July 12, 2002

Mr. John L. Skolds, President
Exelon Nuclear
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, Illinois 60555

SUBJECT: LASALLE COUNTY STATION
NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-373/02-04(DRP);50-374/02-04(DRP)

Dear Mr. Skolds:

On June 30, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your LaSalle County Station. The enclosed report presents the results of that inspection. The results of this inspection were discussed on June 28, 2002, with Mr. G. Barnes and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Specifically, this inspection focused on reactor safety.

Based on the results of this inspection, the inspectors identified three issues of very low safety significance (Green) that were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. However, because of their very low safety significance and because these issues were entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these issues as a Non-Cited Violations in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. If you deny these Non-Cited Violations, you should provide a response with a basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at LaSalle County Station.

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Sincerely,

/RA/

Bruce L. Burgess, Chief
Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374
License Nos. NPF-11; NPF-18

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-373/02-04(DRP);
50-374/02-04(DRP)

cc w/encl: Site Vice President - LaSalle County Station
LaSalle County Station Plant Manager
Regulatory Assurance Manager - LaSalle
Chief Operating Officer
Senior Vice President - Nuclear Services
Senior Vice President - Mid-West Regional Operating Group
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REGION III

Docket Nos:	50-373, 50-374
License Nos:	NPF-11, NPF-18
Report Nos:	50-373/02-04(DRP); 50-374/02-04(DRP)
Licensee:	Exelon Generation Company
Facility:	LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:	2601 N. 21st Road Marseilles, IL 61341
Dates:	April 1 through June 30, 2002
Inspectors:	E. Duncan, Senior Resident Inspector G. Wilson, Resident Inspector D. Kimble, Resident Inspector - Monticello P. Lougheed, Division of Reactor Safety W. Slawinski, Radiation Protection Specialist G. Wright, Division of Reactor Projects J. Yesinowski, Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
Approved by:	Bruce L. Burgess, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000373/02-04(DRP), IR 05000374/02-04(DRP), on 4/1/02-6/30/02; Exelon; LaSalle County Station, Units 1 & 2; Heat Sink Performance; Post-Maintenance Testing; Non-Routine Evolutions; Radioactive Material Control Program.

This report covers a 13-week routine resident inspection. The inspection was conducted by the LaSalle resident inspectors, the Monticello resident inspector, and two regional specialist inspectors. Three Green findings were identified which were the subject of Non-Cited Violations (NCVs). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609 "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be "Green" or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

Inspector Identified Findings

- Green. Debris collected on the drywell floor clogged the drywell floor drain sump due to an inadequate sump screen design. This rendered the leakage detection system incapable of identifying increases in unidentified leakage as required by the Technical Specifications.

  The issue was of very low safety significance since other means remained available to detect an increase in unidentified leakage. A Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," was identified for the failure to properly review for suitability the drywell floor drain sump screen. (Section 40A3)

- Green. Licensee personnel failed to properly perform a governor adjustment procedure associated with the 1A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) which unexpectedly rendered the EDG inoperable.

  The issue was of very low safety significance since the 1A EDG was restored to service within the Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time. A Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified. (Section 1R19)

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety

- Green. A Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 was identified for the failure to conduct an adequate radiological survey and identify a discrete radioactive particle on an individual that alarmed a portal monitor. The failure caused a discrete radioactive particle to be released from the site undetected.

The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance since the public dose impact from the discrete radioactive particle was not more than 0.005 rem total effective dose equivalent and there were not more than five radioactive material event occurrences during the inspection period. (Section 2PS3)

Licensee-Identified Violations

Violations of very low safety significance, which were identified by the licensee have been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensee's corrective action program. These violations and corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status: Unit 1 operated at full power until May 17, 2002, when the unit was shutdown for a planned maintenance outage. The outage was completed and Unit 1 was restarted and synchronized to the grid on May 26, 2002. Following power ascension activities, Unit 1 operated at full power for the remainder of the inspection period, except for power reductions to perform maintenance, pre-planned surveillance testing activities, and rod pattern adjustments. Unit 2 operated at full power until April 9, 2002, when the unit was shut down for a planned maintenance outage. The outage was completed and Unit 2 was restarted and synchronized to the grid on April 24, 2002. Following power ascension activities, Unit 2 operated at full power for the remainder of the inspection period, except for power reductions to perform maintenance, pre-planned surveillance testing activities, and rod pattern adjustments.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified that the design features and licensee procedures protecting systems from the effects of hot weather and high winds were adequate. The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), LaSalle Abnormal Operating Procedures (LOA) TORN-001, "High Winds/Tornado," Revision 2, and LOA-DIKE-001, "Lake Dike Damage/Failure," Revision 2, and other related documentation to verify that the plant was adequately protected from the effects of hot weather and high winds. The inspectors reviewed and verified that prescribed operator actions were appropriate to maintain readiness of essential systems to the maximum extent practicable.

The inspectors reviewed the LaSalle Summer 2002 Readiness Plan and verified that the plan assessed potential items that could affect unit operation during the summer. The inspectors verified that scheduled critical maintenance associated with the switchyard was completed and that non-critical maintenance which was not completed was accurately identified.

The inspectors reviewed LaSalle Operating Surveillance (LOS) ZZ-A2, "Preparation for Summer Operations," completed May 14, 2002, and independently verified that dampers associated with the Emergency Diesel Generator Ventilation, and Essential Switchgear Room Ventilation systems were properly positioned for hot weather conditions.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

a. Inspection Scope

During Unit 2 maintenance outage L2P01, the inspectors performed a walkdown of accessible portions of the 2A and 2B Residual Heat Removal (RHR) systems and the Unit 2 "C" and "D" Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) and flowpaths to verify system availability for primary and alternate decay heat removal. This verification was conducted to ensure that sufficient alternate decay heat removal paths were present during maintenance activities to replace the remaining Unit 2 SRVs which had the potential to compromise the availability of the "C" and "D" SRVs.

The inspectors also performed a walkdown of the accessible portions of the 1A RHR system on May 6, 2002, to verify system availability during scheduled maintenance on the 1B and 1C RHR systems.

On May 7, 2002, the inspectors performed a walkdown of the 1B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) and the Unit 0 EDG to verify system availability during scheduled maintenance on the 1A EDG.

A walkdown of the Unit 1 Division 2 Core Standby Cooling System (CSCS) was performed by the inspectors on May 13, 2002, to verify system availability during scheduled maintenance on the Unit 1 Division 1 CSCS.

The inspectors reviewed documentation to determine correct system lineup. These documents included plant procedures, such as mechanical and electrical checklists, as well as plant drawings. The inspectors identified any discrepancies between the existing equipment lineup and the correct lineup.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors walked down the following risk significant areas to identify any fire protection degradations:

- Fire Zone 2J: Unit 1 Primary Containment
- Fire Zone 3J: Unit 2 Primary Containment
- Fire Zone 3K: Unit 2 Outboard Main Steam Isolation Valve Room
- Fire Zone 5B10: Unit 2 Motor-Driven Reactor Feedwater Pump Room
- Fire Zone 5B7: Unit 1 Hydrogen Seal Oil Units
- Fire Zone 5B8: Unit 2 Hydrogen Seal Oil Units
- Fire Zone 5B9: Unit 1 Motor-Driven Reactor Feedwater Pump Room

Emphasis was placed on control of transient combustibles and ignition sources; the material condition, operational lineup, and operational effectiveness of the fire protection systems, equipment, and features; and the material condition and operational status of fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or fire propagation.

In particular, the inspectors verified that all observed transient combustibles were being controlled in accordance with the licensee's administrative control procedures. In addition, the inspectors observed the physical condition of fire suppression devices, such as overhead sprinklers, and verified that any observed deficiencies did not impact the operational effectiveness of the system. The physical condition of portable fire fighting equipment, such as portable fire extinguishers, was also observed. The inspectors verified that extinguishers were located appropriately and that access to the extinguishers was unobstructed. Fire hoses were verified to be installed at their designated locations and the physical condition of the hoses was verified to be satisfactory and access unobstructed. The physical condition of passive fire protection features such as fire doors, ventilation system fire dampers, fire barriers, fire zone penetration seals, and fire retardant structural steel coatings was inspected and verified to be properly installed and in good physical condition.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and related flood analysis documentation to identify the design internal flood levels for areas which contained safety-related equipment. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's internal flooding update to its risk analysis to identify the most risk significant flooding scenarios.

Based on the insights gained from the above reviews, the inspectors selected the Core Standby Cooling System (CSCS) pump rooms, the turbine building condenser pit, the 120-inch de-icing lines, and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)/Containment Spray (CS)/RHR "A" sump for additional review. The reviews were conducted to independently verify that the licensee's flooding mitigation plans and equipment were consistent with design requirements and risk analysis assumptions. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the maintenance history for the sump pumps, check valves, and level switches for RHR "A" pump room sump 1RE07 and CSCS sump 1DT02. The inspectors observed penetrations and the condition of penetration sleeve seals below the flood line in the Unit 1 CSCS rooms. In addition, the inspectors observed the general condition of watertight doors including seals, and door position limit switches for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 CSCS rooms and entry into the Unit 2 condenser pit area. Further, the inspector interviewed engineering, operations, and training personnel regarding their knowledge of the most recent Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) insights on internal flooding. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's assessment of cable pull boxes

susceptible to external flooding, including discussions with engineering staff regarding the licensee's ongoing evaluation of NRC Information Notice 2002-012, "Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables."

The inspectors also reviewed Work Orders 99253390 and 990023863, which implemented LaSalle Technical Surveillance (LTS) 1000-29, "Watertight Door and Penetration Inspection," on January 25, 2002 and November 13, 2000 for Unit 1 and Unit 2 respectively. The inspectors independently verified that the watertight doors and selected penetrations reviewed in the surveillance were intact. In particular, the inspectors observed the sealing of equipment below the floodline, such as electrical conduits, the presence of holes or unsealed penetrations in floors and walls between flood areas, the adequacy of watertight doors between flood areas, and determined whether sources of potential internal flooding that had not been previously analyzed existed.

The inspectors also reviewed LaSalle Abnormal Operating Procedure (LOA) FLD-001, "Flooding," Revision 4, dated July 14, 2001, and verified that actions prescribed in the procedure could reasonably be used to achieve the desired actions. The inspectors verified that problems related to flooding, including past flooding events, were included in the licensee's corrective action program and were properly identified and prioritized for resolution.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07)

Biennial Review of Heat Sink Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed documents associated with the Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR and High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system room coolers. These coolers were selected based on their high Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) in the licensee's probabilistic safety analysis. The inspector reviewed completed surveillance tests and associated calculations, and performed independent calculations to verify that these tests ensured adequate heat transfer capability. The inspector reviewed the documentation to confirm that the test or inspection methodology was consistent with Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI) standard NP-7552, "Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring Guidelines." The inspector also reviewed documentation to verify that acceptance criteria were consistent with the design basis values contained in the UFSAR and Technical Specifications. The inspector reviewed documentation to verify that testing instruments were within calibration and discussed the use of these instruments with the system engineer to verify that the instruments were used correctly. The inspector reviewed documentation to verify that the licensee took appropriate actions to verify the physical integrity of the heat exchangers. The inspector also reviewed documentation to verify that the licensee had appropriate controls in place to ensure availability of the ultimate heat sink under adverse conditions.

The inspector reviewed corrective action documents concerning heat exchanger and heat sink performance issues to verify that the licensee had an appropriate threshold for identifying issues. The inspectors also evaluated the effectiveness of these corrective actions, including the engineering justification for operability, when applicable.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11)

a. Inspection Scope

On May 6, 2002, the inspectors observed licensed operator re-qualification training scenario ESG43, "High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Water Leg Pump Trip /"A" Control Rod Drive (CRD) Pump Trip With "B" CRD Pump Reduced Capacity/Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)."

The inspectors verified crew performance in terms of clarity and formality of communication; the ability to take timely and safe actions; the prioritizing, interpreting, and verifying of alarms; the correct use and implementation of procedures, including alarm response procedures; timely control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions; the oversight and direction by the shift manager, including the ability to identify and implement appropriate Technical Specification actions such as reporting and emergency plan actions and notifications; and group dynamics.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation of plant risk, scheduling, configuration control, and performance of maintenance associated with planned and emergent work activities and verified that scheduled and emergent work activities were adequately managed. In particular, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for conducting maintenance risk safety assessments and verified that the licensee's planning, risk management tools, and the assessment and management of online risk was adequate. The inspectors also verified that licensee actions to address increased online risk during these periods, such as establishing compensatory actions, minimizing the duration of the activity, obtaining appropriate management approval, and informing appropriate plant staff, were accomplished when online risk was increased due to maintenance on risk-significant structures, systems, and components (SSCs). The following specific activities were reviewed:

- The inspectors reviewed the maintenance risk assessment for work planned during the week of March 31, 2002.

- The inspectors reviewed the maintenance risk assessment for work planned during the week of May 5, 2002.

- The inspectors reviewed the maintenance risk assessment for work planned during the week of May 12, 2002.

- The inspectors reviewed the maintenance risk assessment for work planned during the week of May 19, 2002.

- The inspectors reviewed the maintenance risk assessment for work planned during the week of June 2, 2002.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

.1 Routine Operability Evaluation Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed selected Operability Evaluations (OEs) and Engineering Changes (ECs) of degraded and non-conforming conditions affecting mitigating systems and barrier integrity to ensure that operability was properly justified and the component or system remained available, such that no unrecognized increase in risk had occurred. The following evaluations were reviewed:

- OE02-08: Unit 1 Drywell Floor Drain
- OE 97052: 2C RHR Injection Line
- OE 02-010: Unit 2 Hydraulic Actuator 2TZ-VD003C For EDG Ventilation Damper 2VD03YA Only Strokes 3.0 Inches Instead of 3.5 Inches
- OE 02-09 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Data Collection
- EC 336192: Unit 2 Division 1, 125 Volt Direct Current Battery Cell #21 Charge
- EC 337298 Unit 1A Reactor Recirculation Flow Control Valve

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-373/0203-02(DRP); 50-374/0203-02(DRP): OE 02-06, Unit 1 and Unit 2 Secondary Containment Leakage.

As discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-373/02-03(DRP); 50-374/02-03(DRP), during the performance of LaSalle Technical Surveillance (LTS) 300-3, “Secondary Containment

Leak Rate Test," pressure in the secondary containment was identified as abnormally low. This occurred with the reactor building ventilation (VR) and Standby Gas Treatment (VG) systems of both units shutdown and with the turbine building ventilation (VT) systems of both units operating. Due to the unexpected condition, the test was aborted and the issue was evaluated under OE 02-06, "Unit 1 and Unit 2 Secondary Containment Leakage," to determine whether the operability of the secondary containment was adversely impacted. The evaluation concluded that based upon historical testing data and walkdowns, the Standby Gas Treatment (VG) system and secondary containment would perform all of their design functions.

Licensee personnel subsequently identified degraded VT system supply ductwork which resulted in a large negative turbine building differential pressure. Although this aided the ability of the VG system to draw down the secondary containment with respect to the atmosphere, this condition threatened the capability of the VG system to draw down the secondary containment to a pressure less than the turbine building pressure. This was important to ensure that air flow was always into the secondary containment for processing.

The inspectors reviewed OE 02-06 which documented that the functions of the Standby Gas Treatment system discussed in the Standard Review Plan (SRP) included the ability to maintain the secondary containment vacuum greater than or equal to -0.25 inches water gauge with respect to atmosphere and maintain the pressure in the secondary containment less than the pressure external to the secondary containment (i.e. negative with respect to adjacent structures such as the turbine building). Unresolved Item 50-373/0203-04(DRP); 50-374/0203-04(DRP)) was opened pending a determination of whether the secondary containment testing acceptance criteria, which did not include a verification of negative pressure with respect to the turbine building, was adequate.

During this inspection period, the inspectors determined that the licensee was only required to meet the surveillance acceptance criteria specified in the Technical Specifications and was therefore not required to verify that the pressure in the secondary containment was negative with respect to the turbine building. As a result, the inspectors concluded that the secondary containment testing acceptance criteria was adequate. The VT system was subsequently repaired. The licensee was considering administrative controls, such as monitoring turbine building pressure, to prevent recurrence of the issue.

1R16 Operator Workarounds (71111.16)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Operator Workaround (OWA) 338/339 (Unit 1/Unit 2) regarding feedwater heater trips during reactor recirculation pump downshifts to identify any potential adverse impact on the function of mitigating systems or the ability to implement an abnormal or emergency operating procedure.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed and observed the following post-maintenance testing activities involving risk significant equipment:

- WO 99237316-01 Unit 2 Safety Relief Valve Testing Per LTS-500-19
- WO 99263772-01 Inspect 1HS-VY003
- WO 99180664-01 Unit 1 "A" EDG Woodward Governor Adjustments
- WO 00414392-01 Unit 0 EDG Breaker Inspection
- WO 00387494-01 Unit 0 EDG Governor Inspection
- WO 00449604-01 Unit 2B EDG Potentiometer Replacements
- WO 00450211-03 2E51-F080 Failed to Reopen During Routine Cycling

During post-maintenance testing observations, the inspectors verified that the test was adequate for the scope of the maintenance work which had been performed, and that the testing acceptance criteria was clear and demonstrated operational readiness consistent with the design and licensing basis documents. The inspectors also verified that the impact of the testing had been properly characterized during the pre-job briefing; the test was performed as written and all testing prerequisites were satisfied; and that the test data was complete, appropriately verified, and met the requirements of the testing procedure. Following the completion of the test, the inspectors verified that the test equipment was removed, and that the equipment was returned to a condition in which it could perform its safety function.

b. Findings

Introduction

Work Order (WO) 99180664: 1A EDG Woodward Governor Adjustments

One "Green" finding and an associated Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified due to the failure to properly perform LaSalle Electrical Procedure (LEP) DG-105, "Maintenance and Adjustment of Woodward U 8 Governor Shutdown Solenoids," which rendered the EDG inoperable.

Description

On May 8, 2002, the inspectors observed the performance of LEP-DG-105 on the 1A EDG to evaluate the adequacy of post maintenance testing following the cleaning and adjustment of the governor shutdown solenoid. The licensee did not perform the post maintenance testing activity in accordance with the approved written procedure. Step 14 of Attachment A to the procedure was not performed which energizes the shutdown solenoid prior to performing final solenoid adjustments. The failure to perform the step in accordance with the procedure resulted in an unexpected start of the 1A EDG since the associated shutdown circuitry was never energized. The 1A EDG restarted when the oil pressure switches were reset allowing the air start motor pistons to re-engage. The

licensee conducted a root cause investigation of the event. The event increased the scheduled unavailability of the 1A EDG.

Analysis

The inspectors reviewed this issue against the guidance contained in Appendix B, "Issue Dispositioning Screening," of Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports." In particular, the inspectors compared this finding to the findings identified in Section 4, "Insignificant Procedure Errors," to Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues," of IMC 0612 to determine whether the finding was minor. The inspectors determined that finding had greater safety significance than similar issues described in IMC 0612, Appendix E, Sections 4.a, 4.b, and 4.f. This safety significance was attributed to the fact that the procedural error resulted in a loss of availability of the 1A EDG.

The failure to properly follow LEP-DG-105, "Maintenance and Adjustment of Woodward U 8 Governor Shutdown Solenoids," was a human performance error that resulted in additional unavailability of the 1A EDG, warranting further review in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process (SDP)." The inspectors conducted this review utilizing the "SDP Phase 1 Screening Worksheet For IE [Initiating Events], MS [Mitigating Systems], and B [Barrier Integrity] Cornerstones." The inspectors determined that although the unavailability of the 1A EDG was affected, because the loss of the 1A EDG did not exceed the Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time (AOT) and no weather-related impact existed, that the finding was screened as Green.

Enforcement

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," requires that activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions. The failure to properly perform LEP-DG-105 was an example where the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, were not met and was a violation. However, because of its low safety significance and because it was entered into the corrective action program, the NRC is treating this issue as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV 50-373/0204-02(DRP); 50-374/0204-02(DRP)), in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 017346.

1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities (71111.20)

LaSalle Unit 1 and Unit 2 Maintenance Outage Observations

a. Inspection Scope

On April 9, 2002, Unit 2 was shut down for planned maintenance outage L2P01. The outage was completed and Unit 2 was restarted and synchronized to the grid on April 24, 2002. On May 17, 2002, Unit 1 was shut down for planned maintenance outage L1P03. The outage was completed and Unit 1 was restarted and synchronized to the grid on May 26, 2002. The inspectors evaluated L2P01 and L1P03 outage activities to ensure that

the licensee considered risk in developing the outage schedule; adhered to administrative risk reduction methodologies developed to control plant configuration; developed mitigation strategies for losses of key safety functions; and adhered to the operating license and Technical Specification requirements that ensured defense-in-depth. The following specific outage-related activities were accomplished:

- Outage Plan Review

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's outage control plan and verified that the licensee had appropriately considered risk, industry experience, and previous site-specific problems. The inspectors also confirmed that contingency plans for losses of key safety functions had been established.

- Monitoring of Shutdown Activities

The inspectors observed portions of the Unit 2 shutdown for Maintenance Outage L2P01 and the Unit 1 shutdown for L1P03 and verified that the plant was operated in accordance with regulatory requirements and plant procedures. In particular, the inspectors verified that cooldown restrictions were followed.

- Licensee Control of Outage Activities

The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately managed the configuration of equipment during the outage to ensure that a defense-in-depth commensurate with the outage risk plan for key safety functions and applicable Technical Specifications was maintained. The inspectors also verified that outage activities were appropriately managed. In particular, out-of-service activities were reviewed to ensure that tags were properly hung to support the out-of-service. Reactor coolant system instrumentation was verified to be configured to provide adequate indication of reactor vessel pressure, temperature, and level. In addition, the inspectors routinely observed decay heat removal system parameters and verified that decay heat removal systems were functioning properly. The inspectors verified that flow paths, configurations, and alternative means for inventory addition and decay heat removal were consistent with the outage risk plan. The inspectors verified that the licensee maintained secondary containment in accordance with Technical Specifications.

- Monitoring of Heatup and Startup Activities

The inspectors verified that Technical Specifications, license conditions, and other prerequisites, commitments, and administrative procedure prerequisites for mode changes were met prior to changing modes or plant configurations. The inspectors conducted a walkdown of containment prior to restart and verified that debris had not been left which could adversely impact the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) suction strainers.

- Identification and Resolution of Problems

The inspectors verified that the licensee identified problems related to outage activities at an appropriate threshold and entered them into the corrective action program.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed surveillance testing on risk-significant equipment and verified that the SSCs selected were capable of performing their intended safety function and that the surveillance tests satisfied the requirements contained in Technical Specifications, the UFSAR, and licensee procedures. During surveillance testing observations, the inspectors verified that the test was adequate to demonstrate operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents, and that the testing acceptance criteria was clear. The inspectors also verified that the impact of the testing had been properly characterized during the pre-job briefing; the test was performed as written and all testing prerequisites were satisfied; the test data was complete, appropriately verified, and met the requirements of the testing procedure; and that the test equipment range and accuracy was consistent with the application, and the calibration was current. Following the completion of the test, the inspectors verified that the test equipment was removed, and that the equipment was returned to a condition in which it could perform its safety function.

The following surveillance testing activities were observed:

- LOS-RH-Q3, Attachment 2B, “2B RHR (LPCI) and RHR Service Water Valve Inservice Test for Cold Shutdown or Refuel Condition.”
- LTS-1100-14, “Unit 2 Scram Insertion Times.”
- LOS-RH-Q1, “RHR and RHR Service Water Pump and Valve Inservice Test for Modes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5" on May 14, 2002.
- LaSalle Instrument Surveillance (LIS) NB-104A, “Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Low Water Level 1 ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] Division 1 Initiation and Level 2 RCIC [Reactor Core Isolation Cooling] Initiation Instrument Channels A & C Calibration” on May 16, 2002.
- LTS-300-3, “Secondary Containment Leakage Test,” on May 3, 2002.
- LTS-200-228, “2A DG Flow Balance Test,” on June 19, 2002.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23)

a. Inspection Scope

Temporary Modification 336420 - Seal Weld on 2E12-F009

The inspectors reviewed Temporary Modification 336420 which installed a seal weld on shutdown cooling isolation valve 2E12-F009 to address a body-to-bonnet leak. The inspectors reviewed the associated 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation against the system design basis documentation, including the UFSAR and verified that the temporary modification had no adverse impact on safety. The inspectors also conducted a walkdown of the temporary modification and compared the installed configuration against the configuration prescribed in the design drawings. A review of Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) examination results was also accomplished.

Temporary Modification 337326 - Repair to 2E22-S001 Heat Exchanger Partition Plate

The inspectors reviewed Temporary Modification 337326 which installed a temporary patch over an erosion hole in the 2B EDG cooler partition plate. The inspectors reviewed the associated 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation against the system design basis documentation, including the UFSAR and verified that the temporary modification had no adverse impact on safety. The inspectors also verified that the repair was accomplished in accordance with American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code requirements and that heat exchanger flow had not been adversely impacted.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety

2PS3 Radiological Environmental Monitoring and Radioactive Material Control Programs (71122.03)

.1 Reviews of Radiological Environmental Monitoring Reports and Data

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports for calendar years 2000 and 2001, and the results of monthly radiological environmental monitoring analyses for the first quarter of 2002. The inspector also reviewed the land use census, changes made to the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), and the results of the inter-laboratory comparison program for 2000 and 2001, that were related to the radiological environmental monitoring program. These reviews were conducted to

verify that the radiological environmental monitoring program (REMP) was implemented as required by Technical Specifications and the ODCM, and to verify that any changes did not affect the licensee's ability to monitor the impacts of radioactive effluents on the environment. Additionally, the inspector evaluated the present locations of the environmental monitoring stations and the types of samples collected from each location to determine if they were consistent with the ODCM and NRC guidance in Regulatory Guides 1.21, 4.8 and an associated NRC Branch Technical Position.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Walkdowns of the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Stations and Meteorological Tower

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector walked down four of the nine environmental air sample monitoring stations to determine whether they were located as described in the ODCM, to assess equipment material condition and operability, and to verify that monitoring station orientation, vegetation growth control, and equipment configuration allowed for the collection of representative samples. The meteorological tower was also walked down to verify that the tower was sited adequately and that instrumentation was available and installed consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.23. Meteorological data readouts and recording instruments located at the tower and as provided by the plant process computer were verified to be operable and were compared to determine if there were any line loss differences.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Reviews of Radiological Environmental Monitoring Equipment Maintenance and Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector selectively reviewed the most recent environmental air sample pump calibration records, the REMP contractor's pump calibration procedures and meteorological tower equipment calibration records for calendar year 2001 and the first quarter of 2002, to verify that the testing program for this equipment was implemented consistent with Technical Specifications and procedural requirements. The most recent calibration records for both the rotameter currently used by the REMP technician to field check air sample pumps and the rotameter standard used to calibrate the field rotameter, were reviewed to verify that instrument certifications met industry standards and had traceability to the National Institute of Standards and Technology. The inspector

discussed air sample pump maintenance practices with the contractor REMP technician to assess the adequacy of the preventive maintenance program for this equipment and to

evaluate the technician's knowledge of the program and procedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Reviews of REMP Sample Collection and Analyses

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector accompanied the contractor REMP technician and observed the individual collect an Illinois River surface water sample and change-out air particulate filters at four environmental air sampling stations. The observations were made to determine whether samples were collected in accordance with the contractor's sampling procedure and to determine if appropriate practices were used to ensure sample integrity. Additionally, the inspector observed the technician complete pump flow and pump vacuum field checks to verify that they were accomplished adequately, consistent with the vendor's procedures. The inspector assessed the analytical detection capabilities of the contract laboratory used by the licensee to analyze its environmental sample, and discussed with radiation protection management its plans to revise the ODCM relative to the laboratory inter-comparison program. The assessment was conducted to determine if the radiological environmental sample analysis and inter-laboratory comparison programs were implemented consistent with the ODCM and industry standards, and to verify that the vendor was capable of performing adequate radiological measurements.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.5 Unrestricted Release of Material From Radiologically Controlled Areas (RCAs)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector evaluated the licensee's procedures and practices for the unrestricted release of material from RCAs and for the survey of personnel leaving the RCA and the site. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's personnel survey and unconditional release program to verify that: (1) radiation monitoring instrumentation used to perform surveys for unrestricted release were appropriate; (2) instrument sensitivities were consistent with NRC guidance contained in Inspection and Enforcement Circular 81-07 and Health Physics Positions in NUREG/CR-5569 for both surface contaminated material and material in volumetric form; (3) criteria for survey and unconditional release conformed to NRC requirements; and (4) licensee procedures were technically sound and provided appropriate guidance for survey techniques. The inspector reviewed the licensee's most recent 10 CFR Part 61 analyses and the licensee's assessment of the plant's radionuclide mix to determine if the potential impact of difficult to detect contaminants (such as those that decay by electron capture) was adequately captured in the unrestricted release program.

Additionally, the inspector reviewed the circumstances associated with the inadvertent

release of a worker from the site on February 18, 2002, with a discrete radioactive particle clung to the worker's coat. Specifically, the inspector reviewed the licensee's root cause investigation of the incident, station procedures associated with external dose assessment and with assessment of radiologically contaminated personnel, and the incident was discussed with radiation protection staff involved in its follow-up. The inspector also independently calculated the deep dose equivalent which the worker received from the particle to verify the accuracy of the licensee's dose assessment.

b. Findings

Introduction

A Green finding and an associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.4.1 were identified for the failure to conduct adequate radiological surveys of a contaminated individual in accordance with station procedures, resulting in the inadvertent release of a discrete radioactive particle from the site.

Description

On February 18, 2002, an electrical maintenance department (EMD) worker wearing an overcoat that was contaminated with a 120,000 disintegration per minute (54 nanocurie) discrete radioactive particle, alarmed the main access facility (MAF) portal radiation monitor as the individual attempted to leave the LaSalle Station. (Station portal monitors employ plastic scintillation detectors that are primarily sensitive to gamma radiation, and are set to alarm at an integrated activity level of 50 nanocuries). The individual contacted the radiation protection (RP) department as required by station procedure and reported the alarm to a radiation protection technician (RPT). The technician used a small article monitor and surveyed the personnel effects that the worker carried in a bag. The monitor did not alarm and the bag was cleared. The two individuals then proceeded back to the MAF portal monitors where the EMD worker and subsequently his overcoat were separately passed through the portal monitor. Although the monitor again alarmed as the worker wore his coat thru the monitor, the coat itself did not cause an alarm as it was hand-held by the RPT and moved past the monitor detectors. The worker then cleared the monitor without wearing the coat and was allowed to leave the site along with his coat and other personal belongings. Since the coat had never been in the RCA according to the worker and the coat did not cause the monitor to alarm when it was separately passed through the monitor by the RPT, the technician assumed the prior monitor alarms were false and no contamination was present on the coat. The coat was not surveyed by the RPT using an appropriate instrument such as a Geiger-Mueller (GM) survey meter, as required by station procedure.

On February 21, 2002, the EMD worker returned to the site wearing the overcoat for the first time since February 18, and immediately proceeded to the MAF portal monitors because the alarms received three days earlier concerned the individual. The monitor again alarmed as the worker passed through it wearing the coat and the problem was reported to the RP department. Radiation protection staff performed a thorough survey of the coat using a portable GM survey meter and identified the discrete radioactive particle located on the lower outside back of the coat. The particle was removed and

determined to be comprised primarily of cobalt-60.

Follow-up surveys of those areas where the EMD worker had either worn or stored the coat at the plant between February 18 and February 21, identified no contamination. Similarly, no contamination was identified in the EMD worker's home or vehicle. The licensee's investigation was unable to determine the origin of the particle or how it got onto the worker's coat. The licensee concluded that had a portable GM survey instrument been used to survey the worker and his coat during the initial response to the portal monitor alarm, the particle would have been identified on February 18 and not released off-site.

To assess the total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) received by the individual, the licensee interviewed the individual and determined that the coat had previously been worn to the station and successfully cleared the portal monitors on February 14, and was not brought to the station on February 15, 16 or 17. Consequently, the licensee assumed that the particle was picked-up by the coat on February 18. Based on conservative assumptions of the thicknesses and densities of the coat and the other clothing worn by the worker under the coat (consistent with NUREG/CR-5873) and the amount of time the coat was worn between February 18 and February 21, the licensee calculated an estimated deep dose equivalent to the worker from the particle of approximately 0.5 mrem.

Analysis

This issue represented a performance deficiency associated with the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone that affected the cornerstone objective because a discrete radioactive particle was inadvertently released into the public domain. Specifically, the survey performed on February 18 was not completed consistent with the licensee's procedure for the assessment of radiologically contaminated personnel and resulted in an occurrence in the licensee's radioactive material control program. Since the procedure, had it been followed, adequately covered this condition, this occurrence could have been prevented. Consequently, the issue represents a finding that is more than minor. Although the discrete radioactive particle produced a TEDE as defined in 10 CFR Part 20, the dose did not exceed one mrem. Therefore, consistent with the Pubic Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Radioactive Material Control, this finding is not analyzed using the SDP. However, since the finding is greater than minor but not greater than Green, it is dispositioned as a Green Non-SDP Finding of very low safety significance consistent with Manual Chapter 0612.

Enforcement

Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires, in part, that procedures be established, implemented and maintained that cover the activities recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, which includes procedures for radiation surveys and contamination controls. Procedure RP-AA-350, "Assessment of Radiologically Contaminated Personnel," requires in Section 5.3 that RPT surveys of individuals that alarm a contamination monitor include surveys of all areas that caused the alarm using a GM or other approved instrument. The failure to survey the EMD worker's coat and other clothing using a hand-held GM survey instrument on February 18, 2002, was a

violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1. However, since the licensee documented this issue in its corrective action program (Condition Report and Root Cause Investigation Action Tracking Item No. 96125) and because the violation is of very low safety significance, the violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV 50-373/0204-03; 50-374/0204-03).

.6 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed recent Nuclear Oversight field observations and an audit performed in 2001, and condition reports (CRs) generated in 2001 through April 2002 relative to the REMP and radioactive material control programs. In addition, the inspector reviewed the results of REMP program self-assessments completed in April 2001 and April 2002, including the corrective actions taken for the 2001 self-assessment. These reviews were conducted to determine if the licensee adequately identified individual problems and trends, evaluated contributing causes and extent of condition, and developed corrective actions to prevent recurrence. The inspector also discussed with the radiation protection manager plans to strengthen the radioactive material control program during outages through an enhanced "greeter" initiative, and plans to improve REMP Coordinator transition and change management should future staffing changes occur.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

Cornerstones: Initiating Events and Barrier Integrity

.1 Unplanned Scrams Per 7,000 Critical Hours and Scrams With a Loss of Normal Heat Removal Performance Indicator (PI) Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Licensee Event Reports (LERs) and operator log entries for Unit 1 and Unit 2 to determine the number of scrams that occurred during the previous four quarters and compared that number to the number in the performance indicator. The inspectors also reviewed licensee Monthly Operating Reports and operator logs to verify the accuracy of the number of critical hours reported. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's basis for crediting normal heat removal capability for each of the reported reactor scrams. The inspection was performed utilizing the performance indicator definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline," Revision 2 dated November 2001.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity Performance Indicator

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the dose equivalent iodine calculation procedure, the reactor coolant system (RCS) specific activity performance indicator procedure and interviewed members of the licensee's chemistry staff involved in the determination and verification of RCS specific activity. The inspector also reviewed the licensee's Unit 1 and Unit 2 chemistry sample analysis results for maximum dose equivalent iodine for the twelve month period beginning May 2001. These reviews were performed to verify that the licensee adequately determined dose equivalent iodine values, and to verify adherence to station procedures and to the guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02 relative to assessing and reporting the RCS specific activity performance indicator. Additionally, the inspector observed a chemistry technician collect an RCS sample to verify that the sample was collected properly and discussed with chemistry staff the method used to calculate dose equivalent iodine to verify its adequacy.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed corrective actions associated with the following Problem Identification Forms (PIFs) and Condition Reports (CRs) to verify the effectiveness of the licensee's corrective actions:

- PIF L2000-4349 Configuration Control Issues
- PIF L2000-03778 Fire Seals
- CR 88165 0 EDG Tripped on Low Lube Oil Pressure

Attributes considered during the review of licensee actions included the following:

- Complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner commensurate with its significance and ease of discovery.
- Evaluations and disposition of performance issues associated with maintenance effectiveness.
- Evaluation and disposition of reportability issues.
- Consideration of extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences.
- Classification and prioritization of the resolution of the problem commensurate

with its safety significance.

- Identification of root cause and contributing causes of the problem.
- Identification of corrective actions which are appropriately focused to correct the problem.
- Completion of corrective actions in a timely manner commensurate with the safety significance of the issue.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Follow-up (71153)

Cornerstones: Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems

.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-374/02-01: "Transient Increases in Unit 2 Unidentified Leakage Due to Clogged Drywell Floor Drain Sump Screen"

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-374/02-01: "Transient Increases in Unit 2 Unidentified Leakage Due to Clogged Drywell Floor Drain Sump Screen."

b. Findings

Introduction

A finding of very low significance (Green) and an associated NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control" related to a modification performed on the drywell floor drain screen were identified by the inspectors.

Description

On March 16, 2002, the Unit 2 unidentified leakage in the drywell reached 3.0 gallons per minute (gpm) which exceeded the previous days calculation by more than 2.0 gpm, thereby exceeding Technical Specification 3.4.5.d limits for increased unidentified leakage within a 24 hour period. The increase was transient and returned to normal values. Troubleshooting identified that debris collected on the drywell floor from previous maintenance activities had clogged the drywell floor drain screen due to inadequate design and restricted water flow through the floor drain to the drywell floor sump. The licensee redesigned and installed a new floor drain screen cover and initiated a periodic maintenance activity to perform a thorough cleaning of the drywell after each refueling outage to prevent recurrence. The inspectors determined that although the drywell floor drain sump flow monitoring system was inoperable, other multiple independent means for

detecting drywell leakage were still available and working as designed. Since there were other redundant systems available for leak detection, this Technical Specification 3.4.5.d violation was determined to be of very low safety significance.

Analysis

The inspectors reviewed this issue against the guidance contained in Appendix B, "Issue Dispositioning Screening," of Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports." In particular, the inspectors compared this finding to the findings identified in Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues," of IMC 0612 to determine whether the finding was minor. Following that review, the inspectors concluded that the guidance in Appendix E was not applicable or useful for the specific finding since no examples were provided which involved equipment that was inadvertently rendered inoperable as a direct result of an inadequate design change. As a result, the inspectors compared this performance deficiency to the minor questions contained in Section C, "Minor Questions," to Appendix B of IMC 0612. The inspectors concluded that the issue was more than minor since the finding, if left uncorrected, could become a more significant safety concern. This conclusion was based on the fact that a small reactor coolant system leak would not be detected by the drywell floor drain sump monitoring system because the sump screen was degraded and clogged. Without adequate detection, a small initial leak could become larger and therefore become a more significant concern prior to its detection by other means.

As a result, the inspectors reviewed this issue in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609 "Significance Determination Process (SDP)." The inspectors conducted this review utilizing the "SDP Phase 1 Screening Worksheet For IE [Initiating Events], MS [Mitigating Systems] and B [Barrier Integrity] Cornerstones." The inspectors determined that none of the above cornerstones were directly impacted by this finding, therefore, the issue screened out as Green.

Enforcement

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," requires that measures shall be established for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, and equipment that are essential to the safety-related functions of structures, systems, and components. The failure to properly review the suitability of the application of the existing drywell floor drain screen cover adversely impacted the response of the drywell floor drain monitoring system. As a result, fine debris collected in the screen and resulted in a significant flow restriction, rendering the drywell floor drain sump monitoring system incapable of detecting small leaks, an essential function of this safety related system. The failure to properly review for suitability the drywell floor drain sump screen was an example where the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, were not met and was a violation. However, because of its low safety significance and because it was entered into the corrective action program (CR 99520), the NRC is treating this issue as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV 50-373/0204-01(DRP); 50-374/0204-01(DRP)), in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy.

4OA6 Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the routine resident inspection results to Mr. G. Barnes and other members of licensee management on June 28, 2002. The results of a biennial heat sink inspection were presented to Mr. G. Barnes and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of that inspection on April 5, 2002. The results of a Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) inspection were presented to Mr. G. Barnes and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of that inspection on May 3, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

4OA7 Licensee Identified Violations

The following violations of very low safety significance (Green) were identified by the licensee and are violations of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as Non-Cited Violations (NCVs).

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, "Test Control," requires that all testing required to demonstrate that SSCs will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures. On May 22, 2002, licensee personnel identified that Safety Relief Valve (SRV) pressure drop testing conducted in accordance with LTS-500-18 failed to ensure that all required SRV pilot valve seals were tested. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report (CR) 00104591. Because no actual impact on the operability of the SRVs was identified, this violation is not more than of very low safety significance, and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (50-373/0204-04(DRP); 50-374/0204-04(DRP)).

10 CFR 55.53(f)(2), "Conditions of License," requires that for requalification of senior reactor operators (SROs) limited to fuel handling activities, that one shift of activities under the direction of a qualified SRO must have been completed. On May 7, 2002, licensee personnel identified that SROs limited to fuel handling activities had performed those activities prior to observation of those activities for one shift by a qualified SRO. This item was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 00106992. Because no actual fuel handling errors occurred, this violation was not more than of very low safety significance, and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (50-373/0204-05(DRP); 50-374/0204-05(DRP)).

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Exelon

D. Czufin, Site Engineering Manager
D. Enright, Operations Manager
F. Gogliotti, Design Engineering Supervisor
G. Barnes, Site Vice President
J. Henry, System Engineering Manager
W. Riffer, Regulatory Assurance Manager
M. Schiavoni, Station Manager
C. Wilson, Station Security Manager

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

50-373/0204-01;50-374/0204-01	NCV	Inadequate Drywell Sump Screen Design
50-373/0204-02;50-374/0204-02	NCV	1A EDG Governor Adjustment Error
50-373/0204-03;50-374/0204-03	NCV	Inadequate Radiological Survey
50-373/0204-04;50-374/0204-04	NCV	Inadequate SRV Testing
50-373/0204-05;50-374/0204-05	NCV	Inadequate Requalification of Fuel Handling SROs

Closed

50-373/0204-01;50-374/0204-01	NCV	Inadequate Drywell Sump Screen Design
50-373/0204-02;50-374/0204-02	NCV	1A EDG Governor Adjustment Error
50-373/0204-03;50-374/0204-03	NCV	Inadequate Radiological Survey
50-373/0204-04;50-374/0204-04	NCV	Inadequate SRV Testing
50-373/0204-05;50-374/0204-05	NCV	Inadequate Requalification of Fuel Handling SROs
50-373/0203-02;50-374/0203-02	URI	Secondary Containment Leakage Measurement

Discussed

None

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ACE	Apparent Cause Evaluation
ADAMS	Agency Document and Management System
AOT	Allowed Outage Time
ASME	American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ATWS	Anticipated Transient Without Scram
B	Barrier Integrity
CR	Condition Report
CRD	Control Rod Drive
CS	Containment Spray
CSCS	Core Standby Cooing System
DRP	Division of Reactor Projects
EC	Engineering Change
ECCS	Emergency Core Cooling System
EDG	Emergency Diesel Generator
EMD	Electrical Maintenance Department
EPRI	Electrical Power Research Institute
ER	Engineering Request
GM	Geiger-Mueller
gpm	gallons-per-minute
HPCS	High Pressure Core Spray
IE	Initiating Events
IMC	Inspection Manual Chapter
LCP	LaSalle Chemical Procedure
LEP	LaSalle Electrical Procedure
LER	Licensee Event Report
LIS	LaSalle Instrument Surveillance
LOA	LaSalle Abnormal Operating Procedure
LOS	LaSalle Operating Surveillance
LPCI	Low Pressure Coolant Injection
LTP	LaSalle Technical Procedure
LTS	LaSalle Technical Surveillance
MAF	Main Access Facility
MS	Mitigating Systems
NCV	Non-Cited Violation
NDT	Non-Destructive Testing
NEI	Nuclear Energy Institute
ODCM	Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
OE	Operability Evaluation
OWA	Operator Work Around
PARS	Publicly Available Records
PI	Performance Indicator
PIF	Problem Identification Form
PRA	Probabilistic Risk Analysis
RAW	Risk Achievement Worth
RCA	Radiologically Controlled Area
RCIC	Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
RCS	Reactor Coolant System

REMP	Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
RHR	Residual Heat Removal
RP	Radiation Protection
RPT	Radiation Protection Technician
SDP	Significance Determination Process
SEAG	Site Engineering Administrative Group
SRO	Senior Reactor Operator
SRP	Standard Review Plan
SRV	Safety Relief Valve
SSC	Structure, System, or Component
TEDE	Total Effective Dose Equivalent
UFSAR	Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
WO	Work Order
WR	Work Request
VG	Standby Gas Treatment
VR	Reactor Building Ventilation
VT	Turbine Building Ventilation
VY	Core Standby Cooling System Equipment Cooling Water System

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Adverse Weather Protection

LOS-ZZ-A2	Preparation For Winter/Summer Readiness	Revision 22
LOS-ZZ-A2	Preparation For Winter/Summer Readiness	May 2002
LOA-DIKE-001	Lake Dike Damage/Failure	Revision 2
LOA-TORN-001	High Winds/Tornado	Revision 2
UFSAR	Section 9.2.6.1.2 - Power Generation Design Bases	Revision 14
RegGuide 1.27	Ultimate Heat Sink For Nuclear Power Plants	January 1976
	LaSalle Station Summer Readiness Duty Team Guide - 2002	
EC 334017	Revise Maximum Cooling Water Inlet Temperature From the UHS to 102F For CSCS and WS [Service Water], CW [Circulating Water] From 97.5F to 100F	Revision 0
50.59 Evaluation L-02-0182	Revise Maximum Cooling Water Inlet Temperature From the UHS to 102F For CSCS and WS [Service Water], CW [Circulating Water] From 97.5F to 100F	Revision 0
Calc 97-200	VY Cooler Thermal Performance Model - 1(2)VY01A and 1(2)VY02A	Revision A00
Calc 97-195	Thermal Model of Comed/LaSalle Station Unit 0, 1, and 2 Diesel Generator Jacket Water Coolers	Revision A00
WO 00340260	1TIC-VX007 Alarming Before Setpoint in LOR	
WO 00331190	2TIC-VX007 Alarming Early - 95 Degrees	

Equipment Alignment

LMP-MS-08	Safety Relief Valve Removal/Replacement	Revision 7
LOP-RH-17	Alternate Shutdown Cooling	Revision 17
EC 113199	Replace SRVs Per Procedure LMP-MS-08	
LOP-RH-1AM	U1 A Residual Heat Removal System Mechanical Checklist	Revision 0
LOP-RH-02E	U1 A Residual Heat Removal System Electrical Checklist	Revision 18

LOP-DG-03M	Unit 0 Diesel Generator Mechanical Checklist	Revision 7
LOP-DG-03E	Unit 0 Diesel Generator Electrical Checklist	Revision 7
LOP-DG-2M	U1 HPCS Diesel Generator Mechanical Checklist	Revision 8
LOP-DG-2E	U1 1B Diesel Generator Electrical Checklist	Revision 9
LOP-RHWS-1BM	Unit 1B RHR Service Water Mechanical Checklist	Revision 1
LOP-RH-01E	Unit 1 RHR Service Water Electrical Checklist	Revision 8
LOP-DG-06M	Unit 1A Diesel Generator Cooling System Mechanical Checklist	Revision 11
LOP-DG-06E	Unit 1A Diesel Generator Cooling System Electrical Checklist	Revision 5

Fire Protection

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)	Appendix H	Revision 13
Technical Requirements Manual - Section 3.7.o	Fire Rated Assemblies	Revision 0
Operability Determination OE02-005	Unsealed Openings (Core Holes) in Floor Slab	Revision 0
Apparent Cause Evaluation 95253	Bus Duct Seal Deficiencies	
Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)	Response to NRC Questions	October 1979
NRC Inspection Manual - Chapter 0609	Significance Determination Process	Appendix F
LTS-1000-31	Inspection of Bus Duct Seals on Unit 1 and Unit 2	Revision 7
Drawing NP-8-E-SE-01	Bus Duct Penetration	Tech-Sil Inc.
Drawing 1E-1-3639	Non-Segregated Bus Duct - Auxiliary Building Sections	Revision G
Drawing 1E-1-3641/3644	Non-Segregated Bus Duct - Auxiliary Building Elevation 731’	Revision 2

Drawing S-572	Auxiliary Building Floor Framing Plan - El. 731' South Area	
Drawing S-1072	Auxiliary Building Floor Framing Plan - El. 731' North Area	
Condition Report 095253	Potential Bus Duct Fire Seal Deficiencies Discovered By NRC	
Risk Significance Determination	Bus Duct Seal Deficiencies at LaSalle	April 5, 2002
EC 335434	Evaluate Bus Duct Breeches Between Division 1&2 Switchgear Rooms	

Flood Protection Measures

LTS-1000-29	Watertight Door and Penetration Inspection - Unit 1	Completed January 12, 2002
LTS-1000-29	Watertight Door and Penetration Inspection - Unit 2	Completed November 13, 2000
LTS-1000-3	Groundwater Level Surveillance	Revision 8
LaSalle Focused Area Self-Assessment	Flood Protection Measures	Completed March 3, 2001
LOP-PF-01	Closure of Watertight Doors	Revision 4
LOA-FLD-001	Flooding	Revision 4
LTS-1000-29	Watertight Door and Penetration Inspection	Revision 8
CR 00082752	Storm Drain Configuration Control Issues	
CR 00104408	NRC Observation Notes During Inspection of Unit 1 Core Spray Cooling System (CSCS) Room	
A/R No. 41953	Focus Area Self Assessment Plan	March 12, 2001
Drawing M-7	General Arrangement Main Floor Plan	April 24, 2001
Drawing M-9	General Arrangement Ground Floor Plan	May 2, 2001
Drawing M-11	General Arrangement Basement Floor Plan	March 5, 2001

Drawing M-87	P&ID Core Standby Cooling System - System Equipment Cooling Water System	January 4, 2001
Drawing M-91	P&ID RB Equipment Drains	January 12, 2002
Drawing M-104	P&ID RB Floor Drains	February 8, 1999
Drawing M-105	P&ID Diesel Bldg. Floor Drains	January 5, 2001
Drawing M-106	P&ID Diesel/Aux/Turbine & Service Bldg Floor Drains	May 13, 1999
Drawing M-112	P&ID Waste Water Treatment System	January 5, 1999
Drawing M-151	P&ID Diesel/Aux/Turbine Bldg Floor Drains	September 24, 2001
Drawing M-1203	Reactor-Aux Bldg-Diesel Gen. RM. Sleeve Loc. Pl. El. 673'-4" & 663'-0" and 694'-6"& 687'-0"	
L02-LTS-1000-29	Watertight Door & Penetration Inspection	August 9, 2000
L01-LTS-1000-29	Watertight Door & Penetration Inspection	September 25, 2001
LOA-FLD-001	Flooding Rev. 4	July 14, 2001
LOS-ZZ-Q2	Sump Pump Inspection	March 15, 2001
LTS-1000-3	Groundwater Level Surveillance	June 22, 1999
LOP-PF-01	Closure of Water Tight Doors	October 23, 2001
LOS-ZZ-A4	Sump Inspection	March 21, 1994
LGA-002	Secondary Containment Control (Emergency Procedure)	
2PM10J A-5-02	Service Water Low Pressure Annunciator Response	
LOA-WS-201	Loss of Service Water	
CR-AR-84907	Condition Report on 2RE08PA failure during Functional PMT	May 18, 2001
WOP 99253390 01	Work Order Package for implementation of LTS-1000-29 Rev. 8 for Unit 1	January 25, 2002
	LaSalle Internal Flooding Risk Insights Gained from 2001 PRA.	

Heat Sink Performance

Calculation L-002457	LaSalle County Station Ultimate Heat Sink Analysis	Revision 3
Calculation 97-199	VY Cooler Thermal Performance Model - 1(2)VY03A	Revision B
Calculation 97-200	VY Cooler Thermal Performance Model - 1(2)VY01A and 1(2)VY02A	Revision A
Calculation L-001077	Residual Heat Removal Pumps B & C Cubicle Cooler Ventilation System	Revision 2
Calculation L-001078	Residual Heat Removal Pump A Cubicle Cooler Ventilation System	Revision 2
Calculation L-001221	High Pressure Core Spray Pump Cubicle Cooler Ventilation System	Revision 2
Calculation L-001584	Volume of the Ultimate Heat Sink	Revision 1
CR 98176	2B Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Test (L2R08) Results Are Indeterminate	March 5, 2002
CR 98305	VY Cooler Air Flow Testing Procedure Deficiencies	March 5, 2002
CR 101568	VY Cooler Coils and Screens Dirty	March 14, 2002
CR 102283	VY Cooler Calculation Computer Output Contains Program Flags	April 04, 2002
Drawing 28SW404543	Core Standby Cooling System Equipment Area Cooling Coils (1VY01A, 1VY02A, 2VY01A, 2VY02A)	July 21, 1976
Drawing 28SW404553	Safety Related Heat Recovery Coils - Core Standby Cooling System Equipment Area Cooling Coils (1VY03A, 2VY03A)	July 21, 1976
ER 9804483	Evaluate Division 1 Operation with Various Components Out of Service	September 24, 1998
Procedure CY-AA-120-400	Closed Cooling Water Chemistry	Revision 2
Procedure LCP-110-1	Chemical Analysis and Corrective Action Schedule	Revision 33

Procedure LCP-830-21	Circulating/ Service Water Corrosion Monitoring Program	Revision 5
Procedure LCP-830-23	Monitoring and Adjusting Chemical Feed System Equipment	Revision 1
Procedure LTP-100-5	Service Water Component Inspection Guideline	Revision 4
Procedure LTS-200-12	Northwest and Northeast Cubicle Cooler 1(2)VY01A and 1(2)VY04A Flowrate Test	Revision 7
Procedure LTS-200-13	1(2)VY02A, Southwest Cubicle Cooler Flowrate Test, Division III	Revision 5
Procedure LTS-200-14	1(2)VY03A, Southeast Cubicle Cooler Flowrate Test	Revision 4
Procedure LTS-200-19	Emergency Core Cooling Systems Cubicle Area Cooler Air Flowrate Test	Revision 7
Procedure LTS-200-27	0 Diesel Generator Cooling Water System Flow Test	Revision 6
Specification J-2582	Design Specification for Heat Exchanger Coils and Cabinets - LaSalle County Station - Unit 1	March 25, 1975
SEAG 97-000577	Evaluation of Potential Water Hammer Events Within the Core Standby Cooling System Equipment Cooling Water System	December 4, 1997
SEAG 00-000243	Evaluation of Measured Air Flowrate Which Is Less than Acceptance Criteria in LTS-200-19 for Room Cooler 1VY04A	June 01, 2000
Surveillance LTP-100-5	Water to Air, Air Side Heat Exchanger Inspection Report, 1VY-02C	September 1, 1992
Surveillance LTP-100-5	Water to Air, Air Side Heat Exchanger Inspection Report, 1VY-03C	September 8, 1992
Surveillance LTS-200-13	Southwest Corner Room Area Cooler Water Flowrate Test 1VY02A	June 3, 1998
Surveillance LTS-200-19	Water to Air, Air Side Heat Exchanger Inspection Report, 2VY-03A	December 18, 1991

Trend Reports	Air Flow Trends - 1VY01A, 1VY02A, 1VY03A, 2VY01A, 2VY02A, 2VY03A	March 29, 2002
Trend Reports	Differential Pressure Trends - 1VY01A, 1VY02A, 1VY03A, 2VY01A, 2VY02A, 2VY03A	March 29, 2002
WO 99059404 01	Air Side Flowrate Test 2VY03A	May 24, 2001
WO 99059406 01	Air Side Flowrate Test 2VY02A	June 6, 2001
WO 99164043 01	Heat Exchanger Water Flowrate Test 1VY03A	August 9, 2001
WO 99210556 01	Heat Exchanger Water Flowrate Test 2VY02A	March 5, 2002
WO 99220041 01	Southwest Corner Room Cooler Air Side Flowrate Test 1VY02A	March 13, 2002
WO 99221980 01	Air Side Flowrate Test 1VY03A	March 14, 2002
WO 00371879 01	LOS-DG-Q3 Unit 2 High Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump	December 14, 2001
WO 00377105 01	LOS-DG-Q1 0 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump	December 28, 2001
WO 00390649 01	LOS-DG-Q3 Unit 2 High Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump	February 8, 2002
WO 00393941 01	LOS-DG-Q1 0 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump	February 18, 2002
WR 950036092 01	Air Side Flowrate Test 2VY03A	February 19, 1999
WR 950054677 01	Unit 2 Northwest Cubicle Area Cooler Air Side Flowrate Test 2VY01A	February 11, 1999
WR 950105880 01	Southeast Area Cooler Water Flowrate Test 2VY03A	January 06, 1999
WR 960064305 01	Air Side Flowrate Test 2VY02A	January 11, 1999
WR 970091697 01	Unit 1 Northwest Cubicle Area Cooler Air Side Flowrate Test 1VY01A	June 22, 1998
WR 980058487 01	Southwest Corner Room Area Cooler Water Flowrate Test 1VY02A	October 20, 2000

WR 980060965 01	Heat Exchanger Water Flowrate Test 1VY03A	September 30, 1999
WR 980063945 01	Air Side Flowrate Test 1VY03A	April10, 2000
WR 980066356 01	Unit 1 Northwest Cubicle Area Cooler Air Side Flowrate Test 1VY01A	April 21, 2000
WR 980080278 01	Unit 2 Northwest Cubicle Area Cooler Water Side Flowrate Test 2VY01A	January 31, 1999
WR 980135489 01	Unit 1 Northwest Cubicle Area Cooler Water Side Flowrate Test 1VY01A	October 5, 1999
WR 990018659 01	Core Standby Cooling System Pond Sediment Deposition Check	May 18, 1999
WR 990052824 01	Core Standby Cooling System Pond Sediment Deposition Check	January 22, 2001
WR 990059400 01	Unit 2 Northwest Cubicle Area Cooler Air Side Flowrate Test 2VY01A	April 20, 2001
WR 990059401 01	Heat Exchanger Water Flowrate Test 2VY02A	March 10, 2000
WR 990059402 01	Unit 2 Northwest Cubicle Area Cooler Water Side Flowrate Test 2VY01A	April 23, 2001
WR 990059405 01	Southeast Area Cooler Water Flowrate Test 2VY03A	January 05, 2001
WR 990098661 01	Southwest Corner Room Cooler Air Side Flowrate Test 1VY02A	April 4, 2000
WR 990166167 01	Unit 1 Northwest Cubicle Area Cooler Water Side Flowrate Test 1VY01A	April 23, 2001

Operator Licensing Requalification

	Licensed Operator Requalification Scenario Guide ESG 43	Revision 0
LGA - 010	Failure to SCRAM	Revision 3
LGA - 001	RPV Control	Revision 3
EP-AA-111	Emergency Classification and Protective Action Recommendations	Revision 3

Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation

LaSalle 7-Day Look-Ahead Schedule	Various

Operability Evaluations

EC 336192	Battery Equalize Charge at 2.5 VDC Per Cell	
SEAG 02-00081	Application of 2.5 Volts Per Cell Charging Criteria	March 28, 2002
VETIP J-0150		
LEP-DC-01	Individual Equalizing Cell Charge for Station Batteries	Revision 7
CR 00101955	Formal Documentation Not Obtained For Change to LEP-DC-01	
LEP-DC-01	Unit 2 Division 1, 125 VDC Battery Cell #21 Data	March 26, 2002
WO 0421426	Unit 2 Division 1, 125 VDC, Battery Cell #21 Charge	March 26, 2002
S&L Specification J-2583	Atmospheric Cleanup Filter Units For The LaSalle County Station Units 1 & 2	
OE02-08	Unit 1 Drywell Floor Drain	Revision 0
WO 990213169	1RF08M - Inspect Screen	January 19, 2002
WO 990012582	1RF08M - Inspect Screen	November 11, 1999
WO 990209213	2RF08M - Inspect Screen	November 21, 2000
OE97052	2C RHR Injection Line	March 28, 1997
CR 00109991	Damper Actuator 2TZ-VD003C Does Not Achieve Full Stroke	May 30, 2002
OE02-09	Unit 1 RCIC Data Collection	June 7, 2002
EC 000337298	Operation of 1A RR FCV on LVDT	May 25, 2002

Operator Workarounds

OWA338/339	Feedwater Heater Trips During Reactor Recirculation Pump Downshift	March 6, 2002

LOP-RR-08	Changing Reactor Recirculation Pump Speed From Fast to Slow Speed	Revision 27
LGP-2-1	Normal Unit Shutdown	Revision 61
ATM 36429	Root Cause Evaluation of the Feedwater Temperature Transient During Unit 1 RR Pump Downshift	November 28, 2000

Post-Maintenance Testing

LTS-500-19	Unit 2 Main Steam Safety Relief Valve Operability	Revision 5
WO 99237316	Unit 2 Main Steam Safety Relief Valve Testing	
WO 99180664	Unit “1A” EDG Woodward Governor Adjustments	April 26, 2002
CR 107346	Step 14 of LEP-DG-105 Not Performed	May 8, 2002
WO 00414392	“0” EDG Inspect Breaker	April 18, 2002
WO 00387494	“0” EDG Governor Inspection	April 17, 2002
LOS-DG-M1	0 Diesel Generator Operability Test	Revision 46
WO 00449604	2B Diesel Generator Potentiometer Replacements	May 30, 2002
WO 00450211-03	2E51-F080 Valve Did Not Reopen During Cycling	June 3, 2002
LEP-EQ-114	Westinghouse 250 VDC MCC Equipment Parts Replacement For EQ Requirements or Repair	Revision 8
CR 00110348	2E51-F080 Failed To Open	June 3, 2002
VETIP J-0157	Instruction Manual for Motor-Operated Potentiometer (Return-To-Center)	November 1984

Refueling and Outage Activities

OU-LA-104	Shutdown Safety Management Program	Revision 2
LTP-1500-2	Alternate Decay Heat Removal Lineup Capabilities	Revision 2
L2P01 Shutdown Safety Management Program		Revision 0
EC 336113	SRVs As Alternate Decay Heat Removal	April 1, 2002
Crane Technical Paper #410	Flow of Fluids Through Valves, Fittings and Pipes	1988
LOP-RH-14	Alternate Shutdown Cooling	Revision 17

Kenny Manta Industrial Services Letter	Evaluation of Level 1 Coating - LaSalle Station LST01	April 18, 2002
Kenny Manta Industrial Services Letter	Evaluation of the LaSalle Station Unit 2 Drywell Floor Coating	February 5, 1999
Kenny Manta Industrial Services Letter	Evaluation of Level 1 Coatings at LaSalle Station (L2R08)	November 14, 2000
	L2P01 Drywell Cleanup Project Plan	
LOP-DW-01	Drywell Closeout	Revision 33
LOP-DW-01	Drywell Closeout - Documentation	April 23, 2002
LGP-1-S1	Startup Checklist	Revision 51
LGP-1-1	Reactor Startup	
EC 336572	Upgrade Drywell Floor Drain 2RF08M Screen	Revision 0
EC 336572	Upgrade Drywell Floor Drain 2RF08M Screen	Revision 1
L1P03 Shutdown Safety Management Program		Revision 0
AR 00088182	Failure of Division 3 Temperature Controller to Maintain Temperature	December 27, 2001
CR 00106992	Limited SROs Do Not Properly Maintain Active Status	May 7, 2002

Surveillance Testing

LOS-RH-Q3 Att. 2B	RHR (LPCI) and RHRSW Valve Inservice Test For Cold Shutdown or Refuel Condition	Revision 35
LTS-1100-4	Scram Insertion Times	Revision 20
LTS-1100-4	Scram Insertion Times	April 24, 2002
LTS-300-3	Secondary Containment Leak Rate Test	Revision 16
LTS-300-3	Secondary Containment Leak Rate Test	May 3, 2002
LOS-RH-Q1	RHR and RHR Service Water Pump and Valve Inservice Test for Modes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5	Revision 49
LIS-NB-104A	Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Low Water Level 1 ECCS Division 1 Initiation and Level 2 RCIC Initiation Instrument Channels A & C Calibration	Revision 11

CR 00108062	Maintenance Work Around - EDG Reverse Power K32X Relay	April 8, 2002
ACE 102854	Unit 1A Emergency Diesel Generator Lockout Due to Bumped Relay	April 9, 2002
LTS-200-228	2A DG Flow Balance Test	Revision 3

Temporary Plant Modifications

EC 336420	Temporary Repair of the 2E12-F009 Valve to Eliminate Pressure Seal Gasket Leakage (Seal Welding of Bonnet)	Revision 0
WO00430503-03	Install Temporary Repair of the 2E12-F009 Isolation Valve	April 12, 2002
50.59 L02-0156	Temporary Repair of the 2E12-F009 Valve to Eliminate Pressure Seal Gasket Leakage	April 13, 2002
EC 336699	Evaluation of the 2E12-F009 Seal Weld Leak	
VT Report E02-163	2E12-F009 Inboard Shutdown Cooling Valve	April 21, 2002
EC 337326	Temporary repair to 2E22-S001 Heat Exchanger Plate	May 28, 2002
WO00448732	Installation of TMOD EC 337326	May 29, 2002

Performance Indicator Verification

	Monthly Performance Indicator Packages for Unplanned SCRAMS	January 2001-March 2002
	Monthly Performance Indicator Packages for SCRAMS with a loss of Normal Heat Sink	January 2001-March 2002
	Monthly Operating Reports	January 2001-March 2002

Identification and Resolution of Problems

PIF L2000-4349	Configuration Control Issues	August 30, 2001
PIF/CR L2000-03023	High Differential Pressure Alarm	May 9, 2000

PIF/CR L2000-06843	Extent of Condition - HVAC Filter Discrepancies	November 26, 2000
Root Cause AD-AA-106	Installation of HVAC Pre-Filters Different Than Described in UFSAR	Revision 1
LS-AA-125-1004	Effectiveness Review for HVAC Pre-Filters Different Than Described in UFSAR	April 18, 2002
CR 110032	2B EDG KVAR Output was Abnormal	May 31, 2002
L2001-05813	Failed R3 Potentiometer	October 10, 2001
CR 88165	0 EDG Trip On Low Lube Oil Pressure	December 26, 2001

Event Followup

WR 990209213-01	2RF08M - Inspect Drywell Floor Drain Screen	November 21, 2000
WR 990012582-01	1RF08M - Inspect Drywell Floor Drain Screen	November 11, 1999
WO 990213169	1RF08M - Inspect Drywell Floor Drain Screen	January 19, 2002
	L2P01 Drywell Cleanup Project Plan	
CHRON 307434	LaSalle ComEd SEC Calculation R-M-1044	April 11, 1995
Calc. R-M-1044	Debris Screen Equivalent Area to Drain Pipe	April 12, 1995
LER 50-374/02-01	Transient Increases in Unit 2 Unidentified Leakage Due to Clogged Drywell Floor Drain Sump Screen	

Cross-Cutting Issues

CR 00108062	Maintenance Work Around - DG Reverse Power K32X Relay	April 8, 2002
Dwg. M-137	Reactor Building Equipment Drain System	Sheet 4