April 11, 1988

Docket No. 50-397

Mr. G. C. Sorensen, Manager
Regulatory Programs
Washington Public Power Supply System
P.O. Box 968
3000 George Washington Way
Richland, Washington 99352

Dear Mr. Sorensen:

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SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 54 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-21 - WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 (TAC NO. 66808)

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed amendment to Facility Operating License NPF-21 to the Washington Public Power Supply System for WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2, located in Benton County near Richland, Washington. This amendment is in response to your letter dated December 1, 1987 (G02-87-278) as supplemented by letter dated March 18, 1988 (G02-88-067).

This amendment revises snubber functional testing sampling plans as detailed in Technical Specification 4.7.4.e.

A copy of the related safety evaluation supporting this amendment is enclosed. The enclosed Notice of Issuance will be forwarded to the Office of the Federal Register for publication. Also enclosed for your information is a copy of an Environmental Assessment related to this action which has been published in the Federal Register.

Sincerely,

original signed by

Robert B. Samworth, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate V
Division of Reactor Projects - III,
IV, V and Special Projects

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Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 54 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-21
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice of Issuance
4. Environmental Assessment

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

DRSP/PDV	DRSP/PDV	OGC	DRSP/PD:PDV
JLee	RSamworth:dr		GWKnighton
4/7/88	4/11/88	4/5/88	4/11/88

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Mr. G. C. Sorensen, Manager
Washington Public Power Supply System

WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2
(WNP-2)

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

DOCKET NO. 50-397

WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 54
License No. NPF-21

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment filed by the Washington Public Power Supply System (the Supply System, also the licensee), dated December 1, 1987 as supplemented by letter dated March 18, 1988, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-21 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 54, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

George W. Knighton, Director
Project Directorate V
Division of Reactor Projects - III,
IV, V and Special Projects

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: April 11, 1988

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

No. Inoperable Snubbers of Each Type on Any System per Inspection Period	Subsequent Visual Inspection Period* #
0	18 months, +25%, -50%
1	12 months ± 25%
2	6 months ± 25%
3,4	124 days ± 25%
5,6,7	62 days ± 25%
8 or more	31 days ± 25%

c. Visual Inspection Acceptance Criteria

Visual inspections shall verify that: (1) there are no visible indications of damage or impaired OPERABILITY, (2) attachments to the foundation or supporting structure are secure, and (3) fasteners for attachment of the snubber to the component and to the snubber anchorage are secure. Snubbers which appear inoperable as a result of visual inspections may be determined OPERABLE for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval, provided that: (1) the cause of the rejection is clearly established and remedied for that particular snubber and for other snubbers irrespective of type on that system that may be generically susceptible; and (2) the affected snubber is functionally tested in the as-found condition and determined OPERABLE per Specification 4.7.4f. All snubbers connected to an inoperable common hydraulic fluid reservoir shall be counted as inoperable snubbers. For those snubbers common to more than one system, the OPERABILITY of such snubbers shall be considered in assessing the surveillance schedule for each of the related systems.

d. Transient Event Inspection

An inspection shall be performed of all hydraulic and mechanical snubbers attached to sections of systems that have experienced unexpected, potentially damaging transients as determined from a review of operational data and a visual inspection of the systems within 6 months following such an event. In addition to satisfying the visual inspection acceptance criteria, freedom-of-motion of mechanical snubbers shall be verified using at least one of the following: (1) manually induced snubber movement; or (2) evaluation of in-place snubber piston setting; or (3) stroking the mechanical snubber through its full range of travel.

*The inspection interval for each type of snubber on a given system shall not be lengthened more than one step at a time unless a generic problem has been identified and corrected; in that event the inspection interval may be lengthened one step the first time and two steps thereafter if no inoperable snubbers of that type are found on that system.

#The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

e. Functional Tests

During the first refueling shutdown and at least once per 18 months thereafter during shutdown, a representative sample of snubbers shall be tested using one of the following sample plans. The sample plan shall be selected prior to the test period and cannot be changed during the test period. The NRC Regional Administrator shall be notified in writing of the sample plan selected prior to the test period or the sample plan used in the prior test period shall be implemented:

1) At least 10% of the total of each type of snubber shall be functionally tested either in-place or in a bench test. For each snubber of a type that does not meet the functional test acceptance criteria of Specification 4.7.4f., an additional 5% of that type of snubber shall be functionally tested until no more failures are found or until all snubbers of that type have been functionally tested; or

2) A representative sample of 37 snubbers shall be functionally tested in accordance with Figure 4.7-1. "C" is the total number of snubbers found not meeting the acceptance requirements of Specification 4.7.4f. The cumulative number of snubbers of a type tested is denoted by "N". If at any time the point plotted falls in the "Accept" region, testing of snubbers may be terminated. When the point plotted lies in the "Continue Testing" region, additional snubbers shall be tested until the point falls in the "Accept" region or all the snubbers have been tested. Testing equipment failure during functional testing may invalidate that day's testing and allow that day's testing to resume anew at a later time provided all snubbers tested with the failed equipment during the day of equipment failure are retested.

The representative sample selected for the functional test sample plans shall be randomly selected from the snubbers of each type and reviewed before beginning the testing. The review shall ensure, as far as practicable, that they are representative of the various configurations, operating environments, range of size, and capacity of snubbers of each type. Snubbers placed in the same location as snubbers which failed the previous functional test shall be retested at the time of the next functional test but shall not be included in

e. Functional Tests (Continued)

the sample plan. If during the functional testing, additional testing is required due to failure of snubbers, the unacceptable snubbers may be categorized into test failure mode group(s). A test failure mode group shall include all unacceptable snubbers that have a given failure mode and all other snubbers subject to the same failure mode. Once a test failure mode group has been established, it can be separated for continued testing apart from the general population of snubbers. However, all the unacceptable snubbers in this failure mode group shall be counted as one unacceptable snubber for additional testing in the general population. Testing in the failure mode group shall be based on the number of unacceptable snubbers and shall continue until no more failures are found or all snubbers in the failure mode group have been tested. Any additional unacceptable snubbers found in the test failure mode group shall be counted for continued testing only for that test failure mode group.

f. Functional Test Acceptance Criteria

The snubber functional test shall verify that:

1) Activation (restraining action) is achieved within the specified range in both tension and compression;

2) Snubber bleed, or release rate where required, is present in both tension and compression, within the specified range;

3) Where required, the force required to initiate or maintain motion of the snubber is within the specified range in both directions of travel; and

4) For snubbers specifically required not to displace under continuous load, the ability of the snubber to withstand load without displacement.

Testing methods may be used to measure parameters indirectly or parameters other than those specified if those results can be correlated to the specified parameters through established methods.

g. Functional Test Failure Analysis

An engineering evaluation shall be made of each failure to meet the functional test acceptance criteria to determine the cause of the failure. The results of this evaluation shall be used, if

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

g. Functional Test Failure Analysis (Continued)

applicable, in selecting snubbers to be tested in an effort to determine the OPERABILITY of other snubbers irrespective of type which may be subject to the same failure mode.

For the snubbers found inoperable, an engineering evaluation shall be performed on the components to which the inoperable snubbers are attached. The purpose of this engineering evaluation shall be to determine if the components to which the inoperable snubbers are attached were adversely affected by the inoperability of the snubbers in order to ensure that the component remains capable of meeting the designed service.

If any snubber selected for functional testing either fails to lock up or fails to move, i.e., frozen-in-place, the cause will be evaluated and, if caused by manufacturer or design deficiency or unexpected transient event, all snubbers of the same type subject to the same defect shall be evaluated in a manner (stroking, testing, replacement etc.) to ensure their operability. This evaluation requirement shall be independent of the requirements stated in Specification 4.7.4e. for snubbers not meeting the functional test acceptance criteria.

h. Functional Testing of Repaired and Replaced Snubbers

Snubbers which fail the visual inspection or the functional test acceptance criteria shall be repaired or replaced. Replacement snubbers and snubbers which have repairs which might affect the functional test results shall be tested to meet the functional test criteria before installation in the unit. Mechanical snubbers shall have met the acceptance criteria subsequent to their most recent service, and the freedom-of-motion test must have been performed within 12 months before being installed in the unit.

i. Snubber Service Life Program

The service life of hydraulic and mechanical snubbers shall be monitored to ensure that the service life is not exceeded between surveillance inspections. The maximum expected service life for various seals, springs, and other critical parts shall be determined and established based on engineering information and shall be extended or shortened based on monitored test results and failure history. Critical parts shall be replaced so that the maximum service life will not be exceeded during a period when the snubber is required to be OPERABLE. The parts replacements shall be documented and the documentation shall be retained in accordance with Specification 6.10.2.



FIGURE 4.7-1
SAMPLE PLAN 2) FOR SNUBBER FUNCTIONAL TEST

3/4.7.5 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.5 Each sealed source containing radioactive material either in excess of 100 microcuries of beta and/or gamma emitting material or 5 microcurie of alpha emitting material shall be free of greater than or equal to 0.005 microcurie of removable contamination.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With a sealed source having removable contamination in excess of the above limit, withdraw the sealed source from use and either:

   1. Decontaminate and repair the sealed source, or

   2. Dispose of the sealed source in accordance with Commission Regulations.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.5.1 Test Requirements - Each sealed source shall be tested for leakage and/or contamination by:

a. The licensee, or

b. Other persons specifically authorized by the Commission or an Agreement State.

The test method shall have a detection sensitivity of at least 0.005 microcurie per test sample.

4.7.5.2 Test Frequencies - Each category of sealed sources, excluding startup sources and fission detectors previously subjected to core flux, shall be tested at the frequency described below.

a. Sources in use - At least once per 6 months for all sealed sources containing radioactive material:

   1. With a half-life greater than 30 days, excluding Hydrogen 3, and

   2. In any form other than gas.

3/4.7.4 SNUBBERS (Continued)

failures and initiating events is constant with time and that the failure of any snubber on that system could cause the system to be unprotected and to result in failure during an assumed initiating event. Inspections performed before that interval has elapsed may be used as a new reference point to determine the next inspection. However, the results of such early inspections performed before the original required time interval has elapsed, (nominal time less 25%) may not be used to lengthen the required inspection interval. Any inspection whose results require a shorter inspection interval will override the previous schedule.

The acceptance criteria are to be used in the visual inspection to determine OPERABILITY of the snubbers. For example, if a fluid port of a hydraulic snubber is found to be uncovered, the snubber shall be declared inoperable and shall not be determined OPERABLE via functional testing.

To provide assurance of snubber functional reliability, one of two functional testing methods are used with the stated acceptance criteria:

1. Functionally test 10% of a type of snubber with an additional 5% tested for each functional testing failure, or

2. Functionally test a sample size and determine sample acceptance or continue testing using Figure 4.7-1.

SNUBBERS (Continued)

Figure 4.7-1 was developed using "Wald's Sequential Probability Ratio Plan" as described in "Quality Control and Industrial Statistics" by Acheson J. Duncan.

Permanent or other exemptions from the surveillance program for individual snubbers may be granted by the Commission if a justifiable basis for exemption is presented and, if applicable, snubber life destructive testing was performed to qualify the snubbers for the applicable design conditions at either the completion of their fabrication or at a subsequent date. Snubbers so exempted shall be listed in the list of individual snubbers indicating the extent of the exemptions.

The service life of a snubber is established via manufacturer input and information through consideration of the snubber service conditions and associated installation and maintenance records (newly installed snubbers, seal replaced, spring replaced, in high radiation area, in high temperature area, etc.). The requirement to monitor the snubber service life is included to ensure that the snubbers periodically undergo a performance evaluation in view of their age and operating conditions. These records will provide statistical bases for future consideration of snubber service life.

3/4.7.5 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION

The limitations on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing, including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR 70.39(c) limits for plutonium. This limitation will ensure that leakage from byproduct, source, and special nuclear material sources will not exceed allowable intake values. Sealed sources are classified into three groups according to their use, with surveillance requirements commensurate with the probability of damage to a source in that group. Those sources which are frequently handled are required to be tested more often than those which are not. Sealed sources which are continuously enclosed within a shielded mechanism, i.e., sealed sources within radiation monitoring devices, are considered to be stored and need not be tested unless they are removed from the shielded mechanism.

3/4 7.6 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of the fire suppression systems ensures that adequate fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where safety-related equipment is located. The fire suppression system consists of the water system, spray and/or sprinkler systems, CO_2 systems, Halon systems, and fire hose stations. The collective capability of the fire suppression systems is adequate to minimize potential damage to safety-related equipment and is a major element in the facility fire protection program.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 54 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-21

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO.2

DOCKET NO. 50-397

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated December 1, 1987 (G02-87-278) Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) requested an amendment to the WNP-2 Technical Specifications related to snubber testing. Specifically, WPPSS is seeking to modify snubber functional testing sampling plans as detailed in Technical Specification 4.7.4.e per the guidelines of the draft ANSI/ASME - OM-4 document (Examination and Performance Testing of Nuclear Power Plant Dynamic Restraints). By letter dated March 18, 1988 (G02-88-067) WPPSS requested an editorial change to the first submittal. The March 18, 1988 request did not affect the substance of the amendment.

2.0 DISCUSSION

The first of three approved sampling plans, the "10 percent plan", described in Specification 4.7.4.e(1) requires 10% of the snubbers to be tested periodically. It requires testing of an additional 10% of the snubbers for each snubber not meeting the acceptance criteria of Specification 4.7.4.f. The proposed change modifies this plan to require only a 5% additional testing for each snubber that fails functional testing as presently required.

The second sampling plan, the "37 plan", described in Specification 4.7.4e(2) requires that a representative sample of snubbers be tested periodically in accordance with Figure 4.7-1 of Technical Specification 4.7.4. Figure 4.7-1 provides the acceptance criteria for the functional test results and denotes a "reject" region and a "continue testing" region. If at any time the plotted test results fall within this "reject" region, then all snubbers are to be functionally tested.

The proposed change revises surveillance requirement 4.7.4.e(2) and Figure 4.7-1 to delete the "reject" region and substitute an expanded "continue testing" region. With the deletion of the "reject" line plotting of results by lot or individual basis becomes a moot point because snubbers must continue to be tested until the point falls into the "accept" region or until all snubbers have been tested.

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The proposed change also deletes references to the "reject" region in the text of Specification 4.7.4.e(2) and bases 3/4.7.4. In the December 1, 1987 submittal, the licensee proposed that bases 3/4.7.4 be supplemented by a footnote such that if testing continues to be between 100-200 snubbers and the accept region has not been attained, then the actual percent of population quality of greater than or equal to 5% failed snubbers will probably result in extended testing. The staff finds that the footnote does not add to or clarify the Technical Specification requirements. By letter dated March 18, 1988, the licensee retracted the proposal for the footnote.

The third sampling plan, the "55 plan", described in Specification 4.7.4.e(3) also requires that a representative sample of snubbers be periodically tested. Deleting the "reject" line from the "37 plan" makes the "55 plan" unnecessary and as such it is proposed to be deleted.

3.0 EVALUATION

The proposed change in the first of the sampling plans to require 5% additional testing for each snubber that fails function testing as opposed to 10% additional testing as presently required, removes an inconsistency in the sampling plans. The initial sample size of 10% for plan 1 was selected on the basis that the number of snubbers tested every 15 years will be at least as large as the number of snubbers in the plant when the associated functional testing period is 18 months. The subsequential sample size of 10%, however, was an arbitrary choice. Since all three sampling plans are acceptable, adopting either one of the plans should yield the same results. Yet for a population that would produce the same initial sample size for plans 1 and 2 or 1 and 3, the subsequential sample sizes will differ by twice as much. Revision of the arbitrarily determined subsequential size from 10% to 5%, as proposed will bring all three plans on an equal basis. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Working Group 4 Standard "Examination and Performance Testing of Nuclear Power Plant Dynamic Restraints (Snubbers)", has taken this into consideration, and changed the subsequential sample size from 10% to 5% for plan 1. The standard was approved by NRC and is being adopted by ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Section XI for plant surveillance guidance. This change will reduce the amount of additional testing required and thus reduce man-rem exposure and safety concerns associated with unnecessary functional testing.

Regarding the proposed changes in the second sampling plan, the acceptance criteria (represented by Figure 4.7-1 in the Technical Specifications) were developed using "Wald's Sequential Probability Ration Plan". Statistical studies using Wald's sequential sampling plan indicate that

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*Number of snubbers not meeting the acceptance criteria "C"/number of snubbers tested "N".

a major change in the reject line caused an insignificant change in the accept line or in other words acceptance is independent of rejection. These studies also demonstrate that while the probability of false acceptance of a bad snubber population under the proposed amendment still exists it is negligible. As long as the "reject" line remains in the sample plan there is some possibility of rejecting a good snubber population and consequently requiring an unnecessary 100% functional testing of snubbers with attendant ALARA and safety concerns, manpower utilization and outage extension. The proposed technical specification change will alleviate these problems and still ensure continued or additional testing if snubber quality of failed snubbers is equal to or greater than 5%.

The proposed deletion of the third sampling plan, described in Technical Specification 4.7.4.e(3), is justified because the deletion of the reject line from the "37 plan" makes the sampling plan unnecessary. In addition it is not a Wald sequential plan and as such has also been deleted from the ANSI/ASME OM-4 draft document.

The proposed change in Technical Specification 4.7.4.e clarifies additional functional testing requirements due to failure of snubbers. Technical Specification 4.7.4.e states that if during the functional testing, additional sampling is required due to failure of only one type of snubber, the functional test results shall be reviewed at that time to determine whether additional samples should be limited to the type of snubber which has failed the functional testing. The proposed change allows categorization of unacceptable snubbers into failure mode groups. A test failure mode group shall include all unacceptable snubbers that have a given failure mode and all other snubbers subject to the same failure mode. It allows independent testing of failure mode groups based on the number of unacceptable snubbers and requires one additional test sample from the general population for each failure mode group to provide assurance that failure mode groups have been properly established. This change is consistent with the ASME OM-4 document.

The proposed change to Technical Specification 4.7.4.g addresses the functional test failure analysis of locked up snubbers. Technical Specification 4.7.4.g states that if the cause of the locked up snubbers is due to manufacturer or design deficiency, all snubbers of the same type, subject to the same defect, shall be functionally tested. The proposed change includes unexpected transient events as a cause of locked up snubbers in addition to manufacturer or design deficiency and changes the requirement of mandatory functional testing of this type of failure mode group snubbers to evaluation in a manner (stroking, testing, replacement etc.) to ensure their operability. For mechanical snubbers, this evaluation of operability can easily be demonstrated by determining the freedom of motion by stroking the snubbers rather than functional testing. This will provide better manpower utilization, reduce man-rem exposure and safety concerns associated with unnecessary functional testing. All locked snubbers shall be replaced or repaired to original qualified condition. This change to evaluation in a manner to ensure operability rather than mandatory functional testing has previously been reviewed and approved on another plant.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, an environmental assessment has been published (53 FR 11577) in the Federal Register on April 7, 1988. Accordingly, the Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any environmental impacts other that those evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement.

5.0 CONTACT WITH STATE OFFICIAL

The State of Washington advised by letter dated March 23, 1988 that they did not have any comment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The changes proposed by the licensee have been reviewed by the staff and have been found to be acceptable because they will eliminate unnecessary testing of snubbers resulting in reduced man-rem exposure without undermining the effectiveness of the overall surveillance program. The proposed changes will also clarify certain functional testing and failure analysis requirements as presently stated in the Technical Specification.

The Commission has issued a Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License and Opportunity for Prior Hearing which was published in the Federal Register (53 FR 7269) on March 7, 1988. No request for hearing or petition for leave to intervene was filed following this notice.

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and (3) the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: J. Rajan

Dated: April 11, 1988

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

DOCKET NO. 50-397

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission) has issued Amendment No. 54 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-21, issued to Washington Public Power Supply System (the licensee), which revised the Technical Specifications for operation of the Nuclear Project No. 2, located in Benton County, Washington.

The amendment was effective as of the date of issuance.

The amendment modified the Technical Specifications to revise snubber functional testing sampling plans.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment.

Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments and Opportunity for Prior Hearing in connection with this action was published in the FEDERAL REGISTER on March 7, 1988 (53 FR 7269). No request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene was filed following this notice.

The Commission has prepared an Environmental Assessment related to the action and has concluded that an environmental impact statement is not warranted because there will be no environmental impact attributable to the

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action beyond that which has been predicted and described in the Commission's Final Environmental Statement for the facility dated December 1981.

For further details with respect to the action see (1) the application for amendment dated December 1, 1987, as revised March 18, 1988, (2) Amendment No. 54 to License No. NPF-21, (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation and (4) the Commission's Environmental Assessment. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street N.W., and at the Richland City Library, Swift and Northgate Streets, Richland, Washington 99352. A copy of items (2), (3) and (4) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, V and Special Projects.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 11th day of April 1988.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Robert B. Samworth

Robert B. Samworth, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate V
Division of Reactor Projects - III,
IV, V and Special Projects
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

DOCKET NO. 50-397

ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND FINDING OF

NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-21 issued to Washington Nuclear Project No. 2 (WNP-2), located in Benton County, Washington.

ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT

Identification of Proposed Action:

The proposed amendment would revise the provisions in paragraph 4.7.4.e of the Technical Specifications (TS) relating to the snubber functional testing sample plans.

The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's application for amendment dated December 1, 1987, as supplemented by a letter dated March 18, 1988.

The Need for the Proposed Action:

The proposed change to the TS will reduce the amount of snubber testing required and thus reduce occupational radiation exposure and safety concerns associated with unnecessary functional testing.

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Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action:

The Commission has completed its evaluation of the proposed revisions to the Technical Specifications. The proposed revisions affect the amount of additional sampling to be performed by the licensee for snubbers that fail functional testing. The net effect is a reduction in the number of additional samples which are expected to be taken. The revisions have been found to be acceptable because they will eliminate unnecessary testing of snubbers, resulting in reduced man-rem exposure, without undermining the effectiveness of the overall surveillance program. The proposed changes will also clarify certain functional testing and failure analysis requirements as presently stated in the Technical Specifications. Since the effectiveness of the snubber surveillance program is not affected significantly, the proposed changes do not increase the probability or consequences of an accident. No changes are proposed in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite, and there is no significant increase in the allowable individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. In fact, the net reduction in sampling should reduce occupational exposure. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that this proposed action would result in no significant radiological environmental impact.

With regard to potential non-radiological impacts, the proposed amendment to the TS involves surveillance procedures applied to systems located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. It does not affect non-radiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impact. Therefore, the Commission concludes that there is no significant non-radiological environmental impact associated with the proposed amendment.

The Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment and Opportunity for Hearing in connection with this action was published in the Federal Register on March 7, 1988 (53 FR 7269). No request for hearing or petition for leave to intervene was filed following this notice.

Alternative to the Proposed Action:

Since the Commission concluded that there is no significant environmental effect that would result from the proposed action, alternatives with equal or greater environmental impacts need not be evaluated.

The principal alternative would be to deny the requested amendment. This would not reduce environmental impacts of plant operation and in fact would result in continuing sunubber testing and associated occupational radiation exposure and safety concerns.

Alternative Use of Resources:

This action does not involve the use of any resources not previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement Related to the Operation of WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2, dated December, 1981.

Agencies and Person Consulted:

The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's request and did not consult other agencies or persons.

FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT

The Commission has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed license amendment.

Based upon the foregoing environmental assessment, we conclude that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment.

For further details with respect to this action, see the application for amendment dated December 1, 1987 and a supplement dated March 18, 1988 which are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. and at the Richland City Library, Swift and Northgate Streets, Richland, Washington 99352.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 1st day of April, 1988.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

George W. Knighton, Director
Project Directorate V
Division of Reactor Projects - III,
IV, V and Special Projects
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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