ES-301

Simulator Scenario Quality Checklist

Form ES-301-4

1

	£ 1 1				
DRESDEN Date of Exam	C/3/02 Scenano Nur	mbers: 1/2/ 3-14, 5'Ope	rating	Test N	10/1LT :
QUALITATIVE AT	TRIBUTES			Initia	ais
			а	ь.	۲C
		ntation may be out of	740	r.k	ta
The scenanos consist mostly of related events			me	Dh	In
the malfunction(s) that are entered to the symptoms/cues that will be visibl the expected operator actions (by sh	δ initiate the event e to the crew ift position)		мо	Qh	In
		l into the scenario	MC	Dh	In
The events are valid with regard to physics and	I thermodynamics.		,MC	Dh	. su
		team to obtain	MO	sh	bu
If time compression techniques are used, the scenario summary clearly so indicates. Operators have sufficient time to carry out expected activities without undue time constraints. Cues are given.				12n	H/A Su
The simulator modeling is not altered.				Dh	bu
 The scenarios have been validated. Any open simulator performance deficiencies have been evaluated to ensure that functional fidelity is maintained while running the planned scenarios. 					
Every operator will be evaluated using at least one new or significantly modified scenario. All other scenarios have been altered in accordance with Section D.4 of ES-301.				th	hi
All individual operator competencies can be evaluated, as verified using Form ES-301-6 (submit the form along with the simulator scenarios).				Dh	hen
 Each applicant will be significantly involved in the minimum number of transients and events specified on Form ES-301-5 (submit the form with the simulator scenarios). 					
The level of difficulty is appropriate to support li	censing decisions for each c	rew position.	MO	th	bu
QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES (PER SCENAR	IO; SEE SECTION D.4.D)	Actual Attributes	_	· · ·	
Total malfunctions (5-8)		917181516	шc	Dh	ber
Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)				54	ð.
Abnormal events (2-4)		4/4/4/4/4	мС	54	fu
Major transients (1-2)	······································	1/11/12/1	мс	sh	Sh
EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2	?)	•	.nc	5/	fu
EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions	s (0-2)		mo	+K	fri
Critical tasks (2-3)	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	3/31212/4	MG	The second	sin
	QUALITATIVE AT The initial conditions are realistic, in that some service, but it does not cue the operators into e The scenanos consist mostly of related events Each event description consists of The point in the scenario when it is to the symptoms/cues that will be visible the expected operator actions (by shear event termination point (if applic) No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g. without a credible preceding incident such as a the events are valid with regard to physics and Sequencing and timing of events is reasonable complete evaluation results commensurate with If time compression techniques are used, the shave sufficient time to carry out expected activities. The simulator modeling is not altered. The scenarios have been validated. Any open evaluated to ensure that functional fidelity is matered to ensure that functional fidelity is matered. All individual operator competencies can be evaluated to ensure that functional fidelity is matered. All individual operator competencies can be evaluated on Form ES-301-5 (submit the form with the significantly involved in the specified on Form ES-301-5 (submit the form with the significant time to support life. QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES (PER SCENAR Total malfunctions (5-8) Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) Abnormal events (2-4) Major transients (1-2) EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2)	QUALITATIVE ATTRIBUTES The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrument service, but it does not cue the operators into expected events. The scenanos consist mostly of related events Each event fescription consists of the point in the scenano when it is to be initiated the matfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew the expected operator actions (by shift position) the event termination point (if applicable) No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics. Sequencing and timing of events is reasonable, and allows the examination complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario summary clearly so have sufficient time to carry out expected activities without undue time cons given. The scenarios have been validated. Any open simulator performance deficientiated to ensure that functional fidelity is maintained while running the period other scenarios have been altered in accordance with Section D.4 of ES-30 All individual operator competencies can be evaluated, as verified using For the form along with the simulator scenarios). Each applicant will be significantly involved in the minimum number of trans specified on Form ES-301-5 (submit the form with the simulator scenarios). The level of difficulty is appropriate to support licensing decisions for each conthe form along with the simulator scenarios. Delevel of difficulty is appropriate to support licen	QUALITATIVE ATTRIBUTES The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the operators into expected events The scenanos consist mostly of related events Each event fescription consists of It the point in the scenano when it is to be initiate the event It the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew It the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew It the event termination point (if applicable) No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenano without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event. The event ser valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics. Sequencing and timing of events is reasonable, and allows the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives. If time compression techniques are used, the scenario summary clearly so indicates. Operators have sufficient time to carry out expected activities without undue time constraints. Cues are given. The scenarios have been validated. Any open simulator performance deficiencies have been evaluated using at least one new or significantly modified scenario. All other along with the simulator scenarios). All individual operator competencies can be evaluated, as verified using Form ES-301-6 (submit the form along with the simulator scenarios). The scenarios have been altered in accordance with Section D 4 of ES-301. All individual operator c	QUALITATIVE ATTRIBUTES a The initial conditions are realistic in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the operators into expected events	QUALITATIVE ATTRIBUTES Initial a b* a b* a b* The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the operators into expected events Aif The scenanos consist mostly of related events Aif Each event tescription consists of Aif the point in the scenano when it is to be initiated Mo* the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event Mo the expected operator actions (by shift position) Mo the expected operator actions (by shift position) Mo The event semination point (if applicable) Mo No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario Mc Sequencing and timing of events is reasonable, and allows the examination team to obtain Md If time compression techniques are used, the scenario butfures. Mo If time compression techniques are used, the scenario summary clearly so indicates. Operators have been validated. Any open simulator performance deficiencies have been evaluated to ensure that functional fidelity is maintained while running the planned scenario. All CPAr potents will be evaluated using at least one new or significantly modified scenario. All

NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1 24 of 26

Dresden Generating Station

SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM

SCENARIO

ILT-N-1

Rev. 00

02/02

DEVELOPED BY:

3/29/02 Exam Author Date i e Facility Rec esentative

APPROVED BY:

Master Copy

Stenario Outerie

Form ES-D-1

ity: <u>Dresden</u> Sce			enand No: <u>ILT-N-1</u> Op-Test No: <u>ILT 01-1</u>	
ners:			Ocerators:	
onditions: ~33 s in Mode 4.	% rea		er RM channel 16 out of service; 2B EHC Pump OOS;	
er: Unit startup	in pr	∧ ogress; p 	the rearce flow the rods, then transfer FWLC to 3-element control.	
Malf. No.			Event Description	
N/A	R	NSO SRO	raise reactor power recirculation flow	
N/A	N	NSO SRO	transfer FWLC to 3-element control	
• EHD626	I	ANSO SRO	sourious opening of main turbine bypass valve	
NIA5POT	1	NSO	ARPM channel 5 fails downscale	
NII15POT B15	с	NSO SRO	ARPM channel 5 companion IRM 15 spike upscale causing partial half-scram	
K49 T12	С	ANSO SRO	main feed breaker to Bus 23-1 trips with failure of emergency diesel generator to start automatically	
B12 AW4	M	ALL	falure of RPS to deenergize and ARI to initiate	
H31, H32, H33, H44	IVI	ANSO SRO	tro of all reactor feed pumps	
	ers: onditions: ~33 s in Mode 4. er: Unit startup Malf. No. N/A N/A • EHD626 NIA5POT B15 K49 T12 B15 K49 T12 B12 AW4 H31, H32, H33, H44	ers: onditions: ~33% real s in Mode 4. er: Unit startup in pr Malf. N/A R N/A R N/A R N/A N • EHD626 I NIA5POT I NII15POT I NII15POT C K49 T12 C B12 AW4 M H31, H32,	Image: Similar	

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, C)omponent. M)ajor

Dresden Generating Station

NRC ILT EXAM

Scenario ILT-N-1

Scenario Objective

e

Evaluate the coerators in using the Failure to Scram contingency procedure.

Scenario Summary

Initial Condit cris:

- ~33% power, unit startup in progress
- IRM 16 CCS
- 2B EHC Fump OOS
- Unit 3 is Mode 4

Events:

- Raise Power with Recirculation Flow
- Transfer F.VLC to 3-Element Control
- Spurious Bypass Valve Opening
- APRM Fa Downscale with Partial Half Scram
- Bus 23-1 Loss of Power
- ATWS (Falure of RPS and ARI) with Loss of RFPs

Scenario Sequence

- The crew horeases reactor power by increasing recirculation flow.
- The crew transfers the FWLC system to 3-Element control.
- The main turbine bypass valve #1 opens spuriously. The valve is closed when the ANSO takes manual action at the EHC control panel
- APRM channel 5 fails downscale followed by a companion IRM 15 spike upscale and a partial halfscram occurs. The NSO inserts a complete half-scram.
- The SRO addresses the technical specification requirements for the ARPM channel. The APRM channel is oppassed but the half-scram should not be reset by the NSO.
- The main feed breaker to Bus 23-1 then trips and the 2/3 EDG fails to automatically start. The 2/3 EDG does run when manually started by the ANSO and power is restored to Bus 23-1.
- A Spurious Channel A scram occurs. An ATWS condition exists due to a failure of RPS A to deenergize and ARI is unsuccessful. The crew should perform the ATWS DEOP. Pulling RPS fuses venting the scram air header and driving control rods are successful. The event is complicated by a loss of RFPs and the crew should control RPV level using the HPCI and / or CRD system.
- The scenaro is terminated when all rods are inserted and the plant stabilized.

Event One - Raise Power with Recirculation Flow

The crew raises reactor power by increasing recirculation in w

Malfunctions required: 0

Success Path:

• Increase recirculation flow per procedures.

Event Two – Transfer FWLC to 3-Element Control

The crew transfers FWLC to 3-Element control per DOP 0600-06, Feedwater Regulating Valve (FRV) Operation.

Malfunctions required: 0

Success Path:

• Follows DOP 0600-06.

Event Three - Spurious Bypass Valve Opening

The crew should recognize and respond to main turbine blass valve #1 opening spuriously. The valve will close when the ANSO takes manual action at the EHC control panel

Malfunctions required: 1 (Bypass Jack drift)

Success Path:

• Close the bypass valve with the bypass jack.

Event Four and Five – APRM Fail Downscale/Partial Half Scram

The crew should recognize and respond to failure of APRI.⁴ 15 downscale and a channel B partial half scram.

Malfunctions required: 3 (APRM fail downscale) (IRM spike upscale) (partial half scram)

Success Path:

- Bypass APRM channel 5
- Manually scram RPS channel B

Event Six - Bus 23-1 Loss of Power

The crew rectainces and responds to a loss of normal power to Bus 23-1 and failure of the 2/3 EDG to automatically start

Malfunctions reduired: 2 (Bus 23-1 feed breaker trips) (EDG 2/3 fails to auto start)

Success Path

• Manually starts the 2/3 EDG.

Event Seven and Eight - ATWS (Failure of RPS and ARI) with Loss of RFPs

The crew should recognize and respond to an ATWS condition with a loss of RFPs.

Malfunctions required: 3 (RPS failure to deenergize) (failure of ARI) (Loss of RFPs)

Success Path:

- Inserts rods using alternate methods.
- Control RP , level with HPCI and / or CRD.

Scenario Recapitulation

Total Malfunctions:	9	
Abnormal Events:	4	
Major Transients:	1	(ATWS)
EOPs Entered:	1	
EOP Contingencies:	1	(ATWS)

Operator Actions

Op-Test N	lo: <u>ILT 01-1</u>	Scenaria No ILT-N-1 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 1
Event Des	scription: The	team raises tower using recirculation flow
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	NSO	Performs Te following actions per DGP 01-01, Unit Startup, and DOP 0202- 03, Reactor Recirculation Flow Control System Operation: Falses recirculation pump speed using the master controller potentiometer.
	SRO	Directs raising reactor power per DGP 01-01, Unit Startup, and DOP 0202- 03, Reactor Recirculation Flow Control System Operation, by raising recirculated bump speed.
	ANSO	ROLE PLAY: QNE: request for a ramp rate, respond "limit ramp rate to 250 MWe/hr". Monitors canels and assists as directed.
		Event 1 Completion Criteria: - Significant power increase 902-5 G 8 - AND, at the direction of the NRC chief examiner.

Adjust REMA to say goto 56 MIbm SZ to 58 % FCL Option go ahead with rod putty NEESSARY

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM, Scenario ILT-N-

Page 6 of 23

Rev. 00 (02/02)

Operator Actions

Op-Test No ILT 01-1 Scenario No.: ILT-N-1 Event No 2 Fage 1 of 1 Event Description: The crew transfers Feedwater Level Control System to 3-Element control. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NSO Performs the following actions per DOP 0600-06, Feedwater Regulating Valve (FRV) Operation: Verifies the AUTO Control mode pushbutton is not amper. Verifies that annunciator 902-5 G-8, 1-Element FW 2 phtrol Active at 1 Hi Flow, is in alarm. U Verifies that FWLCS is in Master Auto. \square - Depresses AUTO pushbutton and verifies that the AuTO and SRO Directs transferring FWLC to 3-Element Control per DOP 0600-06. Feedwater Regulating Valve (FRV) Operation. Note: RPV level may take a couple of inch swing during the transfer to 3-Element Control, so the NSO may take Manual Control of the FRV. If the crew requests Instrument Maintenance (IMD) assistance to check out FWLC, tell the crew that you are time compressing and that IMD reports the FWLC. system is functioning normally. The crew should then transfer FWLC back to AUTO Mode. ANSO Monitors panels and assists as directed. Event 2 Completion Criteria: FWLC in 3-Element Control. AND, at the direction of the NRC chief examiner.

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM, Scenario ILT-N-1

Page 7 of 23

Rev. 00 (02/02)

Coerator Actions

Op-Test No: <u>ILT 01-1</u> Scenario N: <u>T-N-1</u> Event No. <u>3</u> Page <u>1</u> c⁺ 1

Event Description: The main turbine by case valve #1 opens spuriously. The valve is closed when the ANSO takes manua at the EHC control panel

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
		SIMULATOR CFERATOR:
		At the discretic - : the NRC chief examiner, activate trigger 1, which works in conjunction with regger 2 to open the #1 turbine bypass valve until the partial open light is lit If after 2 minutes the team has not noticed the bypass valve open, activate trigger 16, which works in conjunction with trigger 17 to open the #1 turbine bypass valve until the full open light is lit and the bypass valve open alarm is received. Note: when the the well activate to delete the bypass jack increase pushbutton, triggers 18 and 19 will activate to delete the bypass jack increase pushbutton and light overrices
	ANSO	Performs the following actions per DAN 902-7 G-3, Turb Byp VIv Open, and/or DOA 5651-03, Turbine Control Valve or Bypass Valve Failed Oper as directed:
		 Verifies teactor pressure stable Verifies to pass valve should be closed Closes to e bypass valve with the bypass valve jack.
	NSO	Acknowledges and announces alarm 902-5 C-8, Main Stm-Turbine Stm 10% Mismatch. He should recognize it alarmed due to the bypass valve opening.
	SRO	Enters and directs performance of DOA 5650-03, Turbine Control Valve or Bypass Valve Falled Open. Places startup on hold. Notifies Shift Manager.
		May refer to the site technical requirements and determine: ITS 3.3 1 1 is not applicable. ITS 3.3 5 1 is not applicable. ITS 3.7 5 not applicable.
	Not uni.l after Value closed	ROLE PLAY: Closes One minute after the crew notices the bypass valve open, call the control room as the IM Supervisor and report "my crew was hooking up a Fluke to take readings on the bypass valve control circuits in panel 903-31 in the AEER. The technician thinks he inadvertently shorted between two terminal points that may have caused the bypass jack to operate. Then he discovered he was in the wrong panel. He was in the 902-31 panel instead of the 903-31 panel. The Unit 2 EHC Control system should operate normally now". Respond as groups notified.
	L	Event 3 Completion Criteria: - Bypass value closed - AND, at the trection of the NRC chief examiner.

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM, Scenario ILT-N-1 Page 8 of 23

ø

Op-Test No: ILT 01-1 Scenario No: ILT-N-1 Elect No. 4 & 5 Page 1 of 1

Event Description. APRM channel 5 fails downscale. IRM 15 stores upscale and a partial half-scram occurs. The NSO inserts a complete half-scram. The SRO addresses the technical specification requirements for the ARPM channel. The APRM channel is bypassed but the half-scram should not be reset by the NSO.

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
		SIMULATOR OPERATOR:	
		At the discretion of the NRC chief examiner, activate trigger 3, which fails APRM 5 downscale and 5 seconds later spikes IRM 15 upscale.	
		NOTE: trigger 4 activates on the half scram signal to remove IRM 15 upscale so it appears to be a spike.	
		NOTE: If the team attempts to reset the half scram, trigger 5 will activate to fail the fuses for scram groups B2 and B3.	
	NSO	 Performs the following actions per DC - 0500-02, Partial 1/2 or Full Scram Actuation: Recognizes and announces partial half scram. Manually scrams RPS channel B. (immediate action) Determines all channel B scram solenoid lights are off. 	
	SRO	Enters and directs performance of DC - 0500-02, Partial 1/2 or Full Scram Actuation.	
	NSO	 Performs the following actions per DA' 902-5 C-6, APRM Downscale, as directed: Compares to other APRMs. Notifies SRO Bypasses APRM channel 5. 	Lites, burned ou
	ANSO	Performs the following actions per DAN 902-5 C-6, APRM Downscale, as directed:	Energitt Rem 15
	SRO	 References plant Technical documents ITS Table 3.3.1.1.A-1, verifies sufficient RPS APRM trip channels (2 available / 2 required for B channel) TRM Table T3.3.a-1, verifies sufficient APRM rod block channels available (5 available / 4 required) 	HV+HI Hay need a cut
		Directs bypassing APRM 5	
		Notifies the Shift Manager and IMD.	
		Events 4 & 5 Completion Criteria: - RPS channel B manually scrammed. - APRM 5 bypassed. - AND, at the direction of the NRC codef examiner.	

Page 9 of 23

Appendix []

Op-Test 1 1-1	Scenario No ILT-N-1 Event No. 6 Page 1 of 2
start.	main feed breaker to Bus 23-1 then trips and the 2/3 EDG fails to automatically The 2/3 EDG does run when manually started by the ANSO and power is red to Bus 23-1.
Time Eastion	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	SIMULATOR OPERATOR:
	At the discretion of the NRC chief examiner, activate trigger 6, which inserts failure of RPS to deenergize, pulls ARI fuses, and main feed breaker to MCC 23-1 trip with failure of 2/3 EDG to start automatically
ANSO	Diagnoses that Bus 23-1 has lost power and that the 2/3 EDG failed to auto start to pick up the bus
	 Should perform the following actions of DGA 12, Partial or Complete Loss of AC Power, and DOA 6600-01, Diesel Generator Failure: Places the 2/3 EDG control switch to start. Dispatches an operator to the 2/3 EDG with Attachment A. Verifies power restored to Bus 23-1 and Bus 28. Resets annunciators and verifies the ones remaining are expected. Dispatches an operator to check the U2 EDG trouble alarm
	 May perform the following actions of DOA 6500-10, 4KV Circuit Breaker Trip if time permits: Dispatches NLO to check for signs of fault or overload. Verifies no other reason for trip.
NSO	Monitors panels and assists as directed.
	ROLE PLAY:
Lav B	NLO to check Bus 23-1 feed breaker (wait 3 min):
The breaker B	NLO to check Bus 23-1 feed breaker (wait 3 min): Report "There are no targets up at the breaker". NLO to perform Attachment A of DOA 6600.01.
OPENanci	
	Respond "I will get a copy of Attachment A of DOA 6600-01 and complete it for the 2/3 EDG".
	SIMULATOR OPERATOR/ROLE PLAY:
	NLO to check U2 EDG trouble alarm (wait 3 min):
	Activate trigger 12 then report "the alarms were circulating lube oil and turbo charger lube oil pumps trouble alarms. The pumps are operating normally and the alarms have reset".

ILT 01-1 NFC EX-M, Scenario ILT-N-1 Page 10 of 23

Operator Actions

Op-Test N	o <u>ILT 01-1</u>	Scenario No.: <u>ILT-N-1</u> Event N: <u>6</u> Page <u>2</u> of <u>2</u>
Event Des	stari	main feed breaker to Bus 23-1 then trips and $t = 1.3$ EDG fails to automatically t. The 2/3 EDG does run when manually started to the ANSO and power is pred to Bus 23-1.
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions cr Elenavior
•	SRO	Enters and directs actions for the following as time permits: DGA 12, Partial or Complete Loss of - 2 Power. DOA 6600-01, Diesel Generator Factifie DOA 0500-05, Loss of Reactor Protection System Bus. DOA 6500-01, 4KV Bus Failure. DOA 6500-10, 4KV Circuit Breaker The
		 The major actions to direct are: Starting the 2/3 EDG Verifying major loads reenergize.
	SRO	Notifies Shift Manager and EMD. <u>Role Play:</u>
		Acknowledge requests for actions not already addressed earlier. If the crew request status of previous requests, report "I am working on it as fast as I can".
		NOTE: The intent here is to proceed to the nere event soon after the 2/3 EDG is started and the crew has begun to accress recovery of equipment. Equipment recovery is not necessary for the remainder of the scenario.
		Event 6 Completion Criteria: - 2/3 EDG supplying Bus 23-1. - AND, at the direction of the NRC chief examiner.

CUE from ONE "No Thermal limits violated" *itasked*

In turnover state QNE present in control Room

Page 11 of 23

Operator Actions

Form ES-D-2

Op · Test N	o. <u>ILT 01-1</u>	Stenario No. ILT-N-1 Event No. 733 Fage 1 of 4
Event Des	perfe	urious RPS Channel A scram begins an ATWS condition. The learn should orm the ATWS DEOP and insert the control rods. The REPs the and the crew ald use HPCI for RPV level control.
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
		SIMULATOR OPERATOR: At the discretion of the NRC chief examiner, activate trigger \neg which causes a sourious RPS channel A half scam. $\neg T_r$: ρ RFP
	NSO	Performs the following actions per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scham Presses scram pushbuttons Places mode switch in shutdown Check rods inserted; discovers rods not inserted. Initiates ARI, checks rods, announces ATWS concructs.
		Performs the following actions per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scramp Verifies turbine and generator tripped (only if Group 1 has occurred or reactor power has dropped low enough that this should occur) Inserts SRM/IRMs
	NSO / ANSO	Performs DEOP 400-5, Failure to Scram, actions as directed Places ADS to inhibit Places both CS pumps in PTL
		Power Leg □ Inserts IRMs & SRMs □ √ Performs Alternate Rod Insertion. (see specific actions below) □ May Inject SBLC.
		Level Leg Rx Power >6% Rx Power ≤6% □ √ Terminates and Prevents injection except boron and CRD until RPV/L is ≤ -35 in. □ Maintains i= i el between -164 and 48 in. □ √ Maintains RPV/L between -164 in. and the level lowered to. □ Image: All the level lowered to.
		Pressure Leg Verifies turbine/bypass valves maintaining RPV/P < 160 psig. If MSIVs isolate, maintains <1060 psig using IC_AE 5 /s and / or HPCI.
		SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY: Operator to jumper the MSIV Group1 –59 in. and offgas hit radiation
		isolations (wait 5 min): Activate trigger 8 (jumpers the MSIV Group1 –59 in. and officials hi hi radiation isolations) and report "the MSIV Group1 –59 in. and offigas — hi radiation isolations are jumpered".

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM, Scenaric ILT-N-1 Page 12 of 23

	perfo shou	orm the ATV/SIDEOP and insert the control rods. The RFPs trip and the crew Id use HPC for PPV level control.
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	SRO	Enters and directs performance of DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, and DEOP 100, RPV Centrol.
		Due to report of ATWS condition, exits DEOP 100 and enters and directs performance of DEOP 400-05, Failure to Scram.
	to fee	Power Lec Directs any of the following control rod insertion methods (first two most preferred) per DEOP 500-05, Alternate Insertion of Control Rods: • puting scram channel A solenoid power supply fuses.
	step G.2. Step G.4. Step G.5. Step G.6	 venting the scram air header. us ng the scram test switches. Manually driving of withdrawn control rods. IAW ??? Way direct Injecting SBLC Level Leg Variation water lough instruments are second to a first
		 Verification water level instituments are accurate Verification any required automatic actions have occurred Directing jumpers installed for MSIV low level and Off Gas high Rad next p
		$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$
		□ √ Maintaining RPV/L between –164 in. and the level lowered to.
		Pressure Leg □ Maintaining <1060 psig using turbine/bypass valves.

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM, Scenario ILT-N- Page 13 of 23

Do-Test No ILT 01-1

Scenario No.: <u>ILT-N-1</u>

Event No. 7 & 8 Page 3 c⁺ -

Ellent Description: A spurious RPS Channel A scram begins an ATWS condition. The team should perform the ATWS DEOP and insert the control rods. The RFPs trip and the creshould use HPCI for RPV level control.

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
		SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:
		Note: For the first two requested actions below, wait about 10 minutes and or at the discretion of the NRC chief examiner
		1. Operator to pull scram channel A solenoid power supply fuses:
		Activate trigger 10 (pulls Channel A RPS fuses and trips reactor feed pumes and then after the fuses are all pulled report "the scram channel A solenoic power supply fuses are pulled".
		2. Operator to vent the scram air header:
		Activate trigger 11 (vents the scram air header) and report "I have vented : ∋ scram air header".
		3. Operator to use the individual scram test switches (wait 2 min):
		Go to Instructor Station screen ROD5 and begin simulating flipping the scram test switches. Follow the guidance in DEOP 500-05 for selecting rods.
• Intern • • • • • • shallo	NSO ediate 16-3 teop 1-14_ w 34-40	If directed, attempts to drive withdrawn control rods in per DEOP 500-05, Alternate Insertion of Control Rods: May close CRD 25 charging water valve. Throttles open the CRD FCV. May start a second CRD pump. May maximize drive water pressure using the CRD 8 valve Bypasses the RVM. Applies an insert signal to the insert rods, the Following order : <u>SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:</u> NLO to close CRD 25 valve (wait 3 min): Activate trigger 9 (closes the CRD 25 valve) and report "the CRD 25 valve :s closed".
	NSO	 Reports that all rods are inserted.
	ANSO	 Restores RPV level to +8 to +48 inches as directed. Begins cooldown as directed.
	SRO	 When receives report that all rods are inserted, exits DEOP 400-05, Failure to Scram and enters DEOP 100 and directs: Controlling RPV water level between +8 to +48 inches. May direct depressurizing the RPV at <100 °F/hr.

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM, Scenario ILT-N-1

Page 14 of 23

Rev. 00 (02 11

Op-Test N	o: <u>ILT 01-1</u>	Scenario No. ILT-N-1 Event No. 7 & 8 Page 4 of 4				
Event Des	Event Description: A spurious RPS Channel A scram degins an ATWS condition. The team should perform the ATWS DEOP and insertime control rods The RFPs trip and the crew should use HPCI for RPV level control.					
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior				
		 Critical Tasks: (identified b; in guide) With a reactor scrame equired and the reactor not shutdown, <i>TAKE</i> <i>ACTION TO REDUCE POWER</i> by injecting boron and/or inserting control rods, to prevere exceeding the primary containment design limits. During an ATWS with conditions met to perform power/level control <i>TERMINATE AND PPEVENT INJECTION</i>, with exception of boron and CRD, into the RF - until conditions are met to re-establish injection. (May not apper / if power becomes <6% before the step requiring this action is reached) When conditions are met to establish injection use available injection systems to <i>MAINTAIN</i> RPV water level above -164". Scenario Completion Criteria: Control rods inserted. Plant stabilized. AND, at the direction of the NRC chief examiner. 				

REFERENCES

PROCEDURE	TITLE	REVISION
JAN 902-5 C-3	E ::: Out Block	09
DAN 902-5 C-6	- FRM Downscale	07
DAN 902-5 C-15	Crannel B IRM Hi Hi/Inop	07
DAN 902-5 D-15	I tannel B Ry Scram	10
DAN 902-5 G-8	∴∃ ement FW Control Active at Hi Flow	09
DAN 902-7 G-3	Turo Byp Vlv Open	01
DOP 0202-03	Peactor Recirculation Flow Control System Operation	20
DOA 0500- 02	Factial 1/2 or Full Scram Actuation	02
DOA 0500-05	Liss of Reactor Protection System Bus	04
DOA 5650-03	Lipine Control Valve or Bypass Valve Failed Coer	09
DOA 6500-10	4-17 Circuit Breaker Trip	03
DOA 6600-01	2 ∈sel Generator Failure	12
DGP 01-01	_ ⁻ : Startup	96
DGP 02-03	Peactor Scram	55
DGP 03-04	Centrol Rod Movements	41
DGA 12	Partial or Complete Loss of AC Power	47
DEOP 0100-00	PPV Control	10
DEOP 0200-01	Emary Containment Control	10
DEOP 0400-02	Emergency Depressurization	04
DEOP 0400-05	Falure to Scram	12
DEOP 0500-02	E passing Interlocks and Isolations	10
DEOP 0500-05	Atternate Insertion of Control Rods	12

PRE-SCENARIO ACTIVITIES

- If applicable, conduct pre-scenario activities in accordance with TQ-AA-106-0107, SIMULATOR EXAMINATION BRIEFING
 - Provide the crew with a copy of Control Room work request list а
 - b Provide the team with a copy of DGP 01-01. Unit Startup, which is marked up to the point of transferring FWLC to 3-Element Contra
 - С If the crew inquires about a startup plan, inform then the Shift Manager is maintaining it.
 - Provide the crew with a copy of the REMA d
 - Inform the crew that (select an individual) is the QNE present in the Control Room. e.
 - Direct the crew to perform their briefs prior to entering the simulator. f.
- Simulator Setup (the following steps can be done in any logical order) 2.
 - Initialize simulator in IC 10 and perform the following prior to proceeding below: a.

 - 1) Transfer Auxiliary Power to the normal full power lineup. 2) Use the Rodmove program to pull rods through step 72 Into Control (Low FRV closed) 2) Use the Rodmove program to pull rods through step 72.
 - MP 3) After the rod move is complete, verify with the Rodworth Minimizer that rod moves are completed through step 12. Ma = corrections if necessary. Then withdraw G-11 4 J-65 57 step 64.
 4) Run CAEP file ilt-n-1 cut in heaters.cae to cut in the heaters. (this will take over 5 minutes)

Start ZE D/W Cooler.

- 5) After ilt-n-1 cut in heaters.cae has completed running, verify the heaters are latched. (no alarms)

10)

- 6) Run the Summary program and clear ALL remotes and overrides.
- 7) Verify 2A EHC and 2⁺ Stator Cooling Water pumps running. 613)
- 15) Set Stator Cooling Water PCV to 28.0. mp 4/26/2 Seedingter flow ~3.5 MLBm/hr. 8) Verify FWLC is in 1-Element control. - Raise rearce so.
- 9) Verify backpanel lights are reset.
- b. Run the initial setup caep file: ilt-n-1.cae
- c. Verify the following simulator conditions:
 - ~40% 1) Master Recirc Flow controller at minimum.
 - 2) MWe at ~245
 - 3) Condensate Demin CP between 20 and 45 psid.
 - 4) Condensate pump amos between 160 and 255 amps
- d. Secure the following equipment and tag out of service:
 - 1) Place IRM 16 902-5 panel joystick in bypass and place an Equipment Status Tag on it.
 - 2) Place 2B EHC Pump control switch in PTL and hang an OOS card on it
- necessary for surrant + Advance the chart recorders
- Mark up rod sequence as completed through step 72. f.
- Place the REMA sheets the appropriate book. Given to trainers .g.
- h. Complete the Simulator Setup Checklist.

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO ILT-N-X Initial Setup CAEP:

ilt-n-1 cae
Setup for ilt-n-1
#Written by JAS
#Rev 00
#Date 02/02

INITIAL CONDITIONS

Inserts a partial RPS CH B scram failure and overrides the bypass jack increase light off imf b15 ior ehl626 off # overrides isolation condenser vent monitor downscale. imf ser0004 off imf ser0019 off

#SETUP EVENT TRIGGERS

Event Trigger 1 in conjunction with trigger 2 causes turbine bypass valve #1 to ramp open unt the partial open light is lit. trgset 1 "0" ior ehd626 (1) depressed

Event Trigger 2 turns off the bypass jack increase override when the partial open light is lit. trgset 2 "ehlbpvi(1)"|2 trg 2 "ior ehd626 off"|2

Event Trigger 3 ARPM channel 5 fails downscale and 5 sec later spikes IRM 15 upscale trgset 3 "0"|2 imf nia5pot (3) 0.0|2 imf nii15pot (3 5) 125|2

Event Trigger 4 removes IRM 15 spike when half scram received. trgset 4 ".not. rpxgp1b"|4 trg 4 "dmf nii15pot"|4

Event Trigger 5 when scram reset switch is placed in GP 2&3 position, causes blown fuse RFS B2 and B3. trgset 5 "rpd30323"|4 irf rpfuseb2 (5) pulled|4 irf rpfuseb3 (5) pulled|4

Event Trigger 6 inserts failure of RPS to deenergize, pulls ARI fuses, and main feed breaker :: MCC 23-1 trip with failure of 2/3 EDG to start automatically trgset 6 "0"|4 imf b12 (6)|4 irf aw4 (6) pulled|4 irf k45 (6) open|4 imf t13 (6)|4

# Event Trigger 7 pulls s	cram fuse for group A4.	and trups	reactor feed	pumps;,
trgset 7 "0" 6	alltime	a REPS free	- W-trigapy L	0
trgset 7 "0" 6 irf rpfusea4 (7) pulled 6	e uda migrin	3 111 - 110		0

Event Trigger 8 jumpers MSIV -59 GP 1 and offgas HI HI rad isolations. trgset 8 "0"|6

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM, Scenario ILT-N-1

Page 18 of 23

⊃ev. 00 (02/02)

arf ci59jp (8) in[6 ; arf ogogjp (8) in[6

Event Trigger 9 closes CRD 25 valve trgset 9 "0"|6 Irf rd25pos (9) 0.0|6

Event Trigger 10 trips all REPs and pulls REE Inannel A fuses. trgset 10 "0"|8 imf h31 (10)|8 imf h32 (10)|8 imf h33 (10)|8 imf h34 (10)|8 irf rpfusea1 (10) pulled|8 irf rpfusea2 (10 20) pulled|8 irf rpfusea3 (10 40) pulled|8

Event Trigger 11 vents the scram air header trgset 11 "0"|10 irf rdscrair (11) open|10

Event Trigger 12 locally acknowledges U2 ED 3 trouble alarm. trgset 12 "0"|10 irf t20 (12) acknowledge|10

Event Trigger 16 in conjunction with trigger 17 causes turbine bypass valve #1 to ramp open until the partial open light is lit. trgset 16 "0"|10 trg 16 "ior ehd626 depressed"|10

Event Trigger 17 turns off the bypass jack increase override when the full open light is lit. trgset 17 "ehlbpvo(1)"|12 trg 17 "ior ehd626 off"|12

Event Triggers 18 and 19 delete the bypass and increase pushbutton and light overrides when the pecrease pushbutton is depressed. trgset 18 "ehd627"|12 trg 18 "dor ehd626"|12 trgset 19 "ehd627"|12 trg 19 "dor ehl626"|12

END

Date TODAY	Unit 2 Turnover
ECCS Status: All	······································
Online Information 245 ₩We Online Risk: Green CDF: 1.00 Risk Equipment:	Shutdown Information MCIE1 Time to Boil: N/A Shutdown Risk: N/A Protected Path: N/A
Unit 2 Priorities	Station Priorities
Continue startup	
LCORAs LCORA # Title	Start Clock Ends
Shift 1 Activities (X = Completed) S	Shift 2 Activities Shift 3 Activities Continue Power Ascension
Shift 1 Activities (X = Completed) S	Common Unit Activities Shift 3 Activities Shift 2 Activities Image: Common Unit Activities Image: Common Unit Activities Image: Common Unit Activities
Common Unit Procedures / Surveillance	es in Progress
arrive from Qu	due to power supery failure. IMD waiting for replacement power supply to ad Cities Station Placed in DEL for tracking. OOS due to a proolem with its pressure compensator. Expected BIS next
Compensatory Actions, Extra Checks	

Equipment OCS		Service Unit St	atus	
2 hr ago 9901-5654	IRM 16	9 days ago	2A Cond Demin	Cut In
6 hr ago 990145652	2B EHC pump	7 days ago	2B Cond Demin	Cut In
		16 days ago	2C Cond Demin	Cut In
		2 days ago	2D Cond Demin	Cut Out
		11 days ago	2E Cond Demin	Cut Out
		6 days ago	2F Cond Demin	Cut Out
		2 days ago	2G Cond Demin	Cut Out
		376 days ago	2A RWCU	Cut In
		240 days ago	2B RWCU	Cut Out
		20 days ago	2C RWCU	Cut Out
		76 days ago	U2 FPC Demin	Cut In
Unit 2 Abnormal Compo	nent Position	···· ·		
		·····		

U2 Open Operability Determinations with Compensatory Actions

Events and Misc. Information

DGP 01-01 in crogress. Continue the startup.	QNE is present in the control room
DW samples: Iodine 131 2.5 X 10 ⁻¹³ Beta Gamma 1.5 X 10 ⁻¹¹	

Rod moves completed, Stop 44 particily withdraton, Raise power with recirculation flow west.

Date: TODAY	Unit 3 Turno	over
ECCS Status: All available		:
Online Information N/A MWe Online Risk: N/A Risk Equipment: N/A	MODE 4	Shuttown Information Time to Boil: 24 hrs. Shutdown Risk: Green Protected Path: None
<u>Unit 3 Priorities</u> Complete startup checklists		<u>Stat : - Priorities</u>
LCORAs LCORA # None Title		Start Clock Ends
Shift 1 Activities (X = Completed)	Shift 2 Activities	Shift 3 Activities
Shift 1 Activities (X = Completed)	Shift 2 Activities	Shift 3 Activities
Common Unit Procedures / Surve	illances in Progress	
Unit 3 Conditions, Status, Abnorn DGP 01-S1, Start-up Checklist, in pl IMD taking voltage readings in the E Compensatory Actions, Extra Che None	rogress. EHC Control Panel 903-31.	
		•;

Equipment OOS	Service Unit S	tatus	
None	5 days ago	34 Dont Demm	Cut In
	· -	EE Dint Demin	Cut In
	10 days ago	30 Cort: Demin	Cut In
	5 days ago	32 Cont Demin	Cut Out
	3 days ago	3E Cont Demin	Cut Out
	15 days ago	3F Cont Demin	Cut Out
	3 days ago	3 3 C : 1¢ Demin	Cut Out
	750 days ago	34 F DU	Cut In
	390 days ago	BEF CU	Cut Out
	60 days ago	30 F 1 DU	Cut Out
	444 days ago	LEFEI Demin	Cut In
		-	
Unit 3 Abnormal Component ⁵ osition			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
None			
U3 Open Operability Determinations with Compensate	ny Actions		
None	Ty Actions		

DGP 01-S1, Start-up Checklist - progress

.

Dresden Generating Station

SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM

SCENARIO

ILT-N-2

Rev. 00

02/02

DEVELOPED BY:

Exam Auth

Representative Facilty

APPROVED BY:

7-18-07

28/0

3

Date

Date

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-I-1 Facility: Dresden Scenario No: ILT-N-2 Op-Test No: ILT 01-1 Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: Unit in Mode 2 at approximately 2% reactor power; IRM channel 16 out cf service; 2B EHC Pump OOS; Unit 3 is in Mode 4. Turnover: Unit startup in progress; return TBCCW pump 2B to service following maintenar ce then continue power ascension Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description ANSO 1 N/A Ν swap TBCCW pumps SRO NSO 2 N/A R raise reactor power by withdrawing control rods SRO NSO 3 RODC13DO С control rod double notches during withdrawal SRO NSO 4 NII12POT Т IRM channel fails upscale SRO ANSO 5 PCPDWTOR Т drywell to torus differential pressure controller failure SRO ANSO 6 HP8 С circulating water pump trip SRO ANSO 7 **CSBRKSEV** Μ lowering torus level from ECCS suction line break SRO ANSO 8 J33 С loss of EHC system SRO (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor AT23 II ANSO Fails 2A Rx Bldg to torus vacuum breaker oper QNE in Control Room 5a

Page 2 of 21

Dresden Generating Station

NRC ILT EXAM

Scenaric ILT-N-2

Scenario Objective

Evaluate the operators in using the Emergency Depress. zation DEOP contingency procedure.

Scenario Summary

Initial Conditions:

- Mode 2 at approximately 2% reactor power.
- IRM channel 16 out of service.
- 2B EHC Pump OOS
- Unit 3 is in Mode 4.

Events:

- Swap TBCCW Pumps .
- Power Change with Rods
- **Control Rod Double Notch** .
- **IRM Channel Fails Upscale**
- Drywell to Torus Differential Pressure Controller Failure
- Circulating Water Pump Trip 24 Rx Bldg to Turns Vacuum Branker Fails Open
- Lowering Torus Water Level

Scenario Sequence

- Maintenance has been completed on TBCCW pump 23 and the SRO directs the ANSO to switch running • pumps and place the TBCCW pump 2B in service.
- The NSO, as directed by the SRO, then continues the power ascension for unit startup by control rod • withdrawal.
- During the control rod withdrawal, a control rod double notches beyond the withdraw limit and must be repositioned.
- IRM channel 12 then fails upscale and a half-scram occurs on the RPS "A" channel. The NSO bypasses the • failed IRM channel and the SRO addresses the technical specification requirements for the failure.
- Drywell to torus differential pressure then begins to decrease and pressure control is regained when the • ANSO takes manual control of the drywell to torus differential pressure controller. >
- Circulating water pump 2C then trips on overload and the ANSO manually starts circulating water pump 2B to maintain condenser vacuum.
- An ECCS suction line break occurs resulting in a lowering torus water level. HPCI spuriously initiates 5 • minutes later. The HPCI System should be secured, the reactor scrammed and an emergency depressurization performed as directed by the DEOP for primary containment control. The EHC system is lost when the reactor is scrammed.
- The scenario terminates when an Emergency Depressurization has been performed.

A drifting the Re Bldg to Torus differential pressure instrament will the cause the 2A RX Bldg to Torus, Vacuum Breaker to open. The US will address Tech Spec,

Event One – Swap TBCCW Pumps

The crew swatth TBCCW pumps by starting 2B TBCCW pump and stopping the 2A TBCCW pump

Malfunctions tequired: 0

Success Path

2B TBCC → pump started and the 2A TBCCW pump stopped

Event Two - Power Change with Rods

The crew increases reactor power by withdrawing control rods cer I OP 0400-01, and DGP 03-04, .

Malfunctions required: 0

Success Pat-

Control rocs pulled per applicable procedures.

Event Three – Control Rod Double Notch

The crew recognizes and responds to control rod that double notches. The crew should insert the control rod to its target position

Malfunctions required: 1 (control rod double notch)

Success Path

• The control rod moved to its target position.

Event Four - IRM Channel Fails Upscale

The crew recognizes and responds to an IRM failing upscale resulting in a half scram.

Malfunctions required: 1 (IRM Fails Upscale)

Success Path

• Bypasses the IRM and resets the half scram.

Event Five – Drywell to Torus Differential Pressure Controller Failure

The crew receptizes and responds to a failure of the automatic mode of the drywell pressure controller.

Malfunctions required: 1 (Controller input fails high)

Success Path

 Place the crywell to torus differential pressure controller in manual mode and controls differential pressure manually

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM, Scenario ILT-N-2

Page 4 of 21

Insert bist 54

Event Six - Circulating Water Pump Trip

The crew should recognize and respond to Circulating water pump 2C tripping on overload. The ANSO should manually start circulating water pump 2B to maintain condenser vacuum.

Malfunctions required: 1 Circulating Water Pump trip)

Success Path:

Start 2B Circulating Water Pump

Events Seven and Eight - Torus Leak

The crew should recognize and respond to a lowering torus water level.

Malfunctions required: 3 (Torus Leak) (2 ~ EHC pump trip) (HPCI spurious initiation)

Success Path:

- Prevent HPCI operation
- Emergency Depressurize
- Stabilizes the plant

Scenario Recapitulation

	5	
Total Malfunctions:	ž	
Abnormal Events:	4	
Major Transients:	1	(emergency
EOPs Entered:	3	,
EOP Contingencies:	1	(emergency

0

(emergency depressurization)

(emergency depressurization)

. . .

Operator Actions

Op-Test N	0: <u>ILT 01-1</u>	Scenario No.: <u>ILT-N-2</u> Event No. <u>1</u> Page <u>1</u> of <u>1</u>
Event Desc	cription: Mair ANS	ntenance has been completed on TBCCW pump 2B and the SRO directs the SO to switch running pumps and place the TBCCW pump 1B in service.
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	ANSO	 Performs the following actions per DOP 3800-01, Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System(TBCCW): Directs NLO to verify 2B TBCCW pump suction and discharge valves open. Directs NLO to verify 2B TBCCW pump oil levels Starts 2B TBCCW pump and verifies proper operation. Stops 2A TBCCW pump. Verifies system parameters normal.
		ROLE PLAY:
		NLO to verify 2B TBCCW pump suction and discharge values open (wait 1 min):
		Report "2B TBCCW pump suction and discharge valves are open". NLO to verify 2B TBCCW pump oil levels (wait 1 min):
		Report "2B TBCCW pump oil levels are normal".
		NLO to report on operation of 2B TBCCW pump: Report "2B TBCCW pump is operating normally".
	SRO	Directs swapping from 2A TBCCW pump to 2B TBCCW cump per DOP 3800-01, Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System TBCCW).
	NSO	Monitors panels and assists as directed.
		Event 1 Completion Criteria: - 2B TBCCW pump running and 2A TBCCW pump storped. - AND, at the direction of the NRC chief examiner.
		NLO to check TOUCH system parameters
		NLO to check TBCCLis system parameters after 2A TBCCLis prop of (wait 1 -12);
		Report "TBOCUS system parameters are normal".

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM, Scenario ILT-N-2 Page 6 of 21

[

Operator Actions

Op-Test N	Jo: <u>ILT 01-1</u>	Scena : No.: ILT-N-2 Event No. 2 Page 1 of 1
Event Des	scription: The start	NSO, as a repted by the SRO, then continues the power ascension for unit up by contracted withdrawal.
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	NSO	Performs the following actions per DOP 0400-01, Reactor Manual Control System Coeration, and DGP 03-04, Control Rod Movements, as prected
		Verifies :: = following prior to moving any control rod: Image: introl rod selected on the select matrix is correct rod. Image: introl rod selected on the select matrix is correct rod. Image: introl rod selected on the select matrix is correct rod. Image: introl rod selected on the select matrix is correct rod. Image: introl rod selected on the select matrix is correct rod. Image: introl rod selected on the select matrix is correct rod. Image: introl rod selected on the select matrix is correct rod. Image: introl rod selected on the select matrix is correct rod. Image: introl rod selected on the select matrix is correct rod. Image: introl rod selected on the select matrix is correct rod. Image: introl rod selected on the select matrix is correct rod. Image: introl rod selected on the select matrix is correct rod. Image: introl rod selected on the select matrix is correct rod. Image: introl rod selected on the select matrix is correct rod. Image: introl rod selected on the select matrix is correct rod. Image: introl rod selected on the selected on the select matrix is correct rod. Image: introl rod selected on the se
		 Withdraws rods as follows: Voves Rod Out Notch Override (RONOR) Switch to NOTCH CRRIDE position (use of RONOR switch is optional) and the Rod Vovement Control switch to ROD OUT. Cerifies ON light illuminated and proper Control Rod Timer operation. Feleases switches before target position is reached. Cerifies rod settles to target position and proper response of nuclear istrumentation.
	ANSO / or Surrogate	Performs second verification checks. For first rod in a step: • erifies correct control rod pattern • erifies correct step and array. • erifies RWM rod blocks enabled For all roos moved: • verifies correct control rod selected. • verifies planned control rod motion is correct. • mediately notify the NSO of errors during rod motion. • verifies control rod at target position.
	SRO	Directs p_ ing control rods. Peviews REMA. Cesignates second verifier. Crects NSO to pulls rods. Event 2 Completion Criteria:
		 Sufficient power increase. AND at the direction of the NRC chief examiner.

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM, Scenario ILT-'--2 Page 7 of 21

Elerator Actions

Op-Test N	o: <u>ILT 01-1</u>	Scenario Nc Event No 3 Page 1 of 1
Event Des	cription: Durii with	ng the control roc and grawal, a control rod double notches beyond the draw limit and must cellepositioned.
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	NSO	Two possible paths can occur:
		Either: Observes and announces that control rod N-13 has moved to position 14 (1 nettro beyond its target position) and responds to alarms: 902-5 B-3 Rod Worth Min Block 902-5 C-3 Rod Out Block
		 Should perform the following actions per DOA 0300-12, Mispositioned Control Rod: Discontinues rod movement and notifies SRO. Moves the mispositioned rod to its target position. Records if DOS-0300-06, Control Rod Abnormality Record.
		Or: When observes rod N-13 moving past its target position of 12, then: □ Uses the Emerg Rod In position of the Rod Out Notch Override switch to move the rod back to its target position prior to it latching in to position 14. □ Notifies the SRO. □ Records = DOS-0300-06, Control Rod Abnormality Record.
	SRO	May enter and direct performance of DOA 0300-12, Mispositioned Control Rod. □ Notifies tr = Shift Manager. □ May refer to ITS 3.1.3 and determine that no actions are required.
		May enter DOA 0300-05, Inoperable or Failed Control Rod Drives.
	ANSO	Respond as the Stift Manager. QNE: If crew requests guidance from the QNE; respond "I recommend inserting rod N-13 to position 12. Monitors panels and assists as directed.
		Event 3 Completion Criteria: - Rod returned to target position - AND, at the direction of the NRC chief examiner.

Operator Actions

Op-Test N	lo: <u>ILT 01-1</u>	Scenario No.: ILT-N-2 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 1
Event Des	The	channel 12 then fails upscale and a half-scram occurs on the RPS "A" channel. NSO bypasses the failed IRM channel and the SRO addresses the technical cification requirements for the failure.
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
		SIMULATOR OPERATOR:
		At the discretion of the NRC chief examiner, activate trigger 1, fails IRM 12 channel upscale
	NSO	 Should perform the following actions per DAN 902-5 C-15: If not in the RUN Mode, verifies the following occurred: Channel A half scram Rod Block. Verifies IRM 12 readings against other IRMs on 902-5 panel. Verifies IRM range switch in correct position Bypasses IRM 12 after T. S. compliance verified by SRO. Resets RPS channel A per DOP 0500-07, Insertion/Reset of Manual Half Scram, as follows: Verifies half scram no longer required Turns the Scram Reset switch in each direction and verifies all eight white group solenoid lights are lit. Verifies alarm 902-5 A-10, Channel A Manual Trip, resets.
	ANSO	 Should perform the following actions per DAN 902-5 C-10: Verifies IRM 12 readings against other IRMs on 902-36 panel. Verifies IRM 12 function switch in operate. Verifies power supplies operating properly.
	SRO	 Should references plant technical documents: ITS Table 3.3.1.1.A-1, verifies sufficient RPS IRM trip channels (3 available / 3 required for A channel) for Mode 2. TRM Table T3.3.a-1, verifies sufficient APRM rod block channels available (7 available / 6 required) for Mode 2.
		Should direct IRM 12 bypassed and the half scram reset per DOP 0500-07, Insertion/Reset of Manual Half Scram.
		Notifies the Shift Manager and IMD.
		Role Play: Respond as persons notified Event 4 Completion Criteria: - IRM 12 bypassed - Half scram reset. - AND, at the direction of the NRC chief examiner.

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM, Scenario ILT-N-2 Page 9 of 21

Op-Test N	o: <u>ILT 01-1</u>	Scenario No.: <u>ILT-N-2</u> Event No.: <u>5</u> Page 1 of 1
Event Des	is re	well to Torus differential pressure the cleagins to decrease and pressure control egained when the ANSO takes manual control of the Drywell to Torus differential source controller.
Time	Position	Applicant s - mons or Behavior
		SIMULATOR OPERATOR:
		At the discretion of the NRC chief elaminer, activate trigger 2, which causes drywell to torus differential pressure controller input to fail high causing the demand to fail to 0%.
	ANSO	Acknowledges and announces ala 902-4 B-15, DW to Torus DP Hi/Lo, and performs the following: □ Should diagnose failure c ² e drywell to torus differential pressure controller AUTO mode of cceration.
		 Performs any of the following as creeted: Places the drywell to torus a ferential pressure controller to MAN and controls the drywell to torus differential pressure manually; AND / OR, vents the torus of Reactor Building Ventilation per DOP 1600-01, Normal Pressure Control of the Drywell or Torus: Verifies atmospheric sample results allow venting. Verifies U2 Reactor Building Ventilation operating. Verifies AO 2-1601-91 coen. Opens AO 2-1601-24 croses when desired to stop venting) Opens AO 2-1601-61 croses when desired to stop venting)
		 May close AO 2-1601-58 per DOP 1600-05, Primary Containment Inerting and Atmosphere Control.
	SRO	 To maintain Primary Containment cressures to those specified in DOP 1600-05, Primary Containment Inerting and Atmosphere Control, should direct performance of any of the following Placing the drywell torus createrntial pressure controller to MAN and controlling Drywell to Torus differential pressure manually; AND / OR, venting the torus to Reactor Building Ventilation per DOP 1600-01, Normal Pressure Control of the Drywell or Torus, to maintain the required differential pressure. May direct closing AO 2-1601-58 per DOP 1600-05, Primary Containment Inerting and Atmosphere Control. May notify IMD.
	NSO	Monitors panels and assists as directed.
		ROLE PLAY: IMD to investigate drywell pressure controller: Respond "I will send a technician :: hvestigate".
		Event 5 Completion Criteria: - Drywell to Torus differential pressure control in progress. - AND, at the direction of the NFI chief examiner.

Op-Test No: ILT 11 Scenario No : ILT-N-2 Event No: 6 Page 1 of 1 Event Descript : Circulating water pump 2C then trips on overload and the ANSO manually starts circulating water pump 2A to maintain condenser valuum.				
Time	Pastion	Applicant's Actions or Elenavior		
		SIMULATOR OPERATOR:		
		At the discretion of the NRC chief examiner, accorate trigger 3, which trips 2C Circulating Water pump.		
	ANSO	 Performs the following actions per DAN 902-1 4-15, Circ Wtr PP Trip, DOA 4400-01, Circulating Water System Failure, and DOA 6500-10, 4KV Circuit Breaker Trip, as directed: Starts 2B Circulating Water pump (immediate action) Verifies condenser vacuum returning to normal. Verifies 2C Circulating Water pump cisconarge valve closes. Sends NLO to check 2C Circulating Water pump breaker and operation of 2B Circulating Water pump control switch in PTL. Places 2C Circulating Water Flow reversal valves lined up normally. May send NLO to check cribhouse bat racks and traveling screens. 		
		ROLE PLAY: NLO to 2C Circulating Water pump breaker (wait 3 min) Report "2C Circulating Water pump breaker has an overcurrent target up". NLO to check 2B Circulating Water pump operation (wait 2 min) Report "2B Circulating Water pump is operating normally". NLO to check cribhouse bar racks and traveling screens (wait 3 min) Report "the cribhouse bar racks and traveling screens are clear".		
	SRO	Enters and directs performance of DOA 4400-3° Circulating Water System Failure, and DOA 6500-10, 4KV Circuit Breaker Trip. Notifies the Shift Manager and EMD. Role Play:		
	NSO	Respond as persons notified. Monitors panels and assists as directed.		
		Event 6 Completion Criteria: - 2B Circulating Water pump started. - AND, at the direction of the NRC chief examiner.		

[

-

Op-Test N	lo: <u>ILT 11-1</u>	Stenario No.: ILT-N-2 Event No.: 7 & 8 Page 1 of 3
Event Des	spur an e	CCS suction line break occurs resulting in a lowering torus water level. HPCI iously initiates. HPCI should be secured, the reactor should be scrammed and mergency depressurization should be performed as directed by the DEOP for ary containment control.
Time	Poston	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
		SIMULATOR OPERATOR:
		At the discretion of the NRC chief examiner, activate trigger 4, which starts an ECCS suction line break in the torus basement and spuriously initiates HPC: after 5 minutes.
		When the unit is manually scrammed, verify trigger 5 automatically activates to tric 2A EHC Pump.
		Note: It takes about 30 minutes for torus level to reach 12 feet. At the discretion of the lead NRC examiner, use the cues later in this event to jump ahead in time to expedite the level drop if desired.
	ANSO	 Reports the following alarms: 902-4 C-23 Torus Narrow Range Wtr Lvl Lo 923-4 A-3 U2 E RBFD Sump Lvl Hi Hi 923-4 B-2 U2 W RBFD Sump Lvl Hi Hi Checks the torus narrow range level indicator. Reports level dropping. Directs NLO to perform DOS 1600-02, Torus Level Verification Using Local Sight Glass. Directs NLO to investigate leakage to torus basement. Verifies proper operation of the RBFD Sump pumps. (will require resetting the Group 2 isolation at both the 902-5 panel and the 923-4 panel for the sump pumps to operate if a Group 2 Isolation occurs)
		ROLE PLAY: NLO to perform DOS 1600-02, Torus Level Verification Using Local Sight
		Glass: (walt 5 min)
		Report "Local Torus level is (use value from variable ppc232, unless it is <20", then report it is below the sightglass)".
		NLO to investigate leakage (wait 2 min):
		Report "There is a large rupture from a pipe attached between the torus shell and the torus suction ring header near the East LPCI Corner room. The torus basement floor is covered with water". There is no valve on the line".
		NLO to report LPCI corner status (wait 2 min):
		Report " there is no water in either LPCI corner room".
		Maintenance to determine if the leak can be stopped (wait 3 min);
		Report "Maintenance cannot stop the leak".

Op-Test N	No: <u>ILT 01-1</u>	_ Scenario No :: ILT-N-2 Event No :: 7 & 8 Paga 2 of 3
Event De:	spui an e	ECCS suction line break occurs resulting in a lowering torus water end. HPCI riously initiates. HPCI should be secured, the reactor should be secured and emergency depressurization should be performed as directed by the DEOP for hary containment control.
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	ANSO	 Performs the following actions per DEOP 200-01, Primary Containment Control, as directed: May attempt to add water to the torus by opening the FFI 14 valve. Monitors/Reports DEOP 200-01 entry parameters. √ Prevents HPCI operation by placing the HPCI 4 value or PTL.
	ANSO	 Performs the following actions per DOA 0040-02, Localized Floering in Plant, as directed: Makes PA announcement. Directs NLO to investigate leakage to torus basement. Notifies Radiation Protection and Security as time permission
		Cue: (if desired for time compression) $k_{bad}/e d / b_{7} Del/$ When torus level is < 14.5 feet and/or at the discretion of the leat NRC examiner, cue the crew that we are taking a time jump and that both torus wide range level meters indicate 12.5 feet and are dropping at about 0.1 ft per minute
	SRO	 Enters and directs performance of DEOP 0200-01, Primary Containment Control: May attempt to add water to the torus by opening the HPC: 14 valve. May decide to anticipate RPV Blowdown: directs a manual scram per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram. enters DEOP 100, RPV Control. directs opening turbine bypass valves. ✓ Directs ANSO to secure HPCI by placing the HPCI 4 valve in PTL before torus level reaches 12 feet.
		 Enters DEOP 0300-01, Secondary Containment Control, and directs: If Reactor Building Ventilation Isolates when unit is scrammed, directs restarting Reactor Building Ventilation.
	ANSO	 Performs DEOP 300-01, Secondary Control, as directed: Time permitting, restarts Reactor Building Ventilation (if : solates when the reactor is scrammed).
	NSO	 ✓ Performs DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, as directed: Presses scram pushbuttons Places mode switch in shutdown Checks rods inserted Maintain RPV/L between +25 and +35 inches or as directed by DEOPs

Op-Test N	lo: <u>ILT 01-1</u>	Scenario No _ <u>N-2</u> Event No. <u>7 & 8</u> Pag <u>∈ 3</u> of <u>3</u>
Event Des	spui an e	ECCS suction line break occurs resulting in a lowering torus water level. HPCI riously initiates. HPC arould be secured, the reactor should be scrammed and emergency depressurization should be performed as directed by the DEOP for hary containment contra
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	ANSO	When attempts to open bypass valves (if directed), reports that the 2B EHC pump tripped.
		Cue: (if time compression was used above)
		10 minutes after the initial time compression cue and/or at the discretion of the lead NRC examiner, cue the crew that both torus wide range level meters indicate 11.5 feet and are dropping at about 0.1 ft per minute.
	SRO	When informed that torus level is approaching 11 feet: □ √ Directs a manual scram (if not already directed above) per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram.
		 Enters DEOP 0400-02, Emergency Depressurization, and directs: Initiation of sp Condenser to maximum flow ○ Verification trat SP/L >6 feet. ○ √ Opening all ADS valves ○ Verification all relief valves are open.
	ANSO	 Performs DEOP 0400-02, Emergency Depressurization, actions as directed: Initiates Isc Condenser to maximum flow Verifies that SP/L >6 feet. √Opens all ADS valves Verifies all relief valves are open.
		 Critical Tasks: (identified by √ in guide) With reactor at power and suppression pool water level cannot be maintained in the safe region of the heat capacity temperature limit, <i>MANUALLY SCRAM</i> the reactor. When it is determined that suppression pool water level cannot be held above 12 feet wide range (level of HPCI exhaust), <i>TRIP AND PREVENT HPCI</i> operation irrespective of adequate core cooling. When it is determined that suppression pool water level cannot be held above 11 feet wide range (level of the downcomers), <i>INITIATE</i> emergency depressurization.
		Scenario Completion Criteria: - HPCI secured. - Reactor scrammed. - RPV depressurization in progress. - AND, at the direction of the NRC chief examiner.

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM, Scenario ILT-N-2 Page 14 of 21

PRECEDURE	TITLE	REVISION
DAN SILE G-2	Area Temp High	06
DAN 901-4 B-15	DW to Torus DP Hi/Lo	06
DAN 901-4 H-17	VIv Leak Det Sys Temp Hi	10
DAN 901-5 A-15	Channel B Manual Trip	04
DAN 911-5 B-3	Rod Worth Min Block	06
DAN 901-5 C-3	Rod Out Block	09
DAN 902-5 C-15	Channel B IRM Hi Hi/Inop	07
DOP 0400-01	Reactor Manual Control System Operation	16
DOP 0511-07	Insertion/Reset of Manual Half Scram	02
DOP 1611-01	Normal Pressure Control of the Drywe or Torus	18
DOP 16::-05	Primary Containment Inerting and Atmosphere Control	37
DOP 3822-01	Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System (TBCCW)	06
DOS 1610-02	Torus Level Verification Using Local S ght Glass.	12
DOA 0311-05	Inoperable or Failed Control Rod Drives	20
DOA 6510-10	4KV Circuit Breaker Trip	03
DGP 02-13	Reactor Scram	54
DGP 03-14	Control Rod Movements	41
DEOP C100-00	RPV Control	10
DEOP CICO-01	Primary Containment Control	10
DEOP 0300-01	Secondary Containment Contro	07
DEOP 0-10-02	Emergency Depressurization	04

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM, Scenario ILT-N-2 Page 15 of 21

Rev. 00 (02/02)

Author ftd ve idation

PRE-SCENARIC ACTIVITIES

- If applicable conduct pre-scenario activities in accordance with TQ-AA-106-0107, SIMULATOR EXAMINATION BRIEFING
 - a. Provide the crew with a copy of Control Room work request list.
 - b. Provide the team with a copy of DGP 01-01, Unit Startup, which is marked up to the point of "verifying main turbine clobass valves open and maintaining pressure at 920 psig".
 - c. Provide the team with a copy of DOP 3800-01, Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System (TBCCW).
 - d. If the creatinquires about a startup plan, inform them the Shift Manager is maintaining it.
 - e. Provide the crew with a copy of the REMA.
 - f. Inform the present in the Control Room.
 - g. Inform the prew that an IM technician is on site to adjust gains.
 - h. Direct the prew to perform their briefs prior to entering the simulator.
- 2. Simulator Secto (the following steps can be done in any logical order)
 - a. Initialize s mulator in IC 7 and perform the following before moving continuing below:
 - 1) Use === Rodmove program to pull rods through step 34. (1.5) Set Stator Cooling Led
 - (12) Ver 2A Stator Cooling Water and 2A EHC Pumps running.
 - 3) Ado the following variables to a Monitor program screen and change the first two as necessary to obtain a DW pressure of ~1.1 psig and torus pressure of ~0.0 psig:

PCY

Start ZE DW Cooler. MP 4/26/02

- a) comndw(1)
- b) comnww(1)

b.

-e-cotr1

Run the ritial setup caep file: ilt-n-2.cae.

Verify the Primary Containment controllers are in AUTO and controlling in the normal at power pressures.

- d. Verify the following simulator conditions:
 - 2) Concensate Demin dP between 20 and 45 psid.
 - 3) Concensate pump amps between 160 and 255 amps.
 - 4) Oper AO 2-1601-58.
 - 5) Verify 2A TBCCW pump running and 2B off.
 - 6) Verify backpanel lights reset.
- d. Secure the following equipment and tag out of service:
 - 1) Place RM 16 902-5 panel joystick in bypass and place an Equipment Status Tag on it.
 - 2) Place 2B EHC Pump control switch in PTL and hang an OOS card on it.
- e. Add variable ppc232 to a Monitor program screen.
- f. Advance the chart recorders.
- g. Mark up rod sequence as completed through step 34.
- Ti. Place the REMA sheet in the appropriate book
- i. Complete the Simulator Setup Checklist!

ILT 01-1 NRC E7.-M, Scenario ILT-N-2 Page 16 of 21

Rev. 00 (02/02)

Kun Caep file Inertocae Computer Aided Exercise Programs

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Initial Setup CAEP:

ilt-n-2.cae # Setup for ilt-n-2 #Written by JAS #Rev 00 #Date 02/02

#INITIAL CONDITIONS

#overrides IC rad mon downscale alarm off imf ser0004 off imf ser0019 off # opens the N2 makeup inlet isolation. irf p33 true # lowers the isolation condenser temperatures. set ich2la = 50.0set ich2lb = 50.0set ichshell = 50.0

#SETUP EVENT TRIGGERS

Event Trigger 1 IRM 12 channel fails upscale trgset 1 "0"|2 imf nii12pot (1) 125.0|2

Event Trigger 2 drywell to torus DP controller input fails upscale. trgset 2 "0"|2 ior pcpdwtor (2) 3.0|2

Event Trigger 3 inserts a 2C circulating water pump trip trgset 3 "0"|4 imf hp8 (3)|4

Event Trigger 4 inserts an ECCS suction line break and spuriously initiates HPCI 5 minutes later. HPCI injection is prevented. trgset 4 "0"|2 imf csbrksev (4) 100.0|4 irf hp8vbkr (4) tripped|4 imf hpinit (4 05:00)|4

Event Trigger 5 trips 2A EHC pump when the reactor is scrammed Thigger 6 trgset 5 "rpdmode4 .or. rpdmode3"|6 imf j33 (5)|6

for 2A RX Bldg to Lorus Vacuum Breater

Event Trigger 16 insert rod N-13 drift out malfunction when it is out past position 10 trgset 16 "rdzactls(163) >31.0"|6 imf rodn13do (16)|6

Event Trigger 17 deletes rod N-13 drift out malfunction when it is out past position 12. trgset 17 "rdzactls(163) > 38.0 .or. (rds303em .and. rdlselw(163))"|6 trg 17 "dmf rodn13do"|6

END

1

Date: TODAY	Unit 2 Turnov	/er
ECCS Status: All		
Online Information N/AMWe Online Risk: Green CDF: 1.00 Risk Equipment:	MODE 1	Shutdown Information Time to Boil: N/A Shutdown Risk: N/A Protected Path: N'A
Unit 2 Priorities		Station Provities
Continue startup		
LCORAs LCORA # None Title		Start Clock Ends
	t 2 Activities Start 2B TBCCW pump Continue startup	Shift 3 Activities
Shift 1 Activities (X = Completed) Shif	Common Unit Activit	ies Shift 3 Activities
Common Unit Procedures / Surveillances	in Progress	
None		
arrive from Quad	Cities Station.	IMD waiting for replacement power supply to hits pressure compensator. Expected BIS next
Compensatory Actions, Extra Checks		•

Equipment OOS		Service Unit S	tätus	
2 hr ago 990045654	IRM 16	9 days ago	2A Cond Demin	Cut In
6 hr. ago 990045652	2B EHC Fump	7 days ago	2B Cond Demin	Cut In
		16 days ago	2C Cond Demin	Cut In
		2 days ago	2D Cond Demin	Cut Out
		11 days ago	2E Cond Demin	Cut Out
		6 days ago	2F Cond Demin	Cut Out
		2 days ago	2G Cond Demin	Cut Out
		376 days ago	2A RWCU	Cut In
		240 days ago	2B RWCU	Cut Out
		20 days ago	2C RWCU	Cut Out
		76 days ago	U2 FPC Demin	Cut In
Unit 2 Abnormal Comp	onent Position	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		·····
	onent Position	nsatory Actions		·····
		nsatory Actions	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	·····
		nsatory Actions	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
U2 Open Operability De Events and Misc. Inforr	eterminations with Compen	-	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
J2 Open Operability De Events and Misc. Inforr DGP 01-01 in progress. I	eterminations with Comper nation Rods pulled up through step	34. Continue the startup). QNE 13 IN-	the control room
U2 Open Operability De Events and Misc. Inforr DGP 01-01 in progress. I	eterminations with Compen	34. Continue the startup	D. QNE 13 In-	the control your
U2 Open Operability De Events and Misc. Inforr DGP 01-01 in progress. I	eterminations with Comper nation Rods pulled up through step	34. Continue the startup	D. QNE 15 IN-	the control room
U2 Open Operability De Events and Misc. Inforr DGP 01-01 in progress. I 2B TBCCW maintenance	eterminations with Comper nation Rods pulled up through step	34. Continue the startup	D. QNE 13 IN-	the control roor

i.

Autrir for Validation

Date TODAY	Unit 3 Turno	ver
ECCS Status: All available		
Online Information N/AMWe Online Risk: N/A Risk Equipment: N/A	MODE 4	Shutdown Information Time to Boil: 24 hrs. Shutdown Risk: Green Protected Path: None
Unit 3 Priorities Complete startup checklists	i	Station Priorities
LCORAs LCORA # None 		Start Clock Ends
Shift 1 Activities (X = Completed)	Shift 2 Activities	Shift 3 Activities
Shift 1 Activities (X = Completed)	Shift 2 Activities	Shift 3 Activities
Common Unit Procedures / Surveillar None Unit 3 Conditions, Status, Abnormalit DGP 01-S1, Start-up Checklist, in progre	lies	
Compensatory Actions, Extra Checks None	;	•

Equipment OOS	Service Unit S	tatus	
None	5 davs ago	3A Cond Demin	Cut In
	8 davs ago	3B Cond Demin	Cut In
	10 dals ago	3C Cond Demin	Cut In
	5 days ago	3D Cond Demin	Cut Ou:
	3 days ago	3E Cond Demin	Cut Ou:
	15 dal siago	3F Cond Demin	Cut Ou:
	°3 days ago	3G Cond Demin	Cut Out
	750 dalis ago	3A RWCU	Cut In
	390 da. s ago	3B RWCU	Cut Out
	60 da, ₅ ago	3C RWCU	Cut Out
	444 daus ago	U3 FPC Demin	Cut In
······································	··· - ··· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
Unit 3 Abnormal Component Position			
None			

U3 Open Operability Determinations with Compensatory Actions None

.....

Events and Misc. Information

DGP 01-S1, Start-up Checklist, in progress

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM, Scenario ILT-N-2

Page 21 of 21

-j -

•

PORM N

"ReMA for D2C18 Startup"

x						1	. 1
Unit: Sequence:	2 X11.0 2X11				Net Leth	Date Time Pisterel 20 Date Time:	ny /2200
Cycle:	18	PART II:	REACTIVIT	Y MANEUY	Netra Terri VEK	Date Time: 30 Date Time: APPROVAL	
Instruction Pull rods to	ns/Steps to . o criticality,	Accomplish the heatup to rated	Evolution (use FO pressure, and to ~ 25	RMs O and P, if 5% CTP.	neede		
FLCPR(20)	OD-20)	APRAT(OD-20				ELPD(OD-20) MFL	PD/FRP(OD-
Comments 1. Monito be less new Es 2. Reactor 3. During	(indicate r or moderator than 240 F stimated Cri r period sho	ange of values temperature or when the reacto ical Position (E uld not be less t	r reaches criticality. CP) calculated by a than 30 seconds prior	quency, if any): approach te critica Moderator tempe QNE. r to, or upen critic	l. Per rature : ality.	² -AA-233, moderator te buld not fall below 140 rext notch upon continu-	F without a
Other Info	rmation:						
rates.			e reactor period befo on sequence by follow	,		th continuously increas	ing SRM count
Criticality is 24-48, and t notching each	these rods a	e noted in the s een 24-48.	ods 12-48. Several re equence. The QNE	ods in group 3 are will provide a reco	preditte ommer :	ed to have high notch wo ation on the necessity of	rths between single
EC EC	P with appr P with appr	oximately -1% oximately +1%	noderator temperatur delta Keff: Step 3, 3 delta Keff: Step 11,	J-14 @ 26. , H-13 @ 32.		0	
The ECP us The ECP us	ing sequenc ing sequenc	X∏ e-2X.0 with a m e 2X.0 with a m X∏	noderator temperatur noderator temperatur	re of 140 is step 11 re of 240 is step 11	, F-11 , H-04	22. 2 16.	
analyzed roo position seq	d position se uence if the	quence allows	up to 8 rods OOS. R e AND they are not :	Rods are only consi	iderec 🛾	hermal Power for RDA OS for the purposes of t will provide assistance	he analyzed rod
range 10 of start up and	IRMs. Onc scram time	e above 10% C testing of L-06	TP, out of sequence.	rod maneuvers per The reactor must	Spec ⊥ be br: ⊥	10% CTP is ~2.1 BP Instructions to rapidly p th to mode 1 prior to so tram timing.	roceed through
pared by:	<u>M</u> , Qa ne/qne/	of 2 days a	PReviewed by:	R. Roknow QNE/Date of N	/2 44- A	Approved by Li Sec	per/yestere Supervisor/Date
		The	Mge Aone	5000 at	Ac.	Whe	

Dresden Generating Station

SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM

SCENARIO

ILT-N-3

Rev. 00

0

02/02

3/28/02 **DEVELOPED BY** Exam Auther Date APPROVED BY 0.) Date Fac Representative

SimScenario-ILT-N-3.doc

Appendix D

Scenario Outline

Form ES-D-1

Facility	Dresden		Sce	enar:: <u>ILT-N-3</u> Op-Test No: <u>ILT 01-1</u>
Examin	ers:			Operators:
Pump o <u>Turnove</u>	ut of service; U	nit 3 i wn in	s in Mode progress	for forced outage; shutdown reactor condensate pump
Event No.	Malf. No.	-	Event Fype*	Event Description
1	N/A	N	ANSO SRO	shuttown condensate pump for unit shutdown
2	N/A	R	NSO SRO	lower reactor power by reducing recirculation flow
3	SER1375 FWDOP2 FWDOP5	с	NSO SRO	reactor feed pump 2B failure
4	ADS3ESD	I	ANSO SRO	spurbus ADS valve opening
5	K11 MGDSCBTR	С	ANSO SRO	stator cooling water pump trips on overload and standby pump fails to start automatically
6	RLLMLS	I	NSO SRO	feedwater level control system setpoint drifts high
7	F44	м	ALL	sma recirculation loop break
8	ACDTP21 ACDCL21		ANSO SRO	TR 12 feed to Bus 21 fails to close
9	HP8VBKR HPLCL8		ANSO SRO	HPC injection valve failure

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (Component, (M)ajor

Page 2 of 24 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1

Dresden Generating Station

NRC ILT EXAM

Scenario ILT-N-3

Scenario Objective

Evaluate the coerators in using the Emergency Depressurization DEOP contingency procedure.

Scenario Summary

Initial Conditions:

- ~80% power.
- IRM 16 COS.
- 2B EHC Pump OOS
- Ready to secure a Condensate Pump.
- Unit 3 is in Mode 4

Events:

- Shutdown 2B Condensate Pump
- Power reduction with recirculation flow .
- 2B RFP Failure .
- E ADSV setpoint drifts low .
- 2A stator water cooling pump trips
- Failure of FWLC auto mode
- Recirculation loop leak with loss of high pressure feed.

Scenario Sequence

- The team continues the shut down by securing 2B condensate pump. .
- Next the team reduces power using recirculation flow. •
- A 2B RFP low lube oil condition will require the team to start 2C RFP and secure 2B RFP.
- The E ADSV setpoint will drift low causing it to open. The team should close it by placing its control switch in • OFF. The SRO will address Technical Specification requirements.
- The 2A stator cooling water pump trips on overload and the standby pump fails to start automatical. The ٠ team should manually start the 2B stator cooling water pump.
- The FWLC system setpoint will begin drifting up. The team should take manual control of the FWLC system.
- A small recirculation loop break occurs causing a reactor scram and high drywell pressure. During the generator trip, Bus 21 will fail to transfer to TR 22 and the 2C RFP Bus 22 breaker will not close resuting in a total loss of high pressure feedwater. The HPCI injection valve fails to open. The team should perform the RPV Control and Primary Containment Control DEOPs. Due to the loss of high pressure injection and RPV level dropping to TAF, the team should Emergency Depressurize and restore RPV level with low pressure injection systems.

Event Two - Power Reduction With Recirculation Flow

The crew reduces power with recirculation few per procedures.

Malfunctions required: 0

Success Path:

Reduces power with recirculation flow per procedures

Event Three – 2B RFP Failure

The crew recognizes and responds to failure of the 2B RFP ube oil system.

Malfunctions required: 2 (Low Lube Oil Pressure) (Failure of aux oil pump to start

Success Path:

Starts 2C RFP and secures 2B RFP

Event Four - E ADSV Setpoint Drifts Low

The crew recognizes and responds to E ADSV setpoint drifting low causing the valve to open.

Malfunctions required: 1 (E ADSV setpoint onft)

Success Path:

Places the E ADSV control switch to OFF

Event Five – 2A Stator Water Cooling Pump Trips

The crew recognizes and responds to trip of 2A stator water cooling pump and failure of 2B stator water cooling pump to automatically start.

Malfunctions required: 1 (loss of stator water cooling)

Success Path:

• Manually start 2B stator water cooling pump.

Event One - Shutclown 28 Consensate The Crew shitsdown IB Concensate Pu Madfunctions required: 4 Success Poth: Shits town 2B Condensate Pump per procedures 81 ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM, Scenario ILT-N-3 Page 4 cf 24

WP 4/26/07-

Autrir for selidation

Rev. 00 (02/02)

Event Six - Failure of FWLC Auto Mode

The crew recognizes and responds to failure of the automatic mode of the FWLL is stem.

Malfunctions required 1 (FWLC setpoint drift)

Success Path:

Takes manual control of the FWLC system.

Event Seven and Eight - Recirculation Loop Leak With Loss Of High Pressare Feed

The crew recognizes and responds to a recirculation loop leak with a loss of high e^{-1} essure injection systems.

Malfunctions required: 3 (recirculation loop leak) (loss of RFPs) (HPCI injection valve failure)

Success Path:

- Emergency Decressurize
- Use low pressure injection systems to restore RPV level.

Scenario Recapitulation

Total Malfunctions Abnormal Events:	8 4	
Major Transients:	1	(emergency depressurization)
EOPs Entered: EOP Contingencies	2	(emergency depressurization)

Appendix D

Operator Actions

Op-Test No: ILT 01-1 Stepario No.: ILT-N-3 Event No 1 Page 1 of 1 Event Description: The team at minues the shut down by securing 2B Condensate Pump. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Directs ANSO to secure 2B Condensate Pump per DOP 3300-03, Concensate System Shutdown, Performs the following actions per DOP 3300-03, Condensate System ANSO Shutcown, to shutdown 2B Condensate Pump as directed: Verifies Reactor Feed Pump Suction Pressure >230 psig. Verifies closed the hydrogen isolation valves. (on turnover) Stops 2B Condensate Pump Selects 2B Condensate Pump for standby. Directs NLO to verify Condensate Pre-filter operating parameters. NSO Monitors panels and assists as directed. ROLE PLAY: NLO to verify 2B Condensate Pump hydrogen isolation valves closed: Report "hydrogen isolation valves are closed". NLO to verify 2B Condensate Pump stopped rotating: Report '2B Condensate Pump has stopped rotating". NLO to verify Condensate Pre-filter operating parameters (wait 2 min): Report Condensate Pre-filter operating parameters are normal." Event 1 Completion Criteria: 2E Condensate Pump secured. AND, at the direction of the NRC chief examiner.

66 Rev for Shutdown

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM, Scenario !_ -N-3 Page 6 of 24

Author for Validation

ſ

Op-Test N	o: <u>ILT 01-1</u>	Scenario No.: <u>ILT-N-3</u> Event No 2 Page 1 of 1
Event Des	cription The	team reduces power using recirculation fow.
	T	·
Time	Position	Applicant's Actors or Behavior
	NSO	 Performs the following actions per DGF 02-01. Unit Statdown, and DOP 0202-03, Reactor Recirculation Flow Control System Deration: Lowers recirculation pump speed using the master controller potentiometer. Verifies expected power reduction.
	SRO	Directs reducing reactor power per DGP 02-01, Unit Soutdown, and DOP 0202-03, Reactor Recirculation Flow Control System Coeration, by lowering recirculation pump speed.
	ANSO	Monitors panels and assists as directed
		Event 2 Completion Criteria: - Significant power reduction - AND, at the direction of the NRC chief examiner.

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM, Scenario ILT-N-3 Page 7 of 24

• •

e deta

:: ::

1 1 1 1 :. :: ::

Operator Actions

Op-Test No: ILT 01-1 Scenario No : ILT-N-3

Event No <u>3</u> Page <u>1</u>

Event Description: A 18 RFP low Lite oil condition will require the team to start 2C RFP and secure 18 RFP.

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
		SIMULATER OPERATOR:
		At the discretion of the NRC chief examiner, activate trigger 1, which inserts 2B RFP low bil pressure and causes failure of its auxiliary oil pump to star
	NSO	 Performs the following actions per DAN 902-6 H-8, 2B RFP Brg Oil Press Lot: Attempts to start 2B RFP Auxiliary Oil Pump. Directs NLO to report 2B RFP oil pressure, oil reservoir level and creck for oil leaks. Informs SRO 2B RFP is running with low oil pressure and the
	1	e₋⊧ ary oil pump will not start.
		ROLE PLAY:
		NLO to check 2B RFP (wait 2 min):
		Report "2E RFP oil pressure is 16 psig. Oil reservoir level is low. There is a large amount of oil on the pump base-plate The oil had not reached the base plate drain yet. I plugged the base plate drain".
		NLO to check 2B RFP Aux Oil pump breaker: (wait 2 min)
		Report "I see no problems with 2B RFP Aux Oil pump breaker".
	SRO	Directs staring 2C RFP and securing 2B RFP.
		Contacts the Shift Manager, and appropriate maintenance departments.
	ANSO	Monitors parels and assists as directed.
	NSO	 Starts 2C F FP per DOP 3200-03, Startup of second Reactor Feed Pump of Shifting to Attended Reactor Feed Pump, as directed: May direct NLO to perform pre-startup checks. Places RFPs Standby selector switch in OFF. Closes the discharge value.
		 Octeos the discharge value. Octeos the recirculation value. Verfes RPV level stable. Stars discharge value opening.
		Starts the RFP. (should start it on Bus 22 per procedure)
		 Verres RPV level stable. Ccses the recirculation value.
		 Directs NLO to perform post-startup checks. Verrees auxiliary oil pump stops.

 Op-Test No:
 ILT 01-1
 Scenario No.:
 ILT -N-3
 Event No.:
 3
 Page
 2
 of
 3

Event Description: A 2B RFP low lube oil condition will require the team to start another RFP and secure 2B RFP.

Time	Position	Applica - s Actions or Behavior
		ROLE PLAY:
		NLO to perform RFP pre-startuc checks (wait 5 min):
		Respond "I have completed the requested RFP startup pre-checks per step G.1 through G.11 of DOP 3200-23".
		NLO to perform post-startup checks: (wait 5 min)
		Respond "The RFP post-startur checks are completed per G.31 of DOP 3200-03".
	NSO	Performs the following actions :== DOP 3200-05, Reactor Feed Pump Shutdown, to shutdown 2B RFF as directed: Verifies zinc injection is =>t lined up to 2B RFP (may not wait on this). Places RFPs standby selector switch to OFF. Opens the recirculation raive. Verifies RPV level stable Closes the discharge verve. Verifies RPV level stable Stops the RFP. Verifies the running RFP amps below 1115 amps. Closes the recirculation raive. Has NLO verify the RFP has come to rest. Has NLO verify the RFP has come to rest. Has NLO verify 2-5772-43B closed. ROLE PLAY: NLO to verify 2B RFP has come to rest (wait 1 min): Respond *Zinc injection is lined up to 2A RFP* NLO to verify 2B RFP has come to rest (wait 1 min): Respond *ZB RFP has stopped rotating* NLO to verify 2B RFP has not rotating in reverse direction: Respond *ZB RFP is not rotating in reverse direction: Respond *ZB RFP is not rotating in reverse direction* NLO to adjust zinc injection to ~20 gpm. NLO to adjust zinc injection to ~20 gpm. NLO to verify 2B RFP is not rotating in reverse direction* Respond *I adjusted zinc injection to ~20 gpm. NLO to verify 2B RFP is not rotating in reverse direction* Respond *I adjusted zinc injection to ~20 gpm. NLO to verify 2-5772-48B closec (wait 1 min): Respond *I adjusted zinc injection to ~20 gpm.

Rev. 00 (02/02)

Op-Test N	01-1_	Scenario No.: ILT-N-3	Event No.: <u>3</u>	Page 1 of 3	
Event Dest secure 2B	oristish: A 2B RFF	RFP low lube oil condition will requ	ire the team to start ar	nother RFP and	
Time	= : sition	Applicant's	Actions or Behavior		
		 Event 3 Completion Criteria: 2C RFP started 2B RFP shutdown AND, at the direction of the NRC chief examiner. 			

ILT 01-1 NRC E (AM, Scenario ILT-N-3

Page 10 of 24

1.1

 \cdot

i

Θ

". a ₽ #

Operator Actions

Op-Test No: ILT 01-1 Scenario No.: ILT-N-3

Ellent No – 4

Page <u>1</u> of <u>1</u>

Event Description: The E ADSV setpoint will drift low causing into open. The team should close it by placing its control switch in OFF.

Time	Position	Applicant's - :: ons or Behavior			
		SIMULATOR OPERATOR:			
		At the discretion of the NRC chief examiner, activate trigger 2, which sets the E ADS valve's setpoint to 390 psig causing it to open.			
	ANSO	Performs the following actions per 2 - N 902-3 E-12, 2E Electromatic Relief			
		Viv Open: Verifies valve actually open ty checking any of the following:			
		Valve position indication			
		Generator output decrease.			
0		Acoustic monitor tripped			
		Increasing tailcipe temperature.			
		Torus temperature increasing			
		Notifies SRO the value is coten.			
	SRO	Enters and directs performance of CCA 0250-01, Relief Valve Failure.			
	ANSO	Performs DOA 0250-01, Relief Valve Failure, as directed:			
		Places the 2E Electromatic Pelief valve control switch to OFF.			
		(immediate action) Userifies RPV level stable (immediate action)			
		 Verifies RPV level stable. (mmediate action) Verifies and reports the value closed 			
		 Verifies and reports the value closed. Resets the acoustic monitor 			
	SRO	References Technical Specifications and determines:			
		ITS 3.6.2.1, Suppression Post Average Temperature, is not applicable.			
		ITS 3.5.1.G, ECCS. if decides the failure does affect its ADS			
		function, then restore the ADS valve to OPERABLE status within 14			
		days, otherwise, this is not applicable.			
		ITS 3.4.3.A, Safety and Relief Valves, restore the relief valve to			
		OPERABLE status within 14 cays.			
		ITS SR 3.6.1.8.2, Suppress on Chamber to Drywell Vacuum			
		Breakers, perform a functional test of each required vacuum breaker			
		within 12 hours.			
		Event 4 Completion Criteria:			
		 2E Electromatic Relief valve closed. 			
		 Referenced Technical Specifications. 			
		 AND, at the direction of the NRC chief examiner. 			

- • · · ·

.

Appen: < D

Op-Test No	D: <u>ILT :</u>	Scenario No.: ILT-N-3 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 1
Event Desc start autom	pription The natioally The	2A stator cooling water pump trips on overload and the standby pump fails to team should manually start the 2B stator cooling water pump
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
		SIMULATOR OPERATOR: At the discretion of the NRC chief examiner, activate trigger 3, which causes 2A stator cooling water pump to trip on overload and 2E to fails to auto start.
	ANSO	 Announces the following alarms: DAN 902-7 B-10, Stator Clg PP Trip DAN 902-7 C-3, Turb Stator Coolant Runback Performs appropriate actions per DOA 7400-01, Failure of the Stator Coolant System: Starts 2B Stator Cooling Water Pump (Immediate Action) Verifies Runback condition clears. Sends NLO to verify 2B Stator Cooling Water Pump operating normally.
		 Performs appropriate actions per DOA 6700-06, 480V C rouit Breaker Trip: Sends NLO to check breaker and 2A Stator Cocing Water Pump for cause of trip. Places 2A Stator Cooling Water Pump control switch in PTL.
		SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY: NLO to acknowledge stator cooling water trouble alarm: (wait 2 min) Activate trigger 9 and report *I have acknowledged stator cooling water
		trouble alarm. The alarms were Inlet Pressure Low and Turbine Runback". NLO to check operation of 2B Stator Cooling Water Pump: (wait 2 min)
		Report "2B Stator Cooling Water Pump is operating normally".
		NLO to check cause of 2A Stator Cooling Water Pump trip (wait 2 min) Report "2A Stator Cooling Water Pump trip on overload".
	SRO	Enters and directs performance of DOA 7400-01, Failure of the Stator Coolant System.
		Enters and directs performance of DOA 6700-06, 480V C. cuit Breaker Trip.
		Monitors panels and assists as directed. ROLE PLAY:
	-	Respond to calls for assistance. Event 5 Completion Criteria: - 2B Stator Cooling Water Pump started

AND, at the direction of the NRC chief examiner.

Rev. 00 (02/02)

Operator Actions

Op-Test N	0. <u>ILT 01-1</u>	Scenar: <u>ILT-N-3</u> Event No. 6 Page 1 of 1	
Event Description: The FWLC system setpoint will begin drifting up. The team should take manual control of the FWLC system.			
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior			
		SIMULATOF OPERATOR:	
		At the discretcen of the NRC chief examiner, activate trigger 7, which causes feedwater level control system setpoint to drift high (to 60") over 10 min.	
	NSO	Observes at announces RPV level rising or responds to alarm 902-5 E-8, RPV LvI Hi	
		Performs the following actions per DOA 0600-01 Transient Level Control: Takes manual control of the Feedwater Regulating Valves. Restares level to within band specified by the SRO 	
SRO Enters and a rects performance of DOA 0600-01 Transient Level C			
		Notifies Shift Manager and IMD.	
		ROLE PLAY: Respond to calls for assistance. <u>Cue:</u> If ANSO goes to check OIS screen, prompt him that the OIS Monitor is blank.	
ANSO Monitors pares and assists as directed.			
	Event 6 Corr pletion Criteria: - Feedwater level control system under manual control. - AND, at = e direction of the NRC chief examiner.		

Add to start next event if crew scrame the unit during this event

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM, Scenario ILT-N-3 Page 13 of 24

Op-Test No: ILT 01-1 Scenario No. ILT-N-3

Event No. 7.833 Page 1 of 3

Event Description: A small recirculation loop break occurs with a loss of high pressure injection. The team should perform the RPV Control and Primary Containment Control DEOPs Due to the cass of high pressure injection and RPV level dropping to TAF; the team should Emergency Depressurize and restore RPV level with low pressure injection systems.

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavic	
		SIMULATOR OPERATOR:	
		At the discretion of the NRC chief examiner, activate trigger 8, causes a 2% recirc loop leak and failure of the HPCI 8 vlv to open.	
	NSO	Announces Reactor Scram on high Drywell pressure.	
		 Performs the following actions per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, and DEOP 100, RPV Control, as directed: Places Mode Switch to Shutdown and depresses the Scrampushbuttons. Checks rods inserted. Maintains RPV level as directed by SRO. Checks turbine and generator tripped. Checks recirc pumps run back to minimum speed. Inserts SRMs and IRMs 	
	ANSO	Should inform the SRO that High Pressure Feedwater and HPCI are not available.	
	SRO	 Enters DEOP 100, RPV Control, due to high PC/P and/or low RP\ and performs/directs: Entering DGP 2-3 Verification of water level instrument accuracy Verification of all isolations, ECCS and EDGs starts Holding RPV/L +8 to +48 inches Maintaining RPV/P <1060 psig 	
		 When informed no high pressure feed is available other than CRD then directs: Inhibiting ADS before -59 inches. Initiating the isolation condenser Directing use of high pressure Alternate Injection systems SBLC and CRD Crosstie) Verifies at least two low pressure injection systems availatie Waits until RPV level drops to TAF. Verifies any low pressure system lined up with a pump running 	
		SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:	
		NLO to lineup CRD crosstie (wait 5 min.):	
		Verify trigger 10 is activated then report "the CRD crosstie is lined _c".	

Op-Test No: ILT 01-1 Scenar : No ______

Event No: 7.8 & 9 Page 2 of 3

Event Description: A small recirculation loop creak occurs with a loss of high pressure injection. The team should perform the RPV Contral and Primary Containment Control DEOPs. Due to the loss of high pressure injection and RPV level dropping to TAF, the team should Emergency Depressurize and restore RPV level with low pressure meetion systems.

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
		SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:		
		NLO to line_p make_p to SBLC Boron tank (wait 5 min.):		
		Verify trigger 11 is activated then report "makeup is lined up to SBLC Boron" tank".		
	SRO Before RPV level reaches -164 inches, enters DEOP 400-02, Emerge Depressurization, and directs: □ Initiation of so Condenser to maximum flow □ Verfication and SP/L >6 feet. □ √ Opening all ADS valves □ Verfication all relief valves are open			
	ANSO	 Performs DEOP 401-02, Emergency Depressurization, as directed: Prevents in ection from LPCI/CS pumps not needed for core cooling per Hard Card, LPCI INJ/CC CONTROL/SHUTDOWN Initates Isc Condenser to maximum flow per Hard Card, ISOLATION CONDENSER Verfies SP _ >6 feet √ Opens all ADS valves Verfies all relief valves are open 		
	SRO	 ✓ Directs NSO/ANSO to control RPV level above TAF using any of the preferred injection systems listed below: Condensate Core Spray LPCI 		
	NSO / ANSO	$\sqrt{\text{Restores RPV}}$ level to that directed by the SRO (above TAF) using the systems specified by the SRO.		

Author For Validation

Op-Test No:	ILT 01-1
-------------	----------

-1 Scenario No.: <u>ILT-N-3</u>

T

Elent No.: 7, 8 & 9 Page 3 of 3

Event Description: A small recirculation loop break occurs with a loss of high pressure injection. The team should perform the RPV Control and Primary Containment Dontrol DEOPs. Due to the loss of high cressure injection and RPV level dropping to TAF, the team should Emergency Depressurize and restore RPV level with low pressure injection systems.

Ti∼≘	Position	Applicant's Emans or Behavior	
	SRO	 Enters DEOP 200-1, Primary Contactment Control, when PC/P reaches 2 psig and performs/directs: Monitoring of PC/P Initiation of torus sprays befine PC/P of 9 psig When PC/P is above 9 psig if before DW/T reaches 281°F: Verification of DSIL Tripping of recirc pumps Tripping of DW coolers Initiation of DW sprays Monitoring of SP/T and initiation of torus cooling Monitors SP/L Verifies initiation of drywell act torus H₂/O₂ monitors 	
	ANSO	 Performs DEOP 200-1, Primary Corris mment Control, actions as directed: Monitors PC/P and initiates torus sprays and drywell sprays per Hard Card LPCI/CCSW OPERATION, as directed Monitors DW/T Monitors SP/T and initiates torus cooling per Hard Card LPCI/CCSW OPERATION as directed Monitors SP/L Verifies initiation of drywell are torus H₂/O₂ monitors ROLE PLAY: NLO to check EDG operation (wait 3 min) Report "Both EDGs are operating normally"	
		 Critical Tasks: (identified by √ in g_ide) With Reactor pressure greater than shutoff head of the low pressure systems and when RPV water level reaches TAF, <i>INITIATE</i> emergency depressurization tefore level reaches Minimum Zero-Injection RPV Water Level. Action is taken to restore RF. water level above TAF by OPERATING available low cressure systems, when RPV pressure decreases below the shutoff read of low pressure systems. 	
		 Scenario Completion Criteria: Performed Emergency Depress_relation Restored RPV level above TAF AND, at the direction of the NRC coef examiner. 	

REFERENCES

PROCEDURE	TITLE	REVISION
DAN 902-5 E-8	RPV LvI Hi	06
DAN 902-6 H-8	2B RFP Brg Oil Press Lo	02
DAN 902-7 B-10	Stator Clg PP Trip	04
DAN 902-7 C-3	Turb Stator Coolant Runback	09
DOP 3200-03	Startup of second Reactor Feed Pump or Shifting to Alternate Reactor Feed Pump	32
DOP 0202-03	Reactor Recirculation Flow Control System Operation	20
DOP 3200-05	Reactor Feed Pump Shutdown	20
DOP 3300-03	Condensate System Shutdown	20
DOA 0250-01	Relief Valve Failure	21
DOA 6700-06	480V Circuit Breaker Trip	08
DOA 7400-01	Failure of the Stator Coolant System	14
DGP 02-01	Unit Shutdown	65
DGP 02-03	Reactor Scram	54
DGP 03-01	Routine Power Changes	40
DEOP 0100	Reactor Control	10
DEOP 0200-01	Primary Containment Control	10
DEOP 0400-02	Emergency Depressurization	04
DEOP 0500-02	Bypassing Interlocks and Isolations	10
DEOP 0500-03	Alternate Water Injection Systems	12

i

Author for Validation

PRE-SCENARIO ACTIVITIES

- If applicable, conduct pre-scenario activities in accordance with TUHA-109-1107, SIMULATOR EXAMINATION . BRIEFING
 - а Provide the crew with a copy of Control Room work request is:
 - Provide the team with a copy of DGP 02-01. Unit Shutdown, which is marked up to the point of taking off the b. fourth condensate pump
 - Provide the team with a copy of DOP 3300-03, Condensate System Shutdown, С
 - Inform the crew that an IM technician is on site to adjust gains d.
 - Direct the crew to perform their briefs prior to entering the simulator. е
- Simulator Setup (the following steps can be done in any logical order 2.
 - a. Initialize simulator in IC.12 and perform the following before contruing be tw:
 - 1) Reduce recirculation pump speed to just below the exclusion range (465%)
 - 2) Verify feed water flow ≤9.0 Mlbm/hr; if not, reduce recirculation pump until it is.

 - 3) Shutdown 2C RFP and place it in standby on Bus 22.
 4) Verify 2A Stator cooling and 2A EHC pumps on.
 7) Verify Stator Cooling Leaster
 PCV set at 2B.C mp fl2b/b2.
 - b. Run the initial setup caep file: ilt-n-3.cae.
 - c. Verify the following simulator conditions:
 - 1) Master Recirc Flow controller at 765% (recirc speec should be 45% so continuous 2) MWe at ~745 700 Monitoring not required for exclusion 3) Condensate Domin dD between 20 min

 - 3) Condensate Demin dP between 20 and 45 psid [EPU]
 - 4) Condensate pump amps between 160 and 255 amps [EPU]
 - d. Secure the following equipment and tag out of service:
 - 1) Place IRM 16 902-5 panel joystick in bypass and place an Equipment Status Tag on it.
 - 2) Place 2B EHC Pump control switch in PTL and place an OCS card on it.
 - e. Advance the chart recorders.
 - f. Mark up rod sequence as completed through step 130.
 - .g. Place the REMA sheet in the appropriate book-
 - Complete the Simulator Setup Checklist. h:

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO ILT-'+-3 Initial Setup CAEP:

ilt-n-3 cae # Setup for ilt-n-3 #Written by JAS #Rev 00 #Date 02/02

INITIAL CONDITIONS

Prevents TR 22 feed to Eus 21 from : bsing in.
ior acdtp21 trip
ior acdcl21 off
overrides 2B stator cooling water pump auto trip light off.
ior mglscbat off

#SETUP EVENT TRIGGERS

Event Trigger 1 Insert 2B RFP low c pressure and failure of its aux oil pump to start trgset 1 "0" ior fwdop2 (1) off ior fwdop5 (1) trip imf ser1375 (1) on

Event Trigger 2 Sets the 3E ADS values setpoint to 890 psig. trgset 2 "0"|1 imf ads3esd (2) 890.0|2

Event Trigger 3 2A stator cooling water pump trips on overload and 2B fails to start trgset 3 "0"|2 ior mgdscbtr (3) trip|2 imf k11 (3 2)|2

Event Trigger 4 when 2B stator cooling water pump control switch is placed to close, removes the override. trgset 4 "mgdscbcl"|4 trg 4 "dor mgdscbtr"|4

Event Trigger 5 when the 2B stator cooling water pump control switch trip override is deleted and the 2A stator cooling water pump is off, sets the 2B stator cooling water pump breaker to closed. trgset 5 ".not. (mgdscbtr.or. mgzsccl(1 "|4 trg 5 "set mgzsccl(2) = true":4

Event Trigger 6 when 2B stator cooling water pump is running, deletes the auto trip light overnoe. trgset 6 "mgzsccl(2)"|6 trg 6 "dor mglscbat"|6

Event Trigger 7 causes feedwater level control system setpoint to drift high (60") over 10 min trgset 7 "0"|6 irf rllmls (7) 60 10:00|6

Event Trigger 8 trips 2C RFP Bus 22 creaker, inserts a 0.5% recirc loop leak and failure of the HPCI 8 vlv to open. trgset 8 "0"|6 ior fwdrfp8 (8) trip|6 ior fwdrfp4 (8) off|6 imf f44 (8) 0.5|6 ior hplcl8 (8) on|6

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM, Scenario ILT-N-3

Page 19 of 24

Rev 10 (02/02)

irf hp8vbkr (8) tripped[6

Event Trigger 9 acknowledges stator cooling water trouble alarm trgset 9 "0" irf t22 (9) acknowledge

Event Trigger 10 lineup CRD crosstie. trgset 10 "0" irf rdxtieu3 (10) true

Event Trigger 11 lineup makeup to SBLC Boron tank. trgset 11 "0" irf scmumntk (11) true

Event Trigger 12 lineup makeup to SBLC Boron tank. trgset 12 "0" irf s45 (12) false

END

Date: TODAY		Unit 2 Turnov	er
ECCS Status: All			
Online formation 715 MV::= [EPU] Online Fisk: Green (CDF: 1.00	MODE 1	Shutdown Information Time to Boil: N/A
Risk Equipment:	CDF: 1.00		Shutdown Risk: N/A Protected Path: N/A
Unit 2 Priorities		S	Station Priorities
Continue Shutdown	•	_	
LCORAs LCORA # None Title			Start Clock Ends
Shift 1 Activities (X = Com		2 Activities ntinue Unit Shutdown	Shift 3 Activities
Shift 1 Activities (X = Com	npleted) Shift	Common Unit Activiti 2 Activities	es Shift 3 Activities
Common Unit Procedure None	es / Surveillances in	n Progress	
Unit 2 Conditions, Statu	s Abnormalities		
2 hr agc 0500	IRM 16 OOS due to		MD waiting for replacement power supcy to
6 hr agc 5650	arrive from Quad C 2B EHC pump OOS shift.		its pressure compensator. Expected BIS next
Compensatory Actions,	Extra Checks		

Equipment OOS		Service Unit S	tatus		
2 hr ago 990045654	IRM 16	ays ago	2A Cond Demin	Cut In	
6 hr. ago 990045652	2B EHC Pump	Tays ago	2B Cond Demin	Cut In	
		days ago	2C Cond Demin	Cut In	
		Litays ago	2D Cond Demin	Cut In	
		days ago	2E Cond Demin	Cut In	
		E tays ago	2F Cond Demin	Cut In	
		L tays ago	2G Cond Demin	Cut Out	
		t 15 days ago	2A RWCU	Cut In	
		140 days ago	2B RWCU	Cut Out	
		🗄 days ago	2C RWCU	Cut Out	
		⁻÷ days ago	U2 FPC Demin	Cut In	
Unit 2 Abnormal Comp	onent Position				
	· -····				
·					
U2 Open Operability De	eterminations with Compen	satory ±ctions			
	······				

Events and Misc. Information

Plant shut down in progress per DGP 02-01. Ready to take cf IB Condensate/Booster Pump. Hydrogen addition already isolated to 2B Condensate/Booster Pump. QNE directed shutting down per station procedures using reverse sequence. No REMA is required.

DW samples:

 Iodine 131
 2.5 X 10⁻¹³

 Beta/Gamma
 1.5 X 10⁻¹¹

Page 22 of 1≠

Author for Val dation

Date: TOD-Y	Unit 3 Turnover
ECCS Status: All available	
Online Information	Shutd: an Information
N/A MWe [EPU]	MODE 4 Time to Boil: 24 hrs.
Online Risk: N/A	Shutzown Risk: Green
Risk Equipment: N/A	Protected Path: None
Unit 3 Priorities	Station Priorities
Maintain operation per BPO	
LCORAs	
LCORA # None	Start
Title	Clock Ends
	Common Unit Activities
Shift 1 Activities (X = Completed)	Shift 2 Activities Shift 3 Activities
Common Unit Procedures / Surve None	illances in Progress
Unit 3 Conditions, Status, Abnorn DGP 01-S1. Start-up Checklist, in pr	
Compensatory Actions, Extra Che	nke
None	
	•

.

Service Unit Status

5 days ago	3A Cond Demin	Cut In
8 days ago	3B Cond Demin	Cut In
10 days ago	3C Cond Demin	Cut In
5 days ago	3D Cond Demin	Cut Out
3 days ago	3E Cond Demin	Cut Out
15 days ago	3F Cond Demin	Cut Out
3 days ago 👘	3G Cond Demin	Cut Out
- 750 days ago	3A RWCU	Cut In
390 days ago	3B RWCU	Cut Out
60 days ago	3C RWCU	Cut Out
444 days ago	U3 FPC Demin	Cut In

Unit 3 Abnormal Component Position

None

U3 Open Operability Determ rations with Compensatory Actions None

- ----

Events and Misc. Information

DGP 01-S1, Start-up Checklis:
progress

Dresden Generating Station

SIMULATOR EXERCISE GUIDE

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM

SCENARIO

ILT-N-5

Rev. 00

02/02

DEVELOPED BY:

Exam Author

3 28/02

Date

ð Facility Representative Date ų,

APPROVED BY:

Appendi	ppendix D			Scenario Outline For	Form ES-2-1		
Facility	Dresden		Sce	enar : `.o: <u>ILT-N-5</u> Op-Test No:	ILT O'-		
Examin	ers:			Operators:			
Pump C	OS; Unit 3 is ir	n Meia	e 4.	reactor power; IRM channel 16 out of service; 2B	EHC		
				Υ			
Event No.	Malf. No.	1	Event Type*	Event Description			
1	N/A	N	ANSO SRO	rotating idle SDC pumps			
2	N/A	R	NSO SRO	lower reactor power by reducing recirculation flow			
3	MGGH2CON	1	ANSO SRO	ma - generator hydrogen temperature controller output fails ow			
4	ICTUBLK	с	ANSO SRO	isolation condenser tube leak			
5	N/A	с	NSO SRO	CRE pump failure			
6	RRMAFDBK	1	NSO SRO	rec roulation pump controller speed signal failure			
7	CIGP1I		ALL	spurpus group 1 actuation and reactor scram			
8	RDHLVFPA RDHLVFPB RDHLDEGA RDHLDEGB	М	ALL	SD. partial hydraulic lock (ATWS)			
9 (N)orm	SCRLFVAD SCRLFVBD		NSO SRO	SBCC pump relief valves fail open			

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (Fostrument, (Component, (M)ajor

Dresden Generating Station

NRC ILT ERAM

Scenario _--N-5

Scenario Objective

Evaluate the operators in using the Failure to Scram DEOF contingency procedure.

Scenario Summary

Initial Conditions

- ~78% pov.er
- IRM channel 16 out of service
- 2B EHC Pump OOS
- Load drop in progress per DGP 03-01, Routine Power Changes
- Unit 3 is in 110de 4.

Events:

- Rotating idle SDC pumps
- Load drop with recirculation flow
- Main generator hydrogen temperature controller failure
- Isolation condenser tube leak
- CRD pump failure
- Recirculation pump controller speed signal failure
- ATWS with Spurious Group 1 Isolation

Scenario Sequence

- The crew assumes the shift with reactor power at about 73% and a power reduction in progress to conduct a drywell entry for leakage inspections.
- The ANSO, as directed by the SRO, performs DOP 1001-06, Rotating Idle SDC Pumps.
- The NSO then lowers reactor power by reducing recirculation flow following direction by the SRO.
- Alarms are then received due to high main generator hystogen temperature resulting from a failed controller. Hydrogen temperature is restored after the controller is paced in manual and adjusted by the ANSO.
- Alarms are then received due to an isolation condenser table leak. The isolation condenser is manually isolated by the ANSO. The SRO addresses the technical specification requirements for the inoperable isolation condenser.
- A field report is received that the 2B CRD pump is failing the to rapid oil loss from a leak. The NSO shutdowns the 2B CRD pump and starts the 2A CRD pump.
- During the power reduction, the speed control signal fails the for recirculation pump 2A and the pump flow increase is stopped when the NSO locks out the scoop table.
- During IMD work on main steam line flow transmitters, a sourious group 1 isolation and a reactor scram occurs. A hydraulic lock of the scram discharge volume results in cartial inward rod motion and an ATWS. When boron injection is initiated, the SBLC pumps do not inject boron into the reactor due to the pump relief valves failing open. The crew then initiates actions for alternate SBLC in ection. The scenario terminates after manual driving in of control rods is in progress and a scram/reset has been successfully initiated.

Event One - Rotating Idle SDC Pumps

The crew performs DOP 1000-06. Rotating Idle SDC Pumps

Malfunctions required: 0

Success Path

• Performs ECP 1000-06, Rotating Idle SDC Pumps.

Event Two - Lead Drop with Recirculation Flow

The crew lowers reactor power by reducing recirculation flow.

Malfunctions required: 0

Success Path:

Load dropped per procedures.

Event Three – Main Generator Hydrogen Temperature Controller Failure

The crew recognizes and responds to a high main generator hydrogen temperature resulting from a failed controller.

Malfunctions required: 1 (failure of auto mode of main generator hydrogen temperature controller)

Success Path:

Takes manual control of main generator hydrogen temperature controller.

Event Four - Isolation Condenser Tube Leak

The crew recognizes and responds to isolation condenser high temperatures / radiation levels.

Malfunctions required: 1 (isolation condenser tube leak)

Success Path:

Isolates the Isolation Condenser.

Event Five – CRD Pump Failure

The crew recognizes and responds to a field report that the 2B CRD pump is failing due to rapid oil loss from a leak.

Malfunctions required: 0

Success Path:

• Swaps CRD cumps.

Event Six – Recirculation Pump Controller Speed Signal Failure

The crew recognizes and responds to a recirculation pump sched control signal taking low for recirculation pump 2A.

Malfunctions required: 1 (Loss of recirculation pump speed feetback signal)

Success Path:

Locks out the scoop tube

Events Seven, Eight and Nine – ATWS with Spurious Group 1 Isolation

The crew recognizes and responds to a spurious Group 1 Isolation with an ATVLS condition. The event is complicated by failure of the SBLC system.

Malfunctions required: 3 (Spurious Group 1) (SDV hydraulic lock) (SBLC relief valve failure)

Success Path:

- Control rod insertion in progress.
- Plant stabilized.

Scenario Recapitulation

Total Malfunctions:	6	
Abnormal Events:	4	
Major Transients:	1	(ATWS)
EOPs Entered:	2	(/(1110)
EOP Contingencies:	1	(level and power contro
0	•	(iever and power contro

Appendix D

[

Operator Actions

=:--=

Op-Test N	0 LT01-1	Scenaria No. ILT-N-5 Event No. 1	Page 1 of 1
Event Des	Event Description: The ANSO, as treated by the SRO, performs DOP 1000-11 Rotating Idle SDC Pumps.		
Time	Position	Applica : Actions or Behavior	
	SRO	Directs 41,50 to perform DOP 1000-06, Rotating Ic :	E SOC Pumps.
	ANSO	 Performs the following actions per DOP 1000-06, Roman Striffies the following valves closed: MO 2-1001-2A, B & C. MO 2-1001-4A, B & C. aces each SDC pump control switch to static aces each pump control switch to stop. aces each pump control switch to stop. aces each pump confirm rotation for each 	- ∋nd then within 3 sec
	NSU	Monitors canels and assists as directed. <u>ROLE PLAY</u> : NLO to confirm SDC pump rotation: Report "the (requested pump) rotated". <u>Event 1 Completion Criteria</u> :	
		 DOP 1000-06 completed. OR, at the direction of the NRC chief examiner. 	

Operator Actions

	Op-Test No. <u>ILT 01-1</u> Scenaric No.: <u>ILT-N-5</u> Event No.: <u>2</u> Page <u>1</u> of <u>1</u> Event Description: The NSO lowers reactor power by reducing recirculation flow following direction by			
	the S	SRO.		
Time	Position	Applicants Actions or Behavior		
	NSO	Performs the following actions per DGP 03-01, Routine Power Changes, and DOP 0202-03, Reactor Recirculation Flow Control System Operation:		
	SRO	Directs reducing reactor power per DGP 03-01, Routine Power Changes, and DOP 0202-03, Reactor Recirculation Flow Control System Operation, by lowering recirculation pump speed.		
	ANSO	Monitors canels and assists as directed.		
		Event 2 Completion Criteria: - Sufficient power reduction. - OR, at the direction of the NRC chief examiner.		

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM, Scenario ILT-'--5 Page 7 of 25

11 •

1

Op-Test	No: <u>ILT 01-1</u>	Scenario No. <u>ILT-N-5</u> Event No. <u>3</u> Fage <u>1</u> of <u>1</u>
Event De	res	rms are then received due to high main generator hydrogen tercerature ulting from a failed controller. Hydrogen temperature is restored after the troller is placed in manual and adjusted by the ANSO.
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
		SIMULATOR OPERATOR:
		At the discretion of the NRC chief examiner, activate trigger 1, which fails the main generator hydrogen temperature controller output.
		Verify trigger 3 automatically activates when the main generator hydrogen temperature controller is placed to MAN.
	ANSO	 Performs the following actions per DAN 902-7 E-11, H2 Sea Dil & Alterrex Pnl Trouble and DAN 2252-7 A-8,. Directs NLO to local panel 2252-7 to determine alarm received. Diagnosis that the main generator hydrogen cooler temperature controller auto mode has failed and places in MAN mode and restores temperature to normal band.
		SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:
		NLO to panel 2252-7 (wait 2 min):
		Activate trigger 4 then Report "the alarm is A-8, Machine Gas Temperature High, and I have acknowledged it".
		NLO to check hydrogen cooler TCV operation: (wait 1 min)
		Report "the hydrogen cooler TCV appears to be operating normally".
	SRO	Directs ANSO to take manual control of the main generator hydrogen temperature controller.
		Notifies Shift Manager and IMD of controller problem.
		ROLE PLAY:
		Respond as individual notified.
	NSO	Monitors panels and assists as directed.
		Event 3 Completion Criteria: - Takes Manual control of the main generator hydrogen terroerature controller.
		 OR, at the direction of the NRC chief examiner.

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM, Scenario ILT-N-5 Page 8 of 25

ġ

Operator Action

Op-Test	No: <u>ILT 01-1</u>	Scenario No <u>ILT-N-5</u> Event No. 4 Page 1 of 1
Event De	con	ms are received due to an isolation and tensor tube leak. The isolation denser is manually isolated by the Property of the SRO addresses the technical cification requirements for the inoperatie isolation condenser.
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
		SIMULATOR OPERATOR: At the discretion of the NRC chief examiner, activate trigger 5 which inserts an Isolation Condenser tube lease 1 5%).
	ANSO	Performs the following actions per CAN 902-3 C-4, Isol Condr Temp Hi, and / or DOA 1300-01, Isolation Conderser Tube Leak: May try to reseat the MC CH 301-3 valve: Closes MO 2-1301-2 Closes MO 2-1301-3 Closes MO 2-1301-3
		 Opens MO 2-1301-4 Opens AO 2-1301-1⁻¹ 20 Checks indication that eak has stopped Isolates the Isolation Contenser by closing: MO 2-1301-1 MO 2-1301-2 MO 2-1301-3 MO 2-1301-4 AO 2-1301-17 & 20 MO 2-1301-10 MO 2-4399-74
	SRO	 Enters DOA 1300-01, Isolation Concenser Tube Leak, and directs: May try reseating the MC 1-1301-3 Isolating the Isolation Concenser. Radiation Protection to survey below the IC vent. Security to limit access below IC vent. Chemistry Department to sample IC shell side for activity. Declares IC inoperable.
		 ITS 3.5.3.A.1; verifies HPC system operable immediately. ITS 3.5.3.A.2; restore IC system to OPERABLE within 14 days
	NSO	Notifies Shift Manager and MMD : C tube leak. Monitors panels and assists as d ented. ROLE PLAY: Respond as departments contacte: Respond as departments contacte: Event 4 Completion Criteria: - Isolation Condenser isolated. Notifies Shift Manager and MMD : C tube leak. Security report after to mit isolated. Security
		 Event 4 Completion Griteria: Isolation Condenser isolated. Technical Specifications referenced. OR, at the direction of the NFC chief examiner.

Author for Val Lation

Operator Actions

Op-Test M	No: <u>ILT : - 1</u>	Scenario No. <u>ILT-N-5</u> Elent No.: <u>5</u> Page 1 of 1			
Event Des	Event Description A field report is received that the 2B CRD pump is failing due to rapid oil loss from a eak. The NSO shutdowns the 2B CRD pump and starts the 2A CRD pump.				
Time	Posit : -	Applicant's Actions or Behavior			
		ROLE PLAY:			
		At the discretion of the NRC chief examiner, report as NLO that "the 2B CRD pump is rapidly losing oil from the pump outboard bearing".			
	NSO	Performs the following actions per DC = 0300-01, Control Rod Drive System Startup and Operation:			
		 May direct the NLO to perform the encoder of the procedure. Verifies 2A CRD pump discharge valve MO 2-0301-2A open. Starts 2A CRD pump. Stops 2B CRD pump 			
		 Verifies charging water pressure between 1450 to 1500 psig. Directs NLO to perform post-startup checks per the procedure. 			
		ROLE PLAY: NLO to perform 2A CRD pump pre-sta ::up checks (wait 3 min):			
		Report "I have completed the pre-startup checks for 2A CRD pump".			
		NLO to perform 2A CRD pump post-startup checks (wait 3 min):			
		Report "I have completed the post-startup checks for 2A CRD pump".			
	SRO	Directs NSO to swap CRD pumps per DOP 0300-01, Control Rod Drive System Startup and Operation;			
	()	OR, directs NSO to immediately swap CRD pumps per DOA 0300-01, Control Rod Drive System Failure.			
		Notifies Shift Manager and MMD of CRD pump problem.			
	ANSO	Monitors panels and assists as directed			
		Event 5 Completion Criteria: - CRD pumps swapped. - OR, at the direction of the NRC chief examiner.			

Author for Validation

Operator Actions

Op-Test N	lo <u>ILT</u>	Scenario No.: <u>ILT-N-5</u> Event No.: <u>6</u> Page <u>1</u> of <u>2</u>
Event Des	scription The	speed control signal fails low for recirculation pump 2A and the pump flow ease is stopped when the NSO locks out the scoop tube.
Time	Posit : -	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	NSC	SIMULATOR OPERATOR: At the discretion of the NRC chief examiner, activate trigger 6, which fails the 2A Recirculation Pump speed feedback signal. Performs the following actions per DAN 902-4 E-6, 2A/B Recirc PPs Speed Mismatch, and DOA 0202-03, Reactor Recirculation System Flow Control
		 Failure: Places the 2A M-G Set Scoop Tube Power Lockout Reset Switch in the Lockout position. Verifies Core thermal power <2927 MWth. Completes actions of 2A Recirc M-G Lockout in DOP 0202-12, Recirculation Pump Motor Generator Set Scoop Tube Operation. Places both recirc pump speed control transfer stations to manual. Runs 2A Recirc M-G Set speed demand to minimum. Places caution card on its Lockout Reset switch. Coordinates with licensed operator at the 2A Recirc M-G Set Scoop Tube to lower its speed to match 2B Recirc M-G Set per DOP 0202-12, Recirculation Pump Motor Generator Set Scoop Tube Operation.
		SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY: Licensed Operator to lower 2A Recirc M-G Set speed locally (wait 3 min) Report "I am ready to begin lowering 2A Recirc M-G Set speed". When directed to lower the speed, toggle trigger 7 active and then inactive about every 10 seconds to "bump" the speed down until the NSO directs stopping the speed drop.
	SRC	 Enters and directs performance of DOA 0202-03, Reactor Recirculation System Flow Control Failure. Enters and directs performance of DGA 7, Unpredicted Reactivity Addition. Contacts QNE. May request NLO to take local speed readings Directs NSO to coordinate with a licensed operator at the 2A Recirc M-G Set Scoop Tube to lower its speed to match 2B Recirc M-G Set. Notifies Shift Manager and IMD of controller problem.
	ANSO	Begins working through the steps of DGA 7, Unpredicted Reactivity Addition, but will not have time to complete the required actions.

Operator Actions

Op-Test N	o: <u>ILT 01-1</u>	Scenario No. <u>ILT-N-5</u> Event tot 6 Event 2 of 2			
Event Des	Event Description: The speed control signal fails low for recirculation sump 2A and the sump flow increase is stopped when the NSO locks out the spoop tube.				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior			
		ROLE PLAY:			
		NLO to obtain local speed of the 2A Recirc MG Set: (Wait 5 ~ - for initial reading, 1 min for subsequent)			
		Take variable RRNMGGEN(1) times 1150 RPM and report the result as the 2A Recirc MG Set speed.			
		NLO to obtain local speed of the 2B Recirc MG Set. (Wait 1 m			
		Take variable RRNMGGEN(2) times 1150 RPM and report the result as the 2B Recirc MG Set speed.			
		Event 6 Completion Criteria: - Efforts in progress to lower 2A Recirc M-G Set speed. - OR, at the direction of the NRC chief examiner.			

:

1997 - 1997 - 19

Constant and an and an a

- 1

	No: $ILT 01-1$	
	610	purious group 1 isolation and a reactor scram occurs. A partial hyperaulic lock of scram discharge volume results in an ATWS. The SBLC system fails due pump of valves failing open. The crew initiates alternate SBLC injection
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	NSO	SIMULATOR OPERATOR: At the discretion of the NRC chief examiner, activate trigger 8, which inserts a spurious Group 1 Isolation and SBLC relief valve setpoint drift
		 Performs the following actions per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram Presses scram pushbuttons Places mode switch in shutdown Checks roots inserted; discovers ATWS condition Initiates ARI Verifies record pump speed at minimum.
	SRO	Enters DEOP 0100 RPV Control. When receives report that AT.'.'S condition exists, exits DEOP 100 and enters DEOP 400-5, Failure to Scra⊤, and directs the following:

Author for Validation

. . . 1

.

Form ES-D-2

Co-Test N	lo. <u>ILT 01-1</u>	Scenario No <u>565</u> Event No. <u>7,8&9</u> Page <u>2</u> of <u>4</u>
Elient Des	the s	urious group 1 isolat to and a reactor scram occurs. A partial hydraulic lock of f scram discharge volume results in an ATWS. The SBLC system fails due pump f valves failing open free crew initiates alternate SBLC injection.
T ~~e	Position	Applicant's Actions : Behavior
	NSO / ANSO	 Performs DEOP 4000 Failure to Scram, actions as directed: ↓ Places ADS to inhibit Places both DS pumps in PTL Power Leg Trips recirce ation pumps ↓ Performs Alternate Rod Insertion. (see below for specific actions) Initiates both Direction. Reports SBLC has failed to inject. Level Leg ↓ Terminates and Prevents injection except boron and CRD until RPV/L is ≤ -00000000000000000000000000000000000
	NSO	 ✓ Performs manual control rod insertion per DEOP 500-05, Alternate Insertion of Control Pids, as directed: Bypasses tree RWM Starts the second GRD pump Maximizes crive water pressure using one or more of the methods in DEOP 500-05 Inserts rods using RONOR in EMERG IN or the normal rod movement control switch
	NSO	 ✓ Performs repeated scram/resets per DEOP 500-05, Alternate Insertion of Control Rods, as directed: Depresses to se pushbuttons for SDV vent and drain valves If RPV/L <-5∃ inches, directs pulling ARI fuses. Attempts to reset scram Directs scram jumpers installed. Resets the scram Verifies all scram valves closed Opens the SDV vent and drains When 902-€ D-1 clears, scrams reactor Repeats as recessary

Author -: r Validation

2 :- Test No: <u>ILT 01-1</u>

Scenario No. ILT-N-5

Event No. 7.8 & 9 Page 3 of 4

Ellent Description: A spurious group 1 isolation and a reactor scram occurs. A partial hydraulic lock of the scram discharge volume results in an ATWS. The SBLC system fails due cump relief valves failing open. The crew.initiates alternate SBLC injection.

ne	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
		SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:	
		Operator to pull ARI fuses (wait 5 min):	
		Verify trigger 10 activated and report "the ARI fuses are pulled".	
		Operator to install scram jumpers (wait 5 min):	
		Verify trigger 11 activated and report "the scram jumpers are installed".	
	SRO	Based on failure of SBLC to inject, directs performance of DECP 0500-01, Alternate Standby Liquid Control Injection.	
	SRO	 Enters DEOP 200-1, Primary Containment Control, when PC/P reaches 2 psig and performs/directs: May direct starting Drywell Coolers per DEOP 0500-02. Initiation of torus sprays before PC/P of 9 psig When PC/P is above 9 psig or before DW/T reaches 281°F: (may not reach these levels) 	
		 Verification of DSIL Tripping of recirc pumps Tripping of DW coolers Initiation of DW sprays Initiation of torus cooling Verifies initiation of drywell and torus H₂/O₂ monitors 	
	ANSO	 Performs DEOP 200-1, Primary Containment Control, actions as directed: May start Drywell Coolers after jumpers installed per DEOP 0500-02. May initiate torus sprays and drywell sprays per Hard Card LPCI/CCSW OPERATION, as directed Initiates torus cooling per Hard Card LPCI/CCSW OPERATION as directed Verifies initiation of drywell and torus H₂/O₂ monitors 	
		SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY: Operator to install jumpers to defeat DW Cooler trips (wait 5 min):	
		Verify trigger 12 activated and report "the DW Cooler trip jumpers are installed".	
			nove start = event; for com

Form ES-D-2

Op-Test N	o: <u>ILT 01-1</u>	Scenario No.: ILT-N-5 Event No. 7, 8 & 9 Page 4 of 4
Event Des	the :	ourious group 1 isolation and a reactor scram occurs. A partial hydraulic lock of scram discharge volume results in an ATWS. The SBLC system fails due pump if valves failing open. The crew initiates alternate SBLC injection.
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Betavior
		SIMULATOR OPERATOR:
		After the crew has reset the scram and at the discretion of the NRC chief examiner, RUN CAEP File ClrHydLk.cae which will remove the SDV hydraulic lock.
	SRO	 Based on report that all roots are inserted, exits DEOP 400-05, Failure to Scram, and enters DEOP 10, RPV Control and directs: Securing Boron injection if any was started. Restoring RPV level to +8 to +48 inches. Develop a cooldown strategy (i.e.; reoden MSIVs and/or restart RWCU)
	NSO	Reports that all rods inserted and performs the following as directed: Restores level to -E to +48 inches.
		 Critical Tasks: (identified by √ in guide) With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, <i>TAKE</i> ACTION TO REDUCE POWER by injecting boron and/or inserting control rods, to prevent exceeding the crimary containment design limits. With a reactor scram required, reactor not shutdown, and conditions for ADS blowdown are met, <i>INHIBIT ADS</i> to prevent an uncontrolled RPV depressurization, to prevent causing a significant power excursion. During an ATWS with conditions met to perform power/level control <i>TERMINATE AND PREVENT INJECTION</i>, with exception of boron and CRD, into the PPV until conditions are met to re-establish injection. When conditions are met to re-establish injection use available injection systems to <i>MAINTAIN</i> RPV water level above -164".
		Scenario Completion Criteria: Image: Control rods inserted. Image: RPV level and pressure stabilized. Image: OR, at the direction of the NRC chief examiner.

REFERENCES

PROCEDURE	TITLE	REVISION
DAN 902-3 C-4	Isol Contri Temp Hi	12
DAN 902-4 E-6	2A/B Ret to PPs Speed Mismatch	13
DAN 902-7 E-11	H2 Sea I & Alterrex Pni Trouble	05
DAN 2252-7 A-8	Machine Gas Temperature High	
DOP 0202-03	Reactor Pedirculation Flow Control System Operation	20
DOP 0202-12	Recirculation Pump Motor Generator Set Scoop Tube Collection	20
DOP 1000-06	Rotating the SDC Pumps	03
DOP 0300-01	Control Find Drive System Startup and Operation	32
DOA 0202-03	Reactor Pecirculation System Flow Control Failure	05
DOA 0300-01	Control Fod Drive System Failure	18
DOA 1300-01	Isolation Condenser Tube Leak	15
DGP 02-03	Reactor Scram	54
DGP 03-01	Routine Power Changes	40
DGA 7	Unpredicted Reactivity Addition	14
DEOP 0100-00	RPV Control	09
DEOP 0200-01	Primary Containment Control	09
DEOP 0400-05	Failure to Soram	12
DEOP 0500-01	Alternate Standby Liquid Control Injection	09
DEOP 0500-02	Bypassing interlocks and Isolations	10
DEOP 0500-05	Alternate -sertion of Control Rods	12

-

PRE-SCENARIO ACTIVITIES

1. If applicable, conduct pre-scenario activities in accordance with TQ-AA-106-0107. SIMULATOR EXAMINATION BRIFFING

CLA OF 20-

E-215 %

1 1 2 2 3

State States States

700 Maie

- a. Provide the crew with a copy of Control Room work request list
- b. Provide the crew with a copy of DGP 03-01, Routine Power Ch down the second reactor feed pump.
- Provide the crew with a copy of DOP 1000-06, Rotating Idle SI C.
- d. Provide the crew with a shutdown plan.
- . _ _ Provide the crew with a copy of the REMA.
 - Inform the crew that (select an individual) is the QNE present in f.
- Direct the crew to perform their briefs prior to entering the simu α.
- 2. Simulator Setup (the following steps can be done in any logical ord
 - a. Initialize simulator in IC 12 and reduce recirc pump speed to 82%. (below exclusion range) b. Run the initial setup caep file: ilt-n-5.cae 5 Set Stator (colling Water PCV to 28.0

 - c. Establish the following simulator conditions:
 - 1) Master Recirc Flow controller at ~62%
 - 2) MWe at ~710
 - 3) Condensate Demin dP between 20 and 45 psid [EPU]
 - 4) Condensate pump amps between 160 and 255 amps [E
 - d. Secure the following equipment and tag out of service:
 - 1) Place IRM 16 902-5 panel joystick in bypass and place
 - 2) Place 2B EHC Pump control switch in PTL and hang an OOS card on it.
 - e. Advance the chart recorders.
 - Add variables RRNMGGEN(1) and RRNMGGEN(2) to a Monitor screen f.
 - Mark up rod sequence as completed through step 130. g.
 - -Place the REMA sheet in the appropriate book.----÷
 - Complete the Simulator Setup Checklist. i.

1.1.1.1.1.1.1

ILT 01-1 NRC EXAM SCENARIO ILT-N-5 Initial Setup CAEP:

≓ ilt-n-5.cae
Setup for ilt-n-5
#Written by JAS
#Rev 00
#Date 12/01

INITIAL CONDITIONS

Inserts SDV hydraulic lock. mf rdhlvfpa 89.0 mf rdhlvfpb 89.0 mf rdhldega 89.0 mf rdhldegb 89.0 # overrides 902-3 G-13 off. mf ser0240 off # overrides IC rad mon downscale alarm off imf ser0004 off imf ser0019 off # overrides SDC pump pressure meters to 25 psig and isolates the suction pressure tric switch. ior sdgppad 25.0|8 ior sdgppbd 25.0|8 0 ior sdgppcd 25.0|8 irf sd1044OA closedI8 irf sd1044OB closedl8 irf sd1044OC closed|8

#SETUP EVENT TRIGGERS

Event Trigger 2 Inserts main generator hydrogen temperature controller output fails low trgset 2 "0"|2 ior mgdh2cmn (2) man|2 ior mgth2man (2) 0.0|2

Event Trigger 3 When main generator hydrogen temperature controller is not in AUTO or BAL, removes MAN override. trgset 3 ".not. (mgdh2cau .or. mgdh2cbl) .and. mgdh2cmn"|2 trg 3 "dor mgth2man"|2

Event Trigger 4 acknowledges the alterrex panel trouble alarm trgset 4 "0"|2 inf t81 (4) true|2

Event Trigger 5 inserts an Isolation Condenser tube leak (0.5%). trgset 5 "0"|2 imf ictublk (5) 0.5|2

Event Trigger 6 inserts 2A recirculation pump controller speed feedback signal failure trgset 6 "0"|4 mf rrmafdbk (6)|4

Event Trigger 7 lowers 2A recirculation M-G Set speed at scoop tube. trgset 7 "0"|4 trg 7 "irf rrrascdc decrease"|4

Page 19 of 25

Event Trigger 8 inserts spurious group 1 actuation and teactor scram and SBLC pump relief valves fail open Inserts full SDV hydraulic lock after 2 min trgset 8 "0"|4 imf cigp1i (8)|4 imf scrlfvad (8) 200.0|4 imf scrlfvbd (8) 200.0|4 imf rdfhylk (8 02:00)|4

Event Trigger 9 installs MSL Group 1 RPV level bypass and Offgas High Radiation bypass jumpers. trgset 9 "0"|6 irf ci59jp (9) in|6 irf ogogjp (9) in|6

Event Trigger 10 pulls ARI fuses trgset 10 "0"|6 irf aw4 (10) pulled|6

Event Trigger 11 installs scram jumpers trgset 11 "0"|6 irf rpjumpas (11) on|6

Event Trigger 12 installs DW cooler jumpers trgset 12 "0"|8 irf cidw28jp (12) in|8 irf cidw29jp (12) in|8

Event Trigger 16 ramps 2A SDC PP Pressure up trgset 16 "sddpastr(1)"|10 trg 16 "ior sdgppad 100.0 00:02"|10

Event Trigger 17 ramps 2A SDC PP Pressure down trgset 17 "sddpastp(1)"|10 trg 17 "ior sdgppad 25.0 00:02"|10

Event Trigger 18 ramps 2B SDC PP Pressure up trgset 18 "sddpastr(2)"|10 trg 18 "ior sdgppbd 100.0 00:02"|10

Event Trigger 19 ramps 2B SDC PP Pressure down trgset 19 "sddpastp(2)"|10 trg 19 "ior sdgppbd 25.0 00:02"|10

Event Trigger 20 ramps 2C SDC PP Pressure up trgset 20 "sddpastr(3)"|10 trg 20 "ior sdgppcd 100.0 00:02"|10

Event Trigger 21 ramps 2C SDC PP Pressure down trgset 21 "sddpastp(3)"|10 trg 21 "ior sdgppcd 25.0 00:02"|10

END

.

Clears Hydraul : Lock

dmf rdfhylk imf rdhlvfpa 0.000 imf rdhlvfpb 0.000 imf rdhldega 0.000 imf rdhldegb 0.000

END

Date: TODAY	<u> </u>	Unit 2 Turno	ver
ECCS Status: All	· · ·		
Online Information 710 MWe Online Risk: Green 33 Risk Equipment:	DF: 1.00	MODE 1	Shutdown Information Time to Boil: N/A Shutdown Risk: N/A Protected Path: N/A
Unit 2 Priorities			Station Priorities
Continue Unit Shutdow-			
LCORAs LCORA # None Title			Start Clock Ends
Shift 1 Activities (X = Carrai	Per	2 Activities form DOP 1000-06	Shift 3 Activities
	Cor	ntinue Power Reducti	ion
		Common Unit Activ	rities
Shift 1 Activities (X = Co-o)	eted) Shift 2	2 Activities	Shift 3 Activities
Common Unit Procedures	; / Surveillances_in	Progress	
None			
6 hr ago 5650	IRM 16 OOS due to arrive from Quad C	ities Station.	e. IMD waiting for replacement power supply to ith its pressure compensator. Expected BIS next
Compensatory Actions E	xtra Checks		•

.

Equipment OOS		Service Unit Status		
2 hr ago 990045654	IRM 16	9 days a <u>s</u> t	2A Cont Demin	Cut In
6 hr. ago 990045652	2B EHC Pump	7 days age	2B Cont Demin	Cut In
		16 days ∋go	20 Cont Demin	Cut In
C		2 days age	2D Cont Demin	Cut In
		11 days ago	2E Cont Demin	Cut In
		6 days ago	2F Cont Demin	Cut In
		 2 days ago 	2G Corit Demin	Cut Out
		376 days ∋go	2A RWCL	Cut In
		240 days ∋go	2B RWCL	Cut Out
		20 days ago	2C RWCL	Cut Out
		76 days ago	U2 FPC I emin	Cut In

U2 Open Operability Determinations with Compensatory Actions

Events and Misc. Information

Power reduction in progress per DGP 03-01, Routine Power Changes.

مشروب الأباب

The QNE directed reducing power per station procedures using reverse control rod sequence. No REMA is required. A Drywell entry is required to perform a leak inspection. Drywell deinerting will be performed next shift. DOP 1000-06, Rotating Idle SDC Pumps, step G.1, Bumping the Motor should be performed next. Step G.3 of DOP 1000-06, Clearing Low Suction Pressure Trip Signal, was performed the previous shift. Then continue the shutdown.

DW samples:

Iodine 131	2.5 X 10 ⁻¹³
Beta/Gamma	1.5 X 10 ⁻¹¹

		and a second
Date: TODAY	Unit 3 Turno	ver
ECCS Status: All available		
Online Information N/A MWe Online Risk: N/A Risk Equipment: N/A	MODE 4	Shutdown Information Time to Boil: 24 hrs. Shutdown Risk: Green Protected Path: None
Unit 3 Priorities		Station Priorities
Complete startup checklists		
LCORAs LCORA # None Title		Start Clock Ends
Shift 1 Activities (X = Completed	Shift 2 Activities	Shift 3 Activities
Shift 1 Activities (X = Completed	Common Unit Activi	ties Shift 3 Activities
Common Unit Procedures / Surveilla None	ances in Progress	
Unit 3 Conditions, Status, Abnormal DGP 01-S1, Start-up Checklist. n prog		
Compensatory Actions, Extra Check None	S	•

Equipment OOS	Service Unit Status			
None	5 days ago	3A Cond Demin	Cut In	
	8 days ago	3B Cond Demin	Cut In	
	10 days ago	3C Cond Demin	Cut In	
	5 days ago	3D Cond Demin	Cut Out	
	3 days ago	3E Cond Demin	Cut Out	
	15 days ago	3F Cond Demin	Cut Out	
	- 3 days ago	3G Cond Demin	Cut Out	
	750 days ago	3A RWCU	Cut In	
	390 days ago	3B RWCU	Cut Out	
	60 days ago	3C RWCU	Cut Out	
	444 days ago	U3 FPC Demin	Cut In	
and the second	· · · · · ·	· · ·		
Unit 3 Abnormal Component Position				
None				
U3 Open Operability Determinations with Con	npensatory Actions			
None				

رد <u>ن</u>

Ât a.

:

į

Events and Misc. Information

DGP 01-S1, Start-up Checklist, in progress

.

i