



FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

Region II

Jacob K. Javits Federal Building
26 Federal Plaza, Room 1337
New York, New York 10278-0002

July 1, 2002

RECEIVED
REGION I
2002 JUL -5 PM 2:02

Mr. Hubert J. Miller, Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRC Region I
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406-1415

Dear Mr. Miller:

Enclosed is a copy of the final exercise report for the December 4, 2001, Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise of the offsite radiological emergency response plans specific to the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Station. The State of New York and Oswego County participated in this exercise. This report was prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region II and a copy has been forwarded to the State of New York, State Emergency Management Office (SEMO.)

No deficiencies were observed during the December 4, 2001 exercise. Three Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) were observed.

Based on the results of the December 4, 2001 exercise, it has been determined that the offsite radiological emergency response plans for the State of New York, and the affected local jurisdictions, specific to the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Station, can be implemented and are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the site.

If there are any questions regarding this matter, please contact Jaye Sutton, at (212) 680-3686.

Sincerely,



Joseph Picciano
Acting Regional Director

Ccs: Vanessa E. Quinn, FEMA Headquarters
Patricia C. Tenorio, FEMA Headquarters
Kathy Halvey Gibson, NRC Headquarters
Robert J. Bores, NRC Region I

Enclosure



Final Exercise Report
NINE MILE POINT
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

Licensee: Constellation Energy Corporation

Exercise Date: December 4, 2001

Report Date: March 27, 2002

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
REGION II
26 Federal Plaza
New York, New York 10278

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
II. INTRODUCTION.....	2
III. EXERCISE OVERVIEW	4
A. Plume Emergency Planning Zone Description	4
B. Exercise Participants.....	5
C. Exercise Timeline	8
IV. EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS.....	9
A. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation	9
B. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated	11
1. STATE OF NEW YORK.....	13
1.1 New York State Emergency Operations Center/State Emergency Coordination Center.....	13
1.2 New York State Accident Assessment.....	14
1.3 Emergency Operations Facility	15
1.4 Joint News Center	15
1.5 EAS Radio Station – WSYR	17
2. OSWEGO COUNTY.....	17
2.1 Oswego County Warning Point	17
2.2 Oswego County Emergency Operations Center.....	18
2.3 Oswego County Accident Assessment.....	18
2.4 Oswego County Radiological Field Monitoring Teams	19
2.5 Oswego County Personnel Monitoring Center	19
2.6 Oswego County Traffic Control Points	20
2.7 Oswego County School Interviews.....	20
2.8 Oswego County School Bus Evacuation.....	20
2.9 Oswego County Special Population Bus Run.....	21
2.10 Oswego County Reception Center and Congregate Care Center.....	21
2.11 Oswego County Medical Drill	21

List of Appendices

APPENDIX 1 - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS	1-1
APPENDIX 2 - EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS	2-1
APPENDIX 3 - EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT	3-1
APPENDIX 4 - EXERCISE SCENARIO SYNOPSIS.....	4-1

List of Tables

Table 1 - Exercise Timeline	8
Table 2 - Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation.....	10

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On December 4, 2001, an exercise was conducted in the 10-mile Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region II. The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERPs) and procedures.

The most recent exercise at this site was conducted on October 20, 1999. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on September 15, 1981.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals in New York and Oswego County who participated in this exercise.

Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants were evident during this exercise.

This report contains the final evaluation of the biennial exercise and the evaluation of the following out-of-sequence activities: School Interviews (Oswego City School District and Mexico Central School District on December 3, 2001); School Bus Evacuation (December 3, 2001); Special Population Bus Run (December 3, 2001); Reception Center and Congregate Care Center (December 13, 2001); and Medical Drill (facilities portion on October 12, 2001 and transportation portion on December 13, 2001).

The State and local organizations, except where noted in this report, demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them. There were no Deficiencies and four Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) identified as a result of this exercise.

II. INTRODUCTION

On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response. FEMA's activities are conducted pursuant to 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350, 351 and 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.

FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMA's initial and continued approval of State and local governments' radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local governments' participation in joint exercises with licensees.

FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:

- Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of RERPs and procedures developed by State and local governments;
- Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments;
- Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17, 1993 (*Federal Register*, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14, 1993); and
- Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:
 - U.S. Department of Commerce,
 - U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
 - U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
 - U.S. Department of Energy,
 - U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
 - U.S. Department of Transportation,
 - U.S. Department of Agriculture,
 - U.S. Department of the Interior, and
 - U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

Representatives of these agencies serve on the FEMA Region II Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) which is chaired by FEMA.

Formal submission of the RERPs for the Nine Mile Point and James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plants (JAFNPP) to FEMA Region II by the New York State and involved local jurisdictions occurred on July 15, 1981. Formal approval of the RERPs was granted by FEMA on February 1, 1985, under 44 CFR 350.

A REP exercise was conducted on December 4, 2001, by FEMA Region II to assess the capabilities of State and local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant. The purpose of this exercise report is to present the exercise results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations (ORO) during a simulated radiological emergency.

The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluator team, with final determinations made by the FEMA Region II RAC Chairperson, and approved by the Regional Director.

The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in:

- NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980;
- FEMA-REP-14, "Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual," September 1991; and
- FEMA-REP-15, "Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation Methodology," September 1991.

Section III of this report, entitled "Exercise Overview," presents basic information and data relevant to the exercise. This section of the report contains a description of the plume pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities which were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.

Section IV of this report, entitled "Exercise Evaluation and Results," presents detailed information on the demonstration of applicable exercise objectives at each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format. This section also contains: (1) descriptions of ARCAs assessed during this exercise, recommended corrective actions, and the State and local governments' schedule of corrective actions for each identified exercise issue and (2) descriptions of unresolved ARCAs assessed during previous exercises and the status of the OROs' efforts to resolve them.

III. EXERCISE OVERVIEW

Contained in this section are data and basic information relevant to the December 4, 2001, exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities in the area surrounding the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant. This section of the exercise report includes a description of the plume pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities which were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.

A. Plume Emergency Planning Zone Description

The area within the Nine Mile Point/James A. FitzPatrick site is located on Lake Ontario and in Oswego County. Oswego County is predominantly rural in nature with approximately 75 percent of its total land acres consisting of woodland, wetlands, and inactive agricultural land. Although active agriculture land only accounts for 16 percent of the local land acres, agriculture is the major land use in the county. The major agriculture activity in Oswego County is dairy, accounting for approximately 63 percent of the value of all farm products produced in the county. The major harvested crops are hay, alfalfa, and corn. The major livestock animals are cattle and hogs.

The 10-mile EPZ contains a total population of 42,597 (1991 estimates). The Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant site is located seven miles to the northeast of the city of Oswego and thirteen miles north of the city of Fulton. Aside from these two areas of population concentration, the region is sparsely populated.

The industrial activities within the 10-mile EPZ are confined principally to the metropolitan area within the city of Oswego, with little industry in the outlying communities of Scriba, Minetto, Volney, and Mexico. Manufacturing firms directly account for 33 percent of the total employment of Oswego County.

The public institutions, aside from the schools and churches, within the EPZ of the site are a hospital, a college, and a jail. There are also a number of special facilities located within the 10-mile EPZ.

Continuing urban and industrial expansion of the area will increase both the population and the amount of land used for residential and commercial purposes. It is anticipated that the population in the region will increase by about 30 percent in the next twenty years, with larger increases in the urban areas.

B. Exercise Participants

The following agencies, organizations, and units of government participated in the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant exercise on December 4, 2001.

NEW YORK STATE :

- New York State Emergency Management Office
- New York State Department of Health
- New York State Police
- New York State Department of Environmental Conservation
- New York State Department of Transportation
- New York State Department of Labor
- New York State Department of Aging
- New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets
- New York State Thruway Authority
- New York State Parks and Recreation
- New York State Correction Services
- New York State Office of Mental Health
- New York State Office of Fire Prevention and Control
- New York State Department of Education
- New York State Department of Energy
- New York State Public Service Commission

RISK JURISDICTIONS

OSWEGO COUNTY

- Oswego County Sheriff's Department
- Oswego County Department of Public Works
- Oswego County Emergency Management
- Oswego County Chairman of the Legislature
- Oswego County Vice Chair of Legislature
- Oswego County Information Technology
- Oswego County Personnel Department
- Oswego County Administration
- Oswego County Department of Social Services
- Oswego County Highway Department
- Oswego County Superintendent of Schools
- Oswego County Department of Health
- Oswego County Fire Coordinators
- Oswego County Government
- Oswego County Attorney

Oswego County Promotion and Tourism
Oswego County Probation Department
Oswego County Planning Department
Oswego County Assembly Office
Oswego County Emergency Medical Services
911
New York State Emergency Management Office
New York State Police
New York State Department of Health
New York State Assembly
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation
BOCES Schools

SUPPORT JURISDICTIONS

Palermo Fire Department
City of Oswego
City of Fulton
Fulton Police Department
Onondaga County
Coop Extension
Oswego County School District
Mexico Central School District

PRIVATE/VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS

American Red Cross
RACES
New York Power Authority - James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation - Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant
WSYR Radio Station, Syracuse
Volunteer Data Analysis
Pioneer Land Search and Rescue
Centro of Oswego Bus Company

C. Exercise Timeline

Table 1, on the following page, presents the time at which key events and activities occurred during the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Plant exercise on December 4, 2001. Also included are times that notifications were made to the participating jurisdictions/functional entities.

The following times for precautionary actions supplement the information provided in Table 1:

- Clear county parks, beaches and waterways – decision @ 0939 (ERPHs 23-29, news release @ 1010)
- Precautionary evacuation of schools in EPZ – decision @ 0945
- Dairy advisory @ SAE – 1105

Table 1. Exercise Timeline

DATE AND SITE: December 4, 2001 – NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

	Time Utility Declared	Time That Notification Was Received or Action Was Taken					
		SEOC	OCEOC	EOF	JNC	EAS Station WSYR	County Warning Point
Unusual Event	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Alert	0844	0902	0911	N/A	N/A	N/A	0855
Site Area Emergency	1105	1122	1118	1106	1133	1113	N/A
General Emergency	1134	1153	1147	1135	1155	N/A	N/A
Simulated Rad. Release Started	1144	1215	1148	1144	1225	N/A	N/A
Simulated Rad. Release Terminated	N/A	1420	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Facility Declared Operational	0930	1001	0948	0944	N/A	N/A	N/A
County Declaration of State of Emergency	N/A	1015	1050	1015(+)	N/A	N/A	N/A
Exercise Terminated	1423	1422	1417	1421	N/A	N/A	N/A
1 ST A + N Sequence "Heads Up"		N/A	1059	N/A	1059	N/A	N/A
1st Siren Activation		1110	1110	N/A	1110	N/A	N/A
1st EAS Message		1113	1113	N/A	1113	1113	N/A
2nd Protective Action Decision Shelter: 6, 8, 11-22 Evacuate: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10		N/A	1205	1208	1205	N/A	N/A
2nd Siren Activation		1216	1216	N/A	1216	N/A	N/A
2nd EAS Message		1219	1219	N/A	1218	N/A	N/A
KI Administration Decision: *No ingestion of KI		1315	1314	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

LEGEND: NA - Not Applicable

IV. EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS

Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities which participated in the December 4, 2001, exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of State and local governments in the 10-mile EPZ surrounding the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on the basis of its demonstration of criteria delineated in exercise objectives contained in FEMA-REP-14, REP Exercise Manual, September 1991. Detailed information on the exercise objectives and the extent-of-play agreement used in this exercise are found in Appendix 3 of this report.

A. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation - Table 2

The matrix presented in Table 2, on the following page(s), presents the status of all exercise objectives from FEMA-REP-14 which were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise objectives are listed by number and the demonstration status of those objectives is indicated by the use of the following letters:

- M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCAs assessed and no unresolved ARCAs from prior exercises)
- D - Deficiency assessed
- A - ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise(s)
- N - Not demonstrated (reason explained in Subsection B)

**Table 2 - Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation
December 4, 2001 - Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant**

Jurisdictional /Functional Entity	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33
State of New York																																	
Emergency Operations Center/State Emergency Coordination Center	M	M	M	M						M	M																						
Accident Assessment					M		M		M					M																			
Emergency Operations Facility	M	M		M																													
Joint News Center	M	M	M	M						M	M	A	M																				
Emergency Alert Station				M						M	M																						
Oswego County																																	
Emergency Warning Point	M	M		M																													
Emergency Operations Center	M	M	M	M						M	M				M	M	M																
Accident Assessment					M	M	A	M	M					M																			
Radiological Field Monitoring Teams	M			M	M	M		M						M																			
Personnel Monitoring Center		M		M	M									M													M						
Traffic/Access Control				M	M									M				M															
School Interviews (EV-2 Checklist)*																	M																
School Bus Evacuation*				M	M											M																	
Special Population Bus Runs*				M	M										M																		
Reception/Congregate Care Center**				M	M																												
Medial Drill***					M																												
Onodaga County																																	
* = Out of Sequence conducted on December 3, 2001																																	
** = Out of Sequence conducted on December 13, 2001																																	
*** = Out of Sequence - Medical Hospital (Oswego County Hospital) conducted on October 12, 2001																																	
- Medical Transportation conducted December 13, 2001																																	
Note: Exercise Criteria 23-33 will be demonstrated in 2005																																	

Legend: M= Met (No Deficiency or ARCA(s) and no unresolved prior ARCA(s))
 A = ARCA (s) assessed and/or unresolved prior ARCA(s)
 D = Deficiency (ies) assessed
 Blank = Not Scheduled for demonstration

B. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated

This subsection provides information on the evaluation of each participating jurisdiction and functional entity, in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format. Presented below are definitions of the terms used in this subsection relative to objective demonstration status.

- **Met** - Listing of the demonstrated exercise objectives under which no Deficiencies or ARCAs were assessed during this exercise and under which no ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved.
- **Deficiency** - Listing of the demonstrated exercise objectives under which one or more Deficiencies were assessed during this exercise. Included is a description of each Deficiency and recommended corrective actions.
- **Area Requiring Corrective Actions** - Listing of the demonstrated exercise objectives under which one or more ARCAs were assessed during the current exercise or ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved. Included is a description of the ARCAs assessed during this exercise and the recommended corrective action to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.
- **Not Demonstrated** - Listing of the exercise objectives which were not demonstrated as scheduled during this exercise and the reason they were not demonstrated.
- **Prior ARCAs - Resolved** - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during previous exercises which were resolved in this exercise and the corrective actions demonstrated.
- **Prior ARCAs - Unresolved** - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during prior exercises which were not resolved in this exercise. Included is the reason the ARCA remains unresolved and recommended corrective actions to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

The following are definitions of the two types of exercise issues which are discussed in this report

- A **Deficiency** is defined in FEMA-REP-14 as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant."

- An **ARCA** is defined in FEMA-REP-14 as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety."

FEMA has developed a standardized system for numbering exercise issues (Deficiencies and ARCAs). This system is used to achieve consistency in numbering exercise issues among FEMA Regions and site-specific exercise reports within each Region. It is also used to expedite tracking of exercise issues on a nationwide basis.

The identifying number for Deficiencies and ARCAs includes the following elements, with each element separated by a hyphen (-).

- **Plant Site Identifier** - A two-digit number corresponding to the Utility Billable Plant Site Codes.
- **Exercise Year** - The last two digits of the year the exercise was conducted.
- **Objective Number** - A two-digit number corresponding to the objective numbers in FEMA-REP-14.
- **Issue Classification Identifier** - (D = Deficiency, A = ARCA). Only Deficiencies and ARCAs are included in exercise reports.
- **Exercise Issue Identification Number** - A separate two (or three) digit indexing number assigned to each issue identified in the exercise.

1. STATE OF NEW YORK

1.1 New York State Emergency Operations Center (EOC)/State Emergency Coordination Center

a. MET: Objectives 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, and 11

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Issue No.:

40-01-4-A-01

Description:

The RECS line had periodic voice transmission drop-offs and messages had to be repeated in order to ensure receipt of all of the information (NUREG-0654, F.1.,2.).

Recommended Corrective Action:

It is recommended that the Utility communications support staff trouble-check the transmitter on the RECS line to correct the message content break-up described above.

Corrective Action Demonstrated:

Since the date of the Exercise, the New York State Emergency Management Office has provided the FEMA Region II Office with copies of weekly RECS line test sheet messages for the months of December 2001, and January and February 2002. The weekly test sheets confirmed with the Utility indicate that the RECS line has been functioning properly without any undue delays in communications between the agencies.

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE

1.2 New York State Accident Assessment (AA)

- a. **MET: Objectives 5, 7, 9, and 14**
- b. **DEFICIENCY: NONE**
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE**
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE**
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: ONE**

Issue No.:

75-00-05-A-01 and 27-01-05-A-01

Description:

The staff used the RASCAL code based on an assumed noble gas and iodine release rate and a release rate pathway that was not appropriate for the accident in progress. The resultant factor was calculated for a filtered and non-filtered release, neither of which was appropriate for the release path. The staff provided the factor of 1 based on the filtered release. This was calculated using the worksheet, assuming the emergency workers had ingested KI, when in fact they did not. (NUREG 0654, K.3.a; New York State REPP, Procedure H, Assessment/Evaluation, Attachment 1, Dose Estimation Procedures).

Recommended Corrective Action:

Emphasize in the training program the need to use actual data, the correct KI assumption, and the appropriate release pathway when making the dosimetry correction calculations.

Corrective Action Taken:

Additional training was provided to Accident Assessment personnel at the NYSEOC after the previous exercise at the site. Actual data and the correct KI assumption were used to make the appropriate dosimetry correction calculations. The Accident Assessment team had the proper worksheets to calculate the emergency worker dose correction factors for both with KI and without KI.

f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

1.3 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

a. **MET: Objectives 1, 2, and 4**

b. **DEFICIENCY: NONE**

c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE**

d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE**

e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE**

f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

1.4 Joint News Center (JNC)

a. **MET: Objectives 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, and 13**

b. **DEFICIENCY: NONE**

c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:**
Objective 12 (x2)

Issue No.:

40-01-12-A-02

Description:

Failure to issue follow-up news releases to correct inconsistencies on previous news releases disseminated by different organizations.

Information on one organization's latest news release was not always consistent with information on another organization's latest news release. For example, the last news release from Constellation Energy issued at 1226 indicated that a radiation release was in progress. One minute earlier at 1225, Oswego County issued a news release confirming a EAS message broadcast at 1219 indicating that a radiation release was not in progress. These were the last news releases issued by both organizations during the exercise. At the time of the Oswego

County news release, the Constellation Energy public information staff at the JNC had informed the Oswego public information staff at the JNC that a radiation release was underway. Because the radiation release had not been confirmed by the County EOC, the JNC public information staff issued the news release without updated information. The exercise was terminated at 1421 pm, a period of almost two hours from the release of the conflicting messages. The Oswego County public information staff (at the JNC and the Oswego County EOC) did not take adequate steps to resolve the conflict of information during this time. Since the Public Inquiry staff uses these news releases and since all media at the JNC may not have heard comments by the Oswego County spokesperson during the media briefing, there remains the possibility that incorrect information could be provided to the public and media representatives.

Recommended Corrective Action:

Establish procedural steps, which when followed, will result in timely resolution of conflicting information in news releases issued by different public information organizations.

Schedule for Corrective Action:

At the 2003 JA Fitzpatrick NPS Biennial Exercise.

Issue No.:

40-01-12-A-03

Description:

The Oswego County Plan incorporates the requirements of the "2001 Nine Mile Point Joint News Center Procedures and Public Education Work Plan." This procedure requires that all news releases be "...faxed to the respective Emergency Operations Centers and the Emergency Operations Facility." The news releases generated by the State of New York were prepared in Albany, NY, and e-mailed to the JNC for release. The State news releases were distributed within the JNC, but were not faxed to the County EOC and EOF as required. All news releases prepared by Constellation Energy and by Oswego County were faxed to all emergency facilities as required. The lack of the State news releases in the EOF and County EOC has the potential to cause inconsistency of information released by all three organizations.

Recommended Corrective Action:

Assign clear responsibilities to ensure that all news releases issued by each organization are faxed or otherwise provided to all responding Emergency Operation Centers and the EOF.

Schedule for Corrective Action:

At the 2003 JA Fitzpatrick NPS Biennial Exercise.

- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE**
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE**
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

1.5 EAS Radio Station (WSYR)

- a. **MET: Objectives 4, 10, and 11**
- b. **DEFICIENCY: NONE**
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE**
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE**
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE**
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

2. OSWEGO COUNTY

2.1 Oswego County Warning Point (WP)

- a. **MET: Objectives 1, 2, and 4**
- b. **DEFICIENCY: NONE**
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE**
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE**

- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE**
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

2.2 Oswego County Emergency Operation Center (EOC)

- a. **MET: Objectives 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 15, 16, and 17**
- b. **DEFICIENCY: NONE**
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE**
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE**
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE**
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

2.3 Oswego County Accident Assessment (AA)

- a. **MET: Objectives 5, 6, 8, 9, and 14**
- b. **DEFICIENCY: NONE**
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Objective 7**

Issue No.:

40-01-7-A-04

Description:

The staff produced a comprehensive printout from the EDAMS projections that showed the calculated isotopic mixture in the projected plume. The radionuclide mixture shown was technically impossible. The staff did not question this result.

Recommended Corrective Action:

Train staff to review all code output to assure that reasonable projections are being made.

Schedule for Corrective Action:

At the 2003 JA Fitzpatrick NPS Biennial Exercise.

- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE**
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE**
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

2.4 Oswego County Radiological Field Monitoring Teams

- a. **MET: Objectives 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 14**
- b. **DEFICIENCY: NONE**
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE**
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE**
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE**
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

2.5 Oswego County Personnel Monitoring Center

- a. **MET: Objectives 2, 4, 5, 14, and 22**
- b. **DEFICIENCY: NONE**
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE**
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE**
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE**
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

2.6 Oswego County Traffic Control Points

- a. **MET:** Objectives 4, 5, 14, and 17
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.7 Oswego County School Interviews (December 3, 2001)

- a. **MET:** Objective 16 - EV-2 Questionnaire
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.8 Oswego County School Bus Evacuation (December 3, 2001)

- a. **MET:** Objectives 4, 5, and 16
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.9 Special Population Bus Runs (December 3, 2001)

- a. **MET: Objectives 4, 5, and 15**
- b. **DEFICIENCY: NONE**
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE**
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE**
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE**
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

2.10 Oswego County Reception Center and Congregate Care Center (December 13, 2001)

- a. **MET: Objectives 4, 5, 18, and 19**
- b. **DEFICIENCY: NONE**
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE**
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE**
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE**
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

2.11 Oswego County Medical Drill (October 12, 2001 - Facilities portion; December 13, 2001 - Transportation portion)

- a. **MET: Objectives 5, 20, and 21**
- b. **DEFICIENCY: NONE**
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE**
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE**
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE**

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE

APPENDIX 1

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations used in this report.

AA	Accident Assessment
ACP	Access Control Point
ARCA	Area Requiring Corrective Action
CCC	Congregate Care Center
CDE	Committed Dose Equivalent
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
cpm	Counts Per Minute
cps	Counts Per Second
DRD	Direct Reading Dosimeter
EAS	Emergency Alert System
ECL	Emergency Classification Level
EDAMS	Emergency Dose Assessment Modeling System
EEM	Exercise Evaluation Methodology
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOF	Emergency Operations Facility
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
EPZ	Emergency Planning Zone
ERPA	Emergency Response Planning Area
FDA	U.S. Food and Drug Administration
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FR	Federal Register
GE	General Emergency
HQ	Headquarters
JAFNPP	James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
JNC	Joint News Center
KI	Potassium Iodide
NPS	Nuclear Power Station

NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NUREG-0654	NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980
NYS	New York State
NYSEOC	New York State Emergency Operations Center
OCEOC	Oswego County Emergency Operations Center
OCFA	Oswego County Field Activity
OEM	Office of Emergency Management
OnCFA	Onondaga County Field Activity
ORO	Offsite Response Organization
PAD	Protective Action Decision
PAG	Protective Action Guide
PIO	Public Information Officer
PMC	Personnel Monitoring Center
R	Roentgen
RAC	Regional Assistance Committee
RACES	Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service
RASCAL	Radiological Assessment System for Consequence Analysis
RC	Reception Center
RECS	Radiological Emergency Communications System
REP	Radiological Emergency Preparedness
RERP	Radiological Emergency Response Plan
R/h	Roentgen(s) per hour
SAE	Site Area Emergency
SEOC	State Emergency Operations Center
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
TEDE	Total Effective Dose Equivalent
TCP	Traffic Control Point
TDD	Telecommunications Device for the Deaf
TL	Team Leader
TLD	Thermoluminescent Dosimeter
USDA	U.S. Department of Agriculture
WP	Warning Point

APPENDIX 2

EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS

The following is a list of the personnel who evaluated the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant exercise on December 4, 2001. Evaluator Team Leaders are indicated by the letters "(TL)" after their names. The organization which each evaluator represents is indicated by the following abbreviations:

FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency
NRC - U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
FDA - U.S. Food and Drug Administration
USDA - U.S. Department of Agriculture
DOT - U.S. Department of Transportation
ICF - Consulting Firm Performing Evaluation

<u>EVALUATION SITE</u>	<u>EVALUATOR</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>
Exercise Oversight	B. Hasemann	FEMA
STATE OF NEW YORK		
State EOC	S. O'Neil (TL)	FEMA
	K. McCarroll (EOC/WP)	FEMA
	Lori Thomas (AA)	USDA
State Warning Point	K. McCarroll	FEMA
EOF	B. Bores	NRC
Joint News Center	Sam Nelson (TL)	ICF
	B. Black	ICF
EAS Radio Station WSYR	A. Davis	FEMA
OSWEGO COUNTY		
Oswego County EOC	K. Reed (TL)	FEMA
	P. Malool	FEMA
	J. Keller (AA)	ICF
	J. Sutton (TCP)	FEMA
Oswego County Field Monitoring Team A	R. Bernacki (TL)	FDA
Oswego County Field Monitoring Team B	T. Green	ICF

OSWEGO COUNTY (Cont'd)

Oswego County Personnel Monitoring Center	B. Lueders	ICF
Oswego County Traffic Control Points	J. Sutton	FEMA

OUT-OF SEQUENCE EVALUATIONS

School Interviews (12/3/01)	B. Black	ICF
School Bus Evacuation (12/3/01)	S. Nelson	ICF
Special Population Bus Run (12/3/01)	S. Nelson	ICF
Reception Center (12/13/01)	B. Black	ICF
	S. Nelson	ICF
Congregate Care Center (12/13/01)	B. Black	ICF
	S. Nelson	ICF
MS-1 Medical Drill (10/11/01and12/12/01)	B. Black	ICF

APPENDIX 3

EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT

Table of Contents

- Section 1 Offsite Objectives and Extent of Play, Facility/Activity Overview
- Section 2 Offsite Objectives and Extent of Play

**NINE MILE POINT UNIT 2 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
2001 FULL SCALE EXERCISE**

SECTION 1

OFF SITE OBJECTIVES AND EXTENT OF PLAY

FACILITY/ACTIVITY OVERVIEW

Facility/Activity	NY State	Oswego	Onondaga	Init. 1.5
Warning Point	Actual	Actual	N/A	N
EOC	Actual	Actual	N/A	N
EOF	Actual	Actual	N/A	N
JNC	Actual	Actual	N/A	Y
Reception Center	N/A	N/A	Actual ¹	Y
Congregate Care Center	N/A	N/A	Actual ¹	Y
Emergency Worker PMC	None	Actual ¹	N/A	Y
Siren Activation	N/A	Simulated	N/A	N
EAS Formulation	Actual ²	Actual	N/A	N
EAS Broadcast	Simulated ³ (1 test only)	Simulated ⁴ (1 test only)	N/A	Y (JNC)
WSYR (EAS Provider)	Simulated	Simulated	N/A	N
Route Alerting				
- Primary	N/A	N/A	N/A	N
- Backup	N/A	1-EOC Discussion	N/A	N
Field Monitoring Team	N/A	2-Actual Teams	N/A	Y
Special Population Bus Run	N/A	1-Sim. w/Interview ⁵	N/A	Y
School Evacuation Bus Run	N/A	2-Sim. w/Interview ⁵	N/A	Y
Notification of Hearing Impaired	N/A	Simulated via EOC Discussion	N/A	N
Evac. of Mobility Impaired				
- Special Population	N/A	Simulated via EOC Discussion	N/A	N
- Non-Institutionalized	N/A	Simulated via EOC Discussion	N/A	N
Traffic Control Points	N/A	1-Sim. w/Interview	N/A	Y

1 Staffing is limited as described in the objectives/extent of play.

2 To be demonstrated at the SEOC should the Governor declare a State of Emergency.

3 News releases will be developed and simulated to be disseminated from the State EOC.

4 EAS Messages will be sent to WSYR but no test message will be broadcast.

5 Out of Sequence with the exercise.

Facility/Activity	NY State	Oswego	Onondaga	Init. 1.5
Impediments to Evacuation	N/A	Simulated via EOC Discussion	N/A	N
KI Administration	Discussion	Discussion	N/A	N
School Interviews	N/A	Actual ⁵	N/A	Y
Medical Drill				
- Ambulance	N/A	N/A	Actual ⁶	Y
- Hospital	N/A	Actual ⁵	N/A	Y

⁶ Drill ends when victim is in ambulance and ready for transport.

EXTENT OF PLAY GROUND RULES

1. **REAL TIME EMERGENCIES TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER EXERCISE PLAY.**
2. **Scenario Development Team will develop free play messages. State Controller will inject free play messages at the Oswego County EOC to the County Emergency Management Director or her designee to initiate actions, after ensuring FEMA evaluators are standing by to observe.**
3. **Free play messages for Public Inquiry (rumor control) at the JNC will be developed by the Scenario Development Team. Public Inquiry (rumor control) messages will be injected at the JNC as directed by the Lead JNC Controller.**
4. **A State Controller will inject radiological data for any field team activities (Field teams, EWPMCs, Reception Center).**
5. **In accordance with REP Program Strategic Review Initiative 1.5, during the tabletop exercises, drills, and other demonstrations conducted either out of sequence or in sequence with the integrated exercise, if FEMA and the offsite response organizations (OROs) agree, the FEMA evaluator may have the participants re-demonstrate any activity that was determined to not have been satisfactorily demonstrated initially. This initiative is not applicable to activities demonstrated in the EOF and/or EOC during the December 4, 2001, exercise (see Facility/Activity Overview for applicable evaluation areas).**

**NINE MILE POINT UNIT 2 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
2001 FULL SCALE EXERCISE**

SECTION 2

OFF SITE OBJECTIVES AND EXTENT OF PLAY

**NINE MILE POINT UNIT 2 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
2001 FULL SCALE EXERCISE
OFF SITE OBJECTIVES AND EXTENT OF PLAY**

OBJECTIVE 1: MOBILIZATION OF EMERGENCY PERSONNEL

Demonstrate the capability to alert and fully mobilize personnel for both emergency facilities and field operations. Demonstrate the capability to activate and staff emergency facilities for emergency operations.

Locations observed: SEOC, EOF, JNC, OCEOC, OCFA

EXTENT OF PLAY:

1. WARNING POINTS

During this exercise the New York State and Oswego County Warning Points will be activated. Demonstrations will include:

- Official notification of an event from the Utility via the Radiological Emergency Communications System (RECS) dedicated line.
- Backup systems will be used in the event of primary system failure.
- The official notification will initiate a notification of designated agencies and personnel who, in turn, have additional notification responsibilities.
- Coordination with EOC.
- State staff will be pre-positioned in the area and will respond when notified.

Extent of Play Agreement

- **Call lists will be provided to FEMA at least two (2) weeks prior to the exercise. These lists will contain the business telephone numbers only. Home phone numbers and pager numbers are available at the OCEOC.**
- **There will be no free play messages introduced at the Warning Points.**

2. EOCs

All activities associated with the activation and operations of the EOC are to be performed as they would be in an actual emergency. Demonstrations will include:

- Partial activation of the State EOC occurs for the Alert classification level with full activation occurring for Site Area Emergency and General Emergency classification levels.

- A State Declaration of Disaster Emergency allows the State to mobilize additional resources but does not change the duties or responsibilities of the various agencies.
- Timeliness of activation.
- State staff will be pre-positioned in the area and will respond when notified.

Extent of Play Agreement

None.

3. EOF

All activities associated with the activation and operation of the EOF are to be performed as they would be in an actual emergency. Demonstrations will include:

- Notification of staff.
- Timeliness of activation.
- Activation occurs at the Alert classification level and includes representatives of the State of New York and Oswego County. Their primary responsibility is to relay information to the State and County EOCs.
- State staff will be pre-positioned in the area and will respond when notified.

Extent of Play Agreement:

None.

4. JOINT NEWS CENTER

All activities associated with the activation and operation of the JNC are to be performed as they would be in an actual emergency. Demonstrations will include:

- The Joint News Center, when activated, includes representatives of the State of New York and Oswego County. These representatives serve as the official sources of State and County information released to the news media.
- State staff will be pre-positioned in the area and will respond when notified.

Extent of Play Agreement:

None.

OBJECTIVE 2: FACILITIES – EQUIPMENT, DISPLAYS, AND WORK ENVIRONMENT

Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations.

Locations Observed: SEOC, EOF, JNC, OCEOC, OCFA

ARCAs: None.

EXTENT OF PLAY:

- Facilities, equipment, and displays will be set-up and used as they would in an actual emergency.
- IDs will be verified and ingress/egress controlled via sign-in logs.

Extent of Play Agreement:

1. **EOCs**
 - Backup power is available at the OCEOC but will **not** be demonstrated.
2. **JNC**
 - At the JNC, status boards will be updated in the media briefing room at the next briefing following receipt of information as defined within the JNC.

OBJECTIVE 3: DIRECTION AND CONTROL

Demonstrate the capability to direct and control emergency operations.

Locations observed: SEOC, JNC, OCEOC

ARCAs: None.

EXTENT OF PLAY:

1. ALL LOCATIONS

Direction and control will be demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency. Demonstrations will include:

- Decision making:
 - coordination with state;
 - notification of public (use of PNS and EAS messages); and
 - protective action recommendations/decisions including consultation with appropriate staff.

- Management of an orderly evacuation (if required).
- Message inserts may be used to demonstrate the following:
 - siren failure and back-up route alerting;
 - impediment(s) to evacuation;
 - requests for transportation assistance;
 - requests for un-met needs; and
 - requests for information from elected officials.

Extent of Play Agreement:

- **The County will demonstrate the ability to deal with impediments to evacuation (some prior to and some after) through EOC discussion only. Play will be initiated with controller inject messages.**
- **No resource providers will be contacted nor equipment deployed into the field.**

OBJECTIVE 4: COMMUNICATIONS

Demonstrate the capability to communicate with all appropriate emergency personnel at facilities and in the field.

Locations observed: SEOC, JNC, OCEOC, OCFA

ARCAs: None

EXTENT OF PLAY:

Communications systems will be demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency. Primary communications systems include:

- Radiological Emergency Communications System (RECS) Line – connecting the Utility with New York State and Oswego County;
- Commercial Telephones – connecting agency representatives at the EOC with their respective staff in the field including the EOF and JNC; and
- Radios – connecting the dose assessment staff with the field teams.

Extent of Play Agreement:

- **A controller will inject a test message to initiate the demonstration of the following backup communications systems:**
SEOC: RACES to OCEOC
EOF: RACES to OCEOC
NC: RACES to OCEOC
OCEOC: RACES to SEOC
Field Monitoring Teams: Portable radios to OCEOC

OBJECTIVE 5: EMERGENCY WORKER EXPOSURE CONTROL

Demonstrate the capability to continuously monitor and control radiation exposure to emergency workers.

Locations observed: SEOC, OCEOC, OCFA, OnCFA

ARCAs: New York State ARCA 75-00-05-A-01

EXTENT OF PLAY:

Demonstrations will include a controller inject to cause the County Radiological Officer and each County Field Monitoring Team to discuss actions for exposure rate in excess of the turn-back value. The term exposure limit is used by all other emergency workers in the County.

Extent of Play Agreement:

- **A controller inject message will cause the County Radiological Officer to discuss what actions would be taken should a Field Monitoring Team's exposure rate exceed the turn-back value. This will be a discussion only activity. (Note: KI is not provided to the general public.)**
- **0-5R Direct Reading Dosimeters will be used at the Reception Center.**
- **0-20R Direct Reading Dosimeters will be used at all other locations.**
- **Direct Reading Dosimeter readings are monitored and reported in accordance with Procedure P.**
- **According to the plans, there are no maximum authorized mission exposure limits. Emergency workers should be aware of their reporting requirements to their supervisor.**

- Exposure rate of 1R/hr, and an exposure of 3R are the *exposure limits* as defined in the plan.
- According to the plans, supervisors should contact their emergency workers regarding KI administration.
- A controller inject message at the SEOC will cause the communications of dosimeter correction factors to Rockland and West Chester Counties, along with the appropriate guidance of how this information should be used.

OBJECTIVE 6: RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING

Demonstrate the appropriate use of equipment and procedures for determining field radiation measurements.

Locations observed: OCEOC, OCFA

ARCAs: None

EXTENT OF PLAY:

Demonstration will include:

- The County will dispatch two Field Monitoring Teams.
- KI will be issued along with their dosimetry prior to departure. They are aware of the procedures regarding the use of KI.
- Each team will take radiation measurements at a minimum of six (6) locations, some of which may be the same locations, but at different times in the scenario. A controller will supply simulated field data when the team has taken measurements.

Extent of Play Agreement

- The teams will not suit up in anti-contamination clothing, however, one member will suit up at FEMA's request at the OCEOC prior to dispatch. Early arrival of team members to support this demonstration is permitted.
- Charcoal adsorbers will be used to simulate silver zeolite cartridges, however, silver zeolite cartridges will be available.
- The teams can be questioned regarding procedures and resources to transport samples to a central point for transfer to the State laboratory (Albany). There will be no transport of samples to either the transfer point or the State laboratory (Albany).

- **The primary mission of field teams is to validate the PADs following a release. Secondly, plume characterization may be directed by the County Dose Assessment Staff.**

OBJECTIVE 7: PLUME DOSE PROJECTION

Demonstrate the capability to develop dose projections and protective action recommendations regarding evacuation and sheltering

Locations observed: SEOC, OCEOC

ARCAs: None

EXTENT OF PLAY:

Dose projections and protective action recommendations will be demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency from the Oswego County EOC except if the Governor declares a state of emergency, then they would be also demonstrated from the State EOC.

Extent of Play Agreement

- **In the OCEOC, dose assessment personnel compare the Utility recommendation to their own assessment.**
- **Whole body gamma dose projections are expressed as TEDE and iodine inhalation dose projections are expressed as CDE Thyroid as specified in the county plan.**
- **Noble Gas/Iodine ratios provided within the dose projection model will be used to translate gamma exposure rates measurements from the plume into corresponding radioiodine concentrations.**
- **There will be no actual packaging or transport of samples to the laboratory. The County Radiological Officer can be questioned regarding procedures and resources to transport samples to a central point for transfer to the State laboratory (Albany).**

OBJECTIVE 8: FIELD RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING – AIRBORNE RADIOIODINE AND PARTICULATE ACTIVITY MONITORING

Demonstrate the appropriate use of equipment and procedures for the measurement of airborne radioiodine concentrations as low as 10^{-7} (0.0000001) micro curies per cubic centimeter in the presence of noble gases and obtain samples of particulate activity in the airborne plume.

Locations observed: OCEOC, OCFA

ARCAs: None

EXTENT OF PLAY:

Demonstration will include:

- The County will dispatch two (2) Field Monitoring Teams.
- KI will be issued along with their dosimetry prior to departure. They are aware of the procedures regarding the use of KI.
- Each team will take airborne radioiodine samples at a minimum of two (2) locations, some of which may be the same locations, but at different times in the scenario. A controller will supply simulated field data when the team has taken measurements.

Extent of Play Agreement

- **Charcoal adsorbers will be used to simulate silver zeolite cartridges for cost savings. However, silver zeolite cartridges will be available.**
- **The teams will not suit up in anti-contamination clothing, however, one member will suit up at FEMA's request at the OCEOC prior to dispatch. Early arrival of team member to support this demonstration is permitted.**
- **County EOC staff and the Field Monitoring Teams can be questioned regarding procedures and resources to transport samples to a central point for transfer to the State laboratory (Albany).**
- **The RO2A and E140N do not have installed check sources. Button sources are available for appropriate instruments for inspection.**

OBJECTIVE 9: PLUME PROTECTION ACTION DECISION MAKING

Demonstrate the capability to make timely and appropriate protective action decisions (PAD).

Locations observed: SEOC, OCEOC

ARCAs: None

EXTENT OF PLAY:

- Protective action decision making will be demonstrated as it would in an actual emergency.
- Emergency workers in the EPZ at risk of exposure to radioactive iodine will be issued KI before dispatch to the field. (Note: KI is not provided to the general public.)

Extent of Play Agreement:

- **Initial and subsequent PADS consider dose assessment team recommendations.**
- **As specified in the plan, subsequent PADS do not consider:**

- shelter availability; or
- relative dose savings between sheltering and evacuating.

OBJECTIVE 10: ALERT AND NOTIFICATION

Demonstrate the capability to promptly alert and notify the public within the 10-mile plume pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) and disseminate instructional messages to the public on the basis of decisions by appropriate State or local officials.

Locations observed: SEOC, JNC, OCEOC, WSYR

ARCAs: None

EXTENT OF PLAY:

Demonstrations will include:

- EAS messages will be developed and sent to WSYR.
- There will be no broadcast of EAS messages, only simulation.
- EAS messages will be drafted and ready for broadcasting within 15 minutes of the decision that requires an EAS message to be broadcast.
- Airing of one EAS message will be simulated. The clock time will be stopped after the announcer has read the first three words of the talk-up, after “this is a drill.”
- Siren and tone alert activations will be simulated.
- Back-up route alerting of one route (selected by the Scenario Development Team) will be discussed at the County EOC, after the inject of a siren failure message.

Extent of Play Agreement:

- **As specified in the plan, there is no primary or supplemental route alerting.**
- **Tone Alert Radio (NOAA Weather radio) activation will be simulated.**
- **As specified in the plan, the siren system does not include a public address system capability.**
- **TDD is not used in Oswego County; other methods are available as described in the plan.**
- **There will be no telephone calls to individuals or institutions, however, lists of these will be available.**

OBJECTIVE 11: PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS AND EMERGENCY INFORMATION

Demonstrate the capability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and instructions to the public.

Locations observed: SEOC, JNC, OCEOC

ARCAs: None

EXTENT OF PLAY:

All activities associated with the activation and operation of the JNC are to be performed as they would be in an actual emergency. Demonstration will include:

- EAS messages will be formulated and simulated to be disseminated as they would in an actual emergency.
- There will be only one (1) simulation of airing of the EAS message. This will be the first EAS message.
- The last time to be recorded (clock stopped) is the time at which the EAS message begins to be broadcast (first three (3) words read of the talk-up, after “this is a drill”).

Extent of Play Agreement:

- **PIOs at the EOC develop and PIOs at the JNC release emergency information and instructions to the public.**
- **The chief elected county official authorizes release of EAS messages.**
- **As specified in the plan, no EAS messages will be re-broadcast.**
- **The following (as specified) are provided in follow-up news releases, and as specified in the plan, are NOT included in any EAS message:**
 - **KI (not provided for the general public)***
 - **Instructions for transients without shelter**
 - **Evacuation routes****
 - **Location of congregate care centers***
 - **Location of Reception Center**
 - **Information concerning:**
 - school closings
 - special populations
 - protective actions for ingestion
 - relocation, reentry, or return
 - Public Inquiry (rumor control) telephone numbers
 - addressing false or misleading rumors

* Not covered in any news releases from the JNC

** Routes are provided within the annual public information distribution

OBJECTIVE 12: EMERGENCY INFORMATION – MEDIA

Demonstrate the capability to coordinate the development and dissemination of clear, accurate, and timely information to the news media.

Locations observed: JNC

ARCAs: None

EXTENT OF PLAY:

The Joint News Center, when activated, includes representatives of the State of New York and Oswego County. These representatives serve as the official sources of State and County information released to the news media. Information will be developed and disseminated to the media as it would in an actual emergency.

Extent of Play Agreement:

- **As specified in the plan, JNC PIOs have the responsibility for conducting media briefings.**
- **The following (as specified) are provided in follow-up news releases, and as specified in the plan, are NOT included in any EAS message:**
 - **KI (not provided for the general public)***
 - **Instructions for transients without shelter**
 - **Evacuation routes****
 - **Location of congregate care centers***
 - **Location of Reception Center**
 - **Information concerning**
 - school closings
 - special populations
 - protective actions for ingestion
 - relocation, reentry, or return
 - Public Inquiry (rumor control) telephone numbers
 - addressing false or misleading rumors

* Not covered in any news releases from the JNC

** Routes are provided within the annual public information distribution

OBJECTIVE 13: EMERGENCY INFORMATION – RUMOR CONTROL (PUBLIC INQUIRY)

Demonstrate the capability to establish and operate rumor control (Public Inquiry) in a coordinated and timely manner.

Locations observed: JNC

ARCAs: None

EXTENT OF PLAY:

- The Joint News Center, when activated, includes representatives of the State of New York and Oswego County. These representatives serve as the official sources of State and County information released to the news media.
- A rumor control (Public Inquiry) function is also provided.

Extent of Play Agreement:

- There will be at least six (6) calls (via controller inject messages) per hour during the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency levels for each of the four (4) (14 total) rumor control (Public Inquiry) staff members.
- Sufficient numbers of false or misleading rumors (via controller inject message), some of which will establish a trend, will be included for which measures should be taken.
- Evaluation of rumor control (Public Inquiry) staff will be limited to four individuals.
- Media Monitoring staff members monitor radio and television broadcasts in the JNC.

OBJECTIVE 14: IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTECTIVE ACTIONS – USE OF KI FOR EMERGENCY WORKERS, INSTITUTIONALIZED INDIVIDUALS, AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC

Demonstrate the capability and resources to implement potassium iodide (KI) protective actions for emergency workers, institutionalized individuals, and, if the State plan specifies, the general public.

Locations Observed: SEOC, OCEOC, OCFA

ARCAs: None

EXTENT OF PLAY:

- The State and County does assessment groups discuss the need to authorize the administration of KI.
- Emergency workers in the EPZ at risk of exposure to radioactive iodine are aware of how and where to obtain KI, and will be issued KI along with their dosimetry prior to dispatch to the field.
- A supply of KI is available at the EOC or other designated locations for distribution to emergency workers.

Extent of Play Agreement:

- In accordance with the New York State and Oswego County plans, KI is not recommended for the general public.
- Institutionalized individuals (Oswego Hospital Patients, and Oswego County Correctional Inmates) may be provided KI through discussion only.

OBJECTIVE 15: IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTECTIVE ACTIONS – SPECIAL POPULATIONS

Demonstrate the capability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for special populations.

Locations Observed: OCEOC, OCFA

ARCAs: None

EXTENT OF PLAY:

- Call lists will be available at the County EOC for special facilities and for the non-institutionalized hearing impaired and mobility impaired individuals.
- The Transportation Coordinator will simulate the initiation of the mobilization of buses in sequence with the scenario. A free play message will be provided at the County EOC directing which routes to simulate as determined by the scenario development team. The driver reports to the bus operators' garage and is assigned routes, briefed, and simulated to be deployed. Discussion of the pickup route and the route to the Reception Center will be done at the request of the FEMA evaluator.

Extent of Play Agreement:

1. **SPECIAL POPULATION BUS ROUTES (for General Population)**

- One bus route (selected by the scenario development team) will be discussed out of sequence with and prior to the exercise (on 12/3/01). A dispatcher and one bus driver will be interviewed.
- No dispatch or travel by the busses will be required.
- Route alerting is not performed in Oswego County.

2. **NOTIFICATION OF THE HEARING IMPAIRED**

- All calls will be simulated.

- **TDD is not used in Oswego County.**
- **Printed captions on TV is not available in Oswego County.**

3. EVACUATION OF NON-INSTITUTIONALIZED MOBILITY IMPAIRED INDIVIDUALS

- **There will be no actual dispatch of vehicles for the transport of non-institutionalized mobility impaired individuals.**
- **All calls will be simulated.**

OBJECTIVE 16: IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTECTIVE ACTIONS – SCHOOLS

Demonstrate the capability and resources necessary to implement protective actions for school children within the plume pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ).

Locations Observed: OCEOC, OCFA

ARCAs: None

EXTENT OF PLAY:

- The bus driver will assemble at the normal dispatch location for briefing, assignment, and simulated dispatch out of sequence and prior to the exercise. Questions will then be posed by the FEMA evaluator.
- The dispatchers will perform all actions as described in the plan.
- Notification of parents and sheltering of students will be in accordance with the schools' policies.

Extent of Play Agreement:

- **One bus route (selected by the scenario development team) will be discussed out of sequence with and prior to the exercise (on 12/3/01) in each of the two school districts**
- **No dispatch or travel by the busses will be required.**
- **School interviews will be performed out of sequence with and prior to the exercise (on 12/3/01) in coordination with Oswego County.**

Three components exist:

- **Interview (on 12/3/01) with Mexico High School and Leighton Elementary School.**
- **Interview bus dispatcher and bus driver (on 12/3/01).**
- **EOC activities in sequence.**

OBJECTIVE 17: TRAFFIC ACCESS AND CONTROL

Demonstrate the organizational capability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas.

Locations Observed: OCEOC, OCFA

ARCAs: None

EXTENT OF PLAY:

- One Traffic Control Point (TCP) will be simulated at the Oswego County EOC in sequence with the scenario.
- The TCPs will be identified in a controller inject message provided at the County EOC.
- The discussion will occur when the scenario calls for activating TCPs and will include a discussion of the dispatch of one police officer. The interview will be terminated when FEMA has completed the evaluation following contact with the County EOC.

Extent of Play Agreement:

- All activities associated with the TCP will be simulated.

OBJECTIVE 18: RECEPTION CENTER – MONITORING , DECONTAMINATION, AND REGISTRATION

Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment, and personnel for the radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees.

Locations Observed: OnCFA, out of sequence on 12/13/01.

ARCAs: None

EXTENT OF PLAY:

The Reception Center in the Youth Building at the NYS Fairgrounds will be demonstrated out of sequence with the scenario on 12/13/01. The facility will be set up as it would be in an actual emergency with exceptions as noted below. The facility is staffed with enough equipment and personnel to monitor 20 percent of the EPZ population (as defined in the plan) in 12 hours.

Extent of Play Agreement:

- One lane for vehicle monitoring with at least one (1) monitor monitoring at least two (2) vehicles.
- One portal monitoring station monitoring at least six (6) individuals.
- Portal monitors are used as a “go/no go” check, with full survey performed only on individuals noted as contaminated (no go). Decontamination will be required when contamination in excess of 360 cpm above background is indicated using the Eberline E120E with HP-260 pancake probe as indicated in the plan.
- One registration station (social services) with two (2) personnel registering at least two (2) individuals each.
- One male and one female decon station with two (2) monitors to simulate at least one (1) personnel decon each.
- One vehicle decon station with at least one (1) monitor to simulate at least two (2) vehicle decons.
- Other staff will be demonstrated through the use of rosters. Evacuees (some of which will be simulated to be contaminated using controller inject messages) will be simulated by members of the facility staff.
- The facility will be set up as it would be in an actual emergency with all route markings and contamination control measures in place with the exception that Reception Center floors will not be covered with paper/plastic.
- Monitors will not suit up in anti-contamination clothing although one (1) monitor will suit up at FEMA’s request.

OBJECTIVE 19: CONGREGATE CARE

Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, supplies, personnel, and procedures for congregate care of evacuees.

Locations Observed: OnCFA, out of sequence with the scenario on 12/13/01.

ARCAs: None

EXTENT OF PLAY:

(Facility to be determined) will be demonstrated out of sequence with the exercise via an interview with the Shelter Manager, Registrar, and one (1) support staff. Center personnel will make estimates of supplies required for the potential evacuees.

Extent of Play Agreement:

- The facility will not be set up nor will equipment and supplies be brought to the center.
- These facilities are facilities of the Onondaga/Oswego Chapter of the American Red Cross.
- The interviews will take place at the Reception Center out of sequence with the scenario on 12/13/01.

OBJECTIVE 20: MEDICAL SERVICES – TRANSPORTATION

Demonstrate the adequacy of vehicles, equipment, procedures, and personnel for transporting contaminated, injured, or exposed individuals.

Locations Observed: OnCFA, out of sequence with the scenario on 12/13/01.

ARCAs: None

EXTENT OF PLAY:

A Rural Metro ambulance crew and one (1) monitor will be stationed at the Reception Center out of sequence with the exercise and on the same day as the Reception Center demonstration. An individual with a simulated injury and simulated contamination will be presented. The individual will be surveyed, administered first aid, and placed in the ambulance.

Extent of Play Agreement:

- The drill will end when the vehicle is ready to depart with the victim.
- Communications will be simulated and include information relative to ETA, patient status, etc.

OBJECTIVE 21: MEDICAL SERVICES – FACILITIES

Demonstrate the adequacy of equipment, procedures, supplies, and personnel of medical facilities responsible for treatment of contaminated, injured, or exposed individuals.

Locations Observed: Oswego Hospital out of sequence with the scenario on 12/13/01.

ARCAs: None

EXTENT OF PLAY:

This drill will be demonstrated out of sequence from the exercise on October 12, 2001, at Oswego Hospital.

OBJECTIVE 22: EMERGENCY WORKERS, EQUIPMENT, AND VEHICLES – MONITORING AND DECONTAMINATION

Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for the monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles.

Locations Observations: OCFA

ARCAs: None

EXTENT OF PLAY:

The Personnel Monitoring Center (PMC) at the County Highway Garage (Dill Pickle Alley) in Parish, NY, will be demonstrated in sequence with the scenario. The facility will be set up as it would be in an actual emergency with all route markings and contamination control measures in place, with exceptions as noted below. A controller will inject simulated contamination levels to drive demonstration of the various activities.

Extent of Play Agreement:

- **One (1) lane for vehicles monitoring with at least one (1) monitor monitoring at least two (2) vehicles.**
- **One (1) portal monitoring station to monitor at least two (2) individuals.**
- **Two (2) personnel decon stations with at least one (1) monitor each to simulate at least two (2) personnel decons.**
- **One (1) vehicle decon station with at least one (1) monitor to simulate at least one (1) vehicle decon.**

- **Other staff will be demonstrated through the use of rosters.**
- **Contaminated individuals will be simulated by members of the facility staff.**
- **PMC floors will not be covered with paper/plastic.**
- **Monitors will not suit up in anti-contamination clothing although one (1) monitor will suit up at FEMA's request.**

The following objectives are not included in this revision in that they have been demonstrated previously and will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

OBJECTIVES 23: SUPPLEMENTARY ASSISTANCE (FEDERAL/OTHER)

Demonstrate the capability to identify the need for external assistance and to request such assistance from Federal or other support organizations.

Date demonstrated 5/27/99 Next year required for demonstration 2005

OBJECTIVE 24: POST-EMERGENCY SAMPLING

Demonstrate the use of equipment and procedures for the collection and transportation of samples from areas that received deposition from the airborne plume.

Date demonstrated 5/27/99 Next year required for demonstration 2005

OBJECTIVE 25: LABORATORY OPERATIONS

Demonstrate laboratory operations and procedures for measuring and analyzing samples.

Date demonstrated 5/27/99 Next year required for demonstration 2005

OBJECTIVE 26: INGESTION EXPOSURE PATHWAY – DOSE PROJECTION AND PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING

Demonstrate the capability to project doses to the public for the ingestion exposure pathway and to recommend protective actions.

Date demonstrated 5/27/99 Next year required for demonstration 2005

OBJECTIVE 27: INGESTION EXPOSURE PATHWAY – DOSE PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Demonstrate the capability to implement protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway.

Date demonstrated 5/27/99 Next year required for demonstration 2005

OBJECTIVE 28: RELOCATION, RE-ENTRY, AND RETURN – DECISION MAKING

Demonstrate the capability to develop decisions on relocation, re-entry, and return.

Date demonstrated 5/27/99 Next year required for demonstration 2005

OBJECTIVE 30: CONTINUOUS, 24-HOUR STAFFING

Demonstrate the capability to maintain staffing on a continuous, 24-hour basis through an actual shift change.

Date demonstrated 1999 Next year required for demonstration 2005

OBJECTIVE 31: OFFSITE SUPPORT FOR THE EVACUATION OF ONSITE PERSONNEL

Demonstrate the capability to provide offsite support for the evacuation of onsite personnel.

Date demonstrated 10/20/99 Next year required for demonstration 2005

OBJECTIVE 32: UNANNOUNCED EXERCISE OR DRILL

Demonstrate the capability to carry out emergency response functions in an unannounced exercise or drill.

Date demonstrated 9/24/97 Next year required for demonstration 2003

OBJECTIVE 33: OFF-HOURS EXERCISE OR DRILL

Demonstrate the capability to carry out emergency response functions during an off-hours exercise or drill.

Date demonstrated 9/24/97 Next year required for demonstration 2003

APPENDIX 4

EXERCISE SCENARIO SYNOPSIS

December 4, 2001

4.1 Initial Conditions

The scenario commences with reactor power at 100 percent, having been at this power level for 330 days. A slow increasing trend in Stack Gas Activity had occurred over a three (3)-day period last week and was determined to be caused by a leaking fuel bundle. Planning is developing the flux test plan to be performed this weekend. Stack gas activity currently indicating 34 uci/sec and steady over the last week. Cooling Tower is operating in the deicing mode. Additionally, the following equipment is out of service:

- Div. 2 Service Water Bay Unit Cooler 2HVY*UC2D out of service as of 0300, troubleshooting in progress, expected return to service by 1600 today.
- RHR B System -replacing lower bearing oil in RHR B pump motor, out of service as of 1200 on 12/3/01, expected return to service 1600 12/4/01.

Tech Spec LCOs in effect:

- 7 day LCO for RHS, ITS 3.5.1.A
- 7 day LCO for Containment Spray ITS 3.6.1.6.A
- 7 day LCO for RHS Sup. Pool Cooling, ITS 3.6.2.3
- 7 day LCO for RHS Sup. Pool Spray, ITS 3.6.2.4
- 72 hr LCO for Div 1 Service Water System, ITS 3.7.1D

An unusual cold snap has been affecting the entire northeast United States over the past two weeks. Temperatures are expected to remain extremely cold, with highs in the low teen's. Service Water inlet temperatures are averaging about 34° F.

4.2 Scenario

The exercise will begin at about 0820 with an annunciators alarm in the control room indicating a fire in the Service Water Pump (SWP) Room. The Chief Shift Operator (CSO) will perform actions in accordance with EPIP-EPP-28, Fire Fighting, to dispatch the fire brigade to the scene. Upon investigation, fire will be reported in the Div 2 SWP Unit Cooler 2HVY*UC2B. Operators will be dispatched to trip the unit cooler off the line at 2EHS*MCC301. As the operator opens the breaker a flash will be observed, and the operator will report that the switch-gear is emitting a hot acrid smell. No smoke will be observed at the switch-gear, but the indications provided will warrant additional inspection. Upon opening of the breaker, the fire brigade will be able to rapidly extinguish the fire in the unit cooler.

At about 0845, following the report of the fire in the unit cooler, in combination with the fire alarms and the report of the problems in 2EHS*MCC301, the SSS will refer to EPIP-EPP-02, Emergency Classifications at Unit 2, and declare an **Alert in accordance with Emergency Action Level # 8.2.2**. The SSS/ED will implement actions in accordance with EPIP-EPP-18, Activation of the Emergency Plan, and direct notifications in accordance with EPIP-EPP-20, Emergency Notifications. The SSS/ED will direct that the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) be activated, and also direct that operators take actions in accordance with N2-ARP-01, Annunciator Response Procedures.

When the TSC/OSC are staffed at about 0915, the SSS/ED will provide plant status and other information to the TSC Manager and will request Damage Control Teams (DCTs) be assigned to the following tasks: investigation of Div 2 unit cooler following indications of fire, and investigation into the problems associated with 2EHS*MCC301. Damage Control Teams will be dispatched as requested. Initial indications will reveal some heat damage to the internals of 2EHS*MCC301. Additionally, the unit cooler in the service water room will require extensive repair. When the EOF is staffed at about 0945, the SSS/ED will provide plant status and other information and turn over duties of the Emergency Director to the Emergency Director/Recovery Manager (ED/RM) in the EOF.

At about 1030 operators will receive indications of a trip of 2EJS*US1. The loss of 2EJS*US1 will result in a loss of power to all Div 1 primary containment isolation valves, and a loss of power to much of the Div. 1 Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS). Additionally, power will be lost to both Division I battery chargers. The SSS will consult Tech Specs and determine that the plant is in a one (1) hour Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for RHR drywell sprays, suppression chamber sprays, suppression pool cooling, and numerous other Tech Specs. The SSS will direct actions to commence a reactor shutdown after notifying plant management. At about 1100 operators will receive indications of rising drywell temperature and pressure.

As drywell pressure continues to rise, the SSS will inform the ED/RM of the change in plant status and direct a rapid power reduction in accordance with N2-SOP-101C. Prior to receiving an automatic scram on high drywell pressure, the Control Room Supervisor (CRS) will direct the r CSO to manually scram the reactor. Upon initiation of the manual scram, the leak inside containment will suddenly increase in size. Also, at the same time that the drywell to wet-well vacuum breakers open, the vacuum breakers will stick in the open position. It will become apparent to the operators when suppression chamber pressure and drywell pressure have equalized that the vacuum breakers have failed to close. The failure of the drywell to wet-well vacuum breakers is postulated to be caused by a common mode failure of the internals of the valve. The steam leak will result in a continually rising drywell and suppression chamber pressure due to the open vacuum breakers. Drywell radiation levels will rise rapidly as the previously leaking fuel bundle is further damaged as a result of the scram. The SSS will direct Operators to take actions in accordance with Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) in order to stabilize the plant and to restore reactor level. Operators' actions to stabilize reactor level will be

slowed due to a failure of 2CSH*MOV-107 to open. Local manual manipulation of the valve will result in the valve opening, but not before reactor water level drops below top of active fuel (TAF). Further inspection of the valve will reveal stripped gears in the gearbox. Additionally, use of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) will be prevented due to a trip of the RCIC turbine.

Additionally, as a result of the pressure transient on the condensate system caused by the reactor scram, a flanged coupling on the discharge side of 2CNM-P1A will start to leak. The leak will spray all three (3) condensate pumps motors resulting in motor electrical faults on all three (3) motors. The operators will be made aware of the loss of condensate by annunciators indicating the motor electrical faults. DCTs sent to the area will observe water on the floor and surrounding areas, and water dripping from all of the condensate pump motors.

As the primary containment pressure continues to rise, it will approach the pressure suppression pressure; operators will be directed to blow-down in accordance with N2-EOPs. Upon opening of the safety relief valves for depressurization, a rapid rise in drywell pressure and radiation levels will be noted, with drywell pressure eventually exceeding design pressure. As the reactor depressurizes, additional fuel damage will occur resulting in a continued rise in drywell radiation levels. At about 1137, as the drywell pressure maximizes to greater than design, an instrument line will break due to the high pressure in the drywell, resulting in an uncontrolled release of radioactive materials from the containment to the reactor building. The SSS will refer to EPIP-EPP-02, and make recommendations to the ED/RM to declare a General Emergency per EAL # 3.1.3. Following a review of the EALs, the ED/RM will declare a **General Emergency in accordance with EAL # 3.1.3**. Notifications will be made in accordance with EPIP-EPP-20, and Protective Actions Recommendations will be made in accordance with EPIP-EPP-08, Offsite Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation.

With the reactor building ventilation system isolated and Standby Gas Treatment (GTS) providing for reactor building ventilation, a filtered monitored release to the environment will begin. As the release continues, stack release rates will start to rise. It is expected that the stack release rates will exceed Technical Specification values at about 1200.

The stack release rates will eventually peak with release duration of four (4) hours expected. As drywell pressure subsides, release rates from the stack will eventually lower, resulting in downwind dose rates lowering.

The exercise will be terminated when the following conditions have been met:

- Reactor depressurized, reactor level stabilized, containment pressure near normal levels.
- Release rates are verified as lowering.
- Downwind survey teams have reported dose rates are lowering in the evacuated Emergency Response Planning Areas (ERPAs).
- It has been verified that Oswego County has completed all required objectives.
- It has been verified that New York State has completed all required objectives.