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Docket Nos. 50-266
and 50-301

Mr. Sol Burstein
Executive Vice President
Wisconsin Electric Power Company
231 West Michigan Street
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201

Dear Mr. Burstein:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 38 and 43 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27 for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The amendments consist of changes to the operating licenses and appended Technical Specifications in response to your request dated April 27, 1979, as supplemented May 7, 1979.

The amendments require actuation of safety injection based on two out of three channels of low pressurizer pressure, revise the opening logic for the pressurizer power-operated relief valves, authorize modifications to the power supplies for safety injection actuation channels, and require that a unit be shutdown in the event certain channels should fail pending completion of the power supply modifications.

Copies of the Safety Evaluation and Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Gnsbr CCP

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 38 to DPR-24
2. Amendment No. 43 to DPR-27
3. Safety Evaluation
4. Notice of Issuance

cc: w/enclosures
See next page

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OFFICE	DOR:ORB1	DOR:ORB1	DOR:AD SB	DOR:ORB1	DOR:AD:S&P	OELD
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DATE	05/10/79	05/ /79	5/10/79	05/10/79	05/10/79	05/12/79

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

May 11, 1979

Docket Nos. 50-266
and 50-301

Mr. Sol Burstein
Executive Vice President
Wisconsin Electric Power Company
231 West Michigan Street
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201

Dear Mr. Burstein:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 38 and 42 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27 for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The amendments consist of changes to the operating licenses and appended Technical Specifications in response to your request dated April 27, 1979, as supplemented May 7, 1979.

The amendments require actuation of safety injection based on two out of three channels of low pressurizer pressure, revise the opening logic for the pressurizer power-operated relief valves, authorize modifications to the power supplies for safety injection actuation channels, and require that a unit be shutdown in the event certain channels should fail pending completion of the power supply modifications.

Copies of the Safety Evaluation and Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

A. Schwencer

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 38 to DPR-24
2. Amendment No. 42 to DPR-27
3. Safety Evaluation
4. Notice of Issuance

cc: w/enclosures
See next page

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Office of Radiation Programs (AW-459)
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Region V Office
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Chicago, Illinois 60604

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-266

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 38
License No. DPR-24

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Wisconsin Electric Power Company (the licensee) dated April 27, 1979, as supplemented May 7, 1979 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-24 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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"(B) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 38 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications."

The license is further amended by addition of new paragraph 3.F to read as follows:

"F. Safety Injection Logic and Power Modification

The licensee is authorized to modify the safety injection actuation logic and actuation power supplies and related changes as described in licensee's application for amendment dated April 27, 1979, as supplemented May 7, 1979. In the interim period until the power supply modification has been completed, should any DC powered safety injection actuation channel be in a failed condition for greater than one hour, the unit shall thereafter be shutdown using normal procedures and placed in a block-permissive condition for safety injection actuation."

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

A. Schwencer

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 11, 1979

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 38

CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-24

DOCKET NO. 50-266

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove the following pages and insert identically numbered revised pages:

15.3.5-2
15.3.5-4
Table 15.3.5-1
Table 15.3.5-3

Safety Injection System Actuation

Protection against a Loss of Coolant or steam line break accident is brought about by automatic actuation of the Safety Injection System [SIS] which provides emergency cooling and reduction of reactivity.

The Loss of Coolant accident is characterized by depressurization of the Reactor Coolant System [RCS] and loss of reactor coolant to the containment. The Engineered Safety Features have been designed to sense the effects of the Loss of Coolant Accident by detecting low pressurizer pressure and generating signals actuating the SIS active phase based upon this signal. The SIS active phase is also actuated by a high containment pressure signal (Hi) brought about by addition of high enthalpy coolant to the containment. This actuation signal acts as a backup to the low pressurizer pressure signal actuation of the SIS and also adds diversity to protection against loss of coolant.

Signals are also provided to actuate the SIS upon sensing the effects of a steam line break accident. Therefore, SIS actuation following a steam line break is designed to occur upon sensing low steam line pressure.

The increase in the extraction of RCS heat following a steam line break results in reactor coolant temperature and pressure reduction. For this reason protection against a steam line break accident is also provided by a low pressurizer pressure signal actuating safety injection.

Protection is also provided for a steam line break in the containment by actuation of SIS upon sensing high containment pressure.

SIS actuation injects highly borated fluid into the Reactor Coolant System in order to counter the reactivity insertion brought about by cooldown of the reactor coolant which occurs during a steam line break accident.

Setting Limits

1. The high containment pressure limit is set at about 10% of design containment pressure. Initiation of Safety Injection protects against loss of coolant [2] or steam line break [3] accidents as discussed in the safety analysis.

2. The hi-hi containment pressure is set at about 50% of design containment pressure for initiation of containment spray and at about 30% for initiation of steam line isolation. Initiation of Containment Spray and Steam Line Isolation protects against large loss of coolant[2] or steam line break accidents[3] as discussed in the safety analysis.

3. The pressurizer low pressure limit is set substantially below system operating pressure limits. However, it is sufficiently high to protect against a loss of coolant accident as shown in the safety analysis.[2]

4. The steam line low pressure signal is lead/lag compensated and its setpoint is set well above the pressure expected in the event of a large steam line break accident as shown in the safety analysis.[3]

5. The high steam line flow limit is set at approximately 20% of nominal full load flow at the no-load pressure and the high-high steam line flow limit is set at approximately 120% of nominal full load flow at the full load pressure in order to protect against large steam break accidents. The coincident low Tavg setting limit for steam line isolation initiation is set below its hot shutdown value. The safety analysis shows that these settings provide protection in the event of a large steam break.[3]

Instrument Operating Conditions

During plant operations, the complete instrumentation systems will normally be in service. Reactor safety is provided by the Reactor Protection System,

TABLE 15.3.5-1

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES INITIATION INSTRUMENT SETTING LIMITS

NO.	FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL	SETTING LIMIT
1	High Containment Pressure (Hi)	Safety Injection*	≤ 6 psig
2	High Containment Pressure (Hi-Hi)	a. Containment Spray b. Steam Line Isolation of Both Lines	≤ 30 psig ≤ 20 psig
3	Pressurizer Low Pressure	Safety Injection*	≥ 1715 psig
4	Low Steam Line Pressure	Safety Injection* Lead Time Constant Lag Time Constant	≥ 500 psig ≥ 12 seconds ≤ 2 seconds
5	High Steam Flow in a Steam Line Coincident with Safety Injection and Low T_{avg}	Steam Line Isolation of Affected Line	d/p corresponding to ≤0.66 x 10^6 lb/hr at 1005 psig ≥ 540°F
6	High-high Steam Flow in a Steam Line Coincident with Safety Injection	Steam Line Isolation of Affected Line	≤ d/p corresponding to 4 x 10^6 lb/hr at 806 psig

* Initiates also containment isolation, feedwater line isolation and starting of all containment fans.

d/p means differential pressure

TABLE 15.3.5-3

EMERGENCY COOLING

NO.	FUNCTIONAL UNIT	1 NO. OF CHANNELS	2 NO. OF CHANNELS TO TRIP	3 MIN. OPERABLE CHANNELS	4 MIN. DEGREE OF REDUNDANCY	5 PERMISSIBLE BYPASS CONDITIONS	OPERATOR ACTION IF CONDITIONS OF COLUMN 3 OR 5 CANNOT BE MET
1.	SAFETY INJECTION						
a.	Manual	2	1	1	1		Hot Shutdown***
b.	High Containment Pressure	3	2	2	1		Hot Shutdown***
c.	Steam Generator Low Steam Pressure/Loop	3	2	2	1	Primary Pressure is Less than 1800 psig	Hot Shutdown***
d.	Pressurizer Low Pressure	3	2	2	1	Primary Pressure is Less than 1800 psig	Hot Shutdown***
2.	CONTAINMENT SPRAY						
a.	Manual	2	2	2	--**		Hot Shutdown***
b.	Hi-Hi Containment Pressure (Containment Spray)	2 sets of 3	2 of 3 in each set	2 per set	1/set		Hot Shutdown***

** - Must actuate 2 switches simultaneously.

*** - If minimum conditions are not met within 24 hours, steps shall be taken on the affected unit to place the unit in cold shutdown conditions.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-301

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 43
License No. DPR-27

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Wisconsin Electric Power Company (the licensee) dated April 27, 1979, as supplemented May 7, 1979 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-27 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"(B) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 43 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications."

The license is further amended by addition of new paragraph 3.F to read as follows:

"F. Safety Injection Logic and Power Modification

The licensee is authorized to modify the safety injection actuation logic and actuation power supplies and related changes as described in licensee's application for amendment dated April 27, 1979, as supplemented May 7, 1979. In the interim period until the power supply modification has been completed, should any DC powered safety injection actuation channel be in a failed condition for greater than one hour, the unit shall thereafter be shutdown using normal procedures and placed in a block-permissive condition for safety injection actuation."

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 11, 1979

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 43

CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-27

DOCKET NO. 50-301

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove the following pages and insert identically numbered revised pages:

15.3.5-2
15.3.5-4
Table 15.3.5-1
Table 15.3.5-3

Safety Injection System Actuation

Protection against a Loss of Coolant or steam line break accident is brought about by automatic actuation of the Safety Injection System [SIS] which provides emergency cooling and reduction of reactivity.

The Loss of Coolant accident is characterized by depressurization of the Reactor Coolant System [RCS] and loss of reactor coolant to the containment. The Engineered Safety Features have been designed to sense the effects of the Loss of Coolant Accident by detecting low pressurizer pressure and generating signals actuating the SIS active phase based upon this signal. The SIS active phase is also actuated by a high containment pressure signal (Hi) brought about by addition of high enthalpy coolant to the containment. This actuation signal acts as a backup to the low pressurizer pressure signal actuation of the SIS and also adds diversity to protection against loss of coolant.

Signals are also provided to actuate the SIS upon sensing the effects of a steam line break accident. Therefore, SIS actuation following a steam line break is designed to occur upon sensing low steam line pressure.

The increase in the extraction of RCS heat following a steam line break results in reactor coolant temperature and pressure reduction. For this reason protection against a steam line break accident is also provided by a low pressurizer pressure signal actuating safety injection.

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SIS actuation injects highly borated fluid into the Reactor Coolant System in order to counter the reactivity insertion brought about by cooldown of the reactor coolant which occurs during a steam line break accident.

Setting Limits

1. The high containment pressure limit is set at about 10% of design containment pressure. Initiation of Safety Injection protects against loss of coolant [2] or steam line break [3] accidents as discussed in the safety analysis.

2. The hi-hi containment pressure is set at about 50% of design containment pressure for initiation of containment spray and at about 30% for initiation of steam line isolation. Initiation of Containment Spray and Steam Line Isolation protects against large loss of coolant[2] or steam line break accidents[3] as discussed in the safety analysis.

3. The pressurizer low pressure limit is set substantially below system operating pressure limits. However, it is sufficiently high to protect against a loss of coolant accident as shown in the safety analysis.[2]

4. The steam line low pressure signal is lead/lag compensated and its setpoint is set well above the pressure expected in the event of a large steam line break accident as shown in the safety analysis.[3]

5. The high steam line flow limit is set at approximately 20% of nominal full load flow at the no-load pressure and the high-high steam line flow limit is set at approximately 120% of nominal full load flow at the full load pressure in order to protect against large steam break accidents. The coincident low Tavg setting limit for steam line isolation initiation is set below its hot shutdown value. The safety analysis shows that these settings provide protection in the event of a large steam break.[3]

Instrument Operating Conditions

During plant operations, the complete instrumentation systems will normally be in service. Reactor safety is provided by the Reactor Protection System,

TABLE 15.3.5-1

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NO.	FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL	SETTING LIMIT
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4	Low Steam Line Pressure	Safety Injection* Lead Time Constant Lag Time Constant	$\geq$ 500 psig $\geq$ 12 seconds $\leq$ 2 seconds
5	High Steam Flow in a Steam Line Coincident with Safety Injection and Low T_{avg}	Steam Line Isolation of Affected Line	d/p corresponding to $\leq 0.66 \times 10^6$ lb/hr at 1005 psig $\geq 540^{\circ}F$
6	High-high Steam Flow in a Steam Line Coincident with Safety Injection	Steam Line Isolation of Affected Line	$\leq$ d/p corresponding to 4×10^6 lb/hr at 806 psig

* Initiates also containment isolation, feedwater line isolation and starting of all containment fans.

d/p means differential pressure

TABLE 15.3.5-3

EMERGENCY COOLING

NO.	FUNCTIONAL UNIT	1 NO. OF CHANNELS	2 NO. OF CHANNELS TO TRIP	3 MIN. OPERABLE CHANNELS	4 MIN. DEGREE OF REDUNDANCY	5 PERMISSIBLE BYPASS CONDITIONS	OPERATOR ACTION IF CONDITIONS OF COLUMN 3 OR 5 CANNOT BE MET
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d.	Pressurizer Low Pressure	3	2	2	1	Primary Pressure is Less than 1800 psig	Hot Shutdown***
2.	CONTAINMENT SPRAY						
a.	Manual	2	2	2	--**		Hot Shutdown***
b.	Hi-Hi Containment Pressure (Containment Spray)	2 sets of 3	2 of 3 in each set	2 per set	1/set		Hot Shutdown***

** - Must actuate 2 switches simultaneously.

*** - If minimum conditions are not met within 24 hours, steps shall be taken on the affected unit to place the unit in cold shutdown conditions.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NOS. 38 AND 43 TO

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-24 AND DPR-27

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301

Introduction

As a result of our ongoing review of the events associated with the March 28, 1979 accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2, the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement issued a number of IE Bulletins describing actions to be taken by licensees. IE Bulletin 79-06 (April 11, 1979) called for licensees with Westinghouse PWRs to instruct operators to manually initiate safety injection whenever pressurizer pressure indication reaches the actuation setpoint whether or not the pressurizer level indication has dropped to the actuation setpoint. IE Bulletin 79-06A (April 14, 1979) further called for these licensees to trip the low pressurizer level bistables such that, when the pressurizer pressure reaches the low setpoint, safety injection would be initiated regardless of the pressurizer level. IE Bulletin 79-06A, Revision 1 (April 18, 1979) modified the action called for in 79-06A by allowing pressurizer level bistables to be temporarily returned to their normal (untripped) operating positions during the pressurizer pressure channel functional surveillance tests so that these tests can be conducted without causing a false safety injection actuation.

Tripping the pressurizer low level bistables, which are normally coincident with the pressurizer low pressure bistables, has the effect of reducing this safety injection actuation logic to a one out of three logic*. A single instrument failure of one of the three (or one of the two for Point Beach) low pressure bistable channels could therefore result in an unwanted safety injection. To prevent this, the licensee proposed in an April 27, 1979 letter, a design modification which would align the existing pressurizer low pressure bistables in a two out of three logic.

*To prevent spurious safety injection actuation of both units at Point Beach in the event of loss of off-site power, the licensee has tripped two level channels, thus changing actuation logic to one-out-of-two. This modification is required in order to prevent an overload condition on the diesel generators at Point Beach. This is discussed more fully later.

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Discussion and Evaluation

On April 27, 1979, all three pressurizer level channels were placed in the tripped condition on both Point Beach units in response to IE Bulletin 79-06A. This action had the effect of changing safety injection actuation logic to one-out-of-three on low pressurizer pressure. In reviewing the impact of this change, called for by the Bulletin, the licensee identified a problem that would lead to simultaneous safety injection on both units. This event could lead to possible overloading of the plants shared diesel generators (two) during the sequencing (starting) phase of safety injection equipment since the diesel generators are designed for safety injection on one unit and a simultaneous shutdown on the other (and not for simultaneous safety injection on both).

Two pressure channels are fed from DC supplies (through inverters). The third is supplied by an AC source. Thus any momentary loss of power to the AC supplied pressure channel would lead to a spurious safety injection signal on that unit. Loss of off-site power would result in loss of power to one pressure channel on each unit, thus leading to simultaneous safety injection on both units. This potential problem was reported to NRC (Region III) in a letter dated April 30, 1979.

As a result of this discovery, the licensee concluded that literal compliance with the Bulletin would not be an appropriate course of action for Point Beach. To correct this problem, the licensee returned one pressurizer low level instrument bistable to the untripped condition (on each unit). The one selected is supplied from the station battery and is paired with the pressurizer low pressure bistable supplied by the AC instrument bus. This scheme would not result in inadvertent safety injection actuation on loss of AC power. At the same time, it complies with the Bulletin to the extent practicable - safety injection would actuate on one-out-of-two low pressurizer pressure signals, irrespective of pressurizer level.

Recognizing that this configuration could trigger a plant trip and spurious safety injection actuation at any time due to a single channel failure, the licensee requested a change to the Point Beach Technical Specifications on April 27, 1979. The proposed change would revise the safety injection actuation logic to two-out-of-three on low pressurizer pressure, thus making each unit immune to a single pressurizer channel failure. At the same time, safety injection logic associated with low pressurizer level would be removed. This is consistent with the NRC position in this matter.

While in the process of reviewing the licensee's proposed change, it became apparent that even after converting to a two-out-of-three logic on pressurizer pressure for safety injection, the AC supplied pressure channel design could still result in spurious safety injection on both units under a specific set of circumstances. It was also apparent that this problem was not limited to pressurizer pressure, but involved all safety injection actuation circuits*.

Specifically, if the site were to experience a loss of all AC power, together with a loss-of-coolant accident in one unit while a battery-supplied safety injection actuation instrument channel was in test (or was tripped due to a failure) in the other unit, simultaneous safety injection in both units would result. This problem was reported by the licensee in a Licensee Event Report on May 2, 1979.

To correct this design problem for all safety injection actuation channels, the licensee proposed, in a letter of May 7, 1979, a modification to the power supply for some of these channels. Basically, the AC powered channels would be supplied power from an inverter on the other unit, thus making all safety injection actuation channels supplied from the station batteries, through inverters. Analysis by the licensee indicates that loss of off-site power and loss of any one inverter would not result in safety injection, steam line isolation, or containment spray. The channel II and IV safety injection pressure circuits that are powered by AC would be powered from opposite unit inverters. The Unit 1 circuits will be on the A battery; the Unit 2 circuits will be on the B battery. The changes involve four conduit runs and associated wiring from breaker panels to the analog racks. The changes will acceptably resolve this problem.

The licensee plans to shutdown one unit for the pressurizer level logic change about May 12; the second unit would be shut down the weekend of May 19-20 for both this same logic change and the power supply change for both units.

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*Safety injection is actuated by a variety of pressure signals at Point Beach, as follows: high containment pressure (two of three); low steam line pressure in either line (two of three in each line); and (with this change) low pressurizer pressure (two of three).

In the interim period of operation prior to the power supply modification (when instrument testing combined with a postulated off-site power loss could cause spurious safety injection actuation), the licensee has committed to not place any of the safety injection actuation instrumentation in the test mode*. This will prevent this problem from occurring as far as testing is concerned. However, the licensee did not state what action would be taken should a channel fail during the interim period.

The NRC staff has concluded that, if any battery-powered channel should fail, the affected unit should be shutdown and placed in a block-permissive condition for safety injection actuation unless the failed channel can be restored to an operable status within one hour. This has been discussed with the licensee who has agreed to this condition.

The pressurizer pressure instrumentation channels also provide control and interlock inputs to the power-operated relief valves (PORV). Two separate pressurizer pressure instruments supply each power-operated relief valve controller. The licensee has proposed to modify the interlock setpoint for the PORVs such that each PORV will require two-out-of-two high pressurizer pressure signals to open. This will reduce the probability of spurious PORV opening, and is acceptable. No credit for PORV opening is taken in the safety analysis of the facility.

We have reviewed the electrical, instrumentation and control systems aspects of the proposed changes as described above. Based on this review and other considerations previously discussed, we conclude that the proposed changes are acceptable. We also conclude that the safety injection system actuation logic change satisfies IEEE standard 279-1971.

Environmental Consideration

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we haver further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

*Except for pressurizer pressure briefly as required to test the over-temperature delta T channels due on a bi-weekly basis (less than one hour).

Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the change does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: May 11, 1979

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment Nos. 38 and 43 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27 issued to Wisconsin Electric Power Company, which revised Technical Specifications for operation of Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit Nos. 1 and 2, located about 15 miles north of Manitowoc, Wisconsin. The amendments are effective as of the date of issuance.

The amendments require actuation of safety injection based on two out of three channels of low pressurizer pressure, revise the opening logic for the pressurizer power-operated relief valves, authorize modifications to the power supplies for safety injection actuation channels, and require that a unit be shutdown in the event certain channels should fail pending completion of the power supply modifications.

The application for the amendments complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendments. Prior public notice of these amendments was not required since the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

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The Commission has determined that the issuance of these amendments will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of these amendments.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendments dated April 27, 1979, as supplemented May 7, 1979, (2) Amendment No. 38 to License No. DPR-24, (3) Amendment No. 43 to License No. DPR-27, and (4) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20555 and at the University of Wisconsin, Stevens Point Library, Stevens Point, Wisconsin 54481. A copy of items (2), (3) and (4) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Operating Reactors.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 11th day of May, 1979.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

A. Schwencer

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors