

Jul. 03, 2002

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THE FOLLOWING CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED TO THE HARDCOPY  
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101 - 101 - EMERGENCY DIRECTOR (ED)-TSC EMERGENCY  
PLAN-POSITION SPECIFIC PROCEDURE

REMOVE MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS DATE: 07/01/2002

ADD MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS DATE: 07/02/2002

CATEGORY: PROCEDURES TYPE: EP  
ID: EP-PS-101  
ADD: PCAF 2002-1437 REV: N/A

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## PROCEDURE CHANGE PROCESS FORM

1. PCAF NO. <u>2002-1437</u>	2. PAGE 1 OF <u>14</u>	3. PROC. NO. <u>EP-PS-101</u> REV. <u>17</u>
4. FORMS REVISED <u>A R 7</u> , <u>- D R 8</u> , <u>- R</u> , <u>- R</u> , <u>- R</u> , <u>- R</u>		
5. PROCEDURE TITLE TSC Emergency Director: Emergency Plan Position Specific Procedure		
6. REQUESTED CHANGE PERIODIC REVIEW <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> YES INCORPORATE PCAFS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> YES    # _____ # _____ # _____ # _____ REVISION <input type="checkbox"/> PCAF <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DELETION <input type="checkbox"/> (CHECK ONE ONLY)		
7. SUMMARY OF / REASON FOR CHANGE TABs A and D were revised to change "assembly" area to "accountability" area. (Emergency Plan Rev 39)		
Continued <input type="checkbox"/>		
8. DETERMINE COMMITTEE REVIEW REQUIREMENTS (Refer to Section 6.1.4) PORC REVIEW REQ'D? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> YES		9. PORC MTG# <u>na</u>
<b>BLOCKS 11 THRU 16 ARE ON PAGE 2 OF FORM</b>		
17. <u>Cynthia Smith</u> / <u>254-3233</u> / <u>05/30/2002</u> PREPARER                      ETN                      DATE (Print or Type)		18. COMMUNICATION OF CHANGE REQUIRED? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> YES (TYPE) _____
19. <u>[Signature]</u> RESPONSIBLE SUPERVISOR <u>6/3/2002</u> DATE		SIGNATURE ATTESTS THAT RESPONSIBLE SUPERVISOR HAS CONDUCTED QADR AND TECHNICAL REVIEW UNLESS OTHERWISE DOCUMENTED IN BLOCK 16 OR ATTACHED REVIEW FORMS. CROSS DISCIPLINE REVIEW (IF REQUIRED) HAS BEEN COMPLETED BY SIGNATURE IN BLOCK 16 OR ATTACHED REVIEW FORMS.
20. <u>[Signature]</u> FUM APPROVAL <u>6/12/02</u> DATE		
21. RESPONSIBLE APPROVER <u>NA</u> INITIALS                      _____ DATE		ENTER N/A IF FUM HAS APPROVAL AUTHORITY

## PROCEDURE CHANGE PROCESS FORM

1. PCAF NO. 2002-1437 | 2. PAGE 2 OF 14 | 3. PROC. NO. EP-PS-101 REV. 17

11. This question documents the outcome of the 50.59 and 72.48 Review required by NDAP-QA-0726. Either 11a, b, c or d must be checked "YES" and the appropriate form attached or referenced.
- a. This change is an Administrative Correction for which 50.59 and 72.48 are not applicable.  YES  N/A
- b. This change is a change to any surveillance, maintenance or administrative procedure for which 50.59 and 72.48 are not applicable.  YES  N/A A-01-732
- c. This change is bounded by a 50.59/72.48 Screen/Evaluation, therefore, no new 50.59/72.48 Evaluation is required.  YES  N/A  
Screen/Evaluation No. \_\_\_\_\_
- d. 50.59 and/or 72.48 are applicable to this change and a 50.59/72.48 Screen/Evaluation is attached.  YES  N/A
12. This change is consistent with the FSAR or an FSAR change is required.  YES  
Change Request No. na
13. Should this change be reviewed for potential effects on Training Needs or Material?  YES  NO  
If YES, enter an Action Item @ NIMS/Action/Gen Work Mech/PICN
14. Is a Surveillance Procedure Review Checklist required per NDAP-QA-0722?  YES  NO
15. Is a Special, Infrequent or Complex Test/Evolution Analysis Form required per NDAP-QA-0320? (SICT/E form does not need to be attached.)  YES  NO

16. Reviews may be documented below or by attaching Document Review Forms NDAP-QA-0101-1.

REVIEW	REVIEWED BY WITH NO COMMENTS	DATE
QADR	_____	_____
TECHNICAL REVIEW	_____	_____
REACTOR ENGINEERING/NUCLEAR FUELS *	_____	_____
IST **	_____	_____
OPERATIONS	_____	_____
NUCLEAR SYSTEMS ENGINEERING	_____	_____
NUCLEAR MODIFICATIONS	_____	_____
MAINTENANCE	_____	_____
HEALTH PHYSICS	_____	_____
NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY	_____	_____
CHEMISTRY	_____	_____
OTHER <u>10CFR50.54Q</u>	<u>W. Alford</u>	<u>6-14-02</u>

\* Required for changes that affect, or have potential for affecting core reactivity, nuclear fuel, core power level indication or impact the thermal power heat balance. <sup>(58)</sup>

\*\* Required for changes to Section XI Inservice Test Acceptance Criteria.

**EMERGENCY DIRECTOR (ED)-TSC:**

Emergency Plan-Position Specific Procedure

**WHEN:** Emergency Support Center (TSC) is activated  
**HOW NOTIFIED:** Phoned by Station Operator  
After hours: Paged by Security  
**REPORT TO:** General Manager-SSES  
**WHERE TO REPORT:** Control Room/TSC

**OVERALL DUTY:**

Manage the Technical Support Center (TSC) so that the plant responds to the emergency, people are protected, and the center processes information to those who need to know. Once the EOF has taken over these communications and radiological functions, concentrate exclusively on returning the plant to a safe condition.

**MAJOR TASKS:**

	<b><u>TAB:</u></b>	<b><u>REVISION:</u></b>
Assemble and brief TSC staff, then take over the task of managing the emergency.	TAB A	<del>6</del> 7
Reclassify the emergency as conditions change.	TAB B	6
Make sure information is being communicated to company, public, and government personnel.	TAB C	5
Make protective action recommendations to safeguard public and measures to protect personnel working in or near the plant.	TAB D	78
Review Severe Accident Management (SAM), strategies.	TAB E	4
Manage turnover to the next shift.	TAB F	4
Turn over Emergency Management to the EOF.	TAB G	4
When emergency is terminated, disband the TSC staff.	TAB H	0

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**MAJOR TASK:**

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Assemble and brief TSC staff, then take over the task of managing the emergency.

**SPECIFIC TASKS:**

**HOW:**

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1. Determine plant status.

1a. Report to Control Room. \_\_\_\_\_

1b. Receive turnover from  
Shift Supervisor. \_\_\_\_\_

**HELP**

**CONTROL ROOM/TSC  
TURNOVER CHECKLIST  
See TAB 5**

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1c. Review classification of  
emergency (TAB B). \_\_\_\_\_

1d. Review radiological conditions and  
dose projections if applicable  
(TAB D). \_\_\_\_\_

2. Determine if situation warrants EOF  
call-out.

1e. Determine:

(1) Resources or actions  
required by Operations. \_\_\_\_\_

(2) In progress plant activities. \_\_\_\_\_

3. Perform external notifications.

3a. Notify Recovery Manager of plant  
status, rad conditions, plume  
direction. \_\_\_\_\_

3b. Notify Public Information Manager  
of plant status. \_\_\_\_\_

3c. Notify General Managers-SSES \_\_\_\_\_

3d. Notify the VP-Nuclear Site  
Operations. \_\_\_\_\_

3e. Notify Senior Vice  
President-Generation and Chief  
Nuclear Officer. \_\_\_\_\_

**SPECIFIC TASKS:**

**HOW:**

4. Assume overall management of the emergency.

4a. Verify key Coordinators are ready to assume emergency functions:

- (1) Operations Coordinator \_\_\_\_\_
- (2) Damage Control Team coordinator \_\_\_\_\_
- (3) Rad Protection Coordinator \_\_\_\_\_
- (4) TSC Coordinator \_\_\_\_\_
- (5) TSC Communicator \_\_\_\_\_

**HELP**

**Emergency Organization  
See TAB 2**

4b. Brief TSC personnel on emergency situation. \_\_\_\_\_

4c. Relieve Control Room of overall management of emergency, with shift concurrence:

- (1) Offsite Notification (TSC Communicator) \_\_\_\_\_
- (2) Dose Projection (Rad Protection-Coordinator) \_\_\_\_\_
- (3) Emergency Teams (Damage Control Team Coordinator) \_\_\_\_\_
- (4) Emergency Classification (Technical Support and Operations Coordinators) \_\_\_\_\_
- (5) Protective Action Recommendations (Rad Protection Coordinator). \_\_\_\_\_

4d. Make a PA announcement when the "TSC is in control of the emergency." \_\_\_\_\_

**NOTE:**

**This responsibility can be delegated to the TSC Communicator.**

**SPECIFIC TASKS:**

**HOW:**

5. Manage the emergency.

5a. Reclassify the emergency as conditions change (TAB B). \_\_\_\_\_

5b. Communicate information concerning emergency (TAB C). \_\_\_\_\_

5c. Initiate radioactive release monitoring to support Public Protective Action Recommendation (TAB D). \_\_\_\_\_

5d. Make Protective Action Recommendation as required (TAB D). \_\_\_\_\_

5e. Notify the Control Room to initiate accountability. \_\_\_\_\_

**NOTE:**

**Accountability required at Alert or higher classification (consider habitability of *accountability* assembly locations). Rad Protection and Security Coordinators responsible to implement.**

5f. Initiate RCA Evacuation when plant conditions dictate or at:  
(1) Alert classification. \_\_\_\_\_  
(2) When accountability is initiated. \_\_\_\_\_

5g. Initiate Site Evacuation when site conditions dictate or when a Site or General Emergency AND accountability is complete. \_\_\_\_\_

**NOTE:**

**Determine which essential personnel should remain.**

(1) Instruct TSC Communicator to perform Site Evacuation notifications. \_\_\_\_\_

5h. Monitor plant status. \_\_\_\_\_

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**SPECIFIC TASKS:**

**HOW:**

**NOTE:**

**Ops Coordinator responsible to maintain.**

- 5i. Establish plant priorities. \_\_\_\_\_

**NOTE:**

**Ops Coordinator responsibility.**

- 5j. Initiate corrective actions for plant priorities. \_\_\_\_\_

**NOTE:**

**Damage Control Team Coordinator responsible to implement actions.**

- 5k. Ensure proper resources are available to combat emergency. \_\_\_\_\_

**NOTE:**

**Damage Control Team and Admin. Coordinators responsibilities.**

- 5l. Initiate core damage assessment. \_\_\_\_\_

**NOTE:**

**Tech Support Coordinator responsibility. Requires PASS sample - Chemistry Coordinator.**

- 5m. Initiate EOF staffing. \_\_\_\_\_

**NOTE:**

**Required at an Alert, Site or General classification. TSC Communicators responsible to initiate.**

- (1) Instruct TSC Communicator to activate the EOF. \_\_\_\_\_

- 5n. Initiate 24-hour shift coverage for emergency positions. \_\_\_\_\_

**NOTE:**

**Admin. Coordinator responsible.**

- 5o. Support emergency medical response, search/rescue. \_\_\_\_\_

**SPECIFIC TASKS:**

**HOW:**

**NOTE:**

**Reference SP-00-308, (Emergency  
Medical Response, Search/Rescue)**

6. Request Federal assistance to augment NERO.

- 6a. When federal assistance is required, requests should be coordinated with PEMA and/or DEP/BRP.

**MAJOR TASK:**

---

Make Protective Action Recommendations to safeguard public and measures to protect personnel working at or near the plant.

**SPECIFIC TASKS:**

**HOW:**

---

1. Monitor conditions to determine if a new protective Action Recommendation is required.

- 1a. Evaluate the following:
- (1) In plant radiation levels.
  - (2) Any release to the environment.
  - (3) Any potential for a release.

2. Make Protective Action Recommendation.

- 2a. Discuss the following with the Radiation Protection Coordinator:
- (1) Field readings
  - (2) Dose projections
  - (3) Release Rates
  - (4) Meteorological conditions
  - (5) Issuance of Potassium Iodide

- 3a. Discuss the potential for a release with the duty Recovery Manager to determine the need for a Protective action Recommendation.

**HELP**

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**Public Protective Action  
Recommendation Guide  
See TAB 7**

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- 2a. Discuss recommendation with the duty Recovery Manager, if feasible.

**NOTE:**

**A Public Protective Action Recommendation must be made within fifteen minutes after declaration of a General Emergency.**

**SPECIFIC TASKS:**

**HOW:**

3. Notify the senior state official at the PEMA Emergency Operations Center of your protective action recommendation.
4. Reassess Protective Action Recommendation periodically and after any significant change in the emergency condition affecting offsite dose.
5. Continue monitoring on-site release(s) to protect plant personnel and anticipate possible off-site conditions.
6. When required, initiate a Controlled Zone, Local Area or Site Evacuation.

6a. **Local Area Evacuation Guidelines:**

Evacuate personnel from an area or building when:

- (1) CAM on high alarm
- (2) ARM on high alarm
- (3) Fire alarm
- (4) Uncontrolled toxic material in area
- (5) Any condition hazardous to personnel if they remain in the area.

6b. **RCA Evacuation:**

Evacuate personnel from the RCA when:

- (1) Alert declared
- (2) Accountability initiated
- (3) Any condition hazardous to personnel who remain in the controlled zone.

**SPECIFIC TASKS:**

**HOW:**

- 
- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <p>7. Initiate habitability survey of all <del>assembly areas</del> <sup>accountability</sup> before nitrating personnel assembly and accountability.</p> <p>8. Initiate accountability.</p> | <p>6c. <b>Site Evacuation:</b></p> <p>Non-essential personnel evacuated from the site when:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>(1) Site or General Emergency declared and accountability completed.</li><li>(2) Any condition hazardous to personnel who remain on site.</li></ul> <p><b>NOTE:</b><br/>Ensure an ENR is generated to notify offsite agencies of site evacuation.</p> <p>7a. Ensure the Radiation Protection Coordinator has completed surveys of <del>assembly areas</del> <sup>accountability areas</sup>.</p> <p><b>NOTE:</b><br/>If an <del>assembly</del> <sup>accountability</sup> area is uninhabitable, consult with Health Physics on the necessity of establishing a remote assembly, (holding), area. (West Building or the Energy Information Center.)</p> <p>8a. Notify the TSC Communicator that Personnel Accountability has been called for.</p> <p>8b. Direct the Security Coordinator to implement accountability.</p> <p><b>NOTE:</b><br/>Accountability should be completed within thirty minutes from time it was called for.</p> |
|--|--|
- 
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**SPECIFIC TASKS:**

**HOW:**

9. Evacuate personnel when required.

**NOTE:**

If site evacuation is not necessary, inform the Security Coordinator to notify all assembly areas of the status of emergency condition and any work restrictions.

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9a. Local Area Evacuation, ensure:

- (1) INDIA Team(s) dispatched to assess and mitigate the emergency condition(s).
- (2) Request non-essential personnel remain out of the area until emergency condition(s) terminated.

9b. RCA Evacuation, ensure:

- (1) INDIA Team(s) dispatched to assess and mitigate the emergency condition(s).
- (2) Have personnel remain out of the RCA until emergency condition(s) are terminated.

9c. SITE EVACUATION, ensure:

- (1) Essential personnel are identified using the following guidelines:
  - a) Electrical and mechanical maintenance personnel to support damage control activities.

**SPECIFIC TASKS:**

**HOW:**

- 
- |   |   |       |
|---|---|-------|
|   | b) Clerical personnel to support communications and log keeping.  | _____ |
|   | c) Health Physics personnel to support decon, in plant and off site monitoring, dose calculations and first aid activities.             | _____ |
|   | d) Chemistry Personnel to support sample analysis.  | _____ |
|   | e) Security personnel to support plant security, access control accountability, fire fighting and First Aid/Search and Rescue.          | _____ |
|   | f) Support Services personnel to provide maintenance support.   | _____ |
| 10. Designate an area for essential personnel to assemble.  | 10a. Have essential personnel assemble at designated work or holding areas such as the Maintenance and I&C shops.                       | _____ |
| 11. Evacuate non-essential personnel from the site.   | 11a. When accountability is completed, direct the Security Coordinator to initiate evacuation of non-essential personnel from the site. | _____ |
| 12. Direct Health Physics to establish ongoing habitability monitoring of essential work locations and holding areas. |   |       |
| 13. Assess manpower needs.  | 13a. Assess current conditions to determine if additional manpower should be called in.   |       |

**SPECIFIC TASKS:**

**HOW:**

14. Adhere to administrative exposure limits for plant personnel.
15. Apply emergency exposure considerations when required.

- 14a. Follow administrative exposure objectives for plant personnel.
- 15a. For doses expected to exceed 4,000 mrem, apply emergency exposure considerations.

**HELP**

**PPL Emergency Personnel  
Dose Assessment and  
Protective Action  
Recommendation Guide  
See TAB 8**



EAL# 2.2:           Control Room Evacuation <i>Alert</i>
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**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

The Control Room was evacuated, then control of plant systems was established from another location within the plant. Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

EAL# 2.3:           Control Room Evacuation <i>Site Emergency</i>
--

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

Within 15 minutes of evacuating the Control Room, operators have been unable to establish remote stations for controlling plant systems.

EAL# 3.1: Fuel Cladding Degradation  
*Unusual Event*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

Minor damage has occurred to the metal tubes that hold uranium fuel pellets. Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

EAL# 3.2: Fuel Cladding Degradation  
*Alert*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

There has been significant damage to metal tubes that hold uranium fuel pellets. Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

EAL# 3.3: Fuel Cladding Degradation  
*Site Emergency*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

Severe damage has taken place to the metal tubes that hold uranium fuel pellets. Abnormally high radiation levels are present in the water which acts as a reactor coolant or in the containment structure surrounding the reactor.

EAL# 3.4.a: Fuel Cladding Degradation  
*General Emergency*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

Severe damage to metal tubes that hold uranium fuel pellets. Higher than normal radiation levels in reactor coolant or containment structure surrounding reactor, with a potential for off-site radioactivity release.

**EAL# 3.4.b: Fuel Cladding Degradation**  
*General Emergency*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

Indication of uranium fuel melting. Potential for off-site radioactivity release.

EAL# 4.1:           General  
                          *Unusual Event*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

(       Specific Event       ) which potentially threatens the safety of the plant. Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

EAL# 4.2:           General  
                          *Alert*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

(       Specific Event       ) which actually threatens the safety of the plant. Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

EAL# 4.3:           General  
                          *Site Emergency*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

(       Specific Event       ) has occurred which indicates an (actual/imminent) loss of important plant safety systems.

EAL# 4.4:           General  
                          *General Emergency*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

(       Specific Event       ) has occurred which indicates an (actual/imminent) major release of radioactivity.

<b>EAL# 5.1:</b> <b>Injured/Contaminated Personnel</b> <i>Unusual Event</i>
--

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

An injured person(s), contaminated with radioactive material, is or has been moved outside the immediate area of the plant. Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

**EAL# 6.1:**            **In-plant High Radiation**  
*Unusual Event*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

High levels of airborne radioactivity have been detected inside the plant. Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

**EAL# 6.2:**            **In-plant High Radiation**  
*Alert*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

Very high levels of radiation have been detected in the plant. Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

EAL# 7.1:           Loss of AC Power  
                          *Unusual Event*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

AC electrical power from either off-site or on-site sources is needed to operate plant safety equipment. Either the off-site or on-site source has been lost; however, power is still available from the other source. Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

EAL# 7.2:           Loss of AC Power  
                          *Alert*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

All AC electrical power (from both on-site and off-site) needed to operate plant safety equipment has been temporarily lost. Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

EAL# 7.3:           Loss of AC Power  
                          *Site Emergency*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

All AC electrical power (from both on-site and off-site) needed to operate plant safety equipment has been lost for a sustained period of time (15 minutes). Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

**EAL# 8.2:           Loss of Control Room Alarms and Annunciators**  
*Alert*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

All control room alarms have been lost. Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

**EAL# 8.3:           Loss of Control Room Alarms and Annunciators**  
*Site Emergency*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

All control room alarms have been lost in combination with another plant operating problem (plant transient).



**EAL# 10.2: Loss of Decay Heat Removal Capability**  
*Alert*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

While the reactor is shutdown (cold shutdown), equipment needed to maintain reactor water temperature below 200° F has been lost. Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

**EAL# 10.3: Loss of Decay Heat Removal Capability**  
*Site Emergency*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

While the unit is shutdown, operators are unable to effectively cool the reactor.

**EAL# 10.4: Loss of Decay Heat Removal Capability**  
*General Emergency*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

Operators are unable to cool the reactor; a release of radioactivity is possible.

**EAL# 11.1: Loss of Reactivity Control**  
*Unusual Event*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

Reactor power has increased in a way that was not anticipated. Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

**EAL# 11.2: Loss of Reactivity Control**  
*Alert*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

During attempted reactor shutdown, the reactor's control rods failed to insert fully (scram). Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

**EAL# 11.3: Loss of Reactivity Control**  
*Site Emergency*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

Operators are unable to shut down and cool the reactor. Reactor control rods failed to fully insert. A back-up chemical control system also failed.

**EAL# 11.4: Loss of Reactivity Control**  
*General Emergency*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

Operators are unable to shut down and cool down the reactor. Reactor control rods failed to fully insert. The back-up chemical control system also failed. The situation could lead to a radioactivity release.

**EAL# 12.1: Loss of Reactor Vessel Inventory**  
*Unusual Event*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

To maintain reactor water level, an emergency cooling system has been activated. Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

**EAL# 12.2: Loss of Reactor Vessel Inventory**  
*Alert*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

Excessive water is leaking from the reactor coolant systems into the containment structure surrounding the reactor vessel. Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

**EAL# 12.3: Loss of Reactor Vessel Inventory**  
*Site Emergency*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

The ability to maintain water level above the fuel has been lost.

**EAL# 12.4.a: Loss of Reactor Vessel Inventory**  
*General Emergency*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

The ability to maintain an adequate water level in the reactor vessel has been lost; severe fuel damage and release of radioactivity are possible.

**EAL# 12.4.b: Loss of Reactor Vessel Inventory**  
*General Emergency*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

Fuel damage and a reactor coolant leak have occurred, with a potential loss of the ability to contain radioactive releases.

EAL# 13.1: Natural Phenomena  
*Unusual Event*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

(Tornado/ Hurricane/ Earthquake) has struck the plant site. Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

EAL# 13.2: Natural Phenomena  
*Alert*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

(Tornado/ Hurricane/ Earthquake) has struck the plant and could affect plant safety. Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened. The event may be severe enough to impact plant equipment.

EAL# 13.3: Natural Phenomena  
*Site Emergency*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

Severe (Tornado/ Hurricane/ Earthquake) is affecting plant safety while plant is not in cold shutdown.

**EAL# 14.1: On-site Fire/Explosion**  
*Unusual Event*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

A (fire/ explosion) has occurred on-site, within the (plant/ security fence). Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

**EAL# 14.2: On-Site Fire/Explosion**  
*Alert*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

A (fire/ explosion) has occurred on-site that has affected plant operation. Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

**EAL# 14.3: On-site Fire/Explosion**  
*Site Emergency*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

A (fire/ explosion) has damaged equipment needed to safely shut down the reactor.

**EAL# 15.1: Radiological Effluent**  
*Unusual Event*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

Radioactivity is being released from the plant that exceeds plant operating license limits (Technical Specifications) for liquid releases or exceeds 2 times plant operating license limits for gaseous releases. Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

**EAL# 15.2: Radiological Effluent**  
*Alert*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

Radioactivity is being released at levels at least ten times higher than those allowed by the plant operating license limits (Technical Specifications) for liquid release or exceeds 200 times plant operating license limits for gaseous limits. Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

**EAL# 15.3: Radiological Effluent**  
*Site Emergency*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

Radioactivity is being or has been released which may result in low levels of exposure to people outside the immediate plant area (emergency planning boundary).

**EAL# 15.4: Radiological Effluent**  
*General Emergency*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

Radioactivity is being released that exceeds federal guidelines which specify actions like sheltering or evacuation to protect the public.

EAL# 16.1: Security Event  
*Unusual Event*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

An attempt has been made to breach station security or a site-specific credible threat has been received. Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

EAL# 16.2: Security Event  
*Alert*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

A compromise of Station security has occurred or is imminent. Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

EAL# 16.3: Security Event  
*Site Emergency*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

Security has been compromised in a way that threatens plant safety systems.

EAL# 16.4: Security Event  
*General Emergency*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

Security has been compromised in a way that has caused loss of control of some or all vital areas of the plant.

**EAL# 17.1: Spent Fuel Related Incident**  
*Unusual Event*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

Used fuel assemblies (groups of the metal rods containing irradiated uranium fuel pellets), being stored in the unit's spent fuel pool, are leaking radioactive material. This is causing abnormally high radiation levels in some areas of the plant. Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

**EAL# 17.2: Spent Fuel Related Incident**  
*Alert*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

Used fuel assemblies (groups of the metal rods containing irradiated uranium fuel pellets), being stored in the unit's spent fuel pool are leaking radioactive material. This is causing very high radiation levels in some areas of the plant. Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

**EAL# 17.3.a: Spent Fuel Related Incident**  
*Site Emergency*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

Severe damage has occurred to some used fuel assemblies (metal rods containing irradiated uranium fuel pellets) stored in the unit's spent fuel pool. A radioactivity release is possible.

**EAL# 17.3.b: Spent Fuel Related Incident**  
*Site Emergency*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

Used (irradiated) fuel assemblies in the unit's spent fuel pool are damaged and no longer covered with cooling water. A radioactive release is possible.

**EAL# 18.2: Steam Line Break**  
*Alert*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

Isolation valves have failed to completely shut off the flow of radioactive steam from the reactor to the turbine-generator. Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

**EAL# 18.3: Steam Line Break**  
*Site Emergency*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

Isolation valves have failed to properly shut and there is significant flow of radioactive steam from the reactor to areas outside the primary containment.

**EAL# 19.1: Toxic/Flammable Gases**  
*Unusual Event*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

(Toxic/ flammable) gas has been released (near-site/ on-site). Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

**EAL# 19.2: Toxic/Flammable Gases**  
*Alert*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

(Toxic/ flammable) gas has entered plant facilities. Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

**EAL# 19.3: Toxic/Flammable Gases**  
*Site Emergency*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

(Toxic/ flammable) gas has entered areas within plant buildings which contain vital safety equipment (plant vital areas).

EAL# 20.1:      Technical Specification Safety Limit <i>Unusual Event</i>
--

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

An abnormal plant condition has occurred. Based on current plant conditions, the safety of the general public is not threatened.

**EAL# 21.1.a: Irradiated Spent Fuel in Dry Storage**  
*Unusual Event*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

While transporting the used (spent) fuel assemblies (groups of rods containing irradiated uranium fuel pellets) from the spent fuel pool to the onsite storage facility, radiological readings indicate that the spent fuel or its container may be damaged.

**EAL# 21.1.b: Irradiated Spent Fuel in Dry Storage**  
*Unusual Event*

**Brief Non-Technical Description:**

After the used (spent) fuel assemblies (groups of rods containing irradiated uranium fuel pellets) have been transported from the spent fuel pool and placed in the horizontal storage module (a concrete structure which will house the steel canister of spent fuel), radiological readings indicate that the fuel storage system may be damaged.

## EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION

CHECK

### 1.0 TIMING OF CLASSIFICATION

1.1 UNUSUAL EVENT

An **UNUSUAL EVENT** shall be declared within 15 minutes of having information necessary to make a declaration.

1.2 ALERT

An **ALERT** shall be declared within 15 minutes of having information necessary to make a declaration.

1.3 SITE AREA EMERGENCY

A **SITE AREA EMERGENCY** shall be declared within 15 minutes of having information necessary to make a declaration.

1.4 GENERAL EMERGENCY

A **GENERAL EMERGENCY** shall be declared within 15 minutes of having information necessary to make a declaration.

## CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

### USE OF EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION MATRIX

**NOTE: CONFIRM THAT INDICATORS AND/OR ALARMS REFLECT ACTUAL CONDITIONS PRIOR TO TAKING ACTION BASED ON THE INDICATOR OR ALARM.**

The matrix is worded in a manner that assumes parameter values indicated are the actual conditions present in the plant.

The matrix is designed to make it possible to precisely classify an abnormal occurrence into the proper emergency classification based on detailed Emergency Action Level (EAL) descriptions. It is impossible to anticipate every abnormal occurrence. Therefore, before classifying any abnormal occurrence based on the EALs in the matrix, one should verify that the general conditions prevalent in-plant and offsite meet the general class description of the emergency classification. In addition, prior to classification, one should be aware of the ramifications in-plant and particularly offsite of that classification. Special consideration of offsite consequences should be made prior to declaring a **GENERAL EMERGENCY**.

## **POLICY STATEMENT ON EMERGENCY DECLARATIONS**

### Policy

When an emergency action level (EAL) is exceeded but the plant quickly returns below the EAL, the emergency should be declared. If appropriate, the emergency can also be downgraded or terminated at essentially the same time and the Emergency Notification Form can say the emergency was declared and terminated (or downgraded) minutes later.

### Example

The main steam lines isolate on high radiation due to a large oil intrusion into the vessel. The isolation on high radiation is a trigger to declare an Alert. If it can quickly be determined that the cause was not damage to the fuel and we should not be in an Alert, then the Alert should be declared and terminated with the same notification report.

### Basis

Declaring the emergency will notify interested offsite personnel and will demonstrate that we recognize that we exceeded an EAL. Immediately terminating or downgrading will avoid activation of company and offsite facilities that are not required for this event.

## CLASS DESCRIPTIONS

- UNUSUAL EVENT** - Events that are occurring or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.
- ALERT** - Events that are occurring or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.
- SITE AREA EMERGENCY** - Events that are occurring or have occurred which involve actual or imminent major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels except inside the emergency planning boundary.
- GENERAL EMERGENCY** - Events that are occurring or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Expectation is that releases will exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the emergency planning boundary.

**CATEGORY INDEX TO THE MATRIX FOR THE  
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS  
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## 1 - AIRCRAFT/TRAIN ACTIVITY

### UNUSUAL EVENT

**EAL# 1.1** Aircraft crash or train derailment onsite as indicated by:

Visual observation or notification received by control room operator.

---

### ALERT

**EAL# 1.2** Aircraft or missile strikes a station structure as indicated by:

Direct observation or notification received by control room operator.

---

### SITE AREA EMERGENCY

**EAL# 1.3** Severe damage to safe shutdown equipment from aircraft crash or missile impact when not in cold shutdown, determined by:

(A and B and C)

A. Direct observation or notification received by control room operator.

and

B. Shift Supervisor evaluation.

and

C. Reactor Coolant temperature greater than 200°F as indicated on Panel 1C651 (2C651).

---

### GENERAL EMERGENCY

**EAL# 1.4** None.

## 2 - CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION

### UNUSUAL EVENT

EAL# 2.1 None.

---

### ALERT

EAL# 2.2 Control Room evacuation as indicated by:

(A and B)

A. Initiation of control room evacuation procedures.

and

B. Establishment of control of shutdown systems from local stations.

---

### SITE AREA EMERGENCY

EAL# 2.3 Delayed Control Room Evacuation as indicated by:

(A and B)

A. Initiation of control room evacuation procedures.

and

B. Shutdown systems control at local stations not established within 15 minutes.

---

### GENERAL EMERGENCY

EAL# 2.4 None.

### 3 - FUEL CLADDING DEGRADATION

#### UNUSUAL EVENT

**EAL# 3.1** Core degradation as indicated by:

(A or B)

A. Valid Off-gas Pre-treatment Monitor high radiation alarm annunciation on Panel 1C651 (2C651) or indication on Panel 1C600 (2C600).

or

B. Reactor coolant activity, determined by sample analysis greater than or equal to 2  $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$  of I-131 equivalent.

---

#### ALERT

**EAL# 3.2** Severe fuel cladding degradation as indicated by:

(A or B or C or D)

A. Valid Off-gas Pre-treatment monitor High-High radiation alarm annunciation on Panel 1C651 (2C651) or indication on Panel 1C600 (2C600).

or

B. Valid Reactor coolant activity greater than 300  $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$  of equivalent I-131, as determined by sample analysis.

or

C. Valid Main Steam Line High radiation trip annunciation or indication on Panel 1C651 (2C651).

or

D. Valid containment post accident monitor indication on Panel 1C601 (2C601) greater than 200 R/hr. (An 8R/hr correction factor must be added manually to the indication to offset a downscale error if primary containment temperature exceeds 225 degrees Fahrenheit. Reference EC-079-0521.)

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

### 3 - FUEL CLADDING DEGRADATION (continued)

#### SITE AREA EMERGENCY

**EAL# 3.3** Severely degraded core as indicated by:

(A or B)

A. Reactor coolant activity greater than 1,000  $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$  of equivalent I-131 as determined by sample analysis.

or

B. Valid containment post accident monitor indication on Panel 1C601 (2C601) greater than 400 R/hr. (An 8 R/hr correction factor must be added manually to the indication to offset a downscale error if primary containment temperature exceeds 225 degrees Fahrenheit. Reference EC-079-0521.)

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

### 3 - FUEL CLADDING DEGRADATION (continued)

#### GENERAL EMERGENCY

**EAL# 3.4.a** Fuel cladding degradation. Loss of 2 out of 3 fission product barriers (fuel cladding and reactor coolant pressure boundary) with potential loss of the third barrier (primary containment) as indicated by:

(A or B)

A. (1 and 2)

1. Valid containment post accident monitor indication on Panel 1C601 (2C601) greater than 400 R/hr. (An 8 R/hr correction factor must be added manually to the indication to offset a downscale error if primary containment temperature exceeds 225 degrees Fahrenheit. Reference EC-079-0521.)

and

2. (a or b or c)

- a. Containment pressure greater than 40.4 PSIG, indicated on Panel 1C601 (2C601).

or

- b. A visual inspection of the containment indicates a potential for loss of containment (e.g. anchorage or penetration failure, a crack in containment concrete at tendon).

or

- c. Other indications of potential or actual loss of primary containment.

or

B. (1 and 2)

1. Reactor coolant activity greater than 1,000  $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$  of equivalent I-131 as determined by sample analysis.

and

2. Actual or potential failure of reactor coolant isolation valves to isolate a coolant leak outside containment as determined by valve position indication on Panel 1C601 (2C601) or visual inspection.

**OR**

**EAL# 3.4.b** Core melt as indicated by:

(A and B)

- A. Valid containment post accident monitor indication on Panel 1C601 (2C601) greater than 2000 R/hr. (An 8 R/hr correction factor must be added manually to the indication to offset a downscale error if primary containment temperature exceeds 225 degrees Fahrenheit. Reference EC-079-0521.)

and

- B. Containment high pressure indication or annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601).

## 4 - GENERAL

### UNUSUAL EVENT

**EAL# 4.1** Plant conditions exist that warrant increased awareness on the part of plant operating staff or state and/or local offsite authorities as indicated by:

Events that are occurring or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

---

### ALERT

**EAL# 4.2** Other plant conditions exist that warrant precautionary activation of PP&L, State, County, and local emergency centers as indicated by:

Events that are occurring or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

---

### SITE AREA EMERGENCY

**EAL# 4.3** Other plant conditions exist that warrant activation of emergency centers and monitoring teams or a precautionary notification to the public near the site as indicated by:

Events that are occurring or have occurred which involve actual or imminent major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels except inside the emergency planning boundary.

---

### GENERAL EMERGENCY

**EAL# 4.4** Other plant conditions exist, from whatever, source, that make release of large amounts of radioactivity in a short time period available as indicated by:

Events that are occurring or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Expectation is that releases will exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the emergency planning boundary.

## 5.- INJURED/CONTAMINATED PERSONNEL

### UNUSUAL EVENT

EAL# 5.1 Transportation of externally contaminated injured individual from site to offsite medical facility as deemed appropriate by Shift Supervisor.

---

### ALERT

EAL# 5.2 None.

---

### SITE AREA EMERGENCY

EAL# 5.3 None.

---

### GENERAL EMERGENCY

EAL# 5.4 None.

## 6 - IN-PLANT HIGH RADIATION

### UNUSUAL EVENT

**EAL# 6.1** Unanticipated or unplanned concentrations of airborne activity exist in normally accessible areas, which are not due to planned maintenance activities, as indicated by:

Concentrations exceed 500 times the DAC values of 10CFR20 Appendix B, Table I values for a single isotope, or for multiple isotopes where

$$\frac{C_A}{DAC_A} + \frac{C_B}{DAC_B} + \frac{C_C}{DAC_C} \dots \frac{C_N}{DAC_N} \geq 500$$

---

### ALERT

**EAL# 6.2** Unexpected in-plant high radiation levels or airborne contamination which indicates a severe degradation in the control of radioactive material as indicated by:

Area Radiation Monitor reading 1000 times normal annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601) or indication on Panel 1C600 (2C600).

---

### SITE AREA EMERGENCY

**EAL# 6.3** None.

---

### GENERAL EMERGENCY

**EAL# 6.4** None.

## 7 - LOSS OF AC POWER

### UNUSUAL EVENT

**EAL# 7.1** Loss of offsite power or loss of all onsite AC power supplies as indicated by:

(A *or* B)

A. Loss of power to Startup Transformer 10 and 20 annunciation or indication on Panel 0C653.

or

B. Failure of all diesel generators to start or synchronize to the emergency buses by indication or annunciation on Panel 0C653.

---

### ALERT

**EAL# 7.2** Loss of all offsite power and all onsite AC power supplies as indicated by:

(A *and* B)

A. Loss of power to Startup Transformer 10 and 20 annunciation or indication on Panel 0C653.

and

B. Failure of all diesel generators to start or synchronize to the emergency buses by annunciation or indication on Panel 0C653.

---

### SITE AREA EMERGENCY

**EAL# 7.3** Loss of all offsite power and loss of all onsite AC power supplies for greater than 15 minutes as indicated by:

(A *and* B *and* C)

A. Loss of offsite power.

and

B. Failure of all diesel generators to startup or synchronize to the emergency buses by indication or annunciation on 0C653.

and

C. The above conditions exist for greater than 15 minutes.

---

### GENERAL EMERGENCY

**EAL# 7.4** None.

## 8 - LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM ALARMS AND ANNUNCIATORS

### UNUSUAL EVENT

EAL# 8.1 None.

---

### ALERT

EAL# 8.2 Loss of all control room annunciators as indicated by:

In the opinion of the Shift Supervisor, all Control Room annunciators and the Plant Process Computer are lost, or insufficient annunciators are available to safely operate the unit(s) without supplemental observation of plant systems.

---

### SITE AREA EMERGENCY

EAL# 8.3 All annunciators lost and plant transient initiated while annunciators are lost as indicated by:

(A and B)

A. In the opinion of the Shift Supervisor, all Control Room annunciators and the Plant Process Computer are lost, or insufficient annunciators are available to safely operate the unit(s) without supplemental observation of plant systems.

and

B. (1 or 2 or 3 or 4)

1. Low-Low reactor water level indication on Panel 1C651 (2C651) followed by ECCS initiation on Panel 1C601 (2C601).

or

2. Reactor coolant temperature change greater than 100°F per hour indication on recorder TR-1R006 on Panel 1C007 (2C007) (Reactor Building elevation 683').

or

3. High reactor pressure indication on Panel 1C651 (2C651) and followed by scram indication on Panel 1C651 (2C651).

or

4. Any indication that transient has occurred or is in progress.

---

### GENERAL EMERGENCY

EAL# 8.4 None.

## 9 - LOSS OF DC POWER

### UNUSUAL EVENT

EAL# 9.1 None.

---

### ALERT

EAL# 9.2 Loss of onsite vital DC power as indicated by:

(A and B)

A. Less than 210 volts on the 250 VDC main distribution Panel buses, 1D652 (2D652) and 1D662 (2D662) as indicated by trouble alarms on Panel 1C651 (2C651).

and

B. Less than 105 volts on the 125 VDC main distribution buses 1D612 (2D612), 1D622 (2D622), 1D632 (2D632), and 1D642 (2D642) as indicated by trouble alarms on Panel 1C651 (2C651).

**NOTE: Buses are not tripped on undervoltage condition.**

---

### SITE AREA EMERGENCY

EAL# 9.3 Loss of all vital onsite DC power sustained for greater than 15 minutes as indicated by:

(A and B and C)

A. Less than 210 volts on the 250 VDC main distribution Panel buses, 1D652 (2D652) and 1D662 (2D662) as indicated by trouble alarms on Panel 1C651 (2C651).

and

B. Less than 105 volts on the 125 VDC main distribution buses 1D612 (2D612), 1D622 (2D622), 1D632 (2D632), and 1D642 (2D642) as indicated by trouble alarms on Panel 1C651 (2C651).

and

C. The above condition exists for greater than 15 minutes.

**NOTE: Buses are not tripped on undervoltage condition.**

---

### GENERAL EMERGENCY

EAL# 9.4 None.

## 10 - LOSS OF DECAY HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY

### UNUSUAL EVENT

EAL# 10.1 None.

---

### ALERT

EAL# 10.2 Inability to remove decay heat while in plant condition 4, inability to maintain the plant in cold shutdown as indicated by:

Inability to maintain reactor coolant temperature less than 200°F with the reactor mode switch in shutdown; exception is when testing per Special Test Exception TS 3.10.1 which allows maximum temperature of 212°F.

---

### SITE AREA EMERGENCY

EAL# 10.3 Inability to remove decay heat while the plant is shutdown as indicated by:

(A and B and C)

A. Reactor Mode switch in shutdown.

and

B. Reactor Coolant System temperature greater than 200°F and rising.

and

C. Suppression Pool temperature greater than 120°F and rising.

---

### GENERAL EMERGENCY

EAL# 10.4 Inability to remove decay heat while the plant is shutdown with possible release of large amounts of radioactivity as indicated by:

(A and B and C)

A. Reactor mode switch in shutdown.

and

B. Reactor coolant system temperature greater than 200°F and rising.

and

C. Suppression pool temperature greater than 290°F indicated on the computer output (MAT 12,13,14,15 or 16).

## 11 - LOSS OF REACTIVITY CONTROL

### UNUSUAL EVENT

**EAL# 11.1** Inadvertent Criticality as indicated by:

Unexpected increasing neutron flux indication on Panel 1C651 (2C651).

---

### ALERT

**EAL# 11.2** Failure of the Reactor Protection System or the Alternate Rod Insertion System to initiate and complete a scram that brings the reactor subcritical as indicated by:

(A or B) and (C and D and E)

A. Trip of at least one sub-channel in each trip system (RPS A and RPS B) as indicated by annunciators and trip status lights on Panel 1C651 (2C651).

or

B. Trip of both trip systems (ARI A and ARI B) as indicated by annunciators on Panel 1C601 (2C601).

and

C. Failure of control rods to insert, confirmed by the full core display indication on Panel 1C651 (2C651) or process computer indications.

and

D. Failure to bring the reactor subcritical confirmed by neutron count rate on the neutron monitoring indication on Panel 1C651 (2C651).

and

E. Reactor power >5% as indicated on Panel 1C651 (2C651).

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

## 11 - LOSS OF REACTIVITY CONTROL (continued)

### SITE AREA EMERGENCY

**EAL# 11.3** Loss of functions needed to bring the reactor subcritical and loss of ability to bring the reactor to cold shutdown as indicated by:

(A and B and C and D)

A. Inability to insert sufficient control rods to bring the reactor subcritical as indicated by count rate on the neutron monitoring instrumentation on Panel 1C651 (2C651).

and

B. (1 or 2)

Failure of both loops of standby liquid control to inject into the vessel indicated by:

1. Low pump discharge pressure indication on Panel 1C601 (2C601).

or

2. Low flow indication on Panel 1C601 (2C601).

and

C. Reactor coolant temperature greater than 200°F, indicated on Panel 1C651 (2C651).

and

D. Reactor power >5% indicated on Panel 1C651 (2C651).

---

### GENERAL EMERGENCY

**EAL# 11.4** Loss of functions needed to bring the reactor subcritical and transient in progress that makes release of large amounts of radioactivity in a short period possible as indicated by:

(A or B) and (C and D)

A. Trip of at least one sub-channel in each trip system (RPS A and RPS B), indicated by annunciation or trip status lights on Panel 1C651 (2C651).

or

B. Trip of both systems (ARI A and ARI B) as indicated by annunciators on Panel 1C601 (2C601).

and

C. Loss of SLC system capability to inject, indicated by instrumentation on Panel 1C601 (2C601).

and

D. Reactor power greater than 25% of rated, indicated on Panel 1C651 (2C651).

## 12 - LOSS OF REACTOR VESSEL INVENTORY

### UNUSUAL EVENT

**EAL# 12.1** Valid initiation of an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) System as indicated by:

(A or B)

A. Initiation of an ECCS System and low, low, low reactor water level (-129) annunciation or indication on Panel 1C651 (2C651).

or

B. Initiation of an ECCS System and High Drywell Pressure annunciation or indication on Panel 1C601 (2C601).

---

### ALERT

**EAL# 12.2** Reactor coolant system leak rate greater than 50 gpm as indicated by:

(A or B)

A. Drywell floor drain sump A or B Hi-Hi alarm on Panel 1C601 (2C601) and 2 or more drywell floor drain pumps continuously running as indicated on Panel 1C601 (2C601).

or

B. Other estimates of Reactor coolant system leakage indicating greater than 50 gpm.

---

### SITE AREA EMERGENCY

**EAL# 12.3** Known loss of coolant accident greater than make-up capacity as indicated by:

Water level below (and failure to return to) top of active fuel for greater than three minutes as indicated on fuel zone level indicator on Panel 1C601 (2C601).

**(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)**

## 12 - LOSS OF REACTOR VESSEL INVENTORY (continued)

### GENERAL EMERGENCY

**EAL# 12.4.a** Loss of coolant accident with possibility of imminent release of large amounts of radioactivity as indicated by:

Water level below (and failure to return to) top of active fuel for greater than 20 minutes as indicated on fuel zone level indicator on Panel 1C601 (2C601).

OR

**EAL# 12.4.b** Loss of Reactor Vessel inventory. Loss of 2 out of 3 fission product barriers (fuel cladding & reactor coolant pressure boundary) with potential loss of the third barrier (primary containment), as indicated by:

(A or B)

A. (1 and 2 and 3)

1. High drywell pressure annunciation or indication on Panel 1C601 (2C601).

and

2. (a or b or c)

a. Containment pressure exceeds 40.4 PSIG as indicated on Panel 1C601 (2C601).

or

b. A visual inspection of the containment indicates a potential or actual loss of containment (e.g. anchorage or penetration failure).

or

c. Containment isolation valve(s) fail to close as indicated by valve position indication on Panel 1C601 (2C601).

and

3. Reactor Vessel level drops below (and fails to return to) top of active fuel for greater than three minutes as indicated on fuel zone level indicator on Panel 1C601 (2C601).

or

B. (1 and 2)

1. Failure of reactor pressure vessel isolation valves to isolate coolant break outside containment as indicated by valve position indication on Panel 1C601 (2C601) or visual inspection.

and

2. Reactor vessel level drops below (and fails to return to) top of active fuel for greater than three minutes as indicated on fuel zone level indicator on Panel 1C601 (2C601).

## 13 - NATURAL PHENOMENA

### UNUSUAL EVENT

**EAL# 13.1** Natural phenomenon occurrence as indicated by:

(A or B or C)

A. Tornado impact on site.

or

B. Hurricane impact on site.

or

C. Earthquake detected by seismic instrumentation systems on Panel 0C696.

---

### ALERT

**EAL# 13.2** Natural Phenomenon Occurrence as indicated by:

(A or B or C)

A. Tornado with reported wind velocities greater than 200 mph impacting on site.\*

or

B. Reported hurricane or sustained winds greater than 70 mph.\*

or

C. Earthquake at greater than operating basis earthquake (OBE) levels as indicated on Panel 0C696.

\* Telephone numbers for the National Weather Bureau are located in the Emergency Telephone Directory.

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

## 13 - NATURAL PHENOMENA (continued)

### SITE AREA EMERGENCY

**EAL# 13.3** Severe natural phenomenon occurrence, with plant not in cold shutdown, as indicated by:

(A and B)

A. Reactor Coolant Temperature greater than 200°F as indicated on Panel 1C651 (2C651).

**and**

B. (1 or 2 or 3)

1. Reported hurricane or sustained winds greater than 80 mph.\*

**or**

2. Earthquake with greater than Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) levels as indicated on Panel 0C696.

**or**

3. Tornado with reported wind velocities greater than 220 mph impacting on site.\*

---

### GENERAL EMERGENCY

**EAL# 13.4** None.

\* Telephone numbers for the National Weather Bureau are located in the Emergency Telephone Directory.

## 14 - ONSITE FIRE/EXPLOSION

### UNUSUAL EVENT

**EAL# 14.1** Significant fire within the plant as indicated by:

(A and B)

A. Activation of fire brigade by Shift Supervisor.

and

B. Duration of fire longer than 15 minutes after time of notification.

OR

Explosion inside security protected area, with no significant damage to station facilities, as indicated by:

Visual observation or notification received by control room operator and Shift Supervisor evaluation.

---

### ALERT

**EAL# 14.2** On-site Fire/Explosion as indicated by:

(A or B)

A. Fire lasting more than 15 minutes and fire is in the vicinity of equipment required for safe shutdown of the plant and the fire is damaging or is threatening to damage the equipment due to heat, smoke, flame, or other hazard.

or

B. (1 and 2)

Explosion damage to facility affecting plant operation as determined by:

1. Direct observation or notification received by control room operator.

and

2. Shift Supervisor observation.

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

## 14 - ONSITE FIRE/EXPLOSION (continued)

### SITE AREA EMERGENCY

**EAL# 14.3** Damage to safe shutdown equipment due to fire or explosion has occurred when plant is not in cold shutdown, and damage is causing or threatens malfunction of equipment required for safe shutdown of the plant as determined by:

(A and B and C)

A. Direct observation or notification received by control room operator.

and

B. Shift Supervisor evaluation.

and

C. Reactor Coolant Temperature greater than 200°F as indicated on Panel 1C651 (2C651).

---

### GENERAL EMERGENCY

**EAL# 14.4** None.

## 15 - RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT

### UNUSUAL EVENT

**EAL# 15.1.a** Radiological gaseous effluents exceed 2 times the Technical Requirement Limits for 60 minutes or longer as indicated by:

(A or B)

A. Valid Building Vent Stack Monitoring System (SPING) indications on Panel 0C630 or 0C677.

1. Noble gases  $>1.70E+6$   $\mu\text{Ci}/\text{min.}$ , or
2. I-131  $>2.08E+2$   $\mu\text{Ci}/\text{min.}$ , or
3. Particulate  $>1.54E+3$   $\mu\text{Ci}/\text{min.}$ , or

or

B. Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous releases indicating total site release rates exceed:

1. Noble gases  $>1000$  mrem/year whole body, or
2. Noble gases  $>6000$  mrem/year skin, or
3. I-131, I-133, H-3, and particulates with half-lives  $>8$  days  $>3000$  mrem/year to any organ (inhalation pathways only).

**OR**

**EAL# 15.1.b** Radiological liquid effluents exceed Technical Requirement Limits for instantaneous release as indicated by:

Report of radiological liquid effluent exceeding Technical Requirement Limits. This includes effluent sources such as Service Water or RHR Service Water Loops A or B.

**(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)**

## 15 - RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT (continued)

### ALERT

**EAL# 15.2.a** Radiological gaseous effluents exceed 200 times the Technical Requirement Limits for 15 minutes or longer as indicated by:

(A or B)

A. Valid Building Vent Stack Monitoring System (SPING) indications on Panel 0C630 or 0C677.

1. Noble gases  $>1.70E+8$   $\mu\text{Ci}/\text{min.}$ , or
2. I-131  $>2.08E+4$   $\mu\text{Ci}/\text{min.}$ , or
3. Particulate  $>1.54E+5$   $\mu\text{Ci}/\text{min.}$

or

B. Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous releases indicating total site release rates exceed:

1. Noble gases  $>1.0E+5$  mrem/year whole body, or
2. Noble gases  $>6.0E+5$  mrem/year skin, or
3. I-131, I-133, H-3, and particulates with half-lives  $>8$  days  $>3.0E+5$  mrem/year to any organ (inhalation pathways only).

OR

**EAL# 15.2.b** Radiological liquid effluents exceed 10 times Technical Requirement Limits for instantaneous release as indicated by:

Report of radiological liquid effluent release exceeding 10 times Technical Requirement Limits. This includes effluent sources such as Service Water or RHR Service Water Loops A or B.

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

## 15 - RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT (continued)

### SITE AREA EMERGENCY

**EAL# 15.3** Radiological effluent corresponds to greater than 50 mrem W.B.<sup>(1)</sup> or 250 mrem thyroid<sup>(2)</sup> for a half-hour or 500 mrem W.B.<sup>(1)</sup> or 2500 mrem thyroid<sup>(2)</sup> for 2 minutes at the emergency plan boundary as indicated by:

**OR**

Emergency plan boundary dose is projected to exceed 500 mrem W.B. <sup>(1)</sup> within 1 hour as indicated by:

(A or B)

A. Dose projections based on:

(1 or 2)

1. Building vent stack monitoring system indications on Panel 0C630 or 0C677.

**or**

2. Field monitoring data onsite or offsite.

**or**

B. Dose projections based on:

(1 or 2)

1. Building vent stack monitoring system indications on Panel 0C630 or 0C677.

**or**

2. Field monitoring data onsite or offsite

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

(1) The sum of the Effective Dose Equivalent resulting from the exposure to external sources and the Committed Effective Dose Equivalent incurred from all significant inhalation pathways during the early phase.

(2) Committed Dose Equivalent to the thyroid from radioiodine.

## 15 - RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT (continued)

### GENERAL EMERGENCY

**EAL# 15.4** Radiological effluent release corresponds to 1 rem whole body<sup>(1)</sup> or 5 rem<sup>(2)</sup> thyroid at the emergency plan boundary as indicated by:

**OR**

Offsite doses are projected to exceed 1 rem whole body<sup>(1)</sup> or 5 rem thyroid<sup>(2)</sup> due to the event as indicated by:

(A or B)

A. Dose projections based on:

(1 or 2 or 3)

1. Building Vent Stack Monitoring System indication on Panel 0C630 or 0C677.

**or**

2. Field monitoring data onsite or offsite.

**or**

3. In-plant conditions.

**or**

B. Dose projections based on:

(1 or 2 or 3)

1. Building Vent Stack Monitoring System indication on Panel 0C630 or 0C677.

**or**

2. Field monitoring data onsite or offsite.

**or**

3. In-plant conditions.

(1) The sum of the Effective Dose Equivalent resulting from the exposure to external sources and the Committed Effective Dose Equivalent incurred from all significant inhalation pathways during the early phase.

(2) Committed Dose Equivalent to the thyroid from radioiodine.

## 16 - SECURITY EVENT

### UNUSUAL EVENT

**EAL# 16.1** Security threat or attempted entry or attempted sabotage as indicated by:

(A or B or C)

A. A report from Security of a security threat, attempted entry, or attempted sabotage of the owner controlled area adjacent to the site.

or

B. Any attempted act of sabotage which is deemed legitimate in the judgment of the SHIFT SUPERVISOR/EMERGENCY DIRECTOR, and affects plant operation.

or

C. A site specific credible security threat notification.

---

### ALERT

**EAL# 16.2** Ongoing Security Compromise as indicated by:

(A or B)

A. A report from Security that a security compromise is at the site but no penetration of protected areas has occurred.

or

B. Any act of sabotage which results in an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant as judged by the SHIFT SUPERVISOR/EMERGENCY DIRECTOR.

---

### SITE AREA EMERGENCY

**EAL# 16.3** An ongoing adversary event threatens imminent loss of physical control of plant as indicated by:

(A or B)

A. Report from Security that the security of the plant vital area is threatened by unauthorized (forcible) entry into the protected area.

or

B. Any act of sabotage which results in actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public as judged by the SHIFT SUPERVISOR/EMERGENCY DIRECTOR.

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

## 16 - SECURITY EVENT (continued)

### GENERAL EMERGENCY

**EAL# 16.4** Loss of physical control of facilities as indicated by:

(A or B)

A. Report from Security that a loss of physical control of plant vital areas has occurred.

or

B. Any act of sabotage which results in imminent significant cladding failure or fuel melting with a potential for loss of containment integrity or the potential for release of significant amounts of radioactivity in a short time as judged by the SHIFT SUPERVISOR/EMERGENCY DIRECTOR.

## 17 - SPENT FUEL RELATED INCIDENT

### UNUSUAL EVENT

**EAL# 17.1** Unanticipated or unplanned concentrations of airborne activity exist in normally accessible areas, which is not due to planned maintenance activities, as indicated by:

Concentrations exceed 500 times the DAC values of 10CFR20 Appendix B, Table I values for a single isotope, or full multiple isotopes where

$$\frac{C_A}{DAC_A} + \frac{C_B}{DAC_B} + \frac{C_C}{DAC_C} \dots \frac{C_N}{DAC_N} \geq 500$$

---

### ALERT

**EAL# 17.2** Unexpected in-plant high radiation levels or airborne contamination which indicates a severe fuel handling accident as indicated by:

Refuel floor area radiation monitor reading 1000 times normal annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601) or indication on Panel 1C600 (2C600).

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

## 17 - SPENT FUEL RELATED INCIDENT (continued)

### SITE AREA EMERGENCY

**EAL# 17.3.a** Major damage to irradiated fuel with actual or clear potential for significant release of radioactive material to the environment as indicated by:

(A and B)

A. Dropping, bumping, or otherwise rough handling of a new **OR** irradiated fuel bundle with irradiated fuel in the pool.

and

B. (1 or 2)

1. Refueling floor area radiation monitor reading 1000 times normal annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601) or indication on Panel 1C600 (2C600).

or

2. Reactor Building vent stack monitoring system high radiation annunciation or indication on Panel 0C630 or 0C677.

**OR**

**EAL# 17.3.b** Damage to irradiated fuel due to uncontrolled decrease in the fuel pool level to below the level of the fuel as indicated by:

(A and B)

A. (1 or 2)

1. Uncovering of irradiated fuel confirmation by verification of significant leakage from spent fuel pool.

or

2. Visual observation of water level below irradiated fuel in the pool.

and

B. (1 or 2)

1. Refueling floor area radiation monitor annunciation on Panel 1C651 (2C651) or indication on Panel 1C600 (2C600).

or

2. Reactor Building vent stack monitoring system high radiation annunciation or indication on Panel 0C630 or 0C677.

---

### GENERAL EMERGENCY

**EAL# 17.4** None.

## 18 - STEAM LINE BREAK

### UNUSUAL EVENT

EAL# 18.1 None.

---

### ALERT

EAL# 18.2 MSIV malfunction causing leakage as indicated by:

(A *and* B)

A. Valid MSIV closure signal or indication on Panel 1C601 (2C601).

and

B. (1 *or* 2)

1. Valid Main Steam Line flow indication on Panel 1C652 (2C652).

or

2. Valid Main Steam Line radiation indication on Panel 1C600 (2C600).

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

## 18 - STEAM LINE BREAK (continued)

### SITE AREA EMERGENCY

**EAL# 18.3** Steam line break occurs outside of containment without isolation as indicated by:

(A or B or C or D)

A. (1 and 2)

1. Failure of both MSIVs in the line with the leak to close as indicated by position indication on Panel 1C601 (2C601).

and

2. (a or b)

a. High MSL flow annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601) or indication on Panel 1C652 (2C652).

or

b. Other indication of main steam leakage outside containment.

or

B. (1 and 2)

1. Failure of RCIC steam isolation valves HV-F008 and HV-F007 to close as indicated on Panel 1C601 (2C601).

and

2. (a or b or c or d or e or f)

a. RCIC steamline pipe routing area high temperature annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601), or indication on Panel 1C614 (2C614).

or

b. RCIC equipment area high temperature annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601) or indication on Panel 1C614 (2C614).

or

c. RCIC steamline high flow annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601).

or

d. RCIC steamline tunnel ventilation high delta temperature annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601).

or

e. RCIC turbine exhaust diaphragm high pressure annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601).

or

f. Other indication of steam leakage from the RCIC system.

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

## 18 - STEAM LINE BREAK (continued)

### SITE AREA EMERGENCY (continued)

or

C. (1 and 2)

1. Failure of HPCI steam isolation valves HV-F002 and HV-F003 to close as indicated by position indicator on Panel 1C601 (2C601).

and

2. (a or b or c or d or e or f)

a. HPCI steamline pipe routing area high temperature annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601), or indication on Panel 1C614 (2C614).

or

b. HPCI equipment area high temperature annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601) or indication on Panel 1C614 (2C614).

or

c. HPCI steamline high flow annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601).

or

d. HPCI steamline tunnel ventilation high delta temperature annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601).

or

e. HPCI turbine exhaust diaphragm high pressure annunciation on Panel 1C601 (2C601).

or

f. Other indication of steam leakage from the HPCI system.

or

D. Any other un-isolatable steam line breaks.

---

### GENERAL EMERGENCY

EAL# 18.4 None.

## 19 - TOXIC/FLAMMABLE GASES

### UNUSUAL EVENT

**EAL# 19.1** Nearby or onsite release of potentially harmful quantities of toxic or flammable material as indicated by:

Visual observation or notification received by the control room operator.

---

### ALERT

**EAL# 19.2** Entry of toxic or flammable gases into the facility, with subsequent habitability problem as indicated by:

Visual observation, direct measurement, or notification received by the control room operator.

---

### SITE AREA EMERGENCY

**EAL# 19.3** Toxic or flammable gases enter vital areas, restricting access and restricted access constitutes a safety problem, as determined by:

(A and B)

A. Shift Supervisor's evaluation.

and

B. Visual observation, direct measurement, or notification received by control room operator.

---

### GENERAL EMERGENCY

**EAL# 19.4** None.

## 20 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SAFETY LIMIT

### UNUSUAL EVENT

**EAL# 20.1** Abnormal occurrences which result in operator complying with any of the Technical Specification SAFETY LIMIT ACTION statements indicated by:

(A or B or C or D)

A. Exceeding THERMAL POWER, low pressure or low flow safety limit 2.1.1.1.

or

B. Exceeding THERMAL POWER, high pressure and high flow safety limit 2.1.1.2.

or

C. Exceeding REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL safety limit 2.1.1.3.

or

D. Exceeding REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE safety limit 2.1.2.

---

### ALERT

**EAL# 20.2** None.

---

### SITE AREA EMERGENCY

**EAL# 20.3** None.

---

### GENERAL EMERGENCY

**EAL# 20.4** None.

## 21 – DRY FUEL STORAGE

### UNUSUAL EVENT

**EAL# 21.1.a.** Situations are occurring or have occurred during the transport of the irradiated spent fuel to the onsite storage facility, which jeopardize the integrity of the spent fuel or its container as indicated by:

(A or B)

A. Radiological readings exceed 2 R/hour at the external surface of any transfer cask or horizontal storage module.

or

B. Radiological readings exceed 1 R/hour one foot away from the external surface of any transfer cask or horizontal storage module.

OR

**EAL# 21.1.b.** Situations are occurring or have occurred at the irradiated spent fuel storage facility, which jeopardize the integrity of the dry cask storage system as indicated by:

(A or B)

A. Radiological readings exceed 2 R/hour at the external surface of any transfer cask or horizontal storage module.

or

B. Radiological readings exceed 1 R/hour one foot away from the external surface of any transfer cask or horizontal storage module.

---

### ALERT

**EAL# 21.2** None.

---

### SITE AREA EMERGENCY

**EAL# 21.3** None.

---

### GENERAL EMERGENCY

**EAL# 21.4** None.

# PP&L EMERGENCY PERSONNEL DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION (PAR) GUIDE

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**EMERGENCY EXPOSURE EXTENSION REQUEST FORM** and  
**POTASSIUM IODIDE TRACKING FORM** can be found immediately following  
EP-AD-000-125.

**PP&L EMERGENCY PERSONNEL DOSE ASSESSMENT AND  
PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION (PAR) GUIDE  
(continued)**

**CHECK**

1.0 Limits for **EMERGENCY** doses.

- 1.1 An **EMERGENCY DOSE AUTHORIZATION** (see EMERGENCY EXPOSURE EXTENSIONS) may be granted in order to protect facilities, and or equipment to substantially limit the escape of radioactive effluents or control fires. The maximum planned doses are:
  - 1.1.1 Whole body (TEDE)<sup>(1)</sup> dose shall not exceed 10 Rem.
  - 1.1.2 Dose to any organ (CDE)<sup>(2)</sup>, including the skin and extremity (SDE)<sup>(3)</sup>, shall not exceed 100 Rem.
  - 1.1.3 Dose to the lens of the eye shall not exceed 30 Rem (LDE)<sup>(4)</sup>.
- 1.2 An **EMERGENCY** dose authorization may be granted for life-saving actions or protection of large populations. The maximum doses are:
  - 1.2.1 Planned whole body (TEDE)<sup>(1)</sup> doses shall not exceed 25 Rem.
  - 1.2.2 Planned dose to any organ (CDE)<sup>(2)</sup>, including skin and extremity doses, shall not exceed 250 Rem.
  - 1.2.3 Dose to the lens of the eye shall not exceed 75 Rem (LDE)<sup>(4)</sup>.
- 1.3 **RARE** situations may occur in which a dose **GREATER THAN** those specified in SECTION 1.2 above for emergency dose would be unavoidable to carry out a lifesaving operation or to avoid extensive exposure of large populations. It is not possible to prejudge the risk that one should be allowed to take to save lives of others, therefore no upper limit has been established.

- (1) The sum of the Effective Dose Equivalent resulting from the exposure to external sources and the committed effective Dose Equivalent incurred from all significant inhalation pathways during the early phase.
- (2) The Committed Dose Equivalent to the thyroid from radioiodine.
- (3) Shallow Dose Equivalent.
- (4) Lens Dose Equivalent.

## PP&L EMERGENCY PERSONNEL DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION (PAR) GUIDE (continued)

### CHECK

2.0 For any **EMERGENCY EXPOSURE OR ACCIDENTAL OVEREXPOSURE**, the assessment actions in step 2 of the EMERGENCY EXPOSURE EXTENSIONS must be performed.

### 3.0 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS

#### 3.1 Potassium Iodide

3.1.1 For emergency workers entering areas where a committed dose equivalent, (CDE)<sup>(2)</sup>, to the thyroid from radioiodine could be 25 Rem or greater, the **Consulting Radiological Physician** should provide input concerning the administration and cessation of KI intake. (See Emergency Telephone Directory for telephone number.)

3.1.2 For thyroid exposures that are strongly expected to exceed 25 Rem, (CDE)<sup>(2)</sup>, KI doses of 130 mg (100 mg - iodine) per day should be administered.

Unless the **EMERGENCY DIRECTOR** or **RECOVERY MANAGER** instructs personnel to do otherwise, the KI tablets should generally be taken **as soon as possible** after thyroid exposure exceeding 25 Rem (CDE)<sup>(2)</sup> is projected.

**NOTE: Stable Iodine (KI) is most effective when administered immediately prior to exposure to radioiodine. Significant blockage of the thyroid dose can be provided by administration within one or two hours after uptake of radioiodine.**

- (1) The sum of the Effective Dose Equivalent resulting from the exposure to external sources and the committed effective Dose Equivalent incurred from all significant inhalation pathways during the early phase.
- (2) The Committed Dose Equivalent to the thyroid from radioiodine.
- (3) Shallow Dose Equivalent.
- (4) Lens Dose Equivalent.

**PP&L EMERGENCY PERSONNEL DOSE ASSESSMENT AND  
PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION (PAR) GUIDE  
(continued)**

**CHECK**

3.1.3 Onsite issuance of KI for iodine prophylaxis requires the approval of the **EMERGENCY DIRECTOR**. Issuance to EOF and FIELD EMERGENCY MONITORING/SAMPLING TEAM personnel requires the approval of the **RECOVERY MANAGER** when the EOF has relieved the TSC of emergency management activities. The **EMERGENCY DIRECTOR** will approve issuance prior to that time. These approvals must be documented on the **POTASSIUM IODIDE (KI) TRACKING FORM**.

3.1.4 For an injured and/or contaminated worker sent to a hospital for treatment, the patient will be under the care of the attending physician. As such, plant procedures no longer apply and KI issuance will be at the discretion of the attending physician. The physician can rely on a senior Health Physics Technician Level II or Health Physics Management to provide the in-plant radiological data on which to base their decision.

3.2 Protective measures should be implemented for EOF personnel at the direction of the **DOSE ASSESSMENT SUPERVISOR**.

3.3. Exposures to members of local offsite support groups, (ambulance workers, fire fighters) shall not exceed 500 mrem (TEDE)<sup>(1)</sup> for the performance of support duties on the site of the Susquehanna SES.

4.0 **EMERGENCY EXPOSURE NOTIFICATIONS AND A HEALTH CONSEQUENCE INVESTIGATION** must be conducted for any emergency exposure as outlined in step 6 of the Emergency Exposure Extensions.

- (1) The sum of the Effective Dose Equivalent resulting from the exposure to external sources and the committed effective Dose Equivalent incurred from all significant inhalation pathways during the early phase.
- (2) The Committed Dose Equivalent to the thyroid from radioiodine.
- (3) Shallow Dose Equivalent.
- (4) Lens Dose Equivalent.

## EMERGENCY EXPOSURE EXTENSIONS

### CHECK

1. Fill out the attached EMERGENCY EXPOSURE EXTENSION REQUEST Form.
2. Review the following factors:
  - Rescue personnel should be volunteers or professional rescuers.
  - Other considerations being equal (e.g., skill, potential need for person on another mission) personnel above the age of 45 are preferred.
  - Rescue personnel should be familiar and briefed with the consequences of exposure.
  - Women capable of reproduction should not take part in an effort requiring EMERGENCY exposure.
  - Use of personnel with high lifetime cumulative exposure should be discouraged.
  - All reasonable measures must be taken to control contamination and internal exposure.
  - Exposure under these conditions shall be limited to once in a lifetime.
  - For exposures greater than 25 Rem whole body (TEDE), the persons undertaking any emergency operation in which the dose will exceed 25 Rem to the whole body (TEDE) should do so only on a voluntary basis and with full awareness of the risks involved, including the numerical levels of dose at which acute effects of radiation will be incurred and numerical estimates of the risk of delayed effects. See the following two tables for general information concerning Health Effects & Cancer Risks.

## EMERGENCY EXPOSURE EXTENSIONS (continued)

**CHECK**

Health Effects Associated with Whole Body Absorbed Doses Received Within a Few Hours<sup>(a)</sup>

Whole Body Absorbed Dose (rad)	Early Fatalities <sup>b</sup> (percent)	Whole Body Absorbed Dose (rad)	Prodromal Effects <sup>c</sup> (percent affected)
140	5	50	2
200	15	100	15
300	50	150	50
400	85	200	85
460	95	250	98

- a Risks will be lower for protracted exposure periods.
- b Supportive medical treatment may increase the dose at which these frequencies occur by approximately 50 percent.
- c Symptoms (nausea, vomiting) which occur within a few hours after exposure to large doses of radiation and which usually precede more serious health effects.

Approximate Cancer Risk to Average Individuals from 25 Rem Effective Dose Equivalent Delivered Promptly

Age at Exposure (years)	Approximate Risk of Premature Death (deaths per 1,000 persons exposed)	Average Years of Life Lost if Premature Death Occurs (years)
20 to 30	9.1	24
30 to 40	7.2	19
40 to 50	5.3	15
50 to 60	3.5	11

3. Review the HEALTH PHYSICS AND ALARA CONSIDERATIONS DURING EMERGENCIES which is attached.
4. Obtain appropriate approval signatures as outlined in the table below.

EXTENSION		APPROVAL	ACTIONS
FROM mrem (TEDE)	TO mrem (TEDE)		
4000	<25000	ED and RPC/RM and DASU	ALARA REVIEW AND APPLY EMERGENCY EXPOSURE CONSIDERATIONS
>25000		ED and RPC/RM and DASU	ALL OF ABOVE AND BRIEFING ON RISKS

## EMERGENCY EXPOSURE EXTENSIONS (continued)

### CHECK

5. If the Emergency Dose Extension is for greater than 4 Rem (TEDE), have the volunteer sign the EMERGENCY EXPOSURE REQUEST Form acknowledging that they are a volunteer and are fully aware of the radiological risks of acute and delayed effects.
6. Upon completion of the activity requiring the Emergency Exposure perform the following:
  - Collect, process, and evaluate personnel dosimetry devices when technically appropriate.
  - Investigate the circumstances of all emergency exposures and confirm the dose received.
  - Notify the NRC of emergency exposure as follows:

**Immediate notification** of the NRC is required for:

- a. Exposure of the whole body of greater than 25 Rem (TEDE); or
- b. Exposure of the skin of the whole body of greater than 150 Rem (SDE); or
- c. Exposure of the extremities of greater than 375 Rem (SDE).

Notification of the NRC **within 24 hours** is required for:

- a. Exposure of the whole body of greater than 5 Rem (TEDE); or
  - b. Exposure of the skin of the whole body of greater than 30 Rem (SDE); or
  - c. Exposure of the extremities of greater than 75 Rem (SDE).
- Assess the health consequences of all emergency exposures. Consult with a physician to determine the need for and extent of physical and biochemical examinations.
  - Whole body greater than 25 Rem (TEDE) should result in an examination of the exposed person by a physician.
  - If internal exposure is suspected, quantitative measurements should be made immediately. Bioassays are required based on the following:
    - Nasal smear or facial contamination greater than 1,000 cpm above background.
    - Greater than 4 DAC-HRS in a day or less, or 20 DAC-HRS in a week or less.

## HEALTH PHYSICS AND ALARA CONSIDERATIONS DURING EMERGENCIES

### CHECK

1.0 Evaluate radiological conditions.

1.1 Obtain detailed survey data to ascertain:

1.1.1 Beta-Gamma radiation levels

1.1.2 Need for neutron measurements

1.1.3 Contamination levels and protective clothing requirements

1.1.4 Airborne radioactive materials

1.1.5 Variability of conditions over space and time

1.2 Evaluate personnel status.

1.2.1 Determine available dose under normal administrative dose objectives.

1.2.2 If essential, obtain approval from RADIATION PROTECTION COORDINATOR/EMERGENCY DIRECTOR for persons expected to exceed administrative objectives.

1.2.3 Follow criteria in PP&L Emergency Personnel Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation Guide when emergency exposures are deemed appropriate by EMERGENCY DIRECTOR.

1.2.4 Assess individual's history of exposure to airborne materials.

1.2.5 Assess individual's skills in relation to proposed task.

1.2.6 Assess individual's lifetime exposure history.

## HEALTH PHYSICS AND ALARA CONSIDERATIONS DURING EMERGENCIES (continued)

### CHECK

- 1.3 Determine proper type and placement of dosimeters.

- 1.3.1 Evaluate need for additional whole body dosimeters.

**NOTE: For emergency exposures above 4 rem, the placement of several dosimeters on an individual is recommended to determine spatial distribution of dose to the individual.**

- 1.3.2 Evaluate need and placement of extremity dosimeters.

- 1.3.3 Evaluate need for additional dosimetry devices such as high range self-reading dosimeters, electronic dosimeters, and neutron dosimeters.

- 1.3.4 Evaluate need for time keeping.

- 1.4 Determine proper respirator equipment required to perform task.

**NOTE: For tasks expected to last more than several hours, consider need for relief of team members.**

- 1.5 Review the following ALARA items:

**NOTE: The detail and scope of ALARA reviews are to be commensurate with the magnitude of doses expected, numbers of people involved, and urgency of required task.**

- 1.5.1 Consider the trend of exposures vs. the importance of the task:

- a. Important and critical task with rising exposure rates will require the dispatch of teams as quickly as possible to reduce exposures.
    - b. Unimportant or less critical task could be delayed until exposure rates begin to trend downward.

**HEALTH PHYSICS AND ALARA CONSIDERATIONS  
DURING EMERGENCIES  
(continued)**

**CHECK**

- 1.5.2 When time permits the following should be included in the ALARA review:
- a. Consider the use of remote handling devices or other special tools.
  - b. Consider the use of portable shielding.
  - c. Consider the need for mock-ups or other practice exercises.
  - d. Assess the number of people required to assure all have essential productive roles.
  - e. Consider the magnitude of doses received by team members in transit to work location.