

May 17, 1995

Mr. Harold B. Ray
Senior Vice President
Southern California Edison Company
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
P.O. Box 128
San Clemente, California 92674-0128

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT FOR SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION,
UNIT NO. 2 (TAC NO. M88183) AND UNIT NO. 3 (TAC NO. M88184)

Dear Mr. Ray:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 119 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-10 and Amendment No. 108 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-15 for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated November 3, 1993.

These amendments revise the operability requirements for the containment isolation valves listed in Table 3.6-1 of TS 3/4.6.3, "Containment Isolation Valves," to require that valves in Section D of the table enter an action statement when secured in their engineered safety feature actuation system (ESFAS) actuated position. Previously, when these valves were secured in their ESFAS actuated position, they were considered to be operable even though they were not able to perform their containment isolation function. The associated Bases are revised to reflect these changes.

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By
Mel B. Fields, Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-2
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-361
and 50-362

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 119 to NPF-10
2. Amendment No. 108 to NPF-15
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

DISTRIBUTION

Docket File	Public	MShuaibi	EPeyton
DHagan, T4A43	GHill (4), T5C3	OPA, 02G5	OC/LFDCB, T9E10
EAdensam	PDIV-2/RF	WBateman	OGC, 015B18
CGrimes, 011E22	ACRS (10), T2E26	Region IV	MFields
KPerkins, RIV/WCFO (4)	LHurley, RIV	EButcher	RBarrett

*For previous concurrences see attached ORC

DOCUMENT NAME: S088183.AMD

OFC	LA/DRPW	SCSB*	SPSB*	OTSB *	PM/PD4-2	OGC*
NAME	EPeyton	RBarrett	EButcher	CGrimes	MFields:pk	EHoller
DATE	5/11/95	3/23/95	4/11/95	4/28/95	5/11/95	5/8/95

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OFC	LA/DRPW	SCSB*	SPSB*	OTSB *	PM/PD4-2	OGC *
NAME	EPeyton	RBarrett	EButcher	CGrimes	MFields:pk	EHoller
DATE	4/11/95	3/23/95	4/11/95	4/28/95	4/11/95	5/8/95

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

May 17, 1995

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Senior Vice President
Southern California Edison Company
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
P.O. Box 128
San Clemente, California 92674-0128

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A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Mel B. Fields", is written over the typed name.

Mel B. Fields, Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-2
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-361
and 50-362

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 119 to NPF-10
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3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

Mr. Harold B. Ray

- 2 -

May 17, 1995

cc:

Mr. R. W. Krieger, Vice President
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San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
P. O. Box 128
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY

SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

THE CITY OF RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA

THE CITY OF ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA

DOCKET NO. 50-361

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 119
License No. NPF-10

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Southern California Edison Company, et al. (SCE or the licensee) dated November 3, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-10 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 119, are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern California Edison Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and to be implemented 30 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Mel B. Fields, Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-2
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 17, 1995

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 119 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-10

DOCKET NO. 50-361

Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE

3/4 6-18
3/4 6-19
3/4 6-22
3/4 6-23
--
--
B 3/4 6-5

INSERT

3/4 6-18
3/4 6-19
3/4 6-22
3/4 6-23
3/4 6-23a
3/4 6-23b
B 3/4 6-5

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.2.3 Two independent groups of containment cooling fans shall be OPERABLE with two fan systems to each group.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

- a. With one group of the above required containment cooling fans inoperable and both containment spray systems OPERABLE, restore the inoperable group of cooling fans to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With two groups of the above required containment cooling fans inoperable, and both containment spray systems OPERABLE, restore at least one group of cooling fans to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Restore both above required groups of cooling fans to OPERABLE status within 7 days of initial loss or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- c. With one group of the above required containment cooling fans inoperable and one containment spray system inoperable, restore the inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Restore the inoperable group of containment cooling fans to OPERABLE status within 7 days of initial loss or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.2.3 Each group of containment cooling fans shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by:
 1. Starting each fan group from the control room and verifying that each fan group operates for at least 15 minutes.
 2. Verifying a cooling water flow rate of greater than or equal to 2000 gpm to each cooler.
- b. At least once per refueling interval by verifying that each fan group starts automatically on a Containment Cooling Actuation test signal.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.3 The containment isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE with isolation times as shown in Table 3.6-1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

1. With one or more of the isolation valve(s) specified in Section A, B, C, and E of Table 3.6-1 inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration* that is open and either:
 - a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or
 - b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one automatic valve secured** in the isolation position, or one closed manual valve or blind flange, or
 - c. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
2. With one or more of the valves specified in Section D1 of Table 3.6-1 inoperable, within 4 hours secure the inoperable valve(s) in its ESFAS actuated position, and restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status during the next cold shutdown or 30 days, whichever is shorter; otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
3. With one or more of the valves specified in Section D2 of Table 3.6-1 inoperable, within 4 hours secure the inoperable valve(s) in its ESFAS actuated position, and restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status during the next cold shutdown; otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
4. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

* Any flow path from the atmosphere or a piping system inside of containment to the atmosphere or a piping system outside of containment. Each flow path is considered as a separate "penetration".

** Locked, sealed or otherwise prevented from unintentional operation.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.3.1 The isolation valves specified in Section A, B, and E of Table 3.6-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of testing pursuant to Specification 4.0.5. Valves secured** in their isolated position are considered OPERABLE pursuant to this specification.

4.6.3.2 Each isolation valve (except check valves) specified in Section A, B, and E of Table 3.6-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per refueling interval by verifying that on an ESFAS test signal, each isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each power operated or automatic valve (except check valves) in Section A and B of Table 3.6-1 shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.6.3.4 The manual isolation valves specified in Section C of Table 3.6-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE in accordance with Specifications 4.6.1.1.a and 4.6.1.2.d.

4.6.3.5 The isolation valves specified in Section D1 and D2 of Table 3.6-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE as required by Specification 4.0.5 and surveillance requirements associated with those Limiting Conditions for Operation pertaining to each valve or system in which it is installed. Specification 4.0.5 is not applicable when the valves are secured open.

** Locked, sealed or otherwise prevented from unintentional operation.

TABLE 3.6-1
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (Continued)

<u>PENETRATION NUMBER</u>	<u>VALVE NUMBER</u>	<u>FUNCTION</u>	<u>MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (SEC)</u>
A. AUTOMATIC CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (Cont.)			
43	HV-6216	Component cooling water outlet	40
45	HV-9900	Containment normal A/C chilled water inlet	40
45	HV-9920	Containment normal A/C chilled water inlet	40
46	HV-9971	Containment normal A/C chilled water outlet	40
46	HV-9921	Containment normal A/C chilled water outlet	40
47	HV-7258	Containment waste gas vent header	40
47	HV-7259	Containment waste gas vent header	40
68	2"-129-A-554	Charging line to auxiliary spray check valve	NA
77	HV-5434	Nitrogen supply to safety injection tanks	40
77	2"-108-C-627	Nitrogen supply to safety injection tanks check valve	NA
B. CONTAINMENT PURGE (CPIS)			
18	HV-9949**	Containment purge inlet (normal)	12
18	HV-9948**	Containment purge inlet (normal)	12
18	HV-9821	Containment mini-purge inlet	5
18	HV-9823	Containment mini-purge inlet	5
19	HV-9950**	Containment purge outlet (normal)	12
19	HV-9951**	Containment purge outlet (normal)	12
19	HV-9824	Containment mini-purge outlet	5
19	HV-9825	Containment mini-purge outlet	5
C. MANUAL*			
6	2"-099-C-334	Safety injection drain to RWST	NA
9	HV-9337#@	Shutdown cooling to LPSI pumps	NA
9	HV-9377#@	Shutdown cooling to LPSI pumps	NA
9	HV-9336#@	Shutdown cooling to LPSI pumps	NA
9	HV-9379#@	Shutdown cooling to LPSI pumps	NA
10B	3/4"-038-C-396	Integrated leak rate test pressure sensor	NA
10B	3/4"-039-C-396	Integrated leak rate test pressure sensor	NA
16A	HV-0500	Post LOCA hydrogen monitor	NA
16A	HV-0501	Post LOCA hydrogen monitor	NA
16B	HV-0502 -	Post LOCA hydrogen monitor	NA
16B	HV-0503	Post LOCA hydrogen monitor	NA
20	2"-321-C-376	Quench tank makeup	NA

* Manual valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

** Power to the valve removed in accordance with Specification 3.6.1.7.

Not subject to Type C leakage tests.

@ Shutdown cooling valves may be opened in MODE 4.

TABLE 3.6-1
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (Continued)

<u>PENETRATION NUMBER</u>	<u>VALVE NUMBER</u>	<u>FUNCTION</u>	<u>MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (SEC)</u>
C. MANUAL* (Cont.)			
21	2"-055-C-387	Service air supply line	NA
25	10"-100-C-212	Refueling canal fill and drain	NA
25	10"-101-C-212	Refueling canal fill and drain	NA
31	HV-9946	Containment hydrogen purge inlet	NA
31	HCV-9945	Containment hydrogen purge inlet	NA
68	2"-130-C-334	Charging line to auxiliary spray	NA
70	2"-037-C-387	Auxiliary steam inlet to utility stations	NA
70	2"-038-C-387	Auxiliary steam inlet to utility stations	NA
74	HV-9917	Containment hydrogen purge outlet	NA
74	HCV-9918	Containment hydrogen purge outlet	NA

* Manual valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

Deleted Intentionally

TABLE 3.6-1
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (Continued)

<u>PENETRATION NUMBER</u>	<u>VALVE NUMBER</u>	<u>FUNCTION</u>	<u>MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (SEC)</u>
D1. SAFETY INJECTION			
3	HV-9323#	High Pressure Safety Injection	NA
3	HV-9324#	High Pressure Safety Injection	NA
5	HV-9326#	High Pressure Safety Injection	NA
5	HV-9327#	High Pressure Safety Injection	NA
39	HV-9329#	High Pressure Safety Injection	NA
39	HV-9330#	High Pressure Safety Injection	NA
41	HV-9332#	High Pressure Safety Injection	NA
41	HV-9333#	High Pressure Safety Injection	NA
48	HV-9322#	Low Pressure Safety Injection	NA
49	HV-9325#	Low Pressure Safety Injection	NA
50	HV-9328#	Low Pressure Safety Injection	NA
51	HV-9331#	Low Pressure Safety Injection	NA
D2. OTHER			
8	HV-9200	Charging line to regenerative heat exchanger	NA
10A	HV-0352A#	Containment pressure detectors	NA
27A	HV-0352D#	Containment pressure detectors	NA
40A	HV-0352B#	Containment pressure detectors	NA
73A	HV-0352C#	Containment pressure detectors	NA
52	HV-9367	Containment spray inlet	NA
53	HV-9368	Containment spray inlet	NA
56	HV-6366	Containment emergency A/C cooling water inlet	NA
57	HV-6372	Containment emergency A/C cooling water inlet	NA
58	HV-6368	Containment emergency A/C cooling water inlet	NA
59	HV-6370	Containment emergency A/C cooling water inlet	NA
60	HV-6369	Containment emergency A/C cooling water outlet	NA
61	HV-6371	Containment emergency A/C cooling water outlet	NA
62	HV-6367	Containment emergency A/C cooling water outlet	NA
63	HV-6373	Containment emergency A/C cooling water outlet	NA

#Not subject to Type C leakage tests.

TABLE 3.6-1
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (Continued)

<u>PENETRATION NUMBER</u>	<u>VALVE NUMBER</u>	<u>FUNCTION</u>	<u>MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (SEC)</u>
E. OTHER			
3	3"-018-A-551#	High pressure safety injection	NA
5	3"-019-A-551#	High pressure safety injection	NA
8	2"-122-C-554	Charging line to regenerative heat exchanger	NA
17	HV-4058#*	Steam generator secondary coolant sample	NA
32	HV-8202#	Mainsteam isolation bypass	NA
33	HV-8203#	Mainsteam isolation bypass	NA
36	HV-4054#*	Steam generator blowdown	NA
37	HV-4053#*	Steam generator blowdown	NA
39	3"-020-A-551#	High pressure safety injection	NA
41	3"-021-A-551#	High pressure safety injection	NA
44	HV-4057#*	Steam generator secondary coolant sample	NA
48	8"-072-A-552#	Low pressure safety injection	NA
49	8"-073-A-552#	Low pressure safety injection	NA
50	8"-074-A-552#	Low pressure safety injection	NA
51	8"-075-A-552#	Low pressure safety injection	NA
52	8"-004-C-406	Containment spray inlet	NA
53	8"-006-C-406	Containment spray inlet	NA
54	HV-9304#@	Containment emergency sump recirculation	NA
54	HV-9302#@	Containment emergency sump recirculation	NA
55	HV-9305#@	Containment emergency sump recirculation	NA
55	HV-9303#@	Containment emergency sump recirculation	NA
67	3"-157-A-550	Hot leg injection	NA
67	HV-9434	Hot leg injection	NA
71	3"-158-A-550	Hot leg injection	NA
71	HV-9420	Hot leg injection	NA

Not subject to Type C leakage tests.

* Manual valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

@ These valves are surveilled for position and power available by Technical Specification 3/4 5.2.

DELETED INTENTIONALLY

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (Continued)

Section C of Table 3.6-1 contains a listing of manual valves that are normally closed and assumed to be closed under design basis accident conditions, but which may be opened intermittently for service, maintenance or test during normal operation provided adequate administrative controls are implemented to ensure operator action is taken to close such valves in the event of an accident.

All valves in Section A, B, C, or E are considered OPERABLE for containment isolation purpose if they are indeed locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position and leakage through the affected flow path is shown to be within limits when tested pursuant to 10 CFR 50 Appendix J.

Sections D1 and D2 of Table 3.6-1 each contain a listing of valves which operate automatically to open on an ESFAS signal to prevent or mitigate the consequences of the design basis accident. Surveillance requirement 4.6.1.1.a is not applicable to such valves. The OPERABILITY of such valves is determined by ESFAS response time testing of Specification 3/4.3.2.

Section E of Table 3.6-1 contains a listing of valves which operate automatically to close on an ESFAS signal, valves with dual ESFAS functions (Open/Close), and check valves. Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.1.a is not applicable to such valves. The OPERABILITY of such valves is determined by ESFAS response time testing of Specification 3/4.3.2. The appropriate Action statement(s) of those Limiting Conditions for Operation pertaining to the valve(s) or system in which it is installed shall be applicable.

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL

The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with 1) zirconium-water reactions, 2) radiolytic decomposition of water and 3) corrosion of metals within containment. These hydrogen control systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA", March 1971.

The containment dome air circulators are provided to ensure adequate mixing of the containment atmosphere following a LOCA. The mixing action of the containment dome air circulators combined with the containment spray system and the containment emergency fan coolers will prevent localized accumulations of hydrogen from exceeding the flammable limit.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY

SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

THE CITY OF RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA

THE CITY OF ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA

DOCKET NO. 50-362

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 108
License No. NPF-15

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Southern California Edison Company, et al. (SCE or the licensee) dated November 3, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-15 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 108, are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern California Edison Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and to be implemented 30 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Mel B. Fields, Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-2
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 17, 1995

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 108 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-15

DOCKET NO. 50-362

Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE

3/4 6-19
3/4 6-20
3/4 6-23
3/4 6-24
--
--
B 3/4 6-5

INSERT

3/4 6-19
3/4 6-20
3/4 6-23
3/4 6-24
3/4 6-24a
3/4 6-24b
B 3/4 6-5

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.3 The containment isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE with isolation times as shown in Table 3.6-1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

1. With one or more of the isolation valve(s) specified in Section A, B, C, and E of Table 3.6-1 inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration* that is open and either:
 - a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or
 - b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one automatic valve secured** in the isolation position, or one closed manual valve or blind flange, or
 - c. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
2. With one or more of the valves specified in Section D1 of Table 3.6-1 inoperable, within 4 hours secure the inoperable valve(s) in its ESFAS actuated position, and restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status during the next cold shutdown or 30 days, whichever is shorter; otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
3. With one or more of the valves specified in Section D2 of Table 3.6-1 inoperable, within 4 hours secure the inoperable valve(s) in its ESFAS actuated position, and restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status during the next cold shutdown; otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN with the following 30 hours.
4. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

* Any flow path from the atmosphere or a piping system inside of containment to the atmosphere or a piping system outside of containment. Each flow path is considered as a separate "penetration".

**Locked, sealed or otherwise prevented from unintentional operation.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.3.1 The isolation valves specified in Section A, B, and E of Table 3.6-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of testing pursuant to Specification 4.0.5. Valves secured** in their isolated position are considered OPERABLE pursuant to this specification.

4.6.3.2 Each isolation valve (except check valves) specified in Section A, B, and E of Table 3.6-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per refueling interval by verifying that on an ESFAS test signal, each isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each power operated or automatic valve (except check valves) in Section A and B of Table 3.6-1 shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.6.3.4 The manual isolation valves specified in Section C of Table 3.6-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE in accordance with Specifications 4.6.1.1.a and 4.6.1.2.d.

4.6.3.5 The isolation valves specified in Section D1 and D2 of Table 3.6-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE as required by Specification 4.0.5 and surveillance requirements associated with those Limiting Conditions for Operation pertaining to each valve or system in which it is installed. Specification 4.0.5 is not applicable when the valves are secured open.

**Locked, sealed or otherwise prevented from unintentional operation.

TABLE 3.6-1
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (Continued)

<u>PENETRATION NUMBER</u>	<u>VALVE NUMBER</u>	<u>FUNCTION</u>	<u>MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (SEC)</u>
C. MANUAL* (Cont.)			
21	2"-055-C-387	Service air supply line	NA
25	10"-100-C-212	Refueling canal fill and drain	NA
25	10"-101-C-212	Refueling canal fill and drain	NA
31	HV-9946	Containment hydrogen purge inlet	NA
31	HCV-9945	Containment hydrogen purge inlet	NA
68	2"-130-C-334	Charging line to auxiliary spray	NA
70	2"-037-C-387	Auxiliary steam inlet to utility stations	NA
70	2"-038-C-387	Auxiliary steam inlet to utility stations	NA
74	HV-9917	Containment hydrogen purge outlet	NA
74	HCV-9918	Containment hydrogen purge outlet	NA

* Manual valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

Deleted Intentionally

TABLE 3.6-1
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (Continued)

<u>PENETRATION NUMBER</u>	<u>VALVE NUMBER</u>	<u>FUNCTION</u>	<u>MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (SEC)</u>
D1. SAFETY INJECTION			
3	HV-9323#	High Pressure Safety Injection	NA
3	HV-9324#	High Pressure Safety Injection	NA
5	HV-9326#	High Pressure Safety Injection	NA
5	HV-9327#	High Pressure Safety Injection	NA
39	HV-9329#	High Pressure Safety Injection	NA
39	HV-9330#	High Pressure Safety Injection	NA
41	HV-9332#	High Pressure Safety Injection	NA
41	HV-9333#	High Pressure Safety Injection	NA
48	HV-9322#	Low Pressure Safety Injection	NA
49	HV-9325#	Low Pressure Safety Injection	NA
50	HV-9328#	Low Pressure Safety Injection	NA
51	HV-9331#	Low Pressure Safety Injection	NA
D2. OTHER			
8	HV-9200	Charging line to regenerative heat exchanger	NA
10A	HV-0352A#	Containment pressure detectors	NA
27A	HV-0352D#	Containment pressure detectors	NA
40A	HV-0352B#	Containment pressure detectors	NA
73A	HV-0352C#	Containment pressure detectors	NA
52	HV-9367	Containment spray inlet	NA
53	HV-9368	Containment spray inlet	NA
56	HV-6366	Containment emergency A/C cooling water inlet	NA
57	HV-6372	Containment emergency A/C cooling water inlet	NA
58	HV-6368	Containment emergency A/C cooling water inlet	NA
59	HV-6370	Containment emergency A/C cooling water inlet	NA
60	HV-6369	Containment emergency A/C cooling water outlet	NA
61	HV-6371	Containment emergency A/C cooling water outlet	NA
62	HV-6367	Containment emergency A/C cooling water outlet	NA
63	HV-6373	Containment emergency A/C cooling water outlet	NA

#Not subject to Type C leakage tests.

TABLE 3.6-1
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (Continued)

<u>PENETRATION NUMBER</u>	<u>VALVE NUMBER</u>	<u>FUNCTION</u>	<u>MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (SEC)</u>
E. OTHER			
3	3"-018-A-551#	High pressure safety injection	NA
5	3"-019-A-551#	High pressure safety injection	NA
8	2"-122-C-554	Charging line to regenerative heat exchanger	NA
17	HV-4058#*	Steam generator secondary coolant sample	NA
32	HV-8202#	Mainsteam isolation bypass	NA
33	HV-8203#	Mainsteam isolation bypass	NA
36	HV-4054#*	Steam generator blowdown	NA
37	HV-4053#*	Steam generator blowdown	NA
39	3"-020-A-551#	High pressure safety injection	NA
41	3"-021-A-551#	High pressure safety injection	NA
44	HV-4057#*	Steam generator secondary coolant sample	NA
48	8"-072-A-552#	Low pressure safety injection	NA
49	8"-073-A-552#	Low pressure safety injection	NA
50	8"-074-A-552#	Low pressure safety injection	NA
51	8"-075-A-552#	Low pressure safety injection	NA
52	8"-004-C-406	Containment spray inlet	NA
53	8"-006-C-406	Containment spray inlet	NA
54	HV-9304#@	Containment emergency sump recirculation	NA
54	HV-9302#@	Containment emergency sump recirculation	NA
55	HV-9305#@	Containment emergency sump recirculation	NA
55	HV-9303#@	Containment emergency sump recirculation	NA
67	3"-157-A-550	Hot leg injection	NA
67	HV-9434	Hot leg injection	NA
71	3"-158-A-550	Hot leg injection	NA
71	HV-9420	Hot leg injection	NA

Not subject to Type C leakage tests.

* Manual valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

@ These valves are surveilled for position and power available by Technical Specification 3/4 5.2.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (Continued)

All valves in Section A, B, C, or E are considered OPERABLE for containment isolation purpose if they are indeed locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position and leakage through the affected flow path is shown to be within limits when tested pursuant to 10 CFR 50 Appendix J.

Sections D1 and D2 of Table 3.6-1 each contain a listing of valves which operate automatically to open on an ESFAS signal to prevent or mitigate the consequences of the design basis accident. Surveillance requirement 4.6.1.1.a is not applicable to such valves. The OPERABILITY of such valves is determined by ESFAS response time testing of Specification 3/4.3.2.

Section E of Table 3.6-1 contains a listing of valves which operate automatically to close on an ESFAS signal, valves with dual ESFAS functions (Open/Close), and check valves. Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.1.a is not applicable to such valves. The OPERABILITY of such valves is determined by ESFAS response time testing of Specification 3/4.3.2. The appropriate Action statement(s) of those Limiting Conditions for Operation pertaining to the valve(s) or system in which it is installed shall be applicable.

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL

The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with 1) zirconium-water reactions, 2) radiolytic decomposition of water and 3) corrosion of metals within containment. These hydrogen control systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA", March 1971.

The containment dome air circulators are provided to ensure adequate mixing of the containment atmosphere following a LOCA. The mixing action of the containment dome air circulators combined with the containment spray system and the containment emergency fan coolers will prevent localized accumulations of hydrogen from exceeding the flammable limit.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 119 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-10
AND AMENDMENT NO. 108 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-15
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY
SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
THE CITY OF RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA
THE CITY OF ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3
DOCKET NOS. 50-361 AND 50-362

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated November 3, 1993, Southern California Edison Company, et al. (SCE or the licensee), submitted a request for changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3. The proposed changes would revise TS 3/4.6.3, "Containment Isolation Valves," TS Table 3.6-1, "Containment Isolation Valves," and the associated Bases, 3/4.6.3, to ensure that the containment isolation valves in Section D of the table are maintained functional. The proposed TS (1) require that these valves be in an ACTION statement when secured in their engineered safety feature actuation signal (ESFAS) actuated position and (2) limit the amount of time that these valves may be secured in their ESFAS position. Prior to these amendments, a footnote in TS 3/4.6.3 considered these valves operable as long as they were secured in their ESFAS actuated position, even though they were incapable of performing their containment isolation function.

2.0 EVALUATION

The function of the containment isolation valves is to isolate the containment atmosphere from the outside environment in the event of a postulated accident. TS 3/4.6.3 ensures this function by (1) requiring the valves listed in Sections A, B, C, and D of Table 3.6-1 to be operable in Modes 1 through 4, (2) specifying surveillance requirements (SRs) to verify operability of these valves, and (3) providing the actions to be taken when the operability requirements are not met.

Table 3.6-1 is currently divided into four sections. Section A, "Automatic Containment Isolation," contains containment isolation valves that are

actuated by a containment isolation actuation signal and check valves inside containment that are considered to be automatic containment isolation valves in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50 general design criteria. Section B, "Containment Purge," contains containment purge isolation valves that are actuated by the containment purge isolation signal. Section C, "Manual," contains manual valves that are assumed to be closed post-accident, but can, under administrative control, be opened during normal operation. Section D, "Other," contains valves whose normal safe post-accident position is open, check valves, valves with a closed ESFAS actuated position, and valves with dual ESFAS functions (open/close).

Existing TS consider valves in Section D of Table 3.6-1 operable when secured in their ESFAS actuated position. However, when secured, these valves may not be able to perform their containment isolation function. Additionally, existing TS do not limit the amount of time that these valves can be secured in their ESFAS actuated position. A footnote which allows securing check valves and valves with dual ESFAS positions in their ESFAS actuation positions is also inappropriately applied to some Section D valves. Therefore, the licensee proposes to reorganize the existing Section D valves into three sections (D1, D2 and E). In addition, the licensee proposes appropriate ACTION statements and allowable outage times (AOTs) for each of these sections.

The proposed reorganization of Section D was based on risk evaluations assessing the duration that these valves can be secured in the open position without significantly contributing to the risk of a significant offsite release. The acceptance criteria for the risk evaluations are as follows: (1) the risk of continued operation with the valves secured in their ESFAS actuated position shall be less than the risk of shutdown (core damage risk per shutdown is $5.0E-7$), and (2) the increase in risk of core damage frequency and significant offsite release frequency with the valves secured in their ESFAS actuated position shall be less than 1 percent of current individual plant examination (IPE) values (1 percent of IPE values corresponds to less than $3.1E-7$ per year for core damage and less than $4.9E-8$ per year for significant offsite release).

The proposed Section D1 contains high-pressure safety injection (HPSI) and low-pressure safety injection (LPSI) valves that have been found to have an acceptable AOT of 90 days. Risk evaluations performed by the licensee for this section of valves found (1) that there is a bigger risk associated with shutdown than there is with continued operation with these valves secured in their ESFAS actuation positions and (2) that there is a less than 1 percent increase in current IPE core damage or significant offsite release frequencies associated with securing these valves in their ESFAS actuated positions for 90 days. An ACTION statement requiring inoperable valves to be secured in their ESFAS actuated position within 4 hours and restored to operable status during the next cold shutdown or 30 days, whichever is shorter, is provided for this category. If these requirements are not met, the plant is required to be in at least hot standby within 6 hours and cold shutdown within the following 30 hours. Although the 90-day AOT resulted in acceptable risk

values, the licensee chose 30 days to provide additional conservatism for this group of containment isolation valves.

The proposed Section D2 contains valves that were found to have an acceptable indefinite AOT. Risk evaluations for this section of valves found (1) that there is a bigger risk associated with shutdown than with continued operation with these valves secured in their ESFAS actuation positions and (2) that there is a less than 1 percent increase in the updated IPE core damage or significant offsite release frequencies associated with securing these valves in their ESFAS actuated positions indefinitely or until the next cold shutdown. Inoperable valves in this category will be required to be secured in their ESFAS actuated position within 4 hours and operable prior to entry into Mode 4 from the next cold shutdown. Otherwise, the plant is required to be in at least hot standby within 6 hours and cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

The proposed Section E contains valves that should not be secured open. These valves will be added to existing Action 1 of TS 3.6.3 and will, therefore, be treated like the valves of Sections A, B, and C. Action 1 requires that either the inoperable valve(s) be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration be isolated within 4 hours. If this action is not satisfied, the plant is required to be in at least hot standby within 6 hours and cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

Based on the above discussion the staff finds acceptable the licensee's request to (1) reorganize existing Section D in Table 3.6-1 into Sections D1, "Safety Injection," D2, "Other," and E, "Other," as explained above; (2) add "E" to existing ACTION Statement 1 to require that the valves of new Section E be bounded by ACTION 1 of TS 3/4.6.3; (3) replace existing ACTION 2 with "With one or more of the valves specified in Section D1 of Table 3.6-1 inoperable, within 4 hours secure the inoperable valve(s) in its ESFAS actuated position, and restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status during the next cold shutdown or 30 days, whichever is shorter; otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours"; and (4) add ACTION 3 stating "With one or more of the valves specified in Section D2 of Table 3.6-1 inoperable, within 4 hours secure the inoperable valve(s) in its ESFAS actuated position, and restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status during the next cold shutdown; otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours."

The licensee also proposes to relocate ACTION 1.d, "The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable," as ACTION 4. Thus, Specification 3.0.4 would not apply to any of the ACTION statements of this limiting condition for operation. This would allow the plant to continue operation, including mode changes, with containment isolation valves secured in their ESFAS actuated positions as long as the remaining Action statements are satisfied. The remaining ACTION statements limit the amount of time that these valves can be inoperable. As discussed earlier, these time constraints were conservatively derived from analyses of shutdown risk and core damage and

significant offsite release frequencies resulting from securing the valves in their ESFAS actuated positions. Therefore, the staff finds the licensee's request to relocate ACTION 1.d as ACTION 4 acceptable.

The last sentence in SR 4.6.3.1 currently reads "Valves secured** in their actuated position are considered OPERABLE pursuant to this specification." After verbal discussions between the staff and the licensee, it was agreed that changing the word "actuated" to "isolated" would more clearly indicate to the operators that the valves would have to be in their closed position in order for the valves to be considered OPERABLE pursuant to this TS. The licensee requested that its submitted TS change request be amended to reflect this change.

In addition, the licensee proposes to (1) relocate SR 4.6.3.1 to the next page due to text overflow; (2) add "E" to SRs 4.6.3.1 and 4.6.3.2; (3) replace "D" with "D1" and "D2" in SR 4.6.3.5; (4) replace the last sentence of SR 4.6.3.5, "Valves secured** in the ESFAS actuated position are considered OPERABLE pursuant to this specification," with "Specification 4.0.5 is not applicable when the valves are secured open"; (5) delete or relocate footnotes in Table 3.6-1, as appropriate, based on the proposed reorganization of the existing Section D valves; and (6) revise the existing Bases to reflect the above changes. These changes were reviewed by the staff and found necessary to maintain consistency within the TS and provide appropriate SRs for the newly formed sections. Therefore, the staff finds these changes acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the California State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (59 FR 7699). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Mohammed Shuaibi

Date: May 17, 1995