

May 29, 1986

Docket Nos.: 50-361  
and 50-362

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Mr. James C. Holcombe  
Vice President - Power Supply  
San Diego Gas & Electric Company  
101 Ash Street  
Post Office Box 1831  
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Gentlemen:

Subject: Issuance of Amendment No. 48 to Facility Operating License NPF-10  
and Amendment No. 37 to Facility Operating License NPF-15  
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 48 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-10 and Amendment No. 37 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-15 for the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3, located in San Diego County, California. The amendments revise the Technical Specifications 3/4.9.6, "Refueling Machine" to allow the use of the refueling machine auxiliary hoist in conjunction with a specially designed four or five lift tool for movement of control element assemblies.

These amendments were requested by your letters of December 10, 1985, and February 4, 1986 and are covered by Proposed Change Number PCN-209.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation supporting the amendments is also enclosed.

Sincerely,

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Harry Rood, Senior Project Manager  
PWR Project Directorate No. 7  
Division of PWR Licensing-B

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 48 to NPF-10
2. Amendment No. 37 to NPF-15
3. Safety Evaluation

cc: See next page

\*Previously concurred on by:

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5/7/86	5/9/86	5/12 /86

DIP-PBD7  
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Southern California Edison Company

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station  
Units 2 and 3

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ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 48 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-10  
AND AMENDMENT NO. 37 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-15  
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3

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Docket File 50-361/362 ✓

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY

SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

THE CITY OF RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA

THE CITY OF ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA

DOCKET NO. 50-361

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 48  
License No. NPF-10

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment to the license for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 (the facility) filed by the Southern California Edison Company on behalf of itself and San Diego Gas and Electric Company, The City of Riverside and The City of Anaheim, California (licensees) dated December 10, 1985, as supplemented by letter dated February 4, 1986, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public;
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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P PDR

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this amendment and Paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-10 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 48, are hereby incorporated in the license. SCE shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This amendment is effective immediately and is to be fully implemented within 30 days of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Harry Rood, Senior Project Manager  
PWR Project Directorate No. 7  
Division of PWR Licensing-B

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 29, 1986

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 48

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-10

DOCKET NO. 50-361

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. Also to be replaced are the following overleaf pages to the amended pages.

<u>Amendment Page</u>	<u>Overleaf Page</u>
3/4 9-6	3/4 9-5
B 3/4 9-2	B 3/4 9-1

## 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION

The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that: 1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and 2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limitations are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilution incident in the accident analyses. The value of 0.95 or less for  $K_{eff}$  includes a 1% delta K/K conservative allowance for uncertainties. Similarly, the boron concentration value of 1720 ppm or greater also includes a conservative uncertainty allowance of 50 ppm boron.

#### 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the source range neutron flux monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

#### 3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME

The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor pressure vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

#### 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS

The requirements on containment penetration closure and OPERABILITY ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from leakage to the environment. The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE.

#### 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS

The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity condition during CORE ALTERATIONS.



## REFUELING OPERATIONS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.9.6 REFUELING MACHINE

The OPERABILITY requirements for the refueling machine ensure that: (1) the refueling machine will be used for movement of all fuel assemblies including those with a CEA inserted, (2) each machine has sufficient load capacity to lift a fuel assembly including those with a CEA, and (3) the core internals and pressure vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.

Five finger CEAs are removed from the reactor vessel either along with the associated fuel bundle utilizing the refueling machine or can be removed without the associated fuel bundle utilizing the refueling machine auxiliary hoist. The four finger CEAs are inserted through the upper guide structure with two fingers in each of the two adjacent fuel bundles in the periphery of the core. The four finger CEAs are either removed with the upper guide structure and lift rig or can be removed with separate tooling prior to upper guide structure removal utilizing the auxiliary hoist of the polar crane or the refueling machine auxiliary hoist.

Coupling and uncoupling of the CEAs and the CEDM drive shaft extensions is accomplished using one of the gripper operating tools. The coupling and uncoupling is verified by weighing the drive shaft extensions.

#### 3/4.9.7 FUEL HANDLING MACHINE - SPENT FUEL STORAGE BUILDING

The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel assembly, CEA and associated handling tool over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool ensures that in the event this load is dropped (1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the accident analyses.

#### 3/4.9.8 SHUTDOWN COOLING AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

The requirement that at least one shutdown cooling train be in operation ensures that (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140°F as required during the REFUELING MODE, and (2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the reactor core to minimize the effects of a boron dilution incident and prevent boron stratification.

The requirement to have two shutdown cooling trains OPERABLE when there is less than 23 feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange, ensures that a single failure of the operating shutdown cooling loop will not result in a complete loss of decay heat removal capacity. With the reactor vessel head removed and 23 feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange, a large heat sink is available for core cooling, thus in the event of a failure of the operating shutdown cooling train, adequate time is provided to initiate emergency procedures to cool the core.

## REFUELING OPERATIONS

### 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.9.5 Direct communications shall be maintained between the control room and personnel at the refueling station.

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS.

#### ACTION:

When direct communications between the control room and personnel at the refueling station cannot be maintained, suspend all CORE ALTERATIONS.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.9.5 Direct communications between the control room and personnel at the refueling station shall be demonstrated within one hour prior to the start of and at least once per 12 hours during CORE ALTERATIONS.

## REFUELING OPERATIONS

### 3/4.9.6 REFUELING MACHINE

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.9.6 The refueling machine shall be used for movement of fuel assemblies with or without CEAs and shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. A minimum capacity of 3000 pounds, and
- b. An overload cut off limit of less than or equal to 3350 pounds.

The refueling machine auxiliary hoist may be used for the movement of CEAs without fuel bundles and shall be OPERABLE with an overload cut off limit of less than or equal to 1000 pounds.

APPLICABILITY: During movement of CEAs and/or fuel assemblies within the reactor pressure vessel utilizing the refueling machine auxiliary hoist or refueling machine.

ACTION: With the requirements for the refueling machine OPERABILITY not satisfied, suspend all refueling machine operations involving the movement of fuel assemblies with or without CEAs within the reactor pressure vessel. With the requirements for the refueling machine auxiliary hoist not satisfied, suspend all refueling machine auxiliary hoist operations involving the movement of CEAs within the reactor pressure vessel.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.9.6 The refueling machine used for movement of fuel assemblies with or without CEAs within the reactor pressure vessel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 72 hours prior to the start of such operations by performing a load test of at least 3000 pounds and demonstrating an automatic load cut off when the refueling machine load exceeds 3350 pounds. The refueling machine auxiliary hoist used for movement of CEAs within the reactor pressure vessel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 72 hours prior to the start of such operations by demonstrating an automatic load cut off when the auxiliary hoist load exceeds 1000 pounds.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY

SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

THE CITY OF RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA

THE CITY OF ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA

DOCKET NO. 50-362

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 37  
License No. NPF-15

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment to the license for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3 (the facility) filed by the Southern California Edison Company on behalf of itself and San Diego Gas and Electric Company, The City of Riverside and The City of Anaheim, California (licensees) dated December 10, 1985, as supplemented by letter dated February 4, 1986, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public;
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this amendment and Paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-15 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 37, are hereby incorporated in the license. SCE shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This amendment is effective immediately and is to be fully implemented within 30 days of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Harry Rood, Senior Project Manager  
PWR Project Directorate No. 7  
Division of PWR Licensing-B

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 29, 1986

- 3 -

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 37FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-15DOCKET NO. 50-362

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. Also to be replaced are the following overleaf pages to the amended pages.

<u>Amendment Page</u>	<u>Overleaf Page</u>
3/4 9-6	3/4 9-5
B 3/4 9-2	B 3/4 9-1

REFUELING OPERATIONS

3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.9.5 Direct communications shall be maintained between the control room and personnel at the refueling station.

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS.

ACTION:

When direct communications between the control room and personnel at the refueling station cannot be maintained, suspend all CORE ALTERATIONS.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.9.5 Direct communications between the control room and personnel at the refueling station shall be demonstrated within one hour prior to the start of and at least once per 12 hours during CORE ALTERATIONS.

## REFUELING OPERATIONS

### 3/4.9.6 REFUELING MACHINE

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.9.6 The refueling machine shall be used for movement of fuel assemblies with or without CEAs and shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. A minimum capacity of 3000 pounds, and
- b. An overload cut off limit of less than or equal to 3350 pounds.

The refueling machine auxiliary hoist may be used for the movement of CEAs without fuel bundles and shall be OPERABLE with an overload cut off limit of less than or equal to 1000 pounds.

APPLICABILITY: During movement of CEAs and/or fuel assemblies within the reactor pressure vessel utilizing the refueling machine auxiliary hoist or refueling machine.

ACTION: With the requirements for the refueling machine OPERABILITY not satisfied, suspend all refueling machine operations involving the movement of fuel assemblies with or without CEAs within the reactor pressure vessel. With the requirements for the refueling machine auxiliary hoist not satisfied, suspend all refueling machine auxiliary hoist operations involving the movement of CEAs within the reactor pressure vessel.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.9.6 The refueling machine used for movement of fuel assemblies with or without CEAs within the reactor pressure vessel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 72 hours prior to the start of such operations by performing a load test of at least 3000 pounds and demonstrating an automatic load cut off when the refueling machine load exceeds 3350 pounds. The refueling machine auxiliary hoist used for movement of CEAs within the reactor pressure vessel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 72 hours prior to the start of such operations by demonstrating an automatic load cut off when the auxiliary hoist load exceeds 1000 pounds.



### 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

#### BASES

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#### 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION

The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that: 1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and 2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limitations are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilution incident in the accident analyses. The value of 0.95 or less for  $K_{eff}$  includes a 1% delta K/K conservative allowance for uncertainties. Similarly, the boron concentration value of 1720 ppm or greater also includes a conservative uncertainty allowance of 50 ppm boron.

#### 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the source range neutron flux monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

#### 3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME

The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor pressure vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

#### 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS

The requirements on containment penetration closure and OPERABILITY ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from leakage to the environment. The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE.

#### 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS

The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity condition during CORE ALTERATIONS.

## REFUELING OPERATIONS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.9.6 REFUELING MACHINE

The OPERABILITY requirements for the refueling machine ensure that: (1) the refueling machine will be used for movement of all fuel assemblies including those with a CEA inserted, (2) each machine has sufficient load capacity to lift a fuel assembly including those with a CEA, and (3) the core internals and pressure vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.

Five finger CEAs are removed from the reactor vessel either along with the associated fuel bundle utilizing the refueling machine or can be removed without the associated fuel bundle utilizing the refueling machine auxiliary hoist. The four finger CEAs are inserted through the upper guide structure with two fingers in each of the two adjacent fuel bundles in the periphery of the core. The four finger CEAs are either removed with the upper guide structure and lift rig or can be removed with separate tooling prior to upper guide structure removal utilizing the auxiliary hoist of the polar crane or the refueling machine auxiliary hoist.

Coupling and uncoupling of the CEAs and the CEDM drive shaft extensions is accomplished using one of the gripper operating tools. The coupling and uncoupling is verified by weighing the drive shaft extensions.

#### 3/4.9.7 FUEL HANDLING MACHINE - SPENT FUEL STORAGE BUILDING

The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel assembly, CEA and associated handling tool over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool ensures that in the event this load is dropped (1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the accident analyses.

#### 3/4.9.8 SHUTDOWN COOLING AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

The requirement that at least one shutdown cooling train be in operation ensures that (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140°F as required during the REFUELING MODE, and (2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the reactor core to minimize the effects of a boron dilution incident and prevent boron stratification.

The requirement to have two shutdown cooling trains OPERALBE when there is less than 23 feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange ensures that a single failure of the operating shutdown cooling loop will not result in a complete loss of decay heat removal capability. With the reactor vessel head removed and 23 feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange, a large heat sink is available for core cooling, thus in the event of a failure of the operating shutdown cooling train, adequate time is provided to initiate emergency procedures to cool the core.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 48 TO NPF-10 AND AMENDMENT NO. 37 TO NPF-15  
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, ET AL  
DOCKET NOS. 50-361 AND 50-362

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Southern California Edison Company (SCE), on behalf of itself and the other licensees, San Diego Gas and Electric Company, The City of Riverside California, and The City of Anaheim, California, has submitted several applications for license amendments for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3. One such request, Proposed Change PCN-209, is evaluated herein. This change would revise Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.9.6, "Refueling Machine" to allow the use of refueling machine auxiliary hoist (RMAH) in conjunction with a specially designed four (4) or five (5) finger lift tool for movement of control element assemblies (CEAS). At the staff's request, by letter dated February 4, 1986 the licensee provided a description of the proposed modification of the refueling machine to add the RMAH and a description of the use of the RMAH.

2.0 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE

The RMAH is an underhung bridge-monorail, wire-rope hoist to be mounted on the existing bridge of the refueling machine. The hoist has five speeds up to 18 fpm. The trolley has two speeds, 30 and 10 fpm. Bidirectional interlocks are provided to prevent simultaneous movement of the refueling machine and the RMAH. Redundant load-limiting devices are provided on the hoist.

The RMAH will be used during refueling to move CEAs without fuel assemblies, in order to perform and verify coupling of CEA extension shafts, and for lifting and manipulating refueling tools. The operation of the RMAH will be governed by the refueling machine operating procedures, i.e., S023-I-3.42, "Refueling Machine, Preeoperation, Operation, and Layup."

The reactor core contains two types of CEA's, the five finger CEA which is inserted into a single fuel assembly and the four finger CEA which is inserted into two adjacent fuel assemblies. At present, a single four finger CEA may be moved over the core by the auxiliary hoist of the polar crane; however, the five finger CEA's are moved with the fuel assembly to the CEA change mechanism location where they are transferred from one fuel assembly to another using the CEA change mechanism. The RMAH will be used in lieu of the polar crane to shuffle the CEAs (both types) over the core, and to handle small loads (i.e., camera lights, storage containers, refueling tools) during refueling.

The proposed revision to Technical Specification 3/4.9.6, "Refueling Machine," allows the use of the RMAH for the movement of CEAs without fuel assemblies. The RMAH is deemed operable with an overload cut off limit of 1000 pounds or less. The cut off limit switch will be demonstrated operable within 72 hours prior to the start of a refueling.

### 3.0 SAFETY EVALUATION

The RMAH will be performing functions presently allowed to be performed with the auxiliary hoist of the polar crane. The RMAH has the following conservative design features:

1. A load cell to provide the operator visual indication of the load being lifted.
2. A fixed set point load monitor to disable upward hoist travel on all five hoist speeds when loads greater than 1000 lb plus or minus 20% are sensed.
3. A variable setpoint load monitor to disable upward hoist travel on the slowest hoist speed when loads greater than the setpoint plus or minus 1% are sensed.
4. An adjustable delay circuit to hold the RMAH in the slowest speed at the beginning of a lift to provide sufficient time for a potential overload condition to be sensed before allowing the selection of a higher speed.
5. Load limiting devices which limit the maximum stresses in load bearing material to 10% of their ultimate strength.
6. Both mechanical and electrical brakes, each capable of restraining 300% of the maximum service load. Both sets of brakes are automatically engaged on the loss of electric power.

The above features provide adequate protection against a possible load drop from the RMAH. The NRC staff has reviewed the proposed change and finds that the use of the RMAH rather than the polar crane auxiliary hoist is acceptable, because the RMAH can be used safely to move CEAs without fuel assemblies during refueling and presents no load handling concern beyond that previously reviewed. Therefore, the proposed change (PCN-209) to Technical Specification 3/4.9.6, "Refueling Machine" is acceptable.

#### 4.0 CONTACT WITH STATE OFFICIAL

The NRC staff has advised the Chief of the Radiological Health Branch, State Department of Health Services, State of California, of the proposed determination of no significant hazards consideration. No comments were received.

#### 5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments involve changes in the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued proposed findings that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such findings. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Sec. 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need to be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

#### 6.0 CONCLUSION

The Staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. We, therefore, conclude that the proposed changes are acceptable, and are hereby incorporated into the San Onofre 2 and 3 Technical Specifications.

Dated: May 29, 1986