

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
<p>B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>Both SW subsystems inoperable.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>UHS inoperable.</p>	B.1 Be in MODE 3.	12 hours
	<p><u>AND</u></p> <p>B.2 Be in MODE 4.</p>	36 hours

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.7.2.1	Verify the river water level is \geq 865 ft mean sea level.	24 hours
SR 3.7.2.2	Verify the average water temperature of UHS is \leq 95°F.	24 hours

(continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.7.3.1	Verify the water level in the REC surge tank is visible above the bottom of the gauge glass.	24 hours
SR 3.7.3.2	Verify the temperature of the REC supply water is $\leq 100^{\circ}\text{F}$.	24 hours
SR 3.7.3.3	<p>-----NOTE----- Isolation of flow to individual components does not render REC System inoperable. -----</p> <p>Verify each REC subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow paths servicing safety related cooling loads, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.</p>	31 days
SR 3.7.3.4	Verify each REC subsystem actuates on an actual or simulated initiation signal.	18 months

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES**
(continued)

level equates to a level of at least 863.2 ft mean sea level in the SW pump bay under postulated worst case conditions. This level exceeds the 862.8 ft mean sea level submergence requirements for necessary long term SW cooling. The ability of the SW System to support long term cooling of the reactor containment is assumed in evaluations of the equipment required for safe reactor shutdown presented in the USAR, Chapters V and XIV (Refs. 2 and 3, respectively). These analyses include the evaluation of the long term primary containment response after a design basis LOCA.

The ability of the SW System to provide adequate cooling to the identified safety equipment is an implicit assumption for the safety analyses evaluated in References 2 and 3. The ability to provide onsite emergency AC power is dependent on the ability of the SW System to cool the DGs. The long term cooling capability of the RHR, core spray, and RHRSWB pumps is also dependent on the cooling provided by the SW System.

The SW System, together with the UHS, satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) (Ref. 4).

LCO

The SW subsystems are independent of each other to the degree that each has separate controls, power supplies, and the operation of one does not depend on the other. In the event of a DBA, one subsystem of SW is required to provide the minimum heat removal capability assumed in the safety analysis for the system to which it supplies cooling water. To ensure this requirement is met, two subsystems of SW must be OPERABLE. At least one subsystem will operate, if the worst single active failure occurs coincident with the loss of offsite power.

A subsystem is considered OPERABLE when it has an OPERABLE UHS, two OPERABLE pumps, and an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the intake structure and transferring the water to the appropriate equipment.

The OPERABILITY of the UHS is based on having a minimum river water level of 865 ft mean sea level and a maximum water temperature of 95°F. |

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSIS
(continued)**

pumps per loop are required to be **OPERABLE** to satisfy the requirements of the LCO.

The ability of the REC System to provide adequate cooling to the identified safety equipment is an implicit assumption for the safety analyses evaluated in Reference 1.

The REC System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) (Ref. 2).

LCO

The REC subsystems are independent of each other to the degree that each has separate controls, power supplies, and the operation of one does not depend on the other. In the event of a DBA, one subsystem of REC is required to provide the minimum heat removal capability assumed in the safety analysis for the system to which it supplies cooling water. To ensure this requirement is met, two subsystems of REC must be **OPERABLE**. At least one subsystem will operate, if the worst single active failure occurs coincident with the loss of offsite power.

A subsystem is considered **OPERABLE** when it has two **OPERABLE** pumps, one **OPERABLE** heat exchanger, and an **OPERABLE** flow path capable of transferring the water to the appropriate equipment. Each REC subsystem's **OPERABILITY** requires that its service water backup cross tie valves be **OPERABLE**.

The **OPERABILITY** of the REC System is also based on having a visible water level in the surge tank gauge glass and a maximum supply water temperature of 100 °F.

The isolation of the REC System to components or systems may render those components or systems inoperable, but does not affect the **OPERABILITY** of the REC System.

APPLICABILITY

In **MODES 1, 2, and 3**, the REC System is required to be **OPERABLE** to support **OPERABILITY** of the equipment serviced by the REC System. Therefore, the REC System is required to be **OPERABLE** in these **MODES**.