June 14, 2002

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Stop P1-137 Washington, DC 20555-0001



ULNRC-04683

DOCKET NUMBER 50-483
CALLAWAY PLANT UNIT 1
UNION ELECTRIC CO.
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-30
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2002-009-01
Flooding of Security Facilities

Reference: ULNRC-04678, dated June 11, 2002

The enclosed licensee event report is submitted in accordance with 10CFR73.71(b)(1), reporting of safeguards events described in paragraph I(c) of Appendix G, to report flooding of Security facilities that impacted the Security Plan.

During a review of the previous letter which transmitted this licensee event report (ULNRC-04678, dated June 11, 2002), it was determined that there was a typographical error in Item C, "Safety Consequences And Implications Of The Event" of Section II: EVENT DRIVEN INFORMATION contained in LER 2002-009-00. This letter transmits a corrected version of the licensee event report, now designated as LER 2002-009-01. This error has been entered in the Callaway Action Request System for disposition.

Warren A. Witt

Warren A. With

Manager, Callaway Plant

WAW/ewh

Enclosure

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#### APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 **EXPIRES 7-31-2004** NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection (7-2001)request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to bjs1@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and (See reverse for required number of Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, digits/characters for each block) and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection. 3. PAGE 2. DOCKET NUMBER 1. FACILITY NAME OF 05000 483 1 3 **CALLAWAY PLANT UNIT 1** 4. TITLE Flooding of Security facilities. 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 5. EVENT DATE DOCKET NUMBER FACILITY NAME REV SEQUENTIAL 05000 YEAR МО DAY YEAR YEAR MO DAY NO NUMBER FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 2002 05000 - 009 - 01 06 11 05 12 2002 2002 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR ': (Check all that apply) 9. OPERATING 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) MODE 1 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10. POWER 100 73.71(a)(4) **LEVEL** 20.2203(a)(1) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 73.71(a)(5) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) OTHER 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) Specify in Abstract below or in 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) NRC Form 366A 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) NAME (573) 676-4306 Mark A. Reidmeyer 13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT REPORTABLE MANU-MANU-REPORTABLE FACTURER SYSTEM COMPONENT TO EPIX COMPONENT TO EPIX CAUSE CAUSE SYSTEM 15. EXPECTED YEAR MONTH DAY 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED

16. ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

On 5/12/02, Callaway Plant experienced heavy rainstorms (approximately 1.7 inches of rain between 1200 and 2359, 5/12/02, as recorded by plant computer) which caused flooding to occur in the Main Access Facility (MAF). At 2247, 5/12/02, an audible sump alarm annunciated in the Central Alarm Station (CAS). At 2251, water was observed to be coming up out of the floor drains. At 2333, power was lost to the CAS Security Computer monitors. Alarm annunciation was verified in the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS). At 2341, SAS entered Independent Mode, due to flooding in CAS (approximately 1.5 inches). At 2346, CAS was evacuated due to personnel safety concerns with submerged electrical components. Safeguards information and contingency gear were relocated to secure areas. Access to CAS was controlled at all times.

NO

SUBMISSION

DATE

A one-hour notification was made to the NRC at 0039, 5/13/02, due to reduced effectiveness of the Security Plan.

The causes of the flooding were faulty sump pumps located in manholes containing conduits connected to MAF, missing waterproof conduit seals on connecting conduits, and malfunctioning sewage pumps for MAF. Repairs are being performed on the faulty sump and sewage pumps to prevent future abnormal water accumulation. Waterproof conduit seals are being replaced as necessary, to prevent unrestricted water flow into MAF.

# NRC FORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

(1-2001)

#### LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2) NUMBER (2)	L	PAGE (3)				
Callaway Plant Unit 1		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
	05000483	2002	- 009 -	01	2	OF	3

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

#### I. DESCRIPTION OF THE REPORTABLE EVENT

#### A. REPORTABLE EVENT CLASSIFICATION

This event is reportable under 10 CFR 73.71 (b)(1), reporting of safeguards events described in paragraph 1(c) of appendix G.

#### B. PLANT OPERATING CONDITIONS PRIOR TO THE EVENT

Callaway Plant was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power.

# C. STATUS OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS THAT WERE INOPERABLE AT THE START OF THE EVENT AND THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT

There were no safety-related structures, systems, or components inoperable at the time of the event and that contributed to the event.

#### D. NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE EVENT, INCLUDING DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES

On 5/12/02, Callaway Plant experienced heavy rainstorms (approximately 1.7 inches of rain between 1200 and 2359, 5/12/02, as recorded by plant computer) which caused flooding to occur in the Main Access Facility (MAF). At 2247, 5/12/02, an audible sump alarm annunciated in the Central Alarm Station (CAS). At 2251, water was observed to be coming up out of the floor drains. At 2333, power was lost to the CAS Security Computer monitors. Alarm annunciation was verified in the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS). At 2341, SAS entered Independent Mode, due to flooding in CAS (approximately 1.5 inches). At 2346, CAS was evacuated due to personnel safety concerns with submerged electrical components. Safeguards information and contingency gear were relocated to secure areas. Access to CAS was controlled at all times.

A one-hour notification was made to the NRC at 0039, 5/13/02, due to reduced effectiveness of the Security Plan.

The cause of the flooding of CAS was due to three items that combined to prevent adequate water removal from CAS:

- 1) Faulted sump pumps for manholes with connecting conduits between CAS and the manholes.
- 2) Lack of waterproof conduit sealant in conduits connecting CAS and various manholes.
- 3) Faulted sewage pumps and level switches located in the Main Access Facility (MAF) and designed to control any liquid influents to CAS.

Repairs are being performed on the faulty sump and sewage pumps to prevent future abnormal water accumulation. Waterproof conduit seals are being replaced as necessary, to prevent unrestricted water flow into MAF.

#### E. METHOD OF DISCOVERY OF EACH COMPONENT, SYSTEM FAILURE, OR PROCEDURAL ERROR

The faulty manhole sump pumps had been identified as inoperative and were awaiting replacement. The missing waterproof conduit seals had previously been identified and rework was scheduled to begin on 5/13/02 dayshift. The malfunctioning sewage pumps were identified when they failed to control level in the sump during the flooding event.

# NRC FORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

(1-2001)

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2) NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)				PAGE (3)		
Callaway Plant Unit 1		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER				
	05000483	2002	- 009 -	01	3	OF	3	

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

## II. EVENT DRIVEN INFORMATION

# A. SAFETY SYSTEMS THAT RESPONDED

Not applicable to this event.

#### **B. DURATION OF SAFETY SYSTEM INOPERABILITY**

Not applicable for this event.

# C. SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE EVENT.

There were no safety-related systems affected by this event, thus there was no danger to the health or safety of the public.

# III. CAUSE OF THE EVENT

A root cause analysis was performed and it was determined that the primary cause of this event was inadequate planning of work packages involving the affected conduits. A lack of instructions to install waterproof conduit seals upon completion of work led to the uncontrolled influx of water into MAF. Contributing causes were delayed replacement of the manhole sump pumps because like kind replacements were unavailable, and ineffective previous repairs on the sewage pumps.

#### IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The following actions have been taken to keep water from entering and/or backing up into MAF:

- 1) The affected manhole sump pumps were replaced under planned work requests by 5/14/02.
- 2) Repairs have been scheduled on open conduit seals connected to MAF.
- 3) Plant employees have been directed to pump down affected manholes on a daily bases, with written instructions to contact appropriate personnel should rain occur during backshift or weekends to pump down manholes.
- 4) Repairs to the MAF sewage sumps are in progress.

Additional corrective actions to address inadequate planning of work packages are under consideration.

# V. PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

A search of data covering the three-year period between 5/12/99 and 5/12/02 revealed one Corrective Action Request (CAR) written on 5/8/02 addressing the water leaking from unsealed conduits in MAF.

## VI. <u>ADDITIONAL INFORMATION</u>

The system and component codes listed below are from the IEEE Standard 805-1984 and IEEE Standard 803A-1984 respectively.

System(s):

WH, WK, NA

Component(s):

CND, P