

May 26, 1988

Docket No. 50-397

Mr. G. C. Sorensen, Manager  
Regulatory Programs  
Washington Public Power Supply System  
P.O. Box 968  
3000 George Washington Way  
Richland, Washington 99352

DISTRIBUTION

Docket File  
NRC LPDRs  
GMHolahan  
RSamworth  
JBradfute  
DHagan  
EJordan  
JPartlow  
TBarnhart (4)  
JLee

Wanda Jones  
EButcher  
ACRS (10)  
GPA/PA  
ARM/LFMB  
Region V (4)  
PD5 Plant File  
JCraig

Dear Mr. Sorensen:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 58 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE  
NO. NPF-21 - WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 (TAC NO. 66927)

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed amendment to Facility Operating License NPF-21 to the Washington Public Power Supply System for WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2, located in Benton County near Richland, Washington. This amendment is in response to your letter dated January 5, 1988 (G02-88-002) as supplemented by letters dated February 12, 1988 (G02-88-037) and March 15, 1988 (G02-88-099).

This amendment revises the requirement for automatic isolation capability for valve RHR-V-8 as detailed in Technical Specifications, Tables 3.3.2-1, "Isolation Actuation Instrumentation," and 3.6.3-1, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves."

A copy of the related safety evaluation supporting this amendment is enclosed. The enclosed Notice of Issuance will be forwarded to the Office of the Federal Register for publication. Also enclosed for your information is a copy of an Environmental Assessment related to this action which has been published in the Federal Register.

Sincerely,



Robert B. Samworth, Senior Project Manager  
Project Directorate V  
Division of Reactor Projects - III,  
IV, V and Special Projects

8806280321 880526  
PDR ADDCK 05000397  
P PDR

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 58 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-21
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice of Issuance
4. Environmental Assessment

cc w/enclosures:

See next page

\*See previous concurrence

\*DRSP/PDV

JLee

05/9/88

\*DRSP/PDV

RSamworth:cw

05/4/88

\*OGC

RBachmann

05/12/88

DRSP/D: PDR

GK Wrighton

05/12/88

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Mr. G. C. Sorensen, Manager  
Washington Public Power Supply System

WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2  
(WNP-2)

cc:

Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esq.  
Bishop, Cook, Purcell  
& Reynolds  
1400 L Street NW  
Washington, D.C. 20005-3502

Regional Administrator, Region V  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210  
Walnut Creek, California 94596

Mr. G. E. Doupe, Esquire  
Washington Public Power Supply System  
P. O. Box 968  
3000 George Washington Way  
Richland, Washington 99532

Chairman  
Benton County Board of Commissioners  
Prosser, Washington 99350

Mr. Curtis Eschels, Chairman  
Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council  
Mail Stop PY-11  
Olympia, Washington 98504

Mr. P. L. Powell, Licensing Manager  
Washington Public Power Supply System  
P. O. Box 968, MD 956B  
Richland, Washington 99352

Mr. A. Lee Oxsen  
Assistant Managing Director for Operations  
Washington Public Power Supply System  
P. O. Box 968, MD 1023  
Richland, WA 99352

Mr. R. B. Glasscock, Director  
Licensing and Assurance  
Washington Public Power Supply System  
P. O. Box 968, MD 280  
Richland, Washington 99352

Mr. C. M. Powers  
WNP-2 Plant Manager  
Washington Public Power Supply System  
P. O. Box MD 927M  
Richland, Washington 99352



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

DOCKET NO. 50-397

WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 58  
License No. NPF-21

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment filed by the Washington Public Power Supply System (the Supply System, also the licensee), dated January 5, 1988 as supplemented by letters dated February 12 and March 15, 1988, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-21 is hereby amended to read as follows:


8806280328 880526  
PDR ADOCK 05000397  
P PDR

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 58, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

  
George W. Knighton, Director  
Project Directorate V  
Division of Reactor Projects - III,  
IV, V and Special Projects

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 26, 1988

ENCLOSURE TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 58

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-21

DOCKET NO. 50-397

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

<u>REMOVE</u>	<u>INSERT</u>
3/4 3-14	3/4 3-14
3/4 3-15	3/4 3-15
3/4 6-23	3/4 6-23
3/4 6-33	3/4 6-33

The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided.

TABLE 3.3.2-1 (Continued)

ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

<u>TRIP FUNCTION</u>	<u>VALVE GROUPS OPERATED BY SIGNAL</u>	<u>MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM (a)</u>	<u>APPLICABLE OPERATIONAL CONDITION</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
3. <u>REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM ISOLATION</u>				
a. $\Delta$ Flow - High	7	1	1, 2, 3	22
b. Heat Exchanger Area Temperature - High	7	1	1, 2, 3	22
c. Heat Exchanger Area Ventilation $\Delta$ Temp. - High	7	1	1, 2, 3	22
d. Pump Area Temperature - High				
1) Pump Room A	7	1	1, 2, 3	22
2) Pump Room B	7	1	1, 2, 3	22
e. Pump Area Ventilation $\Delta$ Temp. - High				
1) Pump Room A	7	1	1, 2, 3	22
2) Pump Room B	7	1	1, 2, 3	22
f. SLCS Initiation	7(f)	N.A.	1, 2, 3	22
g. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2	7	2	1, 2, 3	22
h. RWCU/RCIC Line Routing Area Temperature - High	7	1	1, 2, 3	22
i. RWCU Line Routing Area Temperature - High				
Room 509	7	1	1, 2, 3	22
Room 511	7	1	1, 2, 3	22
Room 408	7	1	1, 2, 3	22
Room 409	7	1	1, 2, 3	22
j. Manual Initiation	7	1/group	1, 2, 3	24

TABLE 3.3.2-1 (Continued)

TRIP FUNCTION	ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION			APPLICABLE OPERATIONAL CONDITION	ACTION
	VALVE GROUPS OPERATED BY SIGNAL	MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM (a)			
<u>4. REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ISOLATION</u>					
a. RCIC Steam Line Flow - High	8	1		1, 2, 3	22
b. RCIC/RHR Steam Line Flow - High	8	1		1, 2, 3	22
c. RCIC Steam Supply Pressure - Low	8, 9	2		1, 2, 3	22
d. RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure - High	8	2		1, 2, 3	22
e. RCIC Equipment Room Temperature - High	8	1		1, 2, 3	22
f. RCIC Equipment Room $\Delta$ Temperature - High	8	1		1, 2, 3	22
g. RWCU/RCIC Steam Line Routing Area Temperature - High	8	1		1, 2, 3	22
h. Drywell Pressure - High	9	2		1, 2, 3	22
i. Manual Initiation(h)	8	1		1, 2, 3	24
<u>5. RHR SYSTEM SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE ISOLATION (i)</u>					
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3	6	2		1, 2, 3	26
b. Reactor Vessel (RHR Cut-in Permissive) Pressure - High	6	1		1, 2, 3	26
c. Equipment Area Temperature - High	6	1		1, 2, 3	26
d. Equipment Area Ventilation $\Delta$ Temp. - High	6	1		1, 2, 3	26
e. Shutdown Cooling Suction Flow Rate - High	6	1		1, 2, 3	26
f. RHR Heat Exchanger Area Temperature - High					
Room 606	6	1		1, 2, 3	26
Room 507	6	1		1, 2, 3	26
Room 605	6	1		1, 2, 3	26
Room 505	6	1		1, 2, 3	26
g. Manual Initiation	6	1/group		1, 2, 3	24

TABLE 3.3.2-1 (Continued)

ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

ACTION STATEMENTS

- ACTION 20 - Be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours.
- ACTION 21 - Be in at least STARTUP with the associated isolation valves closed within 6 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours.
- ACTION 22 - Close the affected system isolation valves within 1 hour and declare the affected system inoperable.
- ACTION 23 - Be in at least STARTUP within 6 hours.
- ACTION 24 - Restore the manual initiation function to OPERABLE status within 8 hours or close the affected system isolation valves within the next hour and declare the affected system inoperable or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- ACTION 25 - Establish SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY with the standby gas treatment system operating within 1 hour.
- ACTION 26 - Lock close or close, as applicable, the affected system isolation valves within 1 hour and declare the affected system inoperable.

TABLE NOTATIONS

\*May be bypassed with reactor steam pressure  $\leq$  1037 psig and all turbine stop valves closed.

\*\*When handling irradiated fuel in the secondary containment and during CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

#During CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

- (a) A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 2 hours for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped condition provided at least one other OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.
- (b) Also actuates the standby gas treatment system.
- (c) Also trips and isolates the mechanical vacuum pumps.
- (d) A channel is OPERABLE if 2 of 4 detectors in that channel are OPERABLE.
- (e) Also actuates secondary containment ventilation isolation dampers per Table 3.6.5.2-1.
- (f) Closes only RWCU system outboard isolation valve RWCU-V-4.
- (g) Only valves RHR-V-123A and RHR-V-123B in Valve Group 5 are required for primary isolation.
- (h) Manual initiation isolates RCIC-V-8 only and only with a coincident reactor vessel level-low, level 3.
- (i) Not required for RHR-V-8 when control is transferred to the alternate remote shutdown panel during operational conditions 1, 2 & 3 and the isolation interlocks are bypassed. When RHR-V-8 control is transferred to the remote shutdown panel under operational modes 1, 2, and 3 the associated key lock switch will be locked with the valve in the closed position. Except RHR-V-8 can be returned to, and operated from, the control room, with the interlocks and automatic isolation capability reestablished in operational conditions 2 and 3 when reactor pressure is less than 135 psig.



TABLE 3.3.2-2

ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS

<u>TRIP FUNCTION</u>	<u>TRIP SETPOINT</u>	<u>ALLOWABLE VALUE</u>
<b>1. <u>PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION</u></b>		
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level		
1) Low, Level 3	> 13.0 inches*	> 11.0 inches
2) Low Low, Level 2	> -50 inches*	> -57 inches
b. Drywell Pressure - High	< 1.68 psig	< 1.88 psig
c. Main Steam Line		
1) Radiation - High	< 3.0 x full power background	< 3.6 x full power background
2) Pressure - Low	> 831 psig	> 811 psig
3) Flow - High	< 105.5 psid	< 108 psid
d. Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature - High	< 164°F	< 170°F
e. Main Steam Line Tunnel $\Delta$ Temperature - High	< 80°F	< 90°F
f. Condenser Vacuum - Low	> 23 inches Hg absolute pressure	> 24.5 inches Hg absolute pressure
g. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.
<b>2. <u>SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION</u></b>		
a. Reactor Building Vent Exhaust Plenum Radiation - High	< 13.0 mR/h	< 16.0 mR/h
b. Drywell Pressure - High	< 1.68 psig	< 1.88 psig
c. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2	> -50 inches*	> -57 inches
d. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.

TABLE 3.6.3-1 (Continued)  
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

<u>VALVE FUNCTION AND NUMBER</u>	<u>VALVE GROUP(a)</u>	<u>MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (Seconds)</u>
a. <u>Automatic Isolation Valves (Continued)</u>		
Reactor Closed Cooling	4	60
RCC-V-5		
RCC-V-21		
RCC-V-40		
RCC-V-104		
Radiation Monitoring Supply & Return	4	5
PI-VX-250		
PI-VX-251		
PI-VX-253		
PI-VX-256		
PI-VX-257		
PI-VX-259		
Residual Heat Removal		
RHR-V-123A,B(g)	5	15
RHR-V-8(g)(k)	6	40
RHR-V-9(g)	6	40
RHR-V-23(g)	6	90
RHR-V-53A,B(g)	6	40
RHR-V-24A,B(c)	10	270
RHR-V-21	10	270
RHR-V-27A,B(c)	10	36
Reactor Water Cleanup System	7	
RWCU-V-1(d)		30(j)
RWCU-V-4		21(j)

TABLE 3.6.3-1 (Continued)  
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

<u>VALVE FUNCTION AND NUMBER</u>	<u>VALVE GROUP(a)</u>	<u>MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (Seconds)</u>
a. <u>Automatic Isolation Valves (Continued)</u>		
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling		
RCIC-V-8	8	13(j)
RCIC-V-63	8	16(j)
RCIC-V-76	8	22
Low Pressure Core Spray		
LPCS-V-12	10	180
High Pressure Core Spray		
HPCS-V-23	11	180
b. <u>Excess Flow Check Valves(e)</u>		
Containment Atmosphere		
PI-EFC-X29d		N. A.
PI-EFC-X29f		
PI-EFC-X30a		
PI-EFC-X30f		
PI-EFC-X42c		
PI-EFC-X42f		
PI-EFC-X61c		
PI-EFC-X62b		
PI-EFC-X69f		
PI-EFC-X78a		

TABLE 3.6.3-1 (Continued)  
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

<u>VALVE FUNCTION AND NUMBER</u>	<u>VALVE GROUP(a)</u>	<u>MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (Seconds)</u>
d. <u>Other Containment Isolation Valves (Continued)</u>		
Radiation Monitoring		N.A.
PI-EFCX-72f		
PI-EFCX-73e		
Transversing Incore Probe System		N.A.
TIP-V-6		
TIP-V-7,8,9,10,11(e)		

TABLE NOTATIONS

\*But greater than 3 seconds.

#Provisions of Technical Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

- (a) See Technical Specification 3.3.2 for the isolation signal(s) which operate each group.
- (b) Valve leakage not included in sum of Type B and C tests.
- (c) May be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.
- (d) Not closed by SLC actuation signal.
- (e) Not subject to Type C Leak Rate Test.
- (f) Hydraulic leak test at 38.2 psig.
- (g) Not subject to Type C test. Test per Technical Specification 4.4.3.2.2
- (h) Tested as part of Type A test.
- (i) May be tested as part of Type A test. If so tested, Type C test results may be excluded from sum of other Type B and C tests.
- (j) Reflects closure times for containment isolation only.
- (k) During operational conditions 1, 2 & 3 the requirement for automatic isolation does not apply to RHR-V-8. Except that RHR-V-8 may be opened in operational conditions 2 & 3 provided control is returned to the control room, with the interlocks reestablished, and reactor pressure is less than 135 psig.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### 3/4.6.4 VACUUM RELIEF

#### SUPPRESSION CHAMBER - DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKERS

##### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.6.4.1 Seven of the nine pairs of suppression chamber - drywell vacuum breakers shall be OPERABLE and all nine pairs shall be closed.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With one or more vacuum breakers in up to two pairs of suppression chamber - drywell vacuum breakers inoperable for opening, verify both vacuum breakers of each pair to be closed within two (2) hours.
- b. With one or more vacuum breakers in three or more pairs of suppression chamber - drywell vacuum breakers inoperable for opening but known to be closed, restore the inoperable pairs of vacuum breakers such that a minimum of seven pairs are in an OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- c. With one suppression chamber - drywell vacuum breaker open, verify the other vacuum breaker in the pair to be closed within 2 hours; restore the open vacuum breaker to the closed position within 72 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- d. With one closed position indicator of any suppression chamber - drywell vacuum breaker inoperable:
  1. Verify the other vacuum breaker in the pair to be closed within 2 hours and at least once per 15 days thereafter, or
  2. Verify the vacuum breaker(s) with the inoperable position indicator to be closed by conducting a test which demonstrates that the  $\Delta P$  is maintained at greater than or equal to 0.5 psi for 1 hour without makeup within 24 hours and at least once per 15 days thereafter.
  3. Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 58 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-21

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO.2

DOCKET NO. 50-397

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated January 5, 1988 (G02-88-002) Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) requested an amendment to the WNP-2 Technical Specifications related to automatic isolation of a valve on the residual heat removal system intake line. Specifically, WPPSS proposed to transfer control of valve RHR-V-8 to the alternate remote shutdown panel, thereby bypassing the automatic isolation controls of that valve. By letter dated February 12, 1988 the licensee described more completely the interlocks which would be bypassed and measures which would be taken to preclude inadvertent operation of the valve from the alternate remote shutdown panel. By letter dated March 15 the licensee provided a revision to the proposed wording for the Technical Specifications. This was for clarity and did not represent a substantive change.

2.0 DISCUSSION

The purpose of transferring control of the valve to the alternate remote shutdown panel is to eliminate the potential for a control room fire to open spuriously both motor-operated Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system suction line isolation valves (RHR-V-8 and RHR-V-9). These valves, which are in series, constitute a high/low pressure interface whenever reactor pressure is greater than the pressure at which the low pressure side of the line is designed (220 psig). The valves are kept closed during power operation and are remote manually opened at other times if needed (e.g., normal shutdown cooling).

The high/low pressure interface is further protected by pressure interlocks provided for these valves (the interlock logic for the valves is housed in two control room panels). At reactor pressures above the shutdown range permissive (135 psig) interlocks will ensure the line isolation (i.e., will prevent opening of the valves or will close the valves if they are open). When the reactor pressure is such that these valves constitute a high/low pressure interface, possible spurious opening of both the valves due to a control room fire and consequent breach of the associated high/low pressure interface should be avoided. Appropriate fire protection procedures should be implemented to ensure that at least one of these two valves cannot spuriously open due to such a fire.

The licensee's resolution of this concern proposed in the January 5 and February 12, 1988 submittals can be summarized as follows:

1. To ensure that the control for valve RHR-V-8 is unaffected by a control room fire when the reactor pressure is greater than 135 psig, the valve transfer switch located at the Alternate Remote Shutdown Panel (ARSP) will be placed in the "Emergency" position during plant Operational Conditions 1, 2 and 3 (power operation, start up and hot shutdown respectively). This will result in bypassing the interlocks associated with the normal shutdown cooling mode isolation actuation instrumentation and consequently bypassing the corresponding automatic isolation signals (reactor pressure above shutdown range permissive, shutdown flow high, and reactor vessel water level low) for the valve.
2. The valve control switch located at the ARSP will be kept in the "Closed" position prior to transfer of its control from the control room to the ARSP to ensure that the valve does not open upon actuation of the valve transfer switch.
3. A two position (Enable-Disable) key-lock switch will be installed at the ARSP and it will be locked with the valve in the closed position to prevent inadvertent opening of the valve from the ARSP. A contact from this switch will be wired in series with the ARSP RHR-V-8 control switch ("Open" control contact). The key will be administratively controlled.
4. RHR-V-8 position indication will continue to be available continuously in the control room during normal plant operation.
5. During plant Operational Conditions 2 and 3 (startup and hot shutdown), if needed, transfer of the valve control back to the control room and additional opening of the valve from the control room will be permissible, provided the reactor pressure is less than 135 psig. Such a re-transfer will result in reestablishment of the valve interlocks and associated automatic isolation signals for the normal shutdown cooling.
6. There will be no change in the existing availability of interlocks and automatic isolation signals for valve RHR-V-9.
7. The plant procedures will be revised as appropriate to implement the above approach.

The submittals included licensee's proposed changes to WNP-2 Technical Specification (TS) Tables 3.3.2-1, "Isolation Actuation Instrumentation," and 3.6.3-1, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves," as they apply to the valve RHR-V-8. A footnote is to be added to each table to indicate that the automatic isolation capability for valve RHR-V-8 would not be available when control is transferred to the ARSP. The footnotes delineate the conditions under which the interlocks are bypassed and the conditions under which control of RHR-V-8 is transferred back to the control room reestablishing the interlocks.

### 3.0 EVALUATION

The staff has determined that while the valve control is transferred to the ARSP, the valve will be closed. Its spurious opening due to a control room fire will thus be prevented. Inadvertent opening from the ARSP will be minimized since such opening will require acquiring the administratively controlled key, changing the key-lock switch from "Disable" to "Enable" position, and changing the valve control switch from "Close" to "Open" position.

The staff has also determined that bypassing the RHR-V-8 valve interlocks and automatic isolation signals during the time when the valve control remains at the ARSP will not compromise the intent and purpose for which these are provided, namely to ensure the isolation of the normal shutdown cooling suction line under adverse reactor conditions. This is because the valve will be ensured to remain in an isolated condition, when its interlocks and automatic isolation signals are bypassed.

The staff therefore finds that the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications will have no significant adverse safety impact but will allow resolution of a significant safety concern.

The staff notes that in the June 3, 1987 and August 20, 1987 submittals, the licensee committed to complete necessary modifications and implement the approach chosen for permanent resolution of the high/low pressure interface concern by the end of the 1988 refueling outage.

### 4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, an environmental assessment has been published (53 FR 18939) in the Federal Register on May 25, 1988. The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment.

### 5.0 CONTACT WITH STATE OFFICIAL

The State of Washington advised that they did not have any comment.

### 6.0 CONCLUSION

The changes proposed by the licensee have been reviewed by the staff and have been found to be acceptable because they will resolve staff concern over potential safety problems resulting from a control room fire and because there is adequate assurance that there will be no greater potential for spurious or inadvertent breeching of the pressure interface with control of the valve transferred to the alternate remote shutdown panel.



The Commission has issued a Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License and Opportunity for Hearing which was published in the Federal Register (53 FR 8291) on March 14, 1988. No request for hearing or petition for leave to intervene was filed following this notice.

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and (3) the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: T. Chadrsekaran  
S. Rhov

Dated: May 26, 1988