Docket

Docket Nos. 50-266
and 50-301

AUG 22 1972

Wisconsin Electric Power Company
Wisconsin Michigan Power Company
Attn: Mr. John G. Quale, President
231 West Michigan Street
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 52301

Change No. 3 to License
Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27

Gentlemen:

Your letter dated June 21, 1972, requested a change in the Technical Specifications for Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27 for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. The change was requested to allow corrective or preventive maintenance to be performed on certain components in the Service Water System without shutdown of either one or both reactors. Your request has been designated Change No. 3.

As stated in the present Technical Specifications, three of the six installed service water pumps are required to operate during the injection and recirculation phases of a postulated loss-of-coolant accident in one unit and a concurrent trip of the second unit to the hot shutdown condition. The headers and associated valves or other passive components are redundant with each redundant portion of the system supplied by three service water pumps. It has been stated that the unaffected component or portion of the system will be tested or placed in continuous operation prior to initiating repair.

We have concluded that the proposed change does not involve significant hazard considerations not described or implicit in the Final Facility Description and Safety Analysis Report and that there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered.

Accordingly, pursuant to Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50, the Technical Specification change outlined in your letter dated June 21, 1972 is hereby authorized. To effect this

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change, replace pages 15.3.3-5 and 15.3.3-6 of the Technical Specifications of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27 with the revised pages 15.3.3-5 and 15.3.3.6 (designated as Amendment 3 on the bottom of the page) enclosed.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By
R. C. DeYoung

R. C. DeYoung, Assistant Director
for Pressurized Water Reactors
Directorate of Licensing

Enclosure:
Revised pages

cc:
Mr. Robert H. Gorske, General Counsel
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Wisconsin Michigan Power Company
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Vice President & General Manager
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requirements of 15.3.3.C-1 are not satisfied within an additional 48 hours, the reactor shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition.

a. One of the assigned component cooling pumps may be out of service provided a pump is restored to operable status within 24 hours.

b. One heat exchanger or other passive component may be out of service provided repairs can be completed within 48 hours.

Two Unit Operation

1. Both reactors shall not be made critical unless the following conditions are met:

   a. Three component cooling pumps are operable.

   b. Three component cooling heat exchangers are operable.

   c. All valves, interlocks and piping required for the functioning of the system during accident conditions and associated with the above components are operable.

2. During power operation, the requirements of 15.3.3.C-1 may be modified to allow one of the following components to be inoperable at any one time. If the system is not restored to meet the conditions of 15.3.3.C-1 within the time period specified, one reactor shall be placed in the hot shutdown condition. If the requirements of 15.3.3.C-1 are not satisfied within an additional 48 hours, that reactor shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition.

   a. One of the three assigned component cooling pumps may be out of service provided a pump is restored to operable status within 24 hours.

   b. One heat exchanger or other passive component may be out of service provided repairs can be completed within 48 hours.

D. Service Water System 3

1. Neither reactor shall be made or maintained critical unless the following conditions are met:

a. Four service water pumps are operable.

b. All necessary valves, interlocks and piping required for the functioning of the Service Water System during accident conditions are also operable.

2. During power operation, the requirements of 15.3.3.D-1 may be modified to allow one of the following components to be inoperable at any one time. It the system is not restored to meet the conditions of 15.3.3.D-1 within the time period specified, both reactors will be placed in the hot shutdown condition. If the requirements of 15.3.3.D-1 are not satisfied within an additional 48 hours, both reactors shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition. 3

   a. One of the four required service water pumps may be out of service provided a pump is restored to operable status within 24 hours.

   b. One of the two loop headers may be out of service for a period of 24 hours.

   c. A valve or other passive component may be out of service provided repairs can be completed within 48 hours.

Basis

The normal procedure for starting the reactor is, first, to heat the reactor coolant to near operating temperature, by running the reactor coolant pumps. The reactor is then made critical by withdrawing control rods and/or diluting boron in the coolant.(1) With this mode of start-up, the energy stored in the reactor coolant during the approach to criticality is substantially equal to that during power operation and therefore to be conservative most engineered safety system components and auxiliary cooling systems, shall be fully operable. During low temperature physics tests there is a negligible amount of stored energy in the reactor coolant, therefore an accident comparable in severity to the Design Basis Accident is not possible, and the engineered safety systems are not required.