



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

January 21, 1987

Docket No. 50-397

Mr. G. C. Sorensen, Manager
Regulatory Programs
Washington Public Power Supply System
P.O. Box 968
3000 George Washington Way
Richland, Washington 99352

Dear Mr. Sorensen:

Subject: Issuance of Amendment No. 36 to Facility Operating
License No. NPF-21 - WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 36 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-21 to the Washington Public Power Supply System for WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2, located in Benton County near Richland, Washington. This amendment is in response to your letter dated April 8, 1986, as clarified by your letter dated November 20, 1986.

This amendment revises the WNP-2 Technical Specifications Sections 3.3.7.8 and 4.3.7.8 (Chlorine Detection System), Section 4.7.2 (Control Room Emergency Filtration System) and Bases Section 3/4.3.7.8 (Chlorine Detection System) by eliminating portions of these sections because chlorine gas is no longer stored in the immediate plant site area. As a result, the threat to control room habitability due to chlorine gas leakage has been eliminated and these Technical Specification sections are no longer relevant.

A copy of the related safety evaluation supporting Amendment No. 36 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-21 is enclosed.

Sincerely,

Elinor G. Adensam, Director
BWR Project Directorate No. 3
Division of BWR Licensing

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 36 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-21
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

DESIGNATED ORIGINAL

Certified By

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Washington Public Power Supply System

WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2
(WNP-2)

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

DOCKET NO. 50-397

WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 36
License No. NPF-21

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment filed by the Washington Public Power Supply System (the Supply System, also the licensee), dated April 8, 1986, as clarified by letter dated November 20, 1986, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the enclosure to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of the Facility Operating License No. NPF-21 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 36, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Elinor G. Adensam, Director
BWR Project Directorate No. 3
Division of BWR Licensing

Enclosure:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: January 21, 1987

ENCLOSURE TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 36

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-21

DOCKET NO. 50-397

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

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PLANT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- c. At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the train by:
 - 1. Verifying that the train satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05% and uses the test procedure guidance in Regulatory Positions C.5.a, C.5.c, and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978 when operating at a flow rate of 1000 cfm \pm 10%.
 - 2. Verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, for a methyl iodide penetration of less than 1.0%; and
 - 3. Verifying a train flow rate of 1000 cfm \pm 10% during train operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980.
- d. After every 720 hours of charcoal adsorber operation by verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, for a methyl iodide penetration of less than 1.0%.
- e. At least once per 18 months by:
 - 1. Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 6 inches water gauge while operating the train at a flow rate of 1000 cfm \pm 10%.

PLANT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

2. Verifying that on each of the below pressurization mode actuation test signals, the train automatically switches to the pressurization mode of operation and the control room is maintained at a positive pressure of 1/8 inch water gauge relative to the outside atmosphere during train operation at a flow rate less than or equal to 1000 cfm:
 - a) Drywell pressure-high,
 - b) Reactor vessel water level-low, and
 - c) Reactor Building exhaust plenum-high radiation.
 3. Verifying that the heaters dissipate 5.0 ± 0.5 kW when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980.
- f. After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank by verifying that the HEPA filter bank satisfies the inplace penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 while operating the train at a flow rate of 1000 cfm \pm 10%.
- g. After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank by verifying that the charcoal adsorber bank satisfies the inplace penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas while operating the train at a flow rate of 1000 cfm \pm 10%.

INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

3/4.3.7.3 METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the meteorological monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data are available for estimating potential radiation doses to the public as a result of routine or accidental release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere. This capability is required to evaluate the need for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the public. This instrumentation is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.23, "Onsite Meteorological Programs," February, 1972.

3/4.3.7.4 REMOTE SHUTDOWN MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of HOT SHUTDOWN of the unit from locations outside of the control room. This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

3/4.3.7.5 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess important variables following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1975 and NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," November 1980.

3/4.3.7.6 SOURCE RANGE MONITORS

The source range monitors provide the operator with information of the status of the neutron level in the core at very low power levels during startup and shutdown. At these power levels, reactivity additions shall not be made without this flux level information available to the operator. When the intermediate range monitors are on scale, adequate information is available without the SRMs and they can be retracted.

3/4.3.7.7 TRAVERSING IN-CORE PROBE SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the traversing in-core probe system with the specified minimum complement of equipment ensures that the measurements obtained from use of this equipment accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the reactor core.

INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

3/4.3.7.8 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

OPERABILITY of the detection instrumentation ensures that both adequate warning capability is available for prompt detection of fires and that fire suppression systems, that are actuated by fire detectors, will discharge extinguishing agent in a timely manner. Prompt detection and suppression of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety-related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program.

Fire detectors that are used to actuate fire suppression systems represent a more critically important component of a plant's fire protection program than detectors that are installed solely for early fire warning and notification. Consequently, the minimum number of OPERABLE fire detectors must be greater.

The loss of detection capability for fire suppression systems, actuated by fire detectors, represents a significant degradation of fire protection for any area. As a result, the establishment of a fire watch patrol must be initiated at an earlier stage than would be warranted for the loss of detectors that provide only early fire warning. The establishment of frequent fire patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is restored to OPERABILITY.

3/4.3.7.9 LOOSE-PART DETECTION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the loose-part detection system ensures that sufficient capability is available to detect loose metallic parts in the primary system and avoid or mitigate damage to primary system components. The allowable out-of-service times and surveillance requirements are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.133, "Loose-Part Detection Program for the Primary System of Light-Water-Cooled Reactors," May 1981.

3/4.3.7.10 RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The radioactive liquid effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive materials in liquid effluents during actual or potential releases of liquid effluents. The alarm/trip setpoints for these instruments shall be calculated and adjusted in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20. The OPERABILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. The purpose of tank level indicating devices is to assure the detection and control of leaks that if not controlled could potentially result in the transport of radioactive materials to UNRESTRICTED AREAS.

INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

3/4.3.7.11 RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The radioactive gaseous effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents during actual or potential releases of gaseous effluents. The alarm/trip setpoints for these instruments shall be calculated and adjusted in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20. This instrumentation also includes provisions for monitoring and controlling the concentrations of potentially explosive gas mixtures in the WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYSTEM. The OPERABILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

3/4.3.8 TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION SYSTEM

This specification is provided to ensure that the turbine overspeed protection system instrumentation and the turbine speed control valves are OPERABLE and will protect the turbine from excessive overspeed. Protection from turbine excessive overspeed is required since excessive overspeed of the turbine could generate potentially damaging missiles which could impact and damage safety-related components, equipment or structures.

3/4.3.9 FEEDWATER SYSTEM/MAIN TURBINE TRIP SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

The feedwater system/main turbine trip system actuation instrumentation is provided to initiate the feedwater system/main turbine trip system in the event of reactor vessel water level equal to or greater than the level 8 setpoint associated with a feedwater controller failure.

3/4.3.10 NEUTRON FLUX MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

At the high power/low flow corner of the operating domain, a small probability of limit cycle neutron flux oscillations exists depending on combinations of operating conditions (e.g., rod patterns, power shape). To provide assurance that neutron flux limit cycle oscillations are detected and suppressed, APRM and LPRM neutron flux noise levels should be monitored while operating in this region.

Stability tests at operating BWRs were reviewed to determine a generic region of the power/flow map in which surveillance of neutron flux noise levels should be performed. A conservative decay ratio of 0.6 was chosen as the bases for determining the generic region for surveillance to account for the plant to plant variability of decay ratio with core and fuel designs. This generic region has been determined to correspond to a core flow of less than or equal to 45% of rated core flow and a thermal power greater than that specified in Figure 3.4.1.1-1 (Reference).



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 36 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-21
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2
DOCKET NO. 50-397

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated April 8, 1986, as clarified by letter dated November 20, 1986, the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) submitted an application to amend Washington Nuclear Project, Unit 2 (WNP-2) License NPF-21. The request involves the deletion of the chlorine detection system due to permanent plant changes involving the elimination of chlorine gas storage from the site. As a result, the licensee has concluded that the threat to control room habitability due to chlorine gas incapacitation has been eliminated.

2.0 EVALUATION

Chlorine gas previously was stored on the WNP-2 site for use in circulating water chemical treatment. Hence, in order to meet the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.95, Revision 1, "Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators Against An Accidental Chlorine Release", the control room was equipped with redundant quick response chlorine detectors with provision for automatic isolation. This provision ensured control room habitability following a chlorine release on site. WPPSS has recently changed the circulating water treatment system to a system using sodium hypochlorite. As a result, chlorine gas is no longer used and is no longer stored on the WNP-2 site. Hence, the WNP-2 chlorine detection system is no longer needed to ensure control room habitability in the event of a chlorine gas release.

Other nuclear facilities located within a five mile radius of WNP-2 are the DOE's Fast Flux Test Facility (located 2.7 miles SSW of WNP-2) and the WPPSS's deferred WNP-1 Project (located one mile ESE of WNP-2). Neither of these facilities stores chlorine gas; therefore neither represents a threat to the control room habitability at WNP-2. Chlorine gas is used at several Department of Energy (DOE) facilities on the Hanford site at distances beyond five miles. The primary destination (and primary areas of use) from which chlorine is distributed to other facilities is the 100-N Area located 18 miles NW of WNP-2. Prior to July 1983, chlorine was transported to the 100-N Area on flatbed rail cars, each loaded with 15 1-ton cylinders. Shipment frequency was one carload every 4-6 months. At its closest approach, the railroad is about 750 ft. from the control room air intake (and about 90 ft. lower) on the east side of the plant. Since mid-1983, chlorine has been transported to the 100-N Area by truck and trailer in the same quantities and frequencies as before. Two or three times per year a single fuel

cylinder is trucked from the 100-N Area to the 300 Area located 7.5 miles SSE of WNP-2. The truck route passes 1.5 miles to the SW. In the future, shipments to 100-N Area could be either by truck or rail. On the basis of the licensee-described DOE purchase agreement and anticipated usage, the upper limits of quantity and frequency of chlorine shipments in the vicinity of WNP-2 appears to be as follows: northbound - 15 1-ton cylinders four times per year (by truck or rail); southbound - a 1-ton cylinder four times per year (by truck). These shipment frequencies are within the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.78.

On the basis of our review, the staff finds that the hazard represented by chlorine gas stored on site has been eliminated because of the change to a water purification system using sodium hypochlorite. There is no other facility within a five mile radius of the WNP-2 site that stores chlorine gas on site. In addition, the quantity and the frequency of chlorine gas shipments in the WNP-2 vicinity are within the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.78. Therefore, the staff concludes that the licensee's proposed amendment to WNP-2 Technical Specification for the deletion of the chlorine detection system is acceptable.

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves a change in the installation and use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes in surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that this amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c) (9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration which was published in the FEDERAL REGISTER (51 FR 32281) on September 10, 1986, and consulted with the state of Washington. No public comments were received, and the state of Washington did not have any comments.

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Angela T. Chu, NRR

Dated: January 21, 1987

AMENDMENT NO. 36 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-21
WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

DISTRIBUTION:

Docket No. 50-397
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