

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Spring City, Tennessee 37381-2000

AUG 0 2 2002

10 CFR 50, App E.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of) Docket No. 50-390 Tennessee Valley Authority)

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) - EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE (EPIP) REVISION

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section V, the enclosure provides the EPIPs as listed below.

Deserse (-	
EPIP	Rev	Title	Effective Date
EPIP-1	20	Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart	7-9-2002
EPIP-2	19	Notification Of Unusual Event	7-30-2002
EPIP-3	22	Alert	7-30-2002
EPIP-4	23	Site Area Emergency	7-30-2002
EPIP-5	24	General Emergency	7-30-2002
EPIP-8	17	Personnel Accountability And Evacuation	7-30-2002
EPIP-11	10	Security and Access Control	7-30-2002

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Filing instructions are included with this document.

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2

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There are no regulatory commitments in this letter. If you should have any questions, please contact me at (423) 365-1824.

Sincerely,

P. L. Pace Manager, Licensing and Industry Affairs

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Enclosure cc (Enclosure): NRC Resident Inspector (w/o Enclosure) Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 1260 Nuclear Plant Road Spring City, Tennessee 37381 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2 copies) Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85

FILING INSTRUCTIONS

DOCUMENT NUMBER $\underline{EPIP} - I$ **REMOVE REVISION** 20 **INSERT REVISION** 20Comments Redistribute - All Copies Should be Single Sided on this Procedure Not Duplexed

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTATING PROCEDURES

EPIP-1

EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION FLOWCHART

Revision 20

Unit 0

NON-QUALITY RELATED

PREPARED BY: <u>B. F. McNew</u> (Type Name)

SPONSORING ORGANIZATION: <u>Emergency Planning</u>

APPROVED BY: ____Frank L. Pavlechko

EFFECTIVE DATE:7/9/2002

LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE

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EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION FLOWCHART

REVISION LOG

Revision Number	Implementation Date		<u> </u>	Description of Revision
0	04/13/90	New	WBN-EPIP.	Supersedes IP-1.
1	02/04/91	Revised to separate RCS leak and identified S/G tube leak initiating conditions. Clarified initiating condition in fire. Updated ODS telephone numbers.		
2	11/28/91	Add initiation conditions. Clarify reference to Attachment 1 Definitions. Define Protected Area, Owner Controlled Area, and Vital Areas throughout procedures. Clarify NOUE declaration for Uncontrolled Shutdown.		
3	03/04/92	Change all Technical Specification references to reflect new "Merit" Tech Specs and ODCM references.		
4	02/10/93	of E 1/92 Prei	mergency Ac , endorsed by paredness Fo	d to reflect the new methodology for development tion Levels per: NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 3, y REG GUIDE 1.101 Emergency Planning and r Nuclear Power Reactors Rev. 3, 8/92.
5	09/15/93	EAL	s to meet rev	ent) and formal changes. Text changes made to view comments identified by the NRC.
6	01/01/94	Pro	cedure revise	d to reflect new 10 CFR 20 changes.
7	05/27/94	and	establish site	d to reflect changes to System 90 (Radmonitoring) perimeter monitoring points.
8	01/10/95	pote wind prov	ential for misc d direction. T vide Operator	I, CNTMT, Bypass, Loss (1), revised to eliminate classification. Maps revised to reference north and able 7-2, Alert, Radiation Levels enhanced to s additional information.
9	4/28/98	Revised Revision Log to include page numbers. References added to the document. Fission Product Barrier Matrix revised to reflect information found in the EOP Set Point Verification Document (WBN-OS64-188). Reference to AOI-27 revised to AOI-30.2. Phone numbers to the National Weather Service changed due to their reorganization. Annunciator window references for the earthquake corrected to match Main Control Room alignment. All references to RM were changed to RE to make it consistent with site description documents. Tables in section seven revised to reflect the following: System 90 changes, monitor efficiencies, default flow rates, release time durations, and annual meteorological data enhancements.		
Revision	Implementation D)ate	Pages	Description of Revision
Number	09/28/95		Affected	The following non-intent enhancements were made:
CN-1				(CCP) Acronym added to the Fission Product Barrier Matrix in 1.2 RCS Barrier, (2. RCS Leakage LOCA), to enhance description. New SI reference number for Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance identified in event 2.5 (RCS Unidentified Leakage) and 2.6 (RCS Identified Leakage). Area code and phone number in event 5.2 (Tornado) revised to new number.
CN-2	11/10/95		3, 6, 34	The following non-intent enhancements were made: Corresponding ERFDS system identifiers were added next to the rad monitors on Table 7-1; Table 7-1 was realigned to improve its usability; an enhanced description for RE-404 was provided in Note 3 of Table 7-1; the ERFDS Operators Manual was added to the Reference section.

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EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION FLOWCHART

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REVISION LOG(Continued)

Revision Number	Implementation Date	Pages Affected	Description of Revision
CN-3	05/24/96	8, 11, 16, 19, 23, 24, 26, 29, 32, 34	The following non-intent enhancements were made: Due to revisions made to AOI-27, it was added back to the EALs in event 4.5 "Control Room Evacuation"; The Assessment Method on Table 7-1 was enhanced to correspond with the note at the top of the table. In addition, the reference to TI-30 was removed since this procedure will be terminated due to the enhancements being made to EPIP-16 and ERFDS. The word Projectile was added to the index and title reference to event 5.3 "Aircraft/Projectile Crash", to make it consistent with the EALs within it's classification.
10	3/15/99	All	The following non-intent enhancement were made: Software revised to Microsoft Word which re-formatted pages along with other enhancements; minor typographical errors corrected; two references revised - one added; SOS/ASOS replaced with SM/US; index page, effluent added to gaseous; vital area definition enhanced; spent fuel pit revised to pool on Table 7-2; SP revised to EAB in Event 7.1; TVA Load Dispatcher/Water Resources revised to River Systems Operations and revised ERFDS/P-2500 to ICS.
11	4/15/99	2, 34	Non intent change. Typo corrected. Changed >1.0 to >0.1.
11A	7/1/99	3,26	Corrected typo on phone number The remaining pages of this procedure are Rev 11 only page 3, and the fold out page for 26 have been changed.
12	9/30/99	All	Non intent change. Minor editorial/format changes made. Typographical errors corrected. Seismic windows revised to reflect DCN-50007 per ERPI Report 6695. (LTL) Lower toxicity limit replaced with (PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit. This revision is also part of the resolution to PER 99-009326-000.
13	12/08/99	All	Non-intent change. Revised page 33 for resolution of PER 99-015478-000. Minor editorial change to Event 5.1 step 1 of the Alert classification.
14	04/10/00	All (Pg.4 & 45)	Non-intend change. Revised page 45 for DCN 50484, stage 1 which moved 0-RE-90-101B, & -132B from ICS Screen 4RM2 to 4RM1. DCN also moved 1-RE-90-421B thru -424B and 0-RE-90-120 & -121 from ICS Screen 4RM1 to 4RM2. This revision allows all liquid radiation monitors to be observable on one ICS screen and all gaseous radiation monitors to be observed on a separate ICS screen.
15	08/17/00	All (Pg. 4, 11A & B)	Intent change. Revised CNTMT Rad Monitors (1-RE-90-271, 272, 273, & 274) readings to correspond with the new TI-RPS-162, "Response of the Primary Containment High Range Monitors" readings (Reference EDC-50600). This analysis resulted in a revision to the EALs 1.1.5 on the Barrier matrix page, 11b. This revision resolves action items from CORP PER 99-000038-000. This revision was also determined not to reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

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EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION FLOWCHART

REVISION LOG (Continued)

Revision Number	Implementation Date	Pages Affected	Description of Revision
16	3/30/01	All (Pg. 11 &14)	Plan effectiveness determinations reviews indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP: Intent change. Revised CNTMT Rad Monitors readings in the Barrier Matrix (1.3) to support new dose assessment methodology. Non intent change. Revised reference from annunciator alarm printer to annunciator monitor per DCN D-50301.
17	09/25//01	All Page 6, 11B	Plan effectiveness determinations reviews indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP: Intent change. Procedure revised to Non-Quality related per requirements of NQAP & pending revision to SPP-2.2. The coversheet and records section of the procedure was revised to reflect this change. Non-Intent change. Corrected typo on Barrier Matrix.
18	02/15/02	All 2, 11B, 44	Plan effectiveness determinations reviews indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP: Non-Intent change. Changes to the EALs in this revision consist of changing β - γ to gamma in Section 7.0 to ensure consistency with NUMARC/NESP-007, Reg Guide 1.101, and NEI 99-01 rev 4. Clarification to EAL 1.3.3 (containment isolation status also made per this reference.) This standardizes these issues with the other TVAN sites. These changes were approved by the State of Tennessee.
19	06/05/02	All 4, 7 &30	Plan effectiveness determinations on these change(s) indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP. Intent change(s): A revision to the Security Event (4.6) was made to incorporate change(s) resulting from the NEI to NRC (Mr. Bruce Boger) letter dated 12/18/01 requesting conformation for an EAL basis change to include response to a Credible Site Specific Threat. Table 4-3 was revised to incorporate this additional EAL. This meets the compliance of the NRC's 10/6/01 Safeguards Advisory on this matter. This represents an additional EAL and does not change existing criteria in the Security Event Basis. Revised 5.1 Interfacing documents by noting the termination of EPIP 9 with reference to EPIP 16.
20	07/09/02	ALL, pg. 2, 10, 13, 15, 20, 24, 30, 32, 39, 43	Plan effectiveness determinations on these change(s) indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP. Intent change(s): Reference to T/S 3.4.16 in Event 2.4 EAL 1(a) revised to correspond to levels in AOI-28. Credible Site-Specific was added to the definition pages. Removed reference to the definition in Table 4-3 SECURITY EVENTS to standardize with other TVAN sites.

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1.0 PURPOSE⁴

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This Procedure provides guidance in determining the classification and declaration of an emergency based on plant conditions.

2.0 RESPONSIBILITY^{2,4}

The responsibility of declaring an Emergency based on the guidance within this procedure belongs to the Shift Manager/Site Emergency Director (SM/SED) or designated Unit Supervisor (US) when acting as the SM or the TSC Site Emergency Director (SED). These duties <u>CAN NOT</u> be delegated.

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS⁴

- 3.1 The criteria in WBN EPIP-1 are given for GUIDANCE ONLY: knowledge of actual plant conditions or the extent of the emergency may require that additional steps be taken. In all cases, this logic procedure should be combined with the sound judgment of the SM/SED and/or the TSC SED to arrive at a classification for a particular set of circumstances.
- 3.2 The Nuclear Power (NP) Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) will be activated when any one of the conditions listed in this logic is detected.
- 3.3 Classification Determination
- 3.3.1 To determine the classification of the emergency, review the Initiating Conditions of the Events described in this procedure with the known or suspected conditions and CARRY OUT the notifications and actions referenced.
- 3.3.2 If a Critical Safety Function (CSF) is listed as an Initiating Condition: the respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the Event classification for the modes listed on the classification flowchart.
- 3.3.3 The highest classification for which an Emergency Action level (EAL) currently exists shall be declared.

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3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued)

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- 3.3.4 After an Event classification, if the following investigation shows that Initiating Conditions were met that dictate a higher Event classification, the new event classification shall be declared at the clock time of the determination.
- 3.3.5 **IF** an EAL for a higher classification <u>was</u> exceeded but the present situation indicates a lower classification, the fact that the higher classification occurred SHALL be reported to the NRC and Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), but should <u>not</u> be declared.
- 3.3.6 **IF** the Parameter is indeterminate due to instrument malfunction and the existence of the condition **CAN NOT** be reasonably discounted (i.e., spurious or false alarm that can be substantiated within 15 minutes) the condition is considered **MET** and the SM/SED SHALL follow the indications provided until such time as the alarm is verified to be false.
- 3.3.7 **IF** an EAL was exceeded, but the emergency has been totally resolved (prior to declaration), the emergency condition that was appropriate <u>shall</u> <u>not</u> be declared but reported to the NRC and Operations Duty Specialist (ODS) at the same clock time.
- 3.3.8 The ACCEPTABLE time frame for notification to the Operation Duty Specialist (ODS) is considered to be five (5) minutes. This is the time period between declaration of the emergency and notifying the ODS.

4.0 RECORDS

4.1 Non-QA Records

None

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5.0 REFERENCES

5.1 Interfacing References

BP-236, Event Critique and Root Cause Analysis

SPP 3.5, Regulatory Reporting Requirements

WBN-EPIP-2, Unusual Event

WBN-EPIP-3, Alert

WBN-EPIP-4, Site Area Emergency

WBN-EPIP-5, General Emergency

WBN-EPIP-9, Loss of Meteorological Data (Canceled see EPIP-16)

WBN-EPIP-13, Termination of the Emergency and Recovery

WBN-EPIP-14, Radiological Control Response

WBN-EPIP-16, Initial Dose Assessment For Radiological Emergencies

CECC-EPIP-9, Emergency Environmental Radiological Monitoring Procedures

SI-4.04, Measurement of Identified and Unidentified Leakage of the Reactor Coolant System

5.2 Other Documents

10 CFR 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities

10 CFR 20, Standards for Protection From Radiation

REG GUIDE-1.101, Emergency Planning and Preparedness For Nuclear Power Reactors endorsing NUMARC NESP-007 Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels.

Site Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), Abnormal Operating Instructions (AOIs), Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Set Point Verification documents, Chemistry Technical documents (CTDs), and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) are also referenced in Appendix C of the Radiological Emergency Plan.

ICS Operator's Manual

EPPOS #2, "NRC EP Position on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions

EPRI Report 6695 Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Response to Earthquakes.

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EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION FLOWCHART ^{1,3,4,5}

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		EPIP-1 Revision 2 Page 9 of 4
1.1	SION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) Fuel Clad RCS Containment	1
SYS 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5	STEM DEGRADATIONLoss of Instrumentation2.6Loss of Function/Communication2.7Failure of Reactor Protection2.8Fuel Clad Degradation2.9RCS Unidentified Leakage2.10Safety Limit	2
LO 3.1 3.2 3.3	SS OF POWER Loss of AC (Power Ops) Loss of AC (Shutdown) Loss of DC	3
HA 4.1 4.2	ZARDS and SED JUDGMENTFire4.3Flammable Gas4.5Control Room EvacuationExplosion4.4Toxic Gas4.6SecurityTable 4-1Table 4-24.7SED JudgmentFigure 4-AFigure 4-BTable 4-3	4
DE 5.1 5.2 5.3	STRUCTIVE PHENOMENONEarthquake5.4River Level HighTornado5.5River Level LowAircraft/Projectile5.6Watercraft CrashCrashFigure 5-ATable 5-1	5
SH 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4	UTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Loss of Shutdown Systems Loss of AC (Shutdown) Loss of DC (Shutdown) Fuel Handling	6
RA 7.1 7.2	DIOLOGICAL Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A	7

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DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS

UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7).

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION).

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site

CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e within 15 minutes

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100 Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostule individual present in a protected area without authorization

ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH: Monttoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection > . 25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g, chlorine)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An inducation or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e., within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included

VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation. EPIP-1 Revision 20 Page 11A of 49

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/ 1.1 Fuel	Clad Barrier
1. Critical Safety Fu	Potential LOSS
Core Cooling Red	Core Cooling Orange
Ì	OR Heat Sink Red
	(RHR Not in Service)
	-OR-
2. Primary Coolant	Activity Level Potential LOSS
RCS sample activity is	Potential L035
Greater Than 300 µCi/gm dose equivalent iodine-131	Not applicable
door equivalent lounie (of	
	-OR-
3. Incore TCs Hi Qu	ad Average
LOSS	Potential LOSS
Greater Than 1200°F	Greater Than 727°F
	00
$\left(\mathbf{x} \right)$	-OR-
4. Reactor Vessel V	
LOSS Not Applicable	Potential LOSS VALID RVLIS level <33%
	(No RCP running)
	-OR-
5. Containment Rac	liation Monitors
LOSS	
	Potential LOSS
VALID reading increase of Greater Than:	
VALID reading increase of Greater Than:	Not Applicable
VALID reading increase of Greater Than: 74 R/hr On 1-RE-90-271 and 272	Not Applicable
VALID reading increase of Greater Than: 74 R/hr On 1-RE-90-271 and 272 OR	Not Applicable
VALID reading increase of Greater Than: 74 R/hr On 1-RE-90-271 and 272	Not Applicable
VALID reading increase of Greater Than: 74 R/hr On 1-RE-90-271 and 272 <u>OR</u> 59 R/hr On 1-RE-90-273	Not Applicable
VALID reading increase of Greater Than: 74 R/hr On 1-RE-90-271 and 272 <u>OR</u> 59 R/hr On 1-RE-90-273 and 274	-OR-
VALID reading increase of Greater Than: 74 R/hr On 1-RE-90-271 and 272 <u>OR</u> 59 R/hr On 1-RE-90-273 and 274 6. Site Emergency [-OR- Director Judgment
VALID reading increase of Greater Than: 74 R/hr On 1-RE-90-271 and 272 <u>OR</u> 59 R/hr On 1-RE-90-273 and 274 6. Site Emergency I Any condition that, in the Indicates Loss or Potenti	-OR- Director Judgment Judgment of the SM/SED, ial Loss of the Fuel Clad
VALID reading increase of Greater Than: 74 R/hr On 1-RE-90-271 and 272 <u>OR</u> 59 R/hr On 1-RE-90-273 and 274 6. Site Emergency I Any condition that, in the Indicates Loss or Potenti	-OR- Director Judgment
VALID reading increase of Greater Than: 74 R/hr On 1-RE-90-271 and 272 <u>OR</u> 59 R/hr On 1-RE-90-273 and 274 6. Site Emergency I Any condition that, in the Indicates Loss or Potenti	-OR- Director Judgment Judgment of the SM/SED, ial Loss of the Fuel Clad

1.2 RC	S Barrier
1. Critical Safety Fun LOSS Not Applicable	Potential LOSS Pressurized Thermal Shock
	Red
	<u>OR</u> Heat Sink Red (RHR <u>Not</u> in Service)
	OR-
2. RCS Leakage/LOC	A
LOSS	Potential LOSS
RCS Leak results in Loss of subcooling (<65°F Indicated), [85°F ADV]	Non Isolatable RCS Leak Exceeding The Capacity of <u>One</u> Charging Pump (CCP) In the Normal Charging Alignment.
	OR RCS Leakage Results In Entry Into E-1
-	OR-
3. Steam Generator T Loss	ube Rupture Potential LOSS
SGTR that results in a safety injection actuation <u>OR</u> Entry into E-3	Not Applicable
	OR-
4. Reactor Vessel Wa	ater Level
	Potential LOSS
VALID RVLIS level <33% (No RCP Running)	Not Applicable
-	OR-
5. Site Emergency Di Any condition that, in the J Indicates Loss or Potential Comparable to the Conditi	udgment of the SM/SED, Loss of the RCS Barrier

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Alther Although Colonization	
1.3 CNTM	I Barrier
1. Critical Safety Functi	on Status
LOSS	Potential LOSS
Not Applicable	Containment (FR-Z.1) <u>Red</u> OR
	Actions of FR-C.1 (Red Path) are INEFFECTIVE
-o 2. Containment Pressu	
LOSS	Potential LOSS
Rapid unexplained decrease following initial increase	Containment Hydrogen Increases to >4% by volume
OR	OR
Containment pressure or Sump level <u>Not</u> increasing	Pressure >2.8 PSIG (Phase B) with < One full train of
(with LOCA in progress)	Containment spray
-0	R-
3. Containment Isolatio	1111
LOSS	Potential LOSS
Containment Isolation is Incomplete (when required) <u>A</u> <u>AND</u> a Release Path to the <u>Solution</u> Environment Exists	Not Applicable
-0	
4 Containment Bypass	· · · · · ·
4 Containment Bypass	Potential LOSS
LOSS RUPTURED S/G is also FAULTED outside CNTMT	Potential LOSS
LOSS RUPTURED S/G is also FAULTED outside CNTMT OR Prolonged (>4 Hours)	Potential LOSS Unexplained VALID increase in area or ventilation RAD monitors in areas adjacent to CNTMT (with LOCA in
RUPTURED S/G is also FAULTED outside CNTMT OR	Potential LOSS Unexplained VALID increase in area or ventilation RAD monitors in areas adjacent to
LOSS RUPTURED S/G is also FAULTED outside CNTMT <u>OR</u> Prolonged (>4 Hours) Secondary Side release outside CNTMT from a S/G with a SGTL > T/S Limits	Potential LOSS Unexplained VALID increase in area or ventilation RAD monitors in areas adjacent to CNTMT (with LOCA in progress)
LOSS RUPTURED S/G is also FAULTED outside CNTMT <u>OR</u> Prolonged (>4 Hours) Secondary Side release outside CNTMT from a S/G with a SGTL > T/S Limits -0 5. Significant Radioacti	Potential LOSS Unexplained VALID increase in area or ventilation RAD monitors in areas adjacent to CNTMT (with LOCA in progress) R-
LOSS RUPTURED S/G is also FAULTED outside CNTMT OR Prolonged (>4 Hours) Secondary Side release outside CNTMT from a S/G with a SGTL > T/S Limits	Potential LOSS Unexplained VALID increase in area or ventilation RAD monitors in areas adjacent to CNTMT (with LOCA in progress) R-
LOSS RUPTURED S/G is also FAULTED outside CNTMT <u>OR</u> Prolonged (>4 Hours) Secondary Side release outside CNTMT from a S/G with a SGTL > T/S Limits -O 5. Significant Radioacti LOSS	Potential LOSS Unexplained VALID increase in area or ventilation RAD monitors in areas adjacent to CNTMT (with LOCA in progress) R- vity in Containment Potential LOSS VALID Reading increase of Greater Than: 108 R/hr on 1-RE-90-271 and 1-RE-90-272
LOSS RUPTURED S/G is also FAULTED outside CNTMT <u>OR</u> Prolonged (>4 Hours) Secondary Side release outside CNTMT from a S/G with a SGTL > T/S Limits -O 5. Significant Radioacti LOSS	Potential LOSS Unexplained VALID increase in area or ventilation RAD monitors in areas adjacent to CNTMT (with LOCA in progress) R- vity in Containment Potential LOSS VALID Reading increase of Greater Than: 108 R/hr on 1-RE-90-271 and
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Modes: 1, 2, 3, 4

INSTRUCTIONS

INSTR	UCTIONS	
		F
NOTE: A condition is considered	to be MFT if in the	I
judgment of the Site Emer	gency Director, the	S
condition will be MET imm	inently (i.e., within 1 to 2	S
hours, in the absence of a	<u>viable success path</u>).	I
The classification shall be determination is made.	made a soon as this	0
determination is made.		Ν
N		
1. In the matrix to the left, re		Р
CONDITIONS in all colun		R
if any, INITIATING CONE	DITIONS are MET.	0
Circle these CONDITION	5.	D
		Ũ
2. For each of the three barr	iers, identity if any	c
LOSS or Potential LOSS		T
CONDITIONS have been	MET.	T
3. If a CSF is listed as an IN	TIATING	
CONDITION; the respecti		B
criteria will be monitored		Α
determine the EVENT cla		R
Modes listed on the class		R
, Modes listed off the class	meation nowchart.	I
4. Compare the barrier losse	es and notential	Е
losses to the EVENTS be		R
appropriate declaration.		
4 -FFF		м
٠.		A
-1		
		T
		R
		Ι
1		X
		U
EV	/ENTS	1
UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	
Loss or Potential LOSS of	Any LOSS or Potential	
Containment Barrier	LOSS of Fuel Clad barrier	•
	OR	
;		
	Any LOSS or Potential	
1	LOSS of RCS barrier	
RITE ADEA EMEDGENOY	GENEDAL ENEDOCIO	
SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENC	<u>r</u>
LOSS or Potential LOSS of	LOSS of any two barriers	
any two barriers	and Potential LOSS of thi	rd
1.5	barrier	-
1		

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FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATR 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment	EPIP-1 Revision 2 Page 12 of IX (Modes 1-4)
2.2Loss of Function/Communication2.7Uncontro2.3Failure of Reactor Protection2.8Turbine	al Specification
LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC	3
4.2Explosion4.4Toxic Gas4.6SeTable 4-1Table 4-24.7SE	ontrol Room Evacuation ecurity ED Judgment able 4-3
DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON5.1Earthquake5.4River Level High5.2Tornado5.5River Level Low5.3Aircraft/Projectile5.6Watercraft CrashCrashFigure 5-ATable 5-1	5
SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATIO 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6.4 Fuel Handling	⁶
RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Leve	1

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 7.1
 Gaseous Effluent
 7.3
 Radiation Levels

 7.2
 Liquid Effluent
 7.4
 Fuel Handling

 Table 7-1
 Table 7-2

 Figure 7-A

1

1.1 1.2 1.3	SION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) Fuel Clad RCS Containment	1
2.1 2.2	STEM DEGRADATIONLoss of Instrumentation2.6Loss of Function/Communication2.7Uncontrolled Cool DownFailure of Reactor Protection2.8Fuel Clad Degradation2.9Technical SpecificationRCS Unidentified Leakage2.10Safety Limit	2
LO 3.1 3.2 3.3	SS OF POWER Loss of AC (Power Ops) Loss of AC (Shutdown) Loss of DC	3
HA 4.1 4.2	ZARDS and SED JUDGMENTFire4.3Flammable Gas4.5Control Room EvacuationExplosion4.4Toxic Gas4.6SecurityTable 4-1Table 4-24.7SED JudgmentFigure 4-AFigure 4-BTable 4-3	4
DE 5.1 5.2 5.3	STRUCTIVE PHENOMENONEarthquake5.4River Level HighTornado5.5River Level LowAircraft/Projectile5.6Watercraft CrashCrashFigure 5-ATable 5-1	5
SH 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4	UTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Loss of Shutdown Systems Loss of AC (Shutdown) Loss of DC (Shutdown) Fuel Handling	6
RA 7.1 7.2	DIOLOGICAL Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A	7

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DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS

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CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

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EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the statuon by threat of force

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e, steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

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ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge

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SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

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UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e g, alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An inducation or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, 1 e, within 15 minutes

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes' deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e g, paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included

VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation

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	<u> </u>	1 Loss of Instrumentation		2.2 Loss of Function	
	∠. Mode	Initiating/Condition	Mode	Initiating/Condition	
G E N E R A L		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" and "Radiological Effluents" (Section 7)		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"	
S – F E	1,2 3,4	Inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress (1 and 2 and 3 and 4) 1. Loss of most (>75%) of MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or indications 2. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress 3. Loss of ICS Computer and SPDS 4. Inability to directly monitor any of the following CSFs Sub-criticality PTS Core Cooling Containment Heat Sink Inventory	1,2 3,4	 Complete loss of function needed to achieve or maintain Hot Shutdown (1 or 2) 1. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red 2. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red (RHR not in service) Note: Also Refer to "Failure of Rx Protection" (2.3) and "Fission Product Barner Matrix" 	
ALERT	1,2 3,4	 UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Printer) or indications for >15 minutes with either a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or ICS computer and SPDS Unavailable (1 and 2 and 3) 1. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or indications for >15 minutes 2 SM/SED Judgment that increased surveillance is required to Safely operate the unit (beyond Shift compliment) 3 (a or b) a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in Progress b Loss of ICS Computer and SPDS 	4	Complete loss of function needed to achieve Cold Shutdown when Shutdown required by Tech Specs (1 and 2 and 3) 1. Shutdown is required 2. Loss of RHR capability 3 Loss of secondary heat sink and condenser	
UNUSUAL EVENT	1,2 3,4	 UNPLANNED loss of most <u>or</u> All Safety System annunciators <u>or</u> indications in the Control Room for >15 Minutes (1 and 2 and 3) 1. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR annunciators (<u>and</u> Annunciator Monitor) <u>or</u> indications for >15 minutes 2. SM/SED Judgment that increased surveillance is required to Safely operate the unit (beyond Shift compliment) 3 ICS Computer <u>or</u> SPDS is in service and capable of displaying data requested 	ALL	 A Unplanned loss of all In-Plant Communication capability (1 and 2 and 3) 1. UNPLANNED loss of EPABX (PAX) phones 2. UNPLANNED loss of all sound powered phones 3 UNPLANNED loss of all radios or B UNPLANNED loss of all Offsite Communication capability (1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5) 1 UNPLANNED loss of all EPABX (PAX) phones 2 UNPLANNED loss of all Radio frequencies 3 UNPLANNED loss of all OPX (Microwave) system 4 UNPLANNED loss of all FTS 2000 (NRC) system 	

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		3 Failure of Rx Protection		2
	Mode	Initiating/Condition	Mode	
G E N E R A	1,2	Loss of Core cooling capability and VALID Trip Signals did <u>not</u> result in a reduction of Rx power to <5% and decreasing (1 and 2) 1. (a or b) a. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red b CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red		R
Ĺ_		 FR-S.1 entered and subsequent actions <u>Did Not</u> result in a Rx Power of <5% and decreasing 		
SLFE	1,2	 Rx power Not <5% and decreasing after VALID Auto and Manual trip signals (1 and 2 and 3) 1. VALID Rx Auto Trip signal received or required 2 Manual Rx Trip from the MCR was Not successful 3 FR-S 1 has been entered. 		R
	1,2	 Automatic Rx trip did not occur after VALID Trip signal and manual trip from MCR was successful (1 and 2) 1 VALID Rx Auto Trip signal received or required 2. Manual Rx Trip from the MCR was successful and power is <5% and decreasing 		F
U N U S U A L E V E T		Not Applicable	1,2, 3,4, 5	FL

	2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation	
ode	Initiating/Condition	
	Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"	S Y S T E M
	Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matrix"	DEGRADATION
	Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matnx"	U 1
1,2, 3,4, 5	 Reactor Coolant System specific activity exceeds LCO (Refer to WBN Tech. Spec. 3.4.16) 1 Radiochemistry analysis indicates (a or b) a Dose equivalent lodine (I-131) >0.265 μCi/gm for >48 Hours or in excess of Appendix A of AOI-28 b Specific activity >100/E μCi/gm 	

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	RCS Unidentified Leakage	Mode	2.6 RCS Identified Leakage
Mode G E N E R A	Initiating/Condition Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matrix"	Mode	Initiating/Condition Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
L S I T E	Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matrix"		Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matnx"
A L E R T	Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matnx"		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
U N U S U 1,2 3,4, *5 L E V E N	 Unidentified or pressure boundary RCS leakage >10 GPM 1 Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage (as defined by Tech Spec.) >10 GPM as indicated below (a or b) a 1-SI-68-32 results b. With RCS Temperature and PZR Level Stable, VCT Level Dropping at a Rate >10 GPM 	1,2, 3,4, *5	Identified RCS leakage >25 GPM 1. Identified RCS leakage (as defined by Tech Spec.) >25 GPM (a or b) a. 1-SI-68-32 results b Level rise in excess of 25 GPM total into PRT, RCDT or CVCS Holdup Tank
5 N T.a 1915	*Note - Applies to Mode 5 if RCS Pressunzed		*Note Applies to Mode 5 if RCS Pressurized

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	2	7 Uncontrolled Cooldown			2.8 Turbine Failure	
-1	Mode	Initiating/Condition	M	lode	Initiating/Condition	
G E N E R A		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matnx"			Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"	S Y S T E M
S I T E		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matnx"			Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matrix"	D E G R A D A T I O N
		Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matnx"	1	1,2,3	Turbine Failure has generated PROJECTILES that cause VISIBLE DAMAGE to any area containing Safety Related equipment 1. Turbine PROJECTILES has resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE in any of the following areas Control Building Auxiliary Building Unit #1 Containment Diesel Generator Bldg RWST Intake Pumping Station CST	U 1
UNUSUAL EVE	1,2,3	 UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the Main Steam System resulting in a rapid RCS cooldown <u>and</u> Safety Injection Initiation (1 and 2) 1. Rapid depressurization of Main Steam System (<675 psig) 2 Safety Injection has initiated <u>or</u> is required 	1	1,2,3	Turbine Failure results in Casing penetration 1 Turbine Failure which results in penetration of the Turbine Casing <u>or</u> Damage to Main Generator Seals	

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2.9 Technical Specification				
G	Initiating/Condition			
EN				
N E R A L				
R A				
	Not Applicable			
S				
TE				
A	Not Applicable			
A L R T				
R				
T				
U				
U S	Inability to reach required Shutdown within Tech. Spec. limits <i>(1 and 2)</i>			
U 1,2 A 3,4	1. Any Tech Spec LCO Statement, requiring a Mode reduction, has been entered			
N U S U A 3,4 L E V	2 The Unit has not been placed in the required Mode within the time prescribed by the LCO Action Statement			
NT				

	2.10 Safety Limit
Mode	Initiating/Condition
	Not Applicable
	Not Applicable
	Not Applicable
1,2, 3,4, 5	 Safety Limits have been Exceeded (1 or 2) The combination of thermal power, RCS temperature, and RCS pressure > safety limits as indicated by WBN Tech Spec. Figure 2 1.1-1 "Reactor Core Safety Limits" RCS/Pressurizer pressure exceeds safety limit (>2735 psig)

		EPIP-1 Revision 20 Page 19 of 4
FIS 1.1 1.2 1.3	SION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) Fuel Clad RCS Containment	1
SY3 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5	STEM DEGRADATIONLoss of Instrumentation2.6Loss of Function/Communication2.7Failure of Reactor Protection2.8Fuel Clad Degradation2.9RCS Unidentified Leakage2.10Safety Limit	2
LO 3.1 3.2 3.3	SS OF POWER Loss of AC (Power Ops) Loss of AC (Shutdown) Loss of DC	3
HA 4.1 4.2	ZARDS and SED JUDGMENTFire4.3Flammable Gas4.5Control Room EvacuationExplosion4.4Toxic Gas4.6SecurityTable 4-1Table 4-24.7SED JudgmentFigure 4-AFigure 4-BTable 4-3	4
DE 5.1 5.2 5.3	STRUCTIVE PHENOMENONEarthquake5.4River Level HighTornado5.5River Level LowAircraft/Projectile5.6Watercraft CrashCrashFigure 5-ATable 5-1	5
SH 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4	UTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Loss of Shutdown Systems Loss of AC (Shutdown) Loss of DC (Shutdown) Fuel Handling	6
RA 7.1 7.2	DIOLOGICALGaseous Effluent7.3Radiation LevelsLiquid Effluent7.4Fuel HandlingTable 7-1Table 7-2Figure 7-ATable 7-2	7

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DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS

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R	PIP-1 evision 20 age 21 of 49						
	3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)						
	Mode	Initiating/Condition	Mode	Initiating/Condition			
G E N E R A L	1,2, 3,4	Prolonged loss of Offsite and Onsite AC power (1 and 2) 1. 1A and 1B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized for >15 minutes 2. (a or b) a Core Cooling Red or Orange b. Restoration of Either 1A or 1B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds is not likely within 4 hours of loss		Not Applicable			
S I T E	1,2, 3,4	Loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Power > 15 minutes 1. 1A and 1B 6 9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized for >15 minutes		Not Applicable			
ALERT	1,2, 3,4	Loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes (1 and 2) 1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes 2. 1A or 1B Diesel Generator not available	5,6, or De- fuel	UNPLANNED loss of Offsite and Onsite AC power for >15 minutes 1. 1A and 1B 6 9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized for >15 minutes Also Refer to "Loss of Shutdown Systems" (6 1)			
U N U S U A L E V E N T	1,2 3,4	 Loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes (1 and 2) 1 C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes 2 Each Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board 	5,6, or De- fuel	 UNPLANNED loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes (1 and 2) 1 C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes 2 Either Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board 			

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
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Node	B Loss of DC Power Initiating/Condition
	Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matrix" and "Loss of Function" (2.2)
1,2, 3,4	Loss of All Vital DC Power for >15 minutes 1. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-I and 1-II and 1-III and 1-IV for >15 minutes Also Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix", "Loss of Function" (2 2), and "Loss of Instrumentation" (2.1)
	Also Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matnx", "Loss of Function" (2.2), and "Loss of Instrumentation" (2.1)
5,6, or De-fuel	 UNPLANNED Loss of the Required Train of DC power for >15 minutes (1 or 2) 1. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-I and 1-III for >15 minutes 2. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-II and 1-IV for >15 minutes

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FIS 1.1 1.2 1.3	SION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) Fuel Clad RCS Containment	1
2.1 2.2 2.3	STEM DEGRADATIONLoss of Instrumentation2.6RCS Identified LeakageLoss of Function/Communication2.7Uncontrolled Cool DownFailure of Reactor Protection2.8Turbine FailureFuel Clad Degradation2.9Technical SpecificationRCS Unidentified Leakage2.10Safety Limit	2
LO 3.1 3.2 3.3	SS OF POWER Loss of AC (Power Ops) Loss of AC (Shutdown) Loss of DC	3
	ZARDS and SED JUDGMENTFire4.3Flammable Gas4.5Control Room EvacuationExplosion4.4Toxic Gas4.6SecurityTable 4-1Table 4-24.7SED JudgmentFigure 4-AFigure 4-BTable 4-3	4
DE 5.1 5.2 5.3	STRUCTIVE PHENOMENONEarthquake5.4River Level HighTornado5.5River Level LowAircraft/Projectile5.6Watercraft CrashCrashFigure 5-ATable 5-1	5
SH 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4	UTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Loss of Shutdown Systems Loss of AC (Shutdown) Loss of DC (Shutdown) Fuel Handling	6
RA 7.1 7.2	DIOLOGICAL Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2	7

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DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS

UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4 7)

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site

CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e within 15 minutes

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action ts required

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED

UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e g, alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e, within 15 minutes

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e g, paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included

VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation •

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
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	4.1 FIRE			4.2 Explosions
Mode	Initiating/Condition	Γ	Mode	Initiating/Condition
G E N E R A L	Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matnx"			Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matnx"
L S T E	Refer to "Control Room Evacuation," (4.5) or Fission Product Barner Matrix"			Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matnx"
A L E R T	 FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting Safety Related equipment (1 and 2) 1 FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 2 (a or b) a VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structure or Safety Related equipment in the specified area is observed due to the FIRE b Control Room indication of degraded Safety System or component response due to the FIRE 		All	 EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting Safety Related equipment (1 and 2) 1. EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 2. (a or b) a An EXPLOSION has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to Safety Related equipment b Control Room indication of degraded Safety System or component response due to the EXPLOSION
U N U S U A II A I E V E N	FIRE in the PROTECTED AREA threatening any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is <u>Not</u> extinguished within 15 minutes from the Time of Control Room notification <u>or</u> verification of Control Room Alarm (Figure 4-A)		All	Refer to "Security" (4 6) UNPLANNED EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED AREA resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to any permanent structure <u>or</u> equipment (Figure 4-A) <i>Refer to "Security" (4 6)</i>

TABLE 4-1 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE AND EXPLOSION EALS

Unit #1 Reactor Building Auxiliary Building Control Building Diesel Generator Building CST Additional Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station Additional Equipment Buildings (Unit 1&2) RWST

Figure 4-A PROTECTED AREA/SITE PERIMETER



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
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	م الفراق التركيمي مراجع التركيمي مراجع التركيمي	4.3 Flammable Gas		4.4 Toxic Gas
	Mode	Initiating/Condition	Node	Initiating/Condition
G E N E R A -		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matnx"		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
S – F E		Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matnx"		Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matrix"
A L E R T	All	 UNPLANNED release of Flammable Gas within a facility structure containing Safety Related equipment or associated with Power production Plant personnel report the average of three readings taken in a ~10ft triangular Area is >25% (LEL) Lower Explosive Limit, as indicated on the monitoring instrument within any building listed in Table 4-2 	All	 Release of TOXIC GAS within a facility structure which Prohibits Safe Operation of systems required to establish <u>or</u> maintain Cold S/D (1 and 2 and 3) Plant personnel report TOXIC GAS within any building listed in Table 4-2 (a or b) a Plant personnel report Severe Adverse Health Reactions due to TOXIC GAS (i e., burning eyes, nose, throat, dizziness) b. Sampling indications > (PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit Plant personnel would be unable to perform actions necessary to establish and maintain Cold Shutdown while utilizing appropriate personnel protection equipment
UNUSUAL EVENT	All	 A. UNPLANNED release of Flammable Gas within the SITE PERIMETER Plant personnel report the average of three readings taken in a ~10ft Triangular Area is >25% (LEL) Lower Explosive Limit, as indicated on the monitoring instrument within the SITE PERIMETER (Refer to Figure 4-B) B Confirmed report by Local, County, or State Officials that a Large Offsite Flammable Gas release has occurred within One Mile of the Site with potential to enter the SITE PERIMETER in concentrations >25% of LEL Lower Explosive Limit (Refer to Figure 4-B) 	All	 A. Normal Operations impeded due to access restrictions caused by TOXIC GAS concentrations within a Facility Structure listed in Table 4-2 <u>OR</u> B. Confirmed report by Local, County, <u>or</u> State Officials that a Large Offsite TOXIC GAS release has occurred within One Mile of the Site with potential to enter the Site Perimeter in concentrations >than the (PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit thus causing an Evacuation (Figure 4-B)

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4.5 C	Control Room Evacuation		4.6 Security
Mode	Initiating/Condition	Mode	Initiating/Condition
	Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"	All	 Security Event resulting in loss of Control of the Plant Hostule Armed Force has taken Control of the Plant, Control Room, or Remote shutdown capability
All	 Evacuation of the Control Room has been initiated and Control of all necessary equipment <u>Has Not</u> been established within 15 minutes of manning the Auxiliary Control Room (1 and 2 and 3) 1. (a or b) a AOI-30.2 "Fire Safety Shutdown" entered b. AOI-27 "Main Control Room Inaccessibility" entered 2. SM/SED Orders Control Room evacuation 	All	Security Event has <u>or</u> is occurring which results in Actual <u>or</u> Likely Failures of Plant Functions needed of Protect the Public 1. VITAL AREA, other than the Control Room, has been penetrated by a Hostile Armed Force
	 Control has <u>Not</u> been established at the Remote Shutdown Panel within 15 minutes of manning the Auxiliary Control Room and transfer of switches on Panels L11A and L11B Evacuation of the Control Room is Required (1 and 2) 		Confirmed Security Event which indicates an Actual Potential Substantial Degradation in the level of Safe of the Plant (1 or 2 or 3)
	 (a or b) A AOI-30 2 "Fire Safe Shutdown" entered A AOI-27 "Main Control Room Inaccessibility" entered SM/SED Orders Control Room evacuation 	Ali	 BOMB discovered within a VITAL AREA CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing within the PROTECT AREA PROTECTED AREA has been penetrated by a Hostil Armed Force Refer to Figure 4-A For a Drawing of Protected Area ar Site Perimeter
	Not Applicable	All	 Confirmed Security Event which indicates a Potentia Degradation in the level of Safety of the Plant (1 or 2) 1. BOMB discovered within the PROTECTED AREA 2 Security Shift Supervisor reports one or more of the events listed in Table 4-3

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4.7 Emergency Director Judgment				
()	Mode	Initiating/Condition		
G E N E R A L	All	Events are in progress <u>or</u> have occurred which involve Actual <u>or</u> Imminent Substantial Core Degradation <u>or</u> Melting With Potential for Loss of Containment Integrity. Releases can be reasonable expected to exceed EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY, Refer to Figure 7-A.		
S I T E	All	Events are in progress <u>or</u> have occurred which involve Actual <u>or</u> Likely Major Failures of Plant Functions needed for the Protection of the Public. Any releases are not expected to result in Exposure Levels which Exceed EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY, Refer to Figure 7-A.		
	All	Events are in progress <u>or</u> have occurred which involve Actual <u>or</u> Potential Substantial Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels.		
	All	Unusual Events are in Progress <u>or</u> have occurred which indicate a Potential Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant. No releases of Radioactive Material requiring Offsite Response <u>or</u> Monitoring are expected unless further degradation of Safety Systems occurs.		

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Η A Table 4-3 SECURITY EVENTS a SABOTAGE/INTRUSION has occurred or is occurring within the **PROTECTED AREA** b. HOSTAGE/EXTORTION Situation that Threatens to interrupt Plant Operations c CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing between the SITE PERIMETER and PROTECTED AREA d. Hostile STRIKE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA which threatens to interrupt Normal Plant Т Operations (Judgment Based on behavior of Strikers and/or Intelligence received) e A CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC security threat notification.

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FIS 1.1 1.2 1.3	SSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) Fuel Clad RCS Containment	1
SY 2.1	STEM DEGRADATION Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage	
2.2 2.3	Loss of Function/Communication2.7Uncontrolled Cool DownFailure of Reactor Protection2.8Turbine Failure	2
2.4	Fuel Clad Degradation2.9Technical Specification	
	RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit OSS OF POWER	
3.1 3.2	Loss of AC (Power Ops) Loss of AC (Shutdown)	3
3.3	Loss of DC	5
4.1 4.2 DI 5.1 5.2 5.3	Fire4.3Flammable Gas4.5Control Room EvacuationExplosion4.4Toxic Gas4.6SecurityTable 4-1Table 4-24.7SED JudgmentFigure 4-AFigure 4-BTable 4-3CSTRUCTIVE PHENOMENONEarthquake5.4River Level HighTornado5.5River Level LowAircraft/Projectile5.6Watercraft CrashCrashFigure 5-AFigure 5-A	4
SH 6.1 6.2	Table 5-1 IUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Loss of Shutdown Systems Loss of AC (Shutdown)	6
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6.3 6.4		
6.4	ADIOLOGICAL	

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DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS

UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7)

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EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force

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FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e g, Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures

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INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization

ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein

PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, musalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation

SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g, chlorine)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e g, alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e, within 15 minutes

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included

VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

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	<u> </u>	5.1 Earthquake		5.2 Tornado
	Mode	Initiating/Condition	Mode	Initiating/Condition
G E N E R A L		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matnx"
SHTE		Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matnx"		Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matrix"
ALURT	All	 Earthquake detected by site seismic instrumentation (1 and 2) 1. (a and b) a Ann 166 D indicates "OBE Spectra Exceeded" b Ann 166 E indicates "Seismic Recording Initiated" 2 (a or b) a Ground motion sensed by Plant personnel b National Earthquake Information Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event. 	All	 Tornado or High Winds strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1 and results in VISIBLE DAMAGE (1 and 2) 1. Tornado or High Winds (Sustained >80 mph > one minute) strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1 2. (a or b) a Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE b Control Room indications of degraded Safety System or component response due to event Note: Site Met Data Instrumentation fails to 0 at >100 mph. National Weather Service Mornstown 1-(423) 586-8400 can provide additional information if needed.
UNUSUAL EVENT	All	 Earthquake detected by site seismic instrumentation (1 and 2) 1. Ann 166 E indicator "Seismic Recording Initiated" 2. (a or b) a Ground motion sensed by Plant personnel b National Earthquake Information Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event. 	All	Tornado within the SITE PERIMETER 1. Plant personnel report a Tornado has been sighted within the SITE PERIMETER (Refer to Figure 5-A)

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	5.3 Aircraft/Projectile Crash				
	Mode	Initiating/Condition			
GENERAL		Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matnx"			
S – F m		Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matnx"			
de é.					
ALERT	All	 Aircraft or PROJECTILE impacts (Strikes) any Plant structure listed in Table 5-1 resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE (1 and 2) 1. Plant personnel report aircraft or PROJECTILE has impacted any structure listed in Table 5-1 2 (a or b) a Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE b Control Room indications of degraded Safety System or component response due to the event within the specified areas 			
	All	Aircraft crash <u>or</u> PROJECTILE impact within the SITE PERIMETER 1. Plant personnel report a Aircraft Crash <u>or</u> PROJECTILE impact within the SITE PERIMETER (Refer to Figure 5-A)			

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Table 5-1 Plant Structures Associated With Tornado/Hi Wind and Aircraft EALs

Unit #1 and 2 Reactor Buildings Auxiliary Building Control Building Diesel Generator Building Additional Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station Additional Equipment Buildings (Units 1 & 2) CDWE Building Turbine Building RWST CST

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	n an taon an ta Taon an taon an t	5.4 River Level HIGH		5.5 River Level LOW
	Mode	Initiating/Condition	Mode	Initiating/Condition
G E N E R A L		Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matnx"		Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matnx"
SLTE		Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matnx"		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matnx"
A L E R T	All	River Reservoir level is at Stage II Flood Warning (1 or 2) 1. River Reservoir level >727 Ft 2 Stage II Flood Warning (AOI-7) has been issued by River Systems Operations	All	River Reservoir level is <668 Ft (AOI-22) as reported by River Systems Operations
U N U S U A L E V E N T	All	 River Reservoir level is at Stage I Flood Warning (1 or 2 or 3) 1. River Reservoir level >726.5 Ft from April 16 thru September 30 2. River Reservoir level >714 5 Ft from October 1 thru April 15 3 Stage I Flood Warning (AOI-7) has been issued by River Systems Operations 	All	River Reservoir level is ≤673 Ft (AOI-22) as reported by River Systems Operations

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	Mode	5.6 Watercraft Crash Initiating/Condition
G E N E R A		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
n H – o		Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matnx"
		Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matrix"
L H R F		
U N U S U A	Ali	 Watercraft Strikes the Intake Pumping Station resulting in a reduction of Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) or Raw Cooling Water (RCW) (1 and 2) Plant personnel report a Watercraft has struck the Intake Pumping Station
L		 2 (a or b or c) a ERCW Supply Header Pressure Train A O-PI-67-18A is <15 psig b ERCW Supply Header Pressure Train B O-PI-67-17A is <15 psig
		c RCW Supply Header Pressure O-PI-24-22 is <15 psig

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
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Figure 5-A PROTECTED AREA/SITE PERIMETER





1.1 1.2 1.3	SION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4 Fuel Clad RCS Containment	1
SYS 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5	STEM DEGRADATIONLoss of Instrumentation2.6RCS Identified LeakageLoss of Function/Communication2.7Uncontrolled Cool DownFailure of Reactor Protection2.8Turbine FailureFuel Clad Degradation2.9Technical SpecificationRCS Unidentified Leakage2.10Safety Limit	2
LO 3.1 3.2 3.3	SS OF POWER Loss of AC (Power Ops) Loss of AC (Shutdown) Loss of DC	3
HA 4.1 4.2	ZARDS and SED JUDGMENTFire4.3Flammable Gas4.5Control Room EvacualExplosion4.4Toxic Gas4.6SecurityTable 4-1Table 4-24.7SED JudgmentFigure 4-AFigure 4-BTable 4-3	ation 4
DE 5.1 5.2 5.3	CSTRUCTIVE PHENOMENONEarthquake5.4River Level HighTornado5.5River Level LowAircraft/Projectile5.6Watercraft CrashCrashFigure 5-ATable 5-1	5
	UTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Loss of Shutdown Systems Loss of AC (Shutdown) Loss of DC (Shutdown) Fuel Handling	6
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DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS

UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4 7)

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e within 15 minutes

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e, steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the statuon.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e g, Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization

ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e g, paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.

VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation. -

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	6.1 L Mode	oss of Shutdown Systems Initiating/Condition	Mode	6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) Initiating/Condition
G E N		Initiating/Condition		Not Applicable
E R A L	5,6	Note Additional information will be provided later pending NRC Guidance on Shutdown EALs Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)		
S 1 T E A L E R T	5,6	 Loss of water level in the Rx vessel that has or will uncover fuel in the Rx vessel with CNTMT closure established (1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5) 1 Loss of RHR capability 2 Rx vessel water level < el. 718' 3. Incore TCs (if available) indicate RCS temp >200° F 4 RCS is vented/open to CNTMT 5 CNTMT closure is established <i>Note: If CNTMT open, refer to "Gaseous Effluents"</i> (7.1) Inability to maintain Unit in Cold Shutdown (1 and 2 and 3) 1. RHR capability is not available for RCS Cooling 2. Incore TCs (if available) indicate RCS temp >200° F 3 CNTMT closure is established 	5,6 or De- Fuel	Not Applicable UNPLANNED loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Power for >15 minutes 1 1A and 1B 6 9 KV Shutdown Bds de-energized for >15 minutes
U N U S U A L E V E N T		Note Additional information will be provided later pending NRC Guidance on Shutdown EALs	5,6 or De- Fuel	 UNPLANNED loss of All Offsite Power for >15 minutes (1 and 2) 1. C and D CSSTS not available For >15 minutes 2 Either Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board

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	6.3 L	oss of DC (Shutdown)	6.4 F
	Mode	Initiating/Condition	Mode
G E N E R A L		Not Applicable	
		Not Applicable	
ALERT		Not Applicable	All
UNUSUAL EVENT		 UNPLANNED loss of the required Train of DC Power for >15 minutes (1 or 2) 1 Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-1 and 1-III for >15 minutes 2 Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-II and 1-IV for >15 minutes. 	All

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F	uel Handling
	Initiating/Condition
	Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)
	Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)
	 Major damage to Irradiated Fuel, <u>or</u> Loss of water level that has <u>or</u> will uncover Irradiated Fuel outside the Reactor Vessel (1 and 2) 1. VALID alarm on O-RE-90-101 <u>or</u> O-RE-90-102 <u>or</u> O-RE-90-103 <u>or</u> 1-RE-90-130/131 <u>or</u> 1-RE-90-112 <u>or</u> 1-RE-90-400 <u>or</u> 2-RE-90-400 2. (a or b) a Plant personnel report damage of Irradiated Fuel sufficient to rupture
	Fuel Rods b Plant personnel report water level drop has <u>or</u> will exceed makeup capability such that Irradiated Fuel will be uncovered
	UNPLANNED loss of water level in Spent Fuel Pool <u>or</u> Reactor Cavity <u>or</u> Transfer Canal with fuel remaining covered (1 and 2 and 3) 1. Plant personnel report water level drop in Spent Fuel Pool or Reactor Cavity, or
	Spent r der fot <u>or</u> Transfer Canal 2. VALID alarm on O-RE-90-102 or O-RE-90-103 or 1-RE-90-60

3. Fuel remains covered with water

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FIS 1.1 1.2	SION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) Fuel Clad RCS	1
1.2	Containment	1
SY: 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5	STEM DEGRADATIONLoss of Instrumentation2.6Loss of Function/Communication2.7Failure of Reactor Protection2.8Fuel Clad Degradation2.9RCS Unidentified Leakage2.10Safety Limit	2
LO 3.1 3.2 3.3	SS OF POWER Loss of AC (Power Ops) Loss of AC (Shutdown) Loss of DC	3
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SH 6.1 6.2 6.3 6 4	UTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Loss of Shutdown Systems Loss of AC (Shutdown) Loss of DC (Shutdown) Fuel Handling	6

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VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation ł

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		7.1 Gaseous Effluents
	Mode	Initiating/Condition
G E N E R A L	All	 EAB dose resulting from an actual <u>or</u> imminent release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 1000 mrem TEDE <u>or</u> 5000 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual <u>or</u> projected duration of the release (1 or 2 or 3) 1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under General in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is <u>Not</u> exceeded 2 Field survey results indicate >1000 mrem/hr gamma <u>or</u> an I-131 concentration of 3 9E-6 μ C/cc at SP 3 EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >1000 mrem TEDE <u>or</u> >5000 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual <u>or</u> projected duration of the release (Figure 7-A)
S H H W	All	 EAB dose resulting from an actual <u>or</u> imminent release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 100 mrem TEDE <u>or</u> 500 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual <u>or</u> projected duration of the release (1 or 2 or 3) A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under Site in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is <u>Not</u> exceeded Field survey results indicate >100 mrem/hr gamma <u>or</u> an I-131 concentration of 3 9E-7 µ Ci/cc at SP EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >100 mrem TEDE <u>or</u> >500 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual <u>or</u> projected duration of the release (Figure 7-A)
ALERT	All	 Any UNPLANNED release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Limit for >15 minutes (1 or 2 or 3) A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under Alert in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is <u>Not</u> exceeded Field survey results indicate >10 mrem/hr gamma at SP >15 minutes EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >10 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Figure 7-A)
U N U S U A L E V E N T	All	 Any UNPLANNED release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Limit for >60 minutes (1 or 2 or 3) 1 A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under UE in Table 7-1 for >60 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded 2 Field survey results indicate >0.1 mrem/hr gamma at SP for >60 minutes 3 EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >0 1 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Figure 7-A)

Mode	Initiating/Condition
	Not Applicable
	Not Applicable
All	 Any UNPLANNED release of Liquid Radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Limit for >15 minutes (1 or 2) A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under Alert in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded. Sample results exceed 200 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >15 minutes in duration
All	 Any UNPLANNED release of Liquid Radioactivity to th Environment that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Limit for >60 minutes (1 or 2) 1 A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under UE in Table 7-1 for >60 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded. 2. Sample results exceed 2 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >60 minutes in duration

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TABLE 7-1 EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITOR EALS⁽¹⁾

The values below, if exceeded, indicate the need to perform the specified assessment. If the assessment can not be completed within 15 minutes (60 minutes for UE), the declaration shall be made based on the VALID reading As used here, the radiation monitor indications as displayed on ICS are the primary indicators. If ICS is unavailable, utilize the radiation monitor readings in the control room or local indication as necessary.

Monitor	ICS Screen	Units	UE	Alert	Site	General
Total Site	EFF1	μCi/s ⁽²⁾	1.5E+05	1.5E+07	2.5E+08	2.5E+09
U1 Shield Building 1-RE-90-400	EFF1	μCi/s	6.7E+04	6.7E+06	1.0E+08	1.0E+09
U2 Shield Building 2-RE-90-400	EFF1	μCi/s	1.5E+04	1.5E+06	2.5E+07	2.6E+08
Auxiliary Building 0-RE-90-101B	4RM1	cpm	1.2E+04	1.2E+06	*****(])	*****(1)
Service Building 0-RE-90-132B	4RM1	cpm	4.3E+03	4.3E+05	9.8E+06	*****(<u>1)</u>
U1 Condenser Vacuum Exhaust					0.007.01	0.0077.000
1-RE-90-404A	3PAM 3PAM	μCi/cc ⁽³⁾ μCi/cc	5.5E-02 5.5E-02	5.5E+00 5.5E+00	8.83E+01 8.83E+01	8.83E+02 8.83E+02
S/G Discharge Monitors 1-RE-90-421 thru 424 (B)	4RM2	mR/hr ⁽⁴⁾	NA	3.5E+02	3.5E+03	3.5E+04
Liquid Monitors 0-RE-90-122 1-RE-90-120,121	n/a 4RM2 4RM2	μCi/ml ⁽²⁾ cpm cpm	1.8E-05 1.1E+06 1.0E+06	1.8E-03 *****(1) *****(1)	N/A N/A N/A	N/A N/A N/A
0-RE-90-225 0-RE-90-212	4RM2 4RM2 4RM2	cpm cpm	9.2E+05 1.5E+04	*****(1) 1.5E+06	N/A N/A N/A	N/A N/A N/A
RELEASE DURATION	min	utes	60	15	15	15

ASSESSMENT METHOD: ICS or radiation monitor (RM) readings in the MCR or local indication as necessary

Note: (1) Table values are calculated values. The ***** indicates the monitor is off scale.


- (2) These releases rate values in µCi/s and µCi/ml are provided on the gaseous and liquid release points for <u>Information Only</u>. Actual monitor readings are given in the table corresponding to the monitor for the four emergency classifications.
- (3) This eberline channel reads out in cpm in the MCR. Indications of a radioactivity release via this pathway would be S/G blowdown monitors or other indications of primary-to-secondary leakage such as S/G level increase or pressurizer level decrease. ICS calculates μ Ci/cc and has a visual indication of an alarm condition when the indications exceeds 5.5E-02 μ Ci/cc. This channel was included in the table to provide a means to further assess a release detected by other indications and to provide a path for possible escalation.
- (4) These unit values are based on flow rates through one [1] PORV of 970,000 lb/hr at 1,185 psig, 600°F. Before using these values, ensure a release to the environment is ongoing (e.g PORV)

NOTE:

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Figure 7-A EXCLUSION AREA, SITE BOUNDARY and SITE PERIMETER

NOTE: The Site Boundary used here is consistent with the definition in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. Do Not confuse this boundary with the SITE PERIMETER defined in these EALs, or with other definitions of "Site Boundary."



Note: Numbered points are [SP] radiological survey point for all sectors.

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:		7.3 Radiation Levels		7.4 Fuel Handling
	Mode	Initiating/Condition	Mode	
G E N E R A L		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" or "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)		Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)
L S I T E		Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matnx" or "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)		Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)
ALERT	All	 UNPLANNED increases in Radiation levels within the Facility that impedes Safe Operations or establishment or maintenance of Cold Shutdown (1 or 2) 1. VALID area Radiation Monitor readings or survey results exceed 15 mrem/hr in the Control Room or CAS 2 (a and b) a VALID area radiation monitor readings exceed values listed in Table 7-2 b. Access restrictions impede operation of systems necessary for Safe Operation or the ability to establish Cold Shutdown See UNUSUAL EVENT Note Below 	All	 Major damage to Irradiated Fuel, <u>or</u> Loss of water level that has <u>or</u> will uncover Irradiated Fuel outside the Reactor Vessel (1 and 2) 1. VALID alarm on 0-RE-90-101 <u>or</u> 0-RE-90-102 <u>or</u> 0-RE-90-103 <u>or</u> 1-RE-90-130/131 <u>or</u> 1-RE-90-112 <u>or</u> 1-RE-90-400 <u>or</u> 2-RE-90-400 2 (a or b) a Plant personnel report damage of Irradiated Fuel sufficient to rupture Fuel Rods b. Plant personnel report water level drop has <u>or</u> will exceed makeup capacity such that Irradiated Fuel will be uncovered
UNUSUAL EVENT	All	 UNPLANNED increase in Radiation levels within the Facility 1. VALID area Radiation Monitor readings increase by a factor 1000 over normal levels Note: In Either the UE or ALERT EAL, the SED must determine the cause of Increase in Radiation Levels and Review Other INITIATING/CONDITIONS for Applicability (e g, a dose rate of 15 mrem/hr in the Control Room could be caused by a release associated with a DBA). 	All	 UNPLANNED loss of water level in Spent Fuel Pool or Reactor Cavity or Transfer Canal with fuel remaining covered (1 and 2 and 3) 1. Plant personnel report water level drop in Spent Fuel Pool, or Reactor Cavity, or Transfer Canal 2. VALID alarm on 0-RE-90-102 or 0-RE-90-103 or 1-RE-90-59 or 1-RE-90-60 3. Fuel remains covered with water.

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Table 7-2

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ALERT - RADIATION LEVELS

	Location	n	Monitor
Monitor No.	Building and E	levation	Reading *
1&2 RE-90-1	Auxiliary E	El. 757.0	2.5×10^3 mR/hr
	(spe	ent fuel pool)	
1-RE-90-2	Auxiliary H	El. 757.0	2.5 x 10° R/hr
	(perse	onnel air lock)	
0-RE-90-3	Auxiliary H	El. 729.0	$2.5 \ge 10^3 \text{ mR/hr}$
	(wa	ste pac. area)	
0-RE-90-4	Auxiliary I	El. 713.0	$1.5 \ge 10^3 \text{ mR/hr}$
	(d	econ room)	
0-RE-90-5	Auxiliary 1	El. 737.0	$1.5 \ge 10^3 \text{ mR/hr}$
	(spt. fu	el pool pmp. ar.)	
1&2-RE-90-6	Auxiliary	El. 737.0	$1.5 \ge 10^3 \text{ mR/hr}$
	(comp.	cl. wtr. ht. ex. ar.)	r.)
1&2-RE-90-7	Auxiliary	El. 713.0	2×10^3 mR/hr
	(53	ample room)	
1&2-RE-90-8	Auxiliary	El. 713.0	$1.5 \ge 10^3 \text{ mR/hr}$
	(aux.	feed pump area)	
0-RE-90-9	Auxiliary	El. 692.0	$1.5 \ge 10^3 \text{ mR/hr}$
	(wst. c	ond. evap. tk. ar.)	
1&2-RE-90-10	Auxiliary	El. 692.0	$1.5 \ge 10^3 \text{ mR/hr}$
		(cvcs area)	
0-RE-90-11	Auxiliary	El. 676.0	$1.5 \ge 10^3 \text{ mR/hr}$
	(ctmt. s	pry. & rhr pmp ar.)	
1-RE-90-61	Auxiliary	El. 736.0	$2.5 \times 10^3 \text{ mR/hr}$
	(RB lo	w. cmpt. inst. rm.)	
0-RE-90-230	Turbine	El. 685.0	$1.5 \ge 10^3 \text{ mR/hr}$
	(cc	onden. demin.)	
0-RE-90-231	Turbine	El. 685.0	1.5×10^3 mR/hr
	(cc	onden. demin.)	

Note: *These monitors read out in mR/hr. It is assumed that this is equivalent to mrem/hr.

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		E NOTES 1 of 1	
1. NIR-0551, DV-84710 850321 809004, MSC-	0 F00012, and MC- -00956, NCO 920030366.	provided in EPIP- 1.1.5 and 1.3 CN (7.1 Gaseous Effli 7-1, 7.3 Radiation Table 7-2). Barrie Fission Product B	and challenges to barriers are -1, Section 1 in (1.1 Fuel Clad TMT Barrier 1.3.5), Section 7 uents, 7.2 Liquid Effluents, Table a Levels, 7.4 Fuel Handling and ers are covered in Section 1, carrier Matrix. Monitor readings in EPIP-5, App. B, Note 3.
2. MC-84 0827 005 035.	A, MCS-2400	SED duties that c Responsibility.	an not be delegated. Section 2.0
3. MC-8407 1900 3003, 920030222 CNTMT	MSC-00701, NCO-	parameter to dete Monitor readings parameters for the classifications. Se Matrix (1.1 Fuel 0 Section 7 (7.1 Ga	ed in conjunction with a plant rmine emergency classifications. are included with plant e purposes of emergency ection 1, Fission Product Barrier Clad, 1.2 RCS, 1.3 Containment), seous Effluent, 7.2 Liquid Radiation Levels and 7.4 Fuel
4. ANSI Standard N.18. 5.3.9.3: 01 POI	7-1976 Subsection	EPIPs will contain	n the following elements
 5. MSC-02401, NCO-92 6. EPPOS #2 	20030998		on of failed fuel. redness Position (EPPOS) on sification of emergency conditions

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FILING INSTRUCTIONS

DOCUMENT NUMBER	EPIP-	2
REMOVE REV	INSERT REV_	19
COMMENTS		

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

EPIP-2

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT

Revision 19

Unit 0

NON-QUALITY RELATED

PREPARED BY: Frank L: Pavlechko (Type Name)

SPONSORING ORGANIZATION: Emergency Planning

APPROVED BY Frank L. Pavlechko

EFFECTIVE DATE: 07/30/2002

LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE

	NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL	EPIP-2]
WBN	EVENT	Revision 19	
		Page 2 of 12	-

REVISION LOG

Revision Number	Implementation Date	Pages Affected	Description of Revision
8	7/5/96	4,5,6,7,8	Phone number and titles revised. Procedure (TI-30) replacement identified. All revisions were evaluated to be non-intent.
9	10/10/96	3,4,5, 8,9	The following non-intent revisions were made: SM designee identified by title, OSC and TSC support personnel instruction added, a reference was added and the non-QA record instructions revised.
CN-1	3/27/97	3,5,6	TEMA additional back-up number added.
CN-2	2/2/98	3,5,7,8	SSP-4.05 was replaced by SPP-3.5 in new procedure system. Editorial.
10	6/30/98	All	Non-Intent Change. Incorporated Change Notices 1 and 2. Changed reference SSP 3.4 to SPP 3.1.
11	10/21/99	All	Non Intent Change. Moved termination of emergency step from Appendix A to Appendix B. STD-3.2 reference canceled.
12	6/14/00	All	Non Intent Change. Revised reference number. Added backup call to the ODS should the EPS fail to operate. Added the word actions after notifications in Step 4 for clarification.
13	10/31/00	All pg. 5	Non-Intent change. Revised NRC dedicated phones from FTS-2000 to TVA phone circuits pa (RIS) 2000-11 "NRC Emergency Telecommunications Systems".
14	3/30/01	All Page 6,10	Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP: Non-Intent change. Revised phone number. Revised initial notification form to standardize within TVAN and meet new NEI PI requirements to the NRC.
15	4/25/01	All pg. 2, 10	Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP: Non-Intent change. Corrected typo.
16	9/25/01	All pg. 9,10	Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP: Intent change. Procedure revised to Non-Quality related per requirements of NQAP & pending revision to SPP-2.2. The coversheet and records section of the procedure was revised to reflect this change. Non-Intent change. Corrected typo on Appendix A.

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NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT

EPIP-2 Revision 19 Page 3 of 12

	Revision Number	Implementation Date	Pages	Description of Revision
			Affected	
	17	01/24/02	All .pg. 3, 5, 7	Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following revisions do not reduce the
	-		, i.,	level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP: Non-intent change. Added step to receive ODS confirmation call to TEMA. This standardizes with other TVAN units. Per NRC Safeguards Advisory, revised caution statement to include security
	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	~	· · · · · ·	adversary attack.
	18	06/05/02	All 3-5 & 7	Plan effectiveness determinations on these changes indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.
t			, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	Intent change(s): per NRC Recommended "Actions for Licensee Response to a Site Specific Credible Threat at Nuclear Power Plants". Revised step 8 and note(s) to require activation of the TSC/OSC for a Security Site Specific Credible Threat. Non-intent change(s): added fax number to TEMA.
	19	07/30/02	All 3, 4, 5, 7, 8	Plan effectiveness determinations on these changes indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP. Intent changes made to the procedure to support the NRC Safeguards Advisory and actions associated with IN 2002-14. (ie) Added Step 8 on the two person line of site rule, and assembly and accountability requirements. Realigned steps in instruction concerning Security Site Specific Credible Threat. Added Steps 18 and 19 to enhance termination instructions. Added NRC IN 2002-14 to the references.

	NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL	EPIP-2
WBN	EVENT	Revision 19
		Page 4 of 12

1.0 PURPOSE

- 1.1 To provide a method for timely notification of appropriate individuals when the Shift Manager (SM) or Site Emergency Director (SED), Technical Support Center (TSC) has determined by WBN, EPIP-1 that an incident has occurred which is classified as a NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT.⁵
- 1.2 To provide a method for periodic reanalysis of the current situation by the SED to determine whether the **NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT** action(s) should be terminated, continued or upgraded to another classification.

2.0 **RESPONSIBILITY**

The SED who is initially the SM (or other SM on-site during the emergency) or designee (Unit Supervisor, US) until properly relieved by the TSC SED, has the responsibility and authority for implementation of the action(s) in this instruction.⁵

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS

- 3.1 Upon determining that existing conditions are classified as a NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT according to EPIP-1 (independent evaluations by crew members may be beneficial), the SED, or designee, will:^{4, 5}
 - IF there are personnel injuries, IMPLEMENT EPIP-10, "Medical Emergency Response."

- 2. COMPLETE Appendix A, Notification Information
- 3. IF the Unusual Event declaration is based on a Credible Site Specific Security Threat Notification indicated by EVENT 4.6 Security EALs or TSC and OSC support is needed for any other reason then **DIRECT** Shift Personnel to activate the Emergency Paging System (EPS) to staff the TSC and OSC. Shift Personnel should confirm activation and provide the 20 minute printed report to the SM for review.
- **NOTE 1** IF the EPS system fails, call the ODS, ringdown or (5-751-1700) and have him activate the EPS.
- **NOTE 2** IF the above methods of activating the EPS fail, Shift Personnel must use the Radiological Emergency Response Call Lists to staff the TSC and OSC. This list is located in the EPS Manual near the terminal.
- CAUTION If there is any possibility of a radiological release or security adversary attack, do not send personnel into areas of unknown radiological conditions or security risk without first contacting Radiological Contro (RADCON) or Security.

WE	BN	NOTIFICATION OF EVENT	UNUSUAL	EPIP-2 Revision 19 Page 5 of 12	
3.0 INSTRU	CTIONS (c	ontinued)		·	
4.	is being d	CE to the crew: "A Noti leclared based on gency Director."			
5.	5-751-249 the ODS of Emergence Emergence	he ODS direct by ODS I 95 and PROVIDE the inf cannot be contacted with cy Management Agency cy Plan activation by cal 262-3300 or 9-1-615-741	formation from hin 10 minute is to be notif ling:	m Appendix A. IF es, the Tennessee fied of the Radiological	
,				3	
· 6.		endix A to the ODS. (# p at 9-1-615-242-9635.	ore-programn	ned or 5-751-3400),	
7.	ATTENTI Event is b	ICE to the plant, "ATTEI ON ALL SITE PERSON being declared based or s." (Repeat)	NEL. A Notil	SITE PERSONNEL. fication of Unusual	
8.	Security r "Two Per	UE has been declared of ecommends Accountab son (Line of Sight) Rule and Accountability.	ility to establ	ish the	C
9.	(SEE duty	y list for telephone numb ne Plant Manager or alte	pers): The D	Appendix A information uty Plant Manager	
10.	RECEIVE State of T	confirmation call from t rennessee) (NA this ste	he ODS (to v o, if the state	verify notification of the was contacted directly).	
11.	activatior	NRC, using the designa	· · · · ·		
NOTĖ	of "NOTII requests, NRC Ope	FICATION OF UNUSUA	L`EVENT'' de t provide a co	practicable, within one house eclaration. Whenever NR pontinuous update to the nercial numbers are for the	С
	9-1-301-8 9-1-301-9	316-5100 (MAIN) 951-0550 (Backup) 316-5151 (FAX)			

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W	BN	NOTIFICATIO	N OF UNU /ENT	SUAL	EPIP-2 Revision 19 Page 6 of 12	
.0 INSTRU		continued)				Ċ
12.	Assessm projectio	TE the need to implent for Radiologic n if radioactivity is ease paths.	al Emerge	ncies. " fo	r a dose	
13.	NOTIFY	WBN Emergency I	Preparedne	ess.		
IOTE	as soon a	on to Emergency F as practicable, but ere with emergenc	only when	notificatio	n does	
	Work - 32 Home - 9 Pager - 3	-1-423-337-2911	or		8004 or 1838 9-1-865-376-4691 70215	-
14.	REEVAL to determ	UATE the event us ine if conditions wa	sing WBN I arrant recla	EPIP-1 as assification	necessary n.	
	A IF by	the situation no lor informing the ODS	nger exists S and the D	TERMIN Puty Plant	ATE the emergency Manager.	L
	B. IF INI	the condition warra	ants upgrad riate steps	ding to a h of WBN E	igher classification, PIPs 3, 4, or 5.	
	info	other plant condition ormation, COMPLE pendix B and NOT	ETE the Fo	llow-up N	otification Form,	
	No info mir is t 9-1	DTIFY the ODS directly the ODS directly the ODS directly or 5-751-1700 or 5-700 or 1000 or 1000 or 1000 or 1000 or 1000-262-3300 or 1000-262-3400. ²	751-2495 a DS cannot ee Emerg informatio	and PROV be contac ency Man n by callir	/IDE the cted within 10 agement Agency ng:	

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	NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL	EPIP-2
WBN	EVENT	Revision 19
	s 1 's	Page 7 of 12

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued)

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15.	FAX Appendix A to the ODS. (# pre-programmed or 5-751-3400), or TEMA at 9-1-615-242-9635.	
16.	ENSURE applicable notifications/actions required by SPP-3.5 and SPP-3.1 have been made.	٥
17.	NOTIFY the NRC Resident Inspector by calling 1776 and PROVIDING the information on Appendix A.	
18.	IF the emergency no longer exist complete <u>Appendix B</u> and terminate.	
19.	NOTIFY the NRC and ODS/TEMA of the termination and fax <u>Appendix B</u> to the ODS # pre-programmed or 5-571-3400 or TEMA at 9-1-615-242-9635.	
20.	After the event is terminated, SEND the completed WBN EPIP-2 and associated documentation to WBN Emergency Preparedness (EP) Manager. The EP Manager shall forward documentation to DCRM for storage as appropriate.	0

	NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL	EPIP-2
WBN	EVENT	Revision 19
		Page 8 of 12

4.0 **REFERENCES**

4.1 Interfacing Documents

SPP-3.1 Corrective Action Program

SPP-3.5 Regulatory Reporting Requirements

WBN-EPIP-1 Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart

WBN-EPIP-3 Alert

WBN-EPIP-4 Site Area Emergency

WBN-EPIP-5 General Emergency

WBN-EPIP-10 Medical Emergency Response

WBN-EPIP-13 Termination of the Emergency and Recovery

WBN-EPIP-14 Radiological Control Response

WBN-EPIP-16 Initial Dose Assessment for Radiological Emergencies

CECC-EPIP-9 Emergency Environmental Radiological Monitoring Procedures

4.2 Other Documents

10 CFR 50.72 Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors

NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants.

ANSI N 18.7 - 1976

NRC IN 2002-14

		WBN	NOTIFICATION C EVEN		EPIP-2 Revision 19 Page 9 of 12	
\mathcal{I}	5.0	APPENDIX		ł		
	-	Appendix A, N	otification Information			
		Appendix B, F	ollow-up Notification F	orm '	•	
	6.0	RECORDS		-	•	
	<i>,</i> 6.1	Non QA Record	ls	•.	• •	
,		All EPIP-2 recor Manager for Life	rds generated, when the of Plant.	ne REP is activa	ated, will be stored	by
			rds generated during t ne EP Manager and st			, ,
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5 4 -			- 4			
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WBN EVENT Rev				EPIP-2 Revision 19 Page 10 of 12	
	INITIAL	ENDIX A (Page 1 . NOTIFICATION ON OF UNUSUA	FORM	NT ^{1,4}	l
THIS IS A REAL EV	ENT	THIS IS A	DRILL		
This is	NAME				
A NOTIFICATION OF U Plant affecting:	I <mark>NUSUAL EV</mark> Unit 1		eclared	l at Watts Bar Nuclear	
Event Declared:			Date: _		
EAL Designator (e.g., F	Fire 4.1):				
Brief Description of th	e Event:		-		_
					_
					_
					-
Radiological Conditior	IS:				
 No Abnormal Airborne Rele Liquid Releas Release Infor 	ease Offsite e Offsite	fsite nown at this time			
☐ There is no Protecti	ve Action Re	ecommendation	at this	time.	
Ask, " <u>Please repeat</u>	the informatio	on you have recei	ved to	ensure accuracy."	

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, ,	WBN '	NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	EPIP-2 Revision 19 Page 11 of 12
		APPENDIX B (Page 1 of 1)	
		WBN FOLLOW-UP INFORMATI	
		NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL	
1. ".	D "THIS IS A R	EAL EVENT" or D'THIS IS A DF	RILL."
2. 🗠 🖂	This is follow-u	at the Watts p information regarding the Notification init 1	n of Unusual Event at
3.	"Reactor: SI	nutdown At power "	, , ,
4.		ns are: Stable 🗆 🖢 Deteriorating 🗆 "	•
5. [°]	"Follow-up info	rmation: <u>(e.g., key events, status char</u>	nges)
	······		
^		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
6.	"The radiologic	al conditions are:	-
	No Abno	rmal Release Offsite	
	Airborne	Release Offsite	
	Liquid R	elease Offsite	
	D Release	Information Not Known."	
7.	"Additional Rad	information: <u>(e.g., release duration)</u>	
	•		
B.		Protostivo Astion Decommondation - t	Albia Airea II
		Protective Action Recommendation at	uns ume."
9.	"The event term	ninated at/ Time Date	''
10.	"Please repeation	at the information you have received to	o ensure accuracy."
11.		/	1
		Signature Time	Date

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	WBN EVENT		UNUSUAL	EPIP-2 Revision 19 Page 12 of 12
			CE NOTES le 1 of 1	
1	NRC IE Inform	nation Notice 89-89	Event Noti	fication Worksheets
2	NRC IE Inform	nation Notice 86-97	Emergenc System	y Communications
3	NRC IE Inform	nation Notice 86-28	•	Numbers to the NRC s Center and Regional
4		MC 840827 00500 4A, MSC-02375, NCO 9200 30985		0 Instructions, 3.1, and A (Page 1 of 1).
5	ANSI N18.7-1976 Subsection 5.3.9.3: 01POR		EPIPs will elements.	contain the following
6	NRC Administ	rative Letter 94-04		NRC Operation Cente al telephone and numbers.

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• • F **FILING INSTRUCTIONS**

DOCUMENT NUMBER <u>EPTP-3</u>

REMOVE REV 2/ INSERT REV 32

COMMENTS_____

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

EPIP-3

ALERT

Revision 22

Unit O

NON-QUALITY RELATED

PREPARED BY: _____ Frank L_ Pavlechko

<u>.</u>,

(Type Name)

SPONSORING ORGANIZATION: _ Emergency Planning _

APPROVED BY: Frank L. Pavlechko

EFFECTIVE DATE: 07/30/2002

LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE

WBN	ALERT	EPIP-3 Revision 22	
		Page 2 of 12	

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Revision	Implementation	Pages	EVISION LOG Description of Revision	
Number	Date	Affected		
11	7/5/96	4,5,7,8	Phone number and titles revised. Procedure replacement (TI-30) identified. All revisions were evaluated to be non-intent	
12	10/10/96	3,4,8,9	The following non-intent revisions were made: Shift Personnel replaced Shift Clerk to reflect additional personnel trained on the paging system, SM designee identified by title, a phone number added, a reference was added and the non-QA record instruction were revised.	
CN-1	3/27/97	3,5,7	TEMA added alternate phone number.	
CN-2	2/2/98	3, 5, 7, 8	SSP-4.05 was replaced by SPP-3.5 in new procedure system. Editorial changes.	
13	6/30/98	All	Non-Intent Changes. Incorporated Change Notices 1 and 2. Changed reference SSP 3.4 to SPP 3.1.	
14	10/21/99	All	Non Intent Change. Moved termination of emergency step from Appendix A to Appendix B. STD-3.2 referenced canceled.	
15	06/14/00	All	Non Intent Change. Revised reference number. Added reference to the direct line to the ODS for clarification. Added the word actions after notifications in Step 19 for clarification.	
16	10/31/00	All pg. 6	Non-Intent change. Revised NRC dedicated phones from FTS-2000 to TVA phone circuits per (RIS) 2000-11 "NRC Emergency Telecommunications Systems".	
17	3/30/01	All Page 10	Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP: Non-Intent change. Revised initial notification form to standardize within TVAN and meet new NEI PI requirements to the NRC.	
18	4/25/01	All pg. 2, 10	Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP: Non-Intent change. Corrected typo.	
19	9/25/01	All pg. 9	Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:	
			Intent change. Procedure revised to Non-Quality related per requirements of NQAP & pending revision to SPP-2.2. The coversheet and records section of the procedure was revised to reflect this change.	
20	01/24/02	All pg. 3, 5, 6	Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:	
			Non-intent change. Added step to receive ODS confirmation call to TEMA. This standardizes with other TVAN units. Enhanced caution statement to include Security adversary attack. Per NRC Safeguards Advisory, moved caution step to enhance information. Changed the word Activate to Sound this makes the wording similar to EPIP 3 & 4 on step 9.	

· ·		EPIP-3
WBN	ALERT	Revision 22
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REVISION LOG

Revision Numb e r	Implementation Date	Pages Affected	Description of Revision
⁻ 21	06/05/02	All 3, 5 & 7	Plan effectiveness determinations on these changes indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.
	· ·		Non-intent change(s): added fax number to TEMA.
22	07/30/02	All 3, 5, 8	Plan effectiveness determinations on these changes indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.
	· · ·	- +	Intent change. Revised caution statement on assembly and accountability. Added NRC IN 2002-14 to the references.

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WBN	ALERT EPIP-3 Revision 22 Page 4 of 12	EPIP-3
		Revision 22
		Page 4 of 12

1.0 PURPOSE

- 1.1 To provide a method for timely notification of appropriate individuals when the Shift Manager (SM) or Technical Support Center (TSC) Site Emergency Director (SED) has determined by WBN EPIP-1 that an incident has occurred which is classified as an ALERT.⁴
- 1.2 To provide a method for periodic reanalysis of the current situation by the SED to determine whether the ALERT should be terminated, continued or upgraded to another classification.

2.0 RESPONSIBILITY⁴

The SED who is initially the SM (or other SM onsite during the emergency) or designee (Unit Supervisor, US) until properly relieved by the TSC SED, has the responsibility and authority for implementation of the actions in this instruction.

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS⁴

- 3.1 Upon determining that existing conditions are classified as an ALERT according to EPIP-1 (independent evaluations by crew members may be beneficial), the SED, or designee, will:
 - DIRECT Shift Personnel to activate the Emergency Paging System (EPS) to staff the TSC and Operations Support Center (OSC). Shift Personnel should confirm activation and provide the 20 minute printed report to the SM for review.

- **NOTE 1** IF the EPS systems fails, call the ODS, ringdown or (5-751-1700) and have him activate the EPS.
- **NOTE 2** IF the above methods of activating the EPS fail, the Shift Personnel must use the Radiological Emergency Response Call Lists to staff the TSC and OSC. This list is located in the EPS Manual near the terminal.
 - 2. **COMPLETE** Appendix A, Notification Information.
 - 3. ANNOUNCE to the crew. "An Alert is being declared based on ______. I will be the Site Emergency Director."

,	BN	ALERT	EPIP-3 Revision 22 Page 5 of 12	,
3.0 INST	RUCTIONS	(continued)		
4.	5-751-249 ODS cann Emergenc Emergenc	ne ODS direct by ODS Ringdown or No. 5 and PROVIDE the information from A not be contacted within 10 minutes, the y Management Agency is to be notified y Plan activation by calling 9-1-800-26 41-0001or 9-1-800-262-3400. ²	Appendix A. If the Tennessee d of the Radiological	
5 .		ndix A to the ODS. grammed or 5-751-3400), or TEMA	at 9-1-615-242-9635.	
6.	ATTENTIC	CE to the plant: "ATTENTION ALL ON ALL SITE PERSONNEL. An Al ared based on SC and OSC." (Repeat)	ERT emergency has	I
CAUTION	adversary these con areas of u	s any possibility of a radiological attack, HOLD assembly and accounditions have been resolved. Do not anknown radiological conditions or acting Radiological Control (RADCO	ntability actions until send personnel into security risk without	
7.	assembly EPIP-8, "F	E plant conditions, and IF condition and accountability by. (For additional Personnel Accountability and Evacuat itiate assembly and accountability, GO	al details, go to WBN ion"). IF you are not	
8.	NOTIFY S	Security (CAS) that assembly and a	ccountability is to be	
9.		CE to the plant: "ATTENTION ALL ON ALL SITE PERSONNEL. Report to	SITE PERSONNEL.	
	for accou personnel	ntability" (Repeat) AND SOUND assembly and accountability. INITIAT Personnel Accountability and Evacuation	EWBN	

		EPIP-3
WBN	ALERT	Revision 22
		Page 6 of 12

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued)

11.	IF there are personnel injuries, IMPLEMENT WBN EPIP-10,
	"Medical Emergency Response."

- 12. IF there is a security threat, IMPLEMENT WBN EPIP-11, "Security and Access Control."
- NOTIFY Duty Plant Manager, and PROVIDE Appendix A information (SEE duty list for telephone numbers). The Duty Plant Manager will call the Plant Manager or his alternate.
- 14. **EVALUATE** the need to implement EPIP-16, "Initial Dose Assessment for Radiological Emergencies," for a dose projection if radioactivity is being released through normal plant release paths.
- 15. **RECEIVE** confirmation call from the ODS (to verify notification of the State of Tennessee) (NA this step, if the state was contacted directly). □
- 16. **NOTIFY** the NRC, using designated NRC phone (ENS), of plan activation.
- NOTE NRC notification should be made as soon as practicable but within one hour of "ALERT" declaration. Whenever NRC requests, a qualified person must provide a continuous update to NRC Operations Center. The following commercial numbers are for the NRC Operations Center.^{3, 5}

9-1-301-816-5100 (MAIN) 9-1-301-951-0550 (BACKUP) 9-1-301-816-5151 (FAX)

17. **NOTIFY** the NRC Resident Inspector by calling 1776 and **PROVIDING** the information on Appendix A.

Ŵ	BN	ALERT	EPIP-3 Revision 22 Page 7 of 12
3.0 INST	RUCTIONS	(continued)	
18.	REEVALU	ATE conditions using WBN EPIP-1 as	s necessary.
	in V	ne conditions are under control, INITIA VBN EPIP-13, 'Termination of the Eme covery.''	
		ne conditions warrant upgrading to a h	
	info	other plant conditions warrant the need rmation, COMPLETE the Followup No pendix B, and NOTIFY the TSC/CECC	otification Form,
	No. IF t Ter of t 9-1	TIFY the ODS direct by ODS Ringdow 5-751-1700 or 5-751-2495 and PRO he ODS cannot be contacted within 10 nessee Emergency Management Age he information by calling: -800-262-3300 or 9-1-615-741-0001 of -800-262-3400 ²	VIDE the information.) minutes, the ency is to be notified
19.	FAX Appe (# pre-pro	ndix A to the ODS. grammed or 5-751-3400), or TEMA a	at 9-1-615-242-9635.
. 20.		applicable notifications/actions require ave been made.	
21.	the Emerg	completed WBN EPIP-3 and associa ency Preparedness (EP) Manager. T ocumentation to DCRM for storage as	The EP Manager shall
2			

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		EPIP-3
WBN	ALERT	Revision 22
		Page 8 of 12

4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 Interfacing Documents

SPP-3.5 Regulatory Reporting Requirements

SPP-3.1 Corrective Action Program

WBN-EPIP-1 Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart

WBN-EPIP-2 Notification of Unusual Event

WBN-EPIP-4 Site Area Emergency

WBN-EPIP-5 General Emergency

WBN-EPIP-10 Medical Emergency Response

WBN-EPIP-11 Security and Access Control

WBN-EPIP-13 Termination of the Emergency and Recovery

WBN-EPIP-16 Initial Dose Assessment for Radiological Emergencies

CECC-EPIP-9 Emergency Environmental Radiological Monitoring Procedures

4.2 Other Documents

10 CFR 50.72 Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors

NUREG 0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants.

ANSI N18.7-1976

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2002-14

CECC-EPIP-8 Dose Assessment Staff Activities During Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergencies

WBN		ALERT	EPIP-3 Revision 22 Page 9 of 12		
5.0	APPENDIX				
	Appendix A, Notif	ication Information	· · · ·		
	Appendix B, Followup Notification Form				
6.0	RECORDS				
6.1	Non QA Records				
	All EPIP-3 records Life of Plant.	generated, when the REP is activated,	will be stored by EP Manager for		
	All EPIP-3 records Manager and stor	s generated during the course of a drill/e	exercise will be assembled by the EF		

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WBN	WBN ALERT EPIP-3 Page 10 of 12				
,	APPENDIX A (Page 1 of 1) INITIAL NOTIFICATION FOR ALERT				
☐ THIS IS A REAL EV	THIS IS A DRILL	_			
This isNAM	ME	_·			
An ALERT has been de	eclared at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant af	fecting:			
🔲 Unit 1	🔲 Unit 2				
Event Declared:	Time: Date: _				
EAL Designator (e.g., I	Fire 4.1):				
Brief Description of th	e Event:				
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·					
Radiological Condition	1S:				
 No Abnormal Releases Offsite Airborne Release Offsite Liquid Release Offsite Release Information Not Known at this time 					
There is no Protecti	ive Action Recommendation at this	time.			
Ask "Please repeat the information you have received to ensure accuracy."					

	WBN	ALERT	EPIP-3 Revision 22 Page 11 of 12
		APPENDIX B (Page 1 of 1))
		WBN FOLLOWUP INFORMATION	N FORM
1.	🗆 ''THIS IS A F	REAL EVENT' or D 'THIS IS A DR	SILL."
2.	This is followup	at the Watts Bar Nuclear Pl information regarding the Alert at Watt ' Unit 2 □."	
3.	"Reactor:	Shutdown At power	•
4.	"Plant conditions	are: Stable Deteriorating	□ "
5.	"Followup inform	nation: (e.g., key events, status chang	es)
	• <u>•</u> ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	·····	
6.	"Site Assembly a	and Accountability is ongoing: Yes [⊐ No ⊡"
7.	"The radiologica	l conditions are:	
	No Abnor	mal Release Offsite	
		Release Offsite	
	•	elease Offsite	
		Information Not Known."	
8.	"Additional Rad	information: (e.g., release duration)	
	<u> </u>		
			7
9.	□ 'There is	no Protective Action Recommendation	n at this time."
10.	"The event term	inated at <u>/</u> ." Time Date	
11.	"Please r	epeat the information you have receive	ed to ensure accuracy."
12.			/
		Signature	Time Date

	WBN	ALE	RT ·	EPIP-3 Revision 22 Page 12 of 12	
	-		IRCE NOTES age 1 of 1		
1	NRC IE Information Notice No. 89-89		Event Notification	on Worksheets	
2	NRC IE Information Notice No. 86-97		Emergency Col	mmunications System	
3	NRC IE Information Notice No. 86-28		Telephone Nun and Regional O	nbers to the NRC Operations Cent Offices	er
4	ANSI N18.7-1976 Subsection 5.3.9.3: 01POI		EPIPs will conta elements.	ain the following	
5	NRC Administrative Letter 94-04		Change of NRC telephone and f	Operations Center commercial acsimile numbers.	

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FILING INSTRUCTIONS

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DOCUMENT NUMBER	EPTP-4
REMOVE REV_22	INSERT REV 23
COMMENTS	、

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

EPIP-4

SITE AREA EMERGENCY

Revision 23

Unit 0

NON-QUALITY RELATED

PREPARED BY: <u>Frank L. Pavlechko</u> (Type Name)

SPONSORING ORGANIZATION: <u>Emergency Planning</u>

APPROVED BY: Frank L. Pavlechko

EFFECTIVE DATE: 07/30/2002

LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE

WBN

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SITE AREA EMERGENCY

EPIP-4 Revision 23 Page 2 of 12 1.

REVISION DESCRIPTION

		• * *	
Revision Number	Implementatio n	Pages Affected	Description of Revision
	Date		
CN-1	9/28/95	5	Revised phone numbers. Editorial (non-intent) changes made.
11	7/5/96	4,5,7,8	Phone number and titles revised. Procedure replacement (TI-30) identified. All revisions were evaluated to be non-intent.
12	10/10/96	3,4,5,8,9, 10 -	The following non-intent revisions were made: Shift Personnel replaced Shift Clerk to reflect additional personnel trained on the paging system, SM designee identified by title, a phone number was added, assembly and accountability instruction enhanced, a reference was added, the non-QA record instructions were revised, and wind speed and direction were added to the initial notification form per TEMA request.
CN-1	3/27/97	3,5,6,7	TEMA additional back-up number added, changed county primary and back-up numbers
CN-2	7/31/97	3,5	Phone number change.
CN-3	2/2/98	3,5,7,8	SSP-4.05 was replaced by SPP-3.5. Editorial change.
13	6/30/98	All	Non-intent changes. Incorporated Changes Notices 1, 2 and 3. Changed reference SSP 3.4 to SPP 3.1.
14	10/21/99	All	Non-intent change. Moved termination of emergency step from Appendix A to Appendix B. STD-3.2 reference canceled.
15	02/08/00	ALL	Non- Intent change. Phone numbers revised.
16	06/14/00	All	Non Intent change. Reference number revised. Phone number revised. Added the word actions after notifications in Step 17 for clarification. Added reference to the ODS, direct line for clarification. This revision resolves problem identified in WBN PER, 006394.
17	10/31/00	All pg. 6	Non-Intent change. Revised NRC dedicated phones from FTS- 2000 to TVA phone circuits per (RIS) 2000-11 "NRC Emergency Telecommunications Systems".
18	3/30/01	All Page 5,10	Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP: Non-Intent change. Revised phone numbers. Revised initial notification form to standardize within TVAN and meet new NEI PI requirements to the NRC.
19	4/25/01	All pg. 2, 10	Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP: Non-Intent change. Corrected typo.
20	9/25/01	All pg. 9	Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP: Intent change. Procedure revised to Non-Quality related per requirements of NQAP & pending revision to SPP-2.2. The coversheet and records section of the procedure was revised to reflect this change.
21	01/24/02	All pg.3, 5, 6	Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP: Non-intent change. Added step to receive ODS confirmation call to TEMA\Local Counties. This standardizes with other TVAN Units. Per NRC Safeguards Advisory, enhanced caution statement to include Security adversary attack.

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Revision	Implementation	Pages	Description of Revision
Number	Date	Affected	
22	- 06/05/02 .	All 3, 5 & 7	Plan effectiveness determinations on these changes indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP. Intent change(s) : removed county EPZ phone numbers per direction from Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA). Non-intent change(s): added fax number to TEMA.
23	07/30/02	All	Plan effectiveness determinations on these changes indicate the

23	07/30/02	All 3, 5, 7, 8	Plan effectiveness determinations on these changes indicate the

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1.0 PURPOSE⁴

- 1.1 To provide a method for timely notification of appropriate individuals when the Shift Manager (SM) or Technical Support Center (TSC) SED has determined by WBN EPIP-1 that an incident has occurred which is classified as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY.
- 1.2 To provide a method for periodic reanalysis of the current situation by the SED to determine whether the SITE AREA EMERGENCY should be terminated, continued or upgraded to a General Emergency.

2.0 RESPONSIBILITY⁴

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The SED who is initially the SM (or other SM onsite during the emergency) or designee (Unit Supervisor, US) until properly relieved by the TSC SED, has the responsibility and authority for implementation of the actions in this instruction.

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS

- 3.1 Upon determining that existing conditions are classified as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY according to WBN EPIP-1 (independent evaluations by crew members may be beneficial), the SED, or designee, will:⁴
 - 1. **DIRECT** the Shift Personnel to activate the Emergency Paging System (EPS) to staff the TSC and Operations Support Center (OSC). Shift Personnel should confirm activation and provide the 20 minute printed report to the SM for review.
- **NOTE 1** IF the EPS system fails, call the ODS, ringdown or (5-751-1700) and have him activate the EPS.
- **NOTE 2 IF** the above methods of activating the EPS fail, Shift Personnel must use the Radiological Emergency Response Call Lists to staff the TSC and OSC. This list is located in the EPS Manual near the terminal.

,	W	BN	SITE AREA EMER	RGENCY	EPIP-4 Revision 23 Page 5 of 12	
3.0	INST	RUCTIONS	(continued)			
r	2.	COMPLE	TE Appendix A Notificatio	n Information	•	
	3.	based on Emergenc	CE to the crew: "A Site A cy Director, all support and d through me."	I w	II be the Site	
	4.		he ODS direct by ODS Rin 5 and PROVIDE the infor	•		
		Emergeno Radiologio	S cannot be contacted wit cy Management Agency i cal Emergency Plan activ -1-615-741-0001 or 9-1-1	is to be notific vation by call	ed of the ing 9-1-800-262-	
	5.		endix A to the ODS. (# pr at 9-1-615-242-9635.	e-programme	ed or 5-751-3400),	
CAU	TION	adversary until thes personne security r	any possibility of a radi y attack, HOLD assembly e conditions have been el into areas of unknown isk without first contact N) or Security.	y and accour résolved. Do radiological	ntability actions o not send conditions or	
	6.	NOTIFY S conducted	Security (CAS) that assem 1.	bly and accou	intábility is to be	
		`. 	· · · · ·	•	 - 	

	W	BN	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	EPIP-4 Revision 23 Page 6 of 12	, .
3.0	INST	RUCTIONS	(continued)		\bigcirc
	7.	ATTENTIC hás been o personnel	CE to the plant: "ATTENTION ALL SI DN ALL SITE PERSONNEL. A SITE A declared based on report to your assembly areas for acco	REA EMERGENCY	
		SOUND a	SC and OSC." (Repeat) ssembly alarm AND WBN EPIP-8, "Personnel Accountabili	ty and Evacuation."	
	8.		DCON Lab and SAY : "We are in a S WBN EPIP-14 and CECC EPIP-9."	Site Area Emergency,	
	9.		re personnel injuries, IMPLEMENT Will by Response''.	BN EPIP-10, "Medical	
	10.		s a security threat, IMPLEMENT WB	N EPIP-11, "Security	
	11.	(SEE duty	Duty Plant Manager, and PROVIDE A list for telephone numbers). The Du ant Manager or alternate.		\bigcirc
	12.	for Radiol	TE the need to implement EPIP-16, "In ogical Emergencies," for a dose proje ased through normal plant release pat	ction if radioactivity is	
	13.	State of To	confirmation call from the ODS (to ve ennessee/local counties.) (NA this ste acted directly).	•	
	14.	NOTIFY tactivation.	the NRC, using designated NRC p	hone (ENS), of plan	
NOT	E	hour of "S requests, a Operation	ication should be made as soon as p SITE AREA EMERGENCY'' declarati a qualified person must provide a conti s Center. The following commercial rations Center: ^{3,5}	on. Whenever NRC inuous update to NRC	
			16-5100 (MAIN) 51-0550 (BACKUP)		\cup

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9-1-301-951-0550 (BACKUP) 9-1-301-816-5151 (FAX)

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued)

- 15. **NOTIFY** the NRC Resident Inspector by calling 1776 and **PROVIDING** the information on Appendix A.
- 16. Once Assembly and Accountability has been **COMPLETED**, review EPIP 8, Appendix G for actions associated with the evacuation of nonemergency responders. **IF** this action has already been initiated, disregard.
- 17. **REEVALUATE** conditions using WBN EPIP-1 as necessary.
 - A. IF the conditions are under control, INITIATE actions identified in WBN EPIP-13, "Termination of the Emergency and Recovery."
 - B. IF conditions warrant upgrading to a higher classification, INITIATE the appropriate steps of WBN EPIP-5.
 - C. IF other plant conditions warrant the need for followup information, COMPLETE the Followup Notification Form, Appendix B, and NOTIFY the TSC/CECC (if it is staffed) or,

NOTIFY the ODS direct by ODS Ringdown or No. 5-751-1700 or 5-751-2495 and PROVIDE the information. IF the ODS cannot be contacted within 10 minutes, the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency is to be notified of the information by calling 9-1-800-262-3300 or 9-1-615-741-0001or 9-1-800-262-3400²

- 18. **FAX** Appendix A to the ODS. (# pre-programmed or 5-751-3400), or TEMA at 9-1-615-242-9635.
- 19. **ENSURE** applicable notifications/actions required by SPP-3.5 and SPP-3.1 have been made.
- 20. **SEND** the completed WBN EPIP-4 and associated documentation to the Emergency Preparedness (EP) Manager. The EP Manager shall forward documentation to DCRM for storage as appropriate.

W	BN	

4.0 **REFERENCES**

4.1 Interfacing Documents

SPP-3.1 Corrective Action Program

SPP-3.5 Regulatory Reporting Requirements

WBN-EPIP-1 Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart

WBN-EPIP-2 Notification of Unusual Event

WBN-EPIP-3 Alert

WBN-EPIP-5 General Emergency

WBN-EPIP-10 Medical Emergency Response

WBN-EPIP-11 Security and Access Control

WBN-EPIP-13 Termination of the Emergency and Recovery

WBN-EPIP-16 Initial Dose Assessment for Radiological Emergencies

CECC-EPIP-9 Emergency Environmental Radiological Monitoring Procedures

4.2 Other Documents

10 CFR 50.72 Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors

NUREG 0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants.

ANSI 18.7-1976

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2002-14

CECC-EPIP-8 Dose Assessment Staff Activities During Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergencies

5.0 APPENDIX

Appendix A, Notification Information

Appendix B, Followup Notification Form

6.0 RECORDS

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6.1 Non QA Records

All EPIP-4 records generated, when the REP is activated, will be stored by EP Manager for Life of Plant.

All EPIP-4 records generated during the course of a drill/exercise will be assembled by the EP Manager and stored appropriately.

APPENDIX A (Page 1 of 1) INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM ¹ SITE AREA EMERGENCY

THIS IS A REAL EVENT
This is
NAME
An SITE AREA EMERGENCY has been declared at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant affecting:
Unit 1 Unit 2
Event Declared: Time: Date:
EAL Designator (e.g., loss of AC 3.1):
Brief Description of the Event:
Radiological Conditions:
 No Abnormal Releases Offsite Airborne Release Offsite Liquid Release Offsite Release Information Not Known at this time
There is no Protective Action Recommendation at this time.
Meteorological conditions are:
Wind Speed: m.p.h. Wind Direction From: degrees
Ask "Please repeat the information you have received to ensure accuracy."

"Reactor:

2.

3.

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APPENDIX B (Page 1 of 1)	I)
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WBN FOLLOWUP INFORMATION FORM SITE AREA EMERGENCY

At power

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1. 🗆	"THIS IS A REAL EVENT" or	□ 'THIS IS A DRILL."
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" I NIS IS			_ at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.	
This is foll	owup	informatio	on regarding the Site Area Emergency at Watts Bar:	
		Unit 2		

4.	"Plant conditions are:	Stable 🗍	Deteriorating	
••	r lanc obhantons arc.		Detenorating	

Shutdown

5. "Followup information: (e.g., key events, status changes)

6.	"Onsite assembly and accountability is ongoing:	Yes 🛛	No	□ "	
----	---	-------	----	-----	--

7.	"The radiological	conditions	are
----	-------------------	------------	-----

- No Abnormal Release Offsite
- Airborne Release Offsite
- Liquid Release Offsite
- Release Information Not Known."

8. "Additional Rad information: (e.g., release duration)

Э.	'The meteorological conditions a	re: Wind speed:	Wind direction
	from:''		

10. There is no Protective Action Recommendation at this time."

11.	"The	event terminated at _	1		
		Time	Date		
12.		"Please repeat the	informatio	on you have received to ensure a	ccuracy."

13.		1	1
	Signature	Time	Date

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SOURCE NOTES Page 1 of 1

1	NRC IE Information Notice No. 89-89	Event Notification Worksheets
2	NRC IE Information Notice No. 86-97	Emergency Communications System
3	NRC IE Information Notice No. 86-28	Telephone Numbers to the NRC Operations Center and Regional Offices
4	ANSI 18.7-1976, Subsection, 5.3.9.3: 01POI	EPIPs will contain the following elements.
5	NRC Administrative Letter 94-04	Change of NRC Operations Center commercial telephone and facsimile numbers.

FILING INSTRUCTIONS

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DOCUMENT NUMBER EP_{IP-5}

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COMMENTS_____

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

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WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

EPIP-5

GENERAL EMERGENCY

Revision 24

Unit 0

NON-QUALITY RELATED

PREPARED BY: <u>Frank L Pavlechko</u> (Type Name)

SPONSORING ORGANIZATION: <u>Emergency Planning</u>

APPROVED BY: Frank L Pavlechko

EFFECTIVE DATE: 07/30/2002

LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE

WBN

GENERAL EMERGENCY

EPIP-5 Revision 24 Page 2 of 12

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Revision	Implementation		Description of Revision	
Number	Date	Affected	Description of Revision	
CN-1	9/28/95	3,5,11	Revised phone numbers. Editorial (non-intent) changes made. All references to RM were changed to RE to make it consistent with site description documents.	
11	7/5/96	4,5,6,7,8	Phone number and titles revised. Procedure replacement (TI-30) identified. All revisions were evaluated to be non-intent.	
12	10/10/96	3,4,5,8,9	The following non-intent revisions were made: Shift Personnel replaced Shift Clerk to reflect additional personnel trained on the paging system, SM designee identified by title, a phone number was added, assembly and accountability instruction enhanced, a reference was added, and the non- QA record instructions were revised.	
CN-1	3/27/97	3,5,6	TEMA additional back-up number added, counties changed phone numbers	
CN-2	2/2/98	3,5,6,7,8	SSP-4.05 was replaced by SPP-3.5. Editorial changes were made.	
13	6/30/98	All	Non-intent Changes. Incorporated Change Notices 1 and 2. Changed reference SSP 3.4 to SPP 3.1.	
14	10/21/99	All	Non-intent change. Moved termination step from Appendix A to Appendix C. STD-3.2 reference canceled.	
15	02/08/00	Ail	Non-intent change. Revised phone number.	
16	6/14/00	All	Non Intent change. Revised phone number. Reference number revised. Added reference to the ODS, direct line for clarification. Added the work actions after notifications in Step 17 for clarification. This revision resolves problem identified in WBN PER, 006394.	
17	08/16/00	All (Pg. 3, 11)	Intent change. Revised CNTMT Rad Monitors (1-RE-90-271, 272, 273 & 274) readings to correspond with the new TI-RPS-162, "Response of the Primary Containment High Range Monitors" readings (Reference EDC-50600). This analysis resulted in a revision to Table 2 on the PAR Chart. This revision resolves action items from CORP PER-99-000038-000. This revision was also determined not to reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.	
18	10/31/00	All pg. 6	Non-Intent change. Revised NRC dedicated phones from FTS-2000 to TVA phone circuits per (RIS) 2000-11 "NRC Emergency Telecommunications Systems".	
19	3/30/01	All .	Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP: Intent change. Re-paginated. Revised phone numbers. Revised initia notification form to standardize within TVAN and meet new NEI PI requirements to the NRC. Revised PAR chart to meet requirements of RTM 96 Vol. 1 Rev. 4. Revised follow-up form to reflect changes in PAR chart.	
20	4/25/01	All pg. 2, 9	Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP: Non-Intent change. Corrected typo.	

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GENERAL EMERGENCY 2 + 17

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EPIP-5 **Revision 24** Page 3 of 12

Revision Number	Implementation Date	Pages Affected	Description of Revision
21	09/25/01	Ali pg.8	Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP: Intent change. Procedure revised to Non-Quality related per requirements of NQAP & pending revision to SPP-2.2. The coversheet and records section of the procedure was revised to reflect this change.
_ 22	01/24/02	All pg. 3,5, 6	Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP: Non-intent change. Added step to receive ODS confirmation call to TEMA \Local Counties. This standardizes with other TVAN Units. Per NRC Safeguards Advisory, enhanced caution statement to include Security adversary attack.
23	06/05/02	All 3, 5 & 7	Plan effectiveness determinations on these changes indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP. Non-intent change(s): added fax number to TEMA.
24	07/30/02	All 3, 5, 6, 8	Plan effectiveness determinations on these changes indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP. Intent Change. Revised caution statement on assembly and accountability. Added Step 16 on Evacuation of Non Emergency Responders. Added NRC IN 2002-14 to the references.

1.0 PURPOSE

- 1.1 To provide a method for timely notification of appropriate individuals when the Shift Manager (SM) or Technical Support Center (TSC) Site Emergency Director (SED) has determined by WBN EPIP-1 that an incident has occurred which is classified as a GENERAL EMERGENCY.¹¹
- 1.2 To provide a method for periodic reanalysis of the current situation by the SED to determine whether the GENERAL EMERGENCY should be terminated or continued.

2.0 **RESPONSIBILITY**

The SED who is initially the SM (or other SM onsite during the emergency) or designee (Unit Supervisor, US) until properly relieved by the TSC SED, has the responsibility and authority for implementation of the actions in this instruction.^{10,11}

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS

- 3.1 Upon determining that existing conditions are classified as a GENERAL EMERGENCY according to WBN EPIP-1 (independent evaluations by crew members may be beneficial), the SED, or designee, will:¹¹
- 1. **DIRECT** Shift Personnel to activate the Emergency Paging System (EPS) to staff the TSC and Operations Support Center (OSC). Shift Personnel should confirm activation and provide the 20 minute printed report to the SM for review.
- **NOTE 1** IF the EPS system fails, call the ODS ringdown or (5-571-1700) and have him activate the EPS.
- **NOTE 2** IF the above methods of activating the EPS fail, Shift Personnel must use the Radiological Emergency Response Call Lists to staff the TSC and OSC. This list is located in the EPS Manual near the terminal.
- 2. **COMPLETE** Appendix A and B, Notification Information.
- ANNOUNCE to the crew: "A General Emergency is being declared based on
 I will be the Site Emergency Director, all support and job assignments must be authorized through me."

	N	/BN	GENERA	AL EMERGENCY	EPIP-5 Revision 24 Page 5 of 12
3.0	INS	TRUCTIONS	(continued)		
CAU	TION	HOLD ass resolved. conditions	embly and a Do not se	ccountability actions u and personnel into a	ase or security adversary attac ntil these conditions have bee reas of unknown radiologic ontacting Radiological Contro
	4.	assembly an SOUND the	nd accountabi	lity is to be conducted. Irm AND INITIATE WBN	FY Security (CAS) that
	5.	ATTENTION		"ATTENTION ALL SIT ERSONNEL. A GENER	
			sonnel report SC." (Repeat)	to assembly areas for a	accountability. Staff the
	6.			y ODS Ringdown or 5-7 from Appendix A.	751-1700 or 5-751-2495 and
		Rhea Count	y, Meigs Cour	ntacted within 10 minute nty, McMinn County, an Agency (TEMA) of the c	d the Tennessee
		Rhea Count (Alternate) Meigs Coun (Alternate) McMinn Cou (Alternate) Tennessee (Alternate) (Alternate)	ty EMA unty EMA	9-775-2505 9-775-7828 9-1-423-334-3211 9-1-423-334-5268 9-1-423-744-2724 9-1-423-744-2721 9-1-800-262-3300 9-1-615-741-0001 9-1-800-262-3400	(TIME) (TIME) (TIME) (TIME) (TIME) (TIME) (TIME) (TIME) (TIME)
	7.	FAX Append at 9-1-615-2		DS. (# pre-programmed	or 5-751-3400), or TEMA
	8.	,		SAY: "We are in a Gen and CECC EPIP-9."	eral Emergency,
	9.	IF there are Response".	personnel inju	uries, IMPLEMENT EPII	P-10, "Medical Emergency

	WBN		GENERAL EMERGENCY	EPIP-5 Revision 24 Page 6 of 12
3.0	INS	TRUCTIONS	(continued)	
	10	IF there is a Control".	security threat, IMPLEMENT EPIP-1	1, "Security and Access
	11.	(SEE duty li	ty Plant Manager, and PROVIDE the st for telephone numbers). The Duty his alternate.	Appendix A information Plant Manager will call the Plant
	12.	Radiological	the need to implement EPIP-16, "Init Emergencies," for a dose projection nal plant release paths.	tial Dose Assessment for if radioactivity is being released
	13.	RECEIVE co Tennessee/lo directly).	onfirmation call from the ODS (to v ocal counties.) (NA this step, if the	rerify notification of the State of e state/counties were contacted
	14.	NOTIFY the	NRC by the NRC designated phone	(ENS) of plan activation.
NO	TE	person must	tion should be made as soon as prace EMERGENCY'' declaration. Wheneve provide a continuous update to NRC nmercial numbers are for the NRC Op 9-1-301-816-5100 (MAIN) 9-1-301-951-0550 (BACKUP) 9-1-301-816-5151 (FAX)	er NRC requests, a qualified
	15.	NOTIFY NRO	C Resident Inspector by CALLING 17 on Appendix A.	776 and PROVIDING the
	16:	Appendix G fo	oly and Accountability has been COMP or actions associated with the evacuati IF this action has already been initiate	on of non-emergency
	17.	under control	TE conditions using WBN EPIP-1 as in INITIATE actions identified in WBN nd Recovery."	necessary. IF conditions are EPIP-13, "Termination of the
.		COMPLE	lant conditions warrant the need for for for the Followup Notification Form, A he TSC/CECC (if it is staffed) or	ollowup information, ppendix C, and
		No. 5-751 IF the OD Emergenc	ne ODS direct by ODS Ringdown or -1700 or 5-751-2495 and PROVIDE S cannot be contacted within 10 minu y Management Agency is to be notifi 62-3300 or 9-1-615-741-0001 or 9-1-	utes, the Tennessee ed of the information by calling

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		EPIP-5
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	* 'z	Page 7 of 12

- **3.0 INSTRUCTIONS** (continued)
- 18. **FAX** Appendix A to the ODS. (# pre-programmed or 5-751-3400), or TEMA at 9-1-615-242-9635.
- 19. **ENSURE** applicable notifications/actions required by SPP-3.5 and SPP-3.1 have been made.
- 20. SEND the completed WBN EPIP-5 and associated documentation to the Emergency Preparedness (EP) Manager. The EP Manager shall forward documentation to DCRM for storage as appropriate.

4.0 **REFERENCES**

- 4.1 Interfacing Documents
 - SPP-3.5 Regulatory Reporting Requirements

SPP-3.1 Corrective Action Program

WBN-EPIP-1 Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart

WBN-EPIP-2 Notification of Unusual Event

WBN-EPIP-3 Alert

WBN-EPIP-4 Site Area Emergency

WBN-EPIP-10 Medical Emergency Response

WBN-EPIP-11 Security and Access Control

WBN-EPIP-13 Termination of the Emergency and Recovery

WBN-EPIP-16 Initial Dose Assessment for Radiological Emergencies

CECC-EPIP-9 Emergency Environmental Radiological Monitoring Procedures

- - -

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4.2 Other Documents

Response Technical Manual (RTM) 96 Vol. 1, Rev. 4

10 CFR 50.72 Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors

NUREG 0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants.

ANSI N18.7-1976

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2002-14

10 CFR 20, Standards for Protection From Radiation

EPA 400-R-92-001, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents

Implementation of New EAL Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents

CECC-EPIP-8 Dose Assessment Staff Activities During Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergencies

5.0 APPENDICES

Appendix A, Notification Information

Appendix B, Protective Action Recommendation Guidance

Appendix C, Follow-up Information Form

6.0 RECORDS

6.1 Non QA Records

All EPIP-5 records generated, when the REP is activated, will be stored by EP Manager for Life of Plant.

All EPIP-5 records generated during the course of a drill/exercise will be assembled by the EP Manager and stored appropriately.

WBN	GENERAL EME	ERGENCY	EPIP-5 Revision 24 Page 9 of 12
-	INITIAL NOTIF	A (Page 1 of 1) ICATION FORI EMERGENCY	VI ^{1,8}
THIS IS A REAL E	VENT	HIS IS A DRILL	_
This is	AME		<u> </u>
N/	AME .		
There has been a GEN	IERAL EMERGENCY	declared at Wa	tts Bar Nuclear affecting
🔲 Unit 1	🔲 Unit 2		
Event Declared:	-Time:	Date: _	
EAL Designator (e.g.,	Fission Product Barrie	r Matrix):	
Brief Description of t	he Event:		,
Airborne Re	ons: al Releases Offsite lease Offsite	this time	· ·
Radiological Conditio	ons: al Releases Offsite lease Offsite ase Offsite	this time	ided
Radiological Conditio	ons: al Releases Offsite lease Offsite ase Offsite ormation Not Known at t	this time ndation is prov	
Radiological Condition I No Abnorma Airborne Re Liquid Relea Release Info The following Protect Recommend shelter remain Recommend	ons: al Releases Offsite lease Offsite ase Offsite ormation Not Known at t ive Action Recommer lation 1 - Evacuate 2 m	this time n dation is prov ile radius and 1	0 miles downwind <u>and</u>
Radiological Condition I No Abnorma Airborne Re Liquid Relea Release Info The following Protect Recommend shelter remain Meteorological Condi Wind Speed:	ons: al Releases Offsite lease Offsite ase Offsite ormation Not Known at the ive Action Recommer lation 1 - Evacuate 2 m inder of 10 mile EPZ. lation 2 - Evacuate 2 m inder of 10 mile EPZ.	this time ndation is prov ile radius and 1 ile radius and 5 p.h.	0 miles downwind <u>and</u>

WBN	GENERAL EMERGENCY	EPIP-5 Revision 24
		Page 10 of 12

APPENDIX B (Page 1 of 1)

PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION 4,5,6,7,8,9,12

Note 1: If conditions are unknown utilizing the flowchart, then answer NO.




TABLE 1 Protective Action Guides		
TYPE	LIMIT	
Measured 3.9E-6 microCi/cc of lodine 131 or 1 REM/hr External Dose		
Projected	1 REM TEDE or 5 REM Thyroid CDE	

WBN		GENERAL EMERGENCY	EPIP-5 Revision 24 Page 11 of 12				
-		APPENDIX C (Page 1 of 1))				
		VBN FOLLOWUP INFORMATIC <u>GENERAL EMERGENC</u>					
1.	□ "THIS IS A REAL EVENT" or □ "THIS IS A DRILL."						
2.	"This is at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. This is followup information regarding the General Emergency at Watts Bar: Unit 1 □ Unit 2 □."						
3.	"Reactor:	Shutdown 🛛 At power	□ "				
4.	"The Plant conditions are: Stable Deteriorating "						
5	"Followup inform	nation: <u>(e.g., key events, status chan</u>	aes)				
	•						
6.	"Evacuation of r	nonessential site personnel is ongoing	g: Yes □ No □ "				
7.	"The radiological conditions are:						
	No Abnor	mal Release Offsite 🛛 Liquid F	Release Offsite				
	□ Airborne Release Offsite □ Release Information Not Known."						
8.	"Additional Rad information: (e.g., release duration)						
9.	"The meteorological conditions are: Wind speed: Wind direction from:"						
10.	"The following protective action recommendation is provided:"						
	□ Recomme □ Recomme	endation 1 endation 2	· · ·				
11.	"The event terminated at:"						
12.	Time Date Date "Please repeat the information you have received to ensure accuracy."						
13. ′	- ¹ -, 2 ju	Signature	/ Date				

WBN	GENERAL	EMERGENCY	EPIP-5 Revision 24 Page 12 of 12
	_ S(OURCE NOTES Page 1 of 2	
¹ NRC IE Information N	otice No. 89-89	Event Notification V	Norksheets
² NRC IE Information N	otice No. 86-97	Emergency Commu	unications System
³ NRC IE Information N	otice No. 86-28	Telephone Number Center and Region	s to the NRC Operations al Offices
⁴ NRC IE Information N	otice No. 83-28	Criteria For Protect For General Emerg	ive Action Recommendations encies
⁵ MC-850321809004, NCO-920030366	MSC-00956,	Monitor readings in Protective Action R	cluded in Logic Diagram for ecommendations App. B, Note 3
⁶ NIR-0588, DV-851601	F 00001.	Include sheltering a Appendix B (Page 1 Note 1 Initiating Co	and immediate Protective Action 1 of 1) Recommendation 2 and nditions.
 ⁷ MC-840827005037, MSC-02402. ³ MC-840827005005, MSC-02376, MSC-02376, NCO-920030986 		Revision to Instructi 1 of 1) Notes 1 thro	ional Notes. Appendix B (Page ugh 5.
		the Site Emergency	
⁹ MC-840719003003, M NCO-920030221	SC-00700,		or Levels used in Protective ations. Appendix B (Page 1 of 1
¹⁰ MC-840827005035A,	MSC-2400	SED duties that can responsibility. Also	not be delegated. Section 2.0 see EPIPs 6 and 15.
¹ ANSI N18.7-1976		EPIPs will contain th Subsection 5.3.9.3:	ne following elements. 01POI
² 390/93-64A		10 CFR 20 revision	made to the PAR chart.
³ NRC Administrative Le	etter 94-04	Change of NRC Ope telephone and fax n	erations Center commercial umbers.

FILING INSTRUCTIONS

DOCUMENT NUMBER <u>FPIP=7</u>

L 7

REMOVE REV $//_{6}$ **INSERT REV** $//_{7}$

COMMENTS_____

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE

EPIP-8

PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND EVACUATION

REVISION 17

PREPARED BY: Frank L. Pavlechko

PHONE: # 3232

RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

APPROVED BY: Frank L. Pavlechko

EFFECTIVE DATE: 7/30/02

LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE

VALIDATION DATE: 7/30/02

NON-QUALITY-RELATED

PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND EVACUATION

EPIP-8

HISTORY OF REVISION/REVIEW

Revision Number	Implementation Date	Pages Affected	Description of Revision
8	2-29-96	3, 11, 17, 18, 20, 27, 28, 29	Non-intent changes made to offsite assembly areas due to removal or nonutilization of the structures. Construction references revised to MODS. Phone number revisions made.
9	8/16/96	3, 4, 6,10- 13, 15-18, 20, 22, 23, 25, 27, 29	Non-intent changes made to identify new shift titles, offsite assembly areas, new building titles, and other format changes, to enhance usability.
CN-1	2/15/97	8,12	Non-intent revision. Added step concerning decontamination support from SQN to the SMs check list so that it corresponded to the Radcon check list. Added owner controlled area ID to the map in Appendix A.
CN-2	3/27/97	3,10,12,13	TEMA additional back-up number added, counties changed phone numbers.
CN-3	2/2/98	3,17,18,20, 25,27,28,29	Removed references to MODs Inprocessing Center
10	6/30/98	All	Non-intent Changes. Incorporated Change Notices 1, 2, and 3. Phone # revision. Typographical Error corrected.
11	12/08/99	All	Non-intent change. Warehouse phone number revised on page 17.
12	02/07/00	All	Non-intent change. Revised phone number.
13	06/14/00	All	Non Intent change. Revised phone numbers to the MET station and McMinn Co. Revised description location of security portal to include (West) portal. Added TVA Police number to near site organizations. This revision resolves problems identified in WBN PER, 006394.
14	12/11/00	All	Non Intent changes. Corrected the fax number for the Main Warehouse to use the fax closest to the assembly area. Revised requirements for visitor(s) and MODS personnel to remain in the Protected area during assembly and accountability operations per directions of the EP PEER Team and TVAN requirements for standardization. Removed reference to the all clear alarm which is being eliminated for standardization purposes.
15	09/25/01	All pg. 6	Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP: Intent change. Procedure revised to Non-Quality related per requirements of NQAP & pending revision to SPP-2.2. The coversheet and records section of the procedure was revised to reflect this change.

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WBN

PERSONNEL-ACCOUNTABILITY AND EVACUATION

EPIP-8

HISTORY OF REVISION/REVIEW

Revision Number	Implementation Date	Pages Affected	Description of Revision
-	01/24/02	All pg. 3, 9, 10, 15, 20	Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP: Intent revision. Per guidance provided in the NRC Safeguards advisory revised App. B, C & D to direct SM and Security to hold limited area evacuations or assembly and accountability activities during a Security Event (adversary attack) or take cover in specific area until the concern is resolved. Non-intent change. Revised phone number on APP F.
17	07/30/02	All	Plan effectiveness determinations revisions indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP: Intent revision. Per guidance provided by the TVAN EP PEER Team this procedure was re-written in the new standardized methods of operation and format. Enhancements made to instructions for notifications to outside protected area assembly areas and near site facilities per IN 2002-14. This reference was added to the procedure.

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INTRODUCTION 1.0

1.1 Purpose

This Procedure provides instructions for accounting for all onsite personnel and visitors prior to an orderly evacuation of a specific area(s) or the site during a radiological or toxic hazard emergency. This Procedure describes the method for notifying all site personnel and gives guidance for re-entry initiation. This Procedure also describes the method for notifying and conducting an orderly evacuation of the near site facilities within the Owner Controlled Area (OCA).

The scope of this procedure includes emergency and non-emergency response personnel, visitors, contractor/construction personnel and other persons who may be within the OCA during an emergency situation.

This procedure will be initiated by way of an emergency classification procedure step (i.e. EPIP-2, 3, 4, and 5). If situations where to exist, where in the judgment of the Shift Manager(SM) / Site Emergency Director (SED) it becomes prudent to initiate the process of Assembly and Accountability and/or Evacuation, this procedure can be entered and initiated via that judgment.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Industry Documents

A. NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants

- B. 10 CFR 50.47, Code of Federal Regulations
- C. NRC Information Notice 2002-14, Ensuring a Capability to Evacuate Individuals. Including Members of the Public, from the Owner-Controlled Area

2.2 Plant Instructions

- A. TVA Radiological Emergency Plan
- EPIP 2. Notification of Unusual Event В
- C. EPIP 3. Alert
- D. EPIP 4, Site Area Emergency
- E.
- EPIP 5, General Emergency EPIP 6, Activation And Operation Of The Technical Support Center (TSC) F.
- G. EPIP 7, Activation And Operation Of The Operations Support Center (OSC)
- H. EPIP 11, Security and Access Control
- EPIP 13, Termination Of The Emergency And Recovery 1.

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	EVACUATION	EPIP-8

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS

3.1 General Personnel Information

2.

- A. Normal Entering and Exiting of the Plant Protected Area (PA).
 - 1. Individuals entering the plant PA shall:
 - Swipe their badge into the entry card reader,
 - Enter the PA in accordance with security procedures.
 - Individuals exiting the PA shall:
 - Swipe their badge into the exit card reader in the appropriate exit portals.
 - Exit the PA in accordance with security procedures.
 - 3. Exit card readers function as accountability card readers for personnel exiting the PA.
 - 4. Protected Area assembly/Accountability card reader locations are identified in <u>Appendix A</u>.

3.2 Activating the Assembly and Accountability Process

- A. Shift Manager/Site Emergency Director
 - 1. The Shift Manager (SM) or Site Emergency Director (SED) shall initiate the activation of the assembly and accountability process.
 - a. The SM\SED can delegate a designee to carry out the actions of this process, but can not delegate the decision to activate the process.
 - 2. Refer to <u>Appendix D</u> for activation.

3.3 Site Assembly and Accountability

A three-minute undulating siren (a siren that raises and lowers in volume and pitch, or public address announcements are the general methods for notifying personnel that emergency conditions exists requiring the assembly and accountability of site personnel. Upon recognition that the assembly and accountability process has been activated, all personnel shall begin immediately to take applicable actions.

A. Non-Emergency Responders With Assigned Assembly Areas

- 1. Upon recognition of the assembly and accountability process, non-emergency responders, shall proceed immediately to their designated assembly areas as listed on Appendix A.
- 2. Arriving at the assembly area, personnel shall:
 - a. Swipe their badge into the accountability card reader (applies only to those assembly areas within the protected area).
 - b. Remain in the designated assembly area until released by the (SED) or a plant evacuation is ordered, following the instructions on the plant address system or through Nuclear Security.

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3.3 Site Assembly and Accountability (Continued)

- B. Non-Emergency Responders With No Assigned Assembly Area (outside the PA)
 - 1. Non-Emergency Responders with no assigned assembly area represent unescorted visitors, contractors/construction personnel, and others persons in public access areas on or passing within the OCA.
 - 2. Upon recognition of the assembly and accountability process, non-emergency responders with no assigned assembly area, shall proceed immediately to their vehicle and exit the OCA.

C. Emergency Responders

- 1. Upon recognition of the Assembly and Accountability process, emergency responders, shall proceed immediately to their designated assembly area(s) as listed on <u>Appendix A</u>.
- 2. Arriving at the designated assembly area, personnel shall:
 - a. Swipe their badge into the accountability card reader.
 - b. Sign the facility Accountability Roster.
 - c. Review their emergency responsibilities and begin work.
 - d. If a plant evacuation is ordered, all emergency responders will remain in their designated assembly area.

D. Emergency Responders Having Escort Responsibilities

Emergency Responders, will take the applicable steps to have their visitor transferred to a non-emergency responder for relocation to an appropriate assembly area.

E. Visitors

Visitors shall remain with escorts and swipe their badge into the appropriate accountability card reader.

F. Special Conditions Concerning Assembly and Accountability

- If a person cannot reach his designated assembly area within 20 minutes, he should go to the nearest designated area and swipe his badge into the card reader. He should remain in that assembly area. Review <u>Appendix A</u> for a list of Protected Area (PA) assembly area locations.
- 2. If the accountability card reader will not accept a badge or an assembly area cannot be accessed, Nuclear Security should be contacted immediately at ext. 8464 or ext. 8495.

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3.3 Site Assembly and Accountability (Continued)

G. Shift Manager (SM)/Site Emergency Director (SED)

When conditions have been met that require the activation of the assembly and accountability process, the SM/SED will implement <u>Appendix D</u> of this procedure.

H. Nuclear Security (NS)

When notified that conditions have been met that require the activation of the assembly and accountability process, or upon indications that assembly and accountability has been initiated, Nuclear Security will implement <u>Appendix E</u> of this procedure.

I. Radiological Control (RADCON)

When notified that entry conditions have been met that require the activation of the assembly and accountability process, or upon indication that assembly and accountability has been initiated, Radiological Control will implement <u>Appendix F</u> of this procedure.

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3.4 Particular Limited Area Evacuation

Plant conditions require Operations to evacuate or request through the TSC the evacuation of a particular plant area(s).

- A. The SM/SED or designee shall make a public address (PA) announcement and follow the instructions in <u>Appendix G</u>.
- B. Personnel in the affected area(s), upon hearing the public address announcement or being notified of the particular area evacuation by any means shall do the following:
 - 1. If working in a contaminated zone, exit the zone in accordance with Radiological Control (RADCON) procedures, unless instructed otherwise by RADCON.

- 1

- 2. Exit the affected area in an orderly manner.
- C. Personnel not in the affected area(s), should continue assigned tasks if not instructed otherwise and should not enter the affected area(s) until the "All Clear" has been announced or directed through emergency response processes.

3.5 Evacuation of Site Non-Emergency Response Personnel

A site evacuation will be conducted upon an order issued by the SM/SED. This Order will be issued to the TSC Nuclear Security Manager or the Nuclear Security Shift Supervisor or their designee, following the completion of Assembly and Accountability.

- A. Non-Emergency Responders Within the Plant Protected Area.
 - 1. All personnel assembled in designated assembly areas within the protected area shall remain in those areas until released for the purpose of evacuation. Visitors shall remain with escorts until they have exited the protected area.
 - 2. The TSC or NS will by public address announcement(s) or dispatching Security personnel, brief and release persons in assembly areas.
 - 3. Once released, personnel shall go immediately to the protected area exit portal. Personnel shall swipe their badge into the exit card reader or as instructed by NS. The protected area shall be exited in accordance with security procedures unless otherwise instructed.
 - a. If for any reason personnel can not go directly to their designated Protected Area exit portal, NS should be contacted immediately.
 - b. If for any reason the exit card reader will not properly acknowledge a badge, NS should be contacted immediately.

WBN		PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND EVACUATION	EPIP-8
3.5 E	vacuation	of Non-Emergency Response Personnel (co	ontinued)
	4.	Personnel shall proceed to their vehicle and e their place of residence or if needed to one of area(a), following all briefing information provi NS. Exit routes leading away from the plant wi	the remote assembly ded to them by the TSC or
	5.	All personnel evacuating should anticipate tha Owner Controlled Area (OCA) Security Check and if conditions require, RADCON will be more personnel as they exit.	t the Point will be established nitoring vehicles and
	6.	Upon exiting the OCA, personnel shall follow a local authorities.	all guidance of state and
B.	Non-E	mergency Responders Within the OCA	
	1 .	All personnel assembled in designated assem and within the OCA shall remain in those area purpose of evacuation.	bly areas outside the PA s until released for the
	2.	NS will notify by phone or dispatch security pe Assembly Areas, brief and release assembled	rsonnel directly to OCA personnel.
	3. ``	Once released personnel shall proceed to their from the site to their place of residence or if ne remote assembly area(s), following all briefing them by NS. Exit routes leading away from the	eded to one of the information provided to
		If for any reason personnel can not proceed di evacuate the site NS shall be contacted immed	rectly to their vehicle ar
		All personnel exiting the site Protected Area sl Security Check Point will be established and if RADCON will be monitoring vehicles and pers	conditions require.
	5.	Upon exiting the OCA, personnel shall follow a local authorities.	all guidance of state and
C.	Emerg	ency Responders	
	Emerg evacua	ency Responders shall remain in Emergency C ate from the site.	Centers and shall not
_ D.	Shift N	lanager/Site Emergency Director	
	non-er	conditions have been met that require an orden nergency response personnel, the Shift Manag pr will implement <u>Appendix G</u> of this procedure	er/Site Emergency

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	EVACUATION	

3.5 Evacuation of Non-Emergency Response Personnel (continued)

E. Nuclear Security (NS)

When notified that an order to evacuate site non-emergency response personnel has been issued by the SM/SED, Nuclear Security will implement <u>Appendix B, C, & H</u> of this procedure.

F. Radiological Control (RADCON)

When notified that an order to evacuate site non-emergency response personnel has been issued by the SM/SED, Radiological Control will implement <u>Appendix I</u> of this procedure.

4.0 DOCUMENTATION

Non-QA Records

Checklist(s), Logs, and Security Computer Roll Call List of accountability operations, will be sent to the WBN Emergency Planning Manager and stored appropriately.

5.0 ILLUSTRATIONS / APPENDICES

- Appendix A -Protected Area Assembly Areas . . Appendix B -Assembly Areas (Outside the Protected Area) Notifications Appendix C -Near site Organization(s) Notifications. Appendix D -Shift Manager/Site Emergency Director - Assembly and Accountability **Actions** Nuclear Security - Assembly and Accountability Actions Appendix E -Appendix F -Radiological Control - Assembly and Accountability Actions Appendix G -Shift Manager/Site Emergency Director - Limited Area & Site Evacuation Actions Nuclear Security - Evacuation Actions Appendix H -Appendix I -Radiological Control - Evacuation Actions Appendix J -Accountability Roster

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PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND EVACUATION.



APPENDIX A Page 1 of 1

PROTECTED AREA ASSEMBLY AREAS

	stand and the second
LOCATION	REPORTING ORGANIZATION(S)
El. 713' Mechanical Maintenance Shop	Mechanical Maintenance personnel
El. 713' Chem Lab	Chemistry Laboratory personnel
El. 713' RADCON Lab	RADCON personnel, AUOs, OSC responders, Fire Operators/others
El. 729' Electrical Maintenance Shop	Electrical Maintenance personnel
El. 729' Instrument Maintenance Shop	Instrument Maintenance personnel
El. 729' MOB Maintenance Engineering ` Support Office	Maintenance Planning/Engineering/others
El. 741' Ops. Procedures Office	Procedure Writers/NRC Office/others
El. 755' Technical Support Center (TSC)	TSC emergency responders
El. 755' Main Control Room	Control Room and Operations personnel
Plant Assembly Room	Main Office Building occupants/others
EQB, Vending Area	EQB and MDB Occupants, MODS personnel/others

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APPENDIX B (Page 1 of 3)

ASSEMBLY AREA(S) (OUTSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA) NOTIFICATIONS

Nuclear Security (NS) will provide the information from this appendix to all assembly areas <u>outside</u> the protected area (listed below) as it becomes available or as directed by the SM/SED or TSC Security Manager.

- Initial contact should be by phone with Fax message used for follow-up.
- Should phone contact not be made, (i.e. off-hours / weekends / phone trouble) direct the
 outside OCA Security Motor Patrol to check the area(s) for personnel and provide information
 as needed.
- After <u>evacuation</u> orders have been initiated, the OCA Security Motor Patrol will ensure all non essential personnel have left the area(s).

Location	Area	Phone #	Fax #
WBN Training Center	Mgr. Office (cafeteria)	x3758, x1216, or x8962	x3797
Administration Building	Vending Area, Office Area(s) Conference Room(s)	x8767 or x8768	x1924 、
Main Warehouse	Conference Room Area	x1436	x3233

	WBN PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND EVACUATION	P-8].
	APPENDIX B (continued) (Page 2 of 3)		\smile
Time: Date:		•	-
A.	"This is a REAL EMERGENCY."OR"This is a DRILL.""This is a REAL EMERGENCY.""This is a DRILL."	-	
В.	WBN has declared a emergency. (enter emergency classification.)		
C.	Radiological conditions are: No release		
D.	 Please convey the following instructions to all people in your assembly area(s). Stay indoors Close off HVAC Systems Check out doors or in adjacent buildings and direct all personnel to the Assembly Area to await instructions. Follow general instructions for the assembly area. 		
E.	Additional instructions are as follows: Return to work Remain in assembly area Additional instructions/information:		
F.	Site Evacuation has been ordered by the SED. YES NO		
G.	Remain calm and exit the site by your normal route unless otherwise directed.		
H.	You will be informed when it is safe to return to work.	0	

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- Main Warehouse
- WBN Training Center Administration Building ٠

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)	~	A	PENDIX B (cont (Page 3 of 3)	•		
			ASSEMBLY AR DE THE PROTEC NOTIFICATION	TED AREA)		
	- <u>AS</u>	<u>"FOR RADIO</u> SEMBLY AREA (OUTSIDE T		NSTRUCTIO	DNS	
1)	START ASSI		SONNEL			
2)	CLOSE ALL	DOORS AND W	VINDOWS			
3)	SHUT DOWN	VENTILATION	SYSTEM		, ,	
4)	NO EATING,	DRINKING OR	SMOKING			
5)		OPLE FROM OU			EA	
6)		SYSTEM AND E EMERGENCY	•	AR FOR US	È -	
7)	LISTEN FOR	INSTRUCTION	S	.	•	
8)		ION OF SITE IS ANNER BY TH	•	SS ROUTE		DUTE)

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APPENDIX C (Page 1 of 3)

NEAR SITE ORGANIZATION(S) NOTIFICATIONS

Nuclear Security (NS) will provide the following information to the near site organizations listed below when directed by the SM/SED or TSC Security Manager. RADCON will provide technicians to monitor personnel (if necessary).

- These contacts should be made by phone with Fax Message for follow-up.
- Should phone contact not be made, (i.e. off-hours/weekends/phone trouble) direct the OCA Security Motor Patrol to check the area for personnel and provide information as needed.
- After <u>evacuation</u> orders have been initiated, the OCA Security Motor Patrol will ensure all non essential personnel have left the area(s).

LOCATION	PHONE #	FAX#
WBN Weapons Range	9-365-1400	NA
WBN Grounds Maintenance	9-365-3334	'NA
WBN Facilities Trailer(s)	9-365-1890 or 1895	9-365-1710
Watts Bar Dam (Hydro)	9-365-7600 or 6300	9-365-7640
TVA Police/TVA TPS Building	9-365-3776 or 3778 or 1965 or 8450	9-365-3873
Watts Bar Maintenance Facility	9-365-8720 or 8722 or 7849	9-365-8709
WBN Environmental Data Station (not normally manned)	9-365-8484	NA
Reservoir Property (Maintenance Base)	9-365-5256	9-365-7628
Lock Master (Watts Bar)	9-365-7634 or 9-1-423-334-3522	9-1-423-334-4521
Watts Bar Dam Spill Way fishing Area	* <u>NO</u> PHONE IN THIS AREA OCA SECURITY MOTOR PATROL OR TVA POLICE SHALL NOTIFY PEOPLE TO LEAVE THE AREA.	NA

-	WBN PERSONNEL			ABILITY AND N	EPIP-8	
	Time Date		NDIX C (cor (Page 2 of 3	-		
			E ORGAN DTIFICATIO	IZATION(S) DNS	-	
A.		EAL EMERGENCY."		R 'This is a D 'This is a D		
В.	WBN has d	eclared a (enter emer	gency class	emergency.	· .	
C.	Radiologica No release Release Or	I conditions are:	·			
D.	StayClosCheo	vey the following inform indoors e off HVAC Systems ok outdoors or in adjace ssembly area to await i	ent buildings	· · · ·	., D	
E. A	.	uctions/information:				
F.		NO m and initiațe an evacu	-			
G.	You will be	informed when it is safe	e to return to	work.	`	
• W.	atts Bar Dam ((Hydro)	•	Reservoir Property ((Maintenance Base)	
• W	BN Weapons	Range	•	WBN Grounds Mair	itenance	
• Wa	atts Bar Mainte	enance Facility	•	WBN Environmenta	l Data Station	
• Lo	Lock Master (Watts Bar) TVA POLICE/TVA TPS Building					
• W	BN Facilities T	railer(s)				

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REVISION 17

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PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND **EVACUATION**

EPIP-8

(alternate route)

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APPENDIX C (continued) (Page 3 of 3)

NEAR SITE ORGANIZATION(S) **NOTIFICATIONS** • `

"FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY" **GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS** (NEARSITE ORGANIZATIONS)

1)	START ASSEMBLING PERSONNEL	
2)	CLOSE ALL DOORS AND WINDOWS	
3)	SHUT DOWN VENTILATION SYSTEM	
4)	NO EATING, DRINKING OR SMOKING	
5)	CALL IN PEOPLE FROM OUTSIDE LOCATIONS OR SURROUNDING BUILDINGS TO A ASSEMBLY AREA	
6)	KEEP PAGE SYSTEM AND PHONES CLEAR FOR USE DURING THE EMERGENCY	
7)	LISTEN FOR INSTRUCTIONS	
8)	IF EVACUATION OF SITE IS DIRECTED, LEAVE IN A <u>SAFE</u> AND ORDERLY MANNER BY THE MAIN ACCESS ROUTE/	•

REVISION 17

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
EPIP-8

APPENDIX D Page 1-of 3

14

SHIFT MANAGER/SITE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR - ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACTIONS

The following appendix shall be utilized by the Shift Manager(SM)/Site Emergency Director(SED) or designee for the purpose of conducting site assembly and accountability actions.





APPENDIX D Page 2 of 3

SHIFT MANAGER/SITE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR - ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACTIONS

6. WHEN... the Assembly and Accountability Sirens have completed the 3-minute cycle and silenced.

MAKE... a PA announcement similar to:

"Attention all plant personnel, the site assembly and accountability process has been initiated. All personnel report immediately to your assigned assembly areas and be accounted for."

(REPEAT)

NOTE

If at any time during the assembly and accountability process RADCON determines that radiation guidelines for an assembly area(s) have been exceeded, request NS to re-locate affected personnel to another assembly area or evacuate affected personnel off-site.

7. **NOTIFY**... Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) Director either by the direct ring-down telephone in the TSC or at ext. 751-1614.

OR

If the CECC Director can not be reached, notify the Operations Duty Specialist (ODS) at ext. 751-1700 that:

A. The assembly and accountability sirens have been activated.

AND

- B. WBN EPIP-8 is currently being implemented for assembly and accountability.
- 8. WHEN...Notified by NS that the assembly and accountability process has been completed.

THEN... MAKE a public address announcement similar to:

"Attention all plant personnel, the site assembly and accountability process has been completed. All personnel remain in your assigned assembly areas and await further instructions."

(REPEAT)

APPENDIX D Page 3 of 3

SHIFT MANAGER/SITE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR - ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACTIONS

- VERIFY if conditions at this time require an order to evacuate all non-emergency response personnel from the Owner Controlled Area(OCA).
- 10. **IF...** Conditions at this time, <u>DO</u> require an order to evacuate all non-emergency response personnel from the OCA.

THEN... Initiate Appendix G of this procedure .

- 11. **IF**... Conditions at this time, <u>DO NOT</u> require an order to evacuate all non-emergency response personnel from the OCA.
 - THEN Exit this procedure. Re-enter this procedure at <u>Appendix G</u> when it has been determined by the SM/SED that conditions require an order to evacuate all non-emergency response personnel.

Initials Time

EPIP-8



Initials

Time

APPENDIX E Page 1 of 4

NUCLEAR SECURITY - ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACTIONS

The following appendix shall be utilized by the TSC Security Manager or if unavailable the Security Shift Supervisor or designee for the purpose of conducting Site Assembly and Accountability actions.

NOTE:

IF a Security Event (i.e. adversary attack) would put people at risk or in Harms way **NOTIFY** the **SM\SED** prior to commencing assembly and accountability. IF this does not apply, proceed with accountability operations.

- 1. Notified that activation of the assembly and accountability process and actions has been initiated by the SM/SED or designee.
- 2. **CONTROL** and **RESTRICT** access to the Protected Area, except for those individuals designated for emergency response, per the Emergency Response Organization Call List or as authorized for emergency response by the SM/SED or TSC Security Manager or OSC Security Advisor.
- 3. MAINTAIN Owner Controlled Area (OCA) traffic controls at the OCA traffic control point.
- 4. **NOTIFY**... the TSC or RADCON at ext.7865 that, OCA traffic control actions are being maintained.


AND

- REQUEST... TSC or RADCON dispatch personnel to the OCA Emergency Survey Point #15 (if determined by RADCON) that survey conditions requiring vehicle survey, exist.
- 5. **CONTROL** and **RESTRICT** access to the Owner Controlled Area, except for those individuals designated for emergency response, per the Emergency Response Organization Call List or as authorized for emergency response by the SM/SED or TSC Security Manager or OSC Security Advisor.
- 6. **COMPLETE** (<u>Appendices B and C</u>) and upon direction from the TSC Security Manager or SM/SED, initiate the calls and Fax the information to the designated locations.

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EPIP-8

APPENDIX E



REVISION 17



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APPENDIX E Page 3 of 4

NUCLEAR SECURITY - ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACTIONS

9. UNACCOUNTED FOR INDIVIDUALS

IF... Individuals remain unaccounted for, (45) minutes following the activation of the assembly and accountability sirens,

THEN...NOTIFY the TSC Security Manager or SM/SED that search teams will be needed to locate the missing individual(s),

AND

RADCON will assist search teams (as needed).

10. TWO PERSON (LINE OF SIGHT) RULE PUBLIC ADDRESS ANNOUNCEMENT

A. WHEN...Assembly and Accountability has been completed,

AND

NS has determined that the <u>Two</u> Person (Line of Sight) Rule is required.

THEN...REQUEST permission from the TSC Security Manager or SM/SED to make the following Public Address Announcement:

Initials Time

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"ATTENTION ALL SITE PERSONNEL, THIS IS A SECURITY ALERT ACTION. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, THE TWO MAN RULE HAS BEEN ORDERED."

"ENTRY TO VITAL AREAS NOW REQUIRES CONTINOUS LINE OF SIGHT BETWEEN TWO (2) PERSONNEL."

(REPEAT)

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APPENDIX E Page 4 of 4

NUCLEAR SECURITY - ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACTIONS

11. AUTOMATED ACCOUNTABILITY, SYSTEM FAILURE GUIDELINES

In the event the automated accountability system is unable to accomplish its designed function, NS will recommend the following methods to account for onsite personnel to the SM or TSC SED for action.

- A. **NOTIFY** personnel in the Assembly Area(s) (within the Protected Area) to remain where they are until the Accountability System can be reactivated.
- B. IF plant conditions require immediate action (i.e., danger to health or safety), the SED will order all nonessential onsite personnel to exit the protected area and report to the Watts Bar Training Center. Once all nonessential personnel have left the protected area, a verbal review of the remaining onsite emergency responders will be conducted.
- C. Walk-downs within the protected area will be conducted to ensure all non-essential personnel have left the plant. These actions and search and rescue efforts (if needed) will be coordinated by the TSC Security Manager or SM/SED.

EPIP-8

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PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND **EVACUATION**



APPENDIX F Page 1 of 1

RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL - ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACTIONS

The following Appendix shall be utilized by the TSC Radiological Control Manager or if he is unavailable the Radiological Control Shift Supervisor or designee, for the purpose of conducting a site assembly and accountability actions. 1 .~

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1.	Notified that activation of the assembly and accountability process and actions has been initiated by the SM/SED or designee.	Initials Time	
2.	IF in plant Radiological conditions require additional monitoring,		
	THEN ESTABLISH a survey routine for all assembly areas, including the Emergency Centers.		
3.	IFRadiological conditions in any assembly area(s) meet or exceed the listed guidelines		
	 Radiation levels that would result in a radiation dose of 100 mrem in one hour, or airborne radioactivity above 10CFR 20.1201 DAC limits. 		
	THEN NOTIFY the SM/SED and recommend that the personnel within the affected area be re-located to another assembly area or evacuated from the site.		
4.	WHENNotified by Nuclear Security that Owner Controlled Area TCP is being maintained.	Initials Time	
	THEN EVALUATE radiological conditions to determine if a RADCON survey checkpoint at the OCA (Emergency Survey Point #15) should be established.		
5.	IF Radiological conditions require that a RADCON survey checkpoint be established,		
	THEN DISPATCH RADCON personnel to the OCA (Emergency Survey Point # 15).		
	AND		
	ESTABLISH a RADCON survey checkpoint.		
6.	RADCON personnel will be dispatched by the OSC or SM/SED to assist Protected Area search teams (as needed).		

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EPIP-8

APPENDIX G Page 1 of 4

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-		SHIFT MANAGER/SITE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR Limited AREA EVACUATION/TAKE COVER ACTIONS
	Α.	MAKE a Public Address (PA) announcement similar to the following
		"This is a real emergency." OR "This is a drill."
		"ATTENTION All Site Personnel, conditions in the (area[s] to be evacuated)
		warrant an evacuation of the area. Leave the (area[s] to be evacuated)
		immediately and remain clear until further notice."
		OR
		"ATTENTION All Site Personnel, conditions in (area[s] of concern)
		warrant you to take cover in this area. Take Cover in the(area[s] of concern)
	-	immediately and remain there until further notice."
;	В.	IF necessary, FORM a team composed of Operations and Additional Control (RADCON) personnel to ensure evacuation of high noise areas.
	C.	DIRECT Operations/RADCON /Others to SEARCH the evacuated area to ensure all personnel have left the area.
	D.	REPORT results to the TSC (if activated).
	E.	INFORM NS of the situation and direct assistance as needed.
	F.	PERFORM other duties as needed.

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EPIP-8

APPENDIX G Page 2 of 4

SHIFT MANAGER/SITE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR - SITE EVACUATION ACTIONS

The following appendix shall be utilized by the Shift Manager(SM)/Site Emergency Director(SED) or designee for the purpose of conducting a evacuation of site non-emergency response personnel.

Note 1	The implementation of a site evacuation should be based on the protective actions which will result in the lowest personal exposure. In a radiological or hazardous material emergency, evacuation should be initiated either before or after the passage of the release. Evacuation routes should be chosen to lead personnel away from the path of the plume or danger.	
Note 2	Based on ongoing emergency activities in the local communities (if activated) discussions with the CECC, Meigs, Rhea, and McMinn Counties, EOC officials may be warranted to identify traffic conditions, road weather conditions, or any other hazards that would effect evacuation.	
1.	Conditions have been met that require an order to evacuate site non-emergency response personnel.	Initials Time
2.	Assembly and accountability has been completed.	
3.	NOTIFY the Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) Director of the impending evacuation. (5-751-1614) (IF not staffed, NOTIFY the Operations Duty Specialist, 5-751-1700)	
4.	CONSIDER first the precautionary evacuation of all non-essential personnel (outside the Protected Area) from the site. These personnel will be assembled in their designated assembly areas. (<u>Appendix B and C</u>) Once completed, non-essential personnel within the Protected Area can be evacuated (<u>Appendix A</u>).	
5.	PROVIDE any special instructions to assembly area(s) through PA announcements, Emergency Dispatches or NS communications. Coordination with RADCON may be necessary prior to these announcements.	
6.	NOTIFY Nuclear Security (NS) at ext. 8464 or 8495 that:	
	 An order to evacuate site non-emergency response personnel has been issued. 	
	AND	
	B. NS Should implement EPIP-8, Appendix H.	_
7.	NOTIFY Radiological Control at ext.7865 that:	
	 An order to evacuate site non-emergency response personnel has been issued, 	
	AND	<u> </u>
	B. RADCON should implement EPIP-8, <u>Appendix I.</u> PAGE 28 OF 36	REVISION 17

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EPIP-8

1	,	APPENDIX G Page 3 of 4	
	SHIF	T MANAGER/SITE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR - SITE EVACUATION ACTIONS	-
	8.** ⁻	IN the event of a total plant EVACUATION, determine the need for non-essential personnel, and vehicles to pass through a RADCON check point (if deemed necessary) prior to being released from the site. This point will be set up at <u>Emergency Survey Point # 15</u>	
	9.	EVACUATION of onsite non-contaminated individuals should take place along normal exit routes away from the site, conditions permitting.	
	10.	DIRECT NS to provide appropriate personnel to direct traffic on to Route 68.	
		IF plant conditions preclude radiological decontamination, evacuees will be informed of transportation, sheltering, and decontamination arrangements prior to leaving the site. The primary evacuation shelter for onsite contaminated personnel will be Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN), approximately 50 miles south of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN).	• •
,	11. [′]	 IF conditions warrant Support personnel can be sent home or directed/staged to other offsite locations (if necessary). Two possible locations are: Englewood Elementary School - if directing personnel to this school, notify McMinn Co. EMA (day hours, Monday - Friday) at 9-1-423-744-2760/2724;or McMinn Co. 911 Communications (off hour, 24 hours), at 9-1-423-744-2721. Also notify the Tennessee EMA at 9-1-615-741-0001. 	
		 2) Roane County High School - if directing personnel to this school, notify the Roane Co. 911 Dispatch Center at 9-1-865-354-8045 and request Roane Co. EMA be notified. Also notify the Tennessee EMA at 9-1-615-741-0001. 	:
	12.	ANNOUNCE Site Evacuation with the following message. REPEAT as needed.	
		"ATTENTION ALL SITE PERSONNEL. ATTENTION ALL SITE PERSONNEL. The SED has ordered a site evacuation. All personnel except those with emergency assignments shall exit via your normal entrance and exit location to their home(s) / until further notice."	
	13. [`]	IF an evacuation is ordered, DIRECT Nuclear Security (NS) to notify the Assembly Areas Outside the Protected Area (<u>Appendix B</u>) and the Near site organizations (<u>Appendix C</u>) of ongoing site actions.	
	14.	IF site personnel require transportation or sheltering coordinate arrangements for assistance with the TSC/CECC.	
,	15.	Conditions permitting, you may recall evacuated people as needed.	
/	16.	KEEP the CECC informed of site activities	
		PAGE 29 OF 36	REVISION 17


APPENDIX G (continued) (Page4 of 4)

MAP. TO ROANE COUNTY HIGH SCHOOL AND ENGLEWOOD ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

From WBN, take route 68 west to route 27 north. Follow 27 north and go through the city of Rockwood. At the 6th traffic light (last light) the road Y's to the right. The road to the right is route 70. Follow route 70 for 12 miles to Kingston. Cross the Clinch River bridge and go approximately one mile and you will see <u>Roane</u> <u>County High School</u> on the left.

From WBN, follow 68 east to route 58 south. Follow 58 south to Decatur. At the traffic light next to the County Court House make a left on to route 30 east. Follow 30 east (10 miles) and go through Athens. Turn left onto route 39 east to Englewood. Follow 39 to Englewood, cross over railroad tracks and go past the first red light; you will see the <u>Englewood Elementary</u> <u>School</u> one block up on the left.

EPIP-8



WBN	
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Initials Time

Initials Time

APPENDIX H Page 1 of 3

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NUCLEAR SECURITY - EVACUATION ACTIONS

The following appendix shall be utilized by the TSC Security Manager or if unavailable the Security Shift Supervisor or designee for the purpose of conducting a evacuation of site non-emergency response personnel.

- 1. Notified that an order to evacuate site non-emergency response personnel has been initiated by the SM /SED.
- 2. **CONTINUE** to control and restrict access to the Plant Protected Area (PA), except for those individuals designated for emergency response, per the Emergency Response Organization Call List or as authorized for emergency response by the TSC Security Manager, OSC Security Advisor or SM/SED.
- 3. **CONTINUE** to maintain OCA on-site traffic controls.

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- 4. **CONTINUE** to control and restrict access to the Owner Controlled (OCA) Area, except for those individuals designated for emergency response, per the Emergency Response Organization Call List or as authorized for emergency response by the TSC Security Manager, OSC Security Advisor or SM/SED.
- 5. **NOTIFY...** RADCON at ext. 7865 that, OCA on-site traffic control actions are in progress,

AND

REQUEST RADCON dispatch personnel to the Owner Controlled Area Traffic Control point (if determined by RADCON) that conditions requiring vehicle survey(s) exist.

- 6. **EVALUATE** evacuation route:
 - A. **Consult** with RADCON information concerning off-site environmental radiological hazards (potential plume pathways).
 - B. **Consider** local weather information to determine if hazardous weather conditions exist.
 - C. **Consider**, all information concerning terrorist activity within a 10 mile radius of the site.

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PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND EVACUATION

EPIP-8


	APPENDIX H Page 2 of 3		
	NUCLEAR SECURITY - EVACUATION ACTIONS		2 X X X X X
7.	DETERMINE evacuation route based upon information obtained in step (6) of this appendix:	. · ·	
8.	VERIFY that all prior listed items are complete before continuing in this action list.		
NC	DTE		
Bri	ief and advise all individuals in Assembly Areas Outside the Protected Area and Ne ganizations areas (Appendix B & C) of :	ar Site	
•	Current actions to conduct an evacuation of all non-emergency response personne	; , ·	
	AND		
•	Recommended exits routes, directing all personnel to follow the instructions of loca enforcement officers upon leaving the Owner Controlled Area (OCA).	ıl iaw	
9.	DISPATCH Security personnel to assist (as needed) and verify in the site evacuation.	ials Tin	
	CONSIDER first the precautionary evacuation of all non-essential personnel (outside the Protected Area) from the site. These personnel will be assembled in their designated near site assembly areas. (<u>Appendix B & C</u>) Once completed, non-essential personnel within the Protected Area can be evacuated (<u>Appendix A</u>).		
10.	NOTIFY the TSC Security Manager or SM/SED upon completion of evacuation of site non-essential personnel.		,

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Initials Time

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REVISION 17

	WBN	PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY AND EVACUATION	EPIP-8
		APPENDIX I Page 1 of 2	Ĺ
·2.		RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL - EVACUATION ACTIO	NS
una	following appe vailable, the Ra evacuation.	ndix shall be utilized by the TSC Radiological Control M adiological Control Shift Supervisor or designee, for the p	anager, or if he is ourpose of conducting a
1.	Notified of o has been ini	rder to evacuate site non-emergency response personne tiated by the SM /SED.	Initials Time
2.	IF a radio established	logical survey checkpoint is needed and has not been at the Owner Controlled Area (OCA), then:	
	DISPATCH Su	RADCON personnel to the OCA Emergency rvey Point # 15	,
		AND	
	ES	TABLISH a RADCON survey checkpoint.	
3.	site exiting. dispatched t	ogical concerns merit the spraying down of vehicles prior Notify the TSC or SM/SED to have the Fire Truck o this location. Hydrant # 0 HYD 026-3108 is near the survey point and adequate water run-off to drainage is	to
4.	be informed arrangement onsite <u>conta</u> approximatel RADCON pe	nditions preclude radiological decontamination, evacuees v of transportation, sheltering, and decontamination s prior to leaving the site. The primary evacuation shelter f <u>minated</u> personnel will be Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN), y 50 miles south of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN). rsonnel from the plant site, SQN, and CECC will respond to ort personnel decontamination activities if there is a need.	or Initials Time

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
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
EPIP-8

APPENDIX I (Page 2 of 2) + ,-

RADCON ASSEMBLY/ACCOUNTABILITY/EVACUATION GUIDELINES

DIRECTIONS TO (SQN) SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT





SSN	Name (Last, First MI)
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FILING INSTRUCTIONS	
DOCUMENT NUMBER EPIP - 11	
REMOVE REVISION $ 7$ INSERT REVISION $ 10$	
Comments	

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

EPIP-11

SECURITY AND ACCESS CONTROL

Revision 10

Unit 0

NON-QUALITY RELATED

PREPARED BY: <u>F. L. Pavlechko</u> (Type Name)

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SPONSORING ORGANIZATION: <u>Emergency Planning</u>

:

APPROVED BY: Frank L Pavlechko

EFFECTIVE DATE: <u>07/30/02</u>

LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE

	SECURITY	EPIP-11	
WBN	AND ACCESS	Revision 10	*
	CONTROL	Page 2 of 11	,

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Revision Number	Implementation Date	Pages Affected	Description of Revision
5	2/15/97	3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11	Editorial non-intent revisions made. SOS revised to SM. Records section added. Information note added to Security in Section 3.3. Contingency(s) titles added to Section 3.6. Owner controlled area ID added to map in Appendix A. JIC map revised.
6	6/30/98	All	Non-intent Change. Revised location of LNC.
7	6/14/00	All	Non Intent change. Revised title of WBN Communications Specialist. This revision resolves problem identified in WBN PER, 006394.
8	9/25/01	All ⁻ pg. 7	Intent change. Procedure revised to Non-Quality related per requirements of NQAP & pending revision to SPP-2.2. The coversheet and records section of the procedure was revised to reflect this change.
9	06/05/02	All 2, 6	Plan effectiveness determinations on these changes indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.
	-		Non-intent change(s): are based on enhanced Security requirements directed by the NRC. Security actions and Media Contingencies wording enhanced in 3.6 for the disposition of media personnel arriving at the site after a REP emergency situation or when the JIC is not activated.
10	07/30/02	All 2, 3, 4, 6-8	Plan effectiveness determinations on these changes indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.
			Intent changes made to the procedure to support the NRC Safeguards Advisory and actions associated with IN 2002-14. (ie) Specified the requirement for a declared emergency in the procedure purpose. The TCP point at Route 68 was moved to its new location. The emergency responder car window placard was eliminated along with the appendix. The appendices were re-designated. EPIP-8 was referenced in the instructions. New picture provided for appendix A.

REVISION DESCRIPTION:

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-	SECURITY	EPIP-11
WBN .	AND ACCESS	Revision 10
-	CONTROL	Page 3 of 11

1.0 PURPOSE²

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This Procedure provides guidelines for Nuclear Security (NS) to implement access control during a Declared Radiological Emergency.

This EPIP does not address security problems/contingencies that may arise during a radiological emergency. These problems **shall** continue to be handled in accordance with the approved Security Contingency Plan.

2.0 **RESPONSIBILITIES**²

- A. Nuclear Security will implement these Instructions in conjunction with WBN EPIP-8, "Personnel Accountability and Evacuation," or as directed by the Site Emergency Director (SED).
- B. The WBN Emergency Preparedness Manager will establish and maintain an "Emergency Response Organization Call List" comprised of current qualified responders. This list will be provided to Nuclear Security and updated quarterly.
- C. The Site Security Manager shall establish an instruction which delineates specific requirements to be performed by NS during a radiological emergency. This instruction shall address directed requirements for the security force contained in this Procedure.

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS

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3.1 Designated Site Areas¹

- A. The "Protected Area" is the area encompassed by physical barriers (i.e. security fence) which surrounds the plant (Reactor, Auxiliary, Control, Turbine, and Service Buildings, Switchyard, Intake Pumping Station, and Diesel Generator Buildings) through which access is controlled. (Appendix A map)
- B. The "Site Perimeter" is the area between the protected area and the outermost fence/buildings surrounding the plant. (Appendix A map)
- C. The "Owner-Controlled Area" is the area which lies between the site perimeter and the TVA Site boundary. (Appendix A map)

• •	SECURITY	EPIP-11	(
WBN ·	AND ACCESS	Revision 10	
Ť	CONTROL	Page 4 of 11	,

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3.0 **INSTRUCTIONS (continued)**

3.2 Access Control to the Protected Area during Emergencies¹

- A. If directed by the SM/SED, NS will restrict access to the Protected Area during any emergency situation at Watts Bar that has resulted in conditions within the Protected Area which warrant accountability and or evacuation (i.e., Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency.)
- B. As directed by the SM/SED or TSC Security Manager, onsite hazards should be identified to the emergency responder prior to entering the Protected Area using the hazards awareness board in the Access Portal.
- C. Emergency responders whose names appear on the Emergency Response Organization Call List or as authorized by the SED or NS representative in the TSC or OSC Manager will be authorized access.
- D. NRC Personnel have authorized access.
- E. Personnel allowed entry will be responsible for entering into the accountability card readers as soon as possible after entering the protected area.
- F. Fire protection vehicles, radiological control (RADCON) monitoring vans, and other emergency vehicles and personnel will be permitted immediate access upon confirmation with the SED that an onsite emergency does exist and their service has been requested.

3.3 Access to the Owner Controlled/Site Perimeter Area¹

NS will control access at the OCA Traffic Control Point (<u>Appendix A</u> - map). Access control will be as follows:

A. GRANT access to those individuals who display a site or other TVA photo ID badge

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3.0 INST	RUCTIONS (cor	ntinued)	-		
3.3	Access to the C	wner Controlled/Site Perimeter	Area ¹		
,, В .	Organization Ca	GRANT access to those individuals whose names are indicated on the Emergency Re Organization Call List and/or other approved list as provided by the SED, TSC Secur Manager, or OSC Manager.			
· • C .	GRANT access	to others as verbally approved by	the SED or NS representative in		
D.		by the TSC Security Manager/Se fied to the emergency responder p			
E.	The following o controlled area:	ffsite support organizations will be	e permitted immediate access to th		
	 RADCON Va Nuclear Regularies Federal Emeral INPO and Wa 	nent Agencies dinance Detachment (EOD Militar ans latory Commission (NRC) gency Management Agency (FEM	IA)		
NOTE	Personnel identi identi	fication cards, uniforms, vehicle m	arkings or letter of access may be		
NOTE	'account for indi- emergency vehic	adiological Emergency Access Lo viduals/vehicles gaining access to t cles are responding to an immediat ckly identified and escorted (if secu	he site during a radiological emer e/ongoing emergency they should		
NOTE	Unauthorized po Security Manag	ersonnel found in the owner contro er for egress instructions.	olled area will be reported to the 7		
3.4 . Egre	ss Control from tl	he Protected Area ¹	,		
A.		a assembly/accountability siren, in			

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3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued)

3.4 Egress Control from the Protected Area¹

B. Emergency vehicles and personnel, including RADCON monitoring vans, will be allowed immediate egress from the protected area during an ongoing radiological emergency.

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C. In the event of a Protected Area evacuation, site personnel will receive instructions from the SM or the TSC/SED concerning what actions to take prior to exiting the Protected Area. Security personnel will follow the instructions provided in EPIP-8 "Personnel Accountability and Evacuation and/or the Physical Security Plan.

3.5 Egress Control from the Site Area and Owner Controlled Area¹

- A. Egress from the owner controlled area will be authorized only after RADCON completes a survey (if radiological release has occurred) or as granted by the SED through the TSC, NS Manager.
- B. NS will provide traffic control (if security staff are available).

3.6 Security and Media Contingencies

- A This EPIP does not address security problems that may arise during a radiological emergency. These problems shall continue to be handled in accordance with the approved Security Contingency Plan.
- B. Press personnel who respond to WBN during an emergency will be directed to the Joint Information Center (JIC) in Chattanooga. (Appendix C)
- C. If the emergency situation has been terminated or the JIC has not been activated and Press personnel respond to the site, the Owner Controlled Area Security Traffic Control Point will notify the SM or SED. Once approval has been granted by the Plant Duty Manager and escorts are provided, the Press will be directed to the WBN Local News Center (LNC) which is classroom 19 in the Training Center to await a briefing or additional instructions.
- D. The WBN Communications Specialist should be notified as soon as possible of the situation (i.e., numbers of people, from: TV, radio, etc.).

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4.0 **REFERENCES**

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- A. Site Physical Security Plan
- B. WBN EPIP-8 Personnel Accountability and Evacuation
- C. NP Radiological Emergency Plan (REP)
- D. NUREG 0654
- E. Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 20 and 50
- F. ANSI N18.7-1976

5.0 ATTACHMENT

- A. Appendix A Owner Controlled, Site Perimeter and Protected Area Map
- B. Appendix B Radiological Emergency Access Log Sheet
- C. Appendix C TVA, JIC Directions

6.0 Records

A. Non-QA Records


All records generated during the course of a declared emergency, exercise or drill, will be sent to the EP Manager and stored appropriately.

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APPENDIX A (Page 1 of 1)

Owner Controlled/Site Perimeter and Protected Area Map



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APPENDIX B (Páge 1 of 1)

RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY ACCESS LOG SHEET

NS Officer

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Date

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
Name	Section	Badge #	Time IN	Time OUT	Vehicle # (if approp.)
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APPENDIX C (Page 1 of 1)

Directions to the TVA Joint Information Center (JIC)

Follow Rt. 68 West to Rt. 27 South. Stay on 27 South to the Martin Luther King exit. Follow Broad Street to the TVA Chattanooga Office Complex (COC). The JIC is located in the Missionary Ridge Building. Į



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		SOURCE NO Page 1 of		
1	BR-77080, BF-00006, IEB-0 NCO-920047022.		ingress and unir postulated occu Instructions, Se the Protected A Access Control Perimeter Area, Protected Area	es allow emergency npeded egress for any arrence. Section 3.0 ection 3.2 Access Control area during Emergencies, to the Owner Controlled , 3.4 Egress Control from and 3.5 Egress Control f and Owner Controlled Are 8.
2	ANSI N18.7-1976 Subsection 5.3.9.3: 01 POI			ain the following

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