APR 14 1986

Docket No.: 50-382

Mr. G. W. Muench
Acting Director - Nuclear Operations
Louisiana Power and Light Company
317 Baronne Street, Mail Unit 17
New Orleans, Louisiana 70160

Dear Mr. Muench:

Subject: Issuance of Amendment No. 4 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-38 for Waterford 3

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 4 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-38 for the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application transmitted by letter dated February 19, 1986, as supplemented by letters dated February 27, 1986, March 4, 1986 and March 17, 1986.

The amendment revises the Appendix A Technical Specifications by delaying the performance of Type B and Type C local leak rate testing as required by Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50 until the first refueling outage and by extending the first emergency diesel generator inspection interval until the first refueling outage and conducting subsequent inspections at intervals not to exceed 24 months.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation supporting the amendment is also enclosed.

Sincerely,

/S/

George W. Knighton, Director
PWR Project Directorate No. 7
Division of PWR Licensing-B

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 4 to NPF-38
2. Safety Evaluation

cc: See next page

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APR 14 1986

ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 4 TO FACILITY OPERATING
LICENSE NP. NPF-38 FOR WATERFORD 3

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

LOUISIANA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-382

WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 4
License No. NPF-38

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment, dated February 19, 1986, as supplemented by letters dated February 27, 1986, March 4, 1986 and March 17, 1986, by Louisiana Power and Light Company (licensee), complies with standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public;

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-38 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 4, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in this license. LP&L shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. The license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

George W. Knighton, Director
PWR Project Directorate No. 7
Division of PWR Licensing-B

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: April 14, 1986

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 4

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-38

DOCKET NO. 50-382

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. Also to be replaced are the following overleaf pages to the amended pages.

Amendment Pages	Overleaf Pages
3/4 6-3	-
3/4 6-4	-
3/4 8-4	-
-	3/4 8-3
3/4 8-5	-
3/4 8-6	-

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

shutdown at either P_a, 44 psig, or at P_t, 22 psig, during each 10-year service period. The third test of each set shall be conducted during the shutdown for the 10-year plant inservice inspection.

b. If any periodic Type A test fails to meet either 0.75 L_a or 0.75 L_t, the test schedule for subsequent Type A tests shall be reviewed and approved by the Commission. If two consecutive Type A tests fail to meet either 0.75 L_a or 0.75 L_t, a Type A test shall be performed at least every 18 months until two consecutive Type A tests meet either 0.75 L_a or 0.75 L_t at which time the above test schedule may be resumed.

c. The accuracy of each Type A test shall be verified by a supplemental test which:

1. Confirms the accuracy of the test by verifying that the supplemental test result, L_c, minus the sum of the Type A and the superimposed leak, L_o, are equal to or less than 0.25 L_a.

2. Has a duration sufficient to establish accurately the change in leakage rate between the Type A test and the supplemental test.

3. Requires the quantity of gas injected into the containment or bled from the containment during the supplemental test to be between 0.75 L_a and 1.25 L_a.

d. Type B and C tests shall be conducted with gas at P_a, 44 psig, at intervals no greater than 24 months* except for tests involving:

1. Air locks,

2. Purge supply and exhaust isolation valves with resilient material seals.

e. Purge supply and exhaust isolation valves with resilient material seals shall be tested and demonstrated OPERABLE per Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.7.2.

*Testing for the first cycle of operation shall be done during the first refueling outage.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

f. The combined bypass leakage rate shall be determined to be less than or equal to 0.06 L_a by applicable Type B and C tests at least once per 24 months* except for penetrations which are not individually testable; penetrations not individually testable shall be determined to have no detectable leakage when tested with soap bubbles while the containment is pressurized to P_a, 44 psig, during each Type A test.

g. Air locks shall be tested and demonstrated OPERABLE per Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.3.

h. The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

*Testing for the first cycle of operation shall be done during the first refueling outage.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4. Verifying the diesel starts from ambient condition and accelerates to at least 600 rpm (60 ± 1.2 Hz) in less than or equal to 10 seconds.* The generator voltage and frequency shall be 4160 ± 420 volts and 60 ± 1.2 Hz within 10 seconds* after the start signal. The diesel generator shall be started for this test by using one of the following signals:

   a) Manual.

   b) Simulated loss-of-offsite power by itself.

   c) Simulated loss-of-offsite power in conjunction with an ESF actuation test signal.

   d) An ESF actuation test signal by itself.

5. Verifying the generator is synchronized, loaded to greater than or equal to 4400 kW in less than or equal to 176 seconds,* and operates with a load greater than or equal to 4400 kW for at least an additional 60 minutes, and

6. Verifying the diesel generator is aligned to provide standby power to the associated emergency busses.

b. At least once per 31 days and after each operation of the diesel where the period of operation was greater than or equal to 1 hour by checking for and removing accumulated water from the diesel oil feed tanks.

c. At least once per 92 days and from new fuel oil prior to addition to the storage tanks, by obtaining a sample of fuel oil in accordance with ASTM-D270-1975, and by verifying that the sample meets the following minimum requirements and is tested within the specified time limits:

   1. As soon as sample is taken (or prior to adding new fuel to the storage tank) verify in accordance with the test specified in ASTM-D975-77 that the sample has:

      a) A water and sediment content of less or equal to 0.05 volume percent.

      b) A kinematic viscosity @ 40°C of greater than or equal to 1.9 centistokes, but less than or equal to 4.1 centistokes.

      c) A specific gravity as specified by the manufacturer @ 60/60°F of greater than or equal to 0.80 but less than or equal to 0.99 or an API gravity @ 60°F of greater than or equal to 11 degrees but less than or equal to 47 degrees.

*The diesel generator start (10 sec) and subsequent loading (176 sec) from ambient conditions shall be performed at least once per 184 days in these surveillance tests. All other engine starts and loading for the purpose of this surveillance testing may be preceded by an engine prelube period and/or other warmup procedures recommended by the manufacturer so that mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine is minimized.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

2. Verify an impurity level of less than 2 mg of insolubles per 100 ml when tested in accordance with ASTM-D2274-70; analysis shall be completed within 7 days after obtaining the sample but may be performed after the addition of new fuel oil; and

3. Verify the other properties specified in Table 1 of ASTM-D975-1977 and Regulatory Guide 1.137, Revision 1, October 1979, Position 2.a., when tested in accordance with ASTM-D975-1977; analysis shall be completed within 14 days after obtaining the sample but may be performed after the addition of new fuel oil.

d. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by:

1. Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of greater than or equal to 498 kW (HPSI pump) while maintaining voltage at 4160 $\pm$ 420 volts and frequency at 60 +4.5, -1.2 Hz.

2. Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of 4400 kW without tripping. The generator voltage shall not exceed 4784 volts during and following the load rejection.

3. Simulating a loss-of-offsite power by itself, and:

a) Verifying deenergization of the emergency busses and load shedding from the emergency busses.

b) Verifying the diesel starts on the auto-start signal, energizes the emergency busses with permanently connected loads within 10 seconds after the auto-start signal, energizes the auto-connected shutdown loads through the load sequencer and operates for greater than or equal to 5 minutes while its generator is loaded with the shutdown loads. After energization, the steady-state voltage and frequency of the emergency busses shall be maintained at 4160 ± 420 volts and 60 + 1.2, -0.3 Hz during this test.

4. Verifying that on an SIAS actuation test signal (without loss-of-offsite power) the diesel generator starts on the auto-start signal and operates on standby for greater than or equal to 5 minutes. The steady-state generator voltage and frequency shall be 4160 ± 420 volts and 60 ± 1.2 Hz within 10 seconds after the auto-start signal; the generator voltage and frequency shall be maintained within these limits during this test.

5. Simulating a loss-of-offsite power in conjunction with an SIAS actuation test signal, and

a) Verifying deenergization of the emergency busses and load shedding from the emergency busses.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

b) Verifying the diesel starts on the auto-start signal, energizes the emergency busses with permanently connected loads within 10 seconds after the auto-start signal, energizes the auto-connected emergency loads through the load sequencer and operates for greater than or equal to 5 minutes. After energization, the steady-state voltage and frequency of the emergency busses shall be maintained at 4160 ± 420 volts and 60 + 1.2, -0.3 Hz during this test.

c) Verifying that all automatic diesel generator trips, except engine overspeed and generator differential, are automatically bypassed upon loss of voltage on the emergency bus concurrent with a safety injection actuation signal.

6. Verifying the diesel generator operates for at least 24 hours. During the first 2 hours of this test, the diesel generator shall be loaded to greater than or equal to 4840 kW and during the remaining 22 hours of this test, the diesel generator shall be loaded to greater than or equal to 4400 kW. The generator voltage and freqency shall be 4160 ± 420 volts and 60 ± 1.2 Hz within 10 seconds after the start signal; the steady-state generator voltage and frequency shall be 4160 ± 420 volts and 60 + 1.2, -0.3 Hz during this test. Within 5 minutes after completing this 24-hour test, perform Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.d.4b.

7. Verifying that the auto-connected loads to each diesel generator do not exceed the 2000-hour rating of 4400 kW.

8. Verifying the diesel generator's capability to:

a) Synchronize with the offsite power source while the generator is loaded with its emergency loads upon a simulated restoration of offsite power,

b) Transfer its loads to the offsite power source, and

c) Be restored to its standby status.

9. Verifying that with the diesel generator operating in a test mode (connected to its bus), a simulated safety injection signal overrides the test mode by (1) returning the diesel generator to standby operation and (2) automatically energizes the emergency loads with offsite power.

10. Verifying that the fuel transfer pump transfers fuel from each fuel storage tank to the diesel oil feed tank of each diesel via the installed cross connection lines.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

11. Verifying that the automatic load sequence timer is OPERABLE with the time of each load block within ±10% of the sequenced load block time.

12. Verifying that the following diesel generator lockout features prevent diesel generator starting only when required:

    a) turning gear engaged
    b) emergency stop
    c) loss of D.C. control power
    d) governor fuel oil linkage tripped

e. At the first refueling outage, and thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 24 months, subject the diesels to an inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations for this class of standby service.

f. At least once per 10 years or after any modifications which could affect diesel generator interdependence by starting the diesel generators simultaneously, during shutdown, and verifying that the diesel generators accelerate to at least 600 rpm (60 ± 1.2 Hz) in less than or equal to 10 seconds.

g. At least once per 10 years by:

    1. Draining each diesel generator fuel oil storage tank, removing the accumulated sediment, and cleaning the tank using a sodium hypochlorite solution or equivalent, and

    2. Performing a pressure test of those portions of the diesel fuel oil system designed to Section III, subsection ND of the ASME Code at a test pressure equal to 110% of the system design pressure.

h. By performing a visual inspection of the interior of the diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks each time the tank is drained and, if necessary, clean the tank with a sodium hypochlorite solution, or equivalent.

4.8.1.1.3 Reports - All diesel generator failures, valid or nonvalid, shall be reported in a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. Reports of diesel generator failures shall include the information recommended in Regulatory Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, August 1977. If the number of failures in the last 100 valid tests (on a per nuclear unit basis) is greater than or equal to 7, the report shall be supplemented to include the additional information recommended in Regulatory Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, August 1977.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 4 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-38

LOUISIANA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3

DOCKET NO. 50-382

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated February 19, 1986, as supplemented by letters dated February 27, 1986, March 4, 1986 and March 17, 1986, Louisiana Power and Light Company (licensee), requested changes to the Technical Specifications (Appendix A to Facility Operating License NPF-38) for the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3. The proposed changes would revise (1) Technical Specification 4.6.1.2 by delaying the performance of Type B and Type C local leak rate testing (LLRT) required by Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50 until the first refueling outage and (2) Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2 by extending the first Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) inspection interval until the first refueling outage and conducting subsequent inspection at intervals not to exceed 24 months.

2.0 DISCUSSION

Technical Specifications 4.6.1.2.d and f require that LLRT be conducted at intervals of no greater than 24 months. Because the LLRT (Type B and C) was completed on April 22, 1984, the above technical specification would require an extended mid-cycle plant shutdown to complete this surveillance in April 1986. The licensee has requested that the technical specifications be revised to permit a delay of this testing to the first refueling outage currently scheduled to start between December 15, 1986 and March 1, 1987. This delay will also put future testing on a schedule coincident with future refueling outages.

Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2.d.1 requires that an inspection of the EDGs be conducted every 18 months during shutdown in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with the manufacturer's recommendations. Inspection of the EDGs would be required in June 1986. This date is based on issuance of the facility operating license in December 1984 and would have reasonably coincided with a refueling outage if the original schedule for commercial operation had been maintained. Commercial operation, however, was delayed. Consequently, the June 1986 date now coincides with an anticipated period of

full power operation. To conduct the EDG inspection as scheduled will require a lengthy, unscheduled outage. Moreover, subsequent EDG inspections would also be out of synch with refueling outages if Waterford 3 adopts a 24-month fuel cycle, as currently planned. The licensee has requested that the initial inspection interval be increased by approximately seven to ten months to coincide with the first Waterford refueling outage and that the inspection interval for subsequent inspections be increased to 24 months.

3.0 EVALUATION

Type B and Type C Containment Leakage Rate Testing

The licensee indicated that the containment is very leak tight. The initial LLRT for the plant demonstrated an actual leak rate of less than 3% of the technical specification allowable limit. Current leakage is only slightly above this value (less than 4% of allowable). Similarly, initial and current bypass leakage is well within (less than 10% of) the allowable limit. Further, the licensee indicates that only limited maintenance has been performed on components which maintain containment integrity, and satisfactory Type B post-maintenance and testing was performed in each case. The containment leak tightness has also been borne out by the periodic (every one to two days) need to relieve containment pressure in order to stay within technical specification containment pressure limits. The licensee has also indicated that the containment air lock and containment purge system (supply and exhaust) which are potentially significant leak paths and receive periodic exercising will continue to be leak tested in accordance with separate Technical Specifications, 3.6.1.3 and 3.6.1.7, respectively.

The licensee points out that the delay in receipt of the operating license (a period of approximately eight months) is the major reason why the Appendix J LLRT schedule does not coincide more closely with the first refueling outage. During this delay, the containment was not under stress as the plant was not operating, thus containment isolation valves were not exercised and received very limited wear. Because of this initial low usage factor, no appreciable additional leakage is expected from Type B and C equipment during the requested extension period over that which might occur during a normal Appendix J schedule period from refueling to refueling, as the greatest wear occurs during power operation when the systems are in use.

In addition to the above, by letter dated February 27, 1986, in response to a staff request, the licensee provided supplemental information in support of the schedular exemption request in order to gain added assurance of current containment integrity. Specifically, the licensee was requested to determine those Type B and C components that could be tested in accordance with the existing requirements of Technical Specifications 4.6.1.2.d and f prior to exceeding the April 22, 1986 LLRT completion schedule requirement.

In their response, the licensee identified those Type B and C components which are testable while the plant is at power and those which if not testable at power should be tested during a currently planned two week outage scheduled for March 1986. The licensee indicated that all electrical penetrations may be tested during power operation since the test can be accomplished from outside containment. However, the remaining components identified in Technical Specification Table 3.6-1 (73 valves) require containment entry for leak rate testing and thus present a concern for radiological exposure to the test personnel. Of these 73 valves, approximately 47 are in systems which can be isolated for testing at power and do not have other technical specification restrictions on them.

In order to assess the exposure to workers for testing these 47 valves, the licensee performed an evaluation of the dose consequences to personnel based on available information regarding the containment conditions, radiation surveys, number of workers, and time required to perform a test of each penetration. The results indicate a total minimum dose of 14.3 man-rem which the licensee views as unacceptably high and unwarranted given the current leak tightness of the containment. Thus, containment isolation valve testing at power was not considered feasible.

The licensee also examined the listing of valves in Technical Specification Table 3.6-1 to determine those which should be tested during the two week outage. Four penetrations (eight valves of the total of 73 listed) were identified for leak testing during the March 1986 outage on the basis of relative frequency of cycling, a history of leakage, leakage potential based on Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System generic data, or the need for rework and retesting from the previous LLRT. The remaining 65 valves are to be tested at the first refueling outage. Valves which show adverse leakage prior to the first refueling outage will be reworked and restested as necessary.

The staff has reviewed the information presented by the licensee and compared the current status of the Waterford containment and the additional licensee commitments against the intent of the criteria of Type B and C leak testing as contained in Appendix J to 10 CFR 50. Appendix J states that this testing "shall be performed during reactor shutdown for refueling, or other convenient intervals but in no case at intervals greater than two years." The intent of Appendix J for LLRT therefore is to permit a full cycle of operation prior to performing the test. Because of the time and containment access requirements for the testing, a refueling outage becomes the only practical or convenient normal interval for which to plan and perform the LLRT. This interval is appropriate since the greatest usage, wear, and potential degradation of containment integrity occurs with the plant at power. On this basis, the staff concludes that the licensee's justification which includes the current leak tightness of the containment, and less than a full operating cycle on Type B and C components because of the initial licensing delay is valid. The staff further concludes that the licensee's evaluation of the practicality and consequences of testing without an extended shutdown, performance of the above identified additional leak rate testing prior to the April 22, 1986 Appendix J

schedule requirement and continued perodic surveillance of the airlock and containment purge valves provides satisfactory additional assurance of containment integrity. The staff therefore, concludes that the licensee's requested one-time change to Technical Specifications 4.6.1.2.d and f to extend the schedule for performance of the Type B and C containment LLRT to the first refueling outage is acceptable. The staff also concludes that an exemption to the schedular requirements of Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50 for Type B and C testing should be granted.

Emergency Diesel Generator Surveillance

The staff's concern is for any potential impact on EDG reliability as a consequence of extending the first EDG inspection interval by as much as 10 months. To evaluate any impact, the staff has reviewed the licensee's submittal, EDG surveillance requirements, Waterford EDG operating history, industry experience with this type of EDG, and the licensee's program for monitoring EDG performance/condition. To date, the EDGs at Waterford, combined, have operated in excess of 1000 hours, have experienced a total of 100 starts (both planned and unplanned), but have had only one failure. This single failure was due to erratic governor operation during a routine surveillance test, which was manually terminated prior to completing the minimum one-hour run. The erratic governor operation was remedied by adjustments to the electronic governor module sensitivity and gain. Such adjustments are not uncommon during early operation of electronic governors and are not indicative of chronic problems. To date, there have been no additional governor problems. Based on the above operating history, the EDGs at Waterford have a demonstrated reliability which is better than the industry average. Between now and the first refueling outage, the EDGs will be tested at least once in every 31 days to demonstrate ongoing operability. Successful testing during this period will enhance reliability figures. In addition to surveillance testing, the licensee has committed to periodic analysis of critical diesel engine pressure and vibration parameters using an engine analyzer manufactured by the engine vendor (Cooper-Bessemer). The vendor has provided a base line plot of these critical engine parameters for the EDGs at Waterford which show the diesel engines to be in good condition. These data will provide the basis against which the periodic analysis results will be compared to determine any significant changes or trends. Engine analysis will provide valuable information regarding continued EDG operability or, if applicable, degradation of operability. Analysis results showing engine degradation would provide advance warning of EDG failure (excepting catastrophic) in sufficient time to allow for safe plant shutdown.

At the present time, there are no known generic problems with EDGs produced by Cooper-Bessemer for nuclear service which would challenge the demonstrated reliability of the Waterford EDGs.

Based on the above evaluation, the staff concurs with the licensee's safety analysis, and concludes that extending the first interval for EDG inspection by approximately 10 months is acceptable.

Inspection of EDGs is conducted periodically for the purpose of evaluating continued operability through physical inspection of various EDG components/systems. The actual condition of the inspected components/systems is evaluated with respect to the condition which could be expected for components/systems having that length and type of service, or against new conditions, as applicable. The periodic inspections are a means of confirming reliability data established through surveillance testing. Inspection results, in combination with EDG operating history, form the bases for developing confidence levels regarding continued EDG operability reliability.

At present, EDG inspections are required every 18 months. This interval is convenient as it corresponds to the normal refueling cycle for nuclear plants. Since these inspections require rendering the EDG inoperable, they are scheduled to coincide with refueling outages so as to eliminate any unnecessary plant shutdown. Extension of the inspection interval by six months to coincide with an anticipated 24-month refueling cycle would have little or no effect on EDG reliability. During this six-month period, EDG operability would still be demonstrated at least once per 31 days, and diesel engine performance parameters would still be monitored. In normal service, the EDGs at Waterford could be expected to see 10 to 50 hours of operation during this six-month period. This is insignificant when considered in light of the usable life at these EDGs which is measured in tens of thousands of hours. Therefore, delaying inspection by six months or 50 operating hours would not have a measurable effect on EDG reliability.

Based on the above, the staff concludes that extending the EDG inspection interval to a maximum of 24 months as proposed by the licensee does not constitute a risk to public health and safety. The proposed Technical Specification change is, therefore, acceptable.

4.0 CONTACT WITH STATE OFFICIAL

The NRC staff has advised the Administrator, Nuclear Energy Division, Department of Environmental Quality, State of Louisiana of the proposed determination of no significant hazards consideration. No comments were received.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves changes in the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupation radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued proposed findings that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such findings. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

Based upon our evaluation of the proposed changes to the Waterford 3 Technical Specifications, we have concluded that: there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. We, therefore, conclude that the proposed changes are acceptable, and are hereby incorporated into the Waterford 3 Technical Specification.

Dated: April 14, 1986