

AUG 07 2002



LRN-02-0272

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

**REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK
SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1
DOCKET NO. 50-272**

The purpose of this letter is to confirm our discussions with NRC staff concerning PSEG Nuclear's continued service and future plans for the Salem 1 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST). These discussions took place during a telecon with Mr. Robert Fretz, NRC Project Manager for Salem on July 24, 2002.

There were two specific issues for which the Staff requested confirmation, specifically; the current on going actions for monitoring of the leakage and the plans to repair the RWST, which is scheduled for the fall 2002 refueling outage (1R12).

As noted during our discussions, all externally accessible welds of the RWST, in the region of the reinforcing pad, have been examined using liquid penetrant (PT) examination methodology and no relevant indications have been detected. These PT examinations have included the nozzle to shell weld and the reinforcing pad to shell welds.

Additionally, there is a daily inspection of a leakage collection bottle which has been attached at the threaded tell tale hole, located in the reinforcing pad surrounding the suction outlet nozzle of the RWST. The daily inspections are performed by operations personnel and are recorded in the primary operator reading sheet. This daily monitoring is part of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) and is documented in Condition Report number 70017741, operation 20. Since the initiation of this inspection there has been essentially an un-measurable quantity/volume of leakage. The daily inspections will continue until the 1R12 refueling outage or until the leakage condition increases to point of exceeding the acceptance limit of 1 GPM.

A001

AUG 07 2002

Upon entering 1R12 refueling outage, corrective maintenance order (60019962) will be implemented for the repair of the RWST. The repair plan involves draining the RWST, performing non-destructive examinations from the inside of the RWST, and weld repairing, using qualified welding procedures and personnel, if any flaw/indication is detected and then subsequently re-examined using the PT and or BT.

Inspections will be made using either liquid penetrant examination or vacuum box bubble (BT) testing, to examine those areas of welds located behind the reinforcing pad that are currently inaccessible from the OD. The PT and or BT will be used to attempt to pinpoint the actual source of the leakage site.

If the examination(s) do not reveal any specific flaw/indication, then all weld(s) areas that are located behind the reinforcing pad will be surface prepared (e.g., ground) for welding and subsequently repair welded. Upon completion of the refueling outage, the RWST will be refilled and a visual examination (VT-2) of the tell tale hole as well as all of the exterior welds in the region of the nozzle and reinforcing pad will be made. This VT-2 will be conducted to detect any evidence of leakage, while the RWST is pressurized to the normal static head pressure conditions.

If you have any questions or comments on this submittal, please contact John Nagle at (856) 339-3171.

Sincerely,



Gabor Salamon
Nuclear Safety and Licensing Manager

**C Mr. H. Miller, Administrator - Region I
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406**

**Mr. R. Fretz
Licensing Project Manager - Salem
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
One White Flint North, Mail Stop 8B2
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852**

**Mr. Ray Lorson
USNRC Senior Resident Inspector - Salem (X24)**

**Mr. K. Tosch, Manager IV
Bureau of Nuclear Engineering
P. O. Box 415
Trenton, NJ 08625**