

September 5, 2002

Mr. Ted C. Feigenbaum
Executive Vice President and
Chief Nuclear Officer
North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation
c/o Mr. James M. Peschel
P.O. Box 300
Seabrook, NH 03874

SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE:
CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ON REFUELING
OPERATIONS (TAC NO. MB2717)

Dear Mr. Feigenbaum:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 85 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-86 for the Seabrook Station, Unit No 1, in response to your application dated August 9, 2001, as supplemented September 17, 2001. By letter dated June 24, 2002, you withdrew that part of the application associated with relocation of Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.9.3, "Decay Time," to the Seabrook Station Technical Requirements Manual.

The amendment combines TS 3/4.9.9, "Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation System," and TS 3/4.9.4, "Containment Building Penetrations." By combining these two TSs, the amendment updates the Seabrook TSs related to refueling operations by adopting portions of NUREG-1431, "Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants," Revision 2. The amendment also changes the TS index pages and the associated TS Bases.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Robert D. Starkey, Project Manager, Section 2
Project Directorate I
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-443

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 85 to NPF-86
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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*SE input dated 8-12-02, no major changes made

** See previous concurrence

Accession No.: ML021990696

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NORTH ATLANTIC ENERGY SERVICE CORPORATION, ET AL.*

DOCKET NO. 50-443

SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 85
License No. NPF-86

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment filed by the North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation, et al. (the licensee), dated August 9, 2001, as supplemented September 17, 2001 and June 24, 2002, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

*North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation (NAESCO) is authorized to act as agent for the: North Atlantic Energy Corporation, Canal Electric Company, The Connecticut Light and Power Company, Great Bay Power Corporation, Hudson Light & Power Department, Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company, Little Bay Power Corporation, New England Power Company, New Hampshire Electric Cooperative, Inc., Taunton Municipal Light Plant, The United Illuminating Company, and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-86 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 85, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B are incorporated into Facility License No. NPF-86. NAESCO shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 90 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA/

Victor Nerses, Acting Chief, Section 2
Project Directorate I
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 5, 2002

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 85

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-86

DOCKET NO. 50-443

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached revised pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

<u>Remove</u>	<u>Insert</u>
viii	viii
ix	ix
xi	xi
xii	xii
3/4 9-4	3/4 9-4
- - -	3/4 9-4A
3/4 9-10	3/4 9-10
B 3/4 9-2a	B 3/4 9-2a
B 3/4 9-4	B 3/4 9-4

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 85 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-86
NORTH ATLANTIC ENERGY SERVICE CORPORATION
SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1
DOCKET NO. 50-443

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated August 9, 2001, as supplemented September 17, 2001, the North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Seabrook Station, Technical Specifications (TSs) 3/4.9.3, "Decay Time," 3/4.9.4, "Containment Building Penetrations," and 3/4.9.9, "Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation System." By letter dated June 24, 2002, the licensee withdrew that part of the application associated with TS 3/4.9.3. The September 17, 2001, and June 24, 2002, letters provided clarifying information that did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination (66 FR 48290).

The requested changes would change the Seabrook TSs related to refueling operations by adopting portions of NUREG-1431, "Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants," Revision 2 (STS). Specifically, the licensee proposed to combine TS 3/4.9.9, "Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation System," into TS 3/4.9.4, "Containment Building Penetrations," consistent with the STS.

2.0 BACKGROUND

During core alterations or the movement of irradiated fuel in containment, TS 3/4.9.4 limits the radiological consequences of a fuel handling accident (FHA) inside containment by controlling the status of certain containment penetrations. During refueling operations (Mode 6), containment pressurization as a result of an accident is not likely; therefore, the requirements to isolate the containment from the outside atmosphere are less stringent. Thus, in Mode 6 only those penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere are required to be closed or be capable of being closed, and only one door on each personnel airlock (PAL) is required to be closed. There are three types of containment penetrations addressed: the equipment door, the two PALs, and other penetrations that provide direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere. These penetrations include those for installed systems, such as the Containment Air Purge (CAP) and the Containment Online Purge (COP), and spare penetrations used for maintenance activities such as steam generator sludge lancing. In order to limit the potential escape paths for fission product radioactivity released within containment, TS 3.9.4 requires such penetrations to be in the following status:

- The equipment door is closed and secured by at least four bolts.
- One door in each PAL is closed; both doors in one PAL may be open provided one of the doors is capable of being closed, and a designated individual is available outside the PAL to close the door.
- Other penetrations are closed by a manual or automatic isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent, or are capable of being closed. Each open penetration in the containment purge and exhaust isolation system, which is usually in operation during refueling, is capable of being closed by an operable automatic isolation valve.

The operability, action, and testing requirements for the purge and exhaust isolation system are specified separately in TS 3/4.9.9. To be considered operable, the purge and exhaust isolation system's automatic isolation valves must be capable of closing automatically within the required time upon detection of high radiation levels within the containment (from each of the two manipulator crane area radiation monitoring instrumentation channels), and by manual initiation. The purge and exhaust isolation system includes the four 8-inch COP valves and the four 36-inch CAP valves. In the event a COP or CAP valve is inoperable, TS 3.9.9 Action a requires closing the affected penetration.

When the unit is in Mode 6 during Core Alterations or movement of irradiated fuel within containment, TS 3.3.3.1, "Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operation," and Functional Unit 2.b of TS Table 3.3-6 require two operable channels of the manipulator crane area radiation monitor. Channel operability requires meeting the instrumentation surveillance requirements specified by TS 4.3.3.1 and TS Table 4.3-3 for this monitor. In the event one or both channels of the manipulator crane area radiation monitor are inoperable, TS 3.3.3.1 Actions and Action 23 of TS Table 3.3-6 allows Core Alterations and movement of irradiated fuel within containment to continue provided the containment ventilation isolation valves (the COP and CAP valves) are maintained closed.

A ventilation penetration is inoperable when either (a) the supporting (automatic or manual) actuation instrumentation channels are inoperable, or (b) the automatic isolation valve is open but will not close for some other reason. In the first case, the action requirements of TS 3.3.3.1 and TS 3.9.9 would apply because all open ventilation system automatic isolation valves would be inoperable. These actions require closing the affected ventilation penetrations. In the second case, TS 3.9.4.c.1 and the action requirements of TS 3.9.9 would apply for the affected valve(s), requiring the isolation of the associated penetration(s). However, in this case, TS 3.9.4.c.3 would alternatively permit leaving the penetration open, provided that the penetration is capable of being closed. This provision conflicts with the action requirement of TS 3.9.9, which does not specify this option. One objective of the proposed amendment is to remove this apparent conflict.

The Bases for TS 3/4.9.4 state that for a penetration to be considered capable of being closed, "a designated individual must be available to close or direct remote closure of the penetration in the event of a FHA. 'Available' means stationed at the penetration or performing activities controlled by a procedure on equipment associated with the penetration." The allowance for penetrations to be open provided they are capable of being closed was added by Amendment No. 40, dated August 31, 1995. The licensee revised its design-basis FHA analysis in support of this allowance. Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 15.7.4.1 states that

“the most limiting FHA is defined as the dropping of a spent fuel assembly within an open containment, resulting in the rupture of the cladding of all the fuel rods in the assembly, despite administrative controls and physical limitations imposed on fuel handling operations.” The analysis of the limiting inside-containment FHA assumes that both of the doors in one PAL are open and also a 12-inch diameter penetration is open. The analysis assumes that all the available activity is released from containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere exponentially over a 2-hour period. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee’s analysis, but did not rely on it in determining the acceptability of the allowance. Instead, the staff performed an independent analysis which verified that the consequences of the limiting FHA scenario are within the acceptance criteria of Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Part 100 and the control room operator dose criteria of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 19. The staff concluded the allowance is acceptable because the FHA radiological consequences with the allowance are acceptable. The analysis results are bounding and conservative because in the event of a radiological release inside containment, the intent of the allowances in TSs 3.9.4.b and 3.9.4.c.3 is only to maintain the PAL open long enough to complete containment personnel evacuation, and to rapidly close all other open penetrations addressed by this specification.

The proposed changes to combine TSs 3/4.9.4 and 3/4.9.9 do not affect the assumptions or validity of the FHA analysis, and are consistent with STS 3.9.4.

3.0 EVALUATION

The licensee proposed to combine current TSs 3/4.9.4, “Containment Building Penetrations” and 3/4.9.9, “Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation System,” in proposed TS 3/4.9.4, “Containment Building Penetrations,” consistent with STS 3.9.4. Essentially, proposed TS 3/4.9.4 retains the content and format of current TS 3/4.9.4, while incorporating some administrative clarifications and a technical relaxation, but also contains modifications to include the unique requirements of current TS 3/4.9.9. These changes are summarized and evaluated in the following section.

Changes to the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)

TS 3.9.4.c states:

Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either:

- 1) Closed by a manual or automatic isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent; or
- 2) Be capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment purge and exhaust isolation valve; or
- 3) Be capable of being closed by a designated individual available at the penetration.

The licensee proposed two changes to these requirements. The LCO in current TS 3.9.4.c.2 is revised trail as follows:

- 1) Be capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation System; or.

Changing the capitalization and replacing the word “valve” by “System” does not modify the existing requirement, but clarifies its intent, since the name of the system is not changed and the specified valve is a part of the system. Therefore, this change is administrative and acceptable. This change is consistent with equivalent STS LCO 3.9.4.c.2.

The LCO in current TS 3.9.4.c.3) is modified with a footnote (*) as follows:

- 2) Be capable of being closed by a designated individual available at the penetration.*

* A designated individual shall not be used for manual isolation of valves CAP-V1, CAP-V2, CAP-V3, and/or CAP-V4.

Addition of this explicit restriction is consistent with current plant practices, which are governed by administrative controls. These controls recognize that a designated individual is likely incapable of manually closing a 36-inch containment air purge (CAP) valve within the time assumed by the analysis of the fuel handling accident inside containment (6.2 seconds; UFSAR Table 15.7-18). The licensee stated that such use of a designated individual, under current TS 3.9.4.c.3), is acceptable for 12-inch penetrations, as addressed in Amendment No. 40. This footnote only clarifies the intent of current TS 3.9.4.c.3. Therefore, this change is administrative and acceptable.

The LCO in current TS 3.9.9, which states that “The Containment Purge and Exhaust System shall be OPERABLE,” will no longer be explicitly specified. The operability of the Containment Purge and Exhaust System will still be required implicitly in proposed TS 3.9.4.c.2. If a purge and exhaust penetration is closed by a valve, blind flange, or equivalent, or is capable of being closed by a designated individual, then the supporting Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation System need not be operable for that penetration. Although this appears to be a relaxation of the TS 3.9.9 requirement for all automatic purge and exhaust isolation valves to be operable, it is consistent with the intent of TS 3.9.9 when associated Action a is considered. In the event the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation System is inoperable, this action statement requires closing each purge and exhaust penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere. Completing this action corresponds to satisfying TS 3.9.4.c.1 for these penetrations. Thus, TS 3.9.9 and associated Action a are redundant to existing TSs 3.9.4.c.1 and 3.9.4.c.2, and may be deleted. Removing these redundant requirements from the TSs is an administrative change, and is, therefore, acceptable.

Changes to Applicability and Action Requirements

The Applicability of current TSs 3/4.9.4 and 3/4.9.9 are identical, and are unchanged by this amendment.

This amendment retains the action requirements of current TS 3.9.4 without change.

Current TS 3.9.9 Action a is administratively retained in proposed TS 3.9.4.c.1, as discussed above. Since the existing action statement specifies no Completion Time for isolating the purge and exhaust penetrations in the event of an inoperable Containment Purge and Exhaust System, it is appropriate to present this action as an optional way to meet the LCO, instead of as an action requirement. Therefore, this administrative change in presentation of current TS 3.9.9 Action a in proposed TS 3.9.4.c.1) is acceptable.

Current TS 3.9.9 Action b states “The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.” Since TS 3.0.3 requires a shutdown to Mode 5, this statement is unnecessary; the Applicability of current TS 3/4.9.9, “During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment,” implies that the plant is already shutdown in Mode 6, or the plant is defueled. Core alterations and movement of irradiated fuel within containment can only occur with the plant shutdown in Mode 6. Therefore, deletion of this superfluous action statement is administrative and acceptable.

Changes to Surveillance Requirements

Current TSs 4.9.4 and 4.9.9 are combined into two surveillance requirements in proposed TSs 4.9.4.a and 4.9.4.b, as follows:

Proposed TS 4.9.4.a requires determining that each required penetration is in its required condition within 100 hours prior to starting, and at least once per 7 days during Core Alterations or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment building. This is consistent with the requirements of current TS 4.9.4.a, except for the omission of the explicit language to determine that each [open] penetration is “capable of being closed by an operable automatic containment purge and exhaust isolation valve.” Since proposed TS 3.9.4.c.2) specifies this as an allowed condition for a penetration to be in (open, but “capable of being closed by an operable automatic Containment Purge and Exhaust System”), the proposed wording of this surveillance is equivalent to the existing requirement. The licensee stated that this surveillance for the open purge and exhaust isolation valves will demonstrate the valves are not blocked from closing, and that each valve operator has motive power. (This means that necessary electrical power is available so that on an actuation signal, air will bleed from the pneumatic actuator, which holds the valve open against a spring, allowing the valve to close. These butterfly valves are designed to fail close on loss of power or loss of instrument air pressure). Proposed TS 4.9.4.a will ensure that each of these valves is capable of being closed by a containment ventilation isolation actuation signal. This is consistent with the Bases for equivalent STS SR 3.9.4.1. Additional assurance of the capability of automatic closure of these valves is provided by current TS 4.3.3.1, Table 4.3-3, Functional Unit 2.b, surveillance requirements (channel checks at least once per 12 hours, quarterly digital channel operational tests, and refueling interval channel calibration) on the manipulator crane area radiation monitoring actuation instrumentation, and the inservice testing (IST) required by current TS 4.0.5 and current TS 4.6.3.3. This IST demonstrates the isolation time of each automatic containment penetration isolation valve is within its limit. In summary, proposed TS 4.9.4.a is equivalent to current TS 4.9.4.a. Therefore, this change is administrative and acceptable.

Proposed TS 4.9.4.b requires demonstrating that the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation System is operable at least once every 18 months and within 10 days prior to the start of Core

Alterations or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment building by verifying that containment purge and exhaust isolation occur on manual initiation and on a High Radiation test signal from each of the manipulator crane radiation area monitoring instrumentation channels. This compares to current TSs as follows:

- Current TS 4.9.4.b, requires testing automatic valves in open purge and exhaust penetrations “per the applicable portions of Specification 4.6.3.2,” within 100 hours prior to starting, and at least once per 7 days during Core Alterations or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment building. Current TS 4.6.3.2.c requires verifying that on a Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation test signal, each purge and exhaust valve actuates to its isolation position, normally on an 18-month frequency. This surveillance is essentially the same test as current TS 4.9.9, and is thus duplicative. (This amendment does not propose to change TS 4.6.3.2.c.)
- Current TS 4.9.9 requires demonstrating the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation System operable within 100 hours prior to starting, and at least once per 7 days during Core Alterations (it omits “during movement of irradiated fuel in the containment building”) by verifying that containment purge and exhaust isolation occur on manual initiation and on a High Radiation test signal from each of the manipulator crane radiation area monitoring instrumentation channels.

In summary, the two existing surveillances 4.9.4.b and 4.9.9 are redundant and, therefore, it is reasonable and acceptable to replace them with a single surveillance.

In addition to the administrative change of deleting TS 4.9.9, the licensee proposed relaxations of the current surveillance frequencies. In proposed TS 4.9.4.b, for open purge and exhaust penetrations, (a) the periodic frequency for verifying the automatic closure capability is relaxed from once per 7 days to once per 18 months, which is consistent with equivalent STS SR 3.9.4.2; and (b) the interval to do this same verification before starting Core Alterations or irradiated fuel movement in containment, is relaxed from 100 hours to 10 days (240 hours). Note that this second performance requirement is not specified by the STS.

In its submittal the licensee stated that the relaxation of the periodic frequency from 7 days to 18 months would maintain consistency with other Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation and valve testing TS requirements. This relaxation is reasonable given (a) the relaxed, although still conservative requirement to perform this surveillance within 10 days before starting Core Alterations or irradiated fuel movement in containment, and (2) the assurances of automatic closure capability of any open purge and exhaust valves provided by proposed TS 4.9.4.a with its 7-day frequency, as previously discussed. Therefore, proposed TS 4.9.4.b is acceptable.

Lastly, in order to retain the existing application of current TS 4.9.9 to only the operable, but open automatic isolation valves that are controlled by the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation System, corresponding proposed TS 4.9.4.b is modified by a footnote. This footnote (**) states that TS 4.9.4.b is “Not required for those valves complying with Specification 3.9.4.c.1 or Specification 3.9.4.c.3.” The surveillance need not be met for purge and exhaust automatic isolation valves (the COP valves) that are either (a) closed, or (b) open, but capable of being closed by a dedicated individual at the penetration. Adding this footnote is an administrative change in presentation of the current TS scope for this surveillance. Therefore, it is acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New Hampshire and Massachusetts State officials were notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State officials had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (66 FR 48290). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: C. Harbuck

Date: September 5, 2002