

December 30, 1992

Docket Nos. 50-528, 50-529  
and 50-530

Mr. William F. Conway  
Executive Vice President, Nuclear  
Arizona Public Service Company  
Post Office Box 53999  
Phoenix, Arizona 85072-3999

Dear Mr. Conway:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS FOR THE PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING  
STATION UNIT NO. 1 (TAC NO. M83092), UNIT NO. 2 (TAC NO. M83093),  
AND UNIT NO. 3 (TAC NO. M83094)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.69 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-41, Amendment No.55 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-51, and Amendment No.42 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-74 for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated March 19, 1992.

These amendments remove certain fuel-cycle-specific parameters from the Technical Specifications and require that a unit-specific Core Operating Limits Report be submitted to NRC instead, as discussed in NRC Generic Letter 88-16.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:  
Charles M. Trammell, Senior Project Manager  
Project Directorate V  
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 69 to NPF-41
2. Amendment No. 55 to NPF-51
3. Amendment No. 42 to NPF-74
4. Safety Evaluation

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Charles M. Trammell".

Charles M. Trammell, Senior Project Manager  
Project Directorate V  
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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cc w/enclosures:  
See next page

Mr. William F. Conway  
Arizona Public Service Company

Palo Verde

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, ET AL.

DOCKET NO. STN 50-528

PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 69  
License No. NPF-41


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by the Arizona Public Service Company (APS or the licensee) on behalf of itself and the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, El Paso Electric Company, Southern California Edison Company, Public Service Company of New Mexico, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, and Southern California Public Power Authority dated March 19, 1992, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-41 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 69, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated into this license. APS shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance and must be fully implemented no later than 60 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

  
for Theodore R. Quay, Director  
Project Directorate V  
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 30, 1992

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 69 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-41

DOCKET NO. STN 50-528

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove

I  
IV  
V  
XVII  
XIX  
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3/4 1-2  
3/4 1-2a  
3/4 1-4  
3/4 1-5  
3/4 1-6 through 3/4 1-15  
3/4 1-16 through 3/4 1-20  
3/4 1-21  
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3/4 1-31  
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3/4 2-4a  
3/4 2-5  
3/4 2-6 through 3/4 2-7a  
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3/4 5-8  
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B 3/4 1-7  
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## DEFINITIONS

### CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT

1.9a The CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT is the unit-specific document that provides core operating limits for the current operating reload cycle. These cycle-specific core operating limits shall be determined for each reload cycle in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1. Plant operation within these operating limits is addressed in individual specifications.

### DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131

1.10 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131 (microcuries/gram) which alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134 and I-135 actually present. The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in Table III of TID-14844, "Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites."

### $\bar{E}$ - AVERAGE DISINTEGRATION ENERGY

1.11  $\bar{E}$  shall be the average (weighted in proportion to the concentration of each radionuclide in the reactor coolant at the time of sampling) of the sum of the average beta and gamma energies per disintegration (in MeV) for isotopes, other than iodines, with half-lives greater than 15 minutes, making up at least 95% of the total noniodine activity in the coolant.

### ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME

1.12 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its ESF actuation setpoint at the channel sensor until the ESF equipment is capable of performing its safety function (i.e., the valves travel to their required positions, pump discharge pressures reach their required values, etc.). Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays where applicable.

### FREQUENCY NOTATION

1.13 The FREQUENCY NOTATION specified for the performance of Surveillance Requirements shall correspond to the intervals defined in Table 1.1.

### GASEOUS RADWASTE SYSTEM

1.14 A GASEOUS RADWASTE SYSTEM shall be any system designed and installed to reduce radioactive gaseous effluents by collecting primary coolant system offgases from the primary system and providing for delay or holdup for the purpose of reducing the total radioactivity prior to release to the environment.

1.15 IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE shall be:

- a. Leakage into closed systems, other than reactor coolant pump controlled bleed-off flow, such as pump seal or valve packing leaks that are captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank, or
- b. Leakage into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, or
- c. Reactor Coolant System leakage through a steam generator to the secondary system.

## 1.0 DEFINITIONS

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The defined terms of this section appear in capitalized type and are applicable throughout these Technical Specifications.

### ACTION

1.1 ACTION shall be that part of a specification which prescribes remedial measures required under designated conditions.

### AXIAL SHAPE INDEX

1.2 The AXIAL SHAPE INDEX shall be the power generated in the lower half of the core less the power generated in the upper half of the core divided by the sum of these powers.

### AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT - $T_g$

1.3 AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT shall be the power asymmetry between azimuthally symmetric fuel assemblies.

### CHANNEL CALIBRATION

1.4 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel output such that it responds with the necessary range and accuracy to known values of the parameter which the channel monitors. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel including the sensor and alarm and/or trip functions, and shall include the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps such that the entire channel is calibrated.

### CHANNEL CHECK

1.5 A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel behavior during operation by observation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and/or status with other indications and/or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### SHUTDOWN MARGIN - $K_{N-1}$ - ANY CEA WITHDRAWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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##### 3.1.1.2

- a. The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to that specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, and
- b. For  $T_{\text{cold}}$  less than or equal to 500°F,  $K_{N-1}$  shall be less than 0.99.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2\*, 3\*, 4\*, and 5\* with any full-length CEA fully or partially withdrawn.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than that specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 26 gpm to the reactor coolant system of a solution containing greater than or equal to 4000 ppm boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored, and
- b. With  $T_{\text{cold}}$  less than or equal to 500°F and  $K_{N-1}$  greater than or equal to 0.99, immediately vary CEA positions and/or initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 26 gpm to the reactor coolant system of a solution containing greater than or equal to 4000 ppm boron or equivalent until the required  $K_{N-1}$  is restored.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.1.1.2.1 With any full-length CEA fully or partially withdrawn, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to that specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT:

- a. Within 1 hour after detection of an inoperable CEA(s) and at least once per 12 hours thereafter while the CEA(s) is inoperable. If the inoperable CEA is immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be untrippable, the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be increased by an amount at least equal to the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable CEA(s).

\* See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.1 and 3.10.9

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- b. When in MODE 1 or MODE 2 with  $k_{eff}$  greater than or equal to 1.0, at least once per 12 hours by verifying that CEA group withdrawal is within the Transient Insertion Limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.
- c. When in MODE 2 with  $k_{eff}$  less than 1.0, within 4 hours prior to achieving reactor criticality by verifying that the predicted critical CEA position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.
- d. Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, by consideration of the factors of e. below, with the CEA groups at the Transient Insertion Limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.
- e. When in MODE 3, 4, or 5, at least once per 24 hours by consideration of at least the following factors:
  - 1. Reactor Coolant System boron concentration,
  - 2. CEA position,
  - 3. Reactor Coolant System average temperature,
  - 4. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,
  - 5. Xenon concentration, and
  - 6. Samarium concentration.

4.1.1.2.2 When in MODE 3, 4, or 5, with any full-length CEA fully or partially withdrawn, and  $T_{Gold}$  less than or equal to 500°F,  $K_{N-1}$  shall be determined to be less than 0.99 at least once per 24 hours by consideration of at least the following factors:

- 1. Reactor Coolant System boron concentration,
- 2. CEA position,
- 3. Reactor Coolant System average temperature,
- 4. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,
- 5. Xenon concentration, and
- 6. Samarium concentration

4.1.1.2.3 The overall core reactivity balance shall be compared to predicted values to demonstrate agreement within  $\pm 1.0\%$  delta k/k at least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD). This comparison shall consider at least those factors stated in Specification 4.1.1.2.1.e or 4.1.1.2.2. The predicted reactivity values shall be adjusted (normalized) to correspond to the actual core conditions prior to exceeding a fuel burnup of 60 EFPD after each fuel loading.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.1.3 The moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) shall be within the area of Acceptable Operation specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT. The maximum upper limit shall be less than or equal to  $+ 0.5 \times 10^{-4} \Delta K/K^{\circ}F$  for a power level of 0% RATED THERMAL POWER with a linear ramp to  $0\Delta K/K^{\circ}F$  at 100% RATED THERMAL POWER.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2\*#.

ACTION:

With the moderator temperature coefficient outside the area of Acceptable Operation, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.1.3.1 The MTC shall be determined to be within its limits by confirmatory measurements. MTC measured values shall be extrapolated and/or compensated to permit direct comparison with the above limits.

4.1.1.3.2 The MTC shall be determined at the following frequencies and THERMAL POWER conditions during each fuel cycle:

- a. Prior to initial operation above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, after each fuel loading.
- b. At any THERMAL POWER, within 7 EFPD after reaching a core average exposure of 40 EFPD burnup into the current cycle.
- c. At any THERMAL POWER, within 7 EFPD after reaching a core average exposure equivalent to two-thirds of the expected current cycle end-of-cycle core average burnup.

---

\*With  $K_{eff}$  greater than or equal to 1.0.

#See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.1.4 The Reactor Coolant System lowest operating loop temperature ( $T_{\text{cold}}$ ) shall be greater than or equal to 552°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2#.

#### ACTION:

With a Reactor Coolant System operating loop temperature ( $T_{\text{cold}}$ ) less than 552°F, restore  $T_{\text{cold}}$  to within its limit within 15 minutes or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 15 minutes.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.1.4 The Reactor Coolant System temperature ( $T_{\text{cold}}$ ) shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 552°F:

- a. Within 15 minutes prior to achieving reactor criticality, and
- b. At least once per 30 minutes when the reactor is critical and the Reactor Coolant System  $T_{\text{cold}}$  is less than 557°F.

---

#With  $K_{\text{eff}}$  greater than or equal to 1.0.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS

#### FLOW PATHS - SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.2.1 As a minimum, one of the following boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE:

- a. If only the spent fuel pool in Specification 3.1.2.5a. is OPERABLE, a flow path from the spent fuel pool via a gravity feed connection and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.
- b. If only the refueling water tank in Specification 3.1.2.5b. is OPERABLE, a flow path from the refueling water tank via either a charging pump, a high pressure safety injection pump, or a low pressure safety injection pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

#### ACTION:

With none of the above flow paths OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.2.1 At least one of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### FLOW PATHS - OPERATING

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.2.2 At least two of the following three boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE:

- a. A gravity feed flow path from either the refueling water tank or the spent fuel pool through CH-536 (RWT Gravity Feed Isolation Valve) and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System,
- b. A gravity feed flow path from the refueling water tank through CH-327 (RWT Gravity Feed/Safety Injection System Isolation Valve) and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System,
- c. A flow path from either the refueling water tank or the spent fuel pool through CH-164 (Boric Acid Filter Bypass Valve), utilizing gravity feed and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

#### ACTION:

With only one of the above required boron injection flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System OPERABLE, restore at least two boron injection flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; restore at least two flow paths to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.2.2.1 At least two of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
- b. At least once per 18 months when the Reactor Coolant System is at normal operating pressure by verifying that the flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.2 delivers at least 26 gpm for 1 charging pump and 68 gpm for two charging pumps to the Reactor Coolant System.

4.1.2.2.2 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into Mode 3 or Mode 4 to perform the surveillance testing of Specification 4.1.2.2.1.b provided the testing is performed within 24 hours after achieving normal operating pressure in the reactor coolant system.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### CHARGING PUMPS - SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.2.3 At least one charging pump or one high pressure safety injection pump or one low pressure safety injection pump in the boron injection flow path required OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

#### ACTION:

With no charging pump or high pressure safety injection pump or low pressure safety injection pump OPERABLE or capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.2.3 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

CHARGING PUMPS - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.2.4 At least two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With only one charging pump OPERABLE, restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.2.4 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BORATED WATER SOURCES - SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.2.5 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

- a. The spent fuel pool with:
  1. A minimum borated water volume of 33,500 gallons and
  2. A boron concentration of between 4000 ppm and 4400 ppm boron, and
  3. A solution temperature between 60°F and 180°F.
- b. The refueling water tank with:
  1. A minimum contained borated water volume of 33,500 gallons and
  2. A boron concentration of between 4000 ppm and 4400 ppm boron, and
  3. A solution temperature between 60°F and 120°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5\* and 6\*.

#### ACTION:

With no borated water sources OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one borated water source is restored to OPERABLE status.



#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

- 4.1.2.5 The above required borated water sources shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 7 days by:
    1. Verifying the boron concentration of the water, and
    2. Verifying the contained borated water volume of the refueling water tank or the spent fuel pool.
  - b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the refueling water tank temperature when it is the source of borated water and the outside air temperature is outside the 60°F to 120°F range.
  - c. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the spent fuel pool temperature when it is the source of borated water and irradiated fuel is present in the pool.

---

\*See Special Test Exception 3.10.7.



RWT LEVEL  
INSTRUMENT  
READING (1)

- (1) THE TANK LEVEL AND VOLUME SHOWN ARE THE USEFUL LEVEL AND VOLUME ABOVE THAT IN THE TANK WHICH IS REQUIRED FOR VORTEX CONSIDERATIONS
- (2) DURING MODE 5 AND 6 ONE OF THESE BORATED SOURCES SHALL CONTAIN A MINIMUM OF 33,500 GALLONS
- (3) THIS VOLUME IS NOT REQUIRED DURING MODE 6

FIGURE 3.1-1  
MINIMUM BORATED WATER VOLUMES

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.2.6 Each of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

- a. The spent fuel pool with:
  1. A minimum borated water volume as specified in Figure 3.1-1, and
  2. A boron concentration of between 4000 ppm and 4400 ppm boron, and
  3. A solution temperature between 60°F and 180°F.
- b. The refueling water tank with:
  1. A minimum contained borated water volume as specified in Figure 3.1-1, and
  2. A boron concentration of between 4000 and 4400 ppm of boron, and
  3. A solution temperature between 60°F and 120°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2,\* 3,\* and 4\*.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the above required spent fuel pool inoperable, restore the pool to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; restore the above required spent fuel pool to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.
- b. With the refueling water tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.2.6 Each of the above required borated water sources shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 7 days by:
  1. Verifying the boron concentration in the water, and
  2. Verifying the contained borated water volume of the water source.
- b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the refueling water tank temperature when the outside air temperature is outside the 60°F to 120°F range.
- c. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the spent fuel pool temperature when irradiated fuel is present in the pool.

\* See Special Test Exception 3.10.7.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BORON DILUTION ALARMS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.2.7 Both startup channel high neutron flux alarms shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3\*, 4, 5, and 6.

ACTION:

- a. With one startup channel high neutron flux alarm inoperable:
  1. Determine the RCS boron concentration when entering MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6 or at the time the alarm is determined to be inoperable. From that time, the RCS boron concentration shall be determined at the applicable monitoring frequency specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT by either boronometer or RCS sampling\*\*.
- b. With both startup channel high neutron flux alarms inoperable:
  1. Determine the RCS boron concentration by either boronometer and RCS sampling\*\* or by independent collection and analysis of two RCS samples when entering Mode 3, 4, or 5 or at the time both alarms are determined to be inoperable. From that time, the RCS boron concentration shall be determined at the applicable monitoring frequency specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, as applicable, by either boronometer and RCS sampling\*\* or by collection and analysis of two independent RCS samples. If redundant determination of RCS boron concentration cannot be accomplished immediately, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until the method for determining and confirming RCS boron concentration is restored.
  2. When in MODE 5 with the RCS level below the centerline of the hotleg or MODE 6, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one startup channel high neutron flux alarm is restored to OPERABLE status.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.2.7 Each startup channel high neutron flux alarm shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of:

---

\* Within 1 hour after the neutron flux is within the startup range following a reactor shutdown.

\*\*With one or more reactor coolant pumps (RCP) operating the sample should be obtained from the hot leg. With no RCP operating, the sample should be obtained from the discharge line of the low pressure safety injection (LPSI) pump operating in the shutdown cooling mode.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

---

- a. A CHANNEL CHECK:
  1. At least once per 12 hours.
  2. When initially setting setpoints at the following times:
    - a) One hour after a reactor trip.
    - b) After a controlled reactor shutdown: Within 1 hour after the neutron flux is within the startup range in MODE 3.
- b. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST every 31 days of cumulative operation during shutdown.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

#### CEA POSITION

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.1 All full-length (shutdown and regulating) CEAs, and all part-length CEAs which are inserted in the core, shall be OPERABLE with each CEA of a given group positioned within 6.6 inches (indicated position) of all other CEAs in its group.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1\* and 2\*.

#### ACTION:

- a. With one or more full-length CEAs inoperable due to being immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be untrippable, determine that the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.2 is satisfied within 1 hour and be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
- b. With more than one full-length or part-length CEA inoperable or misaligned from any other CEA in its group by more than 19 inches (indicated position), be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
- c. With one or more full-length or part-length CEAs misaligned from any other CEAs in its group by more than 6.6 inches, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue, provided that core power is reduced in accordance with the limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT and that within 1 hour the misaligned CEA(s) is either:
  1. Restored to OPERABLE status within its above specified alignment requirements, or
  2. Declared inoperable and the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.2 is satisfied. After declaring the CEA(s) inoperable, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue pursuant to the requirements of Specifications 3.1.3.6 and 3.1.3.7 provided:
    - a) Within 1 hour the remainder of the CEAs in the group with the inoperable CEA(s) shall be aligned to within 6.6 inches of the inoperable CEA(s) while maintaining the allowable CEA sequence and insertion limits and the THERMAL POWER level restrictions of Specifications 3.1.3.6 and 3.1.3.7 during subsequent operation.

---

\*See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2 and 3.10.4.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

---

#### ACTION: (Continued)

- b) The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.2 is determined at least once per 12 hours.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

- d. With one full-length CEA inoperable due to causes other than addressed by ACTION a., above, but within its above specified alignment requirements, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue pursuant to the requirements of Specification 3.1.3.6.
- e. With one part-length CEA inoperable and inserted in the core, operation may continue provided the alignment of the inoperable part length CEA is maintained within 6.6 inches (indicated position) of all other part-length CEAs in its group and the CEA is maintained pursuant to the requirements of Specification 3.1.3.7.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.3.1.1 The position of each full-length and part-length CEA shall be determined to be within 6.6 inches (indicated position) of all other CEAs in its group at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when one CEAC is inoperable or when both CEACs are inoperable, then verify the individual CEA positions at least once per 4 hours.

4.1.3.1.2 Each full-length CEA not fully inserted and each part-length CEA which is inserted in the core shall be determined to be OPERABLE by movement of at least 5 inches in any one direction at least once per 31 days.\*

---

\*With the exception that CEA #64 is exempt from this surveillance requirement for the remainder of Cycle 2 operations (i.e., until restart from the second refueling outage).

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### POSITION INDICATOR CHANNELS - OPERATING

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.2 At least two of the following three CEA position indicator channels shall be OPERABLE for each CEA:

- a. CEA Reed Switch Position Transmitter (RSPT 1) with the capability of determining the absolute CEA positions within 5.2 inches,
- b. CEA Reed Switch Position Transmitter (RSPT 2) with the capability of determining the absolute CEA positions within 5.2 inches, and
- c. The CEA pulse counting position indicator channel.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

#### ACTION:

With a maximum of one CEA per CEA group having only one of the above required CEA position indicator channels OPERABLE, within 6 hours either:

- a. Restore the inoperable position indicator channel to OPERABLE status, or
- b. Be in at least HOT STANDBY, or
- c. Position the CEA group(s) with the inoperable position indicator(s) at its fully withdrawn position while maintaining the requirements of Specifications 3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.5, 3.1.3.6 and 3.1.3.7. Operation may then continue provided the CEA group(s) with the inoperable position indicator(s) is maintained fully withdrawn, except during surveillance testing pursuant to the requirements of Specification 4.1.3.1.2, and each CEA in the group(s) is verified fully withdrawn at least once per 12 hours thereafter by its "Full Out" limit\*.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.3.2 Each of the above required position indicator channels shall be determined to be OPERABLE by verifying that for the same CEA, the position indicator channels agree within 5.2 inches of each other at least once per 12 hours.

---

\*CEAs are fully withdrawn (Full Out) when withdrawn to at least 144.75 inches.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### POSITION INDICATOR CHANNELS - SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

---

3.1.3.3 At least one CEA Reed Switch Position Transmitter indicator channel shall be OPERABLE for each shutdown, regulating or part-length CEA not fully inserted.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3\*, 4\*, and 5\*.

ACTION:

With less than the above required position indicator channel(s) OPERABLE, immediately open the reactor trip breakers.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

---

4.1.3.3 The above required CEA Reed Switch Position Transmitter indicator channel(s) shall be determined to be OPERABLE by performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 18 months.

---

\* With the reactor trip breakers in the closed position.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### CEA DROP TIME

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.4 The individual full-length (shutdown and regulating) CEA drop time, from a fully withdrawn position, shall be less than or equal to 4 seconds from when the electrical power is interrupted to the CEA drive mechanism until the CEA reaches its 90% insertion position with:

- a.  $T_{cold}$  greater than or equal to 552°F, and
- b. All reactor coolant pumps operating.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the drop time of any full-length CEA determined to exceed the above limit, restore the CEA drop time to within the above limit prior to proceeding to MODE 1 or 2.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.3.4 The CEA drop time of full-length CEAs shall be demonstrated through measurement prior to reactor criticality:

- a. For all CEAs following each removal and reinstallation of the reactor vessel head,
- b. For specifically affected individual CEAs following any maintenance on or modification to the CEA drive system which could affect the drop time of those specific CEAs, and
- c. At least once per 18 months.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### SHUTDOWN CEA INSERTION LIMIT

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.5 All shutdown CEAs shall be withdrawn to at least 144.75 inches.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2\*#.

ACTION:

With a maximum of one shutdown CEA withdrawn to less than 144.75 inches, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2, within 1 hour either:

- a. Withdraw the CEA to at least 144.75 inches, or
- b. Declare the CEA inoperable and comply with Specification 3.1.3.1.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.3.5 Each shutdown CEA shall be determined to be withdrawn to at least 144.75 inches:

- a. Within 15 minutes prior to withdrawal of any CEAs in regulating groups during an approach to reactor criticality, and
- b. At least once per 12 hours thereafter except during time intervals when both CEAC's are inoperable, then verify the individual CEA positions at least once per 4 hours.

---

\* See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

#With  $K_{eff}$  greater than or equal to 1.

## REGULATING CEA INSERTION LIMITS

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.6 The regulating CEA groups shall be maintained within the following limits:

- a. One or more CEAC's OPERABLE
  1. The regulating CEA groups shall be limited to the withdrawal sequence, and to the insertion limits## specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT when the COLSS is in service or when the COLSS is not in service. The CEA insertion between the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limits and the Transient Insertion Limits is restricted to:
    - a) Less than or equal to 5 Effective Full Power Days per 30 Effective Full Power Day interval, and
    - b) Less than or equal to 14 Effective Full Power Days per 18 Effective Full Power Months.
  2. CEA insertion between the Short Term Steady State Insertion Limits and the Transient Insertion Limits shall be restricted to  $\leq 4$  hours per 24 hour interval.
- b. Both CEAC's INOPERABLE (with or without COLSS in service)

Regulating CEA group 5 may be inserted no further than 127.5 inches withdrawn which is the Transient Insertion Limit when both CEAC's are inoperable.

Regulating CEA groups which are excluded by these insertion limits must be maintained fully withdrawn  $> 144.75$  inches, which is the Transient Insertion Limit except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1\* and 2\*#.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the regulating CEA groups inserted beyond the Transient Insertion Limits, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2, within 2 hours either:

---

\*See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2 and 3.10.4.

#With  $K_{eff}$  greater than or equal to 1.

##A reactor power cutback will cause either (Case 1) Regulating Group 5 or Regulating Group 4 and 5 to be dropped with no sequential insertion of additional Regulating Groups (Groups 1, 2, 3, and 4) or (Case 2) Regulating Group 5 or Regulating Group 4 and 5 to be dropped with all or part of the remaining Regulating Groups (Groups 1, 2, 3, and 4) being sequentially inserted. In either case, the Transient Insertion Limit and the withdrawal sequence specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT can be exceeded for up to 2 hours.

## REGULATING CEA INSERTION LIMITS

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

---

#### ACTION: (Continued)

1. Restore the regulating CEA groups to within the limits, or
2. Reduce THERMAL POWER as follows:
  - a) One or more CEAC's OPERABLE
    - 1) Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to that fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the CEA group position specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT or
    - 2) Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
  - b) Both CEAC's INOPERABLE  
Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
- b. With the regulating CEA groups inserted between the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limits and the Transient Insertion Limits for intervals greater than 5 EFPD per 30 EFPD interval or greater than 14 EFPD per 18 Effective Full Power Months, either;
  1. Restore the regulating groups to within the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limits within 2 hours, or
  2. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
- c. With the regulating CEA groups inserted between the Short Term Steady State Insertion Limits and the Transient Insertion Limits for intervals > 4 hours per 24 hour interval, operation may proceed provided any subsequent increase in THERMAL POWER is restricted to  $\leq 5\%$  of RATED THERMAL POWER per hour.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.3.6 The position of each regulating CEA group shall be determined to be within the Transient Insertion Limits at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when the PDIL Auctioneer Alarm Circuit is inoperable, or both CEAC's are inoperable, then verify the CEA group positions at least once per 4 hours. The accumulated times during which the regulating CEA groups are inserted beyond the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limits but within the Transient Insertion Limits shall be determined at least once per 24 hours.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### PART LENGTH CEA INSERTION LIMITS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.7 The part length CEA groups shall be maintained within the following limits with COLSS in service or out of service:

a. One or more CEACs OPERABLE

The part length CEA groups shall be limited to the insertion limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT with PLCEA insertion between the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limit and the Transient Insertion Limit restricted to:

1.  $\leq 7$  EFPD per 30 EFPD interval, and
2.  $\leq 14$  EFPD per calendar year.

b. Both CEACs INOPERABLE

The part length CEA groups must be maintained fully withdrawn ( $> 144.75$  inches) which is the Transient Insertion Limit when both CEACs are inoperable.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1\* and 2\*

ACTION:

a. With the part length CEA groups inserted beyond the Transient Insertion Limit, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2, within two hours, either:

1. Restore the part length CEA groups to within the limits, or
2. Reduce THERMAL POWER as follows:

a) One or more CEACs OPERABLE

- 1) Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to that fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the PLCEA group position specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT

- 2) Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

b) Both CEACs INOPERABLE

Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

---

\*See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2 and 3.10.4.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

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#### ACTION: (Continued)

- b. With the part length CEA groups inserted between the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limit and the Transient Insertion Limit for intervals > 7 EFPD per 30 EFPD interval or > 14 EFPD per calendar year, either:
  1. Restore the part length groups within the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limit within two hours, or
  2. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.3.7 The positions of the part length CEA groups shall be determined to be within the Transient Insertion Limit at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when both CEACs are inoperable, then verify the part length CEA group positions at least once per 4 hours.

## 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4 2.1 LINEAR HEAT RATE

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.2.1 The linear heat rate limit specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT shall be maintained by one of the following methods as applicable:

- a. Maintaining COLSS calculated core power less than or equal to the COLSS calculated power operating limit based on linear heat rate (when COLSS is in service); or
- b. Maintaining peak linear heat rate within its limit using any operable CPC channel (when COLSS is out of service).

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

#### ACTION:

With the linear heat rate limit not being maintained as indicated by:

1. COLSS calculated core power exceeding the COLSS calculated core power operating limit based on linear heat rate; or
2. Peak linear heat rate outside its limit using any operable CPC channel (when COLSS is out of service);

within 15 minutes initiate corrective action to reduce the linear heat rate to within the limits and either:

- a. Restore the linear heat rate to within its limits within 1 hour, or
- b. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.2.1.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.1.2 The linear heat rate shall be determined to be within its limit when THERMAL POWER is above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER by continuously monitoring the core power distribution with the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) or, with the COLSS out of service, by verifying at least once per 2 hours that the linear heat rate, as indicated on any OPERABLE Local Power Density channel, is within its limit.

4.2.1.3 At least once per 31 days, the COLSS Margin Alarm shall be verified to actuate at a THERMAL POWER level less than or equal to the core power operating limit based on linear heat rate.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4.2.2 PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS - $F_{xy}$

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.2.2 The measured PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS ( $F_{xy}^m$ ) shall be less than or equal to the PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS ( $F_{xy}^c$ ) used in the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) and in the Core Protection Calculators (CPC).

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER\*.

#### ACTION:

With an  $F_{xy}^m$  exceeding a corresponding  $F_{xy}^c$ , within 6 hours either:

- a. Adjust the CPC addressable constants to increase the multiplier applied to planar radial peaking by a factor equivalent to greater than or equal to  $F_{xy}^m/F_{xy}^c$  and restrict subsequent operation so that a margin to the COLSS operating limits of at least  $[(F_{xy}^m/F_{xy}^c) - 1.0] \times 100\%$  is maintained; or
- b. Adjust the affected PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS ( $F_{xy}^c$ ) used in the COLSS and CPC to a value greater than or equal to the measured PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS ( $F_{xy}^m$ ) or
- c. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.2.2.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.2.2 The measured PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS ( $F_{xy}^m$ ) obtained by using the incore detection system, shall be determined to be less than or equal to the PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS ( $F_{xy}^c$ ), used in the COLSS and CPC at the following intervals:

- a. After each fuel loading with THERMAL POWER greater than 40% but prior to operation above 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and
- b. At least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days.

---

\*See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4.2.3 AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT - $T_q$

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.2.3 The AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT ( $T_q$ ) shall be less than or equal to the following limits:

- a. The AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT Allowance used in the Core Protection Calculators (CPCs), and
- b.1. The limit specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT with COLSS in service, or
- b.2.  $T_q \leq 0.10$  with COLSS out of service.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER\*.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the measured AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT determined to exceed the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT Allowance used in the CPCs, within 2 hours either correct the power tilt or adjust the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT Allowance used in the CPCs to greater than or equal to the measured value.
- b. With the measured AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT determined to exceed the limit specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT with COLSS in service or 0.10 with COLSS out of service:
  1. Due to misalignment of either a part-length or full-length CEA, within 30 minutes verify that the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) (when COLSS is being used to monitor the core power distribution per Specifications 4.2.1 and 4.2.4) is detecting the CEA misalignment.
  2. Verify that the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT is within its limit within 2 hours after exceeding the limit or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 2 hours and verify that the Variable Overpower Trip Setpoint has been reduced as appropriate within the next 4 hours.
  3. Identify and correct the cause of the out of limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER; subsequent POWER OPERATION above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER may proceed provided that the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT is verified within its limit at least once per hour for 12 hours or until verified acceptable at 95% or greater RATED THERMAL POWER.

---

\*See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.  
PALO VERDE - UNIT 1

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.2.3.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.3.2 The AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT shall be determined to be within its limits above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER by:

- a. Continuously monitoring the tilt with COLSS when the COLSS is in service.
- b. Calculating the tilt at least once per 12 hours when the COLSS is out of service.
- c. Verifying at least once per 31 days, that the COLSS Azimuthal Tilt Alarm is actuated at an AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT less than or equal to the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT Allowance used in the CPCs.
- d. Using the incore detectors at least once per 31 EFPD to independently confirm the validity of the COLSS calculated AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4.2.4 DNBR MARGIN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.2.4 The DNBR margin shall be maintained by one of the following methods:

- a. Maintaining COLSS calculated core power less than or equal to COLSS calculated core power operating limit based on DNBR (when COLSS is in service, and either one or both CEACs are operable); or
- b. Maintaining COLSS calculated core power less than or equal to COLSS calculated core power operating limit based on DNBR decreased by the allowance specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (when COLSS is in service and neither CEAC is operable); or
- c. Operating within the region of acceptable operation specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT using any operable CPC channel (when COLSS is out of service and either one or both CEACs are operable); or
- d. Operating within the region of acceptable operation specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT using any operable CPC channel (when COLSS is out of service and neither CEAC is operable).

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

#### ACTION:

With the DNBR not being maintained:

1. As indicated by COLSS calculated core power exceeding the appropriate COLSS calculated power operating limit; or
2. With COLSS out of service, operation outside the region of acceptable operation specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT;

within 15 minutes initiate corrective action to increase the DNBR to within the limits and either:

- a. Restore the DNBR to within its limits within 1 hour, or
- b. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.2.4.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.4.2 The DNBR shall be determined to be within its limits when THERMAL POWER is above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER by continuously monitoring the core power distribution with the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) or, with the COLSS out of service, by verifying at least once per 2 hours that the DNBR, as indicated on any OPERABLE DNBR channel, is within the limit specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT.

4.2.4.3 At least once per 31 days, the COLSS Margin Alarm shall be verified to actuate at a THERMAL POWER level less than or equal to the core power operating limit based on DNBR.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4.2.5 RCS FLOW RATE

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.2.5 The actual Reactor Coolant System total flow rate shall be greater than or equal to  $155.8 \times 10^6$  lbm/hr.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

#### ACTION:

With the actual Reactor Coolant System total flow rate determined to be less than the above limit, reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.2.5 The actual Reactor Coolant System total flow rate shall be determined to be greater than or equal to its limit at least once per 12 hours.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4.2.6 REACTOR COOLANT COLD LEG TEMPERATURE

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.2.6 The reactor coolant cold leg temperature ( $T_c$ ) shall be within the Area of Acceptable Operation shown in Figure 3.2-1.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1\* and 2\*#.

#### ACTION:

With the reactor coolant cold leg temperature exceeding its limit, restore the temperature to within its limit within 2 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.2.6 The reactor coolant cold leg temperature shall be determined to be within its limit at least once per 12 hours.

---

\*See Special Test Exception 3.10.4.

#With  $K_{eff}$  greater than or equal to 1

REACTOR COOLANT COLD LEG TEMPERATURE vs CORE POWER LEVEL




FIGURE 3.2-1

REACTOR COOLANT COLD LEG TEMPERATURE VS CORE POWER LEVEL

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4.2.7 AXIAL SHAPE INDEX

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.2.7 The core average AXIAL SHAPE INDEX (ASI) shall be maintained within the limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT:

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER\*.

ACTION:

With the core average AXIAL SHAPE INDEX outside the limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, restore the core average ASI to within its limit within 2 hours or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.2.7 The core average AXIAL SHAPE INDEX shall be determined to be within its limit at least once per 12 hours using the COLSS or any OPERABLE Core Protection Calculator channel.

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\* See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4.2.8 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.2.8 The pressurizer pressure shall be maintained between 2025 psia and 2300 psia.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

#### ACTION:

With the pressurizer pressure outside its above limits, restore the pressure to within its limit within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.2.8 The pressurizer pressure shall be determined to be within its limit at least once per 12 hours.

## EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

### 3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER TANK

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.5.4 The refueling water tank (RWT) shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. A minimum borated water volume as specified in Figure 3.1-1 of Specification 3.1.2.5, and
- b. A boron concentration between 4000 and 4400 ppm of boron, and
- c. A solution temperature between 60°F and 120°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

#### ACTION:

With the refueling water tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.5.4 The RWT shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 7 days by:
  1. Verifying the contained borated water volume in the tank, and
  2. Verifying the boron concentration of the water.
- b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the RWT temperature when the (outside) air temperature is outside the 60°F to 120°F range.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BASES

#### MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES (Continued)

and LSSS setpoints determination. Therefore, time limits have been imposed on operation with inoperable CEAs to preclude such adverse conditions from developing.

Operability of at least two CEA position indicator channels is required to determine CEA positions and thereby ensure compliance with the CEA alignment and insertion limits. The CEA "Full In" and "Full Out" limits provide an additional independent means for determining the CEA positions when the CEAs are at either their fully inserted or fully withdrawn positions. Therefore, the ACTION statements applicable to inoperable CEA position indicators permit continued operations when the positions of CEAs with inoperable position indicators can be verified by the "Full In" or "Full Out" limits.

CEA positions and OPERABILITY of the CEA position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours with more frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable. These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LCOs are satisfied.

The maximum CEA drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed CEA drop time used in the safety analyses. Measurement with  $T_{\text{cold}}$  greater than or equal to 552°F and with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a reactor trip at operating conditions.

Several design steps were employed to accommodate the possible CEA guide tube wear which could arise from CEA vibrations when fully withdrawn. Specifically, a programmed insertion schedule will be used to cycle the CEAs between the full out position ("FULL OUT" LIMIT) and 3.0 inches inserted over the fuel cycle. This cycling will distribute the possible guide tube wear over a larger area, thus minimizing any effects. To accommodate this programmed insertion schedule, the fully withdrawn position was redefined, in some cases, to be 144.75 inches or greater.

The establishment of LSSS and LCOs requires that the expected long- and short-term behavior of the radial peaking factors be determined. The long-term behavior relates to the variation of the steady-state radial peaking factors with core burnup and is affected by the amount of CEA insertion assumed, the portion of a burnup cycle over which such insertion is assumed and the expected power level variation throughout the cycle. The short-term behavior relates to transient perturbations to the steady-state radial peaks due to radial xenon redistribution. The magnitudes of such perturbations depend upon the expected use of the CEAs during anticipated power reductions

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES (Continued)

and load maneuvering. Analyses are performed based on the expected mode of operation of the NSSS (base load maneuvering, etc.) and from these analyses CEA insertions are determined and a consistent set of radial peaking factors defined. The Long Term Steady State and Short Term Insertion Limits are determined based upon the assumed mode of operation used in the analyses and provide a means of preserving the assumptions on CEA insertions used. The limits specified serve to limit the behavior of the radial peaking factors within the bounds determined from analysis. The actions specified serve to limit the extent of radial xenon redistribution effects to those accommodated in the analyses. The Long and Short Term Insertion Limits of Specifications 3.1.3.6 and 3.1.3.7 are specified for the plant which has been designed for primarily base loaded operation but which has the ability to accommodate a limited amount of load maneuvering.

The Transient Insertion Limits of Specifications 3.1.3.6 and 3.1.3.7 and the Shutdown CEA Insertion Limits of Specification 3.1.3.5 ensure that (1) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (2) the potential effects of a CEA ejection accident are limited to acceptable levels. Long-term operation at the Transient Insertion Limits is not permitted since such operation could have effects on the core power distribution which could invalidate assumptions used to determine the behavior of the radial peaking factors.

The PVNGS CPC and COLSS systems are responsible for the safety and monitoring functions, respectively, of the reactor core. COLSS monitors the DNB Power Operating Limit (POL) and various operating parameters to help the operator maintain plant operation within the limiting conditions for operation (LCO). Operating within the LCO guarantees that in the event of an Anticipated Operational Occurrence (AOO), the CPCs will provide a reactor trip in time to prevent unacceptable fuel damage.

The COLSS reserves the Required Overpower Margin (ROPM) to account for the Loss of Flow (LOF) and CEA misoperation transients. When the COLSS is Out of Service (COOS), the monitoring function is performed via the CPC calculation of DNBR in conjunction with Technical Specification COOS Limit Lines specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT which restrict the reactor power sufficiently to preserve the ROPM.

The reduction of the CEA deviation penalties in accordance with the CEAC (Control Element Assembly Calculator) sensitivity reduction program has been performed. This task involved setting many of the inward single CEA deviation penalty factors to 1.0. An inward CEA deviation event in effect would not be accompanied by the application of the CEA deviation penalty in either the CPC DNB and LHR (Linear Heat Rate) calculations for those CEAs with the reduced penalty factors. The protection for an inward CEA deviation event is thus accounted for separately.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES (Continued)

If an inward CEA deviation event occurs, the current CPC algorithm applies two penalty factors to each of the DNB and LHR calculations. The first, a static penalty factor, is applied upon detection of the event. The second, a xenon redistribution penalty, is applied linearly as a function of time after the CEA drop. The expected margin degradation for the inward CEA deviation event for which the penalty factor has been reduced is accounted for in two ways. The ROPM reserved in COLSS is used to account for some of the margin degradation. Further, a power reduction in accordance with the curve in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT is required. In addition, the part length CEA maneuvering is restricted in accordance with limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT to justify reduction of the PLR deviation penalty factors.

The technical specification permits plant operation if both CEACs are considered inoperable for safety purposes after this period.

## 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.2.1 LINEAR HEAT RATE

The limitation on linear heat rate ensures that in the event of a LOCA, the peak temperature of the fuel cladding will not exceed 2200°F.

Either of the two core power distribution monitoring systems, the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) and the Local Power Density channels in the Core Protection Calculators (CPCs), provide adequate monitoring of the core power distribution and are capable of verifying that the linear heat rate does not exceed its limits. The COLSS performs this function by continuously monitoring the core power distribution and calculating a core power operating limit corresponding to the allowable peak linear heat rate. Reactor operation at or below this calculated power level assures that the limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT are not exceeded.

The COLSS calculated core power and the COLSS calculated core power operating limits based on linear heat rate are continuously monitored and displayed to the operator. A COLSS alarm is annunciated in the event that the core power exceeds the core power operating limit. This provides adequate margin to the linear heat rate operating limit for normal steady-state operation. Normal reactor power transients or equipment failures which do not require a reactor trip may result in this core power operating limit being exceeded. In the event this occurs, COLSS alarms will be annunciated. If the event which causes the COLSS limit to be exceeded results in conditions which approach the core safety limits, a reactor trip will be initiated by the Reactor Protective Instrumentation. The COLSS calculation of the linear heat rate includes appropriate penalty factors which provide, with a 95/95 probability/confidence level, that the maximum linear heat rate calculated by COLSS is conservative with respect to the actual maximum linear heat rate existing in the core. These penalty factors are determined from the uncertainties associated with planar radial peaking measurement, engineering heat flux uncertainty, axial densification, software algorithm modelling, computer processing, rod bow, and core power measurement.

Parameters required to maintain the operating limit power level based on linear heat rate, margin to DNB, and total core power are also monitored by the CPCs. Therefore, in the event that the COLSS is not being used, operation within the linear heat rate limit can be maintained by utilizing any operable CPC channel. The above listed uncertainty and penalty factors plus those associated with the CPC startup test acceptance criteria are also included in the CPCs.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.2.2 PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS

Limiting the values of the PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS ( $F_{xy}^c$ ) used in the COLSS and CPCs to values equal to or greater than the measured PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS ( $F_{xy}^m$ ) provides assurance that the limits calculated by COLSS and the CPCs remain valid. Data from the incore detectors are used for determining the measured PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS. A minimum core power at 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER is assumed in determining the PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS. The 20% RATED THERMAL POWER threshold is due to the neutron flux detector system being inaccurate below 20% core power. Core noise level at low power is too large to obtain usable detector readings. The periodic surveillance requirements for determining the measured PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS provides assurance that the PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS used in COLSS and the CPCs remain valid throughout the fuel cycle. Determining the measured PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS after each fuel loading prior to exceeding 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER provides additional assurance that the core was properly loaded.

#### 3/4.2.3 AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT - $T_q$

The limitations on the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT are provided to ensure that design safety margins are maintained. An AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT greater than the limit specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT with COLSS in service or 0.10 with COLSS out of service is not expected and if it should occur, operation is restricted to only those conditions required to identify the cause of the tilt. The tilt is normally calculated by COLSS. A minimum core power of 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER is assumed by the CPCs in its input to COLSS for calculation of AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT. The 20% RATED THERMAL POWER threshold is due to the neutron flux detector system being inaccurate below 20% core power. Core noise level at low power is too large to obtain usable detector readings. The surveillance requirements specified when COLSS is out of service provide an acceptable means of detecting the presence of a steady-state tilt. It is necessary to explicitly account for power asymmetries because the radial peaking factors used in the core power distribution calculations are based on an untilted power distribution.

The AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT is equal to  $(P_{\text{tilt}}/P_{\text{untilt}})-1.0$  where:

AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT is measured by assuming that the ratio of the power at any core location in the presence of a tilt to the untilted power at the location is of the form:

$$P_{\text{tilt}}/P_{\text{untilt}} = 1 + T_q g \cos(\theta - \theta_0)$$

where:

$T_q$  is the peak fractional tilt amplitude at the core periphery

$g$  is the radial normalizing factor

$\theta$  is the azimuthal core location

$\theta_0$  is the azimuthal core location of maximum tilt

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### BASES

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#### AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT - $T_q$ (Continued)

$P_{\text{tilt}}/P_{\text{untilt}}$  is the ratio of the power at a core location in the presence of a tilt to the power at that location with no tilt.

The AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT allowance used in the CPCs is defined as the value of CPC addressable constant TR-1.0.

#### 3/4.2.4 DNBR MARGIN

The limitation on DNBR as a function of AXIAL SHAPE INDEX represents a conservative envelope of operating conditions consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and which have been analytically demonstrated adequate to maintain an acceptable minimum DNBR throughout all anticipated operational occurrences. Operation of the core with a DNBR at or above this limit provides assurance that an acceptable minimum DNBR will be maintained in the event of a loss of flow transient.

Either of the two core power distribution monitoring systems, the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) and the DNBR channels in the Core Protection Calculators (CPCs), provide adequate monitoring of the core power distribution and are capable of verifying that the DNBR does not violate its limits. The COLSS performs this function by continuously monitoring the core power distribution and calculating a core operating limit corresponding to the allowable minimum DNBR. The COLSS calculation of core power operating limit based on DNBR includes appropriate penalty factors which provide, with a 95/95 probability/confidence level, that the core power limits calculated by COLSS (based on the minimum DNBR Limit) are conservative with respect to the actual core power limit. These penalty factors are determined from the uncertainties associated with planar radial peaking measurement, engineering heat flux, state parameter measurement, software algorithm modelling, computer processing, rod bow, and core power measurement.

Parameters required to maintain the margin to DNB and total core power are also monitored by the CPCs. Therefore, in the event that the COLSS is not being used, operation within the limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT can be maintained by utilizing a predetermined DNBR as a function of AXIAL SHAPE INDEX and by monitoring the CPC trip channels. The above listed uncertainty and penalty factors are also included in the CPCs which assume a minimum core power of 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER. The 20% RATED THERMAL POWER threshold is due to the neutron flux detector system being less accurate below 20% core power. Core noise level at low power is too large to obtain usable detector readings.

A DNBR penalty factor has been included in the COLSS and CPC DNBR calculations to accommodate the effects of rod bow. The amount of rod bow in each assembly is dependent upon the average burnup experienced by that assembly. Fuel assemblies that incur higher average burnup will experience a greater magnitude of rod bow. Conversely, lower burnup assemblies will experience less rod bow. In design calculations, the penalty for each batch required to compensate for rod bow is determined from a batch's maximum average assembly burnup applied to the batch's maximum integrated planar-radial power peak. A single net penalty for COLSS and CPC is then determined from the penalties associated with each batch, accounting for the offsetting margins due to the lower radial power peaks in the higher burnup batches.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.2.5 RCS FLOW RATE

This specification is provided to ensure that the actual RCS total flow rate is maintained at or above the minimum value used in the safety analyses. The minimum value used in the safety analyses is 95% of the design flow rate ( $164.0 \times 10^6$  lbm/hr) or  $155.8 \times 10^6$  lbm/hr. The actual RCS flow rate is determined by direct measurement and an uncertainty associated with that measurement is considered when comparing actual RCS flow rate to the minimum required value of  $155.8 \times 10^6$  lbm/hr.

#### 3/4.2.6 REACTOR COOLANT COLD LEG TEMPERATURE

This specification is provided to ensure that the actual value of reactor coolant cold leg temperature is maintained within the range of values used in the safety analyses.

#### 3/4.2.7 AXIAL SHAPE INDEX

This specification is provided to ensure that the actual value of the core average AXIAL SHAPE INDEX is maintained within the range of values used in the safety analyses.

#### 3/4.2.8 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE

This specification is provided to ensure that the actual value of pressurizer pressure is maintained within the range of values used in the safety analyses.

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

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### CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT

6.9.1.9 Core operating limits shall be established and documented in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT before each reload cycle or any remaining part of a reload cycle for the following:

- a. Shutdown Margin  $K_{N-1}$  - Any CEA Withdrawn for Specification 3.1.1.2
- b. Moderator Temperature Coefficient BOL and EOL limits for Specification 3.1.1.3
- c. Boron Dilution Alarms for Specification 3.1.2.7
- d. Movable Control Assemblies - CEA Position for Specification 3.1.3.1
- e. Regulating CEA Insertion Limits for Specification 3.1.3.6
- f. Part Length CEA Insertion Limits for Specification 3.1.3.7
- g. Linear Heat Rate for Specification 3.2.1
- h. Azimuthal Power Tilt -  $T_q$  for Specification 3.2.3
- i. DNBR Margin for Specification 3.2.4
- j. Axial Shape Index for Specification 3.2.7

6.9.1.10 The analytical methods used to determine the core operating limits shall be those previously reviewed and approved by the NRC in:

- a. "CE Method for Control Element Assembly Ejection Analysis," CENPD-0190-A, January 1976 (Methodology for Specification 3.1.3.6, Regulating CEA Insertion Limits).
- b. "The ROCS and DIT Computer Codes for Nuclear Design," CENPD-266-P-A, April 1983 (Methodology for Specifications 3.1.1.2, Shutdown Margin  $K_{N-1}$  - Any CEA Withdrawn; 3.1.1.3, Moderator Temperature Coefficient BOL and EOL limits and 3.1.3.6, Regulating CEA Insertion Limits).
- c. "Safety Evaluation Report related to the Final Design of the Standard Nuclear Steam Supply Reference Systems CESSAR System 80, Docket No. STN 50-470, "NUREG-0852 (November 1981), Supplements No. 1 (March 1983), No. 2 (September 1983), No. 3 (December 1987) (Methodology for Specifications 3.1.1.2, Shutdown Margin  $K_{N-1}$  - Any CEA Withdrawn; 3.1.1.3, Moderator Temperature Coefficient BOL and EOL limits; 3.1.2.7, Boron Dilution Alarms; 3.1.3.1, Movable Control Assemblies - CEA Position; 3.1.3.6, Regulating CEA Insertion Limits; 3.1.3.7, Part Length CEA Insertion Limits and 3.2.3 Azimuthal Power Tilt -  $T_q$ ).
- d. "Modified Statistical Combination of Uncertainties," CEN-356(V)-P-A Revision 01-P-A, May 1988 (Methodology for Specification 3.2.4, DNBR Margin and 3.2.7 Axial Shape Index).

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

### CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (Continued)

- e. "Calculational Methods for the CE Large Break LOCA Evaluation Model," CENPD-132-P, August 1974 (Methodology for Specification 3.2.1, Linear Heat Rate).
- f. "Calculational Methods for the CE Large Break LOCA Evaluation Model," CENPD-132-P, Supplement 1, February 1975 (Methodology for Specification 3.2.1, Linear Heat Rate).
- g. "Calculational Methods for the CE Large Break LOCA Evaluation Model," CENPD-132-P, Supplement 2-P, July 1975 (Methodology for Specification 3.2.1, Linear Heat Rate).
- h. "Calculative Methods for the CE Small Break LOCA Evaluation Model," CENPD-137-P, August 1974 (Methodology for Specification 3.2.1, Linear Heat Rate).
- i. "Calculative Methods for the CE Small Break LOCA Evaluation Model," CENPD-137-P, Supplement 1P, January 1977 (Methodology for Specification 3.2.1, Linear Heat Rate).
- j. Letter: O. D. Parr (NRC) to F. M. Stern (CE), dated June 13, 1975 (NRC Staff Review of the Combustion Engineering ECCS Evaluation Model). NRC approval for: 6.9.1.10e, 6.9.1.10f, 6.9.1.10h.
- k. Letter: O. D. Parr (NRC) to A. E. Scherer (CE), dated December 9, 1975 (NRC Staff Review of the Proposed Combustion Engineering ECCS Evaluation Model Changes). NRC approval for: 6.9.1.10g.
- l. Letter: K. Kniel (NRC) to A. E. Scherer (CE), dated September 27, 1977 (Evaluation of Topical Reports CENPD-133, Supplement 3-P and CENPD-137, Supplement 1-P). NRC approval for 6.9.1.10.i.

The core operating limits shall be determined so that all applicable limits (e.g., fuel thermal-mechanical limits, core thermal-hydraulic limits, ECCS limits, nuclear limits such as shutdown margin, and transient and analysis limits) of the safety analysis are met.

The CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, including any mid-cycle revisions or supplements thereto, shall be provided upon issuance, for each reload cycle, to the NRC Document Control Desk with copies to the Regional Administrator and Resident Inspector.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, ET AL.

DOCKET NO. STN 50-529

PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 55  
License No. NPF-51

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by the Arizona Public Service Company (APS or the licensee) on behalf of itself and the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, El Paso Electric Company, Southern California Edison Company, Public Service Company of New Mexico, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, and Southern California Public Power Authority dated March 19, 1992, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Part I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-51 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 55, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated into this license. APS shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance and must be fully implemented no later than 60 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

*for Charles M. Trammell*  
Theodore R. Quay, Director  
Project Directorate V  
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 30, 1992

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 55 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-51

DOCKET NO. STN 50-529

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove

Insert

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V	V
XVII	XVII
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## DEFINITIONS

### CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT

1.9a The CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT is the unit-specific document that provides core operating limits for the current operating reload cycle. These cycle-specific core operating limits shall be determined for each reload cycle in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1. Plant operation within these operating limits is addressed in individual specifications.

### DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131

1.10 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131 (microcuries/gram) which alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134 and I-135 actually present. The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in Table III of TID-14844, "Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites."

### $\bar{E}$ - AVERAGE DISINTEGRATION ENERGY

1.11  $\bar{E}$  shall be the average (weighted in proportion to the concentration of each radionuclide in the reactor coolant at the time of sampling) of the sum of the average beta and gamma energies per disintegration (in MeV) for isotopes, other than iodines, with half-lives greater than 15 minutes, making up at least 95% of the total noniodine activity in the coolant.

### ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME

1.12 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its ESF actuation setpoint at the channel sensor until the ESF equipment is capable of performing its safety function (i.e., the valves travel to their required positions, pump discharge pressures reach their required values, etc.). Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays where applicable.

### FREQUENCY NOTATION

1.13 The FREQUENCY NOTATION specified for the performance of Surveillance Requirements shall correspond to the intervals defined in Table 1.1.

### GASEOUS RADWASTE SYSTEM

1.14 A GASEOUS RADWASTE SYSTEM shall be any system designed and installed to reduce radioactive gaseous effluents by collecting primary coolant system offgases from the primary system and providing for delay or holdup for the purpose of reducing the total radioactivity prior to release to the environment.

### IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE

1.15 IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE shall be:

- a. Leakage into closed systems, other than reactor coolant pump controlled bleed-off flow, such as pump seal or valve packing leaks that are captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank, or
- b. Leakage into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, or
- c. Reactor Coolant System leakage through a steam generator to the secondary system.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

#### 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL

##### SHUTDOWN MARGIN - ALL CEAs FULLY INSERTED

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to 1.0% delta k/k.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3, 4\* and 5\* with all full-length CEAs fully inserted.

ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than 1.0% delta k/k, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 26 gpm to reactor coolant system of a solution containing greater than or equal to 4000 ppm boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 1.0% delta k/k at least once per 24 hours by consideration of at least the following factors:

1. Reactor Coolant System boron concentration,
2. CEA position,
3. Reactor Coolant System average temperature,
4. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,
5. Xenon concentration, and
6. Samarium concentration.

4.1.1.1.2 The overall core reactivity balance shall be compared to predicted values to demonstrate agreement within + 1.0% delta k/k at least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD). This comparison shall consider at least those factors stated in Specification 4.1.1.1.1, above. The predicted reactivity values shall be adjusted (normalized) to correspond to the actual core conditions prior to exceeding a fuel burnup of 60 EFPD after each fuel loading.

---

\* See Special Test Exception 3.10.9.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### SHUTDOWN MARGIN - $K_{N-1}$ - ANY CEA WITHDRAWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

##### 3.1.1.2

- a. The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to that specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, and
- b. For  $T_{cold}$  less than or equal to 500°F,  $K_{N-1}$  shall be less than 0.99.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2\*, 3\*, 4\*, and 5\* with any full-length CEA fully or partially withdrawn.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than that specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 26 gpm to the reactor coolant system of a solution containing greater than or equal to 4000 ppm boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored, and
- b. With  $T_{cold}$  less than or equal to 500°F and  $K_{N-1}$  greater than or equal to 0.99, immediately vary CEA positions and/or initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 26 gpm to the reactor coolant system of a solution containing greater than or equal to 4000 ppm boron or equivalent until the required  $K_{N-1}$  is restored.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.1.2.1 With any full-length CEA fully or partially withdrawn, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to that specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT:

- a. Within 1 hour after detection of an inoperable CEA(s) and at least once per 12 hours thereafter while the CEA(s) is inoperable. If the inoperable CEA is immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be untrippable, the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be increased by an amount at least equal to the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable CEA(s).

---

\* See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.1 and 3.10.9.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- b. When in MODE 1 or MODE 2 with  $k_{eff}$  greater than or equal to 1.0, at least once per 12 hours by verifying that CEA group withdrawal is within the Transient Insertion Limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.
- c. When in MODE 2 with  $k_{eff}$  less than 1.0, within 4 hours prior to achieving reactor criticality by verifying that predicted critical CEA position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.
- d. Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, by consideration of the factors of e. below, with the CEA groups at the Transient Insertion Limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.
- e. When in MODE 3, 4, or 5, at least once per 24 hours by consideration of at least the following factors:
  1. Reactor Coolant System boron concentration,
  2. CEA position
  3. Reactor Coolant System average temperature,
  4. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,
  5. Xenon concentration, and
  6. Samarium concentration.

4.1.1.2.2 When in MODE 3, 4, or 5, with any full-length CEA fully or partially withdrawn, and  $T_{cold}$  less than or equal to 500°F,  $K_{N-1}$  shall be determined to be less than 0.99 at least once per 24 hours by consideration of at least the following factors.

1. Reactor Coolant System boron concentration,
2. CEA position,
3. Reactor Coolant System average temperature
4. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation.
5. Xenon concentration, and
6. Samarium concentration.

4.1.1.2.3 The overall core reactivity balance shall be compared to predicted values to demonstrate agreement within  $\pm 1.0\%$  delta k/k at least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD). This comparison shall consider at least those factors stated in Specification 4.1.1.2.1.e or 4.1.1.2.2. The predicted reactivity values shall be adjusted (normalized) to correspond to the actual core conditions prior to exceeding a fuel burnup of 60 EFPD after each fuel loading.

## MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.1.3 The moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) shall be within the area of Acceptable Operation specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT. The maximum upper limit shall be less than or equal to  $+ 0.5 \times 10^{-4} \Delta K/K/^{\circ}F$  for a power level of 0% RATED THERMAL POWER with a linear ramp to  $0\Delta K/K/^{\circ}F$  at 100% RATED THERMAL POWER.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2\*#.

#### ACTION:

With the moderator temperature coefficient outside the area of Acceptable Operation, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.1.3.1 The MTC shall be determined to be within its limits by confirmatory measurements. MTC measured values shall be extrapolated and/or compensated to permit direct comparison with the above limits.

4.1.1.3.2 The MTC shall be determined at the following frequencies and THERMAL POWER conditions during each fuel cycle:

- a. Prior to initial operation above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, after each fuel loading.
- b. At any THERMAL POWER, within 7 EFPD after reaching a core average exposure of 40 EFPD burnup into the current cycle.
- c. At any THERMAL POWER, within 7 EFPD after reaching a core average exposure equivalent to two-thirds of the expected current cycle end-of-cycle core average burnup.

---

\*With  $K_{eff}$  greater than or equal to 1.0.

#See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

## MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.1.4 The Reactor Coolant System lowest operating loop temperature ( $T_{cold}$ ) shall be greater than or equal to 552°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2#.

ACTION:

With a Reactor Coolant System operating loop temperature ( $T_{cold}$ ) less than 552°F, restore  $T_{cold}$  to within its limit within 15 minutes or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 15 minutes.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.1.4 The Reactor Coolant System temperature ( $T_{cold}$ ) shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 552°F:

- a. Within 15 minutes prior to achieving reactor criticality, and
- b. At least once per 30 minutes when the reactor is critical and the Reactor Coolant System  $T_{cold}$  is less than 557°F.

---

#With  $K_{eff}$  greater than or equal to 1.0.

## 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS

### FLOW PATHS - SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.2.1 As a minimum, one of the following boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE:

- a. If only the spent fuel pool in Specification 3.1.2.5a. is OPERABLE, a flow path from the spent fuel pool via a gravity feed connection and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.
- b. If only the refueling water tank in Specification 3.1.2.5b. is OPERABLE, a flow path from the refueling water tank via either a charging pump, a high pressure safety injection pump, or a low pressure safety injection pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

#### ACTION:

With none of the above flow paths OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.2.1 At least one of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### FLOW PATHS - OPERATING

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.2.2 At least two of the following three boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE:

- a. A gravity feed flow path from either the refueling water tank or the spent fuel pool through CH-536 (RWT Gravity Feed Isolation Valve) and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System,
- b. A gravity feed flow path from the refueling water tank through CH-327 (RWT Gravity Feed/Safety Injection System Isolation Valve) and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System,
- c. A flow path from either the refueling water tank or the spent fuel pool through CH-164 (Boric Acid Filter Bypass Valve), utilizing gravity feed and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

#### ACTION:

With only one of the above required boron injection flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System OPERABLE, restore at least two boron injection flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; restore at least two flow paths to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.2.2.1 At least two of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
- b. At least once per 18 months when the Reactor Coolant System is at normal operating pressure by verifying that the flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.2 delivers at least 26 gpm for 1 charging pump and 68 gpm for two charging pumps to the Reactor Coolant System.

4.1.2.2.2 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into Mode 3 or Mode 4 to perform the surveillance testing of Specification 4.1.2.2.1.b provided the testing is performed within 24 hours after achieving normal operating pressure in the reactor coolant system.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### CHARGING PUMPS - SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.2.3 At least one charging pump or one high pressure safety injection pump or one low pressure safety injection pump in the boron injection flow path required OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

#### ACTION:

With no charging pump or high pressure safety injection pump or low pressure safety injection pump OPERABLE or capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.2.3 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

CHARGING PUMPS - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.2.4 At least two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With only one charging pump OPERABLE, restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.2.4 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BORATED WATER SOURCES - SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.2.5 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

- a. The spent fuel pool with:
  1. A minimum borated water volume of 33,500 gallons and
  2. A boron concentration of between 4000 ppm and 4400 ppm boron, and
  3. A solution temperature between 60°F and 180°F.
- b. The refueling water tank with:
  1. A minimum contained borated water volume of 33,500 gallons and
  2. A boron concentration of between 4000 ppm and 4400 ppm boron, and
  3. A solution temperature between 60°F and 120°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5\* and 6\*.

#### ACTION:

With no borated water sources OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one borated water source is restored to OPERABLE status.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


---

4.1.2.5 The above required borated water sources shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:


- a. At least once per 7 days by:
  1. Verifying the boron concentration of the water, and
  2. Verifying the contained borated water volume of the refueling water tank or the spent fuel pool.
- b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the refueling water tank temperature when it is the source of borated water and the outside air temperature is outside the 60°F to 120°F range.
- c. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the spent fuel pool temperature when it is the source of borated water and irradiated fuel is present in the pool.

---

\*See Special Test Exception 3.10.7.



AVERAGE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM TEMP., °F



RWT LEVEL INSTRUMENT READING (1)

- (1) The tank level and volume shown are the useful level and volume above that in the tank which is required for vortex considerations
- (2) During Mode 5 and 6, one of these borated sources shall contain a minimum of 33,500 gallons
- (3) This volume is not required during Mode 6.

FIGURE 3.1-1  
MINIMUM BORATED WATER VOLUMES

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.2.6 Each of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

- a. The spent fuel pool with:
  1. A minimum borated water volume as specified in Figure 3.1-1, and
  2. A boron concentration of between 4000 ppm and 4400 ppm boron, and
  3. A solution temperature between 60°F and 180°F.
- b. The refueling water tank with:
  1. A minimum contained borated water volume as specified in Figure 3.1-1, and
  2. A boron concentration of between 4000 and 4400 ppm of boron, and
  3. A solution temperature between 60°F and 120°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2,\* 3,\* and 4\*.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the above required spent fuel pool inoperable, restore the pool to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; restore the above required spent fuel pool to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.
- b. With the refueling water tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.2.6 Each of the above required borated water sources shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 7 days by:
  1. Verifying the boron concentration in the water, and
  2. Verifying the contained borated water volume of the water source.
- b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the refueling water tank temperature when the outside air temperature is outside the 60°F to 120°F range.
- c. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the spent fuel pool temperature when irradiated fuel is present in the pool.

\* See Special Test Exception 3.10.7.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BORON DILUTION ALARMS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.2.7 Both startup channel high neutron flux alarms shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3\*, 4, 5, and 6.

ACTION:

- a. With one startup channel high neutron flux alarm inoperable:
  1. Determine the RCS boron concentration when entering MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6 or at the time the alarm is determined to be inoperable. From that time, the RCS boron concentration shall be determined at the applicable monitoring frequency specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT by either boronometer or RCS sampling.\*\*
- b. With both startup channel high neutron flux alarms inoperable:
  1. Determine the RCS boron concentration by either boronometer and RCS sampling\*\* or by independent collection and analysis of two RCS samples when entering Mode 3, 4, or 5 or at the time both alarms are determined to be inoperable. From that time, the RCS boron concentration shall be determined at the applicable monitoring frequency specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, as applicable, by either boronometer and RCS sampling\*\* or by collection and analysis of two independent RCS samples. If redundant determination of RCS boron concentration cannot be accomplished immediately, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until the method for determining and confirming RCS boron concentration is restored.
  2. When in MODE 5 with the RCS level below the centerline of the hotleg or MODE 6, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one startup channel high neutron flux alarm is restored to OPERABLE status.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.2.7 Each startup channel high neutron flux alarm shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of:

---

\*Within 1 hour after the neutron flux is within the startup range following a reactor shutdown.

\*\*With one or more reactor coolant pumps (RCP) operating the sample should be obtained from the hot leg. With no RCP operating, the sample should be obtained from the discharge line of the low pressure safety injection (LPSI) pump operating in the shutdown cooling mode.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

---

- a. A CHANNEL CHECK:
  - 1. At least once per 12 hours.
  - 2. When initially setting setpoints at the following times:
    - a) One hour after a reactor trip.
    - b) After a controlled reactor shutdown: Within 1 hour after the neutron flux is within the startup range in MODE 3.
- b. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST every 31 days of cumulative operation during shutdown.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

#### CEA POSITION

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.1 All full-length (shutdown and regulating) CEAs, and all part-length CEAs which are inserted in the core, shall be OPERABLE with each CEA of a given group positioned within 6.6 inches (indicated position) of all other CEAs in its group.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1\* and 2\*.

#### ACTION:

- a. With one or more full-length CEAs inoperable due to being immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be untrippable, determine that the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.2 is satisfied within 1 hour and be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
- b. With more than one full-length or part-length CEA inoperable or misaligned from any other CEA in its group by more than 19 inches (indicated position), be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
- c. With one or more full-length or part-length CEAs misaligned from any other CEAs in its group by more than 6.6 inches, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue, provided that core power is reduced in accordance with the limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT and that within 1 hour the misaligned CEA(s) is either:
  1. Restored to OPERABLE status within its above specified alignment requirements, or
  2. Declared inoperable and the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.2 is satisfied. After declaring the CEA(s) inoperable, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue pursuant to the requirements of Specifications 3.1.3.6 and 3.1.3.7 provided:
    - a) Within 1 hour the remainder of the CEAs in the group with the inoperable CEA(s) shall be aligned to within 6.6 inches of the inoperable CEA(s) while maintaining the allowable CEA sequence and insertion limits and the THERMAL POWER level restrictions of Specifications 3.1.3.6 and 3.1.3.7 during subsequent operation.

---

\*See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2 and 3.10.4.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

---

#### ACTION: (Continued)

- b) The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.2 is determined at least once per 12 hours.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

- d. With one full-length CEA inoperable due to causes other than addressed by ACTION a., above, but within its above specified alignment requirements, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue pursuant to the requirements of Specification 3.1.3.6.
- e. With one part-length CEA inoperable and inserted in the core, operation may continue provided the alignment of the inoperable part length CEA is maintained within 6.6 inches (indicated position) of all other part-length CEAs in its group and the CEA is maintained pursuant to the requirements of Specification 3.1.3.7.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.3.1.1 The position of each full-length and part-length CEA shall be determined to be within 6.6 inches (indicated position) of all other CEAs in its group at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when one CEAC is inoperable or when both CEACs are inoperable, then verify the individual CEA positions at least once per 4 hours.

4.1.3.1.2 Each full-length CEA not fully inserted and each part-length CEA which is inserted in the core shall be determined to be OPERABLE by movement of at least 5 inches in any one direction at least once per 31 days.\*

---

\*With the exception that CEAs 27 and 41 are exempt from this surveillance requirement until restart from the second refueling outage.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### POSITION INDICATOR CHANNELS - OPERATING

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.2 At least two of the following three CEA position indicator channels shall be OPERABLE for each CEA:

- a. CEA Reed Switch Position Transmitter (RSPT 1) with the capability of determining the absolute CEA positions within 5.2 inches,
- b. CEA Reed Switch Position Transmitter (RSPT 2) with the capability of determining the absolute CEA positions within 5.2 inches, and
- c. The CEA pulse counting position indicator channel.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

#### ACTION:

With a maximum of one CEA per CEA group having only one of the above required CEA position indicator channels OPERABLE, within 6 hours either:

- a. Restore the inoperable position indicator channel to OPERABLE status, or
- b. Be in at least HOT STANDBY, or
- c. Position the CEA group(s) with the inoperable position indicator(s) at its fully withdrawn position while maintaining the requirements of Specifications 3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.5, 3.1.3.6 and 3.1.3.7. Operation may then continue provided the CEA group(s) with the inoperable position indicator(s) is maintained fully withdrawn, except during surveillance testing pursuant to the requirements of Specification 4.1.3.1.2, and each CEA in the group(s) is verified fully withdrawn at least once per 12 hours thereafter by its "Full Out" limit.\*

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.3.2 Each of the above required position indicator channels shall be determined to be OPERABLE by verifying that for the same CEA, the position indicator channels agree within 5.2 inches of each other at least once per 12 hours.

---

\*CEAs are fully withdrawn (Full Out) when withdrawn to at least 144.75 inches.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### POSITION INDICATOR CHANNELS - SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

---

3.1.3.3 At least one CEA Reed Switch Position Transmitter indicator channel shall be OPERABLE for each shutdown, regulating or part-length CEA not fully inserted.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3\*, 4\*, and 5\*.

ACTION:

With less than the above required position indicator channel(s) OPERABLE, immediately open the reactor trip breakers.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

---

4.1.3.3 The above required CEA Reed Switch Position Transmitter indicator channel(s) shall be determined to be OPERABLE by performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 18 months.

---

\* With the reactor trip breakers in the closed position.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### CEA DROP TIME

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.4 The individual full-length (shutdown and regulating) CEA drop time, from a fully withdrawn position, shall be less than or equal to 4 seconds from when the electrical power is interrupted to the CEA drive mechanism until the CEA reaches its 90% insertion position with:

- a.  $T_{cold}$  greater than or equal to 552°F, and
- b. All reactor coolant pumps operating.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the drop time of any full-length CEA determined to exceed the above limit, restore the CEA drop time to within the above limit prior to proceeding to MODE 1 or 2.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.3.4 The CEA drop time of full-length CEAs shall be demonstrated through measurement prior to reactor criticality:

- a. For all CEAs following each removal and reinstallation of the reactor vessel head,
- b. For specifically affected individual CEAs following any maintenance on or modification to the CEA drive system which could affect the drop time of those specific CEAs, and
- c. At least once per 18 months.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### SHUTDOWN CEA INSERTION LIMIT

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.5 All shutdown CEAs shall be withdrawn to at least 144.75 inches.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2\*#.

ACTION:

With a maximum of one shutdown CEA withdrawn to less than 144.75 inches, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2, within 1 hour either:

- a. Withdraw the CEA to at least 144.75 inches, or
- b. Declare the CEA inoperable and comply with Specification 3.1.3.1.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.3.5 Each shutdown CEA shall be determined to be withdrawn to at least 144.75 inches:

- a. Within 15 minutes prior to withdrawal of any CEAs in regulating groups during an approach to reactor criticality, and
- b. At least once per 12 hours thereafter except during time intervals when both CEAC's are inoperable, then verify the individual CEA positions at least once per 4 hours.

---

\* See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

#With  $K_{eff}$  greater than or equal to 1.

## REGULATING CEA INSERTION LIMITS

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.6 The regulating CEA groups shall be maintained within the following limits:

- a. One or more CEAC's OPERABLE
  1. The regulating CEA groups shall be limited to the withdrawal sequence, and to the insertion limits## specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT when the COLSS is in service or when the COLSS is not in service. The CEA Insertion between the Long Term Steady State insertion Limits and the Transient Insertion Limits is restricted to:
    - a) Less than or equal to 5 Effective Full Power Days per 30 Effective Full Power Day interval, and
    - b) Less than or equal to 14 Effective Full Power Days per 18 Effective Full Power Months.
  2. CEA insertion between the Short Term Steady State Insertion Limits and the Transient Insertion Limits shall be restricted to  $\leq 4$  hours per 24 hour interval.
- b. Both CEAC's INOPERABLE (With or without COLSS in service)

Regulating CEA group 5 may be inserted no further than 127.5 inches withdrawn which is the Transient Insertion Limit when both CEAC's are inoperable.

Regulating CEA groups which are excluded by these insertion limits must be maintained fully withdrawn  $\geq 144.75$  inches, which is the Transient Insertion Limit except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1\* and 2\*#.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the regulating CEA groups inserted beyond the Transient Insertion Limits, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2, within 2 hour either:
  1. Restore the regulating CEA groups to within the limits, or

---

\*See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2 and 3.10.4.

#With  $K_{eff}$  greater than or equal to 1.

##A reactor power cutback will cause either (Case 1) Regulating Group 5 or Regulating Group 4 and 5 to be dropped with no sequential insertion of additional Regulating Groups (Groups 1, 2, 3, and 4) or (Case 2) Regulating Group 5 or Regulating Group 4 and 5 to be dropped with all or part of the remaining Regulating Groups (Groups 1, 2, 3, and 4) being sequentially inserted. In either case, the Transient Insertion Limit and the withdrawal sequence specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT can be exceeded for up to 2 hours.

## REGULATING CEA INSERTION LIMITS

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

---

#### ACTION: (Continued)

2. Reduce THERMAL POWER as follows:
  - a) One or more CEAC's OPERABLE
    - 1) Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to that fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the CEA group position specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT or
    - 2) Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
  - b) Both CEAC's INOPERABLE  
Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
- b. With the regulating CEA groups inserted between the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limits and the Transient Insertion Limits for intervals greater than 5 EFPD per 30 EFPD interval or greater than 14 EFPD per 18 Effective full Power Months, either:
  1. Restore the regulating groups to within the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limits within 2 hours, or
  2. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
- c. With the regulating CEA groups inserted between the Short Term Steady State Insertion Limits and the Transient Insertion Limits for intervals > 4 hours per 24 hour interval, operation may proceed provided any subsequent increase in THERMAL POWER is restricted to < 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER per hour.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.3.6 The position of each regulating CEA group shall be determined to be within the Transient Insertion Limits at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when the PDIL Auctioneer Alarm Circuit is inoperable, or both CEAC's are inoperable, then verify the CEA group positions at least once per 4 hours. The accumulated times during which the regulating CEA groups are inserted beyond the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limits but within the Transient Insertion Limits shall be determined at least once per 24 hours.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### PART LENGTH CEA INSERTION LIMITS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.7 The part length CEA groups shall be maintained within the following limits with COLSS in service or out of service:

a. One or more CEACs OPERABLE

The part length CEA groups shall be limited to the insertion limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT with PLCEA insertion between the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limit and the Transient Insertion Limit restricted to:

1.  $\leq 7$  EFPD per 30 EFPD interval, and
2.  $\leq 14$  EFPD per calendar year.

b. Both CEACs INOPERABLE

The part length CEA groups must be maintained fully withdrawn ( $> 144.75$  inches) which is the Transient Insertion Limit when both CEACs are inoperable.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1\* and 2\*

ACTION:

- a. With the part length CEA groups inserted beyond the Transient Insertion Limit, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2, within two hours, either;
1. Restore the part length CEA groups to within the limits, or
  2. Reduce THERMAL POWER as follows:
    - a) One or more CEACs OPERABLE
      - 1) Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to that fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the PLCEA group position specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, or
      - 2) Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
    - b) Both CEACs INOPERABLE  
Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

---

\*See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2 and 3.10.4.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

---

#### ACTION: (Continued)

- b. With the part length CEA groups inserted between the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limit and the Transient Insertion Limit for intervals > 7 EFPD per 30 EFPD interval or > 14 EFPD per calendar year, either:
  1. Restore the part length group within the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limit within two hours, or
  2. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.3.7 The positions of the part length CEA groups shall be determined to be within the Transient Insertion Limit at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when both CEACs are inoperable then verify the part length CEA group positions at least once per 4 hours.

## 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4 2.1 LINEAR HEAT RATE

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.2.1 The linear heat rate limit specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT shall be maintained by one of the following methods as applicable:

- a. Maintaining COLSS calculated core power less than or equal to the COLSS calculated power operating limit based on linear heat rate (when COLSS is in service); or
- b. Maintaining peak linear heat rate within its limit using any operable CPC channel (when COLSS is out of service).

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

#### ACTION:

With the linear heat rate limit not being maintained as indicated by:

1. COLSS calculated core power exceeding the COLSS calculated core power operating limit based on linear heat rate; or
2. Peak linear heat rate outside its limit using any operable CPC channel (when COLSS is out of service);

within 15 minutes initiate corrective action to reduce the linear heat rate to within the limits and either:

- a. Restore the linear heat rate to within its limits within 1 hour, or
- b. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.2.1.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.1.2 The linear heat rate shall be determined to be within its limit when THERMAL POWER is above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER by continuously monitoring the core power distribution with the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) or, with the COLSS out of service, by verifying at least once per 2 hours that the linear heat rate, as indicated on any OPERABLE Local Power Density channel, is within its limit.

4.2.1.3 At least once per 31 days, the COLSS Margin Alarm shall be verified to actuate at a THERMAL POWER level less than or equal to the core power operating limit based on linear heat rate.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4.2.2 PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS - $F_{xy}^m$

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.2.2 The measured PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS ( $F_{xy}^m$ ) shall be less than or equal to the PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS ( $F_{xy}^c$ ) used in the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) and in the Core Protection Calculators (CPC).

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER\*.

#### ACTION:

With an  $F_{xy}^m$  exceeding a corresponding  $F_{xy}^c$ , within 6 hours either:

- a. Adjust the CPC addressable constants to increase the multiplier applied to planar radial peaking by a factor equivalent to greater than or equal to  $F_{xy}^m/F_{xy}^c$  and restrict subsequent operation so that a margin to the COLSS operating limits of at least  $[(F_{xy}^m/F_{xy}^c) - 1.0] \times 100\%$  is maintained; or
- b. Adjust the affected PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS ( $F_{xy}^c$ ) used in the COLSS and CPC to a value greater than or equal to the measured PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS ( $F_{xy}^m$ ) or
- c. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.2.2.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.2.2 The measured PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS ( $F_{xy}^m$ ) obtained by using the incore detection system, shall be determined to be less than or equal to the PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS ( $F_{xy}^c$ ), used in the COLSS and CPC at the following intervals:

- a. After each fuel loading with THERMAL POWER greater than 40% but prior to operation above 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and
- b. At least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days.

\*See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4.2.3 AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT - $T_q$

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.2.3 The AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT ( $T_q$ ) shall be less than or equal to the following limits:

- a. The AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT Allowance used in the Core Protection Calculators (CPCs), and
- b.1. The limit specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT with COLSS in service, or
- b.2.  $T_q \leq 0.10$  with COLSS out of service.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER\*.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the measured AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT determined to exceed the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT Allowance used in the CPCs within 2 hours either correct the power tilt or adjust the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT Allowance used in the CPCs to greater than or equal to the measured value.
- b. With the measured AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT determined to exceed the limit specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT with COLSS in service or 0.10 with COLSS out of service:
  1. Due to misalignment of either a part-length or full-length CEA, within 30 minutes verify that the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) (when COLSS is being used to monitor the core power distribution per Specifications 4.2.1 and 4.2.4) is detecting the CEA misalignment.
  2. Verify that the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT is within its limit within 2 hours after exceeding the limit or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 2 hours and verify that the Variable Overpower Trip Setpoint has been reduced as appropriate within the next 4 hours.
  3. Identify and correct the cause of the out of limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER; subsequent POWER OPERATION above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER may proceed provided that the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT is verified within its limit at least once per hour for 12 hours or until verified acceptable at 95% or greater RATED THERMAL POWER.

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\*See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.2.3.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.3.2 The AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT shall be determined to be within its limits above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER by:

- a. Continuously monitoring the tilt with COLSS when the COLSS is in service.
- b. Calculating the tilt at least once per 12 hours when the COLSS is out of service.
- c. Verifying at least once per 31 days, that the COLSS Azimuthal Tilt Alarm is actuated at an AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT less than or equal to the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT Allowance used in the CPCs.
- d. Using the incore detectors at least once per 31 EFPD to independently confirm the validity of the COLSS calculated AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4.2.4 DNBR MARGIN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.2.4 The DNBR margin shall be maintained by one of the following methods:

- a. Maintaining COLSS calculated core power less than or equal to COLSS calculated core power operating limit based on DNBR (when COLSS is in service, and either one or both CEACs are operable); or
- b. Maintaining COLSS calculated core power less than or equal to COLSS calculated core power operating limit based on DNBR decreased by the allowance specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (when COLSS is in service and neither CEAC is operable); or
- c. Operating within the region of acceptable operation specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT using any operable CPC channel (when COLSS is out of service and either one or both CEACs are operable); or
- d. Operating within the region of acceptable operation specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT using any operable CPC channel (when COLSS is out of service and neither CEAC is operable).

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

#### ACTION:

With the DNBR not being maintained:

1. As indicated by COLSS calculated core power exceeding the appropriate COLSS calculated power operating limit; or
2. With COLSS out of service, operation outside the region of acceptable operation specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT;

within 15 minutes initiate corrective action to increase the DNBR to within the limits and either:

- a. Restore the DNBR to within its limits within 1 hour, or
- b. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.2.4.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.4.2 The DNBR shall be determined to be within its limits when THERMAL POWER is above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER by continuously monitoring the core power distribution with the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) or, with the COLSS out of service, by verifying at least once per 2 hours that the DNBR, as indicated on any OPERABLE DNBR channel, is within the limit specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT.

4.2.4.3 At least once per 31 days, the COLSS Margin Alarm shall be verified to actuate at a THERMAL POWER level less than or equal to the core power operating limit based on DNBR.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4.2.5 RCS FLOW RATE

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.2.5 The actual Reactor Coolant System total flow rate shall be greater than or equal to  $155.8 \times 10^6$  lbm/hr.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

#### ACTION:

With the actual Reactor Coolant System total flow rate determined to be less than the above limit, reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.2.5 The actual Reactor Coolant System total flow rate shall be determined to be greater than or equal to its limit at least once per 12 hours.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4.2.6 REACTOR COOLANT COLD LEG TEMPERATURE

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.2.6 The reactor coolant cold leg temperature ( $T_c$ ) shall be within the Area of Acceptable Operation shown in Figure 3.2-1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1\* and 2\*#.

#### ACTION:

With the reactor coolant cold leg temperature exceeding its limit, restore the temperature to within its limit within 2 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.2.6 The reactor coolant cold leg temperature shall be determined to be within its limit at least once per 12 hours.

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\*See Special Test Exception 3.10.4.

#With  $K_{eff}$  greater than or equal to 1

REACTOR COOLANT COLD LEG TEMPERATURE vs CORE POWER LEVEL




FIGURE 3.2-1

REACTOR COOLANT COLD LEG TEMPERATURE VS. CORE POWER LEVEL

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4.2.7 AXIAL SHAPE INDEX

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.2.7 The core average AXIAL SHAPE INDEX (ASI) shall be maintained within the limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER\*.

#### ACTION:

With the core average AXIAL SHAPE INDEX outside the limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, restore the core average ASI to within its limit within 2 hours or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.2.7 The core average AXIAL SHAPE INDEX shall be determined to be within its limit at least once per 12 hours using the COLSS or any OPERABLE Core Protection Calculator channel.

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\* See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4.2.8 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.2.8 The pressurizer pressure shall be maintained between 2025 psia and 2300 psia.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2\*.

ACTION:

With the pressurizer pressure outside its above limits, restore the pressure to within its limit within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.2.8 The pressurizer pressure shall be determined to be within its limit at least once per 12 hours.

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\*See Special Test Exception 3.10.5

## EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

### 3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER TANK

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.5.4 The refueling water tank (RWT) shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. A minimum borated water volume as specified in Figure 3.1-1 of Specification 3.1.2.5, and
- b. A boron concentration between 4000 and 4400 ppm of boron, and
- c. A solution temperature between 60°F and 120°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

#### ACTION:

With the refueling water tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.5.4 The RWT shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 7 days by:
  1. Verifying the contained borated water volume in the tank, and
  2. Verifying the boron concentration of the water.
- b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the RWT temperature when the (outside) air temperature is outside the 60°F to 120°F range.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES (Continued)

and LSSS setpoints determination. Therefore, time limits have been imposed on operation with inoperable CEAs to preclude such adverse conditions from developing.

Operability of at least two CEA position indicator channels is required to determine CEA positions and thereby ensure compliance with the CEA alignment and insertion limits. The CEA "Full In" and "Full Out" limits provide an additional independent means for determining the CEA positions when the CEAs are at either their fully inserted or fully withdrawn positions. Therefore, the ACTION statements applicable to inoperable CEA position indicators permit continued operations when the positions of CEAs with inoperable position indicators can be verified by the "Full In" or "Full Out" limits.

CEA positions and OPERABILITY of the CEA position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours with more frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable. These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LCOs are satisfied.

The maximum CEA drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed CEA drop time used in the safety analyses. Measurement with  $T_{cold}$  greater than or equal to 552°F and with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a reactor trip at operating conditions.

Several design steps were employed to accommodate the possible CEA guide tube wear which could arise from CEA vibrations when fully withdrawn. Specifically, a programmed insertion schedule will be used to cycle the CEAs between the full out position ("FULL OUT" LIMIT) and 3.0 inches inserted over the fuel cycle. This cycling will distribute the possible guide tube wear over a larger area, thus minimizing any effects. To accommodate this programmed insertion schedule, the fully withdrawn position was redefined, in some cases, to be 144.75 inches or greater.

The establishment of LSSS and LCOs requires that the expected long- and short-term behavior of the radial peaking factors be determined. The long-term behavior relates to the variation of the steady-state radial peaking factors with core burnup and is affected by the amount of CEA insertion assumed, the portion of a burnup cycle over which such insertion is assumed and the expected power level variation throughout the cycle. The short-term behavior relates to transient perturbations to the steady-state radial peaks due to radial xenon redistribution. The magnitudes of such perturbations depend upon the expected use of the CEAs during anticipated power reductions

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES (Continued)

and load maneuvering. Analyses are performed based on the expected mode of operation of the NSSS (base load maneuvering, etc.) and from these analyses CEA insertions are determined and a consistent set of radial peaking factors defined. The Long Term Steady State and Short Term Insertion Limits are determined based upon the assumed mode of operation used in the analyses and provide a means of preserving the assumptions on CEA insertions used. The limits specified serve to limit the behavior of the radial peaking factors within the bounds determined from analysis. The actions specified serve to limit the extent of radial xenon redistribution effects to those accommodated in the analyses. The Long and Short Term Insertion Limits of Specifications 3.1.3.6 and 3.1.3.7 are specified for the plant which has been designed for primarily base loaded operation but which has the ability to accommodate a limited amount of load maneuvering.

The Transient Insertion Limits of Specifications 3.1.3.6 and 3.1.3.7 the Shutdown CEA Insertion Limits of Specification 3.1.3.5 ensure that (1) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (2) the potential effects of a CEA ejection accident are limited to acceptable levels. Long-term operation at the Transient Insertion Limits is not permitted since such operation could have effects on the core power distribution which could invalidate assumptions used to determine the behavior of the radial peaking factors.

The PVNGS CPC and COLSS systems are responsible for the safety and monitoring functions, respectively, of the reactor core. COLSS monitors the DNB Power Operating Limit (POL) and various operating parameters to help the operator maintain plant operation within the limiting conditions for operation (LCO). Operating within the LCO guarantees that in the event of an Anticipated Operational Occurrence (AOO), the CPCs will provide a reactor trip in time to prevent unacceptable fuel damage.

The COLSS reserves the Required Overpower Margin (ROPM) to account for the Loss of Flow (LOF) and CEA misoperation transients. When the COLSS is Out of Service (COOS), the monitoring function is performed via the CPC calculation of DNBR in conjunction with Technical Specification COOS Limit Lines specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT which restricts the reactor power sufficiently to preserve the ROPM.

The reduction of the CEA deviation penalties in accordance with the CEAC (Control Element Assembly Calculator) sensitivity reduction program has been performed. This task involved setting many of the inward single CEA deviation penalty factors to 1.0. An inward CEA deviation event in effect would not be accompanied by the application of the CEA deviation penalty in either the CPC DNB and LHR (Linear Heat Rate) calculations for those CEAs with the reduced penalty factors. The protection for an inward CEA deviation event is thus accounted for separately.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES (Continued)

If an inward CEA deviation event occurs, the current CPC algorithm applies two penalty factors to each of the DNB and LHR calculations. The first, a static penalty factor, is applied upon detection of the event. The second, a xenon redistribution penalty, is applied linearly as a function of time after the CEA drop. The expected margin degradation for the inward CEA deviation event for which the penalty factor has been reduced is accounted for in two ways. The ROPM reserved in COLSS is used to account for some of the margin degradation. Further, a power reduction in accordance with the curve in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT is required. In addition, the part length CEA maneuvering is restricted in accordance with limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT to justify reduction of the PLR deviation penalty factors.

The technical specification permits plant operation if both CEACs are considered inoperable for safety purposes after this period.

## 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.2.1 LINEAR HEAT RATE

The limitation on linear heat rate ensures that in the event of a LOCA, the peak temperature of the fuel cladding will not exceed 2200°F.

Either of the two core power distribution monitoring systems, the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) and the Local Power Density channels in the Core Protection Calculators (CPCs), provide adequate monitoring of the core power distribution and are capable of verifying that the linear heat rate does not exceed its limits. The COLSS performs this function by continuously monitoring the core power distribution and calculating a core power operating limit corresponding to the allowable peak linear heat rate. Reactor operation at or below this calculated power level assures that the limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT are not exceeded.

The COLSS calculated core power and the COLSS calculated core power operating limits based on linear heat rate are continuously monitored and displayed to the operator. A COLSS alarm is annunciated in the event that the core power exceeds the core power operating limit. This provides adequate margin to the linear heat rate operating limit for normal steady-state operation. Normal reactor power transients or equipment failures which do not require a reactor trip may result in this core power operating limit being exceeded. In the event this occurs, COLSS alarms will be annunciated. If the event which causes the COLSS limit to be exceeded results in conditions which approach the core safety limits, a reactor trip will be initiated by the Reactor Protective Instrumentation. The COLSS calculation of the linear heat rate includes appropriate penalty factors which provide, with a 95/95 probability/confidence level, that the maximum linear heat rate calculated by COLSS is conservative with respect to the actual maximum linear heat rate existing in the core. These penalty factors are determined from the uncertainties associated with planar radial peaking measurement, engineering heat flux uncertainty, axial densification, software algorithm modelling, computer processing, rod bow, and core power measurement.

Parameters required to maintain the operating limit power level based on linear heat rate, margin to DNB, and total core power are also monitored by the CPCs. Therefore, in the event that the COLSS is not being used, operation within the linear heat rate limit can be maintained by utilizing any operable CPC channel. The above listed uncertainty and penalty factors plus those associated with the CPC startup test acceptance criteria are also included in the CPCs.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### BASES

#### 3/4.2.2 PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS

Limiting the values of the PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS ( $F_{xy}^c$ ) used in the COLSS and CPCs to values equal to or greater than the measured PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS ( $F_{xy}^m$ ) provides assurance that the limits calculated by COLSS and the CPCs remain valid. Data from the incore detectors are used for determining the measured PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS. A minimum core power at 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER is assumed in determining the PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS. The 20% RATED THERMAL POWER threshold is due to the neutron flux detector system being inaccurate below 20% core power. Core noise level at low power is too large to obtain usable detector readings. The periodic surveillance requirements for determining the measured PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS provides assurance that the PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS used in COLSS and the CPCs remain valid throughout the fuel cycle. Determining the measured PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS after each fuel loading prior to exceeding 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER provides additional assurance that the core was properly loaded.

#### 3/4.2.3 AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT - $T_q$

The limitations on the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT are provided to ensure that design safety margins are maintained. An AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT greater than the limit specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT with COLSS in service or 0.10 with COLSS out of service is not expected and if it should occur, operation is restricted to only those conditions required to identify the cause of the tilt. The tilt is normally calculated by COLSS. A minimum core power of 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER is assumed by the CPCs in its input to COLSS for calculation of AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT. The 20% RATED THERMAL POWER threshold is due to the neutron flux detector system being inaccurate below 20% core power. Core noise level at low power is too large to obtain usable detector readings. The surveillance requirements specified when COLSS is out of service provide an acceptable means of detecting the presence of a steady-state tilt. It is necessary to explicitly account for power asymmetries because the radial peaking factors used in the core power distribution calculations are based on an untilted power distribution.

The AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT is equal to  $(P_{\text{tilt}}/P_{\text{untilt}})-1.0$  where:

AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT is measured by assuming that the ratio of the power at any core location in the presence of a tilt to the untilted power at the location is of the form:

$$P_{\text{tilt}}/P_{\text{untilt}} = 1 + T_q g \cos(\theta - \theta_0)$$

where:

$T_q$  is the peak fractional tilt amplitude at the core periphery

$g$  is the radial normalizing factor

$\theta$  is the azimuthal core location

$\theta_0$  is the azimuthal core location of maximum tilt

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### BASES

#### AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT - $T_g$ (Continued)

$P_{\text{tilt}}/P_{\text{untilt}}$  is the ratio of the power at a core location in the presence of a tilt to the power at that location with no tilt.

The AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT allowance used in the CPCs is defined as the value of CPC addressable constant TR-1.0.

#### 3/4.2.4 DNBR MARGIN

The limitation on DNBR as a function of AXIAL SHAPE INDEX represents a conservative envelope of operating conditions consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and which have been analytically demonstrated adequate to maintain an acceptable minimum DNBR throughout all anticipated operational occurrences. Operation of the core with a DNBR at or above this limit provides assurance that an acceptable minimum DNBR will be maintained in the event of a loss of flow transient.

Either of the two core power distribution monitoring systems, the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) and the DNBR channels in the Core Protection Calculators (CPCs), provide adequate monitoring of the core power distribution and are capable of verifying that the DNBR does not violate its limits. The COLSS performs this function by continuously monitoring the core power distribution and calculating a core operating limit corresponding to the allowable minimum DNBR. The COLSS calculation of core power operating limit based on DNBR includes appropriate penalty factors which provide, with a 95/95 probability/confidence level, that the core power limits calculated by COLSS (based on the minimum DNBR Limit) is conservative with respect to the actual core power limit. These penalty factors are determined from the uncertainties associated with planar radial peaking measurement, engineering heat flux, state parameter measurement, software algorithm modelling, computer processing, rod bow, and core power measurement.

Parameters required to maintain the margin to DNB and total core power are also monitored by the CPCs. Therefore, in the event that the COLSS is not being used, operation within the limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT can be maintained by utilizing a predetermined DNBR as a function of AXIAL SHAPE INDEX and by monitoring the CPC trip channels. The above listed uncertainty and penalty factors are also included in the CPCs which assume a minimum core power of 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER. The 20% RATED THERMAL POWER threshold is due to the neutron flux detector system being less accurate below 20% core power. Core noise level at low power is too large to obtain usable detector readings.

A DNBR penalty factor has been included in the COLSS and CPC DNBR calculations to accommodate the effects of rod bow. The amount of rod bow in each assembly is dependent upon the average burnup experienced by that assembly. Fuel assemblies that incur higher average burnup will experience a greater magnitude of rod bow. Conversely, lower burnup assemblies will experience less rod bow. In design calculations, the penalty for each batch required to compensate for rod bow is determined from a batch's maximum average assembly burnup applied to the batch's maximum integrated planar-radial power peak. A single net penalty for COLSS and CPC is then determined from the penalties associated with each batch, accounting for the offsetting margins due to the lower radial power peaks in the higher burnup batches.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.2.5 RCS FLOW RATE

This specification is provided to ensure that the actual RCS total flow rate is maintained at or above the minimum value used in the safety analyses. The minimum value used in the safety analyses is 95% of the design flow rate ( $164.0 \times 10^6$  lbm/hr) or  $155.8 \times 10^6$  lbm/hr. The actual RCS flow rate is determined by direct measurement and an uncertainty associated with that measurement is considered when comparing actual RCS flow rate to the minimum required value of  $155.8 \times 10^6$  lbm/hr.

#### 3/4.2.6 REACTOR COOLANT COLD LEG TEMPERATURE

This specification is provided to ensure that the actual value of reactor coolant cold leg temperature is maintained within the range of values used in the safety analyses.

#### 3/4.2.7 AXIAL SHAPE INDEX

This specification is provided to ensure that the actual value of the core average AXIAL SHAPE INDEX is maintained within the range of values used in the safety analyses.

#### 3/4.2.8 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE

This specification is provided to ensure that the actual value of pressurizer pressure is maintained within the range of values used in the safety analyses.

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

### CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT

6.9.1.9 Core operating limits shall be established and documented in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT before each reload cycle or any remaining part of a reload cycle for the following:

- a. Shutdown Margin  $K_{N-1}$  - Any CEA Withdrawn for Specification 3.1.1.2
- b. Moderator Temperature Coefficient BOL and EOL limits for Specification 3.1.1.3
- c. Boron Dilution Alarms for Specification 3.1.2.7
- d. Movable Control Assemblies - CEA Position for Specification 3.1.3.1
- e. Regulating CEA Insertion Limits for Specification 3.1.3.6
- f. Part Length CEA Insertion Limits for Specification 3.1.3.7
- g. Linear Heat Rate for Specification 3.2.1
- h. Azimuthal Power Tilt -  $T_q$  for Specification 3.2.3
- i. DNBR Margin for Specification 3.2.4
- j. Axial Shape Index for Specification 3.2.7

6.9.1.10 The analytical methods used to determine the core operating limits shall be those previously reviewed and approved by the NRC in:

- a. "CE Method for Control Element Assembly Ejection Analysis," CENPD-0190-A, January 1976 (Methodology for Specification 3.1.3.6, Regulating CEA Insertion Limits).
- b. "The ROCS and DIT Computer Codes for Nuclear Design," CENPD-266-P-A, April 1983 (Methodology for Specifications 3.1.1.2, Shutdown Margin  $K_{N-1}$  - Any CEA Withdrawn; 3.1.1.3, Moderator Temperature Coefficient BOL and EOL limits and 3.1.3.6, Regulating CEA Insertion Limits).
- c. "Safety Evaluation Report related to the Final Design of the Standard Nuclear Steam Supply Reference Systems CESSAR System 80, Docket No. STN 50-470, "NUREG-0852 (November 1981), Supplements No. 1 (March 1983), No. 2 (September 1983), No. 3 (December 1987) (Methodology for Specifications 3.1.1.2, Shutdown Margin  $K_{N-1}$  - Any CEA Withdrawn; 3.1.1.3, Moderator Temperature Coefficient BOL and EOL limits; 3.1.2.7, Boron Dilution Alarms; 3.1.3.1, Movable Control Assemblies - CEA Position; 3.1.3.6, Regulating CEA Insertion Limits; 3.1.3.7, Part Length CEA Insertion Limits and 3.2.3 Azimuthal Power Tilt -  $T_q$ ).
- d. "Modified Statistical Combination of Uncertainties," CEN-356(V)-P-A Revision 01-P-A, May 1988 (Methodology for Specification 3.2.4, DNBR Margin and 3.2.7 Axial Shape Index).

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

### CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (Continued)

- e. "Calculational Methods for the CE Large Break LOCA Evaluation Model," CENPD-132-P, August 1974 (Methodology for Specification 3.2.1, Linear Heat Rate).
- f. "Calculational Methods for the CE Large Break LOCA Evaluation Model," CENPD-132-P, Supplement 1, February 1975 (Methodology for Specification 3.2.1, Linear Heat Rate).
- g. "Calculational Methods for the CE Large Break LOCA Evaluation Model," CENPD-132-P, Supplement 2-P, July 1975 (Methodology for Specification 3.2.1, Linear Heat Rate).
- h. "Calculative Methods for the CE Small Break LOCA Evaluation Model," CENPD-137-P, August 1974 (Methodology for Specification 3.2.1, Linear Heat Rate).
- i. "Calculative Methods for the CE Small Break LOCA Evaluation Model," CENPD-137-P, Supplement 1P, January 1977 (Methodology for Specification 3.2.1, Linear Heat Rate).
- j. Letter: O. D. Parr (NRC) to F. M. Stern (CE), dated June 13, 1975 (NRC Staff Review of the Combustion Engineering ECCS Evaluation Model). NRC approval for: 6.9.1.10e, 6.9.1.10f, 6.9.1.10h.
- k. Letter: O. D. Parr (NRC) to A. E. Scherer (CE), dated December 9, 1975 (NRC Staff Review of the Proposed Combustion Engineering ECCS Evaluation Model Changes). NRC approval for: 6.9.1.10g.
- l. Letter: K. Kniel (NRC) to A. E. Scherer (CE), dated September 27, 1977 (Evaluation of Topical Reports CENPD-133, Supplement 3-P and CENPD-137, Supplement 1-P). NRC approval for 6.9.1.10.i.

The core operating limits shall be determined so that all applicable limits (e.g., fuel thermal-mechanical limits, core thermal-hydraulic limits, ECCS limits, nuclear limits such as shutdown margin, and transient and analysis limits) of the safety analysis are met.

The CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, including any mid-cycle revisions or supplements thereto, shall be provided upon issuance, for each reload cycle, to the NRC Document Control Desk with copies to the Regional Administrator and Resident Inspector.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, ET AL.

DOCKET NO. STN 50-530

PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 42  
License No. NPF-74

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by the Arizona Public Service Company (APS or the licensee) on behalf of itself and the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, El Paso Electric Company, Southern California Edison Company, Public Service Company of New Mexico, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, and Southern California Public Power Authority dated March 19, 1992, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-74 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 42, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated into this license. APS shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance and must be fully implemented no later than 60 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

*for Charles M. Trammell*  
Theodore R. Quay, Director  
Project Directorate V  
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 30, 1992

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 42 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-74

DOCKET NO. STN 50-530

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

<u>Remove</u>	<u>Insert</u>
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V	V
XVII	XVII
XIX	XIX
XX	XX
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## DEFINITIONS

### CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT

1.9a The CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT is the unit-specific document that provides core operating limits for the current operating reload cycle. These cycle-specific core operating limits shall be determined for each reload cycle in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1. Plant operation within these operating limits is addressed in individual specifications.

### DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131

1.10 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131 (microcuries/gram) which alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134 and I-135 actually present. The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in Table III of TID-14844, "Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites."

### $\bar{E}$ - AVERAGE DISINTEGRATION ENERGY

1.11  $\bar{E}$  shall be the average (weighted in proportion to the concentration of each radionuclide in the reactor coolant at the time of sampling) of the sum of the average beta and gamma energies per disintegration (in MeV) for isotopes, other than iodines, with half-lives greater than 15 minutes, making up at least 95% of the total noniodine activity in the coolant.

### ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME

1.12 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its ESF actuation setpoint at the channel sensor until the ESF equipment is capable of performing its safety function (i.e., the valves travel to their required positions, pump discharge pressures reach their required values, etc.). Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays where applicable.

### FREQUENCY NOTATION

1.13 The FREQUENCY NOTATION specified for the performance of Surveillance Requirements shall correspond to the intervals defined in Table 1.1.

### GASEOUS RADWASTE SYSTEM

1.14 A GASEOUS RADWASTE SYSTEM shall be any system designed and installed to reduce radioactive gaseous effluents by collecting primary coolant system offgases from the primary system and providing for delay or holdup for the purpose of reducing the total radioactivity prior to release to the environment.

### IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE

1.15 IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE shall be:

- a. Leakage into closed systems, other than reactor coolant pump controlled bleed-off flow, such as pump seal or valve packing leaks that are captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank, or
- b. Leakage into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, or
- c. Reactor Coolant System leakage through a steam generator to the secondary system.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

#### 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL

##### SHUTDOWN MARGIN - ALL CEAs FULLY INSERTED

##### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to 1.0% delta k/k.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3, 4\*, and 5\* with all full-length CEAs fully inserted.

ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than 1.0% delta k/k, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 26 gpm to reactor coolant system of a solution containing greater than or equal to 4000 ppm boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

##### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 1.0% delta k/k at least once per 24 hours by consideration of at least the following factors:

1. Reactor Coolant System boron concentration,
2. CEA position,
3. Reactor Coolant System average temperature,
4. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,
5. Xenon concentration, and
6. Samarium concentration.

4.1.1.1.2 The overall core reactivity balance shall be compared to predicted values to demonstrate agreement within + 1.0% delta k/k at least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD). This comparison shall consider at least those factors stated in Specification 4.1.1.1.1, above. The predicted reactivity values shall be adjusted (normalized) to correspond to the actual core conditions prior to exceeding a fuel burnup of 60 EFPD after each fuel loading.

---

\*See Special Test Exception 3.10.9.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### SHUTDOWN MARGIN - $K_{N-1}$ - ANY CEA WITHDRAWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

##### 3.1.1.2

- a. The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to that specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, and
- b. For  $T_{cold}$  less than or equal to 500°F,  $K_{N-1}$  shall be less than 0.99.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2\*, 3\*, 4\*, and 5\* with any full-length CEA fully or partially withdrawn.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than that specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 26 gpm to the reactor coolant system of a solution containing greater than or equal to 4000 ppm boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored, and
- b. With  $T_{cold}$  less than or equal to 500°F and  $K_{N-1}$  greater than or equal to 0.99, immediately vary CEA positions and/or initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 26 gpm to the reactor coolant system of a solution containing greater than or equal to 4000 ppm boron or equivalent until the required  $K_{N-1}$  is restored.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.1.2.1 With any full-length CEA fully or partially withdrawn, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to that specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT

- a. Within 1 hour after detection of an inoperable CEA(s) and at least once per 12 hours thereafter while the CEA(s) is inoperable. If the inoperable CEA is immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be untrippable, the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be increased by an amount at least equal to the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable CEA(s).

\*See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.1 and 3.10.9.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

---

- b. When in MODE 1 or MODE 2 with  $k_{eff}$  greater than or equal to 1.0, at least once per 12 hours by verifying that CEA group withdrawal is within the Transient Insertion Limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.
- c. When in MODE 2 with  $k_{eff}$  less than 1.0, within 4 hours prior to achieving reactor criticality by verifying that the predicted critical CEA position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.
- d. Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, by consideration of the factors of e. below, with the CEA groups at the Transient Insertion Limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.
- e. When in MODE 3, 4, or 5, at least once per 24 hours by consideration of at least the following factors:
  - 1. Reactor Coolant System boron concentration,
  - 2. CEA position,
  - 3. Reactor Coolant System average temperature,
  - 4. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,
  - 5. Xenon concentration, and
  - 6. Samarium concentration.

4.1.1.2.2 When in MODE 3, 4, or 5, with any full-length CEA fully or partially withdrawn, and  $T_{cold}$  less than or equal to 500°F,  $K_{N-1}$  shall be determined to be less than 0.99 at least once per 24 hours by consideration of at least the following factors:

- 1. Reactor Coolant System boron concentration,
- 2. CEA position,
- 3. Reactor Coolant System average temperature,
- 4. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,
- 5. Xenon concentration, and
- 6. Samarium concentration.

4.1.1.2.3 The overall core reactivity balance shall be compared to predicted values to demonstrate agreement within  $\pm 1.0\%$  delta k/k at least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD). This comparison shall consider at least those factors stated in Specification 4.1.1.2.1.e or 4.1.1.2.2. The predicted reactivity values shall be adjusted (normalized) to correspond to the actual core conditions prior to exceeding a fuel burnup of 60 EFPD after each fuel loading.

## MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.1.3 The moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) shall be within the area of Acceptable Operation specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT. The maximum upper limit shall be less than or equal to  $+ 0.5 \times 10^{-4} \Delta K/K/^{\circ}F$  for a power level of 0% RATED THERMAL POWER with a linear ramp to  $0\Delta K/K/^{\circ}F$  at 100% RATED THERMAL POWER.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2\*#.

ACTION:

With the moderator temperature coefficient outside the area of Acceptable Operation, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.1.3.1 The MTC shall be determined to be within its limits by confirmatory measurements. MTC measured values shall be extrapolated and/or compensated to permit direct comparison with the above limits.

4.1.1.3.2 The MTC shall be determined at the following frequencies and THERMAL POWER conditions during each fuel cycle:

- a. Prior to initial operation above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, after each fuel loading.
- b. At any THERMAL POWER, within 7 EFPD after reaching a core average exposure of 40 EFPD burnup into the current cycle.
- c. At any THERMAL POWER, within 7 EFPD after reaching a core average exposure equivalent to two-thirds of the expected current cycle end-of-cycle core average burnup.

\*With  $K_{eff}$  greater than or equal to 1.0.

#See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

## MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.1.4 The Reactor Coolant System lowest operating loop temperature ( $T_{\text{cold}}$ ) shall be greater than or equal to 552°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2#.

#### ACTION:

With a Reactor Coolant System operating loop temperature ( $T_{\text{cold}}$ ) less than 552°F, restore  $T_{\text{cold}}$  to within its limit within 15 minutes or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 15 minutes.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.1.4 The Reactor Coolant System temperature ( $T_{\text{cold}}$ ) shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 552°F:

- a. Within 15 minutes prior to achieving reactor criticality, and
- b. At least once per 30 minutes when the reactor is critical and the Reactor Coolant System  $T_{\text{cold}}$  is less than 557°F.

---

#With  $K_{\text{eff}}$  greater than or equal to 1.0.

## 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS

### FLOW PATHS - SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.2.1 As a minimum, one of the following boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE:

- a. If only the spent fuel pool in Specification 3.1.2.5a. is OPERABLE, a flow path from the spent fuel pool via a gravity feed connection and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.
- b. If only the refueling water tank in Specification 3.1.2.5b. is OPERABLE, a flow path from the refueling water tank via either a charging pump, a high pressure safety injection pump, or a low pressure safety injection pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

#### ACTION:

With none of the above flow paths OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.2.1 At least one of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### FLOW PATHS - OPERATING

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.2.2 At least two of the following three boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE:

- a. A gravity feed flow path from either the refueling water tank or the spent fuel pool through CH-536 (RWT Gravity Feed Isolation Valve) and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System,
- b. A gravity feed flow path from the refueling water tank through CH-327 (RWT Gravity Feed/Safety Injection System Isolation Valve) and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System,
- c. A flow path from either the refueling water tank or the spent fuel pool through CH-164 (Boric Acid Filter Bypass Valve), utilizing gravity feed and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

#### ACTION:

With only one of the above required boron injection flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System OPERABLE, restore at least two boron injection flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; restore at least two flow paths to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.2.2.1 At least two of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
- b. At least once per 18 months when the Reactor Coolant System is at normal operating pressure by verifying that the flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.2 delivers at least 26 gpm for 1 charging pump and 68 gpm for two charging pumps to the Reactor Coolant System.

4.1.2.2.2 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into Mode 3 or Mode 4 to perform the surveillance testing of Specification 4.1.2.2.1.b provided the testing is performed within 24 hours after achieving normal operating pressure in the reactor coolant system.

## CHARGING PUMPS - SHUTDOWN

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.2.3 At least one charging pump or one high pressure safety injection pump or one low pressure safety injection pump in the boron injection flow path required OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no charging pump or high pressure safety injection pump or low pressure safety injection pump OPERABLE or capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.2.3 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

## CHARGING PUMPS - OPERATING

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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---

3.1.2.4 At least two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With only one charging pump OPERABLE, restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

---

4.1.2.4 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

## BORATED WATER SOURCES - SHUTDOWN

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.2.5 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

- a. The spent fuel pool with:
  1. A minimum borated water volume of 33,500 gallons and
  2. A boron concentration of between 4000 ppm and 4400 ppm boron, and
  3. A solution temperature between 60°F and 180°F.
- b. The refueling water tank with:
  1. A minimum contained borated water volume of 33,500 gallons and
  2. A boron concentration of between 4000 ppm and 4400 ppm boron, and
  3. A solution temperature between 60°F and 120°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5\* and 6\*.

#### ACTION:

With no borated water sources OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one borated water source is restored to OPERABLE status.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS



---

4.1.2.5 The above required borated water sources shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 7 days by:
  1. Verifying the boron concentration of the water, and
  2. Verifying the contained borated water volume of the refueling water tank or the spent fuel pool.
- b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the refueling water tank temperature when it is the source of borated water and the outside air temperature is outside the 60°F to 120°F range.
- c. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the spent fuel pool temperature when it is the source of borated water and irradiated fuel is present in the pool.

---

\*See Special Test Exception 3.10.7.



- (1) The tank level and volume shown are the useful level and volume above that in the tank which is required for vortex considerations
- (2) During Mode 5 and 6, one of these borated sources shall contain a minimum of 33,500 gallons
- (3) This volume is not required during Mode 6.

FIGURE 3.1-1  
MINIMUM BORATED WATER VOLUMES

## BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.6 Each of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

- a. The spent fuel pool with:
  1. A minimum borated water volume as specified in Figure 3.1-1, and
  2. A boron concentration of between 4000 ppm and 4400 ppm boron, and
  3. A solution temperature between 60°F and 180°F.
- b. The refueling water tank with:
  1. A minimum contained borated water volume as specified in Figure 3.1-1, and
  2. A boron concentration of between 4000 and 4400 ppm of boron, and
  3. A solution temperature between 60°F and 120°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2,\* 3,\* and 4\*.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the above required spent fuel pool inoperable, restore the pool to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; restore the above required spent fuel pool to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.
- b. With the refueling water tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.6 Each of the above required borated water sources shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 7 days by:
  1. Verifying the boron concentration in the water, and
  2. Verifying the contained borated water volume of the water source.
- b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the refueling water tank temperature when the outside air temperature is outside the 60°F to 120°F range.
- c. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the spent fuel pool temperature when irradiated fuel is present in the pool.

\* See Special Test Exception 3.10.7.

## BORON DILUTION ALARMS

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.2.7 Both startup channel high neutron flux alarms shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3\*, 4, 5, and 6.

ACTION:

- a. With one startup channel high neutron flux alarm inoperable:
  1. Determine the RCS boron concentration when entering MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6 or at the time the alarm is determined to be inoperable. From that time, the RCS boron concentration shall be determined at the applicable monitoring frequency specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, by either boronometer or RCS sampling.\*\*
- b. With both startup channel high neutron flux alarms inoperable:
  1. Determine the RCS boron concentration by either boronometer and RCS sampling\*\* or by independent collection and analysis of two RCS samples when entering Mode 3, 4, or 5 or at the time both alarms are determined to be inoperable. From that time, the RCS boron concentration shall be determined at the applicable monitoring frequency specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, as applicable, by either boronometer and RCS sampling\*\* or by collection and analysis of two independent RCS samples. If redundant determination of RCS boron concentration cannot be accomplished immediately, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until the method for determining and confirming RCS boron concentration is restored.
  2. When in MODE 5 with the RCS level below the centerline of the hotleg or MODE 6, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one startup channel high neutron flux alarm is restored to OPERABLE status.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.2.7 Each startup channel high neutron flux alarm shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of:

---

\*Within 1 hour after the neutron flux is within the startup range following a reactor shutdown.

\*\*With one or more reactor coolant pumps (RCP) operating the sample should be obtained from the hot leg. With no RCP operating, the sample should be obtained from the discharge line of the low pressure safety injection (LPSI) pump operating in the shutdown cooling mode.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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- a. A CHANNEL CHECK:
  - 1. At least once per 12 hours.
  - 2. When initially setting setpoints at the following times:
    - a) One hour after a reactor trip.
    - b) After a controlled reactor shutdown: Within 1 hour after the neutron flux is within the startup range in MODE 3.
- b. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST every 31 days of cumulative operation during shutdown.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

#### CEA POSITION

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.1 All full-length (shutdown and regulating) CEAs, and all part-length CEAs which are inserted in the core, shall be OPERABLE with each CEA of a given group positioned within 6.6 inches (indicated position) of all other CEAs in its group.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1\* and 2\*.

#### ACTION:

- a. With one or more full-length CEAs inoperable due to being immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be untrippable, determine that the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.2 is satisfied within 1 hour and be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
- b. With more than one full-length or part-length CEA inoperable or misaligned from any other CEA in its group by more than 19 inches (indicated position), be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
- c. With one or more full-length or part-length CEAs misaligned from any other CEAs in its group by more than 6.6 inches, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue, provided that core power is reduced in accordance with the limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT and that within 1 hour the misaligned CEA(s) is either:
  1. Restored to OPERABLE status within its above specified alignment requirements, or
  2. Declared inoperable and the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.2 is satisfied. After declaring the CEA(s) inoperable, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue pursuant to the requirements of Specifications 3.1.3.6 and 3.1.3.7 provided:
    - a) Within 1 hour the remainder of the CEAs in the group with the inoperable CEA(s) shall be aligned to within 6.6 inches of the inoperable CEA(s) while maintaining the allowable CEA sequence and insertion limits and the THERMAL POWER level restrictions of Specifications 3.1.3.6 and 3.1.3.7 during subsequent operation.

---

\*See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2 and 3.10.4.

## LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

### ACTION: (Continued)

- b) The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.2 is determined at least once per 12 hours.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

- d. With one full-length CEA inoperable due to causes other than addressed by ACTION a., above, but within its above specified alignment requirements, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue pursuant to the requirements of Specification 3.1.3.6.
- e. With one part-length CEA inoperable and inserted in the core, operation may continue provided the alignment of the inoperable part length CEA is maintained within 6.6 inches (indicated position) of all other part-length CEAs in its group and the CEA is maintained pursuant to the requirements of Specification 3.1.3.7.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.1.1 The position of each full-length and part-length CEA shall be determined to be within 6.6 inches (indicated position) of all other CEAs in its group at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when one CEAC is inoperable or when both CEACs are inoperable, then verify the individual CEA positions at least once per 4 hours.

4.1.3.1.2 Each full-length CEA not fully inserted and each part-length CEA which is inserted in the core shall be determined to be OPERABLE by movement of at least 5 inches in any one direction at least once per 31 days.

## POSITION INDICATOR CHANNELS - OPERATING

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.2 At least two of the following three CEA position indicator channels shall be OPERABLE for each CEA:

- a. CEA Reed Switch Position Transmitter (RSPT 1) with the capability of determining the absolute CEA positions within 5.2 inches,
- b. CEA Reed Switch Position Transmitter (RSPT 2) with the capability of determining the absolute CEA positions within 5.2 inches, and
- c. The CEA pulse counting position indicator channel.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

#### ACTION:

With a maximum of one CEA per CEA group having only one of the above required CEA position indicator channels OPERABLE, within 6 hours either:

- a. Restore the inoperable position indicator channel to OPERABLE status, or
- b. Be in at least HOT STANDBY, or
- c. Position the CEA group(s) with the inoperable position indicator(s) at its fully withdrawn position while maintaining the requirements of Specifications 3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.5, 3.1.3.6 and 3.1.3.7. Operation may then continue provided the CEA group(s) with the inoperable position indicator(s) is maintained fully withdrawn, except during surveillance testing pursuant to the requirements of Specification 4.1.3.1.2, and each CEA in the group(s) is verified fully withdrawn at least once per 12 hours thereafter by its "Full Out" limit\*.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.3.2 Each of the above required position indicator channels shall be determined to be OPERABLE by verifying that for the same CEA, the position indicator channels agree within 5.2 inches of each other at least once per 12 hours.

---

\*CEAs are fully withdrawn (Full Out) when withdrawn to at least 144.75 inches.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### POSITION INDICATOR CHANNELS - SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.3 At least one CEA Reed Switch Position Transmitter indicator channel shall be OPERABLE for each shutdown, regulating or part-length CEA not fully inserted.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3\*, 4\*, and 5\*.

ACTION:

With less than the above required position indicator channel(s) OPERABLE, immediately open the reactor trip breakers.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.3.3 The above required CEA Reed Switch Position Transmitter indicator channel(s) shall be determined to be OPERABLE by performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 18 months.

---

\*With the reactor trip breakers in the closed position.

## CEA DROP TIME

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.4 The individual full-length (shutdown and regulating) CEA drop time, from a fully withdrawn position, shall be less than or equal to 4 seconds from when the electrical power is interrupted to the CEA drive mechanism until the CEA reaches its 90% insertion position with:

- a.  $T_{cold}$  greater than or equal to 552°F, and
- b. All reactor coolant pumps operating.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the drop time of any full-length CEA determined to exceed the above limit, restore the CEA drop time to within the above limit prior to proceeding to MODE 1 or 2.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.3.4 The CEA drop time of full-length CEAs shall be demonstrated through measurement prior to reactor criticality:

- a. For all CEAs following each removal and reinstallation of the reactor vessel head,
- b. For specifically affected individual CEAs following any maintenance on or modification to the CEA drive system which could affect the drop time of those specific CEAs, and
- c. At least once per 18 months.

## SHUTDOWN CEA INSERTION LIMIT

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

---

3.1.3.5 All shutdown CEAs shall be withdrawn to at least 144.75 inches.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2\*#.

ACTION:

With a maximum of one shutdown CEA withdrawn to less than 144.75 inches, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2, within 1 hour either:

- a. Withdraw the CEA to at least 144.75 inches, or
- b. Declare the CEA inoperable and comply with Specification 3.1.3.1.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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---

4.1.3.5 Each shutdown CEA shall be determined to be withdrawn to at least 144.75 inches:

- a. Within 15 minutes prior to withdrawal of any CEAs in regulating groups during an approach to reactor criticality, and
- b. At least once per 12 hours thereafter except during time intervals when both CEAC's are inoperable, then verify the individual CEA positions at least once per 4 hours.

---

\*See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

#With  $K_{eff}$  greater than or equal to 1.

## REGULATING CEA INSERTION LIMITS

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.6 The regulating CEA groups shall be maintained within the following limits:

a. One or more CEAC's operable:

1. The regulating CEA groups shall be limited to the withdrawal sequence, and to the insertion limits## specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT when the COLSS is in service or when the COLSS is not in service. The CEA insertion between the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limits and the Transient Insertion Limits is restricted to:
  - a) Less than or equal to 5 Effective Full Power Days per 30 Effective Full Power Day interval, and
  - b) Less than or equal to 14 Effective Full Power Days per 18 Effective Full Power Months.
2. CEA insertion between the Short Term Steady State Insertion Limits and the Transient Insertion Limits shall be restricted to  $\leq$  4 hours per 24 hour interval.

b. Both CEAC's Inoperable (with or without COLSS in service):

Regulating CEA group 5 may be inserted no further than 127.5 inches withdrawn which is the Transient Insertion Limit when both CEAC's are inoperable.

Regulating CEA groups which are excluded by these insertion limits must be maintained fully withdrawn  $\geq$  144.75 inches, which is the Transient Insertion Limit, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1\* and 2\*#.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the regulating CEA groups inserted beyond the Transient Insertion Limits, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2, within 2 hours either:
  1. Restore the regulating CEA groups to within the limits, or
  2. Reduce THERMAL POWER as follows:
    - a) One or more CEAC's Operable
      - 1) Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to that fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the CEA group position specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, or
      - 2) Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

## REGULATING CEA INSERTION LIMITS

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

#### ACTION: (Continued)

b) Both CEAC's Inoperable

Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

- b. With the regulating CEA groups inserted between the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limits and the Transient Insertion Limits for intervals greater than 5 EFPD per 30 EFPD interval or greater than 14 EFPD per 18 Effective Full Power Months, either:
1. Restore the regulating groups to within the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limits within 2 hours, or
  2. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
- c. With the regulating CEA groups inserted between the Short Term Steady State Insertion Limits and the Transient Insertion Limits for intervals > 4 hours per 24 hour interval, operation may proceed provided any subsequent increase in THERMAL POWER is restricted to < 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER per hour.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.6 The position of each regulating CEA group shall be determined to be within the Transient Insertion Limits at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when the PDIL Auctioneer Alarm Circuit is inoperable, or both CEAC's are inoperable, then verify the CEA group positions at least once per 4 hours. The accumulated times during which the regulating CEA groups are inserted beyond the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limits but within the Transient Insertion Limits shall be determined at least once per 24 hours.

\*See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2 and 3.10.4.

#With  $K_{eff}$  greater than or equal to 1.

##A reactor power cutback will cause either (Case 1) Regulating Group 5 or Regulating Group 4 and 5 to be dropped with no sequential insertion of additional Regulating Groups (Groups 1, 2, 3, and 4) or (Case 2) Regulating Group 5 or Regulating Groups 4 and 5 to be dropped with all or part of the remaining Regulating Groups (Groups 1, 2, 3, and 4) being sequentially inserted. In either case, the Transient Insertion Limit and the withdrawal sequence specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT can be exceeded for up to 2 hours.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### PART LENGTH CEA INSERTION LIMITS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.7 The part length CEA groups shall be maintained within the following limits with COLSS in service or out of service:

a. One or more CEACs OPERABLE

The part length CEA groups shall be limited to the insertion limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT with PLCEA insertion between the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limit and the Transient Insertion Limit restricted to:

1.  $\leq 7$  EFPD per 30 EFPD interval, and
2.  $\leq 14$  EFPD per calendar year.

b. Both CEACs INOPERABLE

The part length CEA groups must be maintained fully withdrawn ( $\geq 144.75$  inches) which is the Transient Insertion Limit when both CEAC's are inoperable.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1\* and 2\*

ACTION:

- a. With the part length CEA groups inserted beyond the Transient Insertion Limit, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2, within two hours, either:
  1. Restore the part length CEA groups to within the limits, or
  2. Reduce THERMAL POWER as follows:
    - a) One or more CEACs OPERABLE
      - 1) Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to that fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the PLCEA group position specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, or
      - 2) Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
    - b) Both CEACs INOPERABLE  
Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

---

#### ACTION: (Continued)

- b. With the part length CEA groups inserted between the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limit and the Transient Insertion Limit for intervals > 7 EFPD per 30 EFPD interval or > 14 EFPD per calendar year, either:
  1. Restore the part length groups within the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limit within two hours, or
  2. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.3.7 The positions of the part length CEA groups shall be determined to be within the Transient Insertion Limit at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when both CEACs are inoperable, then verify the part length CEA group positions at least once per 4 hours.

---

\*See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2 and 3.10.4.

## 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4 2.1 LINEAR HEAT RATE

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.2.1 The linear heat rate limit specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT shall be maintained by one of the following methods as applicable:

- a. Maintaining COLSS calculated core power less than or equal to the COLSS calculated power operating limit based on linear heat rate (when COLSS is in service); or
- b. Maintaining peak linear heat rate within its limit using any operable CPC channel (when COLSS is out of service).

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

#### ACTION:

With the linear heat rate limit not being maintained, as indicated by:

1. COLSS calculated core power exceeding the COLSS calculated core power operating limit based on linear heat rate; or
2. Peak linear heat rate outside its limit using any operable CPC channel (when COLSS is out of service);

within 15 minutes initiate corrective action to reduce the linear heat rate to within the limits and either:

- a. Restore the linear heat rate to within its limits within 1 hour, or
- b. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.2.1.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.1.2 The linear heat rate shall be determined to be within its limit when THERMAL POWER is above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER by continuously monitoring the core power distribution with the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) or, with the COLSS out of service, by verifying at least once per 2 hours that the linear heat rate, as indicated on any OPERABLE Local Power Density channel, is within its limit.

4.2.1.3 At least once per 31 days, the COLSS Margin Alarm shall be verified to actuate at a THERMAL POWER level less than or equal to the core power operating limit based on linear heat rate.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4.2.2 PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS - $F_{xy}^m$

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.2.2 The measured PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS ( $F_{xy}^m$ ) shall be less than or equal to the PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS ( $F_{xy}^c$ ) used in the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) and in the Core Protection Calculators (CPC).

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER\*.

#### ACTION:

With an  $F_{xy}^m$  exceeding a corresponding  $F_{xy}^c$ , within 6 hours either:

- a. Adjust the CPC addressable constants to increase the multiplier applied to planar radial peaking by a factor equivalent to greater than or equal to  $F_{xy}^m/F_{xy}^c$  and restrict subsequent operation so that a margin to the COLSS operating limits of at least  $[(F_{xy}^m/F_{xy}^c) - 1.0] \times 100\%$  is maintained; or
- b. Adjust the affected PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS ( $F_{xy}^c$ ) used in the COLSS and CPC to a value greater than or equal to the measured PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS ( $F_{xy}^m$ ) or
- c. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.2.2.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.2.2 The measured PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS ( $F_{xy}^m$ ) obtained by using the incore detection system, shall be determined to be less than or equal to the PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS ( $F_{xy}^c$ ), used in the COLSS and CPC at the following intervals:

- a. After each fuel loading with THERMAL POWER greater than 40% but prior to operation above 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and
- b. At least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days.

---

\*See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4.2.3 AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT - $T_q$

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.2.3 The AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT ( $T_q$ ) shall be less than or equal to the following limits:

- a. The AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT Allowance used in the Core Protection Calculators (CPCs), and
- b.1. The limit specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT with COLSS in service, or
- b.2.  $T_q \leq 0.10$  with COLSS out of service.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER\*.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the measured AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT determined to exceed the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT Allowance used in the CPCs within 2 hours either correct the power tilt or adjust the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT Allowance used in the CPCs to greater than or equal to the measured value.
- b. With the measured AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT determined to exceed the limit specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT with COLSS in service or 0.10 with COLSS out of service.
  1. Due to misalignment of either a part-length or full-length CEA, within 30 minutes verify that the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) (when COLSS is being used to monitor the core power distribution per Specifications 4.2.1 and 4.2.4) is detecting the CEA misalignment.
  2. Verify that the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT is within its limit within 2 hours after exceeding the limit or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 2 hours and verify that the Variable Overpower Trip Setpoint has been reduced as appropriate within the next 4 hours.
  3. Identify and correct the cause of the out of limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER; subsequent POWER OPERATION above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER may proceed provided that the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT is verified within its limit at least once per hour for 12 hours or until verified acceptable at 95% or greater RATED THERMAL POWER.

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\*See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.2.3.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.3.2 The AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT shall be determined to be within its limits above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER by:

- a. Continuously monitoring the tilt with COLSS when the COLSS is in service.
- b. Calculating the tilt at least once per 12 hours when the COLSS is out of service.
- c. Verifying at least once per 31 days, that the COLSS Azimuthal Tilt Alarm is actuated at an AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT less than or equal to the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT Allowance used in the CPCs.
- d. Using the incore detectors at least once per 31 EFPD to independently confirm the validity of the COLSS calculated AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4.2.4 DNBR MARGIN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.2.4 The DNBR margin shall be maintained by one of the following methods:

- a. Maintaining COLSS calculated core power less than or equal to COLSS calculated core power operating limit based on DNBR (when COLSS is in service, and either one or both CEACs are operable); or
- b. Maintaining COLSS calculated core power less than or equal to COLSS calculated core power operating limit based on DNBR decreased by the allowance specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (when COLSS is in service and neither CEAC is operable); or
- c. Operating within the region of acceptable operation specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT using any operable CPC channel (when COLSS is out of service and either one or both CEACs are operable); or
- d. Operating within the region of acceptable operation specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT using any operable CPC channel (when COLSS is out of service and neither CEAC is operable).

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

#### ACTION:

With the DNBR not being maintained:

1. As indicated by COLSS calculated core power exceeding the appropriate COLSS calculated power operating limit; or
2. With COLSS out of service, operation outside the region of acceptable operation specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT.

within 15 minutes initiate corrective action to increase the DNBR to within the limits and either:

- a. Restore the DNBR to within its limits within 1 hour, or
- b. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.2.4.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.4.2 The DNBR shall be determined to be within its limits when THERMAL POWER is above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER by continuously monitoring the core power distribution with the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) or, with the COLSS out of service, by verifying at least once per 2 hours that the DNBR, as indicated on any OPERABLE DNBR channel, is within the limit specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT.

4.2.4.3 At least once per 31 days, the COLSS Margin Alarm shall be verified to actuate at a THERMAL POWER level less than or equal to the core power operating limit based on DNBR.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4.2.5 RCS FLOW RATE

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.2.5 The actual Reactor Coolant System total flow rate shall be greater than or equal to  $155.8 \times 10^6$  lbm/hr.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

#### ACTION:

With the actual Reactor Coolant System total flow rate determined to be less than the above limit, reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.2.5 The actual Reactor Coolant System total flow rate shall be determined to be greater than or equal to its limit at least once per 12 hours.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4.2.6 REACTOR COOLANT COLD LEG TEMPERATURE

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.2.6 The reactor coolant cold leg temperature ( $T_c$ ) shall be within the Area of Acceptable Operation shown in Figure 3.2-1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1\* and 2\*#.

ACTION:

With the reactor coolant cold leg temperature exceeding its limit, restore the temperature to within its limit within 2 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.2.6 The reactor coolant cold leg temperature shall be determined to be within its limit at least once per 12 hours.

---

\*See Special Test Exception 3.10.4.

#With  $K_{eff}$  greater than or equal to 1

REACTOR COOLANT COLD LEG TEMPERATURE vs CORE POWER LEVEL




FIGURE 3.2-1

REACTOR COOLANT COLD LEG TEMPERATURE VS. CORE POWER LEVEL

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4.2.7 AXIAL SHAPE INDEX

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.2.7 The core average AXIAL SHAPE INDEX (ASI) shall be maintained within the limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 above 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER\*.

#### ACTION:

With the core average AXIAL SHAPE INDEX outside the limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, restore the core average ASI to within its limit within 2 hours or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.2.7 The core average AXIAL SHAPE INDEX shall be determined to be within its limit at least once per 12 hours using the COLSS or any OPERABLE Core Protection Calculator channel.

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\* See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

3/4.2.8 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.2.8 The pressurizer pressure shall be maintained between 2025 psia and 2300 psia.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

With the pressurizer pressure outside its above limits, restore the pressure to within its limit within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.2.8 The pressurizer pressure shall be determined to be within its limit at least once per 12 hours.

## EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

### 3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER TANK

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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- 3.5.4 The refueling water tank (RWT) shall be OPERABLE with:
- a. A minimum borated water volume as specified in Figure 3.1-1 of Specification 3.1.2.5, and
  - b. A boron concentration between 4000 and 4400 ppm of boron, and
  - c. A solution temperature between 60°F and 120°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the refueling water tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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- 4.5.4 The RWT shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 7 days by:
    1. Verifying the contained borated water volume in the tank, and
    2. Verifying the boron concentration of the water.
  - b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the RWT temperature when the (outside) air temperature is outside the 60°F to 120°F range.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES (Continued)

and LSSS setpoints determination. Therefore, time limits have been imposed on operation with inoperable CEAs to preclude such adverse conditions from developing.

Operability of at least two CEA position indicator channels is required to determine CEA positions and thereby ensure compliance with the CEA alignment and insertion limits. The CEA "Full In" and "Full Out" limits provide an additional independent means for determining the CEA positions when the CEAs are at either their fully inserted or fully withdrawn positions. Therefore, the ACTION statements applicable to inoperable CEA position indicators permit continued operations when the positions of CEAs with inoperable position indicators can be verified by the "Full In" or "Full Out" limits.

CEA positions and OPERABILITY of the CEA position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours with more frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable. These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LCOs are satisfied.

The maximum CEA drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed CEA drop time used in the safety analyses. Measurement with  $T_{\text{cold}}$  greater than or equal to 552°F and with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a reactor trip at operating conditions.

Several design steps were employed to accommodate the possible CEA guide tube wear which could arise from CEA vibrations when fully withdrawn. Specifically, a programmed insertion schedule will be used to cycle the CEAs between the full out position ("FULL OUT" LIMIT) and 3.0 inches inserted over the fuel cycle. This cycling will distribute the possible guide tube wear over a larger area, thus minimizing any effects. To accommodate this programmed insertion schedule, the fully withdrawn position was redefined, in some cases, to be 144.75 inches or greater.

The establishment of LSSS and LCOs requires that the expected long- and short-term behavior of the radial peaking factors be determined. The long-term behavior relates to the variation of the steady-state radial peaking factors with core burnup and is affected by the amount of CEA insertion assumed, the portion of a burnup cycle over which such insertion is assumed and the expected power level variation throughout the cycle. The short-term behavior relates to transient perturbations to the steady-state radial peaks due to radial xenon redistribution. The magnitudes of such perturbations depend upon the expected use of the CEAs during anticipated power reductions

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES (Continued)

and load maneuvering. Analyses are performed based on the expected mode of operation of the NSSS (base load maneuvering, etc.) and from these analyses CEA insertions are determined and a consistent set of radial peaking factors defined. The Long Term Steady State and Short Term Insertion Limits are determined based upon the assumed mode of operation used in the analyses and provide a means of preserving the assumptions on CEA insertions used. The limits specified serve to limit the behavior of the radial peaking factors within the bounds determined from analysis. The actions specified serve to limit the extent of radial xenon redistribution effects to those accommodated in the analyses. The Long and Short Term Insertion Limits of Specifications 3.1.3.6 and 3.1.3.7 are specified for the plant which has been designed for primarily base loaded operation but which has the ability to accommodate a limited amount of load maneuvering.

The Transient Insertion Limits of Specifications 3.1.3.6 and 3.1.3.7 and the Shutdown CEA Insertion Limits of Specification 3.1.3.5 ensure that (1) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (2) the potential effects of a CEA ejection accident are limited to acceptable levels. Long-term operation at the Transient Insertion Limits is not permitted since such operation could have effects on the core power distribution which could invalidate assumptions used to determine the behavior of the radial peaking factors.

The PVNGS CPC and COLSS systems are responsible for the safety and monitoring functions, respectively, of the reactor core. COLSS monitors the DNB Power Operating Limit (POL) and various operating parameters to help the operator maintain plant operation within the limiting conditions for operation (LCO). Operating within the LCO guarantees that in the event of an Anticipated Operational Occurrence (AOO), the CPCs will provide a reactor trip in time to prevent unacceptable fuel damage.

The COLSS reserves the Required Overpower Margin (ROPM) to account for Loss of Flow (LOF) and CEA misoperation transients. When the COLSS is Out of Service (COOS), the monitoring function is performed via the CPC calculation of DNBR in conjunction with Technical Specification COOS Limit Lines specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT which restricts the reactor power sufficiently to preserve the ROPM.

The reduction of the CEA deviation penalties in accordance with the CEAC (Control Element Assembly Calculator) sensitivity reduction program has been performed. This task involved setting many of the inward single CEA deviation penalty factors to 1.0. An inward CEA deviation event in effect would not be accompanied by the application of the CEA deviation penalty in either the CPC DNB and LHR (Linear Heat Rate) calculations for those CEAs with the reduced penalty factors. The protection for an inward CEA deviation event is thus accounted for separately.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES (Continued)

If an inward CEA deviation event occurs, the current CPC algorithm applies two penalty factors to each of the DNB and LHR calculations. The first, a static penalty factor, is applied upon detection of the event. The second, a xenon redistribution penalty, is applied linearly as a function of time after the CEA drop. The expected margin degradation for the inward CEA deviation event for which the penalty factor has been reduced is accounted for in two ways. The ROM reserved in COLSS is used to account for some of the margin degradation. Further, a power reduction in accordance with the curve in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT is required. In addition, the part length CEA maneuvering is restricted in accordance with limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT to justify reduction of the PLR deviation penalty factors.

The technical specification permits plant operation if both CEACs are considered inoperable for safety purposes after this period.

## 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.2.1 LINEAR HEAT RATE

The limitation on linear heat rate ensures that in the event of a LOCA, the peak temperature of the fuel cladding will not exceed 2200°F.

Either of the two core power distribution monitoring systems, the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) and the Local Power Density channels in the Core Protection Calculators (CPCs), provide adequate monitoring of the core power distribution and are capable of verifying that the linear heat rate does not exceed its limits. The COLSS performs this function by continuously monitoring the core power distribution and calculating a core power operating limit corresponding to the allowable peak linear heat rate. Reactor operation at or below this calculated power level assures that the limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT are not exceeded.

The COLSS calculated core power and the COLSS calculated core power operating limits based on linear heat rate are continuously monitored and displayed to the operator. A COLSS alarm is annunciated in the event that the core power exceeds the core power operating limit. This provides adequate margin to the linear heat rate operating limit for normal steady-state operation. Normal reactor power transients or equipment failures which do not require a reactor trip may result in this core power operating limit being exceeded. In the event this occurs, COLSS alarms will be annunciated. If the event which causes the COLSS limit to be exceeded results in conditions which approach the core safety limits, a reactor trip will be initiated by the Reactor Protective Instrumentation. The COLSS calculation of the linear heat rate includes appropriate penalty factors which provide, with a 95/95 probability/confidence level, that the maximum linear heat rate calculated by COLSS is conservative with respect to the actual maximum linear heat rate existing in the core. These penalty factors are determined from the uncertainties associated with planar radial peaking measurement, engineering heat flux uncertainty, axial densification, software algorithm modelling, computer processing, rod bow, and core power measurement.

Parameters required to maintain the operating limit power level based on linear heat rate, margin to DNB, and total core power are also monitored by the CPCs. Therefore, in the event that the COLSS is not being used, operation within the linear heat rate limit can be maintained by utilizing any operable CPC channel. The above listed uncertainty and penalty factors plus those associated with the CPC startup test acceptance criteria are also included in the CPCs.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.2.2 PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS

Limiting the values of the PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS ( $F_{xy}^c$ ) used in the COLSS and CPCs to values equal to or greater than the measured PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS ( $F_{xy}^m$ ) provides assurance that the limits calculated by COLSS and the CPCs remain valid. Data from the incore detectors are used for determining the measured PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS. A minimum core power at 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER is assumed in determining the PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS. The 20% RATED THERMAL POWER threshold is due to the neutron flux detector system being inaccurate below 20% core power. Core noise level at low power is too large to obtain usable detector readings. The periodic surveillance requirements for determining the measured PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS provides assurance that the PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS used in COLSS and the CPCs remain valid throughout the fuel cycle. Determining the measured PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS after each fuel loading prior to exceeding 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER provides additional assurance that the core was properly loaded.

#### 3/4.2.3 AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT - $T_q$

The limitations on the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT are provided to ensure that design safety margins are maintained. An AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT greater than the limit specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT with COLSS in service or 0.10 with COLSS out of service is not expected and if it should occur, operation is restricted to only those conditions required to identify the cause of the tilt. The tilt is normally calculated by COLSS. A minimum core power of 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER is assumed by the CPCs in its input to COLSS for calculation of AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT. The 20% RATED THERMAL POWER threshold is due to the neutron flux detector system being inaccurate below 20% core power. Core noise level at low power is too large to obtain usable detector readings. The surveillance requirements specified when COLSS is out of service provide an acceptable means of detecting the presence of a steady-state tilt. It is necessary to explicitly account for power asymmetries because the radial peaking factors used in the core power distribution calculations are based on an untilted power distribution.

The AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT is equal to  $(P_{\text{tilt}}/P_{\text{untilt}})-1.0$  where:

AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT is measured by assuming that the ratio of the power at any core location in the presence of a tilt to the untilted power at the location is of the form:

$$P_{\text{tilt}}/P_{\text{untilt}} = 1 + T_q g \cos(\theta - \theta_0)$$

where:

$T_q$  is the peak fractional tilt amplitude at the core periphery

$g$  is the radial normalizing factor

$\theta$  is the azimuthal core location

$\theta_0$  is the azimuthal core location of maximum tilt

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### BASES

#### AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT - $T_g$ (Continued)

$P_{\text{tilt}}/P_{\text{untilt}}$  is the ratio of the power at a core location in the presence of a tilt to the power at that location with no tilt.

The AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT allowance used in the CPCs is defined as the value of CPC addressable constant TR-1.0.

#### 3/4.2.4 DNBR MARGIN

The limitation on DNBR as a function of AXIAL SHAPE INDEX represents a conservative envelope of operating conditions consistent with the safety analysis assumptions which have been analytically demonstrated adequate to maintain an acceptable minimum DNBR throughout all anticipated operational occurrences. Operation of the core with a DNBR at or above this limit provides assurance that an acceptable minimum DNBR will be maintained in the event of a loss of flow transient.

Either of the two core power distribution monitoring systems, the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) and the DNBR channels in the Core Protection Calculators (CPCs), provide adequate monitoring of the core power distribution and are capable of verifying that the DNBR does not violate its limits. The COLSS performs this function by continuously monitoring the core power distribution and calculating a core operating limit corresponding to the allowable minimum DNBR. The COLSS calculation of core power operating limit based on DNBR includes appropriate penalty factors which provide, with a 95/95 probability/confidence level, that the core power limits calculated by COLSS (based on the minimum DNBR Limit) are conservative with respect to the actual core power limit. These penalty factors are determined from the uncertainties associated with planar radial peaking measurement, engineering heat flux, state parameter measurement, software algorithm modelling, computer processing, rod bow, and core power measurement.

Parameters required to maintain the margin to DNB and total core power are also monitored by the CPCs. Therefore, in the event that the COLSS is not being used, operation within the limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT can be maintained by utilizing a predetermined DNBR as a function of AXIAL SHAPE INDEX and by monitoring the CPC trip channels. The above listed uncertainty and penalty factors are also included in the CPCs which assume a minimum core power of 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER. The 20% RATED THERMAL POWER threshold is due to the neutron flux detector system being less accurate below 20% core power. Core noise level at low power is too large to obtain usable detector readings.

A DNBR penalty factor has been included in the COLSS and CPC DNBR calculations to accommodate the effects of rod bow. The amount of rod bow in each assembly is dependent upon the average burnup experienced by that assembly. Fuel assemblies that incur higher average burnup will experience a greater magnitude of rod bow. Conversely, lower burnup assemblies will experience less rod bow. In design calculations, the penalty for each batch required to compensate for rod bow is determined from a batch's maximum average assembly burnup applied to the batch's maximum integrated planar-radial power peak. A single net penalty for COLSS and CPC is then determined from the penalties associated with each batch, accounting for the offsetting margins due to the lower radial power peaks in the higher burnup batches.

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.2.5 RCS FLOW RATE

This specification is provided to ensure that the actual RCS total flow rate is maintained at or above the minimum value used in the safety analyses.

The minimum value used in the safety analysis is 95% of the design flow rate ( $164.0 \times 10^6$  lbm/hr) or  $155.8 \times 10^6$  lbm/hr. The actual RCS flow rate is determined by direct measurement and an uncertainty associated with that measurement is considered when comparing actual RCS flow rate to the minimum required value of  $155.8 \times 10^6$  lbm/hr.

#### 3/4.2.6 REACTOR COOLANT COLD LEG TEMPERATURE

This specification is provided to ensure that the actual value of reactor coolant cold leg temperature is maintained within the range of values used in the safety analyses.

#### 3/4.2.7 AXIAL SHAPE INDEX

This specification is provided to ensure that the actual value of the core average AXIAL SHAPE INDEX is maintained within the range of values used in the safety analyses.

#### 3/4.2.8 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE

This specification is provided to ensure that the actual value of pressurizer pressure is maintained within the range of values used in the safety analyses.

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

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### CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT

6.9.1.9 Core operating limits shall be established and documented in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT before each reload cycle or any remaining part of a reload cycle for the following:

- a. Shutdown Margin  $K_{N-1}$  - Any CEA Withdrawn for Specification 3.1.1.2
- b. Moderator Temperature Coefficient BOL and EOL limits for Specification 3.1.1.3
- c. Boron Dilution Alarms for Specification 3.1.2.7
- d. Movable Control Assemblies - CEA Position for Specification 3.1.3.1
- e. Regulating CEA Insertion Limits for Specification 3.1.3.6
- f. Part Length CEA Insertion Limits for Specification 3.1.3.7
- g. Linear Heat Rate for Specification 3.2.1
- h. Azimuthal Power Tilt -  $T_q$  for Specification 3.2.3
- i. DNBR Margin for Specification 3.2.4
- j. Axial Shape Index for Specification 3.2.7

6.9.1.10 The analytical methods used to determine the core operating limits shall be those previously reviewed and approved by the NRC in:

- a. "CE Method for Control Element Assembly Ejection Analysis," CENPD-0190-A, January 1976 (Methodology for Specification 3.1.3.6, Regulating CEA Insertion Limits).
- b. "The ROCS and DIT Computer Codes for Nuclear Design," CENPD-266-P-A, April 1983 (Methodology for Specifications 3.1.1.2, Shutdown Margin  $K_{N-1}$  - Any CEA Withdrawn; 3.1.1.3, Moderator Temperature Coefficient BOL and EOL limits and 3.1.3.6, Regulating CEA Insertion Limits).
- c. "Safety Evaluation Report related to the Final Design of the Standard Nuclear Steam Supply Reference Systems CESSAR System 80, Docket No. STN 50-470, "NUREG-0852 (November 1981), Supplements No. 1 (March 1983), No. 2 (September 1983), No. 3 (December 1987) (Methodology for Specifications 3.1.1.2, Shutdown Margin  $K_{N-1}$  - Any CEA Withdrawn; 3.1.1.3, Moderator Temperature Coefficient BOL and EOL limits; 3.1.2.7, Boron Dilution Alarms; 3.1.3.1, Movable Control Assemblies - CEA Position; 3.1.3.6, Regulating CEA Insertion Limits; 3.1.3.7, Part Length CEA Insertion Limits and 3.2.3 Azimuthal Power Tilt -  $T_q$ ).
- d. "Modified Statistical Combination of Uncertainties," CEN-356(V)-P-A Revision 01-P-A, May 1988 (Methodology for Specification 3.2.4, DNBR Margin and 3.2.7 Axial Shape Index).

## ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

### CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (Continued)

- e. "Calculational Methods for the CE Large Break LOCA Evaluation Model," CENPD-132-P, August 1974 (Methodology for Specification 3.2.1, Linear Heat Rate).
- f. "Calculational Methods for the CE Large Break LOCA Evaluation Model," CENPD-132-P, Supplement 1, February 1975 (Methodology for Specification 3.2.1, Linear Heat Rate).
- g. "Calculational Methods for the CE Large Break LOCA Evaluation Model," CENPD-132-P, Supplement 2-P, July 1975 (Methodology for Specification 3.2.1, Linear Heat Rate).
- h. "Calculative Methods for the CE Small Break LOCA Evaluation Model," CENPD-137-P, August 1974 (Methodology for Specification 3.2.1, Linear Heat Rate).
- i. "Calculative Methods for the CE Small Break LOCA Evaluation Model," CENPD-137-P, Supplement 1P, January 1977 (Methodology for Specification 3.2.1, Linear Heat Rate).
- j. Letter: O. D. Parr (NRC) to F. M. Stern (CE), dated June 13, 1975 (NRC Staff Review of the Combustion Engineering ECCS Evaluation Model). NRC approval for: 6.9.1.10e, 6.9.1.10f, 6.9.1.10h.
- k. Letter: O. D. Parr (NRC) to A. E. Scherer (CE), dated December 9, 1975 (NRC Staff Review of the Proposed Combustion Engineering ECCS Evaluation Model Changes). NRC approval for: 6.9.1.10g
- l. Letter: K. Kniel (NRC) to A. E. Scherer (CE), dated September 27, 1977 (Evaluation of Topical Reports CENPD-133, Supplement 3-P and CENPD-137, Supplement 1-P). NRC approval for 6.9.1.10.i.

The core operating limits shall be determined so that all applicable limits (e.g., fuel thermal-mechanical limits, core thermal-hydraulic limits, ECCS limits, nuclear limits such as shutdown margin, and transient and analysis limits) of the safety analysis are met.

The CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, including any mid-cycle revisions or supplements thereto, shall be provided upon issuance, for each reload cycle, to the NRC Document Control Desk with copies to the Regional Administrator and Resident Inspector.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 69 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-41,  
AMENDMENT NO. 55 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-51,  
AND AMENDMENT NO. 42 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-74  
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, ET AL.  
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1, 2, AND 3  
DOCKET NOS. STN 50-528, STN 50-529, AND STN 50-530

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated March 19, 1992, the Arizona Public Service Company (APS or the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (Appendix A to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-41, NPF-51, and NPF-74, respectively). The Arizona Public Service Company submitted this request on behalf of itself, the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, Southern California Edison Company, El Paso Electric Company, Public Service Company of New Mexico, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, and Southern California Public Power Authority. The proposed changes would relocate certain fuel-cycle-specific parameters from the technical specifications to a unit-specific Core Operating Limits Report (COLR), as provided for in NRC Generic Letter (GL) 88-16.

2.0 EVALUATION

The proposed changes to the TS are in accordance with the guidance provided by GL 88-16 and are addressed below.

- (1) The definition section of the TS was modified to include a definition of the COLR that requires cycle/reload-specific parameter limits to be established on a unit-specific basis in accordance with NRC-approved methodologies that maintain the limits of the safety analysis. The definition notes that plant operation within these limits is addressed by individual specifications.
- (2) The following specifications were revised to replace the values of cycle-specific parameter limits with reference to the COLR that provides these limits.

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(a) Specification 3.1.1.2

Shutdown margin limits for this specification are specified in the COLR.

(b) Specification 3.1.1.3

The moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) limits for this specification are specified in the COLR, except that the upper limits on positive moderator temperature coefficient have been retained without change. This modification to the licensee's proposed change was discussed and agreed to by the licensee and is based on the NRC staff's desire to explicitly approve any changes in positive moderator coefficient that could have an adverse impact on previously reviewed analyses for anticipated transients without scram (ATWS).

(c) Specification 3.1.2.7

The boron dilution alarm limits for this specification are specified in the COLR.

(d) Specification 3.1.3.1

The core power limits for the moveable control rod assemblies-CEA position deviation are specified in the COLR.

(e) Specifications 3.1.3.6 and 3.1.3.7

The regulating CEA insertion limits and part-length CEA insertion limits for these specifications are specified in the COLR.

(f) Specification 3.2.1

The linear heat rate limit for this specification is specified in the COLR.

(g) Specification 3.2.3

The maximum tilt limits for this specification are specified in the COLR.

(h) Specification 3.2.4

The DNBR margin related limits for this specification are specified in the COLR.

(i) Specification 3.2.7

The axial shape index range limits for this specification are specified in the COLR.

The bases of affected specifications have been modified by the licensee to include appropriate reference to the COLR. Based on our review, we conclude that the changes to these bases are acceptable.

- (3) Specification 6.9.1.9 is revised to include the COLR under the reporting requirements of the Administrative Control section of the TS. This specification requires that the COLR be submitted, upon issuance, to the NRC Document Control Desk with copies to the Regional Administrator and Resident Inspector. The report provides the values of cycle-specific parameter limits that are applicable for the current fuel cycle. Furthermore, this specification requires that the NRC-approved methodologies be used in establishing the values of these limits for the relevant specifications and that the values be consistent with all applicable limits of the safety analysis. The approved methodologies are the following:
- (a) CENPD-190-A, "C-E Method for Control Element Assembly Ejection Analysis," January, 1976 (Methodology for Specification 3.1.3.6 regulating CEA insertion limits).
  - (b) CENPD-266-P-A, "The ROCS and DIT Computer Codes for Nuclear Design," April, 1983 (Methodology for Specifications 3.1.1.2 shutdown margin  $K_{eff}$  - any CEA withdrawn, 3.1.1.3 moderator temperature coefficient BOL and EOL limits and 3.1.3.6 regulating CEA insertion limits).
  - (c) CENPD-153-P, Revision 1-P-A, "INCA/CECOR Power Peaking Uncertainty," May, 1980.
  - (d) NUREG-0852, "Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Final Design of the Standard Nuclear Steam Supply Reference Systems CESSAR System 80, Docket No. STN 50-470," November 1981; Supplement No. 1, March 1983; No. 2, September 1983; No. 3, December 1987.
  - (e) CEN-356(V)-P-A, Revision 01-P-A, "Modified Statistical Combination of Uncertainties," May, 1988 (Methodology for Specification 3.2.4 DNBR Margin and Axial Shape Index).
  - (f) CENPD-132-P, "Calculations Methods for the C-E Large Break LOCA Evaluation Model," August 1974; Supplement No. 1, February 1975; No. 2, July 1975 (Methodology for Specification 3.2.1 Linear Heat Rate).
  - (g) CENPD-137-P, "Calculative Methods for the C-E Small Break LOCA Evaluation Model," August 1974; Supplement No. 1, January 1977 (Methodology for Specification 3.2.1 Linear Heat Rate).

Finally, the specification requires that all changes in cycle-specific parameter limits be documented in the COLR before each reload cycle or remaining part of a reload cycle and submitted upon issuance to NRC prior to operation with the new parameter limits. The licensee has identified the applicable specifications to be relocated to the COLR under each approved methodology cited above. This list was modified by the licensee at the request of the NRC staff to more particularly identify the approved methodology for each specification to be relocated to the COLR, and to list the NRC approval documents for each topical report where NRC approval was not obvious from the title of the report.

On the basis of the review, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee has provided an acceptable response to the items in GL 88-16 on modifying cycle-specific parameter limits in TS. Because plant operation continues to be limited in accordance with the values of cycle-specific parameter limits that are established using NRC-approved methodologies, the NRC staff concludes that this change has no impact on plant safety. Accordingly, the staff finds that the proposed changes are acceptable.

### 3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Arizona State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

### 4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (57 FR 18169). In addition, the amendment changes recordkeeping or reporting requirements. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) and (10). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

### 5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such

activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: T. Huang

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