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Performance Assessment Perspective on the Behavior of Engineered Barriers

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Outline

- Overall repository risk – current knowledge
- Insights on system behavior (waste package as a barrier)
- Conservatism and ‘risk’
- Performance Assessment (PA) perspective – waste package key issues



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Performance Assessment Perspective

- Performance assessment perspective is a result of:
 - Independent analyses by NRC and CNWRA (TPA code, uncertainty and sensitivity analyses, barrier evaluation, other)
 - Review of DOE and others (e.g. EPRI)
 - Comments of review committees (e.g. ACNW, NWTRB, peer reviews)
- Performance assessment involves understanding why the results are what they are



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Repository Risk (role of waste package)

| Scenario | Time Period | Nominal (mrem/yr)/# Failures | | Igneous (mrem/yr) |
|--------------|-------------|------------------------------|-------|-------------------|
| DOE, TSPA-SR | 10k | 0 | 0 | 0.1 |
| DOE, FEIS | 10k | 0.00002 | 0.3 | 0.1 |
| DOE, TSPA-SR | 100k | 70 | 6000 | NA |
| DOE, FEIS | 100k | 0.1 | 900 | NA |
| DOE, TSPA-SR | peak | 500 | 12000 | NA |
| DOE, FEIS | peak | 200 | 12000 | NA |



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Overall Repository Risk – Current Understanding

- 10k model risks are small (assuming current models appropriately represent uncertainties)
- 100k and longer model risks are comparable to background radiation
- Igneous activity model risks are larger than nominal risks in 10k, but small compared to the radiological standard
- Why continue to study this problem?



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
Overall Repository Risk – Current Understanding

- We continue to evaluate this problem to understand the impact of key uncertainties on:
 - 1) Timing and magnitude of the doses in the nominal scenario
 - 2) Magnitude of the disruptive scenario doses (reasonably bounded by current estimates).
 - 3) The capabilities of the barriers



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Insights on System Behavior

- 
- Repository system comprised of many components
 - Not all components are created equal (from a risk perspective)
 - Both NRC and DOE analyses suggest that the waste package performance is significant contributor to limiting future risk
 - Simple calculations can provide insights into repository behavior
 - Is the waste package the only contributor that limits future risk?



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Waste Package as a Barrier

- Take inventory of ^{129}I (0.3 Ci) and ^{99}Tc (130 Ci) in a single commercial spent nuclear fuel waste package (readily transported species)
- Assume the spreading/dilution function of the rest of the system is only equivalent to 500 years
- Dilute the concentrations in the regulatory defined water volume (3,000 acre-ft/yr)
- Dose from a single package ~ 0.5 mrem/yr
- TPA 4.1 result from 40 initial failures is 0.02 mrem/yr, a factor of 1000 *lower*
- Other components of the repository system contribute to the limitation of future risks




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Risk and Surface Area Failed

- Diffusive releases are directly proportional to the surface area of the failures
- Early advective releases are strongly correlated with surface area failed
- Does the type of failure have a strong influence on risk?



Risk and Surface Area Failed



In TSPA-SR, only 13% of packages experience advective conditions 10



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Simple Models to Evaluate Diffusive Risks - SCC

Conservative representation (only diffusion through the end caps):

~300 mrem/yr from ^{129}I , ^{99}Tc , and ^{237}Np (300 cracks per package, 1000 packages cracked)

Less conservative representation (adding diffusion from waste to end caps through water film):

Reduces dose to 0.1 mrem/yr (no performance benefit from rest of repository)

Conclusion – Caution is needed in interpreting the results of highly conservative models



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Risk and Surface Area Failed - Summary

- Caution is needed in employing conservatism in mass transfer representations for radionuclide release
- Waste package failure mechanisms that result in numerous small openings or a few catastrophic failures are not likely to be risk-significant
- PA staff are most concerned with mechanisms that may result in numerous moderate to large openings that experience advective conditions



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Issue Resolution in Waste Package and Drip Shield Performance

- Environmental Conditions
- Uniform Corrosion/Passivity
- Localized Corrosion
- Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC)
- Drip Shield Performance
- Materials Aging
- Mechanical Failure
- Juvenile Failure
- Criticality



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PA Perspective on Key WP Issues

Environmental Conditions, Uniform Corrosion, Passivity, Localized Corrosion, Materials Aging

- Higher risk-significance for mechanisms (or combination of) that could result in numerous reasonably-sized openings.
- Important to understand consequence and identify likelihood of transpassivity/localized corrosion



PA Perspective on Key WP Issues

Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC)

- Frequency and size of openings not likely to create significant “risk” unless combined with conservative release modeling (see slide 11).
- Advective release not expected based on size of SCC failures and capillarity argument.
- Lower risk-significance.



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PA Perspective on Key WP Issues

Drip Shield Performance

- If drip shield is preventing numerous rockfall failures or preventing aggressive chemical conditions, would be much more risk-significant than current results indicate (see slide 25)
- Lower risk-significance (quantitative), Moderate risk-significance (thought)?



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PA Perspective on Key WP Issues

Mechanical Failure

- Current analyses suggest combination of likelihood of occurrence and consequences are lower risk (rockfall)
- However, extent of drift degradation (likelihood) and resultant consequences need to be further analyzed
- Lower risk-significance (rockfall), drift degradation?



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PA Perspective on Key WP Issues

Juvenile Failures

- Current TSPA results suggest frequency not high enough to create significant risk (see slides 4, 8)
- Lower risk-significance

Criticality

- Coupled to other degradation modes
- Current analyses suggest likelihood not large enough to create significant risk
- Lower risk-significance



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TSPAI Agreements and WP Key Issues

- 42 Agreements for TSPAI subissue 3 (model abstraction)
- Many TSPAI agreements deal with uncertainty
- ~ 30% pertain to uniform corrosion/passivity, localized corrosion, and environmental conditions



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
Conclusions

- The waste package is an important barrier, *but* the performance of other system components limit risks
- Caution is needed in utilizing conservatism and in interpreting results (from conservative models)
- PA results and additional analyses are used to condition thinking
- The assigned relative risk importance to CLST issues is based on current understanding





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Back-up Slides





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


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Parametric

| NOMINAL CASE | |
|--------------|---|
| 1 | Mean annual infiltration at start |
| 2 | WP flow multiplication factor |
| 3 | Spent fuel dissolution model pre-exponent |
| 4 | Subarea wet fraction |
| 5 | Drip shield failure time |
| 6 | Well pumping rate |
| 7 | Defective Fraction of WPs |
| 8 | Tuff-alluvium interface distance |
| 9 | Retardation of Np in SZ alluvium |
| 10 | Condensate toward repository |

Suppressed Barrier Component



% change w.r.t dose when all barrier components suppressed



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



Figure 1 from (Esh, Codell, and McCartin, IHLW 2001) 24



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Figure 5.2-3. Sensitivity of the Mean Dose Rate Profile to the Uncertainty of the Residual Hoop Stress and Stress Intensity Factor in the Outer Lid and Inner Lid Closure Welds



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



Figure 5.3-3. Sensitivity of the Predicted Mean Dose Rate Profile to the Degraded and Enhanced Drip Shield Cases



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Figure 5.3-5. Sensitivity of the Predicted Mean Dose Rate Profile to the Degraded and Enhanced Waste Package Cases