



UNITED STATES  
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

PDR

August 14, 1984

Docket No. 50-397

Mr. G. C. Sorensen, Manager  
 Regulatory Programs  
 Washington Public Power Supply System  
 P. O. Box 968  
 3000 George Washington Way  
 Richland, Washington 99352

Dear Mr. Sorensen:

Subject: Issuance of Amendment No. 4 to Facility Operating License  
 NPF-21, WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 4 to Facility Operating License NPF-21 to the Washington Public Power Supply System for WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2, located in Benton County near Richland, Washington. This amendment is in response to your letters dated, January 20, February 8 and May 4, 1984.

This amendment would modify the Technical Specifications as follows:

- (1) Technical Specification Table 4.3.7.12-1: Note 7 is added to state that "for the Channel Functional Test on intermediate range noble gas activity monitors, demonstrate that circuit failures or instrument controls when set in the OFF position produce control room alarm annunciation."
- (2) Technical Specification Table 3.6.3-1, Primary Containment Isolation Valves: The closure times is revised from 5 seconds to 15 seconds for the 8 Reactor Recirculation Hydraulic Valves and Reactor Recirculation (Seal Injection) Valves RR-V-16 A, B.
- (3) Technical Specification 3/4.8.1, A. C. Sources: In the note referred to in paragraph 4.8.1.1.2.a, Items 4 and 5, the word "only" is changed to "at least" to allow the flexibility to perform more than one cold start test of the diesel generator per 184 days as currently required.
- (4) Technical Specification 3/4.8.3, Onsite Power Distribution Systems: Paragraph 3.8.3.2 b is modified to clarify that distribution panel DP-S1-1F is the Division 1 125-VDC critical switch gear distribution panel and DP-S1-1D is the Division 1 remote shutdown distribution panel.
- (5) Technical Specification 3/4.9.2, Instrumentation: In item b, the words "audible indication" is changed to "alarm."
- (6) Technical Specification 6.2.3, Nuclear Safety Assurance Group (NSAG): Paragraph 6.2.3.2 is modified to include qualification of NSAG consistent with FSAR & SER. In line 3 after the word "science" the following is added: or qualifications meeting ANS 3.1 Draft Revision, dated March 13, 1981, Section 4.2 or 4.4 or equivalent, as described in Section 4.1

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A copy of the related safety evaluation supporting Amendment 4 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-21 is enclosed.

Sincerely,

*A. Schwencer*

A. Schwencer, Chief  
Licensing Branch No. 2  
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:

- 1. Amendment No. 4 to Facility Operating License NPF-21
- 2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:  
See next page

DL:LB#2/PM  
*Paul*  
Rau:ck:bdm  
8/13/84

*Paul*  
DL:LB#2/LA  
EHylton  
7/1/84  
8/13/84

*A. Schwencer*  
DL:LB#2/BC  
ASchwencer  
8/1/84  
8/13/84

Distribution:  
Docket File  
LB#2 Reading

WNP-2

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM  
DOCKET NO. 50-397  
WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2  
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

License No. NPF-21  
Amendment No. 4

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment filed by the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS, also the licensee) dated January 20, February 8 and May 4, 1984, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulation set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of the Facility Operating License No. NPF-21 is hereby amended as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 4, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

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3. This amendment was effective as of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

A. Schwencer, Chief  
Licensing Branch No. 2  
Division of Licensing

Enclosure:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance:

*WDP*  
DL:LB#2/PM  
PA Luck:bdm  
~~7/30/84~~  
*WDP*  
DL:LB#2/LA  
Chilton  
~~7/1/84~~  
8/13/84

*AS*  
DL:LB#2/BC  
ASchwencer  
8/1/84

*WDP*  
OELD  
WPaton  
~~7/1/84~~  
8-8-84

Distribution:  
Docket File  
LB#2 Reading  
W. Paton, OELD

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 4  
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-21  
DOCKET NO. 50-397

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

3/4 3-93  
3/4 3-94  
3/4 3-95  
3/4 6-22  
3/4 6-31  
3/4 8-3  
3/4 8-18  
3/4 9-3  
6-7

INSERT

3/4 3-93  
3/4 3-94  
3/4 3-95  
3/4 6-22  
3/4 6-31  
3/4 8-3  
3/4 8-18  
3/4 9-3  
6-7

TABLE 4.3.7.12-1

RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>SOURCE CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>	<u>CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST</u>	<u>MODES IN WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED</u>
1. Main Condenser Offgas Post-Treatment Radiation Monitor					
a. Gross gamma detector alarm and automatic isolation of the offgas system outlet and drain valves	D	D	R(2)	Q(1)	*
2. Main Condenser Offgas Pre-Treatment Radiation Monitor					
a. Gamma sensitive ion chamber located upstream of holdup line	D	M	R(2)	Q(1)	**
3. Main Plant Release Monitor					
a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor					
1) Low Range	D	M	R(2)	Q(1)	*
2) Intermediate Range	D	M	R(2)	Q(7)	*
b. Iodine Sampler	W	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	*
c. Particulate Sampler	W	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	*
d. Effluent System Flow Rate Monitor	D	N.A.	R	Q	*
e. Sampler Flow Rate Monitor	D	N.A.	R	Q	*
4. Turbine Building Ventilation Exhaust Monitor					
a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor					
1) Low Range	D	M	R(2)	Q(1)	*
2) Intermediate Range	D	M	R(2)	Q(7)	*
b. Iodine Sampler	W	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	*
c. Particulate Sampler	W	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	*
d. Effluent System Flow Rate Monitor	D	N.A.	R	Q	*
e. Sampler Flow Rate Monitor	D	N.A.	R	Q	*

WASHINGTON NUCLEAR - UNIT 2

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Amendment 4

TABLE 4.3.7.12-1 (Continued)

RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>SOURCE CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>	<u>CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST</u>	<u>MODES IN WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED</u>
5. Radwaste Building Ventilation Exhaust					
a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor					
1) Low Range	D	M	R(2)	Q(1)	*
2) Intermediate Range	D	M	R(2)	Q(7)	*
b. Iodine Sampler	W	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	*
c. Particulate Sampler	W	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	*
d. Effluent System Flow Rate Measurement Device	D(4)	N.A.	R(6)	Q(5)	*
e. Sampler Flow Rate Monitor	D	N.A.	R	Q	*
6. Main Condenser Offgas Treatment System Explosive Gas Monitoring System					
a. Hydrogen Monitor	D	N.A.	Q(3)	M	**

TABLE 4.3.7.12-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

\*At all times.

\*\*During main condenser offgas treatment system operation.

- (1) The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that control room alarm annunciation occurs if any of the following conditions exists:
  - a. Instrument indicates measured levels above the alarm setpoint.
  - b. Circuit failure.
  - c. Instrument controls not set in operate mode.
- (2) The initial CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be performed using one or more reference radioactive standards traceable to the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) or using standards that have been obtained from suppliers that participate in measurement assurance activities with NBS. These standards shall permit calibrating the system over its intended range of energy and measurement range. Subsequent CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be performed using the initial radioactive standards or other standards of equivalent quality or radioactive sources that have been related to the initial calibration.
- (3) The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall include the use of standard gas samples containing a nominal:
  - a. 0.0 volume percent hydrogen, balance nitrogen, and
  - b. 2.0 volume percent hydrogen, balance nitrogen.
- (4) The CHANNEL CHECK shall be performed by comparing computer readings or comparing each fan's local amperage reading.
- (5) The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be performed by measurement of the phase currents for each fan.
- (6) The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be performed by using a flow measurement device to determine the fan current to flow relationship.
- (7) For the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on the intermediate range noble gas activity monitors, demonstrate that circuit failures or instrument controls when set in the OFF position produce control room alarm annunciation.

TABLE 3.6.3-1 (Continued)

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

<u>VALVE FUNCTION AND NUMBER</u>	<u>VALVE GROUP(a)</u>	<u>MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (Seconds)</u>
a. <u>Automatic Isolation Valves (Continued)</u>		
Equipment Drain (Radioactive)	4	15
EDR-V-19		
EDR-V-20		
Floor Drain (Radioactive)	4	15
FDR-V-3		
FDR-V-4		
Fuel Pool Cooling/Suppression Pool Cleanup	4	35
FPC-V-153(f)		
FPC-V-154(f)		
FPC-V-156		
Reactor Recirculation Hydraulic Control(e)	4	15
HY-V-17A,B		
HY-V-18A,B		
HY-V-19A,B		
HY-V-20A,B		
HY-V-33A,B		
HY-V-34A,B		
HY-V-35A,B		
HY-V-36A,B		
Traversing Incore Probe Valve	4	5
TIP-V-6,7,8,9,10 (Probe Line Ball Valves)		
TIP-V-11 (N <sub>2</sub> Gate Valve)		

WASHINGTON NUCLEAR - UNIT 2

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Amendment 4

TABLE 3.6.3-1 (Continued)

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

<u>VALVE FUNCTION AND NUMBER</u>	<u>VALVE GROUP(a)</u>	<u>MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (Seconds)</u>
d. <u>Other Containment Isolation Valves (Continued)</u>		
Containment Purge System		
CSP-V-8		N. A.
CSP-V-9		4
CSP-V-10		N. A.
Reactor Recirculation (Seal Injection)		
RRC-V-13A,B		N. A.
RRC-V-16A,B		15
Containment Instrument Air		
CIA-V-20		22
CIA-V-21		N. A.
CIA-V-30A,B		22
CIA-V-31A,B		N. A.
Containment Air Supply		
CAS-V-453		N. A.
Post-Accident Sampling System(c)		
PSR-V-X73-1		
PSR-V-X73-2		
PSR-V-X77A1		
PSR-V-X77A2		
PSR-V-X77A3		
PSR-V-X77A4		
PSR-V-X80-1		

WASHINGTON NUCLEAR - UNIT 2

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Amendment 4

## ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.8.1.1.1 Each of the above required independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system shall be:

- a. Determined OPERABLE at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability, and.
- b. Demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during shutdown by transferring, manually and automatically, unit power supply from the normal circuit to the alternate circuit.

4.8.1.1.2 Each of the above required diesel generators shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. In accordance with the frequency specified in Table 4.8.1.1.2-1 on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:
  1. Verifying the fuel level in the day fuel tank.
  2. Verifying the fuel level in the fuel storage tank.
  3. Verifying the fuel transfer pump starts and transfers fuel from the storage system to the day fuel tank.
  4. Verifying the diesel starts from ambient condition and accelerates to at least 900 rpm (60 Hz) in less than or equal to 10 seconds\* for DG-1 and DG-2 and 13 seconds\* for DG-3. The generator voltage and frequency shall be  $4160 \pm 420$  volts and  $60 \pm 3.0$  Hz within 10 seconds\* for DG-1 and DG-2 and 13 seconds\* for DG-3 after the start signal. The diesel generator shall be started for this test by using one of the following signals:
    - a) Manual.
    - b) Simulated loss-of-offsite power by itself.
    - c) Simulated loss-of-offsite power in conjunction with an ESF actuation test signal.
    - d) An ESF actuation test signal by itself.
  5. Verifying the diesel generator is synchronized, loaded to greater than or equal to 4400 kW for DG-1 and DG-2 and 2600 kW for DG-3 in less than or equal to 60 seconds\*, and operates with these loads for at least 60 minutes.
  6. Verifying the diesel generator is aligned to provide standby power to the associated emergency busses.
  7. Verifying the pressure in all diesel generator air start receivers to be greater than or equal to 230 psig for DG-1 and DG-2 and 200 psig for DG-3.
- b. At least once per 31 days and after each operation of the diesel where the period of operation was greater than or equal to 1 hour by checking for and removing accumulated water from the day fuel tanks.

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\*These diesel generator starts from ambient conditions shall be performed at least once per 184 days in these surveillance tests and all other engine starts for the purpose of this surveillance testing shall be preceded by an engine prelube period and/or other warmup procedures recommended by the manufacturer so that mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine is minimized.

## ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

### DISTRIBUTION - SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.8.3.2 As a minimum, the following power distribution system divisions shall be energized:

- a. For A.C. power distribution, Division 1 or Division 2, and when the HPCS system is required to be OPERABLE, Division 3, with:
  1. Division 1, consisting of:
    - a) 4160-volt bus SM-7.
    - b) 480-volt bus SL-71 and SL-73.
    - c) 480-volt MCC's 7A, 7A-A, 7B, 7B-A, 7B-B, 7F.
    - d) 480-volt Power Panel PP-7A-B.
    - e) 120/208-volt 3Ø Power Panels PP-7A-G, PP-7A-A-A.
    - f) 120/240-volt 1Ø Power Panels PP-7A-A, PP-7A-F, PP-7A-E, and PP-7A.
  2. Division 2, consisting of:
    - a) 4160-volt bus SM-8.
    - b) 480-volt bus SL-81 and SL-83.
    - c) 480-volt MCC's 8A, 8A-A, 8B, 8B-A, 8B-B, 8F.
    - d) 480-volt Power Panel PP-8A-B.
    - e) 120/208-volt 3Ø Power Panels PP-8A-G, PP-8A-A-A.
    - f) 120/240-volt 1Ø Power Panels PP-8A-A, PP-8A-F, PP-8A-E, and PP-8A.
  3. Division 3, consisting of:
    - a) 4160-volt bus SM-4.
    - b) 480-volt 3Ø Engine & Gen. Aux. loads Power Panel.
    - c) 120/240-volt 1Ø Power Panel PP-4A.
    - d) 480-volt 3Ø MCC 4A.
- b. For D.C. power distribution, Division 1 or Division 2, and when the HPCS system is required to be OPERABLE, Division 3, with:
  1. Division 1, consisting of:
    - a) 125-volt D.C. Main Distribution Panel S1-1.
    - b) 125-volt VDC Motor Control Center MC-S1-1D.
    - c) 125-VDC Instr. and Control NSSS Bd. Distr. Panel DP-S1-1A.
    - d) 125-VDC Remote Shutdn. Distr. Pnl. DP-S1-1D.
    - e) 125-VDC Diesel Gen. 1 Dist. Pnl. DP-S1-1E.
    - f) 250-VDC Main Distribution Panel S2-1.
    - g) 250-VDC Motor Control Center MC-S2-1A, Part A and Part B.
    - h) ±24-VDC Power Panel DP-S0-A.
    - i) 125-VDC Critical Swgr. Dist. Pnl. DP-S1-1F
  2. Division 2, consisting of:
    - a) 125-volt D.C. Main Distribution Panel S1-2.
    - b) 125-volt VDC Motor Control Center MC-S1-2D.
    - c) 125-VDC Instr. and Control NSSS Distr. Panel DP-S1-2A.
    - d) 125-VDC Critical Swgs. & Remote Shutdn. Distr. Pnl. DP-S1-2D.
    - e) 125-VDC Diesel Gen. 2 Dist. Pnl. DP-S1-2E.
    - f) ±24-VDC Power Panel DP-S0-B.
  3. Division 3, consisting of 125-volt D.C. HPCS distribution panel.

## REFUELING OPERATIONS

### 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.9.2 At least 2 source range monitor\* (SRM) channels shall be OPERABLE and inserted to the normal operating level with:

- a. Continuous visual indication in the control room,
- b. At least one with alarm in the control room,
- c. One of the required SRM detectors located in the quadrant where CORE ALTERATIONS are being performed and the other required SRM detector located in an adjacent quadrant, and
- d. The "shorting links" removed from the RPS circuitry prior to and during the time any control rod is withdrawn<sup>#</sup> and shutdown margin demonstrations are in progress.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5.

#### ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS\*\* and insert all insertable control rods.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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- 4.9.2 Each of the above required SRM channels shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:
- a. At least once per 12 hours:
    1. Performance of a CHANNEL CHECK,
    2. Verifying the detectors are inserted to the normal operating level, and
    3. During CORE ALTERATIONS, verifying that the detector of an OPERABLE SRM channel is located in the core quadrant where CORE ALTERATIONS are being performed and another is located in an adjacent quadrant.

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\*The use of special movable detectors during CORE ALTERATIONS in place of the normal SRM nuclear detectors is permissible as long as these special detectors are connected to the normal SRM circuits.

\*\*Except movement of IRM, SRM or special movable detectors.

<sup>#</sup>Not required for control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 and 3.9.10.2.

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

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### 6.2.3 NUCLEAR SAFETY ASSURANCE GROUP (NSAG)

#### FUNCTION

6.2.3.1 The NSAG shall function to examine unit operating characteristics, NRC issuances, industry advisories, Licensee Event Reports, and other sources of unit design and operating experience information, including units of similar design, which may indicate areas for improving unit safety. The NSAG shall make detailed recommendations for revised procedures, equipment and modifications, maintenance activities, operations activities, or other means of improving unit safety to the Director of Licensing and Assurance.

#### COMPOSITION

6.2.3.2 The NSAG shall be composed of at least five, dedicated, full-time engineers, a minimum of three located on site and two at the home office. Each shall have a bachelor's degree in engineering or related science or qualifications meeting ANS.3.1 Draft Revision dated March 13, 1981, Section 4.2 or 4.4, or equivalent, as described in Section 4.1 and at least 2 years professional level experience in his field, at least 1 year of which experience shall be in the nuclear field.

#### RESPONSIBILITIES

6.2.3.3 The NSAG shall be responsible for maintaining surveillance of unit activities to provide independent verification\* that these activities are performed correctly and that human errors are reduced as much as practical.

#### RECORDS

6.2.3.4 Records of activities performed by the NSAG shall be prepared, maintained, and forwarded each calendar month to the Director of Licensing and Assurance.

### 6.2.4 SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISOR

6.2.4.1 The Shift Technical Advisor shall provide advisory technical support to the Shift Manager in the areas of thermal hydraulics, reactor engineering, and plant analysis with regard to the safe operation of the unit. The Shift Technical Advisor shall have a bachelor's degree or equivalent in a scientific or engineering discipline and shall have received specific training in the response and analysis of the unit for transients and accidents, and in unit design and layout, including the capabilities of instrumentation and controls in the control room.

### 6.3 UNIT STAFF QUALIFICATIONS

6.3.1 Each member of the unit staff shall meet or exceed the minimum qualifications of ANSI/ANS N18.1-1971 for comparable positions, except for the Health Physics/ Chemistry Manager who shall meet or exceed the qualifications of Regulatory Guide 1.8, Revision 1-R, May 1977. The licensed Operators and Senior Operators shall also meet or exceed the minimum qualifications of the supplemental requirements specified in Sections A and C of Enclosure 1 of the March 28, 1980 NRC letter to all licensees.

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\*Not responsible for sign-off function.

SAFETY EVALUATION  
AMENDMENT NO.4 TO NPF-21  
WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO.2  
DOCKET NO. 50-397

Introduction

By letters dated January 20, February 8 and May 4, 1984, the licensee requested the following changes to the WNP-2 Technical Specifications.

- (1) Technical Specification Table 4.3.7.12-1: Note 1 lists alarm functions for the intermediate noble gas activity monitor not applicable in the WNP-2 design. Add note 7 to state that "for the Channel Functional Test on intermediate range noble gas activity monitors, demonstrate that circuit failures or instrument controls when set in the OFF position produce control room alarm annunciation."
- (2) Technical Specification Table 3.6.3-1, Primary Containment Isolation Valves: Revise the closure times from 5 seconds to 15 seconds for 8 Reactor Recirculation Hydraulic Valves and Reactor Recirculation (Seal Injection) Valves RR-V-16 A, B. The increase of valve closure times to 15 seconds results in changes which are within the acceptable design criteria with respect to the system.
- (3) Technical Specification 3/4.8.1, A. C. Sources: In the note referred to in paragraph 4.8.1.1.2.a, Items 4 and 5, change the word "only" to "at least" to allow the flexibility to perform more than one cold start test of the diesel generator per 184 days as currently required.
- (4) Technical Specification 3/4.8.3, Onsite Power Distribution System: Paragraph 3.8.3.2 b is modified to clarify that distribution panel DP-S1-1F is the Division 1 125-VDC critical switch gear distribution panel and DP-S1-1D is the Division 1 remote shutdown distribution panel.
- (5) Technical Specification 3/4.9.2, Instrumentation: In item b, change the words "audible indication" to "alarm."
- (6) Technical Specification 6.2.3, Nuclear Safety Assurance Group (NSAG): Modify paragraph 6.2.3.2 to include qualification of NSAG consistent with FSAR & SER. In line 3 after the word "science" add the following: or qualifications meeting ANS 3.1 Draft Revision, dated March 13, 1981, Section 4.2 or 4.4 or equivalent, as described in Section 4.1

Evaluation

The radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation channel alarm setpoints are set to ensure that specified release limits (established in accordance with the offsite dose calculation manual, ODCM) are not exceeded. Table 4.3.7.12-1 (Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements) specifies that a quarterly channel functional test be performed for both the low range and the intermediate range noble gas activity monitors in the main plant (reactor building) release path, the turbine building ventilation exhaust, and the radwaste building ventilation

exhaust. One low range and one intermediate range monitor is provided for each of these gaseous effluent release paths. Each of the monitors provides an input to an indicator located in the control room. The normal measured activity level is near the low end of the low range indicator. The intermediate range indicator should read downscale.

The operators rely on the high level alarm associated with the low range monitors to alert them of high activity levels in the gaseous effluent exhaust. Following receipt of an alarm, the operator will take action, if appropriate, to ensure that the ODCM release limits are not exceeded. The licensee considers the high activity alarm associated with the intermediate range monitor to be a nuisance alarm (i.e., it requires acknowledgement by the operators, but does not provide the operators with any new information since they are already aware of high gaseous effluent activity levels via the low range monitor alarm). There are no isolation or actuation functions performed by the intermediate range monitors. If the alarm associated with the low range monitor should fail, the licensee can detect a high activity level from the control room indicators. The licensee is required by the Technical Specifications to perform a channel check of these indicators daily. An abnormally high gaseous effluent activity level, as well as a failed indicator, should be detected by the channel check.

A quarterly channel functional test, excluding verification of control room annunciation on indicated high activity levels, will still be required for the intermediate range monitors. The channel functional test will confirm that control room annunciation is received upon circuit failure and when the instrument controls are set in the "OFF" position. Quarterly channel functional tests, including verification that control room annunciation occurs on high activity levels, are required for the low range monitors. If the noble gas activity monitor becomes inoperable, the Technical Specifications still permit effluent releases via the associated pathway for up to 30 days provided that grab samples are taken at least once per 8 hours and analyzed for noble gas gamma emitters within 24 hours.

These changes revise the containment isolation closure items, Table 3.6.3-1 of the Technical Specification, from 5 seconds to 15 seconds for 8 Reactor Recirculation Hydraulic Valves and Reactor Recirculation (Seal Injection) valves. The licensee stated that the proposed changes will still provide adequate time for valve closure to limit the release of radioactivity from the containment. According to the licensee, release of contaminants from failed fuel post-LOCA does not occur mechanistically until sometime on the order of a minute. For a design basis accident, the FSAR analyses indicated that fuel uncover does not occur for approximately 30 seconds and peak clad temperatures do not occur for approximately 120 seconds. Therefore, the licensee concluded that the proposed maximum closure time of 15 seconds, for the valves identified earlier, will not result in an increase in the probability of releases from failed fuel. The staff agrees with the licensee's analysis and concludes that since it is very unlikely to have fuel failure within the first 30 seconds following the onset of a LOCA, valve closure time of 15 seconds will assume no release of radioactivity from the containment.

The note referred to in paragraphs 4.8.1.1.2.a, 4 and 5 requires performance of a prelube function prior to DG testing. This requirement may compromise plant safety if surveillance testing is required on a diesel generator due to another diesel generator being inoperative. Conduct of the prelube function would then increase the number of power supplies in an inoperable condition. The licensee proposed to change the word "only" to "at least" to allow the flexibility to perform more than one cold start test of the diesel generator per 184 days as currently required. The proposed change has been reviewed and is acceptable. In addition, the staff will also include this change in the BWR Standard Technical Specifications.

The proposed changes in Section 3.8.3.2.b.1 provide clarification that distribution panel DP-S1-1F is the Division 1 125-VDC critical switch gear distribution panel and DP-S1-1D is the Division 1 remote shutdown distribution panel. The proposed clarification is acceptable to the staff.

In Section 3.9.2.b., the words "audible indication" are changed to "alarm" for clarification purpose. This change is acceptable to the staff.

The licensee has requested changes to the composition of the Nuclear Safety Assurance Group (NSAG), Section 6.2.3 of the WNP-2 Technical Specifications. Section 6.2.3.2 states that each member of the NSAG shall have a bachelor's degree in engineering or related science and at least two years professional level experience in his field. The licensee proposes to provide for alternate qualifications. The alternate requirements are those meeting ANS 3.1 Draft Revision, dated March 13, 1981, Section 4.2 or 4.4, or equivalent, as described in Section 4.1. The staff has reviewed this proposed change and concludes that it meets the requirements for members of an independent engineering group, such as the NSAG, described in Section 13.4 of the Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, and is, therefore, acceptable.

#### Environmental Consideration

This amendment involves a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

#### Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) this amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, creation of a new or

different accident from any previously evaluated, or a significant reduction in a safety margin and, therefore, does not involve a significant hazards consideration; (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: August 14, 1984