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Docket No. ~~50-331~~

Iowa Electric Light and Power Company
ATTN: Mr. Duane Arnold, President
Security Building
P. O. Box 351
Cedar Rapids, Iowa 52406

Gentlemen:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 8 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-49 for the Duane Arnold Energy Center. The amendment includes Change No. 9 to the Technical Specifications and is in response to your application dated January 28, 1975, and supplement dated March 5, 1975.

The amendment permits changes to the Technical Specifications that modify limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for installed filters in the standby gas treatment system and in the control room air treatment system.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation and the Federal Register Notice are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

George Lear, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Reactor Licensing

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 8
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Federal Register Notice

cc: See next page

Dispatched 5-19-75

OFFICE	ORB#3	ORB#3	BC:ETS	OELD	ORB#3	
SURNAME	SATeets/dg	WPaulson/dg	JCollins	W. D. Paton / W. D. PATON	GLear	
DATE	4/24/75	4/24/75	4/28/75	5/2/75	5/9/75	

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

IOWA ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
CENTRAL IOWA POWER COOPERATIVE
CORN BELT POWER COOPERATIVE

DOCKET NO. 50-331

DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 8
License No. DPR-49

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Iowa Electric Light and Power Company, Central Iowa Power Cooperative, and Corn Belt Power Cooperative (the licensees) dated January 28, 1975 and supplement dated March 5, 1975, comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; and

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by a change to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility License No. DPR-49 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   "(2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications, as revised by issued changes thereto through Change No. 9."

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3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

George Lear

George Lear, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Reactor Licensing

Attachment:
Change No. 9
Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: MAY 13 1975

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 8

CHANGE NO. 9 TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-49

DOCKET NO. 50-331

Replace pages 3.7-14 through 3.7-16, pages 3.7-41 through 3.7-46, and pages 3.10-1 through 3.10-6 with the attached revised pages (no change has been made on pages 3.7-14 and 3.7-41).

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
must be taken out of power operation.	functionally tested once per operating cycle in conjunction with specification 4.7.A.6.a. Should one of the two H_2 or O_2 analyzers serving the drywell or suppression pool be found inoperable the remaining analyzer of the same type serving the same compartment shall be tested for operability once per week until the defective analyzer is made operable.
7. If the specifications of 3.7.A.1 through 3.7.A.5 cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in a cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.	

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
(3.7)	(4.7)
B. Standby Gas Treatment System	B. Standby Gas Treatment System
9 1. Except as specified in 3.7.B.3 below, both trains of the standby gas treatment system and the diesel generators required for operation of such trains shall be operable at all times when secondary containment integrity is required.	1.a At least once per operating cycle it shall be demonstrated that pressure drop across the combined high efficiency and charcoal filters is less than 11 inches of water at 4,000 cfm.
	b. At least once per operating cycle demonstrate that the inlet heaters on each train are capable of an output of at least 11 Kw.
	c. At least once per operating cycle demonstrate that air distribution is uniform within 20% of averaged flow per unit across HEPA filters.
	d. At least once per operating cycle automatic initiation of each branch of the standby gas treatment system shall be demonstrated. 9
	e. At least once per operating cycle manual operability of the bypass system for filter cooling shall be demonstrated.
	f. System drains shall be inspected quarterly for adequate water level in loop seals.
	g. Each bed will be visually inspected in conjunction with the sampling in Specification 3.7.B.2.b to assure that no flow blockage has occurred.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
2.a The results of the in-place cold DOP and halogenated hydrocarbon tests at design flows on HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks shall show $\geq$ 99% DOP removal and $\geq$ 99% halogenated hydrocarbon removal.	2.a The tests and sample analysis of Specification 3.7.B.2 shall be performed initially and at least once per year for standby service or after every 720 hours of system operation and following significant painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system.
b. The results of laboratory carbon sample analysis shall show $<$ 1.0% penetration of radioactive methyl iodide at 70% R. H., 150°F, 40$\pm$4 FPM face velocity with an inlet concentration of 0.5 to 1.5 mg/m^3 inlet concentration methyl iodide.	b. Cold DOP testing shall be performed after each complete or partical replacement of the HEPA filter bank or after any structural maintenance on the system housing.
c. Fans shall be shown to be capable of operation from 1800 to 4000 cfm.	c. Halogenated hydrocarbon testing shall be performed after each complete or partial replacement of the charcoal adsorber bank or after any structural maintenance on the system housing.
9	d. Each circuit shall be operated with the heaters on at least 10 hours every month.
3. From and after the date that one train of the standby gas treatment system is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, continued reactor operation or fuel handling is permissible only during the succeeding seven days unless such train is sooner made operable, provided that during such seven days all active components of the other standby gas treatment train shall be operable.	3. When one train of the standby gas treatment system becomes inoperable, the operable train shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter.
4. If Specifications 3.7.B.1, 3.7.B.2 and 3.7.B.3 are not met, the reactor shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition and fuel handling operations shall be prohibited.	

Due to the nitrogen addition, the pressure in the containment after a LOCA could possibly increase with time. Under the worst expected conditions the containment pressure will reach 30 psig in approximately 70 days. If and when that pressure is reached, venting from the containment shall be manually initiated. The venting path will be through the Standby Gas Treatment System in order to minimize the offsite dose.

Following a LOCA, periodic operation of the drywell and torus sprays may be used to assist the natural convection and diffusion mixing of hydrogen and oxygen.

7. Standby Gas Treatment System and Secondary Containment

The secondary containment is designed to minimize any ground level release of radioactive materials which might result from a serious accident. The reactor building provides secondary containment during reactor operation, when the drywell is sealed and in service; the reactor building provides primary containment when the reactor is shut down and the drywell is

open, as during refueling. Because the secondary containment is an integral part of the complete containment system, secondary containment is required at all times that primary containment is required as well as during refueling.

The standby gas treatment system is designed to filter and exhaust the reactor building atmosphere to the stack during secondary containment isolation conditions, with a minimum release of radioactive materials from the reactor building to the environs. Both standby gas treatment fans are designed to automatically start upon containment isolation and to maintain the reactor building pressure at approximately a negative 1/4-inch water gauge pressure; all leakage should be inleakage. Only one of the two standby gas treatment systems is 9

needed to cleanup the reactor building atmosphere upon containment isolation. If one system is found to be inoperable, there is no immediate threat to the containment system performance and reactor operation or refueling operation may continue while repairs are being made. If neither circuit is operable, the plant is brought to a condition where the standby gas treatment system is not required.

High efficiency particulate absolute (HEPA) filters are installed before and after the charcoal adsorbers to minimize potential release of particulates to the environment and to prevent clogging of the iodine adsorbers. The charcoal adsorbers are installed to reduce the potential release of radioiodine to the environment. The in-place test results should indicate a system leak tightness of less than 1 percent bypass leakage for the charcoal adsorbers and a HEPA efficiency of a least 99 percent removal of DOP particulates. The laboratory carbon sample test results should indicate a radioactive methyl iodide removal efficiency of at least 99 percent for expected accident conditions. If the efficiencies of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers are as specified, the resulting doses will be less than the 10 CFR 100 guidelines for

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the accidents analyzed, as the FSAR analysis shows compliance with 10 CFR 100 guidelines with an assumed efficiency of 90% for the adsorber. Operation of the fans significantly different from the design flow envelope will change the removal efficiency of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.

Pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers of less than 11 inches of water at the system design flow rate will indicate that the filters and adsorbers are not clogged by excessive amounts of foreign matter. Heater capability, pressure drop and air distribution should be determined at least once per operating cycle to show system performance capability.

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The frequency of tests and sample analysis are necessary to show that the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers can perform as evaluated. Tests of the charcoal adsorbers with halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant shall be performed in accordance with USAEC Report DP-1082. Iodine removal efficiency tests shall follow RDT Standard M-16-1T. (The design of the SGTS system allows the removal of charcoal samples from the bed directly through the use of a grain thief.) Each sample should be at least two inches in diameter and a length equal to the thickness of the bed. If test results are unacceptable, all adsorbent in the system shall be replaced with an adsorbent qualified according

to Table 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.52. Tests of the HEPA filters with DOP aerosol shall be performed in accordance to ANSI N101.1-1972. Any HEPA filters found defective shall be replaced with filters qualified pursuant to Regulatory Position C.3.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52.

All elements of the heater are demonstrated to be functional and operable during the test of heater capacity. Demonstration of 11 KW capability assures relative humidity below 70%.

System drains are present in the filter/adsorber banks, loop-seal water level is checked to ensure no bypass leakage from the banks. 9

If significant painting, fire or chemical release occurs such that the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber could become contaminated from the fumes, chemicals or foreign material, the same tests and sample analysis shall be performed as required for operational use. The determination of significant shall be made by the operator on duty at the time of the incident. Knowledgeable staff members should be consulted prior to making this determination.

Demonstration of the automatic initiation capability and operability of filter cooling is necessary to assure system performance capa-

bility. If one standby gas treatment system is inoperable, the other system must be tested daily. This substantiates the availability of the operable system and thus reactor operation or refueling operation can continue for a limited period of time.

Initiating reactor building isolation and operation of the standby gas treatment system to maintain at least a 1/4 inch of water vacuum within the secondary containment provides an adequate test of the operation of the reactor building isolation valves, leaktightness of the reactor building and performance of the standby gas treatment system. Functionally testing the initiating sensors and associated trip channels demonstrates the capability for automatic actuation. Performing these tests prior to refueling will demonstrate secondary containment capability prior to the time the primary containment is opened for refueling. Periodic testing gives sufficient confidence of reactor building integrity and standby gas treatment system performance capability. 9

8. Primary Containment Power Operated Isolation Valves

Automatic isolation valves are provided on process piping which penetrates the containment and communicates with the

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT
3.10 ADDITIONAL SAFETY RELATED PLANT CAPABILITIES	4.10 ADDITIONAL SAFETY RELATED PLANT CAPABILITIES
Applicability:	Applicability:
Applies to the operating status of the main control room ventilation system and the emergency shutdown local control panel.	Applies to the surveillance requirements for the main control room ventilation system, and the emergency shutdown control panels which are required by the corresponding Limiting Conditions for Operation.
Objective:	Objective:
To assure the availability of the main control room ventilation system, and emergency shutdown control panels under the conditions for which the capability is an essential response to station abnormalities.	To verify that operability or availability under conditions for which these capabilities are an essential response to station abnormalities.
A. MAIN CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION	A. MAIN CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION
1. Except as specified in Specification 3.10.A.3 below, the control room air treatment system and the diesel generators required for operation of this system shall be operable at all times when containment integrity is required.	1. At least once per operating cycle, the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks shall be demonstrated to be less than 6 inches of water at system design flow rate.
2.a. The results of the in-place cold DOP and halogenated hydrocarbon tests at design flows on HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks shall show ≥ 99% DOP removal and ≥ 99% halogenated hydrocarbon removal.	2.a. The tests and sample analysis of Specification 3.10.A.2 shall be performed initially and at least once per year for standby service or after every 720 hours of system operation and following significant painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system.

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
b. The results of laboratory carbon sample analysis shall show $\geq$ 90% radioactive methyl iodide removal at a face velocity of 40 fpm, 0.05 to 0.15 mg/m^3 inlet iodide concentration, $\geq$95% R.H. and $\geq$125°F.	b. Cold DOP testing shall be performed after each complete or partial replacement of the HEPA filter bank or after any structural maintenance on the system housing.
c. System flow shall be 1000 cfm $\pm$ 100 cfm.	c. Halogenated hydrocarbon testing shall be performed after each complete or partial replacement of the charcoal adsorber bank or after any structural maintenance on the system housing.
9	d. Each circuit shall be operated at least 10 hours every month. 9
3. From and after the date that one of the control room air treatment systems is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, reactor operation or refueling operations is permissible only during the succeeding seven days unless such circuit is sooner made operable.	3. At least once per operating cycle automatic initiation of the control room air treatment system shall be demonstrated.
4. If these conditions cannot be met, reactor shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in cold shutdown within 24 hours for reactor operations and refueling operations shall be terminated immediately.	
B. EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN CONTROL PANEL	B. EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN LOCAL CONTROL PANEL
1. At all times when not in use or being maintained the emergency shutdown local control panel shall be secured.	1. The emergency shutdown local control panel shall be visually checked once per week to verify it is secured.
	2. Operability of the switches on the emergency shutdown local control panel shall be functional tested once per refueling outage.

3.10.A BASES

MAIN CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION

The control room air treatment system is designed to filter the control room atmosphere for intake air and/or for recirculation during control room isolation conditions. The control room air treatment system is designed to automatically start upon control room isolation and to maintain the control room pressure to the design positive pressure so that all leakage should be out leakage.

High efficiency particulate absolute (HEPA) filters are installed before the charcoal adsorbers to prevent clogging of the iodine adsorbers. The charcoal adsorbers are installed to reduce the potential intake of radioiodine to the control room. The in-place test results should indicate a system leak tightness of less than 1 percent bypass leakage for the charcoal adsorbers and a HEPA efficiency of at least 99 percent removal of DOP particulates. The laboratory carbon sample test results should indicate a radioactive methyl iodide removal efficiency of at least 90 percent for expected accident conditions. If the efficiencies of the HEPA 9

filters and charcoal adsorbers are as specified, the resulting doses will be less than the allowable levels stated in Criterion 19 of the General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. Operation of the fans significantly different from the design flow will change the removal efficiency of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.

If one of the systems is found to be inoperable, the second unit provides protection and reactor operation or refueling operation may continue for a limited period of time while repairs are being made. If the system cannot be repaired within seven days, the reactor is shutdown and brought to cold shutdown within 24 hours or refueling operations are terminated. 9

B. EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN LOCAL CONTROL PANEL

The Emergency Shutdown Local Control Panel is provided to assure the capability of controlling reactor pressure for taking the plant to the hot shutdown condition external to the control room for the unlikely condition that the control room becomes uninhabitable.

4.10.A BASES

MAIN CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION

Pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers of less than 6 inches of water at the system design flow rate will indicate that the filters and adsorbers are not clogged by excessive amounts of foreign matter. Pressure drop should be determined at least once per operating cycle to show system performance capability.

The frequency of tests and sample analysis are necessary to show that the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers can perform as evaluated. Tests of the charcoal adsorbers with halogenated hydrocarbon shall be performed in accordance with USAEC Report DP-1082. Iodine removal efficiency tests shall follow RDT Standard M-16-1T. Test cartridges are provided to allow removal of a representative charcoal sample without affecting the operation of the bed. If test results are unacceptable, all adsorbent in the system shall be replaced with an adsorbent qualified according to Table 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.52. The replacement tray for the adsorber tray removed for the test should meet the same adsorbent quality. Tests of the HEPA filters with DOP aerosol shall be performed 9

in accordance to ANSI N101.1-1972. Any HEPA filters found defective shall be replaced with filters qualified pursuant to Regulatory Position C.3.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52.

Operation of the system for 10 hours every month will demonstrate operability of the filters and adsorber system and remove excessive moisture built up on the adsorber.

If significant painting, fire or chemical release occurs such that the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber could become contaminated from the fumes, chemicals or foreign materials, the same tests and sample analysis shall be performed as required for operational use. The determination of significant shall be made by the operator on duty at the time of the incident. Knowledgeable staff members should be consulted prior to making this determination. 9

Demonstration of the automatic initiation capability is necessary to assure system performance capability.

B. EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN LOCAL CONTROL PANEL

Once per week verification of the panel being properly secured is considered adequate. The associated equipment is proven operable during surveillance testing of that equipment. An operability verification by functional test at each refueling outage is adequate to assure that the panel is available and can perform its design function.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 8 TO LICENSE NO. DPR-49

(CHANGE NO. 9 TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS)

IOWA ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
CENTRAL IOWA POWER COOPERATIVE
CORN BELT POWER COOPERATIVE

DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER

DOCKET NO. 50-331

Introduction

On January 28, 1975, Iowa Electric and Power Company (IELP) submitted an application for a license amendment which proposed to incorporate changes to the Duane Arnold Energy Center Technical Specifications(Appendix A to the license). The amendment would modify limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for installed filters in the standby gas treatment system and in the control room air treatment system. This submittal was in response to our request dated December 18, 1974. Based on discussions with us, IELP modified their original submittal by letter dated March 5, 1975.

Discussion

1. Standby Gas Treatment System

The standby gas treatment system (SGTS) provides a means for minimizing the release of radioactive material from the containment to the environs by first filtering and then exhausting the atmosphere from the reactor building. Primary containment and vent exhaust can also be directed to the SGTS for processing prior to release. Exhaust from the SGTS is discharged through the main offgas stack.

The SGTS consists of two identical, parallel air filtration trains. Each train has the capacity to clean up the reactor building atmosphere upon containment isolation and consists of a demister (moisture separator), electrical heating coil, prefilter, high efficiency particulate absorber (HEPA) filter, charcoal filter, HEPA filter, and exhaust fan.

The changes to the Techhical Specifications proposed by IELP would provide additional limiting conditions for operation. The filters and fans of the SGTS are to undergo specific tests to assure their operating efficiency. The associated surveillance requirements provide the test intervals.

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

2. Control Room Air Treatment System

Intake air radiation monitors will isolate the normal control room ventilation path on sensing a high radiation level and will connect the intake to high efficiency filter trains. Two 1000 cfm single-pass high-efficiency filter trains are provided in parallel with the normal outside air inlet duct. Each filter train consists of inlet and outlet isolation dampers, a heating coil, prefilter, high-efficiency particulate absorber (HEPA), charcoal filter, and final HEPA filter.

The changes to the Technical Specifications proposed by IELP would provide additional limiting conditions for operation. The filter trains of the control room air treatment system are to undergo specific tests to assure their operating efficiency. The associated surveillance requirements provide the test intervals. In addition, the length of time that one filter train of the control room air treatment system may be inoperable during power operation or during refueling operations is reduced from thirty days to seven days. If the inoperable train cannot be restored within seven days the reactor must be shut down and be in cold shutdown condition within 24 hours and refueling operations must be terminated immediately.

Evaluation

The Technical Specifications for installed filter systems as proposed by IELP are quite similar to those that we developed and transmitted to IELP in our letter of December 18, 1974. The changed Technical Specification requirements will further assure that the SGTS filter system will effectively reduce radioactive releases and will further assure that the releases during postulated accident conditions will not exceed the limits of 10 CFR Part 100. In the case of the control room air treatment system, the changed Technical Specifications will further assure that the filter trains will effectively reduce radioactive concentrations in the ventilation intake to the control room during accident conditions and will further assure that the requirements of General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 are satisfied.

Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the change does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: MAY 1 3 1975

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. 50-331

IOWA ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
CENTRAL IOWA POWER COOPERATIVE
CORN BELT POWER COOPERATIVE

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Notice is hereby given that the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No.8 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-49 issued to Iowa Electric Light and Power Company, Central Iowa Power Cooperative and Corn Belt Power Cooperative which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the Duane Arnold Energy Center, located in Linn County, Iowa. The amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

The amendment permits changes to the Technical Specifications that would modify limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for installed filters in the standby gas treatment system and in the control room air treatment system.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Prior public notice of this amendment is not required since the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated January 28, 1975 and supplement dated March 5, 1975, (2) Amendment No. 8 to License No. DPR-49, with Change No.9 and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are

available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W. Washington, D. C. and at the Cedar Rapids Public Library, 426 Third Avenue, S. E., Cedar Rapids, Iowa 52401.

A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Reactor Licensing.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland MAY 13 1975

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

George Lear

George Lear, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Reactor Licensing