April 20, 1994

Docket Nos. 50-266
and 50-301

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Mr. Robert E. Link, Vice President
Nuclear Power Department
Wisconsin Electric Power Company
231 West Michigan Street, Room P379
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201

Dear Mr. Link:

SUBJECT: AMENDMENT NOS. 147 AND 151 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-24 AND DPR-27 (TACS M86779 AND M86780)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 147 and 151 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27 for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The amendments revise the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated February 26, 1993.

The amendments add operating conditions and limiting conditions for operation for the atmospheric steam dump valves, the crossover steam dump system, the turbine stop and governor valves, and the various turbine overspeed protection features installed at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant. Additionally, they revise the surveillance requirements for the auxiliary feedwater system. The amendments also add explanatory text to the bases for Sections 15.3.4 and 15.4.8.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,
Original signed by Richard J. Laufer

for Allen G. Hansen, Project Manager
Project Directorate III-3
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 147 to DPR-24
2. Amendment No. 151 to DPR-27
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

LA:PDIII-3:DRPW	INTERN	PM:PDIII-3:DRPW	D:PDIII-3:DRPW	OGC-OWF
MRushbrook	JKing/JTk/bj	AHansen	JHannon	H. Torczon
12/14/93	12/14/93	12/14/93	12/15/93	3/3/94

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

April 20, 1994

Docket Nos. 50-266
and 50-301

Mr. Robert E. Link, Vice President
Nuclear Power Department
Wisconsin Electric Power Company
231 West Michigan Street, Room P379
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201

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See next page

Mr. Robert E. Link
Wisconsin Electric Power Company

Point Beach Nuclear Plant
Unit Nos. 1 and 2

cc:

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-266

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 147
License No. DPR-24

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Wisconsin Electric Power Company (the licensee) dated February 26, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-24 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   B. Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 147, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective immediately upon issuance. The Technical Specifications are to be implemented within 20 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

for John B. Hopkins

Allen G. Hansen, Project Manager
Project Directorate III-3
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of issuance: April 20, 1994

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-301

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 151
License No. DPR-27

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Wisconsin Electric Power Company (the licensee) dated February 26, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-27 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   B. Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 151 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective immediately upon issuance. The Technical Specifications are to be implemented within 20 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

for John B. Hopkins

Allen G. Hansen, Project Manager
Project Directorate III-3
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of issuance: April 20, 1994

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NOS. 147 AND 151

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-24 AND DPR-27

DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301

Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE	INSERT
15.3.4-2	15.3.4-2
15.3.4-2a	15.3.4-2a
15.3.4-2b	15.3.4-2b
---------	15.3.4-2c
15.4.8-1	15.4.8-1
---------	15.4.8-2

3. A minimum of 13,000 gallons of water per operating unit in the condensate storage tanks and an unlimited water supply from the lake via either leg of the plant Service Water System.

4. System piping and valves required to function during accident conditions directly associated with the above components operable.

5. Both atmospheric steam dump lines shall be operable. If either of the atmospheric steam dump lines is determined to be inoperable, restore the inoperable line to an operable status within 24 hours. If operability cannot be restored, be in hot shutdown within six hours and cold shutdown within 24 hours.

B. The iodine-131 activity on the secondary side of the steam generator shall not exceed 1.2 μCi/cc.

C. During power operation the requirements of 15.3.4.A.2.a and b may be modified to allow the following components to be inoperable for a specified time. If the system is not restored to meet the requirements of 15.3.4.A.2.a and b within the time period specified, the specified action must be taken. If the requirements of 15.3.4.A.2.a and b are not satisfied within an additional 48 hours, the appropriate reactor(s) shall be cooled down to less than 350^{o}F.

1. Two Unit Operation - One of the four operable auxiliary feedwater pumps may be out-of-service for the below specified times. A turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump may be out of service for up to 72 hours. If the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump cannot be restored to service within the 72 hour time period the associated reactor shall be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours. A motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump may be out of service for up to 7 days. If the inoperable motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump cannot be restored to service within the 7 day time period both of the reactors shall be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours.

2. Single Unit Operation - One of the three operable auxiliary feedwater pumps associated with a unit may be out-of-service for the below specified times. The turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump may be out-of-service for up to 72 hours. If the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump cannot be restored to service within that 72-hour time period, the reactor shall be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours. Either one of the two motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps may be out-of-service for up to 7 days. If the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump cannot be restored to service within that 7-day period the operating unit shall be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours.

D. The crossover steam dump system shall be operable. If the crossover steam dump system is determined to be inoperable, reduce power to less than 480 MWe (gross) within 3 hours.

E. During power operation, at least one of the turbine overspeed protection systems that trip the turbine stop valves or shut the turbine governor valves shall be operable. If all three systems are determined to be inoperable, isolate the turbine from the steam supply within the next six hours.

F. Should one of the turbine stop valves or governor valves be declared inoperable, restore the inoperable valve to an operable status within 72 hours. If operability cannot be restored, perform one of the following actions:

1. Shut the affected valve within the next six hours.

2. Isolate the turbine from the steam supply within the next six hours.

Basis

A reactor shutdown from power requires removal of core decay heat. Immediate decay heat removal requirements are normally satisfied by the steam bypass to the condenser. Therefore, core decay heat can be continuously dissipated via the steam bypass to the condenser as feedwater in the steam generator is converted to steam by heat absorption. Normally, the capability to return feedwater flow to

the steam generators is provided by operation of the turbine cycle feedwater system.

The eight main steam safety valves have a total combined rated capability of 6,664,000 lbs/hr. The total full power steam flow is 6,620,000 lbs/hr, therefore eight (8) main steam safety valves will be able to relieve the total full-power steam flow if necessary.

In the unlikely event of complete loss of electrical power to the station, decay heat removal would continue to be assured for each unit by the availability of either the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump or one of the two motor-driven auxiliary steam generator feedwater pumps, and steam discharge to the atmosphere via the main steam safety valves or atmospheric relief valves. One motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump can supply sufficient feedwater for removal of decay heat from a unit. The minimum amount of water in the condensate storage tanks ensures the ability to maintain each unit in a hot shutdown condition for at least one hour concurrent with a loss of all AC power.

An unlimited supply is available from the lake via either leg of the plant service water system for an indefinite time period.

Each of the AFW pumps possesses a low suction pressure trip that will protect it should a loss of feedwater occur. Additionally, should a steam generator tube rupture occur, the motor-operated steam admission valves for the turbine-driven AFW pumps serve as isolation boundaries for the affected steam generator.

The crossover steam dump system is designed to prevent the turbine from exceeding 132% of rated speed following a unit trip. The system is armed at approximately 430 MWe. The system receives input from, and is actuated when the turbine auxiliary governor and/or the Independent Overspeed Protection System (IOPS) senses an overspeed condition. The system consists of four pilot-operated dump valves, with only three valves being necessary to achieve the required overspeed protection. However, in order to meet single failure criteria, the crossover steam dump system shall be declared inoperable if any one of the four dump valves is declared inoperable.

In addition to the crossover steam dump system, there are three other systems that protect the turbine from an overspeed condition. The first feature is the mechanical overspeed trip mechanism which consists of an eccentric weight located in the turbine rotor extension shaft. The second feature uses the turbine auxiliary governor to sense turbine overspeed using the auxiliary speed tachometer. The third feature is IOPS. This system monitors turbine speed electrically and consists of three independent speed channels. The actuation of two of three channels will generate a trip signal. The mechanical overspeed trip mechanism and IOPS cause the turbine stop valves to trip and the turbine governor valves to shut, while the auxiliary governor causes only the governor valves to shut. A turbine stop valve shall be declared inoperable if it does not trip shut following a valid overspeed signal. A turbine governor valve shall be declared inoperable if it does not respond properly following a valid overspeed signal.

The atmospheric steam dump lines are required to be operable because they are relied upon, following a steam generator tube rupture coincident with a loss of A.C. power, to cool down the Reactor Coolant System to RHR entry conditions. An atmospheric steam dump line is considered operable if it is capable of providing the controlled relief of main steam flow necessary to perform the RCS cooldown. Isolating an atmospheric steam dump line does not render it inoperable if the line can be unisolated and the RCS can still be cooled down to RHR entry conditions, through local or remote operation, within the time period required by the applicable FSAR accident analyses.

15.4.8 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

Applicability

Applies to periodic testing requirements of the turbine-driven and motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps.

Objective

To verify the operability of the Auxiliary Feedwater System and its ability to respond properly when required.

Specification

1. a. Each motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump will be started quarterly.

   b. Each steam turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump will be started quarterly provided steam is available. If the test comes due when not at power operation, the test shall be performed during the subsequent startup within 24 hours of entering power operation.

   c. The auxiliary feedwater pumps discharge valves and the service water supply valves on the suction side will be tested by operator action quarterly.

2. These tests shall be considered satisfactory if control board indication and subsequent visual observation of the equipment demonstrate that all components have operated properly.

Basis

The quarterly testing of the auxiliary feedwater pumps will verify their operability. The quarterly test of the steam driven pumps will be a fast start test with no prior warmup. Proper functioning of the steam turbine admission valves and the start of the feedwater pumps will demonstrate the integrity of the steam driven pumps. The ability to both open and shut

the turbine-driven AFW pump motor-operated steam admission valves will be demonstrated since these valves serve as isolation boundaries should a steam generator tube rupture occur. Verification of correct operation will be made both from instrumentation within the main control room and direct visual observation of the pumps.

Reference

FSAR - Sections 10.4 FSAR - Section 14.1.7 FSAR - Section 14.2.5

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 147 AND 151 TO

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-24 AND DPR-27

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated February 26, 1993, Wisconsin Electric Power Company (Wisconsin Electric or the licensee) requested amendments to the steam and power conversion system Technical Specifications (TSs) for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The proposed amendments would revise TS section 15.3.4 by adding operating conditions and limiting conditions for operation for the atmospheric steam dump valves, the crossover steam dump system, the turbine overspeed protection features, and the turbine stop and governor valves. The request also proposes to revise the surveillance requirements of TS section 15.4.8 (Auxiliary Feedwater System). The bases for these TS sections are also being revised to support the proposed changes.

The proposed amendments resulted from a review of the safety analyses in the Point Beach Nuclear Plant's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) against the Limiting Condition for Operation and Surveillance sections of the TSs. Wisconsin Electric committed to conduct this review in a letter that was submitted to the NRC on December 3, 1991. The review identified several systems, components, and functions credited in the safety analyses which the licensee concluded should be added to the TSs. This request includes the changes and additions identified in the review that are associated with the steam and power conversion systems.

2.0 BACKGROUND

2.1 Current License Condition

The current license condition as stated in the TSs is applicable for both Units 1 and 2 as follows:

(1) Section 15.3.4, "Steam and Power Conversion System," describes the operating conditions and limiting conditions for operation for the main steam safety valves and the auxiliary feedwater system. This section also prescribes the limits for Iodine-131 activity on the secondary side of a steam generator.

(2) Section 15.4.8, "Auxiliary Feedwater System," describes the surveillances required to be performed on the auxiliary feedwater pumps and associated support equipment.

2.2 Proposed Changes

The proposed revisions will add operating conditions and limiting conditions for operation for the atmospheric steam dump valves, crossover steam dump system, turbine stop and governor valves, and the various turbine over-speed protection features. Additionally, the changes will revise the surveillance requirements for the auxiliary feedwater system and add explanatory text to the bases for Section 15.3.4 (Steam and Power Conversion System) and Section 15.4.8 (Auxiliary Feedwater System). The changes include:

(1) Add limiting conditions to the atmospheric steam dump lines by placing a limit on the time that a steam dump line is allowed to be inoperable.

(2) Add a limiting condition to the crossover steam dump system; an inoperable crossover steam dump system will require a reduction in power.

(3) Add specifications to the Turbine Overspeed Protection System and the Turbine Stop and Governor Valves. The change would require that at least one Turbine Overspeed Protection System be operable during power operation. In addition, all Turbine Stop Valves and Governor valves must be operable.

(4) Revise the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps surveillance requirements (TS 15.4.8.1.b). The modification will contain a clarifying statement that states the surveillance requirements in the event steam is unavailable.

(5) Modify the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Discharge Valves and Suction Side Service Water Supply Valves surveillance requirements (TS 15.4.8.1.c). The test interval will be consistent with the existing surveillance requirements for the Motor and Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.

(6) Revise the basis for TS 15.3.4 (Steam and Power Conversion System) and 15.4.8 (Auxiliary Feedwater System) to support the changes.

3.0 EVALUATION

3.1 Atmospheric Steam Dump Lines

In the event the main condenser is unavailable, the atmospheric steam dump lines, in conjunction with the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) and Condensate Storage Tank (CST), act to initially cool the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). In the case of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (a 2-Loop Westinghouse design), there are two atmospheric steam dump lines per unit, one line per steam generator. After the RCS has been initially cooled and depressurized to a specified temperature and pressure, the Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) is placed in operation, further reducing the temperature of the core.

Although RCS cooldown to RHR entry conditions using the atmospheric steam dump lines may be necessary following several classes of accidents involving a loss of the main condenser, the performance of the atmospheric steam dump lines in attaining subcooled conditions in the RCS to terminate primary to secondary flow following a steam generator tube rupture is most limiting. The acceptability of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant FSAR analysis of a steam generator tube rupture with a loss of power to plant auxiliaries is based on the use of an atmospheric steam dump line to cool down the RCS. Based on this accident analysis, an atmospheric steam dump line is considered operable when the RCS is capable of being cooled to RHR entry conditions through local manual or remote operation of the associated atmospheric steam dump valve within the time period assumed in the FSAR accident analysis for a steam generator tube rupture.

The licensee proposes adding the following specification for the atmospheric steam dump lines as TS 15.3.4.A.5:

> Both atmospheric steam dump lines shall be operable. If either of the atmospheric steam dump lines is determined to be inoperable, restore the inoperable line to an operable status within 24 hours. If operability cannot be restored, be in hot shutdown within 6 hours and cold shutdown within 24 hours.

Both lines are required to be operable due to the lack of redundancy for the limiting steam generator tube rupture event. The proposed action times are acceptable based on the likely availability of the steam dump system and the main condenser, and the low probability of an event requiring use of the atmospheric steam dump lines during that period of time. The required action places the plant in cold shutdown if both atmospheric steam dump lines are not returned to an operable status in the allowed time because the atmospheric steam dump lines are not needed to perform a necessary function in that mode.

The proposed additional specification is acceptable because it is conservative in placing new operability requirements on the atmospheric steam dump system.

3.2 Crossover Steam Dump and Turbine Overspeed Protection Systems

The crossover steam dump system is designed to vent the steam stored in the high pressure turbine and the moisture separator/reheaters (MSRs) to atmosphere following a unit trip in order to prevent the turbine from exceeding its design overspeed of 132 percent of rated speed. The crossover steam dump system is armed at a generator output above approximately 430 MWe.

In addition to the crossover steam dump system, the turbine is provided with three different turbine overspeed protection systems which control steam supply to the high pressure turbine. The mechanical overspeed trip mechanism and the Independent Overspeed Protection System (IOPS) prevent an overspeed condition by rapidly closing the turbine stop and governor valves using independent trip mechanisms when an overspeed condition is sensed. The auxiliary governor uses solenoid operated hydraulic dump valves to rapidly close the turbine governor valves when an overspeed condition or a mismatch between MSR pressure and generator output is sensed. Each turbine governor valve must be operable or closed in order for the auxiliary governor overspeed protection function to be operable. Each of the systems described above reduce the probability of generation of a turbine missile with sufficient energy to damage safety-related structures, systems, or components.

The licensee proposes adding the following specification for the crossover steam dump system as TS 15.3.4.D:

> The crossover steam dump system shall be operable. If the crossover steam dump system is determined to be inoperable, reduce power to less than 480 MWe (gross) within three hours.

The crossover steam dump system is required to be operable since there is no redundant system which performs its function. The licensee has determined that the turbine will not exceed 132 percent of rated speed following a unit trip when initially operating at less than 480 MWe (gross) regardless of the status of the crossover steam dump system. Therefore, the proposed action is acceptable because it places the plant in a condition where the function of the crossover steam dump is not required. The required time to complete the action is acceptable based on the low probability of a unit trip requiring operation of the crossover steam dump system during that time.

The licensee proposes adding the following specification for the turbine overspeed protection systems as TS 15.3.4.E:

> During power operation, at least one of the turbine overspeed protection systems that trips the turbine stop valves or shuts the turbine governor valves shall be operable. If all three systems are determined to be inoperable, isolate the turbine from the steam supply within the next 6 hours.

The licensee also proposed adding the following specification for the turbine stop and governor valves as TS 15.3.4.F:

> Should one of the turbine stop valves or governor valves be declared inoperable, restore the inoperable valve to an operable status within 72 hours. If operability cannot be restored, perform one of the following actions:
>
> 1. Shut the affected valve within the next 6 hours.
>
> 2. Isolate the turbine from the steam supply within the next 6 hours.

The proposed additions of turbine overspeed protection system and turbine stop and governor valve specifications are acceptable because they are conservative in placing new operability requirements on the turbine overspeed protection systems and the turbine stop and governor valves.

3.3 Auxiliary Feedwater System Surveillance Requirements

The licensee proposes adding a statement to TS 15.4.8.1.b which would require that a quarterly operability test of the turbine-driven AFW pump which comes due when not at power operation be performed during the subsequent startup within 24 hours of entering power operation. The existing TS 15.3.4.A states that when the reactor coolant is heated above 350 °F, the reactor shall not be taken critical unless the turbine-driven AFW pump, together with its associated flowpath and essential instrumentation, is operable. However, the reactor coolant pumps are not capable of maintaining the RCS at the necessary temperature for performance of the turbine-driven AFW pump operability test with its associated steam demand unless core heat generation is occurring. The proposed addition to TS 15.3.4.A is acceptable due to the low probability of the turbine-driven AFW pump being inoperable when required to function during the first 24 hours after entering power operation, due to the availability of the motor-operated AFW pumps, and because it is consistent with the requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, "Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components," as implemented by 10 CFR 50.55a

The licensee also proposes changing the frequency of the full stroke and valve position indication tests required by TS 15.4.8.1.c from monthly to quarterly. This change would require testing of the AFW pump discharge valves and suction side service water supply valves at the same frequency as the motor-operated and turbine driven AFW pumps. This proposed test interval is acceptable since it corresponds to the requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, "Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components."

3.4 Technical Specification Bases

The licensee submitted proposed bases changes for TS Section 15.3.4, "Steam and Power Conversion System," and TS Section 15.4.8, "Auxiliary Feedwater System." These changes reflect the proposed TS changes to these two sections, and are explanatory only. The staff has reviewed the revised bases submitted by the licensee, and found the revised bases to be consistent with the revised TSs, the system description, and the safety function presented in the FSAR.

3.5 Concluding Remarks

The staff found the proposed TS additions to be acceptable. The additions were conservative in that operability restrictions were proposed for systems and components which currently have no TS operability requirements. The revisions to the AFW system surveillance requirements were found to be acceptable based on the physical constraints and regulatory requirements associated with the testing. The bases revisions were found to be acceptable as they are administrative only.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Wisconsin State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments change a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or change a surveillance requirement. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously published a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (58 FR 43939). Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR §51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: S. Jones

Date: April 20, 1994