Mr. C. Lance Terry
Group Vice President, Nuclear
TU Electric
Energy Plaza
1601 Bryan Street, 12th Floor
Dallas, TX 75201-3411

March 14, 1996

SUBJECT: COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - AMENDMENT NOS. 47 AND 33 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. NPF-87 AND NPF-89 (TAC NOS. M91248 AND M91249)

Dear Mr. Terry:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 47 and 33 to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-87 and NPF-89 for the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated December 19, 1994 (TXX-94274), as supplemented by letter dated January 25, 1996 (TXX-96026).

The amendments allow testing of Reactor Protection System and Engineered Safety Features Actuation System instrument channels with the channel under test in bypass in order to reduce the vulnerability to spurious trips during surveillance testing.

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:
Timothy J. Polich, Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-1
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 47 to NPF-87
2. Amendment No. 33 to NPF-89
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

March 14, 1996

Mr. C. Lance Terry
Group Vice President, Nuclear
TU Electric
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1601 Bryan Street, 12th Floor
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Mr. C. Lance Terry
TU Electric Company

Comanche Peak, Units 1 and 2

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC COMPANY

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-445

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 47
License No. NPF-87

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Texas Utilities Electric Company (TU Electric, the licensee) dated December 19, 1994 (TXX-94274), as supplemented by letter dated January 25, 1996 (TXX-96026), complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-87 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   2. Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. **47**, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Timothy J. Polich, Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-1
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: **March 14, 1996**

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC COMPANY

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 2

DOCKET NO. 50-446

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 33
License No. NPF-89

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Texas Utilities Electric Company (TU Electric, the licensee) dated December 19, 1994 (TXX-94274), as supplemented by letter dated January 25, 1996 (TXX-96026), complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-89 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 33, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated into this license. TU Electric shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Timothy J. Polich, Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-1
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 14, 1996

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NOS. 47 AND 33

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. NPF-87 AND NPF-89

DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE	INSERT
3/4 3-5	3/4 3-5
3/4 3-6	3/4 3-6
3/4 3-7	3/4 3-7
3/4 3-23	3/4 3-23

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

[a]Only if the reactor trip breakers happen to be in the closed position and the Control Rod Drive System is capable of rod withdrawal.

[b]Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

[c]Below the P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

[d]Above the P-7 (At Power) Setpoint

[e]Deleted.

[f]Above the P-8 (3-loop flow permissive) Setpoint.

[g]Above the P-7 and below the P-8 Setpoints.

[h]Deleted.

[i]Above the P-9 (Reactor trip on Turbine trip Interlock) Setpoint.

ACTION STATEMENTS

ACTION 1 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

ACTION 2 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours,

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel or another channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1, and

c. Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER and the Power Range Neutron Flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per 12 hours per Specification 4.2.4.1.

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

ACTION 3 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and with the THERMAL POWER level:

a. Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the P-6 Setpoint,

b. Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint but below 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION 4 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes.

ACTION 5 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or within the next hour open the reactor trip breakers and suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes. With no channels OPERABLE complete the above actions within 4 hours.

ACTION 6 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel or another channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1.

ACTION 7 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window(s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

ACTION 8 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1 or maintenance, provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 9 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or open the reactor trip breakers within the next hour.

ACTION 10 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may continue provided the inoperable channels are placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours.

ACTION 11 - With one of the diverse trip features (undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) inoperable, restore it to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or declare the breaker inoperable and apply ACTION 8. The breaker shall not be bypassed while one of the diverse trip features is inoperable except for the time required for performing maintenance to restore the breaker to OPERABLE status, during which time ACTION 8 applies.

ACTION 12 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel or another channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing per Specifications 4.3.1.1 or 4.2.5.4.

ACTION 13 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 6 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

TABLE 4.3-1
REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST	ACTUATION LOGIC TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
1. Manual Reactor Trip	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R(14)	N.A.	1, 2, 3[a], 4[a], 5[a]
2. Power Range, Neutron Flux						
a. High Setpoint	S	D(2, 4), M(3, 4), Q(4, 6), R(4, 5)	Q	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
b. Low Setpoint	S	R(4)	S/U(1)	N.A.	N.A.	1[c], 2
3. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Positive Rate	N.A.	R(4)	Q	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
4. Not Used						
5. Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux	S	R(4, 5)	S/U(1)	N.A.	N.A.	1[c], 2
6. Source Range, Neutron Flux	S	R(4, 13)	S/U(1), Q(9)	N.A.	N.A.	2[b], 3, 4, 5
7. Overtemperature N-16	S	D(2, 4), M(3, 4), Q(4, 6), R(4, 5)	Q	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
8. Overpower N-16	S	D(2, 4), R(4, 5)	Q	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
9. Pressurizer Pressure--Low	S	R	Q(8)	N.A.	N.A.	1[d]
10. Pressurizer Pressure--High	S	R	Q	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2

TABLE 3.3-2 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

ACTION 17 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel or another channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.

ACTION 18 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window(s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.

ACTION 19 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 6 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 20 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

ACTION 21 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or declare the associated valve inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.5.

ACTION 22 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable chnnel to OPERABLE status within 6 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 23 - a. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met.

TABLE 3.3-2 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

b. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, declare Preferred Offiste Power inoperable, take the Action required by Specification 3.8.1.1, and open the Preferred Offsite Power Breaker within 6 hours.

c. With the number of Operable channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, declare Alternate Offsite Power inoperable, take the Action required by Specification 3.8.1.1, and open the Alternate Offsite Power Breaker within 6 hours.

d. With the number of OPERABLE Channels less than the minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, declare the appropriate Train A.C. Emergency Buses inoperable and take the Action required by Specification 3.8.3.1 for the buses not fully energized.

e. With the number of OPERABLE Channels less than the minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, declare both Offsite Power Sources inoperable, take the Action required by Specification 3.8.1.1, and open both offsite power breakers to the affected bus within 6 hours.

ACTION 24 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or initiate and maintain operation of the Control Room Emergency Recirculation System.

ACTION 25 - With the number of OPERABLE channels on one or more trains less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, declare the diesel generator(s) associated with the affected train(s) inoperable and apply the appropriate ACTION for Specification 3.8.1.1.

ACTION 26 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 6 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 47 AND 33 TO

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. NPF-87 AND NPF-89

TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC COMPANY

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated December 19, 1994 (TXX-94274), as supplemented by letter dated January 25, 1996 (TXX-96026), Texas Utilities Electric Company (TU Electric/the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) (Appendix A to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-87 and NPF-89) for the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES), Units 1 and 2. The proposed changes would allow testing of Reactor Protection System (RPS) and Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) instrument channels with the channel under test in bypass. Currently at CPSES, Units 1 and 2, when an instrument channel is placed in test, a trip condition for that instrument channel is inserted into the RPS and ESFAS. This trip condition decreases a two-out-of-four trip logic to a one-out-of-three, and a two-out-of-three trip logic to a one-out-of-two, thereby increasing the vulnerability of the affected unit to inadvertent or spurious trips. In order to reduce the vulnerability to spurious trips, TU Electric proposes to change the TSs to allow surveillance testing with channels in bypass rather than in trip.

On January 11, 1996, a conference call was held with the licensee and Westinghouse. By letter dated January 23, 1996, the staff requested additional information (RAI) on the design of the channel bypass capability in order to complete its review. By letter dated January 25, 1996, the licensee submitted the Revision 1 of Westinghouse topical report WCAP-14096, "Bypass Test Instrumentation for Comanche Peak Units 1 and 2" (proprietary version) and Revision 0 of WCAP-14569 (non-proprietary version) containing the information requested by the staff. The January 25, 1996, supplemental letter was clarifying in nature and did not change the initial no significant hazards consideration determination.

2.0 BACKGROUND

In a previous safety evaluation dated February 21, 1985, for Westinghouse topical report WCAP-10271, "Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out Of Service Times for the Reactor Protection Instrumentation Systems," the staff concluded that testing of analog channels in a bypassed condition is acceptable as long as the channel did not fail to the bypass position and did

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not require lifting of leads or installing jumpers. Although placing a RPS or ESFAS channel in bypass at CPSES currently requires, in many cases, the use of jumpers or lifted leads, TU Electric will modify the circuitry to facilitate placing these channels in bypass. This modification will allow the licensee to test or maintain a channel without placing it in a tripped state. Presently, when a channel is in a trip condition, a redundant channel cannot be maintained or tested without risking a spurious reactor trip or safeguard actuation. Thus, with the bypass test instrumentation (BTI), the spurious reactor trip or safeguards actuation will be avoided since the partial trip condition is eliminated and the coincident logic is maintained. Thus, signals from two other channels are required in order to initiate a protective action. Until these modifications are made, TU Electric will continue the current trip-to-test practice. When a channel is determined to be inoperable, the inoperable channel will be bypassed for testing (except for those functions covered by Action Statement 17 where the current TSs allow the channel being tested to be bypassed).

In order to allow for testing in bypass, the licensee has proposed the following changes to the TSs:

- TS Table 3.3-1: Revise Action Statements 2b, 6b, and 12b to allow for testing in bypass.

- TS Table 3.3-2: Revise Action Statement 17b to allow for testing in bypass.

The licensee submitted Westinghouse Topical Reports WCAP-14096, Revision 1 (proprietary version), and WCAP-14569, Revision 0 (non-proprietary version) in support of the BTI design. The BTI can only be enabled by a key lock switch on the Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) bypass panel and by the keylock on the door for the 7300 Process Protection System. When the BTI is enabled, the channel bypass is annunciated in the control room. An individual signal in a channel is bypassed by a toggle switch and a bypass indication light for that signal is displayed on the BTI panel. Administrative controls will ensure that failed channels are placed in the tripped condition following completion of surveillance testing. The staff finds that sufficient controls are provided as stated above for placing and indication of a channel in bypass.

WCAP-14096 discusses conformance of the BTI to the applicable NRC design criteria. In this BTI design, a limiting single failure could cause a channel to remain in bypass while the control room indication shows the channel has been removed from bypass. Therefore, a later test in bypass of another channel could place two channels in bypass simultaneously. This condition in a two-out-of-three logic could prevent reactor trip from being generated. For this failure to occur, however, one contact would have to be stuck closed in the relay associated with the key lock switch. This relay failure would be detected by observation of the bistable or the bypass panel status light. Such a failure is, therefore, detectible and is acceptable in accordance with IEEE-279. Also for the NIS BIT, the toggle switch is a three position switch in order to facilitate make-before-break action. The middle position of the switch is not marked. If the operator leaves the switch in the middle

position, the channel will remain in bypass even though the keylock switch has been returned to the normal position. This will be indicated to the operator by the control room annunciator and local status indication lights. TU Electric will modify this circuit during next refueling outage to ensure that a channel will not remain in bypass once the keylock switch is returned to normal position. Because the BTI panel is under administrative control during channel testing, local status indicating lights and the control room annunciator will warn the operator of this failure, the staff finds the current design acceptable for one refueling outage until the circuit modification is completed.

Each NIS channel has its own associated BTI panel. The NIS BTI panels contain both safety (class 1E) and non-safety (non-class 1E) 118 vac circuits. The part of the BTI panel which is non-class IE is isolated from class IE circuits by qualified isolators, and separation is maintained by placing a ground layer between these circuits. Thus, there is no credible control system fault which can propagate to all the bypass panels and simultaneously adversely affect all protection channels. The BTI panels and the components of the BTI are environmentally and seismically qualified for the CPSES site. BTI panels for the NIS have been evaluated for seismic qualification with respect to the effect on the instrument rack where they will be installed. The licensee determined that the instrumentation rack will maintain structural integrity and electrical isolation capability in event of an earthquake. The BTI for the 7300 Process Protection System utilizes the same hardware that was originally designed for surveillance testing with annunciator signals provided through the qualified isolators. Therefore the BTI for the 7300 Process Protection System has no new panels and only wiring changes have been performed to the existing hardware to provide channel bypass capability.

In its previous review of WCAP-10271 and its various revisions and supplements, the staff established that bypass testing was an acceptable method for conducting periodic surveillance of the RPS and ESFAS. In WCAP-0271, the effects of testing were analyzed in a bypass-to-test configuration as well as a trip-to-test configuration. The results indicated only a slight increase in core damage frequency and public health risk for testing in bypass when compared to testing in trip configuration. The CPSES Individual Plant Examination confirms the above results and concludes that the slight increase is within acceptable limits. The staff agrees with this determination.

3.0 EVALUATION

Based on the review of Westinghouse Topical Reports WCAP-14096, Revision 1 (proprietary version) and WCAP-14569, Revision 0 (non-proprietary version), the staff concludes that the BTI design meets applicable NRC criteria and sufficient controls are provided to preclude improper bypass. Also, the proposed plant configuration of bypass testing and decreased test frequency is consistent with the previously accepted WCAP-10271. The staff, therefore, finds the proposed changes to the RPS and ESFAS TSs to permit bypass testing to be acceptable. The staff notes that the licensee will modify the circuit for the NIS BIT at the next refueling outage to ensure that a channel will not remain in bypass once the keylock switch is returned to normal position.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Texas State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (60 FR 6312). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Hukam C. Garg

Date: March 14, 1996