# Industry Views on Fire Protection SDP Changes

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## **Topics**

- Goals for meeting
- Industry position
- Previous industry comments
- Recommended actions

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## **Goals for Meeting**

- Staff understanding of industry positions and rationale
- Agreement on pathway for revising SDP
- ✓ Agreement on interim measures

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## **Industry Positions**

- Revise SDP to address industry concerns
- Provide improved bases for determining degradation of DID elements
- Provide clear guidance for interim SDP use



## **Industry Position**

- Need revised SDP:
  - Risk informed
  - Allows use of plant PSA
  - Addresses all DID elements
  - Useful to inspectors and licensees
  - Effectively screens out low significance issues
  - Credits compensatory measures and manual actions
  - Consistent with other SDPs
  - Transparent use



## **Industry Position**

- Improved basis for determining degradation of DID elements
  - Current guidelines in IM 0609F-2 are unnecessarily conservative
  - Specific recommendations made in NEI letter of 10/18/01



## **Industry Position**

- Interim safety significance determination needs clear NRC guidance
  - Emphasis on transparent use and clear stafflicensee communication
  - Improve ability to credit non safe shutdown equipment to avoid core damage



## **Previous Industry Comments**

- NEI letter October 18, 2001
  - Unnecessary complexity and subjectivity in fire protection SDP
    - Detailed comments provided
  - Address excessive application of resources to inspections
    - Pursue use of self-assessments to reduce inspection resources



### **Recommended Actions**

- Develop new SDP with stakeholder input
- Revise IM 0609F-2, with stakeholder input
- Develop clear guidance for interim use of current SDP, with stakeholder input
- Agree on concrete steps to pursue increased use of self-assessments

## **Proposed Approach**

 $\Delta CDF = F_{f} * P_{g} * P_{gD} * P_{AE} * P_{DM} * \Delta P_{CCD} (per r.y.)$ 

Fr - frequency of any size fire

 $P_{\rm g} =$  fire size parameter (more realistic location and size)

PED = probability of equipment/cable damage given substantial fire

PAS - probability that automatic suppression won't control the fire

 $P_{\rm BM}$  \_ probability that detection and manual suppression won't control the fire

 $\Delta$   $P_{\rm CCD}$  = change in conditional probability of core damage given fire-induced failure(s)

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## **Proposed Approach**

Prevention Det/Suppr SS Core Damage  $\Delta \ \mathrm{CDF} = \left\{ \mathbf{F}_{\mathrm{f}} \ ^{\bullet} \mathbf{P}_{\mathrm{E}} \right\} \ ^{\bullet} \left\{ \ \mathbf{P}_{\mathrm{BM}} \ ^{\bullet} \mathbf{P}_{\mathrm{AE}} \right\} \ ^{\bullet} \left\{ \mathbf{P}_{\mathrm{ED}} \right\} \ ^{\bullet} \left\{ \ \Delta \ \mathbf{P}_{\mathrm{CCD}} \right\}$ 

DID element

Prevention

Ignition frequency; fire severity; scenario development

Det/Suppr

Degradation ratings; brigade performance evals

Safe Shutdown

Berrier degradation; spurious acts

Core Demare

Credit for remaining mitigation capability; credit for ASSD capability and manual actions

## Pre-screening

- Application of prevention or safe shutdown considerations
  - Screen out if fires are very low probability of if there is no safe shutdown or cable present