

50-361/362



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

November 23, 1994

Mr. Harold B. Ray
Senior Vice President
Southern California Edison Co.
Irvine Operations Center
23 Parker Street
Irvine, California 92718

Mr. Edwin A. Guiles
Vice President
Engineering and Operations
San Diego Gas & Electric Co.
101 Ash Street
San Diego, California 92112

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT FOR SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION,
UNIT NO. 2 (TAC NO. M85945) AND UNIT NO. 3 (TAC NO. M85946)

Gentlemen:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 114 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-10 and Amendment No. 103 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-15 for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated March 5, 1993 (PCN-329), as supplemented by letter dated September 22, 1994.

These amendments propose to revise Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.7.1.1, "Main Steam Safety Valves," and the associated Bases to (1) increase the as-found setpoint tolerance of Table 3.7-1 for the Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) from ± 1 percent to +2 percent and -3 percent; (2) add a footnote to Table 3.7-1 to indicate that the setpoint tolerance for the lowest set pair of MSSVs will be +1 percent and -3 percent; (3) add a footnote to TS 3.7.1.1 and revise footnote 1 of Table 3.7-1 to clarify that the MSSVs will be left at the lift setting according to Table 3.7-1 within a ± 1 percent tolerance following inservice testing; (4) add an ACTION statement requiring the plant to be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 12 hours for the case of less than five MSSVs operable per operable steam generator; (5) require the plant to be in "HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 12 hours" instead of "COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours" per the existing ACTION statement; (6) revise the title of column 1 of Table 3.7-2 to read "Number of Operable Safety Valves per Operable Steam Generator," instead of "Maximum Number of Inoperable Safety Valves on Any Operating Steam Generator," for better readability; and (7) delete the ORIFICE SIZE column of Table 3.7-1.

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Messrs. Ray and Guiles

- 2 -

November 23, 1994

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

Mel B. Fields, Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-2
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362

- Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 114 to NPF-10
- 2. Amendment No. 103 to NPF-15
- 3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encs: See next page

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TQuay	OGC	DHagan
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MShuaibi	JNorberg	OPA
MFields	GHill (4)	

DOCUMENT NAME: S085945.AMD

OFC	LA:DRPW <i>DM</i>	PN:PD4-2	EMEB <i>10/24/94</i>	SRXB <i>DM</i>	OGC <i>WTA</i>
NAME	DFoster-Curseen	MFields:pk <i>MF</i>	RWessman	RJones	<i>WTA</i>
DATE	<i>10/24/94</i>	<i>10/24/94 11/23/94</i>	<i>10/24/94</i>	<i>11/3/94</i>	<i>11/15/94</i>

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Messrs. Ray and Guiles

- 2 -

November 23, 1994

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

Mel B. Fields, Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-2
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362

- Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 114 to NPF-10
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cc w/encls: See next page

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NAME	DFoster-Curseen	MFields:pk <i>[Signature]</i>	RWessman	RJones	<i>[Signature]</i>
DATE	10/24/94	10/24/94 <i>11/23/94</i>	10/24/94	11/3/94	11/15/94

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Messrs. Ray and Guiles

- 2 -

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Mel B. Fields

Mel B. Fields, Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-2
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No.114 to NPF-10
2. Amendment No.103 to NPF-15
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

Messrs. Ray and Guiles
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY

SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

THE CITY OF RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA

THE CITY OF ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA

DOCKET NO. 50-361

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 114
License No. NPF-10

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Southern California Edison Company, et al. (SCE or the licensee) dated March 5, 1993, as supplemented by letter dated September 22, 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-10 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 114, are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern California Edison Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and must be fully implemented no later than 30 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Mel B. Fields, Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-2
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: November 23, 1994

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 114 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-10

DOCKET NO. 50-361

Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE

XIX
3/4 7-1
3/4 7-2
3/4 7-3
B 3/4 7-1

INSERT

XIX
3/4 7-1
3/4 7-2
3/4 7-3
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3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE

SAFETY VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.1 All main steam safety valves shall be OPERABLE with as-found lift settings as specified in Table 3.7-1.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With both reactor coolant loops and associated steam generators in operation and with one or more main steam safety valves inoperable, operation in MODES 1, 2 and 3 may proceed provided, that within 4 hours, the Power Level-High trip setpoint is reduced per Table 3.7-2; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 12 hours.
- b. With one or more Steam Generators having less than five main steam safety valves OPERABLE, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 12 hours.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.1 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

*Following testing according to Specification 4.0.5, MSSVs will be returned to within +/-1% of the lift setting specified in Table 3.7-1.

TABLE 3.7-1

MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES

	<u>VALVE NUMBER</u>		<u>LIFT SETTING*</u>
	<u>Line No. 1</u>	<u>Line No. 2</u>	
a.	2PSV-8401	2PSV-8410	1100 psia**
b.	2PSV-8402	2PSV-8411	1107 psia
c.	2PSV-8403	2PSV-8412	1114 psia
d.	2PSV-8404	2PSV-8413	1121 psia
e.	2PSV-8405	2PSV-8414	1128 psia
f.	2PSV-8406	2PSV-8415	1135 psia
g.	2PSV-8407	2PSV-8416	1142 psia
h.	2PSV-8408	2PSV-8417	1149 psia
i.	2PSV-8409	2PSV-8418	1155 psia

*The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure. Each MSSV has an as-found tolerance of +2%/-3%. Following testing according to Specification 4.0.5, MSSVs will be set within +/-1% of the specified lift setpoint.

**Valves 2PSV-8401 and 2PSV-8410 have an as-found lift setting of 1100 psia with a tolerance of +1%/-3%.

TABLE 3.7-2

MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE VALUE LINEAR POWER LEVEL-HIGH TRIP WITH OPERABLE
MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES DURING OPERATION WITH BOTH STEAM GENERATORS

<u>Number of Operable Safety Valves Per Operable Steam Generator</u>	<u>Maximum Allowable Value Linear Power Level-High Trip (Percent of RATED THERMAL POWER)</u>
8	98.6
7	86.3
6	74.0
5	61.6

3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE

3/4.7.1.1 SAFETY VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the main steam safety valves (MSSVs) ensures that the secondary system pressure will not exceed 110% (1210 psia) of its design pressure of 1100 psia during the most severe anticipated system operational transient. The total relief capacity available is greater than the maximum steam flow required after a turbine trip from 102% RATED THERMAL POWER coincident with an assumed loss of condenser heat sink.

The MSSV lift setpoints are staggered, as shown in Table 3.7-1, such that only those valves needed for pressure relief will actuate. Column 3 and footnotes 1 and 2 of Table 3.7-1 specify the setpoints and tolerances which meet valve operability requirements consistent with the safety analysis assumptions. The MSSVs were constructed in accordance with the requirements of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1974 Edition, as described in the Overpressure Protection Report (UFSAR Appendix 5.2A). The valves are tested under ASME Section XI per Technical Specification 4.0.5. The total available relieving capacity for all valves on all of the steam lines is 15,473,628 lbs/hr at 1190 psia. A minimum of one OPERABLE safety valve per steam generator ensures that sufficient relieving capacity is available for removing decay heat.

The lowest allowable lift setting of 1067 psia (1100 psia -3%) is bounded by existing analyses. The radiological release assumptions used in the Steam Generator Tube Rupture dose assessment bound the source terms which are based on a low MSSV setpoint of 1100 psia with 15% MSSV blowdown. Moreover, steam generator releases and integrated primary to secondary mass leakage with 15% MSSV blowdown from the lowest allowable lift setting of 1067 psia would not be significantly different from those assuming 15% blowdown from 1100 psia.

STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION is allowable with safety valves inoperable within the limitations of the ACTION requirements on the basis of the reduction in secondary system steam flow and THERMAL POWER required by the reduced reactor trip settings of the Power Level-High channels. The reduced reactor trip allowable values are derived on the following bases:

$$SP = \frac{(X) - (Y)(V)}{X} \times 111.0$$

where:

SP = reduced reactor trip allowable value in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER.

V = maximum number of inoperable safety valves per steam line.

111.0 = Power Level-High Trip allowable value from Table 2.2-1.

X = Total relieving capacity of all safety valves per steam line in lbs/hour (7,736,814 lbs/hr at 1190 psia).

Y = Maximum relieving capacity of any one safety valve in lbs/hour (859,646 lbs/hr at 1190 psia).

PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the auxiliary feedwater system ensures that the Reactor Coolant System can be cooled down to less than 350°F from normal operating conditions in the event of a total loss of off-site power. In addition, the flow paths are automatically aligned to support an Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal or a Main Steam Isolation Signal.

Each electric driven auxiliary feedwater pump is capable of delivering a total feedwater flow of 700 gpm at a pressure of 1170 psig to the entrance of the steam generators. The steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump is capable of delivering a total feedwater flow of 700 gpm at a pressure of 1170 psig to the entrance of the steam generators. This capacity is sufficient to ensure that adequate feedwater flow is available to remove decay heat and reduce the Reactor Coolant System temperature to less than 350°F when the shutdown cooling system may be placed into operation.

Each electric driven auxiliary feedwater pump is powered from an independent 1E power supply, and feeds one steam generator through a set of valves powered from the same 1E source. The AC-powered valves associated with the same train electric driven auxiliary feedwater pump defines that flow path. The steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump can feed each steam generator through two sets of valves powered from 125VDC 1E power sources. Each set of valves aligned to a steam generator from the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump, are powered from the opposite train from the valves from the corresponding electric driven auxiliary feedwater pump. For purposes of identifying the appropriate action statement, the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump flow path is defined as both sets of valves aligned to steam generators. Loss of Operability of one or more of the DC powered valves constitutes loss of the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater flow path.

If the steam generators are used for decay heat removal in Mode 4 under the provisions of Technical Specifications 3/4.4.1.3, at least one motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump and associated flow path per steam generator is required to be OPERABLE to provide decay heat removal.

3/4.7.1.3 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANKS

The OPERABILITY of the condensate storage tank T-121 with the minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available to maintain the RCS at HOT STANDBY conditions for 2 hours followed by cooldown to shutdown cooling initiation, with steam discharge to atmosphere with concurrent loss of offsite power and most limiting single failure. The OPERABILITY of condensate storage tank T-120 in conjunction with tank T-121 ensures that sufficient water is available to maintain the RCS at HOT STANDBY conditions for 24 hours including cooldown to shutdown cooling initiation, with steam discharge to atmosphere with concurrent loss of offsite power and most limiting single failure. The contained water volume limits are specified relative to the highest auxiliary feedwater



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY

SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

THE CITY OF RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA

THE CITY OF ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA

DOCKET NO. 50-362

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 103
License No. NPF-15

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Southern California Edison Company, et al. (SCE or the licensee) dated March 5, 1993, as supplemented by letter dated September 22, 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-15 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 103, are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern California Edison Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and must be fully implemented no later than 30 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Mel B. Fields, Project Director
Project Directorate IV-2
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: November 23, 1994

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 103 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-15

DOCKET NO. 50-362

Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE

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3/4 7-1
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3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE

SAFETY VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.1 All main steam safety valves shall be OPERABLE with as-found lift settings as specified in Table 3.7-1.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With both reactor coolant loops and associated steam generators in operation and with one or more main steam safety valves inoperable, operation in MODES 1, 2 and 3 may proceed provided, that within 4 hours, the Power Level-High trip setpoint is reduced per Table 3.7-2; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 12 hours.
- b. With one or more Steam Generators having less than five main steam safety valves OPERABLE, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 12 hours.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.1 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

*Following testing according to Specification 4.0.5, MSSVs will be returned to within +/-1% of the lift setting specified in Table 3.7-1.

TABLE 3.7-1

MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES

	<u>VALVE NUMBER</u>		<u>LIFT SETTING*</u>
	<u>Line No. 1</u>	<u>Line No. 2</u>	
a.	3PSV-8401	3PSV-8410	1100 psia**
b.	3PSV-8402	3PSV-8411	1107 psia
c.	3PSV-8403	3PSV-8412	1114 psia
d.	3PSV-8404	3PSV-8413	1121 psia
e.	3PSV-8405	3PSV-8414	1128 psia
f.	3PSV-8406	3PSV-8415	1135 psia
g.	3PSV-8407	3PSV-8416	1142 psia
h.	3PSV-8408	3PSV-8417	1149 psia
i.	3PSV-8409	3PSV-8418	1155 psia

*The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure. Each MSSV has an as-found tolerance of +2%/-3%. Following testing according to Specification 4.0.5, MSSVs will be set within +/-1% of the specified lift setting.

**Valves 3PSV-8401 and 3PSV-8410 have an as-found lift setting of 1100 psia with a tolerance of +/-1%/-3%.

TABLE 3.7-2

MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE VALUE LINEAR POWER LEVEL-HIGH TRIP WITH OPERABLE
MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES DURING OPERATION WITH BOTH STEAM GENERATORS

<u>Number of Operable Safety Valves Per Operable Steam Generator</u>	<u>Maximum Allowable Value Linear Power Level-High Trip (Percent of RATED THERMAL POWER)</u>
8	98.6
7	86.3
6	74.0
5	61.6

PLANT SYSTEMS

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.2.1 At least three independent steam generator auxiliary feedwater pumps and associated flow paths shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. Two motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, each capable of being powered from separate emergency busses,
- b. One steam turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump capable of being powered from an OPERABLE steam supply system, and
- c. Manual valves in the correct position and automatic valves each capable of being opened and closed, with the following exceptions:
 1. Motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge bypass control valves, HV-4762 and HV-4763, need only be capable of being closed,
 2. Steam turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump steam supply isolation valves, HV-8200 and HV-8201, and turbine stop valve, HV-4716, need only be capable of being opened, and
 3. Manual crosstie valves 1305MU634 and 1305MU635 may be open in Mode 3 provided a minimum of 2 hours has elapsed since reactor shutdown.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With one auxiliary feedwater pump or its associated flow path inoperable, restore the required auxiliary feedwater pump and its associated flow path to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- b. With either two auxiliary feedwater pumps, two flow paths, or one pump and one separate flow path inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- c. With three auxiliary feedwater pumps or flow paths inoperable, immediately initiate corrective action to restore at least one auxiliary feedwater pump and its associated flow path to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.
- d. With an automatic valve in any flow path incapable of closing upon receipt of a Main Steam Isolation Signal, close the affected valve or its block valve within 4 hours and enter actions a, b, or c if there is a loss of the flow path(s). Testing pursuant to Technical Specification 3.3.2 does not constitute entry into this ACTION Statement.

3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE

3/4.7.1.1 SAFETY VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the main steam safety valves (MSSVs) ensures that the secondary system pressure will not exceed 110% (1210 psia) of its design pressure of 1100 psia during the most severe anticipated system operational transient. The total relief capacity available is greater than the maximum steam flow required after a turbine trip from 102% RATED THERMAL POWER coincident with an assumed loss of condenser heat sink.

The MSSV lift setpoints are staggered, as shown in Table 3.7-1, such that only those valves needed for pressure relief will actuate. Column 3 and footnotes 1 and 2 of Table 3.7-1 specify the setpoints and tolerances which meet valve operability requirements consistent with the safety analysis assumptions. The MSSVs were constructed in accordance with the requirements of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1974 Edition, as described in the Overpressure Protection Report (UFSAR Appendix 5.2A). The valves are tested under ASME Section XI per Technical Specification 4.0.5. The total available relieving capacity for all valves on all of the steam lines is 15,473,628 lbs/hr at 1190 psia. A minimum of one OPERABLE safety valve per steam generator ensures that sufficient relieving capacity is available for removing decay heat.

The lowest allowable lift setting of 1067 psia (1100 psia -3%) is bounded by existing analyses. The radiological release assumptions used in the Steam Generator Tube Rupture dose assessment bound the source terms which are based on a low MSSV setpoint of 1100 psia with 15% MSSV blowdown. Moreover, steam generator releases and integrated primary to secondary mass leakage with 15% MSSV blowdown from the lowest allowable lift setting of 1067 psia would not be significantly different from those assuming 15% blowdown from 1100 psia.

STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION is allowable with safety valves inoperable within the limitations of the ACTION requirements on the basis of the reduction in secondary system steam flow and THERMAL POWER required by the reduced reactor trip settings of the Power Level-High channels. The reduced reactor trip allowable values are derived on the following bases:

$$SP = \frac{(X) - (Y)(V)}{X} \times 111.0$$

where:

SP = reduced reactor trip allowable value in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER.

V = maximum number of inoperable safety valves per steam line.

111.0 = Power Level-High Trip allowable value from Table 2.2-1.

X = Total relieving capacity of all safety valves per steam line in lbs/hour (7,736,814 lbs/hr at 1190 psia).

Y = Maximum relieving capacity of any one safety valve in lbs/hour (859,646 lbs/hr at 1190 psia).

PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the auxiliary feedwater system ensures that the Reactor Coolant System can be cooled down to less than 350°F from normal operating conditions in the event of a total loss of offsite power. In addition, the flow paths are automatically aligned to support an Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal or Main Steam Isolation Signal.

Each electric-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is capable of delivering a total feedwater flow of 700 gpm at a pressure of 1170 psig to the entrance of the steam generators. The steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is capable of delivering a total feedwater flow of 700 gpm at a pressure of 1170 psig to the entrance of the steam generators. This capacity is sufficient to ensure that adequate feedwater flow is available to remove decay heat and reduce the Reactor Coolant System temperature to less than 350°F when the shutdown cooling system may be placed into operation.

Each electric driven auxiliary feedwater pump is powered from an independent 1E power supply, and feeds one steam generator through a set of valves powered from the same 1E source. The AC-powered valves associated with the same train electric driven auxiliary feedwater pump defines that flow path. The steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump can feed each steam generator through two sets of valves powered from 125VDC 1E power sources. Each set of valves aligned to a steam generator from the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump, are powered from the opposite train from the valves from the corresponding electric driven auxiliary feedwater pump. For purposes of identifying the appropriate action statement, the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump flow path is defined as both sets of valves aligned to steam generators. Loss of Operability of one or more of the DC powered valves constitutes loss of the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater flow path.

If the steam generators are used for decay heat removal in Mode 4 under the provisions of Technical Specifications 3/4.4.1.3, at least one motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump and associated flow path per steam generator is required to be OPERABLE to provide decay removal.

3/4.7.1.3 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANKS

The OPERABILITY of the condensate storage tank T-121 with the minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available to maintain the RCS at HOT STANDBY conditions for 2 hours followed by cooldown to shutdown cooling initiation, with steam discharge to atmosphere with concurrent loss of offsite power and most limiting single failure. The OPERABILITY of condensate storage tank T-120 in conjunction with tank T-121 ensures that sufficient water is available to maintain the RCS at HOT STANDBY conditions for 24 hours including cooldown to shutdown cooling initiation, with steam discharge to atmosphere with concurrent loss of offsite power and most limiting single failure. The contained water volume limits are specified relative to the highest auxiliary feedwater pump suction inlet in the tank for T-121, and to the T-121 cross connect siphon inlet for T-120. (Water volume below these datum levels is



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 114 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-10
AND AMENDMENT NO. 103 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-15
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY
SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
THE CITY OF RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA
THE CITY OF ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3
DOCKET NOS. 50-361 AND 50-362

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated March 5, 1993, and supplemented by letter dated September 22, 1994, Southern California Edison Company, et al. (SCE or the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3. The proposed changes would revise Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.7.1.1, "Main Steam Safety Valves," and the associated Bases to (1) increase the as-found setpoint tolerance of Table 3.7-1 for the Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) from ± 1 percent to +2 percent and -3 percent; (2) add a footnote to Table 3.7-1 to indicate that the setpoint tolerance for the lowest set pair of MSSVs will be +1 percent and -3 percent; (3) add a footnote to TS 3.7.1.1 and revise footnote 1 of Table 3.7-1 to clarify that the MSSVs will be left at the lift setting according to Table 3.7-1 within a ± 1 percent tolerance following inservice testing; (4) add an ACTION statement requiring the plant to be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 12 hours for the case of less than five MSSVs operable per operable steam generator; (5) require the plant to be in "HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 12 hours" instead of "COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours" per the existing ACTION statement; (6) revise the title of column 1 of Table 3.7-2 to read "Number of Operable Safety Valves per Operable Steam Generator," instead of "Maximum Number of Inoperable Safety Valves on Any Operating Steam Generator," for better readability; and (7) delete the ORIFICE SIZE column of Table 3.7-1.

The additional information contained in the supplemental letter dated September 22, 1994, served to clarify the amendments, was within the scope of the initial notice, and did not affect the Commission's proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

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2.0 EVALUATION

The licensee proposes to revise Technical Specification 3.7.1.1 and Table 3.7-1 to (1) increase the as-found setpoint tolerance of the MSSVs from ± 1 percent to $+2/-3$ percent, (2) maintain the lowest set pair of valves at 1100 psia $+1/-3$ percent, and (3) require the as-left setpoint tolerance to be within ± 1 percent. The purpose of these changes is to increase the allowable lift setting tolerance for normal MSSV setpoint drift. To support the proposed changes, the licensee considered the results of transients and accidents that would be affected by the proposal in its reanalyses. These parameters are overpressurization events, small break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), and steam generator tube rupture (SGTR).

The MSSVs are designed to prevent overpressurization of the steam generators and associated equipment and to provide a passive heat sink for the primary coolant. To meet these design functions, the actual MSSV lift setpoints must be less than or equal to the limiting lift setpoint assumed in the overpressurization analyses. These overpressurization analyses are performed using loss of condenser vacuum (LOCV) and feedwater line break (FWLB) as the limiting events. As a result, the licensee incorporated these events into its reanalyses.

The LOCV and FWLB events were reanalyzed assuming lift setpoints 2 percent above the existing TS setpoints. As a result of this change, the LOCV peak primary and secondary pressures were found to increase from 2732 psia to 2734 psia and from 1186 psia to 1195 psia, respectively. These new calculated values are within the maximum allowable primary and secondary pressures of 2750 psia and 1210 psia respectively. Additionally, the reanalyses found that the FWLB peak primary pressure does not increase from its current value of 2911 psia but that the FWLB secondary pressure increases from 1150 psia to 1160 psia. These values are also found within the maximum allowable primary and secondary FWLB pressures of 3000 psia and 1210 psia, respectively, for the San Onofre units.

The -3 percent as-found tolerance proposed by this request allows for only one of the nine MSSVs to reach the 1067 psia. In accordance with the proposed changes and Table 3.7-1 all other MSSVs as-found settings must be above 1067 psia.

In the event of a small-break LOCA, raising the upper limit of lift pressures over the existing TS values would affect the initial condition of the event. This event was not reanalyzed by the licensee. Instead, a footnote is proposed to be added to Table 3.7-1 which requires that the lowest set pair of valves will be maintained at 1100 psia $+1/-3$ percent. This note would ensure that the lowest set pair of valves would lift as is required by the current TS (at the current highest allowable lift pressure).

In the case of an SGTR, operation of the MSSVs at reduced pressures can impact radiological releases and primary-to-secondary leakage following the event. In case of maximum allowable negative drift, the proposed changes would potentially reduce the lifting pressure of the lowest set pair of valves from

1089 psia (1100 psia -1 percent) to 1067 psia (1100 psia -3 percent). However, on studying the existing SGTR analysis, it was determined that the MSSV model used bounds the characteristics of an MSSV with setpoints as low as 1067 psia. Therefore, the proposed changes are within the limits of the existing analyses and maintain the current dose assumption associated with a SGTR.

The revisions to add a footnote to limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.7.1.1 and to revise footnote 1 of Table 3.7-1 are intended to (1) clarify that the MSSVs must be left within a ± 1 percent tolerance following inservice testing and (2) reduce the potential of the setpoint drifting outside the proposed acceptable $+2/-3$ percent tolerance range before the next scheduled inservice testing. In accordance with these revisions, if after inservice testing an MSSV is found to be within the as-found $+2/-3$ percent, but outside the as-left ± 1 percent tolerance limits, the valve will be considered operable but must be returned to within the as-left ± 1 limit of the setpoint.

Based on the above considerations, the staff finds acceptable the proposed revisions to Technical Specification 3.7.1.1 and Table 3.7-1 to (1) increase the as-found setpoint tolerance of the MSSVs from ± 1 percent to $+2/-3$ percents, (2) maintain the lowest set pair of valves at 1100 psia $+1/-3$ percent and (3) require the as-left setpoint tolerance to be within ± 1 percent.

The licensee proposes to revise ACTION statement "a" of TS 3.7.1.1 to (1) require entry into "HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 12 hours" instead of "COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours" and (2) delete the option of restoring the MSSVs to operable status.

While existing TS require entry into COLD SHUTDOWN (Mode 5), the applicability statement for the TS requires the valves operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3. Therefore, since previous analyses of events did not require the valves operable in Mode 4 (HOT SHUTDOWN), the appropriate action if the LCO is not met is to enter Mode 4 (HOT SHUTDOWN). Due to the seriousness of the conditions requiring entry into this ACTION, the time limit is conservatively shortened from 30 hours to 12 hours. Also, the existing statement requiring restoration of the inoperable valves to operable status in order to exit the LCO is unnecessary because restoration of the inoperable valves causes an automatic exit from the LCO.

Based on the above discussion and consistency between the requested revision and the language in the improved Standard Technical Specifications (STS) for Combustion Engineering plants (NUREG-1432), the staff finds acceptable the proposed revisions to ACTION statement "a" of TS 3.7.1.1 to (1) require entry into "HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 12 hours" instead of "COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours" and (2) delete the option of restoring the MSSVs to operable status.

The licensee proposes the addition of ACTION statement b, "With one or more steam generators having less than five main steam safety valves OPERABLE, be

in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 12 hours," to TS 3.7.1.1. The addition of this statement is conservative and provides explicit guidance to the operators for the applicable configurations of inoperable MSSVs. Therefore, the staff finds this change acceptable.

The licensee proposes to delete the "ORIFICE SIZE" column of Table 3.7-1. Deleting the "ORIFICE SIZE" column from Table 3.7-1 is an editorial change. This information is not used by the operators nor do the operators have any control over it. Additionally, the orifice size is a constant measure of the relieving capacity of the valves, which is discussed in great detail in the Bases. The request is also consistent with the STS. Therefore the proposed change to delete the "ORIFICE SIZE" column from Table 3.7-1 is acceptable.

The licensee proposes to revise the title of column 1 of Table 3.7-2 to read "Number of Operable Safety Valves per Operable Steam Generator," instead of "Maximum Number of Inoperable Safety Valves on Any Operating Steam Generator." Specifying the minimum number of operable MSSVs instead of the maximum number of inoperable MSSVs is an editorial change to improve readability and does not change the intent or requirements of the TS. Therefore, the staff finds this change acceptable.

The licensee also proposed to revise the Bases to TS 3/4.7.1 to provide consistency with the above changes. These changes have been reviewed and found to accurately reflect the changes. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed changes to the Bases acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the California State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (58 FR 34093). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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Date: November 23, 1994