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SOUTHERN COMPANY
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant
Emergency Implementing Procedures Revision

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section V, Southern Nuclear Operating Company hereby submits the following revision to the Plant Hatch Emergency Implementing Procedures (EIPs):

EIP No.	Version	Effective Date
73EP-EIP-001-0	14.3	07/09/02
73EP-EIP-005-0	7.0	07/09/02
73EP-EIP-009-0	7.0	07/09/02
73EP-EIP-011-0	4.0	07/12/02

These revisions incorporate comments identified during our review of the interim compensatory measures (ICMs).

By copy of this letter, Mr. L. A. Reyes, NRC Region II Administrator, will receive two copies of the revised procedures.

Should you have any questions in this regard, please contact this office.

Respectfully submitted,

Lewis Sumner

H. L. Sumner, Jr.

CKB/eb

Enclosures: 73EP-EIP-001-0, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions
73EP-EIP-005-0, On-Shift Operations Personnel Emergency Duties
73EP-EIP-009-0, Nuclear Security Duties
73EP-EIP-011-0, Assembly, Accountability and Evacuation

A045

cc: Southern Nuclear Operating Company (w/o)
Mr. P. H. Wells, Nuclear Plant General Manager
SNC Document Management (R-Type A02.001)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.(w/o)
Mr. L. N. Olshan, Project Manager - Hatch

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II
Mr. L. A. Reyes, Regional Administrator (with 2 copies)
Mr. J. T. Munday, Senior Resident Inspector – Hatch (w/o)

1.0 OBJECTIVE

This procedure establishes the methodology for emergency classification. Specific Emergency Action Levels (EALs) and minimum initial actions to respond to a given emergency are established in this procedure.

2.0 APPLICABILITY

This procedure applies to emergency classification determinations and associated initial responses. This procedure is performed as required.

3.0 REFERENCES

3.1 10AC-MGR-006-0, Hatch Emergency Plan

3.2 73EP-EIP-004-0, Duties of Emergency Director

3.3 73EP-EIP-005-0, On-Shift Operations Personnel Emergency Duties

3.4 73EP-EIP-015-0, Offsite Dose Assessment

3.5 73EP-EIP-018-0, Prompt Dose Assessment

3.6 73EP-EIP-073-0, Offsite Emergency Notifications

3.7 Hatch Unit 1 Technical Specifications (TS), Sections 2.0, 3.2 through 3.9, 3.11

3.8 Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS), Sections 2.0, 3.2 through 3.9, 3.11

3.9 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 1 and Unit 2 System Evaluation Document

4.0 REQUIREMENTS

4.1 PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

4.1.1 Any personnel trained and qualified as an Emergency Director (ED) may use this procedure.

4.1.2 The Emergency Director may modify emergency plan implementing procedures and staffing to meet the needs of emergency response.

4.1.3 Personnel who have received instruction in applicable emergency procedures are required to perform this procedure.

4.1.4 Initially, the Emergency Director position is filled by the Superintendent of Shift (SOS). If the SOS is unavailable, then the affected unit's Shift Supervisor (SS) will become the Emergency Director. IF the SOS is unavailable and the event involves both units, the Unit 1 Shift Supervisor (SS) will become the Emergency Director. Any of these persons will assume the position of Emergency Director in the Control Room until a qualified relief, as specified in step 4.1.5, can arrive on site and receive an adequate turnover.

4.1.5 Any one of the following persons may assume the Emergency Director (ED) duties after he is given proper turnover from the off going ED.

- Nuclear Plant - General Manager
- Plant Operations - Assistant General Manager (POAGM)
- Plant Support - Assistant General Manager (PSAGM)
- Vice President - Plant Hatch
- Other qualified Emergency Director

4.2 MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

N/A - Not applicable to this procedure

4.3 SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS

4.3.1 Portions of this procedure require the results from calculations of projected doses at or beyond the site boundary to determine the appropriate emergency classification. Refer to procedures 73EP-EIP-015-0 and 73EP-EIP-018-0.

4.3.2 Portions of this procedure will require actual dose measurements (onsite OR off-site) to determine the appropriate emergency classification. Refer to procedures 73EP-EIP-015-0 and 73EP-EIP-018-0.

5.0 PRECAUTIONS/LIMITATIONS

5.1 PRECAUTIONS

The value of any emergency actions, which may require movement of plant personnel, must be judged against the danger to personnel or nuclear safety.

5.2 LIMITATIONS

5.2.1 The Operating Facility is defined to be areas within the Protected Area and the 230 Kv and 500 Kv switchyards.

5.2.2 Onsite is defined to be anywhere within the Owner Controlled Area.

7.0 PREREQUISITES

This procedure will be utilized for drills, exercises and actual emergencies.

REFERENCE

7.0 PROCEDURE

7.1 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND INITIAL ACTIONS

7.1.1 Upon notification of an abnormal condition OR observation of abnormal instrument readings, notify the Unit Shift Supervisor immediately.

7.1.2 Confirm abnormal conditions by comparing redundant instrument channels OR other related parameters, observation AND field reports, as applicable.

7.1.3 Assess the abnormal condition and classify the emergency by referring to subsection 7.2, Emergency Classification Chart.

CAUTION

THE REVIEW OF ALL EMERGENCY CLASSES ASSOCIATED WITH A GIVEN CONDITION IS ESSENTIAL. FAILURE TO DO SO COULD RESULT IN A LOWER CLASSIFICATION THAN WARRANTED.

7.1.3.1 The Emergency Classification Chart details abnormal plant conditions that meet specific emergency class entrance requirements. These emergency classes are defined, in theory, in steps 7.1.3.1.1 through 7.1.3.1.4.

CAUTION

IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT AN ABNORMAL CONDITION MEETS THE DEFINITIONS STATED IN 7.1.3.1.1 THROUGH 7.1.3.1.4 BUT ARE NOT COVERED IN THE EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION CHART, OR THE INITIATING CONDITION IS MET BUT EQUIPMENT STATUS PARAMETERS VALUES ARE NOT, THE SOS/ED WILL USE HIS JUDGMENT, BASED ON THE AVAILABLE INFORMATION, TO DECLARE THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF EMERGENCY.

7.1.3.1.1 NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT (NUE)

Unusual events are in progress OR have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response OR monitoring are expected UNLESS further degradation of safety systems occurs.

7.1.3.1.2 ALERT EMERGENCY

Events are in progress OR have occurred which involve an actual OR potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guideline (PAG) exposure levels.

7.1.3.1.3 SITE AREA EMERGENCY

Events are in progress OR have occurred which involve actual OR likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public. Any releases are NOT expected to exceed PAG exposure levels, except near the site boundary.

7.1.3.1.4 GENERAL EMERGENCY

Events are in progress OR have occurred which involve actual OR imminent substantial core degradation OR melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed PAG exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

7.1.4 IF a potentially declarable emergency exists, inform the SOS immediately. The SOS will evaluate the abnormal condition and operator actions.

7.1.5 IF a declarable emergency exists, the SOS shall assume the duties of the Emergency Director in accordance with 73EP-EIP-004-0, Duties of Emergency Director AND declare the appropriate emergency classification within 15 minutes of the condition requiring the classification.

7.2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION CHART

Refer to the applicable section of the emergency classification chart to assess an abnormal condition and classify the emergency. An index of each emergency action level in the chart is listed on the next page for reference. The key words of an initiating condition are indicated in **BOLD** print. The supporting data / parameters are listed below each emergency action level. The logical connectors (**AND** and **OR**) used in the supporting data / parameters are to be used as described in Technical Specification section 1.0 "Use and Application", part 1.2 "Logical Connectors."

Index of Emergency Action Levels

1.0 - AUTOMATIC INITIATION OF ECCS

Emergency conditions exist WHEN: **AUTOMATIC INITIATION, OR DEMAND FOR ECCS, TO RECOVER WATER LEVEL** as indicated by:	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
HPCI, Core Spray, or LPCI Automatic Initiation has occurred. **AND** HPCI, Core Spray, or LPCI is discharging to the vessel. **AND** Reactor Water Level < - 113 inches **OR** Drywell Pressure > 1.92 PSIG (TS)	■			
See Section 20.0, Loss of Coolant, for determination of Site Area Emergency Classification.			■	
See Section 22.0, Multiple Symptoms and Other Conditions, for determination of the General Emergency Classification.				■

END
AUTOMATIC INITIATION OF ECCS

2.0 - RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS

Emergency conditions exist WHEN:	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
LIMITS FOR GASEOUS EFFLUENT RELEASES BEYOND THE SITE BOUNDARY HAVE EXCEEDED TS as indicated by either actual field measurements OR effluent monitor readings corresponding to: ≥ 0.057 mR (TEDE) in an hour* (*TS yearly limit divided by the number of hours in a year) **OR** ≥ 500 mR (TEDE) in a year (TS)				
LIMITS FOR LIQUID EFFLUENTS HAVE BEEN EXCEEDED [as given in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM)] as indicated by Chemistry analysis as follows: ≥ 1.5 mR to the total body in a quarter **OR** ≥ 3.0 mR to the total body in a year				
A GASEOUS EFFLUENT RELEASE IS UNDERWAY WITH OFFSITE DOSE RATES BEYOND THE SITE BOUNDARY, as indicated by either field measurements OR effluent monitor readings corresponding to: ≥ 0.57 mR (TEDE) in an hour** (** 10 times the TS yearly limit divided by the number of hours in a year.) **OR** ≥ 5000 mR (TEDE) in a year (10 X T.S.)				

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2.0 - RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS (continued)

Emergency conditions exist WHEN:	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
NOTE Adverse meteorological conditions is defined as Stability Class F AND 1m/sec (≈ 2 mph) wind speed, OR inclement weather. **A GASEOUS EFFLUENT RELEASE IS UNDERWAY WITH OFFSITE DOSE AT THE SITE BOUNDARY,** as indicated by either field measurements OR effluent monitor readings (using adverse meteorological conditions) corresponding to: ≥ 50 mR (TEDE)in an hour for > 1/2 hr but< 1000 mR (TEDE) in an hour **OR** ≥ 500 mR (TEDE)in an hour for 2 min. but < 1000 mR (TEDE) in an hour **OR** ≥ 250 mR (CDE thyroid) in an hour for 1/2 hr but < 5 REM (CDE thyroid) in an hour **OR** ≥ 2500 mR (CDE thyroid) in an hour for 2 min. but < 5 REM (CDE thyroid) in an hour			■	
DOSE BEYOND THE SITE BOUNDARY IS PROJECTED TO BE > EPA PAGs based on dose projections from plant parameters as follows: ≥ 1 REM (TEDE) **OR** ≥ 5 REM (CDE thyroid)			■	

→ → [CONTINUE TO THE NEXT PAGE] → →

2.0 - RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS (continued)

Emergency conditions exist WHEN:	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
A GASEOUS EFFLUENT RELEASE IS UNDERWAY WITH OFFSITE DOSE BEYOND THE SITE BOUNDARY, as indicated by either field measurements OR effluent monitor readings (using actual meteorological conditions) corresponding to: ≥ 1 REM (TEDE) in an hour **OR** ≥ 5 REM(CDE thyroid) in an hour				
DOSE BEYOND THE SITE BOUNDARY IS PROJECTED TO BE > EPA PAGS based on dose projections from plant parameters as follows: A gaseous release is ongoing or imminent **AND** ≥ 1 REM (TEDE) **OR** ≥ 5 REM (CDE thyroid)				

END
RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS

3.0 - CORE DAMAGE

Emergency conditions exist WHEN:	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
CORE DAMAGE IS INDICATED BY HIGH OFF-GAS ACTIVITY WITH PRETREAT MONITOR (D11-K601) AT HI ALARM PLUS Pretreat Monitor reading exceeding either of following as indicated on pretreat graph located in Unit 1 OR Unit 2 OFF-GAS Release Curve book. ≥ 500,000 µCi/sec **OR** ≥ 100,000 µCi/sec increase WITHIN a 30 minute period	■			
CORE DAMAGE IS INDICATED BY HIGH OFF-GAS ACTIVITY WITH PRETREAT MONITOR (D11-K601) AT HI-HI ALARM PLUS ≥ 5 CI/SEC as indicated on pretreat graph located in Unit 1 OR Unit 2 Off-Gas Release Curve book		■		
CORE DAMAGE IS INDICATED BY HIGH COOLANT ACTIVITY LAB SAMPLE WITH I-131 DOSE EQUIVALENT COOLANT ACTIVITY > 100 µCi/gm	■			
CORE DAMAGE IS INDICATED BY HIGH COOLANT ACTIVITY LAB SAMPLE WITH I-131 DOSE EQUIVALENT COOLANT ACTIVITY > 300 µCi/gm		■		
CORE DAMAGE IS INDICATED BY DEGRADED CORE WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OF CORE GEOMETRY as indicated by the following: Containment Post LOCA Hi Rad Alarm > 138 REM/hr (TS) **AND** Reactor Low, Low, Low, Level Alarm < -113 inches **OR** Noble Gas Fission Product Monitor (D11-K630) upscale (7.0 x 10^5cpm) **OR** Noble Gas Fission Product Monitor (D11-K630) (variable setpoint) Hi-Hi Radiation Alarm			■	
See Section 22.0, Multiple Symptoms and Other Conditions for determination of General Emergency Classification.				■

END
CORE DAMAGE

4.0 - STEAM LINE BREAK OR SAFETY RELIEF VALVE (SRV) FAILURE

Emergency conditions exist WHEN:	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
A MAIN STEAM LINE RELIEF VALVE FAILED TO CLOSE WHEN system pressure is reduced below setpoint of safety relief valve (S/RV) and fuses pulled as indicated by: S/RV tailpipe temperature remaining > 230° F **AND** S/RV tailpipe pressure switch remaining > 80 psig **AND** Temperature continuing to increase on any suppression pool local water temperature indicator	■			
A PRIMARY SYSTEM (AS DEFINED BY EOPs) STEAM LINE BREAK OCCURS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT WITH significant isolation valve leakage as indicated by the following: Any valid Reactor or Turbine Bldg. leak detection indication **OR** Hi MSL Tunnel Temperature ≥ 194° F (TS) **AND** Any Reactor Bldg. ARM above maximum Normal Operating Values AND increasing **OR** Any Turbine Bldg. ARM above alarm setpoint AND increasing		■		

→ → [CONTINUE TO THE NEXT PAGE] → →

4.0 - STEAM LINE BREAK OR SAFETY RELIEF VALVE (SRV) FAILURE (continued)

Emergency conditions exist WHEN:	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
AN UNISOLABLE PRIMARY SYSTEM (AS DEFINED BY THE EOPS) BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT as indicated by: A primary containment isolation failure (cannot be isolated automatically OR manually) has occurred on the affected primary system. **AND** Entry conditions into Secondary Containment Control Emergency Operating Procedures **OR** Any indications of significant leakage into the Turbine Bldg. from the Main Steam system WITH Turbine Bldg. ARMs above alarm setpoint AND increasing. **OR** SOS/ED judgment			■	
See Section 22.0, Multiple Symptoms and Other Conditions, for determination of General Emergency Classification.				■

END

STEAM LINE BREAK OR SAFETY RELIEF VALVE (SRV) FAILURE

5.0 - LOSS OF AC POWER

Emergency conditions exist WHEN: **A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER OR LOSS OF ONSITE AC POWER CAPABILITY HAS OCCURRED** and is indicated as follows:	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER is indicated by: Zero voltage on all 500 kV incoming lines **AND** Zero voltage on all 230 kV incoming lines **OR** Loss of startup transformers (SUTs) 1C AND 1D **OR** Loss of startup transformers (SUTs) 2C AND 2D	■			
LOSS OF ONSITE AC POWER CAPABILITY is indicated by: Loss of all emergency diesel generators on Unit One **OR** Unit Two for any reason	■			
LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER WITH LOSS OF ALL ONSITE AC POWER ≤15 MINUTES (on Unit One OR Unit Two) is indicated by: All 4.16 kV buses (Unit One OR Unit Two) reading zero volts AC **AND** The inability to energize at least one Unit One **AND** one Unit Two 4.16 kV bus WITH diesel generators		■		
LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER WITH LOSS OF ALL ONSITE AC POWER >15 MINUTES (on Unit One OR Unit Two) is indicated by: All 4.16 KV buses (Unit One **OR** Unit Two) reading zero volts AC **AND** The inability to energize at least one Unit One **AND** one Unit Two 4.16 kV bus WITH diesel generators			■	
See Section 22.0, Multiple Symptoms and Other Conditions, for Determination of General Emergency Classification.				■

END
LOSS OF AC POWER

6.0 - LOSS OF ONSITE DC POWER

Emergency conditions exist WHEN: **A LOSS OF ALL VITAL ONSITE DC POWER OCCURS** and is indicated as follows:	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
A LOSS OF ALL VITAL ONSITE DC POWER OCCURS FOR ≤ 15 MINUTES as indicated by: Low voltage AND/OR fuse trouble on ALL the affected unit's 125v/250v station batteries **AND** Low voltage AND/OR fuse trouble on the affected unit's 125v D/G batteries (including the swing D/G)		■		
A LOSS OF ALL VITAL ONSITE DC POWER OCCURS FOR > 15 MINUTES as indicated by: Low voltage AND/OR fuse trouble on ALL the affected unit's 125v/250v station batteries **AND** Low voltage AND/OR fuse trouble on the affected unit's 125v D/G batteries (including the swing D/G)			■	

END
LOSS OF ONSITE DC POWER

7.0 - LOSS OF CONTAINMENT

Emergency conditions exist WHEN:	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
NOTE NUE is to be declared upon commencing Load Reduction. **A LOSS OF PRIMARY OR SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY OCCURS** as indicated by the inability to meet any one of the requirements WITHIN the time limit established by the applicable unit's TS.	■			
See Section 11.0, Hazards to Plant Operation, for determination of Alert Classification.		■		
See Section 11.0, Hazards to Plant Operation for determination of Site Area Emergency Classification.			■	
See Section 22.0, Multiple Symptoms and Other Conditions, for determination of General Emergency Classification.				■

END
LOSS OF CONTAINMENT

8.0 - FIRE IN PLANT

Emergency conditions exist WHEN:	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
A FIRE CONTINUING > 10 MINUTES (AFTER DISCOVERY) EXISTS WITHIN THE PROTECTED AREA, INCLUDING 230 KV AND 500 KV SWITCHYARDS, as indicated by: Fire Alarm WITH visual confirmation **OR** SOS/ED judgment	■			
NOTE Refer to the System Evaluation Document (SED) for a listing of safety systems. **A FIRE CONTINUING > 10 MINUTES (AFTER DISCOVERY) EXISTS POTENTIALLY AFFECTING SAFETY SYSTEMS,** required for the present mode of operation, as indicated by: Fire Alarm **AND** Location, observation AND judgment of SOS/ED		■		
A FIRE CONTINUING > 10 MINUTES (AFTER DISCOVERY) COMPROMISING THE FUNCTIONS OF SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS as indicated by: Fire defeating redundant safety system trains required for the current mode of operation **OR** Loss of safety system due to fire that affects shutdown capability by the inability to perform ONE of the following functions: • Prevent excessive reactor pressurization • Provide adequate makeup inventory • Depressurize the reactor • Remove decay heat from the reactor **OR** Location, observation AND judgment of SOS/ED			■	
See Section 22.0, Multiple Symptoms and Other Conditions for determination of General Emergency Classification.				■

END
FIRE IN PLANT

9.0 - SECURITY EVENT

Emergency conditions exist WHEN:	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
A SECURITY ALERT OCCURS as indicated by Nuclear Security Shift Supervisor advises SOS/ED of Security Alert condition **AND** SOS/ED judgment	■			
A SECURITY EMERGENCY OCCURS as indicated by: Nuclear Security Shift Supervisor advises the SOS/ED of a Security Emergency condition **AND** SOS/ED judgment		■		
A LOSS OF PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE PLANT IS IMMINENT as indicated by: Loss of physical barrier capability or control of the protected area **OR** Attempted unauthorized entry into the protected area by force or covert action **AND** SOS/ED judgment based on Nuclear Security Shift Supervisor advice			■	
A LOSS OF PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE PLANT IS IMMINENT as indicated by: Loss of physical barrier capabilities of any vital building **OR** Loss of control of any vital area including: • Intake Structure • Main Control Room • Diesel Generator Bldg. • CAS/SAS • Power Block **AND** SOS/ED judgment based on Nuclear Security Shift Supervisor advice				■

END
SECURITY EVENT

10.0 - NATURAL PHENOMENON

Emergency conditions exist WHEN: **EARTHQUAKE DETECTED:**	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
ANY EARTHQUAKE IS DETECTED WITHIN THE PLANT as indicated by: Felt by Personnel **OR** Confirmed "Seismic Instrumentation Triggered" (Unit 1) alarm indicating horizontal acceleration > 0.005 g				
ANY EARTHQUAKE IS DETECTED WITHIN THE PLANT as indicated by: "Seismic Instrumentation Triggered" (Unit 2) alarm indicating horizontal acceleration ≥ 0.08g Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE Level) **OR** Any horizontal (N-S, E-W) peak shock annunciator 12.7 hz **AMBER** light illuminated indicates 100% OBE actuated on Panel 1H11-P701 **AND** "Seismic Instrumentation Triggered" (Unit 1) alarm indicating horizontal acceleration > 0.005g **OR** Unit 1 AND/OR Unit 2 Seismic Peak Shock Recorder High "G" Alarm **OR** Unit 1 AND Unit 2 Time-History Recorders start				

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10.0 - NATURAL PHENOMENON, (continued)

Emergency conditions exist WHEN: **EARTHQUAKE DETECTED: (continued)**	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
NOTE The actual maximum g acceleration may be determined by having I & C play back the Time-History Recorder's tapes per the Earthquake Response Manual, SX18271 (located in Document Control) and the applicable I & C procedure(s). **ANY EARTHQUAKE IS DETECTED WITHIN THE PLANT** as indicated by: Same parameters as in the Alert classification **AND** Any horizontal (N-S, E-W) peak shock annunciator, 12.7 hz **RED** light illuminated on Panel 1H11-P701 indicating maximum g level measured by Time-History Recorders as ≥ 0.15g Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) **AND** EITHER unit NOT in Cold Shutdown			■	
AN EARTHQUAKE THAT COULD CAUSE MASSIVE DAMAGE TO ANY PLANT SYSTEM WHICH COULD LEAD TO CORE DEGRADATION OR CORE MELT as indicated by: Loss of systems needed to maintain integrity of all three fission product barriers: • Fuel Integrity • RCS Integrity • Containment Integrity **OR** Observation and judgment of SOS/ED.				■

END - EARTHQUAKE

→ [NATURAL PHENOMENON - CONTINUED TO NEXT PAGE]→

10.0 - NATURAL PHENOMENON, (continued)

Emergency conditions exist WHEN: **HIGH WINDS EXIST:**	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
HIGH WINDS are indicated by: Any tornado observed onsite **OR** Any hurricane force winds projected onsite with windspeed > 75 mph	■			
Any tornado observed striking the operating facility (areas within the protected area and the 230 Kv and 500 Kv switchyards) **OR** Any hurricane observed onsite with sustained windspeeds at design level (≥ 94.5 mph) **OR** SOS/ED judgment		■		
CAUTION The wind speed instrumentation will not reflect the actual wind speeds of a tornado. Consideration should be given to the distance of a reported tornado from the met tower and the extent of the reported damage when attempting to determine if the wind speed "exceeds the range of the instrumentation (> 100 mph)".			■	
The observation of damage from an onsite tornado with windspeed in excess of meteorological instruments range (>100 mph) **OR** Sustained windspeeds in excess of meteorological instruments range (>100 mph) **AND** Either unit NOT in Cold Shutdown			■	

END - HIGH WINDS

→ [NATURAL PHENOMENON - CONTINUED TO NEXT PAGE] →

10.0 - NATURAL PHENOMENON, (continued)

Emergency conditions exist WHEN: **HIGH / LOW RIVER WATER LEVEL INDICATED:**	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
HIGH RIVER WATER LEVEL is indicated by: Plant Service Water Intake Pump well level indication ≥ 88.6 ft Mean Sea Level (MSL)	■			
Plant Service Water Intake Pump well level indication ≥ 100 ft MSL		■		
Plant Service Water Intake Pump well level indication ≥ 120 ft MSL **OR** Actual OR projected hurricane surge OR flood levels ≥ 120 ft MSL **AND** Either unit NOT in Cold Shutdown			■	
LOW RIVER WATER LEVEL is indicated by: Plant Service Water Intake Pump well level indication < 60.7 ft Mean Sea Level (MSL)	■			
Plant Service Water Intake Pump well level indication < 59.9 ft MSL		■		
Plant Service Water Intake Pump well level indication < 57.2 ft MSL **AND** Either unit NOT in Cold Shutdown			■	

END - HIGH / LOW RIVER WATER LEVEL

END
NATURAL PHENOMENON

11.0 - HAZARDS TO PLANT OPERATION

Emergency conditions exist WHEN:	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
AIRCRAFT ACTIVITY				
UNUSUAL AIRCRAFT ACTIVITY IS OBSERVED over the operating facility (areas within the protected area and the 230 Kv and 500 Kv switchyards) **OR** **AIRCRAFT CRASH OCCURS** within the owner controlled area **AND** SOS/ED judgment	■			
AIRCRAFT CRASH OCCURS WITHIN THE OPERATING FACILITY (areas within the protected area and the 230 Kv and 500 Kv switchyards)		■		
AIRCRAFT CRASH OCCURS AFFECTING VITAL OPERATING PLANT STRUCTURES by impact OR fire including: • Intake Structure • Main Control Room • Diesel Generator Bldg. • CAS/SAS • Power Block **AND** Either unit NOT in Cold Shutdown **OR** SOS/ED judgment			■	

END - AIRCRAFT ACTIVITY

→ [HAZARDS TO PLANT OPERATION - CONTINUED TO NEXT PAGE]→

11.0 - HAZARDS TO PLANT OPERATION, (continued)

Emergency conditions exist WHEN:	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
EXPLOSIONS				
ANY EXPLOSION OBSERVED WITHIN THE OPERATING FACILITY (areas within the protected area and the 230 Kv and 500 Kv switchyards)	■			
KNOWN EXPLOSION DAMAGE TO FACILITY (ONSITE) AFFECTING PLANT OPERATION		■		
SEVERE DAMAGE TO SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT FROM MISSILES OR EXPLOSION THAT AFFECTS SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY by the inability to perform ONE of the following functions: Prevent excessive reactor pressurization **OR** Provide adequate makeup inventory **OR** Depressurize the reactor **OR** Remove decay heat from the reactor **AND** Either unit NOT in Cold Shutdown			■	

END - EXPLOSIONS

→ [HAZARDS TO PLANT OPERATION - CONTINUED TO NEXT PAGE]→

11.0 - HAZARDS TO PLANT OPERATION, (continued)

Emergency conditions exist WHEN: **TOXIC GAS RELEASED:**	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
NOTE Toxic gas releases may hamper the ability of personnel to perform activities related to plant safety. Releases within the protected area of the plant may jeopardize the operation of equipment or safety functions necessary to establish or maintain cold shutdown. Releases which may fall into this category include, but are NOT limited to Carbon Dioxide, Nitrogen and Chlorine.				
CAUTION DO NOT LIMIT EVALUATION OF THE CONDITION BASED ON THE CHEMICAL DEFINITION OF THE MATERIAL IN QUESTION. THE WORD "TOXIC" IN THESE EALS IS A BROAD CATEGORY OF MATERIALS WHICH HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR LIMITING THE ABILITY OF PERSONNEL TO PERFORM WORK ACTIVITES ASSOCIATED WITH PLANT SAFETY.				
OBSERVATION OF SIGNIFICANT TOXIC GAS RELEASE WITHIN the operating facility (areas within the protected area and the 230 Kv and 500 Kv switchyards) **AND** SOS/ED judgment	■			
UNCONTROLLED TOXIC GAS ENTRY INTO PROTECTED AREA FACILITY ENVIRONS		■		
UNCONTROLLED TOXIC GAS ENTRY INTO A VITAL AREA restricting access and constituting a safety problem: • Intake Structure • Main Control Room • Diesel Generator Bldg. • CAS/SAS • Power Block **AND** Either unit NOT in Cold Shutdown			■	

END - TOXIC GAS

→ [HAZARDS TO PLANT OPERATION - CONTINUED TO NEXT PAGE]→

11.0 - HAZARDS TO PLANT OPERATION, (continued)

Emergency conditions exist WHEN: **FLAMMABLE GAS RELEASED:**	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
NOTE Flammable gas releases may jeopardize the operation of equipment or safety functions necessary to establish or maintain cold shutdown.				
OBSERVATION OF SIGNIFICANT FLAMMABLE GAS RELEASE WITHIN the operating facility (areas within the protected area and the 230 Kv and 500 Kv switchyards) **OR** **PIPING RUPTURE IN ANY FLAMMABLE GAS SYSTEM** (i.e., hydrogen, propane, etc.) **OR** SOS/ED judgment	■			
UNCONTROLLED FLAMMABLE GAS ENTRY into any Protected Area facility environs		■		
UNCONTROLLED FLAMMABLE GAS ENTRY INTO VITAL AREAS INCLUDING: • Intake Structure • Main Control Room • Diesel Gen. Bldg. • CAS/SAS • Power Block **AND** Either unit not in cold shutdown			■	

END - FLAMMABLE GAS

→ [HAZARDS TO PLANT OPERATION - CONTINUED TO NEXT PAGE]→

11.0 - HAZARDS TO PLANT OPERATION, (continued)

Emergency conditions exist WHEN: **TURBINE FAILURE/MISSILE IMPACT**	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
A TURBINE FAILURE GENERATING PROJECTILES is indicated by: Main Turbine Trip **AND** Confirmation of rotating component failure **OR** SOS/ED judgment				
A TURBINE FAILURE GENERATING PROJECTILES is indicated by: Main turbine trip **AND** Turbine casing penetration by internal components **OR** Projectile from any source, affects plant operation **OR** SOS/ED judgment				

END - TURBINE FAILURE/MISSILE IMPACT

END
HAZARDS TO PLANT OPERATION

12.0 – THIS SECTION INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

13.0 - CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION

Emergency conditions exist WHEN: **AN EVACUATION OF THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM IS IMMINENT** as indicated by:	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
Entry into the Remote Shutdown procedures used to shutdown the plant from outside the Control Room.		■		
An evacuation of the Main Control Room is ordered **AND** Control of shutdown systems from local stations is NOT established within 15 minutes after Main Control Room evacuation.			■	

END
CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION

14.0 - CONTROL ROD DROP

Emergency conditions exist WHEN: **A CONTROL ROD DROP ACCIDENT OCCURS** as indicated by:	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
Local power range monitors (LPRM) indicate abnormal neutron flux in the vicinity of the suspected dropped rod **AND** MSL high rad monitors > 3X normal background **OR** Average power range monitor (APRM) upscale trip of RPS channels "A" and/or "B" • Unit 1 > 120% RTP • Unit 2 > 120% RTP **OR** Intermediate range monitor (IRM) upscale trip of RPS channels "A" and/or "B" Either unit ≥ 120/125 divisions of full scale				

END
CONTROL ROD DROP

15.0 - FAILURE OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM

Emergency conditions exist WHEN:	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
A FAILURE OF THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) TO INITIATE A SCRAM as indicated by: Valid automatic scram signal **AND** Reactor NOT subcritical OR subcriticality cannot be maintained	■			
A FAILURE OF THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) TO INITIATE AND COMPLETE A SCRAM which brings the reactor subcritical, is indicated by: Valid automatic AND manual scram signal **AND** Reactor NOT subcritical OR subcriticality cannot be maintained		■		
A TRANSIENT REQUIRING OPERATION OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS WITH FAILURE TO SCRAM (continued power generation but no core damage immediately evident) is indicated by Valid automatic AND manual scram signal **AND** < 3% power generation cannot be achieved OR maintained **AND** Standby Liquid Control initiation required			■	
See section 22.0, Multiple Systems and Other Conditions, for determination of the General Emergency Classification				■

END
FAILURE OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM

16.0 - LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM INDICATION/ALARMS/ANNUNCIATORS

Emergency conditions exist WHEN:	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
ANY SIGNIFICANT LOSS OF ANY ONE OF THE FOLLOWING MAIN CONTROL ROOM INDICATION OR ALARMS, THAT REDUCE ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY TO THE EXTENT REQUIRING PLANT SHUTDOWN BY TS: • Plant Process Computer • Safety Parameter Display System • Radioactive Effluent Instrumentation **AND** The plant NOT shut down WITHIN the time limit specified by TS				
MOST OR ALL MAIN CONTROL ROOM ALARMS (ANNUNCIATORS) LOST as indicated by: Observation OR failure in alarm check **OR** SOS/ED judgment				
MOST OR ALL MAIN CONTROL ROOM ALARM (ANNUNCIATORS) LOST WITH PLANT TRANSIENT INITIATED OR IN PROGRESS as indicated by: Observation of plant transient (i.e., reactor trip, turbine trip, loss of feedwater, etc.) **OR** SOS/ED judgment				

END

LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM INDICATION/ALARM/ANNUNCIATORS

17.0 - LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS

Emergency conditions exist WHEN:	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
A COMPLETE LOSS OF ANY FUNCTION NEEDED FOR PLANT COLD SHUTDOWN is indicated by: Both trains of RHR shutdown cooling mode unavailable for any reason **AND** Loss of alternate shutdown cooling modes **AND** Inability to maintain reactor coolant temperature < 212° F, WHEN required.				
See section 22.0, Multiple Symptoms and Other Conditions, for determination of the General Emergency Classification				

END
LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS

18.0 - FUEL DAMAGE BY FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT

Emergency conditions exist WHEN:	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
A FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT WITH RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVITY TO REACTOR BUILDING is indicated by: Valid Refueling Floor ARM Hi Alarm > 50 mR/hr **OR** Valid "REFUELING FLOOR VENT EXHAUST RADIATION HI-HI" Alarm (601-403) **AND** Any of the following process radiation monitors indicating > 20 mR/hr • 1D11-K611A-D • 2D11-K611A-D • 2D11-K634A-D • 2D11-K635A-D **OR** Valid "REFUELING FLOOR VENT FLTR DISCH RADIATION HIGH" Alarm (601-42 **AND** Any of the following process radiation monitors indicating > 20 mR/hr • 1D11-K616A, B • 2D11-K616A, B		■		
MAJOR DAMAGE TO SPENT FUEL IN REACTOR BUILDING as indicated by: Spent Fuel Storage Pool Low Level Alarm **AND** More than one Refuel Floor ARM exceeding Max Safe Operating Value **OR** Large object damages spent fuel in pool **AND** SOS/ED judgment (based on refueling floor radiation levels)			■	

END
FUEL DAMAGE BY FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT

19.0 - HIGH RADIATION OR AIRBORNE CONTAMINATION

Emergency conditions exist WHEN:	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
HIGH RADIATION LEVELS OR HIGH AIRBORNE CONTAMINATION WHICH INDICATE A SEVERE DEGRADATION IN CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL is indicated by: ARMs are offscale high (readings confirmed) **OR** An increase by factor of 1,000 in direct radiation readings		■		

END
HIGH RADIATION OR AIRBORNE CONTAMINATION

20.0 - LOSS OF COOLANT

Emergency conditions exist WHEN:	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
NOTE NUE is to be declared based upon commencing Load Reduction. **ANY CONFIRMED REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE AS DEFINED BY TS** is indicated by: Any RCS pressure boundary leakage	■			
ANY CONFIRMED REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) LEAK OR UNISOLABLE SYSTEM LEAK CAUSING THE DIRECT LOSS OF VESSEL INVENTORY GREATER THAN 50 GPM as indicated by: Calculation of RCS leak rate greater than 50 gpm using Drywell Equip AND/OR Floor Drain Sump level integrators on Panel H11-P613 **OR** SOS/ED judgment that an unisolable RCS leak greater than 50 GPM into the Reactor Building has occurred and may be indicated by one OR more of the following indications: • Reactor Building Equip AND/OR Floor Drain Sump level high alarms • Valid leak detection alarms • Any confirmed ARM in the Reactor Building above Max Normal Operating Values. **OR** SOS/ED judgment		■		
ANY CONFIRMED REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) LEAK is indicated by: RCS leak greater than all available ECCS pump capacities **AND** Reactor low, low, low level alarm < -113 inches AND level decreasing with available makeup pumps running and discharging to vessel **AND** Drywell High Temp Alarms AND Drywell temperature increasing **OR** Drywell high pressure initiation alarm > 1.92 psig AND increasing			■	
See section 22.0, Multiple Symptoms and Other Conditions for determination of the General Emergency Classification				■

END
LOSS OF COOLANT

21.0 - LOSS OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES

Emergency conditions exist WHEN:	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
THE LOSS OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF) WITH CONTINUED OPERATION OF EITHER UNIT BEYOND THE TIMEFRAME SPECIFIED IN THE APPLICABLE TS REQUIRED ACTION STATEMENT (RAS): The following are engineered safety features (ESFs): • Automatic Depressurization System • Containment Heat Removal System • Containment Isolation System • Control Rod Velocity Limiters • Core Spray • CRD Housing Supports • Diesel Generators • High Pressure Coolant Injection System • Low Low Set Relief Logic System • Low Pressure Coolant Injection System • Main Control Room Environmental Control System • Main Steam Line Flow Restrictor • Main Steam Line Isolation Valves • Post LOCA Hydrogen Recombiner System (i.e., Combustible Gas Control System) • Reactor Protection System • Standby Gas Treatment System				

END
LOSS OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES

22.0 - MULTIPLE SYMPTOMS AND OTHER CONDITIONS

Emergency conditions exist WHEN: **TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SAFETY LIMITS ARE EXCEEDED:**	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
PLANT CONDITIONS THAT EXCEED ANY SAFETY LIMIT AS REQUIRED IN TS are indicated by the following categories: Thermal Power **OR** Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) **OR** Low reactor water level with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel < -139" in Unit 1 OR < -158" in Unit 2 **OR** Reactor vessel steam dome pressure > 1325 psig with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel **OR** Other condition that in the SOS/ED judgement warrant increased awareness of the plant operating staff or State and/or local authorities.				

END - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SAFETY LIMITS

→ → [MULTIPLE SYMPTOMS AND OTHER CONDITIONS -

CONTINUED TO NEXT PAGE]→ →

22.0 - MULTIPLE SYMPTOMS AND OTHER CONDITIONS, (continued)

Emergency conditions exist WHEN: **PRECAUTIONARY ACTIVATION OF TSC IS WARRANTED:**	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
Plant conditions exist that warrant precautionary activation of the TSC and placing the EOF AND other key emergency responders on standby, as indicated by the following: Observation **AND** SOS/ED judgment				

END - PRECAUTIONARY ACTIVATION OF TSC

→ → [MULTIPLE SYMPTOMS AND OTHER CONDITIONS -

CONTINUED TO NEXT PAGE] → →

22.0 - MULTIPLE SYMPTOMS AND OTHER CONDITIONS, (continued)

Emergency conditions exist WHEN: **PRECAUTIONARY ACTIVATION OF MONITORING TEAMS IS WARRANTED:**	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
Plant conditions exist that warrant activation of emergency centers and monitoring teams, OR a precautionary notification to the public near the site, as indicated by the following: Observation **AND** SOS/ED judgment				

END - PRECAUTIONARY ACTIVATION OF MONITORING TEAMS

→ → [MULTIPLE SYMPTOMS AND OTHER CONDITIONS - CONTINUED TO NEXT PAGE] → →

22.0 - MULTIPLE SYMPTOMS AND OTHER CONDITIONS (continued)

Emergency conditions exist WHEN: **POTENTIAL LARGE RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVITY EXISTS:**	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
PLANT CONDITIONS EXIST WHERE THE POTENTIAL RELEASE OF LARGE AMOUNTS OF RADIOACTIVITY IN A SHORT TIME PERIOD ARE POSSIBLE (e.g., any core melt situation) is indicated by the following conditions: Transient (e.g., scram, loss of offsite power, etc.) **AND** Failure of required core shutdown system (could lead to core melt in several hours) [e.g., CRD system, SLC system, RPS, ECCS, DG'S, RHRSW] **AND** Containment failure likely **OR** Small or large LOCA **AND** Failure of ECCS to perform (leading to core degradation or melt in minutes to hours) **AND** Loss of containment imminent **OR** Small or large LOCA **AND** Containment performance is unsuccessful (affecting longer term success of ECCS. Could lead to core degradation OR melt in hours)				

→ → [CONTINUE TO THE NEXT PAGE] → →

22.0 - MULTIPLE SYMPTOMS AND OTHER CONDITIONS (continued)

Emergency conditions exist WHEN: **POTENTIAL LARGE RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVITY EXISTS: (continued)**	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
OR Shutdown occurs **AND** Required decay heat removal systems (e.g., RHR) are rendered unavailable or non-safety systems heat removal capabilities are rendered unavailable **AND** Core degradation OR melt could occur in about ten hours WITH subsequent containment failure **OR** Any major internal OR external event which could cause massive damage to plant systems resulting in any of the conditions listed in multiple symptoms of potential larger releases of radioactivity **OR** SOS/ED judgment				

END - POTENTIAL LARGE RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVITY

→ → [MULTIPLE SYMPTOMS AND OTHER CONDITIONS -

CONTINUED TO NEXT PAGE] → →

22.0 - MULTIPLE SYMPTOMS AND OTHER CONDITIONS (continued)

Emergency conditions exist WHEN: **FIRE IN PLANT OCCURS:**	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
A FIRE IN THE PLANT THAT COULD CAUSE MASSIVE DAMAGE TO ANY PLANT SYSTEM WHICH COULD LEAD TO CORE DEGRADATION OR CORE MELT as indicated by the following: Loss of systems due to fire, needed to maintain integrity of all three fission product barriers. • Fuel Integrity • RCS Integrity • Containment Integrity **OR** Location, observation AND judgment of SOS/ED (Based upon Fire Brigade Leader's report.)				

END - FIRE IN PLANT

→ [MULTIPLE SYMPTOMS AND OTHER CONDITIONS -

CONTINUED TO NEXT PAGE]→

22.0 - MULTIPLE SYMPTOMS AND OTHER CONDITIONS (continued)

Emergency conditions exist WHEN: **Any of the following are indicated, using the Parameter Assessment Table below:**	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
A Failure of the Fuel Cladding AND Primary Containment with a potential loss of the Primary Coolant Boundary **OR** **A Failure of the Fuel Cladding AND Primary Coolant Boundary with a potential loss of Primary Containment** **OR** **A Failure of the Primary Coolant Boundary AND Primary Containment with a potential loss of the Fuel Cladding**				

A **General Emergency** should be declared when **TWO boundaries (cladding, coolant, or containment)** have an **ACTUAL failure AND** a **THIRD boundary** has an **ACTUAL** or **POTENTIAL failure**. IF a parameter is approaching emergency action level criteria and mitigation systems are unavailable, assume the barrier will be lost. **Exceeding ONE** of the parameters below is an **indication of an actual or potential loss of the associated boundary.**

PARAMETER ASSESSMENT TABLE

CLADDING		COOLANT		CONTAINMENT	
Actual		**Actual**		**Actual**	
☐	I-131 > 100μCi/cc	☐	Unisolable primary system break outside containment	☐	Integrity breached
☐	DWRRM > 500 R/hr	☐	Significant leakage in TB With TB ARMs above alarm setpoints and increasing.	☐	Drywell **OR** Torus ≥ 6% hydrogen with ≥ 5% oxygen
		☐	DW Pressure ≥ 25 psig	☐	SOS judgement that containment is lost **OR** loss is imminent
		☐	DW Temperature ≥ 300°F		
		☐	Gap activity in DW		
Potential		**Potential**		**Potential**	
☐	Failure of ECCS to maintain RWL	☐	Failure of SRVs to open with pressure high off-scale	☐	Containment pressure approaching 56 psig
☐	RWL ≤ -158" for 3.5 min **AND** MCUTL	☐	All 4160/600 V buses undervoltage	☐	Drywell **OR** Torus ≥ 6% hydrogen with ≥ 5% oxygen
☐	All 4160/600 V buses undervoltage	☐	Failure of ECCS to maintain RWL	☐	SOS/ED judgement that containment loss is imminent

END
MULTIPLE SYMPTOMS AND OTHER CONDITIONS

23.0 - ISFSI OPERATIONS

Emergency conditions exist WHEN:	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
A LOSS OF CASK CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY FOR ANY LOADED SPENT FUEL CASK OCCURS as indicated by: Direct Radiation levels outside the ISFSI protected area boundary exceed 2 mrem in an hour **AND** Contamination levels outside the ISFSI protected area boundary exceed the technical specification limits for spent fuel storage cask surface contamination **OR** Direct Radiation Readings for a Loaded Spent Fuel Cask exceed the technical specification limit for overpack average surface dose rates.				
DEGRADATION OF ANY SPENT FUEL CASK DUE TO AN OPERATIONAL EVENT as indicated by: Direct observation of a loaded spent fuel cask indicates cask confinement boundary or shielding damage due to an operational event • Cask handling • Cask drop • Cask tip-over **AND** SOS/ED judgment				

→ → [ISFSI OPERATIONS - CONTINUED TO NEXT PAGE] → →

23.0 - ISFSI OPERATIONS (continued)

Emergency conditions exist WHEN:	NUE	ALERT	SAE	GEN
A Loss of cask confinement boundary for any loaded spent fuel cask occurs as indicated by: **Degradation of any Spent Fuel Cask due to environmental phenomena or external events** Direct observation of a loaded spent fuel cask indicates cask confinement boundary or shielding damage due to environmental phenomena or external events • Tornado • Explosion • Lightning • Flooding • Earthquake • Extreme environmental temperatures • Burial under debris • Fire • Explosion • Aircraft Crash • Missile or projectile impact • Security Event **AND** SOS/ED judgment				

END
ISFSI OPERATIONS

1.0 OBJECTIVE

This procedure provides guidance to on-shift operations personnel for response to declared emergencies.

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2.0 APPLICABILITY

This procedure applies to responses and actions taken by on-shift operations personnel. This procedure is performed as required.

3.0 REFERENCES

3.1. 10AC-MGR-006-0, Hatch Emergency Plan

3.2. Edwin I. Hatch Unit 1 and Unit 2 Emergency Plan

3.3. FULL SIZE FORM

- TRN-0144, Emergency Page Announcement Guide

4.0 REQUIREMENTS

4.1. PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

On-shift operations personnel who have received emergency response training are required to perform this procedure.

4.2. MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

N/A - Not applicable to this procedure

4.3. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS

N/A - Not applicable to this procedure

5.0 PRECAUTIONS/LIMITATIONS

5.1. PRECAUTIONS

N/A - Not applicable to this procedure

5.2. LIMITATIONS

This procedure is NOT intended for use by the Emergency Director (ED).

6.0 PREREQUISITES

A declared emergency or an emergency drill/exercise must exist before using this procedure.

REFERENCE

7.0 PROCEDURE

7.1 SUPERINTENDENT OF SHIFT (SOS)

		NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.1.1	Review the event and classify the emergency in accordance with 73EP-EIP-001-0, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions.	X	X	X	X
7.1.2	Assume the duties of the ED in accordance with 73EP-EIP-004-0, Duties of Emergency Director.	X	X	X	X
7.1.3	After turnover of ED duties, perform the following:				
7.1.3.1	Direct operation of the plant to mitigate consequences of the event and to restore to a safe operating condition.	X	X	X	X
7.1.3.2	Analyze plant conditions and assist the ED with reclassifications and protective action recommendations.	X	X	X	X
7.1.3.3	Advise the ED and TSC Manager on degrading plant conditions, initiation of any release or changes in the magnitude of any release as soon as practical.	X	X	X	X
7.1.3.4	Ensure communications is established and maintained with the emergency response facilities (ERFs), NRC, and Security, as appropriate.		X	X	X

7.2 SUPERINTENDENT OF SHIFT (SOS) (CONT'D)

		NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.1.3.5	IF the main access road can not be used as a site exit route, coordinate with the Emergency Director and Security to open the alternate site exit route(s) to allow evacuating personnel to leave the plant site.	X	X	X	X
7.1.3.6	IF the following conditions are present which may prevent facility activation, protected area evacuation or site evacuation, THEN consult with the ED and Security prior to dispatching Control Room personnel, making PA announcements or augmenting on-shift staffing: • security events • severe weather conditions • other hazards that affect personnel safety		X	X	X

END OF 7.1, SUPERINTENDENT OF SHIFT (SOS)

7.2 SHIFT SUPERVISOR (SS)

		NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.2.1	IF the SOS is unavailable or incapacitated, assume the duties of SOS and perform the SOS duties in accordance with section 7.1 of this procedure. IF available, assign any qualified SRO to assume the unit SS duties.	X	X	X	X
7.2.2	Direct operation of the plant to mitigate consequences of the event and to restore to a safe operating condition.	X	X	X	X
7.2.3	Activate emergency response teams, IF necessary, by contacting the TSC (or the Health Physics office and other support departments IF the TSC is not activated) and provide directions regarding needed actions.	X	X	X	X
7.2.4	Assist in the performance of prompt offsite dose assessments, as needed.	X	X	X	X
7.2.5	Advise the SOS on any degradation of plant equipment, onset of a release, and changes in release magnitude as soon as possible.	X	X	X	X
7.2.6	Establish communications with the ERFs, Plant Security, the ED and the NRC as requested by SOS.		X	X	X

END OF 7.2, SHIFT SUPERVISOR (SS)

7.3 SHIFT SUPPORT SUPERVISOR (SSS)

		NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.3.1	Maintain accountability of all SOs dispatched from the Control Room.		X	X	X

NOTE:	All entries to areas with higher than normal radiological conditions must be dispatched from the OSC.

		NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.3.2	Ensure SOs are logged on the Operations rounds blanket RWP to track their dose.		X	X	X

NOTE:	SOs can be dispatched with no limitations provided radiological conditions are not degraded.

		NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.3.3	Dispatch SOs to perform various tasks to assist in mitigation of an emergency condition.		X	X	X
7.3.4	Coordinate with Control Room Operators to monitor ARM readings and plant conditions for the location where SOs have been dispatched. IF conditions change, THEN withdraw all personnel dispatched to that location.		X	X	X
7.3.5	Send extra SOs to the OSC as conditions allow. SOs for shutdown activities will remain in the Control Room.		X	X	X

END OF 7.3, SHIFT SUPPORT SUPERVISOR (SSS)

7.4 CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR

		NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.4.1	Take actions to place the plant in a safe condition in accordance with annunciator response procedures, emergency operating procedures and Technical Specifications.	X	X	X	X
7.4.2	Periodically report plant status to the SS.	X	X	X	X
7.4.3	Notify the SS or SOS of any degradation to plant equipment.	X	X	X	X
7.4.4	Perform prompt offsite dose assessment calculations in accordance with 73EP-EIP-018-0, Prompt Offsite Dose Assessment, as required. Refer to "Prerequisites" section of 73EP-EIP-018-0 to determine necessity to perform prompt offsite dose assessment calculation. Notify the SOS or SS of the onset of a release or any change in the magnitude of release. When the TSC is activated, turnover dose assessment duties to the TSC and exit procedure 73EP-EIP-018-0.		X	X	X
7.4.5	Notify the SSS of changes in plant conditions, radiological conditions or radiological releases.		X	X	X

7.4 CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR (CONT'D)

CAUTION:	CHANGES IN WIND DIRECTION MAY REQUIRE CHANGING RALLY POINTS AND EVACUATION ROUTES; THEREFORE, USE OF AVERAGE WIND DIRECTION IS ACCEPTABLE AND DESIRED. BE AWARE OF CHANGING CONDITIONS.

		NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.4.6	Complete form TRN-0144, Emergency Page Announcement Guide, filling in the required sections.	X	X	X	X
7.4.7	Obtain concurrence from the SOS for PA announcements being made for the following circumstances: • security events • severe weather conditions • other hazards that affect personnel safety.	X	X	X	X

NOTE:	The purpose of making announcements is to inform plant personnel of an event or change in conditions that warrants a response. The timeliness and accuracy of the announcement will have a direct effect on the implementation of that response. Announcements are normally concise statements containing sufficient detail to elicit the appropriate response.

		NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.4.8	Sound the applicable warning tone, THEN make the appropriate announcement and, as directed by the SOS or SS and using the applicable section of TRN-0144, Emergency Page Announcement Guide. The appropriate announcement/tone will be made as soon as practicable upon initial emergency declaration, and every thirty (30) minutes for the first two (2) hours of the declared emergency. After the first two (2) hours, repeat the announcement/ tone as directed by the SS.	X	X	X	X

END OF 7.4, CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR

7.5 SYSTEM OPERATOR (SO)

		NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.5.1	Complete current assigned task OR restore equipment to a safe condition and report status to the Control Room.		X	X	X
7.5.2	Report to the SSS in the Control Room and remain under his direction until dispatched to the OSC.		X	X	X

NOTE: Unusual circumstances may require personnel to immediately terminate work activities and exit the area. These circumstances include, but are not limited to:

- an ARM alarms in the work area
- the worker's digital dosimeter alarms, or
- a radiological event is announced and personnel are directed to evacuate the area

		NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.5.3	IF unusual circumstances occur in or near your present location, THEN terminate your work activities, exit the area and report back to the SSS in the Control Room.		X	X	X

END OF 7.5, SYSTEM OPERATOR (SO)

1.0 OBJECTIVE

This procedure establishes the minimum measures which are taken by the Nuclear Security Department to respond to declared emergencies.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

2.0 APPLICABILITY

This procedure is applicable to responses taken by the Nuclear Security Department to declared emergencies, which implement the Hatch Emergency Plan. This procedure is performed as required.

3.0 REFERENCES

3.1 10AC-MGR-006-0, Hatch Emergency Plan

3.2 Edwin I. Hatch Unit 1 & Unit 2 Emergency Plan, Section E

3.3 Emergency Response Facility Position Matrix

3.4 FULL-SIZE FORM

- TRN-0147, Plant Hatch Owner-Controlled Area

4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES

4.1 PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

4.1.1 Security Personnel who have received instruction in applicable emergency implementing procedures are required to perform this procedure.

4.1.2 Off-duty Nuclear Security officers may be called in to man the various posts/patrols, including access control at the Emergency News Center.

4.2 MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

N/A - Not applicable to this procedure

4.3 SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS

N/A - Not applicable to this procedure

5.0 PRECAUTIONS/LIMITATIONS

5.1 PRECAUTIONS

Uncertain or higher than normal radiological conditions may be encountered during actual emergencies. Maintain radiation exposure ALARA

5.2 LIMITATIONS

N/A - Not applicable to this procedure

6.0 PREREQUISITES

A declared emergency OR an emergency drill/exercise must exist before using this procedure.

REFERENCE

7.0 PROCEDURE

NOTE:	The Emergency Response Facility (ERF) Position Matrix may be used to determine those individuals who may assume the following emergency response positions.

7.1 EOF SECURITY MANAGER

		NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.1.1	Report to EOF to assume the position of EOF Security Manager.		X	X	X
7.1.2	Ensure Security staff personnel for the TSC, OSC and EOF are dispatched as required. Additional support persons may be brought in to assist the EOF Security Manager, as needed.		X	X	X
7.1.3	Contact the Public Information (PI) Director to determine when Security personnel will be needed for access control at the Emergency News Center complex. Refer to the Emergency Call List for applicable phone number(s).		X	X	X
7.1.4	Inform the Security Shift Supervisor when Security personnel will be needed at the Emergency News Center complex.		X	X	X
7.1.5	Coordinate security activities as requested by the Emergency Director or EOF Manager.		X	X	X

NOTE:	The Emergency Director may order evacuation of non-essential personnel at any emergency classification.

		NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.1.6	Establish contact with local law enforcement representatives (in the applicable County Emergency Operations Centers) to coordinate the release of non-essential personnel from the plant site, as necessary.		X	X	X
7.1.7	Evaluate the event and make recommendations to Emergency Response Management, as required.		X	X	X

END OF 7.1, EOF SECURITY MANAGER

7.2 TSC SECURITY SUPERVISION

		NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.2.1	Report to the TSC to assume the position of TSC Security Supervisor.		X	X	X
7.2.2	Ensure that actions taken by Security shift supervisor are appropriate.		X	X	X
7.2.3	Confer with TSC HP/Chemistry Supervision concerning radiological conditions as they pertain to Security personnel assignments.		X	X	X
7.2.4	Ensure radiological condition information is relayed to applicable security posts/patrols.		X	X	X
7.2.5	Report protected area accountability and evacuation status to the TSC Manager and EOF Security Manager after receipt of this information from the Security shift supervisor.		X	X	X
7.2.6	As appropriate, evacuate and/or relocate security posts/patrols based on radiological conditions.			X	X
7.2.7	Interface with EOF Security Manager to direct emergency response activities.			X	X

END OF 7.2, TSC SECURITY SUPERVISION

7.3 SECURITY SHIFT SUPERVISOR

		NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.3.1	Ensure all Nuclear Security personnel are notified of the emergency and are accounted for.	X	X	X	X
7.3.2	Direct an NSO to activate the Simulator & Skills Buildings' public address system. This may be activated either in the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) or in the Simulator Building mechanical room (near the Cafeteria).	X	X	X	X
7.3.3	Ensure that Nuclear Security Officers (NSOs) are available to escort emergency vehicles and expedite access to the plant, as necessary.	X	X	X	X
7.3.4	Ensure the applicable sections of the Emergency Call List are initiated.		X	X	X
7.3.5	Direct Alarm Station Operator to relay radiological condition information to applicable security posts/patrols, as directed by TSC Security Supervisor.		X	X	X
7.3.6	Direct two NSOs to report to the EOF to initiate access control. Refer to section 7.8 for EOF Access Control instructions.		X	X	X
7.3.7	When directed, dispatch a NSO to the Emergency News Center (ENC) to initiate access control. Refer to section 7.10 for ENC Access Control instructions.		X	X	X
7.3.8	Dispatch NSOs to the owner-controlled area to inform personnel of an emergency. Efforts should be made to notify persons in public areas first, THEN all other locations, as identified in form TRN-0147, Plant Hatch Owner Controlled Area. Guidance is also provided in form TRN-0147 on information to provide to personnel in these locations. NSOs must ensure the main recreational area gate and the contractor access road gate are secured so that site access is restricted to the main access road.		X	X	X

7.3 SECURITY SHIFT SUPERVISOR (CONT'D)

NOTE:	The Emergency Director may order evacuation of non-essential personnel at any emergency classification.

		NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.3.9	Provide crowd control at rally points, IF necessary.	X	X	X	X
7.3.10	WHEN advised by the Emergency Director OR Control Room, dispatch roving patrol to open and man Gate 17 for protected area evacuation. Dispatch additional NSOs to assist at Gate 17, as necessary.	X	X	X	X
7.3.11	Ensure evacuation instructions are conveyed to evacuating personnel by NSOs at the PESB AND/OR Gate 17 rally points, as necessary.	X	X	X	X
7.3.12	IF the main access road can not be used as a site exit route, coordinate with the Superintendent of Shift /Emergency Director (SOS/ED) to open the alternate site exit route(s) to allow evacuating personnel to leave the plant site.	X	X	X	X
7.3.13	Dispatch two NSOs to initiate river patrol.			X	X
7.3.14	Dispatch NSO to the TSC and NSO(s) to OSC for access control IF the TSC and OSC card readers fail to operate. Refer to section 7.7 for TSC & OSC Access Control instructions.		X	X	X
7.3.15	Compile all accountability reports from locations within the Protected Area. Attempt to contact those that have not reported, including determination of the last known location of unaccounted personnel. Refer to 7.13 for instructions to perform accountability.		X	X	X
7.3.16	Report accountability results to the TSC Security Supervisor as soon as possible.		X	X	X
7.3.17	Report to the TSC Security Supervisor for further instructions.		X	X	X

END OF 7.3, SECURITY SHIFT SUPERVISOR

7.4 SECURITY POST 200 CAS AND SAS

		NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.4.1	Activate the Emergency Accountability System and THEN run an accountability report on the security computer. Forward this report to the Security shift supervisor as soon as possible.		X	X	X
7.4.2	Notify all posts and patrols of emergency and account for all Nuclear Security personnel by using a radio or other means.	X	X	X	X
7.4.3	Initiate applicable sections of the Emergency Call List, as directed.		X	X	X
7.4.4	When directed by the Security shift supervisor, notify roving patrol to open and man Gate 17 for protected area evacuation. Dispatch additional NSOs to assist at Gate 17, as necessary.		X	X	X
7.4.5	Relay radiological condition information to applicable security posts/patrols, as directed.		X	X	X

END OF 7.4, SECURITY POST 200 CAS AND SAS

7.5 SECURITY POST 200 CHARLIE [PLANT ENTRY SECURITY BUILDING (PESB)]

		NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.5.1	Restrict personnel access to the following groups: Southern Company personnel, NRC personnel, and other personnel as authorized by the Emergency Director.		X	X	X
7.5.2	Prepare to assist with protected area evacuation.	X	X	X	X
7.5.3	IF the computer accountability system is inoperable, perform accountability per subsection 7.13 of this procedure.		X	X	X

END OF 7.5, SECURITY POST 200 CHARLIE (PESB)]

7.6 SECURITY POST 200 BRAVO (GATE 1)

		NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.6.1	Restrict personnel access to the following groups: Southern Company personnel, NRC personnel, and other personnel as authorized by the Emergency Director.		X	X	X
7.6.2	Direct members of the press and the public to the Emergency News Center.		X	X	X

END OF 7.6, SECURITY POST 200 BRAVO (GATE 1)

7.7 TSC AND OSC ACCESS CONTROL

NOTE:	TSC and OSC access control are required only IF card readers are inoperable.

		NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.7.1	Restrict personnel access to the following groups: Southern Company personnel, NRC personnel, and other personnel as authorized by the Facility (TSC or OSC) Manager.		X	X	X
7.7.2	Log personnel entering OR leaving the facility.		X	X	X
7.7.3	Report the names and security badge numbers of facility (TSC or OSC) personnel to the Supervisor Nuclear Security (Shift) as soon as possible.			X	X

END OF 7.7, TSC AND OSC ACCESS CONTROL

7.8 EOF ACCESS CONTROL

		NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.8.1	Restrict personnel access to the following groups: Southern Company personnel, NRC personnel, and other personnel as authorized by the EOF Manager.		X	X	X
7.8.2	Log personnel entering OR leaving the EOF.		X	X	X

END OF 7.8, EOF ACCESS CONTROL

7.9 RIVER PATROL

		NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.9.1	Attach boat to security vehicle, proceed to boat ramp and launch boat.			X	X
7.9.2	NSOs will man the boat and patrol the river adjacent to the plant to inform personnel of the declared emergency and request they leave the plant vicinity.			X	X

END OF 7.9, RIVER PATROL

7.10 EMERGENCY NEWS CENTER (ENC) ACCESS CONTROL

		NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.10.1	When directed, NSOs will report to the Emergency News Center (ENC) complex to establish access control. Contact ENC Facilities/Operations Coordinator upon arrival for instructions.		X	X	X
7.10.2	Direct personnel requesting entry to present a picture ID and state their reason for requesting access. Log all personnel entering the facility and issue the appropriate identification badge.		X	X	X
7.10.3	Restrict access of unauthorized personnel to the Main ENC media building.		X	X	X

END OF 7.10, ENC ACCESS CONTROL

7.11 ADDITIONAL SECURITY POSTS

	NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
"Hotel", "Golf", "Foxtrot", "Echo", "Sierra" and all other security posts not specifically mentioned will perform duties as normal during drills, exercises or actual emergencies unless notified otherwise by the Security Shift Supervisor.			X	X

END OF 7.11, ADDITIONAL SECURITY POSTS

7.12 GATE 17 ACCESS CONTROL

NOTE:	The Emergency Director may order evacuation of non-essential personnel at any emergency classification.

	NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
IF the rally point is established at this location, collect the protected area badges of the personnel leaving the protected area. Collected protected area badges will be brought to the PESB to log personnel out of the protected area. IF the security computer is not operable, THEN Security will compare the collected badges to the most recent accountability report to determine those personnel remaining in the protected area.	X	X	X	X

END OF 7.12, GATE 17 ACCESS CONTROL

7.13 ACCOUNTABILITY

NOTE:	The Emergency Director may order evacuation of non-essential personnel at any emergency classification.

	NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.13.1 Security will ensure that accountability is achieved within 30 minutes of declaration of a Site Area Emergency, General Emergency, or Protected Area evacuation order. Accountability is achieved when all personnel within the Protected Area AND the Vital Area are identified by name or badge number as being in the Protected AND/OR Vital Area at the time of the accountability check. Personnel logged into emergency accountability regions (i.e., control room, OSC, and TSC), after accountability is initiated, will not appear on the emergency accountability report.		X	X	X
7.13.2 Accountability will be conducted in accordance with the following:		X	X	X

IF Security System Computer (SSC) is:	AND Accountability Function is:	THEN:
Operational	Operational	Run an Accountability report. The Site-Specific Alarm Station Operators Manual will be utilized for specific steps to access and utilize the accountability function.
Operational	NOT Operational	Run an ALL REGION ENROLLMENT report.

7.13.3 In the event the Security Access Control system is not operable, Security will collect the protected area badge of each evacuating person. Security will compare the collected badges to the most recent accountability report to determine those personnel remaining in the protected area.		X	X	X

END OF 7.13, ACCOUNTABILITY

1.0 OBJECTIVE

This procedure provides instructions for assembly, accountability, and evacuation of site personnel during a declared emergency.

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2.0 APPLICABILITY

This procedure applies to the activities and responses of personnel that are necessary to assemble, account for, and evacuate site personnel during an emergency. This procedure is performed as required.

3.0 REFERENCES

3.1 10AC-MGR-006-0, Hatch Emergency Plan

3.2 Edwin I. Hatch Unit 1 & Unit 2 Emergency Plan

3.3 73EP-EIP-009-0, Nuclear Security Duties

4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES

4.1 PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

Personnel who conduct assembly, accountability, and evacuation of personnel will receive indoctrination and training in applicable emergency implementing procedures.

4.2 MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

N/A - Not applicable to this procedure

4.3 SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS

N/A - Not applicable to this procedure

5.0 PRECAUTIONS/LIMITATIONS

5.1 PRECAUTIONS

Uncertain or varying levels of radiation and/or contamination may be encountered.

5.2 LIMITATIONS

N/A - Not applicable to this procedure

6.0 PREREQUISITES

A declared emergency OR an emergency drill/exercise must exist before using this procedure.

REFERENCE

7.0 PROCEDURE

7.1 INVOLVED PERSONNEL

		NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.1.1	Report incident status to the Control Room and take actions to limit the incident, IF possible. Retreat to an unaffected area.	X	X	X	X
7.1.2	Report to the Health Physics Office for contamination surveys and decontamination, IF applicable.	X			
7.1.3	Contact Health Physics in the Operations Support Center (OSC) for contamination surveys and decontamination.		X	X	X

END OF 7.1, INVOLVED PERSONNEL

7.2 NON-INVOLVED PERSONNEL (INSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA)

NOTE:	Personnel actions (i.e., emergency response facility activation, escorting visitors to the PESB, evacuation from the site, etc.) may be delayed as a result of a security event, severe weather conditions or other hazards to personnel safety.

	NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.2.1 Observe the Public Address (PA) announcements and/or warning signals for emergency information (i.e., declaration, upgrades in severity and evacuation orders). Stay clear of affected areas.	X	X	X	X
7.2.1.1 Remain at your present location until further notice IF a security emergency is occurring.	X	X	X	X
7.2.2 Stand by for an escalation in emergency classification and continue normal work activities until advised otherwise.	X			
7.2.3 Emergency Response Organization members will report to assigned facility [Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC) or Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)].		X	X	X
7.2.4 Escort all escorted personnel to Plant Entry Security Building (PESB) for processing out. These persons will be directed to report to the Simulator cafeteria and await further instructions on actions to be taken.		X	X	X
7.2.5 Department supervisory personnel will account for personnel under their supervision. The names of personnel who are unaccounted must be immediately reported to Security at the PESB.		X		
7.2.6 Secure your work location. IF in a contaminated area, follow normal undressing and frisking procedures as time allows. THEN, go to your reporting area and await further instructions.		X		
7.2.7 Secure your work location. IF in a contaminated area, follow normal undressing and frisking procedures as time allows.			X	X

7.2 NON-INVOLVED PERSONNEL (INSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA) (CONT'D)

NOTE :	• The Emergency Director may order evacuation of non-essential personnel at any emergency classification. • Unless otherwise specified, the rally points designated for use are the Plant Entry Security Building (PESB) or Gate 17 (Northwest section of the protected area).

		NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.2.8	Leave the protected area, using the designated rally point, as directed by PA announcement and/or Nuclear Security personnel. Turn in your protected area badge, IF directed to do so by Security personnel. Submit to radiological monitoring as directed by the Rally Point Team. Report to the Simulator cafeteria and await further instructions on actions to be taken.	X	X	X	X
7.2.9	Leave the plant site using specified site exit routes as directed by PA announcement and/or Nuclear Security personnel. IF DIRECTED, report to the appropriate State Reception Center for contamination monitoring IF a radiological release is underway AND radiological monitoring at the plant site is not feasible. Areas designated as State Reception Centers are shown in Attachments 1 & 2.	X	X	X	X

END OF 7.2, NON-INVOLVED PERSONNEL (INSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA)

7.3 NON-INVOLVED PERSONNEL (OUTSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA)

NOTE:	Personnel actions (i.e., emergency response facility activation, escorting visitors to the PESB, evacuation from the site, etc.) may be delayed as a result of a security event, severe weather conditions or other hazards to personnel safety.

		NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.3.1	When notified, Emergency Response Organization members will report to their assigned facility (TSC, OSC, or EOF).		X	X	X
7.3.2	IF in areas with a PA system, personnel will observe PA announcements/ warning tones and stay clear of affected areas.	X	X	X	X
7.3.3	IF in areas without a PA system, personnel will observe instructions provided by Security, stay clear of affected areas, secure their work location and THEN report to the Simulator Building cafeteria for further instructions.		X	X	X

NOTE :	• The Emergency Director may order evacuation of non-essential personnel at any emergency classification. • Unless otherwise specified, the rally points designated for use are the Plant Entry Security Building (PESB) or Gate 17 (Northwest section of the protected area).

		NUE	ALERT	SITE-AREA	GENERAL
7.3.4	Leave the plant site using specified site exit routes as directed by PA announcement and/or Nuclear Security personnel. IF DIRECTED, report to the State Reception Center IF DIRECTED, report to the appropriate State Reception Center for contamination monitoring IF a radiological release is underway AND radiological monitoring at the plant site is not feasible. Areas designated as State Reception Centers are shown in Attachments 1 & 2.		X	X	X

END OF 7.3, NON-INVOLVED PERSONNEL (OUTSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA)



Directions to State Reception Center (at Appling Co. High School):

Travel south from Plant Hatch on U.S. Hwy 1 for approximately 13 miles to Hwy 15. Bear left on Hwy 15 and travel approximately 3/4 mile to the school (on the right).



Directions to State Reception Center (at Toombs Co. High School):

Travel north from Plant Hatch on U.S. 1 for approximately 15 miles to County Road 115 (Aimwell Road Extension). Turn left onto County Road 115 and travel until it intersects with County Road 337 (Lyons Center Road). Turn right onto County Road 337 and travel approximately 2 miles to the school (on your left).