCV-700). Another valve (RCS-1-512D) has been identified which should be subjected to local leak rate testing, in accordance with Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50. The staff considers the addition of these valves to Table 3.6-1 to be appropriate and acceptable.

Two valves are being deleted from Table 3.6-1, namely, valve FCV-682 and a series check valve. These valves were in a line identified as the "Instrument Air Supply for $H_2$ Purge." Plant modifications (such as the installation of hydrogen recombiners) have made this penetration unnecessary, and it will be closed with caps welded onto the pipe penetration. Thus, deletion of those two valves from Table 3.6-1 is appropriate and acceptable.

The first footnote at the end of Table 3.6-1 currently reads: "*May be opened on an intermittent basis under adminstrative control (Normally closed manual valves only)". Valves marked by an asterisk (*) in the table are normally closed, but may be opened intermittently during normal plant operation for such purposes as drawing samples through sample lines. The licensee purposes to revise the parenthetical expression in the footnote to read: ".....(Normally closed manual or remotely operable valves only)". Allowing remotely operable valves to be opened intermittently is equally as acceptable as allowing manual valves to be opened, since both require administrative control for their repositioning and remotely operable valves can be closed from the control room. Thus, the revision of the footnote is acceptable.

The licensee proposed to add an asterisk to 13 valves in Table 3.6-1, making them subject to the footnote discussed above. These 13 valves are FCV-696 through FCV-700, FCV-235 through FCV-240, SI-1-161, and RCS-1-512D. This is necessary to allow periodic testing and operation of the associated equipment (primarily sampling systems). The staff finds this to be acceptable.

A second footnote in Table 3.6-1 reads: "*Note subject to Type C leakage tests." The licensee proposed to remove the footnoting symbol (#) from three check valves in the lines identified as the "CCW Supply to RCP 10", "CCW return from RCP (FCV-749 Bypass) 1C", and "CCW Supply to Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger OC." This would mean the check valves would be added to the Type C local leak testing program required by Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50. This change, therefore, is acceptable. In conclusion, the staff finds all of the proposed changes to Table 3.6-1 of the Technical Specifications to be acceptable.

Fire Suppression System

Section 3.7.9.1 of the Technical Specifications previously required at least one operable high pressure pump. However, the licensee identified the need for a greater quantity of water to supply anticipated fire fighting requirements. Therefore, one pump may not be able to meet this need, depending on the demand from manual hose streams and automatic fire suppression systems. Consequently, the limiting condition for operation will be changed to require that two high pressure pumps be operable. We conclude that this change will provide greater assurance that the required quantity of water for fire fighting will be available and, therefore, is acceptable.

Section 4.7.9.4 of the technical specifications previously required that explosive initiators in the Halon system be replaced at least once per 5 years with initiators that have a remaining service life of at least 5 years. However, the maximum service life of all initiators is 5 years from the date of manufacture. Therefore, considering storage, shipping and other normal time delays, it is not possible to literally comply with this surveillance requirement. The intent of this requirement is to assure that initiators are not being used beyond their service life. The licensee's proposed modification will stipulate that initiators are replaced prior to expiration of the service life and is, therefore, acceptable.

Containment Spray Initiation

The licensee has proposed certain changes to the technical specifications concerning the initiation of containment spray. These proposed changes would reflect an increase in the delay time for containment spray initiation from 40 to 75 seconds. The delay time is the elapsed time from the receipt of a containment high-high pressure signal (which activates the containment spray system), to the delivery of spray to the containment.

To support the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications, the licensee provided a reanalysis of the containment pressure and temperature response to the design basis LOCA; i.e. a double-ended break of the reactor coolant pump suction (cold leg) piping. The licensee's reanalysis, using the Westinghouse COCO Code, shows that the peak containment pressure does not exceed the containment design pressure (47 psig). For the analysis, the licensee increased the containment spray system delay time to 80 seconds, to provide a 5 second margin relative to the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications. Also, the licensee used new data for the mass and energy of water and steam released from the pipe break. The method used by the licensee to compute the mass and energy release rate data is documented in Westinghouse Topical Report WCAP-8312-A, "Westinghouse Mass and Energy Release Data for Containment Design." This topical report was approved by the staff in a letter dated March 12, 1975; therefore, the licensee's mass and energy release rate data for the double-ended pump suction break are acceptable.

The staff reviewed the remaining plant parameters used in the LOCA reanalysis and found them to be conservative for calculating peak containment pressure, except for the containment spray flow rate. The FSAR design value flow rate for one spray train is 2600 gpm; the licensee used a flow rate of 3250 gpm, a value obtained from plant preoperational tests. The licensee calculated a peak containment pressure of 46.91 psig using the 3250 gpm flow rate (only one of two redundant spray trains assumed operable). The staff performed a confirmatory analysis using its CONTEMPT-LT/28 computer code and, assuming the more conservative spray flow rate (2600 gpm), a peak calculated containment pressure of 45.4 psig was obtained. Additional staff analysis shows that the calculation is relatively insensitive to the spray flow rate, i.e., a 3250 gpm spray flow reduces the peak pressure by only 0.1 psig when compared to the pressure obtained when assuming a 2600 gpm spray flow.

Based upon the staff's confirmatory analysis, which also shows that the containment design pressure would not be exceeded for a spray system delay time of 80 seconds, the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications are found to be acceptable. The proposed changes appear in Table 4.8-2, "Load Sequencing Timers, ESF Timers," where a maximum timer setting of 28 seconds is specified for the containment spray pumps, and Table 3.3-5, "Engineered Safety Features Response Times," where the containment spray response time is increased from "$\bar{\ }$ 27.5" to "$\bar{\ }$ 48.5" seconds. A footnote to the response time explains that the time interval is from when containment pressure exceeds the high-high setpoint until the spray pump is started and the discharge valve is fully open, assuming offsite power is not available. The proposed values are consistent with an overall spray system delay time of 75 seconds.

The FSAR value of the two-hour thyroid dose at the site boundary was previously calculated to be 95.9 REM for the case of no post-LOCA delay in the containment spray. The licensee has reanalyzed the above value and the value for the proposed delay in containment spray using a current verified code and dose conversion factors provided in Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.109. The results of the reanalysis indicated that two-hour thyroid dose at the site would be 85.6 REM for no spray delay and 93.4 REM for the proposed delay.

The licensee also proposes to revise the basis for Technical Specification 3/4.6.1.4, Containment Systems Internal Pressure, to reflect the reanalysis of the design basis LOCA. The proposed revision has been found acceptable.

While there is a small reduction in the safety margin in both containment pressure and dose consideration on the basis of the analysis using the revised code, they are clearly within acceptable criteria, i.e. the design of the containment, 47 psig, and the 300 REM value in 10 CFR 100. Therefore, the staff concludes that, based on the foregoing discussions, the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications are acceptable.

Contact With State Official

By copy of letters dated July 15, August 11, August 12 and August 25, 1983 to the licensee, the NRC staff advised the Chief of the Radiological Health Branch, State Department of Health Services, State of California, of its proposed determination of no significant hazards consideration. No comments were received.

Environmental Consideration

We have determined that this amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amount nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that this amendment involves action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and pursuant 10 CFR Section 51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

Conclusion

Based upon our evaluation of the proposed changes to the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Technical Specifications, we have concluded that: there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. We, therefore, conclude that the proposed changes are acceptable.

Dated: NOV 10 1983

DL:LB#3
JWilson/yt
9/30/83

DL:LB#1
GWunighton
9/30/83

November 10, 1983

ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 7 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-76
DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1

DISTRIBUTION:

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