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Dockets Nos. 50-266  
and 50-301

Wisconsin Electric Power Company  
Wisconsin Michigan Power Company  
ATTN: Mr. Sol Burstein  
Executive Vice President  
231 West Michigan Street  
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201

Gentlemen:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendments Nos. 25 and 30 to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27 for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units Nos. 1 and 2. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications and are in accordance with your application dated January 6, 1977.

These amendments consist of changes in the Technical Specifications that will revise the Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor (FN<sub>ΔH</sub>) limits to account for the effects of fuel rod bowing on departure from nucleate boiling.

Copies of the related Safety Evaluation and the Federal Register Notice also are enclosed.


Sincerely,

George Lear, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #3  
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. <sup>25</sup> to License DPR-24
2. Amendment No. <sup>30</sup> to License DPR-27
3. Safety Evaluation
4. Federal Register Notice

cc: See next page



OFFICE →	ORB#3	ORB#3	OELD	ORB#3		
SURNAME →	CParrish	JWetmore:acr		GLear		
DATE →	4/1/77	4/1/77	4/1/77	4/1/77		

Wisconsin Electric Power Company  
Wisconsin Michigan Power Company - 2 -

cc:

Mr. Bruce Churchill, Esquire  
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Mr. Arthur M. Fish  
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Manager, Nuclear Power Division  
Point Beach Nuclear Plant  
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Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201

Chief, Energy Systems Analysis Branch (AW-459)  
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U. S. Environmental Protection Agency  
Federal Activities Branch  
Region V Office  
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230 S. Dearborn Street  
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Walter L. Meyer  
Town Chairman  
Town of Two Creeks, Wisconsin  
Route 3, Two Rivers, Wisconsin 54241



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY  
WISCONSIN MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-266

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 25  
License No. DPR-24

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Wisconsin Electric Power Company and Wisconsin Michigan Power Company (the licensees) dated January 6, 1977 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B. of Facility Operating License No. DPR-24 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(B) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 25, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensees shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



George Lear, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #3  
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 4, 1977

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 25

TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-24

DOCKET NO. 50-266

Replace pages 15.2.1-3, 15.3.10-2 and 15.3.10-13 with the attached revised pages.

Additional peaking factors to account for local peaking due to fuel rod axial gaps and reduction in fuel pellet stack length as well as a penalty to account for rod bowing, have been included in the calculation of the curves shown in Figure 15.2.1-1. These curves are based on an  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  of 1.58, cosine axial flux shape, and a DNB analysis as described in Section 4.3 of WCAP-8050, "Fuel Densification, Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Cycle 2", (including the effects of fuel densification and flattened cladding).

Figure 15.2.1-1 also includes an allowance for an increase in the enthalpy rise hot channel factor at reduced power based on the expression:

$$F_{\Delta H}^N = 1.58 [1 + 0.2 (1-p)] \text{ where } P \text{ is a fraction of rated power}$$

when  $P \leq 1.0$ .  $F_{\Delta H}^N = 1.58$  when  $P > 1.0$ .

An additional rod bow penalty is applied to the Point Beach fuel to limit  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  to a more conservative value. Since the effects of rod bow are dependent on fuel burnup, the additional penalty is based on a decrease in the  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  limit of 2% for 0-15,000 MWD/MTU<sub>0</sub> burnup, 4% for 15,000 to 24,000 MWD/MTU<sub>0</sub> burnup and 6% for greater than 24,000 MWD/MTU<sub>0</sub> burnup. The application of these penalties to the design  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  results in a revised full power  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  limit of 1.55 for 0-15,000 MWD/MTU<sub>0</sub>, 1.52 for 15,000 to 24,000 MWD/MTU<sub>0</sub> fuel and 1.49 for fuel of burnup greater than 24,000 MWD/MTU<sub>0</sub>.

The hot channel factors are also sufficiently large to account for the degree of malpositioning of full-length rods that is allowed before the reactor trip setpoints are reduced and rod withdrawal block and load runback may be required. Rod withdrawal block and load runback occur before reactor trip setpoints are reached. The Reactor Control and Protective System is designed to prevent any anticipated combination of transient conditions that would result in a DNB ratio of less than 1.30.

3. The part-length rods shall be fully withdrawn from the core, except for physics testing.
4. When the reactor is subcritical, except for physics tests, the critical rod position, i.e., the rod position at which criticality would be achieved if the control rods were withdrawn in normal sequence with no other reactivity changes, shall not be lower than the insertion limit for zero power.

B. Power Distribution Limits

1. a. Except during low power physics tests, the hot channel factors defined in the basis must meet the following limits:

$$F_Q(Z) < \frac{(2.32)}{P} \times K(Z) \quad \text{for } P > .5$$

$$F_Q(Z) < 4.64 \times K(Z) \quad \text{for } P \leq .5$$

$$F_{\Delta H^-}^N < 1.55 \times (1+0.2 (1-P)) \quad \text{for 0 to 15,000 MWD/MTU. burnup fuel}$$

$$F_{\Delta H^-}^N < 1.52 \times (1+0.2 (1-P)) \quad \text{for 15,000 to 24,000 MWD/MTU. burnup fuel}$$

$$F_{\Delta H^-}^N < 1.49 \times (1+0.2 (1-P)) \quad \text{for greater than 24,000 MWD/MTU. burnup fuel}$$

where P is the fraction of full power at which the core is operating, K(Z) is the function in Figure 15.3.10-3 and Z is the core height location of  $F_Q$ .

- b. Following core loading prior to exceeding 90% of rated power and at effective full power monthly intervals thereafter, power distribution maps using the movable incore detector system shall be made to confirm that the hot channel factor limits are satisfied. The measured hot channel factors shall be increased in the following way:

- (1) The measurement of total peaking factor,  $F_Q^{Meas}$ , shall be increased by three percent to account for manufacturing tolerances and further increased by five percent to account for measurement error.

In the design limit of  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  there is 8 percent allowance for uncertainties which means that normal operation of the core is expected to result in a design  $F_{\Delta H}^N \leq 1.58/1.08$ . The logic behind the larger uncertainty in this case is that (a) normal perturbations in the radial power shape (i.e., rod misalignment) affect  $F_{\Delta H}^N$ , in most cases without necessarily affecting  $F_Q$ , (b) the operator has a direct influence of  $F_Q$  through movement of rods, and can limit it to the desired value, he has no direct control over  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  and (c) an error in the predictions for radial power shape which may be detected during startup physics tests can be compensated for in  $F_Q$  by tighter axial control, but compensation for  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  is less readily available. When a measurement of  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  is taken, experimental error must be allowed for and four percent is the appropriate allowance for a full core map taken with the movable incore detector flux mapping system. The  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  limits in specification 15.3.10.B.1.a. include an additional penalty for rod bow. This penalty is explained further in the basis on page 15.2.1-3.

Measurements of the hot channel factors are required as part of startup physics tests, at least each full power month operation, and whenever abnormal power distribution conditions require a reduction of core power to a level based upon measured hot channel factors. The incore map taken following initial loading provides confirmation of the basic nuclear design bases including proper fuel loading patterns. The periodic monthly incore mapping provides additional assurance that the nuclear design bases remain inviolate and identify operational anomalies which would, otherwise, affect these bases.

The procedures for axial power distribution control are designed to minimize the effects of xenon redistribution on the axial power distribution during load follow maneuvers. Basically, control of flux difference is required to limit the difference between the current value of flux difference ( $\Delta I$ ) and a reference value which corresponds to the full power equilibrium value of axial offset (axial offset =  $\Delta I$ /fractional power).



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY  
WISCONSIN MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-301

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 30  
License No. DPR-27

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Wisconsin Electric Power Company and Wisconsin Michigan Power Company (the licensees) dated January 6, 1977 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B. of Facility Operating License No. DPR-27 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(B) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 30, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensees shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



George Lear, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #3  
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 4, 1977

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 30

TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-27

DOCKET NO. 50-301

Replace pages 15.2.1-3, 15.3.10-2 and 15.3.10-13 with the attached revised pages. Delete page 15.3.10-2a.

Additional peaking factors to account for local peaking due to fuel rod axial gaps and reduction in fuel pellet stack length as well as a penalty to account for rod bowing, have been included in the calculation of the curves shown in Figure 15.2.1-1. These curves are based on an  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  of 1.58, cosine axial flux shape, and a DNB analysis as described in Section 4.3 of WCAP-8050, "Fuel Densification, Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Cycle 2", (including the effects of fuel densification and flattened cladding).

Figure 15.2.1-1 also includes an allowance for an increase in the enthalpy rise hot channel factor at reduced power based on the expression:

$$F_{\Delta H}^N = 1.58 [1 + 0.2 (1-p)] \text{ where } P \text{ is a fraction of rated power}$$

when  $P \leq 1.0$ .  $F_{\Delta H}^N = 1.58$  when  $P > 1.0$ .

An additional rod bow penalty is applied to the Point Beach fuel to limit  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  to a more conservative value. Since the effects of rod bow are dependent on fuel burnup, the additional penalty is based on a decrease in the  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  limit of 2% for 0-15,000 MWD/MTU. burnup, 4% for 15,000 to 24,000 MWD/MTU. burnup and 6% for greater than 24,000 MWD/MTU. burnup. The application of these penalties to the design  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  results in a revised full power  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  limit of 1.55 for 0-15,000 MWD/MTU., 1.52 for 15,000 to 24,000 MWD/MTU. fuel and 1.49 for fuel of burnup greater than 24,000 MWD/MTU..

The hot channel factors are also sufficiently large to account for the degree of malpositioning of full-length rods that is allowed before the reactor trip setpoints are reduced and rod withdrawal block and load runback may be required. Rod withdrawal block and load runback occur before reactor trip setpoints are reached. The Reactor Control and Protective System is designed to prevent any anticipated combination of transient conditions that would result in a DNB ratio of less than 1.30.

3. The part-length rods shall be fully withdrawn from the core, except for physics testing.
4. When the reactor is subcritical, except for physics tests, the critical rod position, i.e., the rod position at which criticality would be achieved if the control rods were withdrawn in normal sequence with no other reactivity changes, shall not be lower than the insertion limit for zero power.

B. Power Distribution Limits

1. a. Except during low power physics tests, the hot channel factors defined in the basis must meet the following limits:

$$F_Q(Z) \leq \frac{(2.32)}{P} \times K(Z) \quad \text{for } P > .5$$

$$F_Q(Z) < 4.64 \times K(Z) \quad \text{for } P \leq .5$$

$$F_{\Delta H}^N < 1.55 \times (1 + 0.2(1-P)) \quad \text{for 0 to 15,000 MWD/MTU. burnup fuel}$$

$$F_{\Delta H}^N < 1.52 \times (1 + 0.2(1-P)) \quad \text{for 15,000 to 24,000 MWD/MTU. burnup fuel}$$

$$F_{\Delta H}^N < 1.49 \times (1 + 0.2(1-P)) \quad \text{for greater than 24,000 MWD/MTU. burnup fuel}$$

where P is the fraction of full power at which the core is operating, K(Z) is the function in Figure 15.3.10-3 and Z is the core height location of  $F_Q$ .

- b. Following core loading prior to exceeding 90% of rated power and at effective full power monthly intervals thereafter, power distribution maps using the movable incore detector system shall be made to confirm that the hot channel factor limits are satisfied. The measured hot channel factors shall be increased in the following way:

- (1) The measurement of total peaking factor,  $F_Q^{Meas}$ , shall be increased by three percent to account for manufacturing tolerances and further increased by five percent to account for measurement error.

In the design limit  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  there is 8 percent allowance for uncertainties which means that normal operation of the core is expected to result in a design  $F_{\Delta H}^N \leq 1.58/1.08$ . The logic behind the larger uncertainty in this case is that (a) normal perturbations in the radial power shape (i.e., rod misalignment) affect  $F_{\Delta H}^N$ , in most cases without necessarily affecting  $F_Q$ , (b) the operator has a direct influence of  $F_Q$  through movement of rods, and can limit it to the desired value, he has no direct control over  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  and (c) an error in the predictions for radial power shape which may be detected during startup physics tests can be compensated for in  $F_Q$  by tighter axial control, but compensation for  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  is less readily available. When a measurement of  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  is taken, experimental error must be allowed for and four percent is the appropriate allowance for a full core map taken with the movable incore detector flux mapping system. The  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  limits in specification 15.3.10.B.1.a. include an additional penalty for rod bow. This penalty is explained further in the basis on page 15.2.1-3.

Measurements of the hot channel factors are required as part of startup physics tests, at least each full power month operation, and whenever abnormal power distribution conditions require a reduction of core power to a level based upon measured hot channel factors. The incore map taken following initial loading provides confirmation of the basic nuclear design bases including proper fuel loading patterns. The periodic monthly incore mapping provides additional assurance that the nuclear design bases remain inviolate and identify operational anomalies which would, otherwise, affect these bases.

The procedures for axial power distribution control are designed to minimize the effects of xenon redistribution on the axial power distribution during load follow maneuvers. Basically, control of flux difference is required to limit the difference between the current value of flux difference ( $\Delta I$ ) and a reference value which corresponds to the full power equilibrium value of axial offset (axial offset =  $\Delta I$ /fractional power).



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
SUPPORTING AMENDMENTS NOS. 25 AND 30 TO LICENSES DPR-24 AND DPR-27  
WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY  
WISCONSIN MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY  
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS NOS. 1 AND 2  
DOCKETS NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301

Introduction

By letter dated January 6, 1977, Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WEPCO) proposed changes to the Technical Specifications appended to Facility Licenses Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27 for Point Beach Units Nos. 1 and 2. The proposed changes would revise the Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor ( $FN_{\Delta H}$ ) limits to account for the effects of fuel rod bowing on departure from nucleate boiling.

Discussion

On August 9, 1976, Westinghouse Electric Corporation presented data to the NRC staff which showed that previously developed methods for accounting for the effect of fuel rod bowing on departure from nucleate boiling may not contain adequate thermal margin when unheated rods (such as thimble tubes) are present. We have evaluated the impact of the Westinghouse data on all operating pressurized water reactors (PWR's). Models for treating the effects of fuel rod bowing on thermal-hydraulic performance have been derived for all PWR's. The models are based on the propensity of the individual fuel designs to bow and on the thermal analysis methods used to predict the coolant conditions for both normal operation and anticipated transients. As a result of these evaluations, the staff has concluded that for some facilities the current Technical Specification operating limits do not provide sufficient thermal margin. In these cases, additional thermal margin is required to assure, with high confidence, that departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) does not occur during anticipated transients.

To accommodate the loss of thermal margin for the Point Beach facility, the licensee has proposed to change the Technical Specifications requirements to provide additional thermal margin.

## Background

In 1973 Westinghouse Electric presented to the staff the results of experiments in which a 4 x 4 bundle of electrically heated fuel rods was tested to determine the effect of fuel rod bowing to contact on the thermal margin. The departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR) is a measure of the thermal margin available prior to the point at which DNB occurs. The tests were performed at conditions representative of PWR coolant conditions. The results of these experiments showed that, for the highest power density at the highest coolant pressure expected in a Westinghouse reactor, the DNBR reduction due to a heated rod bowed to the point of contact with adjacent heater rods was approximately 8%.

Fuel bundle coolant mixing and heat transfer computer programs such as COBRA IIIC and THINC-IV were able to predict the results of these experiments. Because the end point could be predicted, i.e., the DNBR reduction at contact, there was confidence that the DNBR reduction due to partial rod bow, that is, rod bow to a point less than contact with the adjacent rod, could also be correctly predicted.

On August 9, 1976, Westinghouse met with the NRC staff to discuss further experiments with the same configuration of fuel bundle (4 x 4) using electrically heated rods. However, for this set of experiments one of the center 4 fuel rods was replaced by an unheated tube of the same size as a Westinghouse thimble tube. This new test configuration was tested over the same range of power, flow and pressure as the earlier tests. However, with the unheated, larger diameter rod the reduction in DNBR was much larger than in the earlier (1973) tests.

The data consisted of points corresponding to no intentional bowing (that is, a certain amount of bowing due to tolerances cannot be prevented) and to contact. No data were taken at partial clearance reductions between rods.

The staff attempted to calculate the Westinghouse results with the COBRA IIIC computer code but could not obtain agreement with the new data. Westinghouse was also unable to obtain agreement between their experimental results and the THINC-IV computer code.

On August 19, 1976, Combustion Engineering (CE) presented results of similar experiments to the staff. These tests were performed using a 21-rod bundle of electrically heated rods and an unheated guide tube. Results were presented for not only the case of full contact, but also the case of partial bowing.

Both sets of data (Westinghouse and CE) showed similar effects due to variations in coolant conditions. For both cases, the DNBR reduction became greater as the coolant pressure and the rod power increased.

Because both sets of data showed that plant thermal margins might be less than those intended, the staff derived an interim model to conservatively predict the DNBR reduction. Since the data with unheated rods could not be predicted by existing analytical methods, empirical models were derived<sup>(1)</sup>. Using these empirical models, the staff calculated DNBR reductions to be applied to all operating pressurized water reactors. A discussion of these empirical models is contained in reference 1.

#### Evaluation

The licensee has proposed Technical Specification changes which would provide for additional DNBR margin to offset the reduction in DNBR due to rod bow at Point Beach Units Nos. 1 and 2. The staff has evaluated the proposed Technical Specification changes using the procedure given in reference 1. This procedure consisted of predicting the rod-to-rod clearance reduction due to rod bow as a function of burnup, then applying an appropriate DNBR reduction based on the empirical model discussed in the attachment. The DNBR reduction is a function of the rod-to-rod clearance reduction. The DNBR reduction is then converted to a corresponding reduction in the  $F_{\Delta H}$  limits. The specific  $F_{\Delta H}$  reductions that were calculated for the type of fuel used at Point Beach Units Nos. 1 and 2 are: (1) a 0 to 2% ramp for burnups of 0 to 15,000 MWD/MTU, (2) 4% for burnups of 15,000 to 24,000 MWD/MTU, and (3) 6% for burnups from 24,000 to 33,000 MWD/MTU. These values are consistent with what the licensee has proposed. Therefore, we have concluded that the proposed reductions in  $F_{\Delta H}$  limits are adequate to offset the loss of thermal margin indicated by the Westinghouse rod bow data; and thus, the proposed changes are acceptable.

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(1) Revision 1 to Interim Safety Evaluation Report on Effects of Fuel Rod Bowing on Thermal Margin Calculations, dated February 16, 1977. (Attached)

### Environmental Considerations

We have determined that the amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendments involve an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

### Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendments do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and do not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: May 4, 1977

ATTACHMENT

INTERIM SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT  
ON EFFECTS OF FUEL ROD BOWING  
ON THERMAL MARGIN CALCULATIONS  
FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS

(REVISION I)

February 16, 1977

## CONTENTS

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 DNBR Reduction Due to Rod Bow
- 3.0 Application To Plants In The Construction Permit And Operating License Review Stage
- 4.0 Application To Operating Reactors
- 5.0 References

Data have recently been presented (Reference 1) to the staff which show that previously developed methods for accounting for the effect of fuel rod bowing on departure from nucleate boiling in a pressurized water reactor (PWR) may not contain adequate thermal margin when unheated rods, such as instrument tubes, are present. Further experimental verification of these data is in progress. However an interim measure is required pending a final decision on the validity of these new data.

The staff has evaluated the impact of these data on the performance of all operating pressurized water reactors. Models for treating the effects of fuel rod bowing on thermal-hydraulic performance have been derived. These models are based on the propensity of the individual fuel designs to bow and on the thermal analysis methods used to predict the coolant conditions for both normal operation and anticipated transients. As a result of these evaluations the staff has concluded that in some cases sufficient thermal margin does not now exist. In these cases, additional thermal margin will be required to assure, with high confidence, that departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) does not occur during anticipated transients. This report discusses how these conclusions were reached and identifies the amount of additional margin required.

The models and the required DNBR reductions which result from these models are meant to be only an interim measure until more data are available. Because the data base is rather sparse, an attempt was made to treat this problem in a conservative way. The required DNBR reductions will be revised as more data become available.

The staff review of the amount and consequences of fuel rod bowing in a boiling water reactor is now underway. At present no conclusions have been reached. When this review reaches a stage where either an interim or final conclusion can be reached, the results of this review will be published in a separate safety evaluation report.

It should be noted that throughout the remainder of this report, all discussion and conclusions apply only to pressurized water reactors.

2.0 DNBR Reduction Due To Rod Bow

2.1 Background

In 1973 Westinghouse Electric presented to the staff the results of experiments in which a 4x4 bundle of electrically heated fuel rods was tested to determine the effect of fuel rod bowing to contact on the thermal margin (DNBR reduction) (Reference 2). The tests were done at conditions representative of PWR coolant conditions. The results of these experiments showed that, for the highest power density at the highest coolant pressure expected in a Westinghouse reactor, the DNBR reduction due to heated rods bowed to contact was approximately 8%.

Fuel bundle coolant mixing and heat transfer computer programs such as COBRA IIIC and THINC-IV were able to accurately predict the results of these experiments. Because the end point could be predicted, i.e., the DNBR reduction at contact, there was confidence that the DNBR reduction due to partial bow, that is, bow to less than contact could also be correctly predicted.

On August 9, 1976 Westinghouse met with the staff to discuss further experiments with the same configuration of fuel bundle (4x4) using electrically heated rods. However, for this set of experiments one of the center 4 fuel rods was replaced by an unheated tube of the same size as a Westinghouse thimble tube. This new test configuration was tested over the same range of power, flow and pressure as the earlier tests. However, with the unheated, larger diameter rod the reduction in DNBR was much larger than in the earlier (1973) tests.

The data consisted of points corresponding to no intentional bowing (that is, a certain amount of bowing due to tolerances cannot be prevented) and to contact. No data were taken at partial clearance reductions between rods.

The staff attempted to calculate the Westinghouse results with the COBRA IIIC computer code but could not obtain agreement with the new data. Westinghouse was also unable to obtain agreement between their experimental results and the THINCIV computer code.

On August 19, 1976 CE presented results of similar experiments to the staff. These tests were performed using a 21 rod bundle of electrically heated rods and an unheated guide tube. Results were presented for not only the case of full contact, but also the case of partial bowing.

Both sets of data (Westinghouse and CE) showed similar effects due to variations in coolant conditions. For both cases, the DNBR reduction became greater as the coolant pressure and the rod power increased.

Because both sets of data showed that plant thermal margins might be less than those intended, the staff derived an interim model to conservatively predict the DNBR reduction. Since the data with unheated rods could not be predicted by existing analytical methods, empirical models were derived. These models give the reduction in DNBR as a function of the clearance reduction between adjacent fuel rods. Two such models were derived, one based on the Westinghouse data and one based on the CE data.

## 2.2 Model Based on Westinghouse Data

As stated in Section 2.1, data were presented by Westinghouse for the DNBR reduction at full contact and with no bow. No data at partial gap closure were presented. Westinghouse proposed, and the staff accepted, a straight line interpolation between these two points as shown in Figure 2.1.

This approach is conservative if the DNBR reduction does not increase more rapidly than the straight line reduction shown in Figure 2.1. Although the data for DNBR reduction due to rod bowing in the presence of an unheated fuel rod cannot be predicted by existing analytical methods, one would nevertheless expect that the actual behavior would more nearly follow the curved line also shown in Figure 2.1. According to this curved line, the DNBR would be reduced gradually for small amounts of bow. As the fuel rods (or fuel rod and unheated rod) become close enough so that there is an interaction, the DNBR would decrease more rapidly. No physical mechanism has been postulated which would lead to sudden large decreases in the DNBR for small or moderate gap closures. Thus, the straight line approximation is believed to be an overestimate of the expected behavior.

Experience with critical heat flux tests also supports the assumption of a small reduction in DNBR for small amounts of fuel rod bowing. Experimental measurements of critical heat flux done on test assemblies always have some amount of rod bowing. This may be due simply to fabrication tolerances or to electromagnetic attraction forces set up between electrically resistance heated rods which simulate fuel rods.

It should be noted that this behavior (little or no reduction in DNBR for small amount of bowing) is shown by Combustion Engineering data which became available to the staff after the Westinghouse model was derived. The Combustion Engineering data is discussed in Section 2.3 and the model derived from this data is shown in Figure 2.2.

All manufacturers of reactor cores, including Westinghouse, include a factor in their initial core design to account for the reduction in DNBR that may result from pitch reduction from fabrication tolerances and initial rod bow. The amount of this pitch reduction factor varies with the fuel design and the analysis methods which are used. For any particular core this factor is not varied as a function of burnup.

In developing the interim rod bow penalties described in this report, it became apparent that the penalty should be a function of burnup since the magnitude of rod bow is a function of burnup. However, to maintain existing thermal margins early in core life when only a small amount of fuel rod bow is anticipated, the initial pitch reduction factor was included until such time as the rod bow DNBR reduction became greater. This is represented as the straight horizontal line on Figure 2.1.

## 2.3

### Combustion Engineering Model

Combustion Engineering performed experiments to determine the effect of rod bowing on DNBR which included some cases in which the effect of partial bowing as well as bowing to contact was determined. Again, a straight line interpolation is used. However, the point of zero DNBR reduction is not at zero clearance reduction but rather, at an intermediate value of clearance reduction. This is shown schematically

in Figure 2.2. The horizontal straight line, representing the initial pitch reduction factor is included as explained previously in Section 2.2

#### 2.4 Models for Babcock and Wilcox and Exxon

On August 17, 1975 representatives of Babcock and Wilcox met with the staff to discuss this problem. Babcock and Wilcox did not present any data on the effects of rod bowing on DNBR. They had previously presented data to the staff on the amount of bowing to be expected in Babcock and Wilcox 15x15 fuel assemblies. Because Babcock and Wilcox had no data on the effect of rod bow on DNBR, the staff applied the Westinghouse model to calculate the effect of rod bowing on DNBR for Babcock and Wilcox fuel. This is acceptable since the conditions of operation are nearly the same in pressurized water reactors from both vendors and the fuel bundle designs are similar.

The amount of fuel rod bowing as a function of burnup was calculated using the Babcock and Wilcox 15x15 fuel bundle data.

Representatives of the Exxon Nuclear Corporation discussed the effects of fuel rod bowing in the presence of an unheated rod on DNBR with the staff on August 19, 1976. Exxon has not performed DNB tests with bowed rods and thus has no data pertinent to this problem. The first cycle of Exxon fuel has just been removed from H. B. Robinson and the results of measurements on the magnitude of rod bowing have not yet been presented to the staff. The effects of fuel rod bowing for Exxon fuel were evaluated on a plant by plant basis as discussed in Section 4.0

## 2.5 Application of the Rod Bow/DNBR Model

Using these empirical models, the staff derived DNBR reductions to be applied to both operating reactors and plants in the Operating License review stage. The procedure in applying these empirical models is as follows:

Step 1: Predict the clearance reduction due to rod bow as a function of burnup. An expression of the form

$$\frac{\Delta C}{C_0} = a + b\sqrt{BU}$$

is used where

$\frac{\Delta C}{C_0}$  = fractional clearance reduction due to rod bowing

a, b = empirical constants obtained for a given fuel design

BU = burnup (region average or bundle average, depending on the fuel designer).

Westinghouse showed in Reference 6 that an equation of the above form fit the rod bow data from 26 fuel regions. The constant a represents the initial bow of the fuel rods due to fabrication tolerance. The staff has approved the above equation (Reference 8).

Also included in the constants a and b is a factor of 1.2 to convert from the cold conditions at which the measurements were made to the hot operating conditions and a factor of 1.645 which, when multiplied by the standard deviation, gives an amount of bow greater than that expected from 95% of the fuel rods with a 95% confidence.

Step 2: Apply the previously discussed empirical models of DNBR reduction as a function of clearance reduction using the value of  $\Delta C/C_0$  calculated from step 1.

Step 3: The staff has permitted the reduction in DNBR calculated in step 2 to be offset by certain available thermal margins. These may be either generic to a given fuel design or plant dependent.

An example of a generic thermal margin which would be used to offset the DNBR reduction due to rod bow is the fact that the DNBR limit of 1.30 is usually greater than the value of DNBR above which 95% of the data lie with a 95% confidence. The difference between 1.30 and this number may be used to offset the DNBR reduction.

For Westinghouse 15x15 fuel, the value of DNBR which is greater than 95% of the data at a 95% confidence level is 1.24 (Reference 1). For Westinghouse 17x17 fuel this number is 1.28 (Reference 1). A review of the data used to derive these numbers shows that the use of three significant figures is justified.

An example of a plant specific thermal margin would be core flow greater than the value given in the plant Technical Specifications.

A discussion of the application of this method to Construction Permit and Operating License reviews is given in Section 3.0. A discussion of the application and the results of this method to operating reactors is given in Section 4.0. The application to reactors using Exxon fuel is also discussed in Section 4.0.

3.0 Application to Plant in Construction Permit And Operating License Review Stage

3.1 CP Applications

No interim rod bow DNB penalties should be applied to CP applications. The rod bow data upon which the interim limits have been based should be considered preliminary. There is sufficient time available to review the data and assess a penalty, if any, prior to the OL stage. We will advise each CP applicant of the nature of interim penalties being applied to OL reviews and operating reactors.

As stated above, the data used to evaluate the effects of rod bow on DNBR are preliminary. They are also incomplete. In order to assess the conservatism of the straight line approximation and to obtain data on designs for which no data is now available we will require the applicant to (1) fully define the gap closure rate for prototypical bundles and (2) determine by an appropriate experiment the DNB effect that bounds the gap closure from part (1). Such requirements will be part of our CP review effort.

3.2 OL Applications

Plants which are in the operating license review stage should consider a rod bow penalty. This penalty should be as described in Section 2.2 for Westinghouse or Section 2.3 for Combustion Engineering. Babcock and Wilcox plants should use the rod bow vs. burnup curve appropriate to their fuel and the Westinghouse curve of DNBR reduction as a function of rod bow.

All applicants may propose appropriate thermal margins (as discussed in Section 2.4) to help offset the calculated DNBR reduction.

4.0 Application To Operating Reactors

This section divides the operating plants into distinct categories and lists them according to the fuel and/or reactor manufacturer. Operating plants which cannot be so categorized (such as plants with fuel supplied by more than one vendor) are placed in a separate category. The plants assigned to each category are listed in the appropriate subsection.

The conclusions reached in this section are in some cases dependent on conditions or analysis which are valid only for the present fuel cycle. Hence, the FAH or DNBR reductions which are given (or the fact that no such reduction is concluded to be required) is valid only for the present operating cycle.

4.1 Westinghouse LOPAR Fuel

The designation LOPAR stands for low parasitic and refers to the fact that the guide tubes in the fuel bundle are made of Zircaloy. Table 4.1 gives a list of the operating plants which fall into this classification.

TABLE 4.1: PLANTS WHICH CURRENTLY USE THE WESTINGHOUSE LOPAR FUEL ASSEMBLY

<u>15 x 15</u>	<u>17 x 17</u>
Zion 1 Cycle 2	Trojan Cycle 1
Zion 2 Cycle 1	Beaver Valley 1 Cycle 1
Indian Point 3 Cycle 1	
Turkey Point 3 Cycle 4	
Turkey Point 4 Cycle 3	
Prairie Island 2 Cycle 2	
Prairie Island 1 Cycle 2	

TABLE 4.1 (cont.)

15 x 15

Surry 1 Cycle 4

Surry 2 Cycle 3

Kewaunee Cycle 2

Point Beach 1 Cycle 5

Point Beach 2 Cycle 3

The reduction in DNBR due to fuel rod bowing is assumed to vary linearly with the reduction in clearance between the fuel rods (or fuel rod and thimble rod) according to the model discussed in Section 2.2.

The maximum value of DNBR reduction (at contact), obtained from the experimental data was used to calculate the DNBR reduction vs. bow for the 15x15 LOPAR fuel. This DNBR contact reduction was adjusted for the lower heat flux in the 17x17 LOPAR fuel.

The clearance reduction is conservatively assumed to be given by the following equation for the 15x15 (and 14x14) fuel,

$$\frac{\Delta C}{C_0} = a + b \sqrt{Bu}$$

where  $\frac{\Delta C}{C_0}$  is the reduction in clearance

Bu is the region average burnup

and a, b are empirical constants fitted to Westinghouse 15x15 rod bow data



TABLE 4.2: FΔH REDUCTION FOR WESTINGHOUSE LOPAR FUEL

CYCLE	REDUCTION IN FΔH (%)		
	15x15	17x17	ZION 1&2
1st Cycle (0-15 Gwd*/MTU)	0-2 ramp	0-9.5	0-6 ramp
2nd Cycle (15-24 Gwd*/MTU)	4	12	8
3rd Cycle (24-33 Gwd*/MTU)	6	12	10

These reductions in FΔH may be treated on a region by region basis. If the licensee chooses, credit may be taken for the margin between the actual reactor coolant flow rate and the flow rate used in safety calculations. Credit may also be taken for a difference between the actual core coolant inlet temperature and that assumed in safety analyses. In taking credit for coolant flow or inlet temperature margin, the associated uncertainties in these quantities must be taken into account.

#### 4.2 Westinghouse HIPAR and Stainless Steel Clad Fuel

The designation HIPAR stands for high parasitic and refers to the fact that the guide tubes in the fuel bundle are made of stainless steel. These two fuel types, HIPAR and Stainless Steel clad, are grouped together because the amount of bowing expected (and observed) is significantly less than that in the observed Westinghouse LOPAR fuel. The plants which fall under this classification are listed in Table 4.3.

$$* \frac{\text{Gwd}}{\text{MTU}} = 1000 \frac{\text{Mwd}}{\text{MTU}}$$

TABLE 4.3: HIPAR AND STAINLESS STEEL PLANTS

Ginna	Indian Point 2
San Onofre	Connecticut Yankee

The model for the reduction in DNBR due to fuel rod bowing is assumed to be identical to that used for the LOPAR fuel. This is acceptable since cladding material should have no effect on CHF (critical heat flux) and the same DNB correlation applies to both HIPAR and LOPAR grids.

For reactors in this category, the peak reduction in DNBR (corresponding to 100% closure) was adjusted to correspond to the peak overpower heat flux of that particular reactor.

The amount of rod bowing for the plants listed in Table 4.3 which use HIPAR and stainless steel fuel, was calculated by means of an adjustment to the 15x15 LOPAR formula. This adjustment took the form of the ratio

$$\frac{\text{amount of bow for assembly type}}{\text{amount of bow for LOPAR fuel}} = \frac{(L/IE) \text{ assy type}}{(L/IE) \text{ LOPAR}}$$

where

L is the span length between grids

I is the moment of inertia of the fuel rod

E is the modulus of elasticity of the fuel rod cladding

Ginna Cycle 6

The Ginna plant is fueled with 121 fuel assemblies. Two of these are Exxon assemblies, and two are B&W assemblies. The remainder are Westinghouse HIPAR fuel assemblies. The experimental value of DNBR reduction was adjusted for heat flux and pressure from peak experimental to actual plant conditions. Ginna took credit for the thermal margins due to pitch reduction, design vs. analysis values of TDC and

fuel densification power spike. These thermal margins offset the calculated DNBR reduction so that no reduction in  $F\Delta H$  is required.

San Onofre Cycle 5

San Onofre is fueled with 157 bundles of 15x15 stainless steel clad fuel. An  $F\Delta H$  of 1.55 was used in thermal design and in the Technical Specifications. To offset the reduction in  $F\Delta H$  due to rod bowing San Onofre has proposed taking credit for margin available from the assumed worst case axial power distribution used in the thermal analysis for San Onofre and that which would be possible during operation. This proposal is now being reviewed by the staff.

Indian Point 2 Cycle 2

Indian Point 2 is fueled with HIPAR fuel bundles. The experimental value of DNBR reduction was adjusted for heat flux and pressure to actual plant conditions. Indian Point Unit 2 had thermal margin to offset this DNBR reduction in pitch reduction, design vs. analysis values of TDC, fuel densification power spike and a value of  $F\Delta H$  of 1.65 used in the design (vs. 1.55 in the Tech Spec). Therefore, no reduction of  $F\Delta H$  is required for Indian Point Unit 2.

Connecticut Yankee Cycle 7

Connecticut Yankee is fueled with 157 stainless steel clad fuel assemblies. The DNBR reduction at contact was assumed to be that used for the Westinghouse LOPAR 15x15 fuel. No adjustment was made for heat flux. The value of pressure was adjusted to the overpressure trip set point value of 2300 psi. Full closure will not occur in stainless steel fuel out to the design burnup.

Connecticut Yankee has sufficient thermal margin in variable overpressure and overpower trip set points to accommodate the calculated DNBR reduction. Therefore no penalty is required.

4.3 Babcock and Wilcox 15x15

The reactors listed in Table 4.4 are fueled with B&W fuel.

TABLE 4.4: REACTOR USING B&W FUEL

Oconee 1 Cycle 3
Oconee 2 Cycle 2
Oconee 3 Cycle 1
Rancho Seco
Three Mile Island 1 Cycle 2
Arkansas 1 Cycle 1

Babcock and Wilcox met with the staff on September 8, 1975 and presented data on the amount of rod bow in B&W fuel. The staff derived a model for B&W 15x15 fuel based on this data. This model has the form:

$$\frac{\Delta C}{C_0} = a + b\sqrt{Bu}$$

where  $\frac{\Delta C}{C_0}$  is the fractional amount of closure

Bu is the bundle average burnup

and a,b are empirical constants fitted to B&W data

The reduction in DNBR due to fuel rod bowing is assumed to vary linearly with the reduction in clearance between the fuel rods (or fuel rod and thimble rod) but can never be lower than that due to the pitch reduction factor used in thermal analysis, as explained in Section 2.2.

Babcock and Wilcox claimed and the staff approved credit for the following thermal margins:

- . Flow Area (Pitch) reduction
- . Available Vent Valve credit
- . Densification Power Spike removal
- . Excess Flow over that used in safety analyses
- . Higher than licensed power used for plant safety analyses

Based on this review and the thermal margins presented by B&W to offset the new Westinghouse data, Rancho Seco is the only plant for which a reduction in DNBR is required. Table 5 gives the values for the reduction of DNBR required at this time.

TABLE 5: DNBR REDUCTIONS FOR B&W PLANTS

Burnup	DNBR Reduction
	<u>Rancho Seco</u>
Cycle 1 (0-15 $\frac{\text{Gwd}}{\text{MTU}}$ )	0
Cycle 2 (15-24 $\frac{\text{Gwd}}{\text{MTU}}$ )	1.6%
Cycle 3 (24-33 $\frac{\text{Gwd}}{\text{MTU}}$ )	3%

Plans must be submitted to the staff to establish how these reductions in DNBR will be accommodated.

4.4

Combustion Engineering 14x14

Combustion Engineering has presented data to the staff on the amount of rod bowing as a function of burnup. (Reference 5) The staff used this data to derive the following model for CE 14x14 fuel (Reference 7)

$$\frac{\Delta C}{C_0} = a + b \sqrt{\text{Bu}}$$

$\Delta C/C_0$  = fraction of closure for CE fuel

Bu is the bundle average burnup

and a, b are empirical constants fitted to CE data

CE was given credit for thermal margin due to a multiplier of 1.065 on the hot channel enthalpy rise used to account for pitch reduction due to manufacturing tolerances. Table 4.6 presents the required reduction in DNBR using the model described above, after accounting for this thermal margin. Table 4.7 is a list of the reactors to which it applies.

A licensee planning to operate at a burnup greater than 24000 Mwd/MTU should present to the staff an acceptable method of accommodating the thermal margin reduction shown in Table 4.6. This may be done as part of the reload submittal if this burnup will not be obtained during the current cycle.

TABLE 4.6: EFFECT OF ROD BOWING ON DNBR IN REACTORS WITH COMBUSTION ENGINEERING 14x14 FUEL

<u>BURNUP</u>	<u>REDUCTION IN DNBR</u>
Cycle 1 (0-15 $\frac{\text{Gwd}}{\text{MTU}}$ )	0
Cycle 2 (15-24 $\frac{\text{Gwd}}{\text{MTU}}$ )	0
Cycle 3 (24-33 $\frac{\text{Gwd}}{\text{MTU}}$ )	3%

TABLE 4.7: PLANTS FUELED BY CE FUEL TO WHICH VALUES OF TABLE 4.6 APPLY

St. Lucie 1	Cycle 1
Ft. Calhoun	Cycle 3
Millstone 2	Cycle 2
Maine Yankee	Cycle 2
Calvert Cliffs 1	Cycle 1

4.5

Plants Fueled Partially With Exxon Fuel

Palisades, H. B. Robinson, Yankee Rowe and D. C. Cook are partially fueled with Exxon fuel. A discussion of these reactors follows:

Palisades Cycle 2

The Palisades reactor for Cycle 2 is fueled with 136 Exxon fuel assemblies and 68 Combustion Engineering fuel assemblies.

The Combustion Engineering fuel was treated according to the Combustion Engineering model for both extent of rod bow as a function of burnup and DNBR reduction due to clearance reduction.

The Exxon fuel was assumed to bow to the same extent as the Combustion Engineering fuel. This assumption is acceptable since the Exxon fuel has a thicker cladding and other design features which should render the amount of bowing no greater than in the Combustion Engineering fuel.

The DNBR reduction was assumed to be linear with clearance reduction according to the Westinghouse type curve of Figure 2.1. The DNBR reduction at contact was based on the Westinghouse experimental data adjusted for the peak rod average heat flux in Palisades and for the coolant pressure in Palisades.

The variation of the DNBR reduction with coolant pressure is given in Reference 1. The DNBR reduction decreases as the coolant pressure decreases. The overpressure trip set point in Palisades is set at 1950 psi. At this pressure, according to the data presented in Reference 1, the penalty is greatly reduced compared to the penalty at high pressures.

The limiting anticipated transient in the Palisades reactor results in a DNBR of 1.36. The thermal margin between this value and the DNBR limit of 1.3 results in adequate thermal margin to offset the rod bow penalty.

Yankee Rowe Cycle 12

Yankee Rowe is fueled with 40 Exxon fuel assemblies and 36 Gulf United Nuclear Corporation fuel assemblies. The fuel assemblies consist of 16x16 Zircaloy clad fuel rods.

The reduction in DNBR due to fuel rod bowing was assumed to vary linearly with the reduction in clearance between fuel rods. The peak experimental conditions used in the Westinghouse test were used to fix the penalty at full closure. The calculated reduction in DNBR is still less than that which would produce a DNBR less than 1.3 for the most limiting anticipated transient (two pump out of four pump loss-of-flow). Thus, no penalty is required.

H. B. Robinson Cycle 5

H. B. Robinson is fueled with 105 Westinghouse fuel assemblies and 52 Exxon Nuclear Corporation fuel assemblies. The Westinghouse 15x15 DNBR penalty model was applied to the Westinghouse fuel with a correction for the actual heat flux rather than the peak experimental values. The Exxon fuel was considered to bow to the same extent as the Westinghouse 15x15 fuel so that the Westinghouse bow vs. burnup equation was also applied to the Exxon fuel. This assumption is conservative since the Exxon fuel has a thicker cladding and other design features which should render the amount of bowing no greater than in the Westinghouse fuel.

The DNBR reduction calculated by this method was offset by the fact that the worst anticipated transient for H. B. Robinson results in a DNBR of 1.68.

D. C. Cook Cycle 2

D. C. Cook contains 128 Westinghouse fuel assemblies and 65 Exxon fuel assemblies. The limiting transient for D. C. Cook is the Loss of Flow (4 pump coastdown) which has a minimum DNBR of 2.01. This value of DNBR is sufficiently high to accommodate the rod bow penalty for Cycle 2 without reducing the DNBR below the safety limit value of 1.3.

5.0 References

1. Letter to V. Stello, Director, Division of Operating Reactors, USNRC from C. Eicheldinger, Manager, Nuclear Safety Department, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, NS-CE-N61, August 13, 1976.
2. Hill, K. W. et., al, "Effects of a Bowed Rod on DNB", Westinghouse Electric Corporation", WCAP 8176.
3. Standrad Review Plan - Section 4.4, II.1.A.
4. Letter to R. Salvatori, Manager, Nuclear Safety Department, Westinghouse Electric Corporation from D. Vassallo, Chief, Light Water Reactors Project Branch 1-1, Directorate of Licensing, December 4, 1974.
5. Letter to V. Stello, Director, Division of Operating Reactors, USNRC, from P. L. McGill, Combustion Engineering Company, December 15, 1975.
6. Reavis, J. R., et. al., "Fuel Rod Bowing" WCAP 8691 (Proprietary) Westinghouse Electric Corporation, December, 1975.
7. Letter to Mr. Ed Sherer, Combustion Engineering from D. F. Ross, Assistant Director, Reactor Safety, May 14, 1976.
8. Interim Safety Evaluation Report on Westinghouse Fuel Rod Bowing Division of System Safety, USNRC, April, 1976.

FIGURE 2.1

### WESTINGHOUSE MODEL





FIGURE 2.2



UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKETS NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301

WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY  
WISCONSIN MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO FACILITY

OPERATING LICENSES

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendments Nos. 25 and 30 to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27 issued to Wisconsin Electric Power Company and Wisconsin Michigan Power Company, which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant Units Nos. 1 and 2, located in the town of Two Creeks, Manitowoc County, Wisconsin. The amendments are effective as of the date of issuance.

These amendments consist of changes in the Technical Specifications that will revise the Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor ( $F_{\Delta H}^N$ ) limits to account for the effect of fuel rod bowing on departure from nucleate boiling.

The application for the amendments complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendments. Prior public notice of these amendments was not required since the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration.


The Commission has determined that the issuance of these amendments will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of these amendments.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendments dated January 6, 1977, (2) Amendment No. 25 to License No. DPR-24, (3) Amendment No. 30 to License No. DPR-27, and (4) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. and at the University of Wisconsin - Stevens Point Library, ATTN: Mr. Arthur M. Fish, Stevens Point, Wisconsin 54481.

A copy of items (2), (3) and (4) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Operating Reactors.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 4 day of May 1977.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



George Lear, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #3  
Division of Operating Reactors