

February 20, 1997

Mr. Roger O. Anderson, Director
Licensing and Management Issues
Northern States Power Company
414 Nicollet Mall
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401

SUBJECT: PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 -
ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS RE: SAFETY INJECTION PUMP LOW TEMPERATURE
OPERATIONS (TAC NOS. M97884 AND M97885)

Dear Mr. Anderson:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 127 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-42 and Amendment No. 119 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-60 for the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated February 6, 1997, as supplemented by your letter dated February 12, 1997. This request was treated as an exigent amendment in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6)(i)(B). Public notice concerning these proposed amendments and the proposed determination of no significant hazards was published in the Red Wing Republican Eagle, the Minneapolis Star Tribune, and the St. Paul Pioneer Press.

The amendments revise TS 3.3.A and the associated Bases to allow safety injection pump testing and evolutions during low-temperature shutdown conditions provided control for reactor coolant system conditions are in place to provide low temperature overpressurization protection. The current TS do not allow the testing and evolutions to be performed.

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Beth A. Wetzel, Project Manager
Project Directorate III-1
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-282 and 50-306

- Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 127 to DPR-42
- 2. Amendment No. 119 to DPR-60
- 3. Safety Evaluation

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OFFICE	PM:PD31	E	LA:PD31	E	AC:SRXB*	OGC*	PM:PD31	D:PD31
NAME	AKugler		CJamerson		JLyons	EHoller	BWetzel	JHannon
DATE	02/20/97		02/20/97		02/19/97	02/19/97	02/20/97	02/20/97

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PDR ADOCK 05000282
P PDR

DATED: February 20, 1997

AMENDMENT NO. 127 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-42-PRAIRIE ISLAND UNIT 1
AMENDMENT NO. 119 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-60-PRAIRIE ISLAND UNIT 2

Docket File
PUBLIC
PDIII-1 Reading
J. Roe
C. Jamerson
B. Wetzel (2)
OGC
G. Hill (4)
C. Grimes, O-11F23
C. Liang, SRXB
ACRS
M. Jacobson, RIII
SEDB

250006

DFB1
1/1

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Andrew J. Kugler, Project Manager
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 Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV
 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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OFFICE	PM:PD31	E	LA:PD31	E	AC:SRXB*	OGC <i>AK</i>	D:PD31
NAME	AKugler: <i>AK</i>		CJamerson <i>AK</i>		JLyons	<i>ET/6/2/97</i>	JHannon
DATE	02/19/97		02/19/97		02/19/97	02/19/97	02/ /97

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Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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OFFICE	PM:PD31	E	LA:PD31	E	AC:SRX	OGC	D:PD31
NAME	AKugler:		CJamerson		JLyons		JHannon
DATE	02/ /97		02/ /97		02/19 /97	02/ /97	02/ /97

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

February 20, 1997

Mr. Roger O. Anderson, Director
Licensing and Management Issues
Northern States Power Company
414 Nicollet Mall
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401

SUBJECT: PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 -
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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Beth A. Wetzel".

Beth A. Wetzel, Project Manager
Project Directorate III-1
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-282 and 50-306

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 127 to DPR-42
2. Amendment No. 119 to DPR-60
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encl: See next page

Mr. Roger O. Anderson, Director
Northern States Power Company

Prairie Island Nuclear Generating
Plant

cc:

J. E. Silberg, Esquire
Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge
2300 N Street, N. W.
Washington DC 20037

Tribal Council
Prairie Island Indian Community
ATTN: Environmental Department
5636 Sturgeon Lake Road
Welch, Minnesota 55089

Plant Manager
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating
Plant
Northern States Power Company
1717 Wakonade Drive East
Welch, Minnesota 55089

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Resident Inspector's Office
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Welch, Minnesota 55089-9642

Regional Administrator, Region III
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
801 Warrenville Road
Lisle, Illinois 60532-4351

Mr. Jeff Cole, Auditor/Treasurer
Goodhue County Courthouse
Box 408
Red Wing, Minnesota 55066-0408

Kris Sanda, Commissioner
Department of Public Service
121 Seventh Place East
Suite 200
St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-2145

Site Licensing
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating
Plant
Northern States Power Company
1717 Wakonade Drive East
Welch, Minnesota 55089

November 1996



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-282

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 127
License No. DPR-42


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Northern States Power Company (the licensee) dated February 6, 1997, as supplemented by a letter dated February 12, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-42 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 127, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance, with full implementation within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Beth A. Wetzel, Project Manager
Project Directorate III-1
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 20, 1997

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 127

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-42

DOCKET NO. 50-282

Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

TS.3.3-3
B.3.3-2

INSERT

TS.3.3-3
B.3.3-2

- 3.3.A.2.g. The valve position monitor lights or alarms for motor-operated valves specified in 3.3.A.1.g above may be inoperable for 72 hours provided the valve position is verified once each shift.
3. At least one safety injection pump control switch in the control room shall be in pullout whenever RCS temperature is less than 310°F* except that both SI pumps may be run for up to one hour while conducting the integrated SI test** when either of the following conditions is met:
- (a) There is a steam or gas bubble in the pressurizer and an isolation valve between the SI pump and the RCS is shut, or
 - (b) The reactor vessel head is removed.
4. Both safety injection pump control switches*** in the Control Room shall be in pullout whenever RCS temperature is less than 200°F (except one or both pumps may be run as specified in 3.3.A.3 and 3.1.A.1.d.(2)).

*Valid until 20 EFPY

**Other SI system tests and operations may also be conducted under these conditions.

***This specification does not apply whenever the reactor vessel head is removed.

3.3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURESBases continued

- (1) Assuring with high reliability that the safety system will function properly if required to do so.
- (2) Allowance of sufficient time to complete required repairs and testing using safe and proper procedures.

Assuming the reactor has been operating at full RATED THERMAL POWER for at least 100 days, the magnitude of the decay heat decreases as follows after initiating HOT SHUTDOWN.

<u>Time After Shutdown</u>	<u>Decay Heat, % of RATED POWER</u>
1 min.	4.5
30 min.	2.0
1 hour	1.62
8 hours	0.96
48 hours	0.62

Thus, the requirement for core cooling in case of a postulated loss-of-coolant accident while in the shutdown condition is significantly reduced below the requirements for a postulated loss-of-coolant accident during POWER OPERATION. Putting the reactor in the HOT SHUTDOWN condition significantly reduced the potential consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident, and also allows more free access to some of the engineered safeguards components in order to effect repairs.

The accumulator and refueling water tank conditions specified are consistent with those assumed in the LOCA analysis (Reference 2).

Specification 3.3.A.3 allows use of an SI pump to perform operations required at low RCS temperatures; e.g., raising accumulator levels in order to meet the level requirement of Specification 3.3.A.1.b(2) or ASME Section XI tests of the SI system check valves.

Specification 3.3.A.3 also allows use of both SI pumps at low temperatures for conduct of the integrated SI test and other SI system tests and operations providing the pumps run for less than 1 hour. In this case, pressurizer level is maintained at less than 50% and a positive means of isolation is provided between the SI pumps and the RCS to prevent fluid injection into the RCS. This isolation is accomplished by using either a closed manual valve or a closed motor operated valve with the power removed. This combination of conditions under strict administrative control assure that overpressurization cannot occur. The option of having the reactor vessel head removed is allowed since in this case RCS overpressurization cannot occur.

Maintaining both safety injection pump Control Room control switches in pullout, as specified in 3.3.A.4, will ensure that the RCS pressure/temperature limitations specified in Figures TS.3.1-1 and TS.3.1-2 will not be exceeded, at low RCS temperatures, as the result of mass input into the RCS from an inadvertent safety injection pump start. The provisions of this specification are not applicable when the reactor vessel head is removed since in that condition RCS overpressurization can not occur.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-306

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 119
License No. DPR-60


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Northern States Power Company (the licensee) dated February 6, 1997, as supplemented by a letter dated February 12, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-60 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 119, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance, with full implementation within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Beth A. Wetzel, Project Manager
Project Directorate III-1
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 20, 1997

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 119

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-60

DOCKET NO. 50-306

Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

TS.3.3-3
B.3.3-2

INSERT

TS.3.3-3
B.3.3-2

- 3.3.A.2.g. The valve position monitor lights or alarms for motor-operated valves specified in 3.3.A.1.g above may be inoperable for 72 hours provided the valve position is verified once each shift.
3. At least one safety injection pump control switch in the control room shall be in pullout whenever RCS temperature is less than 310°F* except that both SI pumps may be run for up to one hour while conducting the integrated SI test** when either of the following conditions is met:
- (a) There is a steam or gas bubble in the pressurizer and an isolation valve between the SI pump and the RCS is shut, or
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4. Both safety injection pump control switches*** in the Control Room shall be in pullout whenever RCS temperature is less than 200°F (except one or both pumps may be run as specified in 3.3.A.3 and 3.1.A.1.d.(2)).

*Valid until 20 EFPY

**Other SI system tests and operations may also be conducted under these conditions.

***This specification does not apply whenever the reactor vessel head is removed.

3.3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURESBases continued

- (1) Assuring with high reliability that the safety system will function properly if required to do so.
- (2) Allowance of sufficient time to complete required repairs and testing using safe and proper procedures.

Assuming the reactor has been operating at full RATED THERMAL POWER for at least 100 days, the magnitude of the decay heat decreases as follows after initiating HOT SHUTDOWN.

<u>Time After Shutdown</u>	<u>Decay Heat, % of RATED POWER</u>
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30 min.	2.0
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Thus, the requirement for core cooling in case of a postulated loss-of-coolant accident while in the shutdown condition is significantly reduced below the requirements for a postulated loss-of-coolant accident during POWER OPERATION. Putting the reactor in the HOT SHUTDOWN condition significantly reduced the potential consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident, and also allows more free access to some of the engineered safeguards components in order to effect repairs.

The accumulator and refueling water tank conditions specified are consistent with those assumed in the LOCA analysis (Reference 2).

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Specification 3.3.A.3 also allows use of both SI pumps at low temperatures for conduct of the integrated SI test and other SI system tests and operations providing the pumps run for less than 1 hour. In this case, pressurizer level is maintained at less than 50% and a positive means of isolation is provided between the SI pumps and the RCS to prevent fluid injection into the RCS. This isolation is accomplished by using either a closed manual valve or a closed motor operated valve with the power removed. This combination of conditions under strict administrative control assure that overpressurization cannot occur. The option of having the reactor vessel head removed is allowed since in this case RCS overpressurization cannot occur.

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 127 AND 119 TO

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-42 AND DPR-60

NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-282 AND 50-306

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated February 6, 1997, as supplemented by a letter dated February 12, 1997, the Northern States Power Company (NSP or the licensee) requested amendments to the Technical Specifications (TS) appended to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-42 and DPR-60 for the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The proposed amendments would revise TS 3.3.A and the associated Bases to allow safety injection pump testing and evolutions during low-temperature shutdown conditions provided control for reactor coolant system (RCS) conditions are in place to provide low temperature overpressurization protection. The current TS do not allow the testing and evolutions to be performed.

The low temperature overpressure protection (LTOP) system is provided to assure that under low temperature operating conditions the integrity of the reactor vessel is not compromised by violating 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G requirements. The design of the LTOP system is based on an analysis considering a credible mass addition or heat addition transient during low temperature operating conditions. In the limiting mass addition transients at different operating temperature, some safety injection pump(s) (SIPs) are assumed incapable of injection water to the RCS upon an inadvertent safety injection signal. TS 3.3 provide restrictions for the SIPs' capabilities during low temperature operations to assure that the plant will be operated within the configurations consistent with the analysis assumptions.

2.0 EVALUATION

The current TS 3.3.A.2.g requires that the licensee place at least one SIP control switch in the control room in the pullout position whenever RCS temperature is less than 310 °F and both SIP control switches in the pullout position whenever RCS temperature is less than 200 °F. However, the TS allows NSP to run both SIPs while conducting the integrated SI test when either there is a steam or gas bubble in the pressurizer and the SI discharge valves are shut or the reactor vessel head is removed.

By letters dated February 6, 1997, and February 12, 1997, the licensee proposed a modified TS 3.3.A.2.g that would allow the licensee to run both SIPs for up to 1 hour while conducting the integrated SI test when there is a steam or gas bubble in the pressurizer and an isolation valve between the SIP and the RCS is shut or the reactor vessel head is removed. The proposed TS includes a note which indicates that other SI system tests and operations may also be conducted during the time period of conducting the integrated SI test. Also, another note in the proposed TS points out that whenever the reactor vessel head is removed, this TS does not apply.

The licensee's intent of this TS modification is to clearly specify the scope of the allowable integrated SI test to include SIP tests, SI system flow tests, pump breaker tests, water addition to the emergency core cooling system accumulators, and other necessary evolutions during low temperature operations, since some of these tests and evolutions may be interpreted as outside the current TS. The licensee also modified the bases for TS 3.3 to indicate that during the integrated SI tests, a positive means of isolation is provided between the SIPs and the RCS. This isolation is accomplished by using either a closed manual valve or a closed motor-operated valve with the power removed.

The licensee's proposed changes in TS 3.3 reflect the changes discussed above. The staff has reviewed the licensee's submittal and finds that the proposed TS will continue to assure that the reactor vessel will be protected from low temperature overpressure events. Therefore, the changes are acceptable.

3.0 EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES

The Commission's regulations, 10 CFR 50.91, contain provisions for issuance of amendments where the Commission finds that exigent circumstances exist, in that a licensee and the Commission must act quickly and that time does not permit the Commission to publish a Federal Register notice allowing 30 days for prior public comment. The exigency exists in this case in that the proposed amendments are needed prior to the restart of Prairie Island Unit 2 and time does not permit the Commission to publish a notice allowing 30 days for prior public comment. The licensee discovered on February 3, 1997, that the existing TS would preclude testing of the safety injection system that is required prior to restarting the unit. The licensee submitted the amendment request on February 6, 1997, and supplemented it on February 12, 1997. The staff has determined that the licensee used its best efforts to make a timely application.

Accordingly, the Commission has determined that exigent circumstances exist pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6), the submittal of information was timely and could not have been avoided, and that the licensee did not create the exigency.

4.0 FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS DETERMINATION

The Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92(c) state that the Commission may make a final determination that a license amendment involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or (3) result in a significant reduction in the margin of safety. The NRC staff has made a final determination that no significant hazards consideration is involved for the proposed amendments and that the amendments should be issued as allowed by the criteria contained in 10 CFR 50.91. The NRC staff's final determination is presented below.

- (1) The proposed changes would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes would allow the licensee to operate the SIPs as necessary for required testing and evolutions at low RCS temperatures. The proposed changes also include controls to ensure that the RCS continues to be protected from low temperature overpressure events. Therefore, the changes do not involve a significant increase in the consequences or probability of a previously evaluated accident.

- (2) The proposed changes would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes would allow the licensee to operate the SIPs for required tests and evolutions. The affected TS establish limiting conditions for operation to protect the RCS from low temperature overpressure events. The proposed changes also include controls to provide this protection. Therefore, a new or different kind of accident is not created.

- (3) The proposed changes would not result in a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The proposed changes would allow the licensee to perform required tests and evolutions involving the SIPs. However, the proposed changes also include controls to ensure that the RCS continues to be protected from low temperature overpressure events. Therefore, these changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Minnesota State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has made a final finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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Date: February 20, 1997