Docket File

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

October 3, 1989

Docket No. 50-397

Mr. G. C. Sorensen, Manager
Regulatory Programs
Washington Public Power Supply System
P.O. Box 968
3000 George Washington Way
Richland, Washington 99352

Dear Mr. Sorensen:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 74 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-21 - WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 (TAC NO. 71128)

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed amendment to Facility Operating License NPF-21 to the Washington Public Power Supply System for WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2, located in Benton County near Richland, Washington. This amendment is in response to your letter dated October 24, 1988 (G02-99-221).

This amendment revises Technical Specification (TS) Section 3/4.3.7, Table 3.3.7.1-1, Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and the associated bases to reflect modifications in system configuration and operation. This amendment must be implemented within seven days of issuance. Within 30 days, you must certify that station procedures have been revised to implement this amendment and that all appropriate staff have been trained in the implementation of these procedures.

A copy of the related safety evaluation supporting the amendment is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's bi-weekly Federal Register notice.

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For the reasons given in our letter dated November 30, 1988, we were not able to review the footnote which you proposed to add to TS page 3/4 3-58 or to review the proposed changes to ACTION statement 70 on TS page 3/4 3-59 specifying times to restore monitors to operable status. Therefore, those proposed changes are hereby denied. A copy of the Notice of Partial Denial is enclosed for your information.

Sincerely,

Robert B. Samworth

Robert B. Samworth, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate V
Division of Reactor Projects - III,
IV, V and Special Projects
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 74 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-21
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice of Partial Denial

cc: w/enclosures
See next page

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original signed by

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[WNP2 AMEND RAD MON]

*See previous concurrene

DRSP/PD5	DRSP/PD5*	SPLB*	PRPB*	OGC	DRSP/PD5
JLee	RSamworth:dr	CMcCracken	LCunningham	*	GKnighton
9/ /89	3/1/89	8/30/89	9/1/89	9/14/89	10/3 /89

*Changes as marked

Docket No. 50-397

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Mr. G. C. Sorensen, Manager
Regulatory Programs
Washington Public Power Supply System
P.O. Box 968
3000 George Washington Way
Richland, Washington 99352

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SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-21 - WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 (TAC NO. 71128)

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed amendment to Facility Operating License NPF-21 to the Washington Public Power Supply System for WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2, located in Benton County near Richland, Washington. This amendment is in response to your letter dated October 24, 1988 (G02-88-221).

This amendment revises Technical Specification (TS) Section 3/4.3.7, Table 3.3.7.1-1, Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and the associated bases to reflect modifications in system configuration and operation. This amendment must be implemented within seven days of issuance.

For the reasons given in our letter dated November 30, 1988, we were not able to review the footnote which you proposed to add to TS page 3/4 3-58 or to review the proposed changes to ACTION statement 70 on TS page 3/4 3-59 specifying times to restore monitors to operable status.

A copy of the related safety evaluation supporting the amendment is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's bi-weekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Robert B. Samworth, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate V
Division of Reactor Projects - III,
IV, V and Special Projects
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. to Facility Operating License No. NPF-21
2. Safety Evaluation

cc: w/enclosures
See next page

DRSP/PD5	DRSP/APM:PD5	SPLB	PRAB	OGC	DRSP/D:PD5
JLee:bd	RSamworth	~~JCraig~~ C. McCracken	LJCunningham		GWKnighton
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		8/30			

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Benton County Board of Commissioners
Prosser, Washington 99350

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1400 L Street NW
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

DOCKET NO. 50-397

NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 74
License No. NPF-21

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment filed by the Washington Public Power Supply System (the licensee), dated October 24, 1988, complies with complies the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-21 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 74, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This amendment is effective as of the date of issuance and must be fully implemented no later than 7 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

George W. Knighton, Director
Project Directorate V
Division of Reactor Projects - III,
IV, V and Special Projects
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: October 3, 1989

ENCLOSURE TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 74

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-21

DOCKET NO. 50-397

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change. Also to be replaced are the following overleaf pages.

AMENDMENT PAGE	OVERLEAF PAGE
3/4 3-58	3/4 3-57
3/4 3-59	3/4 3-60
B 3/4 3-4	B 3/4 3-3

3/4.3.7 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.7.1 The radiation monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.7.1-1 shall be OPERABLE with their alarm setpoints within the specified limits.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3.7.1-1.

ACTION:

a. With a radiation monitoring instrumentation channel alarm setpoint exceeding the value shown in Table 3.3.7.1-1, adjust the setpoint to within the limit within 4 hours or declare the channel inoperable.

b. With one or more radiation monitoring channels inoperable, take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.7.1-1.

c. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.7.1 Each of the above required radiation monitoring instrumentation channels shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the conditions and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.7.1-1.

TABLE 4.3.6-1 (Continued)

CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

TABLE NOTATIONS

(a) Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

(b) Within 24 hours prior to startup, if not performed within the previous 7 days.

(c) Includes reactor manual control multiplexing system input.

* With THERMAL POWER $\geq$ 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

** With more than one control rod withdrawn. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

TABLE 3.3.7.1-1

RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

INSTRUMENTATION	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE CONDITIONS	ALARM SETPOINT	ACTION
1. Main Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitor	2/intake	1,2,3,5 and *	≤ 5000 cpm	70
2. Area Monitors				
a. Criticality Monitors				
1) New Fuel Storage Vault	2	#	≤ 5 R/h(a)	71
2) Spent Fuel Storage Pool	1	##	≤ 20 mR/h	71

TABLE NOTATIONS

*When the main condenser air evacuation system is in operation.

#With fuel in the new fuel storage vault.

##With fuel in the spent fuel storage pool.

(a)Alarm setpoint set IAW 10 CFR 70.24.a.1.

ACTION STATEMENTS

ACTION 70 -

a. With one of the required monitors inoperable, manually isolate the associated remote air intake within 1 hour; restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or, within the next 6 hours, initiate and maintain operation of the control room emergency filtration system in the pressurization mode of operation.

b. With both of the required monitors inoperable, initiate and maintain operation of the control room emergency filtration system in the pressurization mode of operation within 1 hour.

ACTION 71 - With the required monitor inoperable, assure a portable continuous monitor with the same alarm setpoint is OPERABLE in the vicinity of the installed monitor during any fuel movement. If no fuel movement is being made, perform area surveys of the monitored area with portable monitoring instrumentation at least once per 24 hours.

TABLE 4.3.7.1-1

RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENTATION	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED
1. Main Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitor	S	M	R	1, 2, 3, 5 and *
2. Area Monitors				
a. Criticality Monitors				
1) New Fuel Storage Vault	S	M	R	#
2) Spent Fuel Storage Pool	S	M	R	##

TABLE NOTATIONS

#With fuel in the new fuel storage vault.

##With fuel in the spent fuel storage pool.

*When the main condenser air evacuation system is in operation.

3/4.3.5 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

The reactor core isolation cooling system actuation instrumentation is provided to initiate actions to assure adequate core cooling in the event of reactor isolation from its primary heat sink and the loss of feedwater flow to the reactor vessel without providing actuation of any of the emergency core cooling equipment.

Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is equal to or less than the drift allowance assumed for each trip in the safety analyses.

3/4.3.6 CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION

The control rod block functions are provided consistent with the requirements of Specifications 3/4.1.4, Control Rod Program Controls, 3/4.2, Power Distribution Limits and 3/4.3.1 Reactor Protection System Instrumentation. The trip logic is arranged so that a trip in any one of the inputs will result in a control rod block.

Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is equal to or less than the drift allowance assumed for each trip in the safety analyses.

3/4.3.7 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

3/4.3.7.1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring instrumentation ensures that; (1) the radiation levels are continually measured in the areas served by the individual channels; (2) the alarm is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is exceeded; and (3) sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident. This capability is consistent with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 19, 41, 60, 61, 63, and 64.

The criticality monitor alarm setpoints were calculated using the criteria from 10 CFR 70.24.a.1 that requires detecting a dose rate of 20 Rads per minute of combined neutron and gamma radiation at 2 meters. The alarm setpoint was determined by calculational methods using the gamma to gamma plus neutron ratios from ANSI/ANS 8.3-1979, Criticality Accident Alarm System, Appendix B and assuming a critical mass was formed from a seismic event, with a volume of 6' x 6' x 6' at a distance of 27.7 feet from the two detectors. The calculated dose rate using the methodology is 5.05 R/hr. The allowable value for the alarm setpoint was, therefore, established at 5R/hr.

3.4.3.7.2 SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the seismic monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluate the response of those features important to safety. This capability is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for the unit. This instrumentation is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.12, "Instrumentation for Earthquakes," April 1974.

3/4.3.4 RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

The anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) recirculation pump trip system provides a means of limiting the consequences of the unlikely occurrence of a failure to scram during an anticipated transient. The response of the plant to this postulated event falls within the envelope of study events in General Electric Company Topical Report NEDO-10349, dated March 1971, and NEDO-24222, dated December 1979.

The end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip (EOC-RPT) system is a part of the reactor protection system and is an essential safety supplement to the reactor trip. The purpose of the EOC-RPT is to recover the loss of thermal margin which occurs at the end-of-cycle. The physical phenomenon involved is that the void reactivity feedback due to a pressurization transient can add positive reactivity to the reactor system at a faster rate than the control rods add negative scram reactivity. Each EOC-RPT system trips both recirculation pumps, reducing coolant flow in order to reduce the void collapse in the core during two of the most limiting pressurization events. The two events for which the EOC-RPT protective feature will function are closure of the turbine throttle valves and fast closure of the turbine governor valves.

A fast closure sensor from each of two turbine governor valves provides input to the EOC-RPT system; a fast closure sensor from each of the other two turbine governor valves provides input to the second EOC-RPT system. Similarly, a position switch for each of two turbine throttle valves provides input to one EOC-RPT system; a position switch from each of the other two throttle valves provides input to the other EOC-RPT system. For each EOC-RPT system, the sensor relay contacts are arranged to form a 2-out-of-2 logic for the fast closure of turbine governor valves and a 2-out-of-2 logic for the turbine throttle valves. The operation of either logic will actuate the EOC-RPT system and trip both recirculation pumps.

Each EOC-RPT system may be manually bypassed by use of a keyswitch which is administratively controlled. The manual bypasses and the automatic Operating Bypass at less than 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER are annunciated in the control room.

The EOC-RPT system response time is the time assumed in the analysis between initiation of valve motion and complete suppression of the electric arc, i.e., 190ms, less the time allotted for sensor response, i.e., 10ms, and less the time allotted for breaker arc suppression determined by test, as correlated to manufacturer's test results, i.e., 83ms, and plant preoperational test results.

Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is equal to or less than the drift allowance assumed for each trip in the safety analyses.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 74 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-21

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

DOCKET NO. 50-397

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated October 24, 1988, Washington Public Power Supply System proposed certain changes to Technical Specification Section 3/4.3.7 "Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation," including Table 3.3.7.1-1, Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation," by removing reference to "trips" actuated by the instrumentation. Specifically, in accordance with the requirements of this specification, main control room ventilation radiation monitors should alarm in the control room during high radiation levels and also should trip air system intake valves to cause air to be drawn from a different point. The amendment would allow continued operation without the automatic trip capability. The alarm functions would be retained and the air intakes would be realigned manually.

Action 70(a) in the table is to be revised to show that the licensee would manually isolate a remote air intake when a monitor associated with that intake is inoperable. This would achieve the same objective as the trip mechanism for the case of one inoperable monitor.

The associated bases would be changed to be consistent with the specifications.

The licensee stated that the change, which would delete the trip function, is necessary because under the existing specifications should a LOCA occur, then a single failure (for example a short closing an isolation valve) could result in both remote air intakes remaining closed. Such a sequence of events would force the control room ventilation system into the recirculation mode resulting in higher control room in-leakage rates from the reduction in control room pressure. This increased in-leakage in turn could cause excessive radiation exposure to the control room personnel.

To avoid this situation the licensee has already replaced the motor operators on the controlled intake valves with manual operators. Following the deletion of the automatic trip function for these valves, the licensee has been operating the control room ventilation system in the pressurization mode in accordance with requirements in Action 70(b) in the Technical Specification.

2.0 EVALUATION

The control room habitability system protects operators from airborne radioactivity. The control room HVAC system is arranged with one normal air intake and two remote air intakes that function during accident conditions. Each remote air intake line has two radiation monitors and two electro-hydraulic valves in series which are normally closed and powered from different vital buses. The normal air intake has two isolation valves which are normally open, but which close on an F, A, or Z signal (high drywell pressure, low RFV level or high radiation, any of which could be indicative of a LOCA in progress). An FAZ signal also causes the isolation valves in both remote air intakes to open, the emergency supply fans to start, and the control room exhaust fan to trip, and places the control room HVAC in the pressurization mode, providing filtered air through filtration units.

When the radiation monitors in one remote intake line sense high radiation (after initial opening of the valves on an FAZ signal), they provide an alarm function and cause the isolation valves in that line to close, but the control room remains in the pressurization mode through the other remote air intake.

On September 2, 1988, engineers from Generation Engineering discovered that the control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system was susceptible to a single failure for which WNP-2 was not analyzed (See Licensee Event Report 88-31). The reactor was shutdown at the time and remained shutdown until the problem was resolved on September 5.

Should a LOCA have occurred, a single failure could have resulted in both remote intakes remaining closed. For example, a "hot short" could close an intake valve in one of the remote intakes while the opposite intake was isolated as a result of the LOCA release. This event would have forced the control room ventilation system into the "recirculation" mode and caused higher control room in-leakage rates from the loss of control room pressure. This in-leakage could have caused excessive radiation exposure to the control room personnel.

To avoid this situation, the Supply System replaced the motor operators on the remote air intake valves with manual operators. In the event of a LOCA, an operator would be dispatched to close the appropriate set of isolation valves for an alarming condition on the radiation monitors for a given remote air intake. Procedures were revised to reflect this modification and a dry run was conducted to ensure that this could be accomplished in a timely manner. Operation of the control room emergency filtration system has been maintained in the pressurization mode in accordance with ACTION 70(a) in the Technical Specifications.

With the approval of this Technical Specification change request, operation in the pressurized mode would not be required. Normal plant lineup would be such that the two remote intakes will be administratively controlled open with normal control room intake through those intakes and the normal intake. Occasionally one remote intake might be isolated to facilitate maintenance or other activities. The 750 cfm exhaust fan would remain operational. In the event of an FAZ signal, the normal intake will close, the 750 cfm exhaust will de-energize, and the emergency filters will automatically be placed in service. These FAZ initiated actions are per the original plant design and were not altered.

After the FAZ initiation, either intake can be manually isolated locally, given a change in radiological conditions as sensed by the original radiation elements. This is similar to the original design concept that manually repositioned a remote air intake valve open following an FAZ condition and provided a single isolation given changing radiological conditions. Evaluations and actual plant walkthrough demonstration have verified that the manual action can be accomplished well within the time frame evaluated in Section 6.4.4 of the WNP-2 FSAR. (The FSAR evaluated the exposure which would occur with the alternate remote intake valve which is in the path of the plume stuck in the open position for three hours. The licensee demonstrated that manual action would take less than 20 minutes, including the donning of protective clothing and accessing the valve area.) Additionally, with both intakes normally open versus one as discussed in the FSAR analysis, the dose to the operators is diluted during the three-hour period and consequently is bounded conservatively by the analysis provided in the FSAR. The purge valve also functions similarly and is opened depending on the position of its associated remote intake isolation valve.

The changes ensure that the emergency filtration system remains in service and that no single component failure can prevent operator action from establishing a suitable source of air for the pressurization mode. Further, the changes retain the indication function of the remote radiation monitors.

When the trip function was eliminated from the instrumentation, the licensee initiated and has maintained the operation of the control room emergency filtration system in the pressurization mode of operation as required by action statement 70 of Table 3.3.7.1-1.

The proposed change to Table 3.3.7.1-1 of the Technical Specification would delete reference to the trip function and would require manual isolation of an air intake associated with an inoperable radiation monitor in lieu of manually tripping the inoperable channel. Without the trip function as a requirement, the instrumentation would be operable and the licensee would no longer need to operate the plant in the action statement for this function.

Since the alarms are retained and timely operator action can be taken, the staff finds deletion of the trip function requirement from the technical specifications acceptable.

As indicated by letter dated November 30, 1988 from R. Samworth, NRC, to G. C. Sorensen, WPPSS, the proposed addition of the footnote on page 3/4 3-58 and the proposed changes to ACTION statement 70 on page 3/4 3-59 specifying times to restore the monitors to operable status did not (1) indicate any need for these changes, (2) present a safety analysis or (3) provide a "no significant hazards consideration analysis" addressing these changes. Accordingly, no review was performed and these proposed changes are being denied.

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves a change to requirements with respect to the installation and use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that this amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

4.0 CONTACT WITH STATE OFFICIAL

The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and consulted with the State of Washington. No public comments were received, and the State of Washington did not have any comment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and (3) the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: R. Samworth

Dated: October 3, 1989

7590-01

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

DOCKET NO. 50-397

NOTICE OF PARTIAL DENIAL OF AMENDMENT TO

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING

The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has denied in part a request by the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS or licensee) for an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-21 for operation of the WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2, located in Benton County, Washington. The Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment was published in the Federal Register on November 30, 1988 (53 FR 48340).

The licensee proposed to amend the technical specifications related to radiation monitoring of control room ventilation air to remove the requirement for an automated trip of air intakes upon a high radiation signal. Arguments were presented to support this action; and it was reviewed and approved.

In the same application, several other changes to the affected section were proposed but were not supported. Specifically, NRC staff did not review the footnote which was proposed to be added to page 3/4 3-58 or review the proposed changes to statement 70 on page 3/4 3-59 specifying times to restore the monitors to operable status because the licensee did not (1) indicate any need for the changes, (2) present a safety analysis, instead arguing that the proposed wording would be consistent with wording used in unrelated sections

of the technical specifications, or (3) provide a "no significant hazards consideration analysis" addressing these changes. Therefore, these proposed changes have been denied.

By November 9, 1989, the licensee may demand a hearing with respect to the denial described above and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding may file a written petition for leave to intervene.

A request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene must be filed with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Regulatory Publications Branch, Office of Administration, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555, by the above date.

A copy of any petitions should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, and to Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esq., Bishop, Cook, Purcell and Reynolds, 1400 L Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20005-3502 and G. E. Doupe, Esq., Washington Public Power Supply System, P.O. Box 968, 3000 George Washington Way, Richland, Washington 99352, attorneys for the licensee.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated October 24, 1988 (2) Amendment No. 74 to License No. NPF-21, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555, and at the Richland City Library, Swift and Northgate Streets, Richland, Washington 99352. A copy of

items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V and Special Projects.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 3rd day of October, 1989.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Robert B. Samworth

Robert B. Samworth, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate V
Division of Reactor Projects - III,
IV, V and Special Projects
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation