

Docket No: 50-361

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Gentlemen:

Subject: Issuance of Amendment No. 6 to Facility Operating License NPF-10
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued Amendment No. 6 to Facility Operating License NPF-10 for the San Onofre Nuclear Station, Unit 2, located in San Diego County, California.

This amendment authorizes operation at power levels up to 100 percent of full rated power, 3390 thermal megawatts. This amendment also contains changes to the license and the Appendix A Technical Specifications which (1) modify the operability requirements for fire detection instrumentation (as requested by your letters of July 9 and July 12, 1982), (2) extend the implementation date for the environmental qualification surveillance program, (3) add emergency preparedness conditions required by the May 14, 1982 Order of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, (4) require performance of a study of rapid depressurization and decay heat removal, and (5) impose a requirement on qualification of auxiliary feedwater motor bearings.

A copy of Amendment No. 6 is enclosed. Also enclosed are copies of the related safety evaluation supporting Amendment No. 6 to Facility Operating License NPF-10 and the related notice which has been forwarded to the Office of the Federal Register for publication. Appendices B and C to the original license remain unchanged, and are not included with this Amendment.

Sincerely,

Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 6
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Federal Register Notice

cc w/enclosure:

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY

SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

THE CITY OF RIVERSIDE CALIFORNIA

THE CITY OF ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA

DOCKET NO. 50-361

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 7
License No. NPF-10

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for license and the applications for amendment thereof (dated May 14, July 9, and July 12, 1982) for the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 (the facility) filed by the Southern California Edison Company on behalf of itself and San Diego Gas and Electric Company, The City of Riverside and The City of Anaheim, California (licensees) comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The Southern California Edison Company* is technically qualified to engage in the activities authorized by this operating license in accordance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - E. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public;

*The Southern California Edison Company is authorized to act as agent for the other co-owners and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation, and maintenance of the facility.

F. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraphs 2.C(1), 2.C(2), and 2.C(5) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-10 are hereby amended to read as follows:

(1) Maximum Power Level

Southern California Edison Company (SCE) is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of full power (3390 megawatts thermal).

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 7, are hereby incorporated in the license. SCE shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

(5) Environmental Qualification (Section 3.11, SER, SSER #3, SSER #4)

- a. * * *
- b. * * *

- c. Prior to exceeding five (5) percent power, SCE shall provide affirmation of implementation of the maintenance program procedures.
- d. Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, SCE shall provide affirmation of implementation of the improved surveillance program procedures.

3. In addition, paragraphs 2.C(23), 2.C(24), and 2.C(25) to Operating License No. NPF-10 are hereby added, to read as follows:

(23) Emergency Preparedness Conditions

- a. Conditions of ASLB Initial Decision of May 14, 1982

Within five (5) months of initially exceeding five (5) percent power, SCE shall:

- i. Demonstrate that both meteorological towers and the Health Physics Computer System are fully installed and operational. SCE shall maintain offsite assessment and monitoring capabilities, essentially as described in the hearing (see Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph D.1-12, pp. 136-140),

at no less than that level of readiness, pending development of satisfactory capability of offsite response organizations (see Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph D.27, pp. 145-146, and Section V, Paragraph B, pp. 213-214).

- ii. Provide an assessment of whether public information regarding emergency planning should also be presented in Spanish (see Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph F.32, pp. 168, and Section V, Paragraph C.2, pp. 215).
- iii. Provide plans demonstrating that SCE and offsite jurisdictions have developed and stand ready to implement arrangements for medical services for members of the offsite public. Documentation of the arrangements and provisions made shall be provided to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board as well as to the NRC staff (see Initial Decision, Section III, pp. 43-47, and Section V, Paragraph D, pp. 216-217).
- iv. Provide revised plans demonstrating that the "extended" Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) concept has been deleted from the San Onofre onsite and offsite plans and the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ boundary has been extended, along with siren coverage, to Dana Point and all of San Juan Capistrano (see Initial Decision, Section IV, Paragraph D.25, pp. 98, and Section V, Paragraph C.5, pp. 216; see also Order (Making Clarifying Change in Initial Decision) dated May 25, 1982).

b. Completion of Emergency Preparedness Requirements

In the event that the NRC finds that the lack of progress in completion of the procedures in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's proposed rules, 44 CFR 350, is an indication that a major substantive problem exists in achieving or maintaining an adequate state of preparedness, the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(s)(2) will apply.

(24) RCS Depressurization System (PORV's)


By June 30, 1983, SCE shall provide a complete response to the NRC letter of March 27, 1982, requesting additional information relative to the capability of San Onofre 2 and 3 for rapid depressurization and decay heat removal without power operated relief valves (PORVs).

(25) Qualification of Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump Motor Bearings

By October 30, 1982, SCE shall submit a proposed hardware modification and schedule for implementation that will increase the reliability of the AFW motor-driven pumps in the event of a break in the high energy line feeding the steam-driven pump. In the interim, prior to the installation of a hardware modification acceptable to the NRC staff, SCE shall perform an augmented in-service inspection of the steam line in accordance with SCE's letter of July 12, 1982.

4. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director
Division of Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: SEP 7 1982

AMENDMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 7FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-10DOCKET NO. 50-361

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

<u>Overleaf</u> <u>page</u>	<u>Amended</u> <u>Page</u>
	3/4 3-57
	3/4 3-58
3/4 3-60	3/4 3-59
3/4 3-62	3/4 3-61
3/4 7-32	3/4 7-31

TABLE 3.3-11

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS
MINIMUM INSTRUMENTS OPERABLE*

Zone	Instrument Location	Early Warning			Actuation		
		HEAT	FLAME	SMOKE	HEAT	FLAME	SMOKE
1	<u>Containment</u>						
	Cable Tray Areas Elev 63'3"			10			
	Cable Tray Areas Elev 45'			9			
	Cable Tray Areas Elev 30'			4			
	Elevator Machinery Room			1			
	Combustible Oil Area Two steam generator rooms						32
	Charcoal Filter Area Elev 45'	2					
2	<u>Penetration</u>						
	Elev 63'6"			12			
4	<u>New Fuel Storage Area and</u>						
	<u>Spent Fuel Pool Areas</u>						
	Spent Fuel Pool			4			
	New Fuel Pool			3			
5	<u>Control Building Elev 70'</u>						
	Cable Riser Gallery Rm 423			2		24	
	Cable Riser Gallery Rm 449			3		24	
6	<u>Control Building Elev 70'</u>						
	Radiation Chemical Lab Rms 421, 420	1					
7	<u>Radwaste Elev 63'6"</u>						
	Chemical Storage Area Rm 503			1			
	Radwaste Control Panel Rm 513			1			
	Storage Area Rm 523			1			
	Hot Machine Shop	1					
8	<u>Radwaste Elev 63'6"</u>						
	Waste Decay Tank Rms 511A			None			
9	<u>Fuel Handling Building Elev 45'</u>						
	Emgy. A.C. Unit Rm 309-Train A	1		1			
	Emgy. A.C. Unit Rm 301-Train B	1		1			
10	<u>Penetration</u>						
	Elev 45'			6			

* The fire detection instruments located within the Containment are not required to be OPERABLE during the performance of Type A Containment Leakage Rate Tests.

TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)

Zone	Instrument Location	Early Warning			Actuation		
		HEAT	FLAME	SMOKE	HEAT	FLAME	SMOKE
11	<u>S.E.B. Roof and Main Steam Relief Valves</u>						
		None					
12	<u>Control Building Elev 50'</u>						
	Cable Riser Gallery Rm 305			3		42	
	Cable Riser Gallery Rm 315			3		40	
13A	<u>Control Building Elev 30'</u>						
	Emgy. HVAC Unit Rm 309A			1			
13B	<u>Control Building Elev 50'</u>						
	Emgy. HVAC Unit Rm 309B			1			
14	<u>Radwaste Elev 24'</u>						
	Boric Acid Makeup Tank Rm 204B						
	Boric Acid Makeup Tank Rm 204A						
		None					
15	<u>Control Building Elev 50'</u>						
	ESF Switchgear Rm 308A				2		
	ESF Switchgear Rm 308B				2		
16	<u>Radwaste Elev 37' & 50'</u>						
	Ion Exchangers						
		None					
17	<u>Diesel Generator Building</u>						
	Train A				3		4
	Train B				3		4
18	<u>Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank</u>						
	<u>Underground Vaults</u>						
		None					
20	<u>Condensate Storage Tank T-121</u>						
		None					
21	<u>Nuclear Storage Tank T-104</u>						
		None					
22	<u>Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room</u>				2		6
23	<u>Fuel Handling Bldg Elev 30'</u>						
	Spent Fuel Pools Heat Exchange Room 209						
		None					
28	<u>Penetration Elev. 30'</u>				2		

TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)

Zone	Instrument Location	Early Warning			Actuation		
		HEAT	FLAME	SMOKE	HEAT	FLAME	SMOKE
29	<u>Control Building Elev 30'</u>						
	Cable Riser Gallery Rm 236			3			51
	Cable Riser Gallery Rm 224			3			52
30	<u>Electrical Tunnel Elev 30'6"</u>			13			50
31	<u>Control Building Elev 30'</u>			29			
32A	<u>Control Building Elev 30'</u>						
	Fan Room Rm 219 & Corridor Rm 221	2			1		
32B	<u>Control Building Elev 30'</u>						
	Fan Room Rm 233 & Corridor Rm 234	2			1		
34	<u>Radwaste Elev 9' & 24'</u>						
	Secondary Radwaste Tank Rms 126A,B & 127A,B			None			
35	<u>Radwaste Elev 9' & 24'</u>						
	Spent Resin Tank Rms 125A,B			None			
36	<u>Fuel Handling Building Elev 17'6"</u>						
	Spent Fuel Pool Pump Rm 107				2		
37	<u>Radwaste Elev 24'</u>						
	Letdown Heat Exchanger Rms 209A,B			None			
38	<u>Radwaste Elev 24'</u>						
	Letdown Control Valve Rms 218A,B			None			
39	<u>Radwaste Elev 24'</u>						
	Filter Crvd Tank Rm 216			None			
40	<u>Radwaste Elev 9' & 24'</u>						
	Primary Radwaste Tank Rms 211A,D			None			
41	<u>Control Building Elev 9'</u>						
	Cable Spreading Rm 111A				17		36
	Cable Spreading Rm 111B				14		36
42	<u>Control Building Elev 9'</u>						
	Cable Riser Gallery Rm 110				6		44
	Cable Riser Gallery Rm 112				6		39

TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)

Zone	Instrument Location	Early Warning			Actuation		
		HEAT	FLAME	SMOKE	HEAT	FLAME	SMOKE
43	<u>Control Building Elev 9'</u> Emgy. Chiller Rm 115 Emgy. Chiller Rm 117			2 2			
44	<u>Intake Structure</u> Pump Rm T2-106 Pump Rm T3-106			4 4			
45	<u>Penetration Area Elev 9' & 15'</u> Piping Penetration Area 15'	None					
48	<u>Safety Equipment Building 9'</u> CCW HX and Piping Rm 022-025	None					
50	<u>Radwaste Elev 9'</u> Charging Pump Rms 106A-F			6			
51	<u>Radwaste Elev 9'</u> Boric Acid Makeup Tank Rms 105A-D	None					
53	<u>Electrical Tunnel Elev 9'6", 11'6", (-) 2'6"</u>			21	54		
54	<u>Safety Eqpmt Bldg Elev 15'6" & 8'</u> Shutdown HX Rms 003, 004, 016, 018	None					
55	<u>Safety Eqpmt Bldg Elev 8'</u> Chemical Storage Tank Rm 019			1			
56	<u>Safety Eqpmt Bldg Elev 8'</u> Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Rms 020, 021	None					
57	<u>Safety Eqpmt Bldg Elev 15'6"</u> Pump Rm 005			1			
58	<u>Radwaste Elev 37'</u> Reactor Trip System Rms 308A-D, 309-A-C			9			
59	<u>Safety Eqpmt Bldg Elev 15'6"</u> Pump Rm 001			1			

TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)

Zone	Instrument Location	Early Warning			Actuation		
		HEAT	FLAME	SMOKE	HEAT	FLAME	SMOKE
60	<u>Safety Eqpmt Bldg Elev 15'6"</u> Pump Rm 015			1			
61	<u>Safety Eqpmt Bldg Elev 15'6"</u> Component Cooling Water Pump Rms 006, 007, 008			3			
62	<u>Radwaste Elev 50'</u> Volume Control Valve Rooms	None					
63	<u>Control Building Elev 50'</u> Corridor			12			
64	<u>Control Building Elev 50'</u> Vital Power Distribution Rms 310A-H			8			
65	<u>Control Building Elev 50'</u> Battery Rms 306B-J			8			
66	<u>Control Building Elev 50'</u> Evacuation Rm 311			1			
67	<u>Radwaste Elev 63'6"</u> Cable Riser Gallery Rm 506A Cable Riser Gallery Rm 506B			2 2	4 4		
68	<u>Penetration 9' - 63'6"</u> Cable Riser Shaft			1	21		
69	<u>Safety Eqpmt Bldg Elev 5'3"</u> Salt Water Cooling Piping Rm 010	None					
70	<u>Radwaste Elev 24'</u> Duct Shaft Rms 222A,B	None					
72	<u>Control Building Elev 70'</u> Corridor 401	None					
75	<u>Refueling Water Storage Tank</u> T-005	None					
76	<u>Refueling Water Storage Tank</u> T-006	None					

TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)

Zone	Instrument Location	Early Warning			Actuation		
		HEAT	FLAME	SMOKE	HEAT	FLAME	SMOKE
78	<u>Control Building Elev 9'</u> Corridor Rm 105			4			
79	<u>Control Building Elev 50'</u> ESF Switchgear Rm 302A ESF Switchgear Rm 302B			2 2			
80	<u>Radwaste Elev 37' & 50'</u> Duct Shaft Rms			None			
81	<u>Radwaste Elev 63'6"</u> Duct Shaft Rms 527A,B			None			
83	<u>Salt Water Cooling Tunnel</u>						6*
84	<u>Safety Eqpmt Bldg Elev 8'</u> HVAC Rm 017						3

*3 in UNIT 2, 3 in UNIT 3

TABLE 3.7-5

Safety Related Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems

<u>Hazard</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>No. of Systems</u>	<u>System Type</u>
Reactor Coolant Pumps	Containment	4	Deluge-Water Spray
R.R. Tunnel	Fuel Hand. Bldg.	1	Wet Pipe
Truck Ramp	Radwaste Bldg.	1	Wet Pipe
Cable Tunnel	Section 1	1	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Tunnel	Section 2	1	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Tunnel	Section 3	1	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Tunnel	Section 4	1	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Tunnel	Section 5	1	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Tunnel	Section 6	1	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Tunnel	Section 7	1	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Tunnel	Section 8	1	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Tunnel	Section 9	1	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Tunnel	Section 10	1	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Tunnel Riser	Fuel Hand. Bldg.	1	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Gallery	Radwaste Bldg.	2*	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Risers El. 9 ft.	Control Bldg.	2*	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Risers El. 30 ft.	Control Bldg.	2*	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Risers El. 50 ft.	Control Bldg.	2*	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Risers El. 70 ft.	Control Bldg.	2*	Deluge-Water Spray
Cable Spreading Room	Control Bldg.	4*	Deluge-Water Spray
Emergency A.C. Unit - Train A	Fuel Handling Bldg.	1**	Deluge-Water Spray
Emergency A.C. Unit - Train B	Fuel Handling Bldg.	1**	Deluge-Water Spray
Diesel Generator	DG Building	2	Pre-action Sprinkler
HVAC Room 309A; Corridor 303	Control Bldg. 50'	1	Wet Pipe
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room	Tank Bldg. 30'	1	Pre-action Sprinkler
Fan Room 233 and Corridor 234	Control Bldg. 30'	1	Wet Pipe
Salt Water Cooling Pumps and Salt Water Cooling Tunnel	Intake Structure	1	Wet Pipe
CCW Heat Exchangers and Piping Room; A/C Room 017	Safety Equipment Bldg.	1	Wet Pipe
Corridor 401	Control Bldg. 70'	1	Wet Pipe
Corridor 105	Control Bldg. 9'	1	Wet Pipe

*One half of these systems are designated Unit 3, but are required to be OPERABLE for Unit 2 operation.

**Charcoal filter deluge systems are manually actuated.

PLANT SYSTEMS

FIRE HOSE STATIONS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.8.3 The fire hose stations shown in Table 3.7-6 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever equipment in the areas protected by the fire hose stations is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

- a. With one or more of the fire hose stations shown in Table 3.7-6 inoperable, route an additional equivalent capacity fire hose to the unprotected area(s) from an OPERABLE hose station within 1 hour if the inoperable fire hose is the primary means of fire suppression; otherwise route the additional hose within 24 hours. Restore the fire hose station to OPERABLE status within 14 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the station to OPERABLE status.
- b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.8.3 Each of the fire hose stations shown in Table 3.7-6 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by visual inspection of the stations accessible during plant operation to assure all required equipment is at the station.
- b. At least once per 18 months by:
 1. Visual inspection of the stations not accessible during plant operations to assure all required equipment is at the station.
 2. Removing the hose for inspection and re-racking, and
 3. Inspecting all gaskets and replacing any degraded gaskets in the couplings.
- c. At least once per 3 years by:
 1. Partially opening each hose station valve to verify valve OPERABILITY and no flow blockage.
 2. Conducting a hose hydrostatic test at a pressure of 150 psig or at least 50 psig above the maximum fire main operating pressure, whichever is greater.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION
AMENDMENT 7 to NPF-10
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2
DOCKET NO. 50-361

Introduction

Amendment 7 to the San Onofre Unit 2 Operating License makes several changes. These are:

- (1) Maximum Power Level is changed to 100 percent of full power.
- (2) The Technical Specification operability requirements for fire detection instrumentation are modified.
- (3) The date for implementation of the environmental qualification surveillance program is changed from June 30, 1982 to the first refueling.
- (4) Emergency preparedness conditions are imposed.
- (5) The study of rapid depressurization and decay heat removal requested in the NRC letter of March 27, 1982 is required by June 30, 1983.
- (6) A proposed hardware modification to increase the reliability of the AFW pumps in the event of a steam line break in the AFW pump room is required by October 30, 1982. Augmented inservice inspection is required in the interim.

The following sections evaluate each of the changes made in Amendment 7 to NPF-10.

Maximum Power Level

NPF-10 was issued on February 16, 1982, and contained a condition limiting the maximum power level to 5 percent of full power. In addition, several other conditions must be completed prior to exceeding 5 percent power. At the time that NPF-10 was issued, the principal open area that precluded authorization to operate above 5 percent power was emergency preparedness. As is discussed below, with the issuance of the ASLB Initial Decision and Order of May 14, 1982, the implementation of the ASLB conditions as discussed below and included in Amendment 7 to NPF-10, and based on the Commission Memorandum M820728 of July 30, 1982, there are no open items that require staff evaluation to resolve prior to allowing San Onofre Unit 2 to exceed 5 percent power. On this basis, the maximum power condition in the San Onofre Unit 2 license is changed by this amendment to allow full power operation in due course.

It should be noted, however, that there are several license conditions, both in the license as issued on February 16, 1982, and in this amendment, that will require NRC staff inspection to verify completion prior to San Onofre Unit 2 exceeding 5 percent power. Further, another condition requires the completion of the planned test program, which will result in power being raised in steps, with tests to verify plant operating characteristics at each power plateau.

Technical Specifications

By letters dated July 9, 1982, and July 12, 1982, the licensee requested that changes be made to Technical Specification 3.3.3.7, Table 3.3-11, "Fire Detection Instruments-Minimum Instruments Operable," and to Technical Specification 3.7.8.2, Table 3.7-5, "Safety Related Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems."

In its letter dated July 9, 1982, the Southern California Edison Company (SCE) on behalf of itself, San Diego Gas and Electric Company, the City of Riverside and the City of Anaheim (the licensees), requested the following change to the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 Technical Specifications:

For Specification 3.3.3.7, Fire Detection Instrumentation, Table 3.3-11, Fire Detection Instruments-Minimum Instruments Operable, Zone 1 Containment, SCE has requested to change the required early warning detectors from 6 flame to 10 smoke for cable tray areas elev 63' 3", 4 flame to 9 smoke for cable tray areas elev 45', 4 flame to 4 smoke for cable tray areas elev 30'. SCE also requested that the 32 smoke actuation detectors for combustion oil area steam generator rooms be deleted and that a single smoke detector be listed in the elevator machinery room. SCE also requested that the 2 heat actuation detectors be changed to 2 heat early warning detectors for charcoal filter area elev 45' and that the 1 heat actuation detector be changed to 1 heat early warning detector for Zone 9 Fuel Handling Building Elev 45' for both the emergency A.C. unit room 309-train A and the emergency A.C. unit room 301-train B.

Our evaluation of the proposed changes indicated above is as follows:

The 14 flame detectors listed in the cable tray areas are ultraviolet (UV) detectors and may not operate in the expected radiation environment. The licensee's proposal to replace these 14 UV detectors with 23 ionization smoke detectors which will operate in the expected radiation environment is acceptable because it will provide equivalent fire detection capability in the affected areas. The reactor coolant pump oil collection system provides adequate fire protection without UV detectors in the combustible oil area of containment.

The 32 UV flame detectors provided for early warning in the combustible oil area (reactor coolant pump area) were inadvertently listed as smoke detectors in the actuation column. The UV detectors may not operate in the expected radiation environment. The licensee's proposal to remove these 32 UV flame detectors is acceptable because the reactor coolant pump oil collection system in combination with a heat actuated deluge-water spray system provides adequate fire protection without the UV flame detectors being installed.

There has been spurious actuation of the automatic charcoal filter deluge system at San Onofre Unit 2 during the startup program. The licensee's proposal to change the charcoal filter deluge system from automatic to manual by moving the 2 heat detectors listed in the actuation column to the early warning column for the charcoal filter area and the fuel handling building is acceptable because in the automatic system, an early warning alarm would occur prior to actuation of the deluge system at higher temperatures and in the manual system, the early warning alarm would result in dispatch of the fire brigade to actuate the deluge system, if required. Because of the slow burning nature of charcoal filter fires, manual actuation would occur at approximately the same time after the early warning alarm as automatic actuation. As a result, the difference between automatic and manual actuation is insignificant. However, as a result of this change, charcoal filter availability is significantly increased by elimination of the possibility of spurious actuation associated with the automatic system.

Staff approval of the above changes was given by telephone on July 9, 1982 and was confirmed by letter dated July 15, 1982.

By letter dated July 12, 1982, the licensee requested that, in addition to the above changes, the following related changes be made to the San Onofre Unit 2 Technical Specifications.

(1) Technical Specification 3.3.3.7, Table 3.3-11

Zone 28 Move the two heat detectors listed in the actuation column to the early warning column.

Zone 32A Move the two heat detectors listed in the actuation column to the early warning column.

Zone 32B Add two heat detectors to the early warning column.

Zone 72 Change corridor 442 to 401.

(2) Technical Specification 3.7.8.2, Table 3.7-5

Charcoal Filter A-353: Delete the deluge-water spray system in this area.

Emergency AC Unit - Train A and Train B: Add a note to indicate the conversion of the automatic deluge-water spray systems protecting the charcoal filters to manual operation and clarify surveillance requirement 4.7.8.2.d.1.a.

Charcoal Filter E-419 and Charcoal Filter A-206: Delete deluge-water spray system and add wet pipe sprinkler system.

Add spray and/or sprinkler systems to Table 3.7-5 for the following areas:

HVAC Room 309; Corridor 303
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room
Fan Room 233 and Corridor 234
Salt Water Cooling Pumps
Salt Water Cooling Tunnel
CCW Heat Exchangers and Piping Room; AC Room 017
Corridor 401
Corridor 105

Our evaluation of the above changes as requested in the SCE letter of July 12, 1982 is given below.

(1) Technical Specification 3.3.3.7, Table 3.3-11.

Zones 28 and 32A: These changes are acceptable because they facilitate conversion of the charcoal filter deluge-water spray system from automatic to manual operation. This conversion provides adequate fire protection and enhances the availability of the charcoal filters by reducing the probability of spurious dousing of the charcoal. Because of the slow burning nature of charcoal fires, additional damage resulting from the time delay associated with manual actuation is insignificant when compared with the potential damage resulting from spurious dousing of the charcoal filter by the automatically actuated system.

Zone 32B: This change provides early warning of a charcoal filter fire, enabling manual actuation of the charcoal filter deluge-water spray system, and is, therefore, acceptable.

Zone 72: This change corrects a typographical error and is, therefore, acceptable.

(2) Technical Specification 3.7.8.2, Table 3.7-5.

Charcoal Filter A-353: Deletion of the deluge-water spray system in this area is acceptable because there is no safety related equipment or cabling in the vicinity of this charcoal filter, and a fire in this charcoal filter would not significantly increase the risk of a radioactive release to the environment.

Charcoal Filters E-419 and A-206: Replacement of the deluge-water spray system with a wet pipe sprinkler system for these filters is acceptable because the wet pipe sprinkler system adequately protects the train A and B safe shutdown equipment by insuring that a single fire in any of these charcoal filters would not incapacitate redundant trains of safety related equipment nor would a fire increase the risk of a radioactive release to the environment.

The addition of spray and/or sprinkler systems to Table 3.7-5 for the following areas

HVAC Room 309A; Corridor 303
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room
Fan Room 233 and Corridor 234
Salt Water Cooling Pumps
Salt Water Cooling Pumps
CCW Heat Exchangers and Piping Room; AC Room 017
Corridor 401
Corridor 105

is acceptable because it provides fire suppression capability in areas containing redundant trains of equipment, thereby ensuring that the redundant trains of safety-related equipment will not be incapacitated by a single fire nor will a fire significantly increase the risk of a release of radioactivity to the environment.

For the reasons given above, the staff concludes that the Technical Specification changes proposed in the licensee's letters of July 9 and 12, 1982 are acceptable.

Environmental Qualification

By letter dated May 14, 1982, the licensee requested that condition 2.C(5)c of the San Onofre Unit 2 Operating License be amended to (1) continue to require implementation of the environmental qualification maintenance program procedures by June 30, 1982 or prior to exceeding 5% power whichever comes first, but (2) change the date for implementation of the surveillance program procedures to the first refueling outage. The licensee further states in this letter that they will comply with both existing Sections 2.C.(5)a, which specifies that, by June 30, 1982 the provisions of NUREG-0588, Rev. 1, shall be complied with for safety-related electrical equipment exposed to a harsh environment, and 2.C(5)b, which requires that complete and auditable qualification records be available by June 30, 1982 and maintained thereafter.

In Supplement No. 3 to the SER, the staff addressed the environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment for San Onofre 2 and 3. That supplement requested certain information from the licensee and included several pages of equipment, with deficiencies identified, requiring additional information and/or corrective action. We received a subsequent revision to the licensee's environmental qualification report after the issuance of Supplement No. 3 to the SER, and our preliminary evaluation of this information is given in Supplement No. 4 to the SER. On February 16, 1982, an operating license, NPF-10, was issued for San Onofre Unit 2. Condition 2.C(5) of NPF-10 required that the licensee comply with the provisions of NUREG-0588 by June 30, 1982. However, the June 30, 1982 deadline by which electrical equipment must

be qualified has been removed as a license condition for all operating plants by a recently issued rule (47 F.R. 28363, June 30, 1982), and a new deadline will be imposed by a forthcoming revision to that rule. Therefore, the revision to the environmental qualification report submitted by the licensee will be reviewed in detail in accordance with the newly established deadline.

We have reviewed the May 14, 1982 letter and we find acceptable the licensee's request to revise existing Section 2.C.(5)c of the San Onofre 2 license such that implementation of the improved surveillance program procedures would not be required until the first refueling outage. This finding is based on our conclusion that the surveillance presently required by the Technical Specifications is adequate until a full surveillance and trending program related to the environmental qualification of electrical equipment can be implemented because few equipment failures resulting from environmental conditions are expected during the period of operation prior to the first refueling outage. Additionally, the licensee has stated that an experienced consultant is being hired to assist in the development of the surveillance program, and we conclude that requiring implementation of a full surveillance program at this time would preclude the orderly development a well thought out and technically sound program.

Emergency Preparedness

With regard to our evaluation of emergency preparedness at San Onofre, the staff review is complete, and there are no open licensing items other than the ASLB conditions discussed below. Based on the inclusion of these conditions in the San Onofre Unit 2 operating license, the staff confirmation of certain ASLB requirements (see below), and the staff finding that both offsite and onsite emergency preparedness are adequate, issuance of this amendment authorizing full power operation is warranted.

(1) ASLB Conditions

The NRC staff conclusion regarding onsite and offsite capabilities to respond to an emergency at San Onofre 2 and 3 was provided in Supplement No. 6 to the Safety Evaluation Report for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3, NUREG-0712, issued in June 1982 (SSER 6). That supplement also addressed the May 14, 1982, Initial Decision of the San Onofre 2 and 3 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (the ASLB or Board), as modified by its clarifying Order of May 25, 1982. The staff committed to confirm that each Board condition has either been satisfied prior to issuance of a full power license for San Onofre Unit 2 or that the license will be conditioned to require that the Board condition be satisfied on the schedule defined by the Board. The staff, based on its review of the May 14, 1982 Initial Decision concluded that the items the Board required "prior to full power operation" should be completed prior to exceeding 5% power, and that the items the Board required "during the first six months of full power operation" should be completed no later than five months after initially exceeding 5% power in order to

permit NRC evaluation within the 6-month period. The following discussion addresses these items required to be completed prior to exceeding 5% power. The remaining items, viz., those required within five months after exceeding 5% power, will be imposed as license conditions by Amendment No. 7 to the San Onofre Unit 2 Operating License, NPF-10.

The conditions imposed by the Board that must be satisfied prior to exceeding 5% power are those identified as items A.1 and A.2 (a-h) in Section 13.3.4 of SSER 6 and are repeated below:

- A.1 The NRC staff shall certify to the ASLB that the siren system has been shown to perform in accordance with its technical specifications.
- A.2 The NRC staff shall confirm that:
 - a. The FEMA concerns expressed in the November Updated Evaluation about lesson plans and schedules have been satisfied.
 - b. Initial training of adequate numbers of onsite and offsite personnel in each category listed in Section II.0.4 of NUREG-0654 has been completed, except for radiological monitoring teams and radiological analysis personnel (paragraph 4.C of Section II.0.4).
 - c. The same (or an improved) communications system that was installed at the original interim Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) has been adopted for the relocated interim EOF.
 - d. The same (or an improved) set of operating procedures that were adopted for the original interim Emergency Operations Facility have been adopted for the relocated interim EOF.
 - e. Emergency equipment, suitable for its emergency purpose, has been purchased and delivered to the offsite response organizations.
 - f. A drill has been conducted to verify the adequacy of the physical design, communications equipment, and operating procedures of the relocated interim EOF.
 - g. FEMA has reviewed and confirmed that the EOF, Offsite Dose Assessment Center (ODAC), and Liaison SOPs are adequate.
 - h. Consistency has been achieved in the prewritten instructions for the public in the licensees' and the local jurisdictions' emergency plans.

Condition A.1.

The NRC staff certifies that the siren system installed within the 10 mile plume exposure EPZ has been shown to perform in accordance with its technical specifications. This certification is based upon a similar certification received from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in a memorandum to Brian Grimes, NRC, from Richard W. Krimm, FEMA, dated July 1, 1982 (Subject: Initial Decision (ASLB) on San Onofre 2 and 3 dated May 14, 1982). The staff has also reviewed the following correspondence and reports provided by the licensee to NRC and FEMA pertaining to the installation and testing of the siren system:

- (1) Letter to Ken Nauman, FEMA, from F. K. Massey, SCE, dated March 25, 1982.
- (2) Letters to Frank Miraglia, NRC, from K. P. Baskin, SCE, dated May 28, 1982, and June 4, 1982.

The above certification does not address the performance of the sirens planned for installation in Dana Point and the remainder of San Juan Capistrano in accordance with the Board's condition regarding extension of the plume exposure EPZ boundary. The staff will confirm siren performance in these areas on a schedule consistent with that established by the Board in its clarifying Order of May 25, 1982.

Conditions A.2 (a-h)

The NRC staff has determined that each of the above items a-h imposed by the Board and required by the Board to be satisfied prior to exceeding 5% power have been completed. The staff concurs with the FEMA evaluation of these license conditions given in their above mentioned July 1, 1982 letter and has evaluated NRC Inspection Reports Nos. 50-361/81-31, 50-361/82-07, and 50-361/82-18 and the documentation provided by the licensee in a May 20, 1982 letter to the Director, NRC Office of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Based on this determination and the above finding regarding condition A.1, the staff concludes that all the ASLB conditions required to be completed prior to exceeding 5% power have been completed.

(2) Evaluation of April 15, 1982 Exercise

On April 15, 1982, an emergency preparedness exercise was conducted at San Onofre to demonstrate the adequacy of the emergency plan and the implementation capabilities of the State and local agencies involved. The exercise also provided opportunities to demonstrate the adequacy of corrective actions that were called for in the May 13, 1981 exercise critique.

The FEMA evaluation of the exercise was documented and transmitted to the NRC staff by letter dated July 7, 1982, from Richard W. Krimm, FEMA, to Brian Grimes, NRC, Subject: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Exercise. Based on their evaluation of the April 15, 1982 exercise, FEMA concluded that with respect to the status of offsite emergency preparedness, all participating jurisdictions exhibited an adequate or better capability to respond to an offsite emergency. The NRC staff has evaluated the FEMA findings and concurs.

(3) Ingestion Pathway

The ASLB, in its May 14, 1982 Initial Decision, determined that the adequacy of emergency preparedness in the ingestion pathway emergency planning zone (ingestion EPZ) was no longer a contested matter and accordingly left satisfaction of this planning standard to the NRC staff for resolution. This section addresses resolution of this item.

As part of the FEMA evaluation of the April 15, 1982 exercise, FEMA provided their findings regarding the results of a March 25, 1982 drill during which Orange County exercised its capabilities with regard to the ingestion EPZ. By letters dated July 28, 1982, and August 5, 1982, from Richard W. Krimm, FEMA, to Brian Grimes, NRC, FEMA presented additional information regarding ingestion pathway planning and capabilities and stated that the current overall offsite response capability is adequate. The NRC staff has evaluated the FEMA findings and conclusions and concurs.

(4) Completion of Emergency Preparedness Requirements

The formal FEMA approval process for State emergency response plans as outlined in the proposed FEMA rule, 44 CFR 350, has not been completed. Consistent with an agreement reached between General Giuffrida, Director, FEMA, and Chairman Palladino, NRC, at an August 19, 1981 meeting, the San Onofre Unit 2 license has been conditioned to identify to the licensee that deficiencies identified during the 44 CFR 350 approval process may be viewed as potentially significant deficiencies for which NRC enforcement action in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(s)(2)(ii) may be considered.

(5) Conclusions

In summary, as stated above, the staff has found that:

- a. The ASLB conditions that must be satisfied prior to exceeding five percent power have been satisfied.
- b. The April 15, 1982 exercise demonstrated that the offsite emergency plans and implementation capability at San Onofre is adequate.
- c. The ingestion pathway EPZ assessment and monitoring capability is adequate.

Further, in Supplement No. 6 to the SER we stated that the ASLB conditions that must be satisfied within 6 months of full power operation would be included in the San Onofre Unit 2 license as conditions. Based on the foregoing we conclude that offsite emergency preparedness at San Onofre meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b), Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, Regulatory Guide 1.101, Revision 2, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, and the ASLB Initial Decision of May 14, 1982, and is acceptable.

Rapid Depressurization and Decay Heat Removal

On March 27, 1982, the NRC staff issued a letter to SCE requesting that information be provided about the capability of San Onofre 2 and 3 for rapid depressurization and decay heat removal without power operated relief valves (PORVs). This request was discussed at the July 28, 1982 meeting of the NRC, and the Commission voted to require that the information requested in March 27, 1982 letter be completed by approximately March to July, 1983 on a date to be agreed upon by the staff and licensee. By letter dated July 30, 1982, the licensee proposed that the completion date be June 30, 1983. The staff concurs with this date. The basis for safe plant operation prior to completion of the study is given in Section 5.4.3 of Supplement No. 6 to the SER.

Environmental Qualification of AFW Pump Motor Bearings

In meetings between the licensee and the NRC staff on May 24 and June 24, 1982, and in letters dated June 10 and July 12, 1982, the licensee informed the staff that failures of the environmentally qualified cast iron bearings of the AFW pump motors had occurred. To allow the startup test program to continue, the cast iron bearings had been replaced with Babbitt-metal bearings. However, the Babbitt bearings are not qualified for operation in the environment that they would experience in the event of a steam line break in the AFW pump room.

In their letter of July 12, 1982, SCE evaluated a number of possible solutions to the problem and recommended that augmented inservice inspection be performed on the steam line in the AFW pump room to reduce the likelihood of a catastrophic failure of the line. This would, in SCE's view, obviate the need to postulate a break in this line. The staff has evaluated this proposal and has concluded that while the augmented inservice inspection (daily visual inspection of the AFW pump room steam line) provides a basis for interim plant operation, that ultimately a hardware modification is necessary to protect the AFW system against the potential common-mode failure of all three pumps due to the failure of a single line.

Consequently, we will condition the San Onofre 2 operating license to require that SCE propose a hardware modification to resolve this problem by October 30, 1982. In the interim, daily inspection of the AFW pump room steam line will be required to provide an early indication of leaks in the steam line so that it may be isolated, thereby acceptably reducing the likelihood of catastrophic failure.

Environmental Consideration

We have determined that authorization of full power operation by this license amendment will not result in any environmental impacts other than those evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement (FES) and its Errata, since full power operation is encompassed by the overall action evaluated in the FES and its Errata.

We have determined that the other changes made by this amendment do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amount nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the other changes made by this amendment involve action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact, and, pursuant to 10 CFR Section 51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

Conclusion

Prior public notice of the overall action involving issuance of this operating license amendment authorizing full power operation, including emergency preparedness issues, was published in the FEDERAL REGISTER on April 7, 1977 (42 F.R. 18460). Staff evaluation of the safety of the overall action is given the SER and its supplements (NUREG-0712). With regard to the other actions authorized by this amendment including changes to the Technical Specifications, we have concluded that because they do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered, do not create the possibility of an accident of a type different from any evaluated previously, and do not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, these actions do not involve a significant safety hazards consideration.

Further, there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the manner authorized by this amendment, and the activities authorized by this amendment will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. We, therefore, conclude that the proposed changes are acceptable.

Dated: SEP 7 1982

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. 50-361

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, ET AL

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-10

Pursuant to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's Partial Initial Decision dated January 11, 1982, its Initial Decision dated May 14, 1982 and Commission Memorandum M820728 dated July 30, 1982, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 7 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-10, to Southern California Edison Company, San Diego Gas and Electric Company, The City of Riverside, California and The City of Anaheim, California (licensees) for the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 (the facility). The facility is a pressurized water reactor, located in San Diego County, California.

This amendment authorizes operation at power levels up to 100% of full rated core power, 3390 thermal megawatts, in accordance with the provisions of the License as amended, the Technical Specifications as amended, and the Environmental Protection Plan. In addition, the amendment includes changes to the License and Technical Specifications to (1) modify the operability requirements for fire detection instrumentation, (2) extend the implementation date for the environmental qualification surveillance program, (3) add emergency preparedness conditions, (4) require performance of a study of rapid depressurization and decay heat removal, and (5) impose a requirement on qualification of auxiliary feedwater pump motor bearings. The amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

Issuance of this amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the amendment. Prior public notice of the overall action involving the proposed issuance of an operating license authorizing full power operation including item (3) above was published in the FEDERAL REGISTER on April 7, 1977 (42 F.R. 18460). Prior notice of the actions authorized in items (1), (2), (4) and (5), above is not required since these actions do not involve significant hazards considerations.

The Commission has determined that the issuance of this license amendment will not result in any environmental impacts other than those evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement and its Errata since the activity authorized by the license amendment is encompassed by the overall action evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement and its Errata.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) Amendment No. 7 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-10 and the related Safety Evaluation; (2) Southern California Edison Company's letters dated May 14, July 9, July 12, and July 30, 1982; (3) the reports of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards dated February 10, 1981, and March 17, 1981; (4) the Commission's Safety Evaluation Report dated February 1981, Supplement No. 1 dated February 1981, Supplement No. 2 dated May 1981, Supplement No. 3 dated September 1981, Supplement No. 4 dated January 1982, Supplement No. 5 dated February 1982 and Supplement No. 7 dated June 1982; (5) the Final Safety Analysis Report and amendments thereto; (6) the Environmental Report and Supplements thereto; (7) the Final Environmental

Statement dated April 1981 and the Errata to the Final Environmental Statement dated June 1981; (8) the Partial Initial Decision and the Initial Decision issued by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board dated January 11, 1982 and May 14, 1982, respectively; and (9) Commission Memorandum M820728 dated July 30, 1982.

These items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., and the San Clemente Branch Library, 242 Avenida Del Mar, San Clemente, California 92672. A copy of Amendment No. 7 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-10 may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington D. C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Licensing. Copies of the Safety Evaluation Report and its Supplements 1 through 6 (NUREG-0712) and the Technical Specifications (NUREG-0741) may be purchased at current rates from the National Technical Information Service, Department of Commerce, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161, and through the NRC GPO sales program by writing to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attention: Sales Manager, Washington, D. C. 20555. GPO deposit account holders can call 301/492-9530.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 7th day of September, 1982.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Frank J. Miraglia, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 3
Division of Licensing