

June 3, 1987

Docket No.: 50-528

Mr. E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
Executive Vice President
Arizona Nuclear Power Project
Post Office Box 52034
Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034

Dear Mr. Van Brunt:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 17 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-41
FOR PALO VERDE UNIT 1 (TAC NO. 63134)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 17 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-41 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application transmitted by letter dated October 2, 1986.

The amendment revised Specification 3/4.6.1, "Primary Containment," and Specification 3/4.6.2, "Depressurization and Cooling Systems," to change (1) pressure values for testing containment leakage rates based on the results of a revised containment accident analysis, and (2) the ACTION statement for Specification 3.6.1.3 to allow a containment air lock door to be opened, for a cumulative time not to exceed one hour per year, to permit entry for repairing an inoperable inner air lock door. The changes made the Specifications for these systems consistent with the Technical Specifications previously approved by the staff for Palo Verde Unit 2 (Appendix A to Facility Operating License NPF-51) and Palo Verde Unit 3 (Appendix A to Facility Operating License NPF-65).

Page 3/4 6-30 was revised in Amendment No. 15, which was issued April 18, 1987. In order to correct typographical errors on Page 3/4 6-30, it is being reissued at this time along with its overleaf page (3/4 6-29).

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A copy of the Safety Evaluation supporting the amendment is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular bi-weekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

E. A. Licitra, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate V
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV/V
& Special Projects

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 17 to NPF-41
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Pages 3/4 6-29 and 3/4 6-30

cc: See next page

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6/3/87

Mr. E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
Arizona Nuclear Power Project

Palo Verde

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, ET AL.

DOCKET NO. STN 50-528

PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 17
License No. NPF-41

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment, dated October 2, 1986, by the Arizona Public Service Company (APS) on behalf of itself and the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, El Paso Electric Company, Southern California Edison Company, Public Service Company of New Mexico, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, and Southern California Public Power Authority (licensees), complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public;
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the enclosure to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-41 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 17, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in this license. APS shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



George W. Knighton, Director
Project Directorate V
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV/V
& Special Projects

Enclosure:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: June 3, 1987

June 3, 1987

ENCLOSURE TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 17

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-41

DOCKET NO. STN 50-528

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change. Also to be replaced are the following overleaf pages to the amended pages.

Amendment Pages

Overleaf Pages

3/4 6-1
3/4 6-2
3/4 6-3
3/4 6-4
3/4 6-5
3/4 6-15
B 3/4 6-2

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3/4 6-6
3/4 6-16
B 3/4 6-1

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations* not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions except as provided in Table 3.6-1 of Specification 3.6.3.
- b. By verifying that each containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.
- c. After each closing of each penetration subject to Type B testing, except containment air locks, if opened following a Type A or B test, by leak rate testing the seal with gas at P_a 49.5 psig and verifying that when the measured leakage rate for^a these seals is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.2d. for all other Type B and C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less than or equal to 0.60 L_a.

* Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment and are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to:

- a. An overall integrated leakage rate of:
 1. Less than or equal to L_a , 0.10% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at P_a , 49.5 psig, or
 2. Less than or equal to L_t , 0.05% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at a reduced pressure of P_t , 24.8 psig.
- b. A combined leakage rate of less than or equal to $0.60 L_a$ for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests, when pressurized to P_a .

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With either (a) the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceeding $0.75 L_a$ or $0.75 L_t$, as applicable, or (b) with the measured combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Types B and C tests exceeding $0.60 L_a$, restore the overall integrated leakage rate to less than or equal to $0.75 L_a$ or less than or equal to $0.75 L_t$, as applicable, and the combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests to less than or equal to $0.60 L_a$ prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 210°F.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.2 The containment leakage rates shall be demonstrated at the following test schedule and shall be determined in conformance with the criteria specified in Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50 using the methods and provisions of ANSI N45.4 - 1972:

- a. Three Type A tests (Overall Integrated Containment Leakage Rate) shall be conducted at 40 ± 10 month intervals during shutdown at either P_a 49.5 psig or at P_t 24.8 psig during each 10-year service period. The third test of each set shall be conducted during the shutdown for the 10-year plant inservice inspection.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.6.1.4 INTERNAL PRESSURE

The limitations on containment internal pressure ensure that (1) the containment structure is prevented from exceeding its design negative pressure differential with respect to the outside atmosphere of 4 psig and (2) the containment peak pressure does not exceed the design pressure of 60 psig during LOCA conditions.

The maximum peak pressure expected to be obtained from a LOCA event is 49.5 psig. The limit of 2.5 psig for initial positive containment pressure will limit the total pressure to 49.5 psig which is less than the design pressure (60 psig) and is consistent with the safety analyses.

3/4.6.1.5 AIR TEMPERATURE

The limitation on containment average air temperature ensures that the overall containment average air temperature does not exceed the initial temperature condition assumed in the safety analysis.

3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to ensure that the containment will withstand the maximum pressure of 49.5 psig in the event of a LOCA. The containment design pressure is 60 psig. The measurement of containment tendon lift-off force; the tensile tests of the tendon wires or strands; the examination and testing of the sheathing filler grease; and the visual examination of tendon anchorage assembly hardware, surrounding concrete and the exterior surfaces of the containment are sufficient to demonstrate this capability. The tendon wire or strand samples will also be subjected to tests. All of the required testing and visual examinations should be performed in a time frame that permits a comparison of the results for the same operating history.

The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the containment's structural integrity are in compliance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.35, "Inservice Surveillance of Ungrouted Tendons in Prestressed Concrete Containment Structures," Revision 3, 1984, and Regulatory Guide 1.35.1, "Determining Prestressing Forces for Inspection of Prestressed Concrete Containments," 1984.

The required Special Reports from any engineering evaluation of containment abnormalities shall include a description of the tendon condition, the condition of the concrete (especially at tendon anchorages), the inspection procedures, the tolerances on cracking, the results of the engineering evaluation, and the corrective actions taken.

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

3/4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the safety analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation, will limit the site boundary radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR Part 100 during accident conditions.

3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

The limitations on containment leakage rates ensure that the total containment leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the safety analyses at the peak accident pressure, P_a . As an added conservatism, the measured overall integrated leakage rate is further limited to less than or equal to $0.75 L_a$ or less than or equal to $0.75 L_t$, as applicable during performance of the periodic tests to account for possible degradation of the containment leakage barriers between leakage tests.

The surveillance testing for measuring leakage rates are consistent with the requirements of Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50.

3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

The limitations on closure and leak rate for the containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and containment leak rate. Surveillance testing of the air lock seals provides assurance that the overall air lock leakage will not become excessive due to seal damage during the intervals between air lock leakage tests.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- b. If any periodic Type A test fails to meet either $0.75 L_a$ or $0.75 L_t$, the test schedule for subsequent Type A tests shall be reviewed and approved by the Commission. If two consecutive Type A tests fail to meet either $0.75 L_a$ or $0.75 L_t$, a Type A test shall be performed at least every 18 months until two consecutive Type A tests meet either $0.75 L_a$ or $0.75 L_t$ at which time the above test schedule may be resumed.
- c. The accuracy of each Type A test shall be verified by a supplemental test which:
 - 1. Confirms the accuracy of the Type A test by verifying that the supplemental test result L_c minus the sum of the Type A test result, L_{am} , and the superimposed leak rate, L_o , is equal to or less than $0.25 L_a$.
 - 2. Has a duration sufficient to establish accurately the change in leakage rate between the Type A test and the supplemental test.
 - 3. Requires that the rate at which gas is injected into the containment or bled from the containment during the supplemental test is between $0.75 L_a$ and $1.25 L_a$.
- d. Type B and C tests shall be conducted with gas at P_a , 49.5 psig, at intervals no greater than 24 months except for tests involving:
 - 1. Air locks,
 - 2. Purge supply and exhaust isolation valves with resilient material seals.
- e. Purge supply and exhaust isolation valves with resilient material seals shall be tested and demonstrated OPERABLE per Specifications 4.6.1.7.3 and 4.6.1.7.4.
- f. Air locks shall be tested and demonstrated OPERABLE per Specification 4.6.1.3.
- g. The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.3 Each containment air lock shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. Both doors closed except when the air lock is being used for normal transit entry and exit through the containment, then at least one air lock door shall be closed, and
- b. An overall air lock leakage rate of less than or equal to $0.05 L_a$ at P_a , 49.5 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

- a. With one containment air lock door inoperable:
 1. Maintain at least the OPERABLE air lock door closed* and either restore the inoperable air lock door to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or lock the OPERABLE air lock door closed. Operation may then continue until performance of the next required overall air lock leakage test provided that the OPERABLE air lock door is verified to be locked closed at least once per 31 days, or
 2. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
 3. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
- b. With the containment air lock inoperable, except as the result of an inoperable air lock door, maintain at least one air lock door closed; restore the inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.3 Each containment air lock shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. Within 72 hours following each closing, except when the air lock is being used for multiple entries, then at least once per 72 hours, by verifying seal leakage to be less than or equal to $0.01 L_a$ when determined with the volume between the door seals pressurized to greater than or equal to 14.5 ± 0.5 psig, for at least 15 minutes,

*Except during entry to repair an inoperable inner door, for a cumulative time not to exceed 1 hour per year.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- b. By conducting overall air lock leakage tests at not less than P_a , 49.5 psig, and verifying the overall air lock leakage rate is within its limit:
 - 1. At least once per 6 months#, and
 - 2. Prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY when maintenance has been performed on the air lock that could affect the air lock sealing capability.*
- c. At least once per 6 months by verifying that only one door in each air lock can be opened at a time.

#The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

*This constitutes an exemption to Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

INTERNAL PRESSURE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.4 Primary containment internal pressure shall be maintained between -0.3 and 2.5 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the containment internal pressure outside of the limits above, restore the internal pressure to within the limits within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.4 The primary containment internal pressure shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 12 hours.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.2.1 Two independent containment spray systems shall be OPERABLE with each spray system capable of taking suction from the RWT on a containment spray actuation signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a recirculation actuation signal. Each spray system flow path from the containment sump shall be via an OPERABLE shutdown cooling heat exchanger.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.*

ACTION:

With one containment spray system inoperable, restore the inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours., restore the inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.6.2.1 Each containment spray system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path is positioned to take suction from the RWT on a containment spray actuation (CSAS) test signal.
 - b. By verifying that each pump develops an indicated differential pressure of greater than or equal to 257 psid at greater than or equal the minimum allowable recirculation flowrate when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.
 - c. At least once per 31 days by verifying that the system piping is full of water to the 60 inch level in the containment spray header (>115 foot level).
 - d. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:
 1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a containment spray actuation (CSAS) and recirculation actuation (RAS) test signal.
 2. Verifying that upon a recirculation actuation test signal, the containment sump isolation valves open and that a recirculation mode flow path via an OPERABLE shutdown cooling heat exchanger is established.

*Only when shutdown cooling is not in operation.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

3. Verifying that each spray pump starts automatically on a safety injection actuation (SIAS) and on a containment spray actuation (CSAS) test signal.
- e. At least once per 5 years by performing an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

VALVE NUMBER	PENETRATION NUMBER	FUNCTION	MAXIMUM ACTUATION TIME (SECONDS)
E. SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES			
SIA-PSV 151#	23	Containment recirculation sump to containment spray, LPSI and HPSI headers 1A & 1B	N.A.
SIB-PSV 140#	24	Containment recirculation sump to containment spray, LPSI and HPSI headers 2A & 2B	N.A.
SIB-PSV 189	26	From shutdown cooling RC Loop 2	N.A.*
SIA-PSV 179	27	From shutdown cooling RC Loop 1	N.A.*
SIE-PSV 474	28	Safety injection drain relief	N.A.

*Valves also covered by Specification 3/4.4.8.3

#Not Type C Tested

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

VALVE NUMBER	PENETRATION NUMBER	FUNCTION	MAXIMUM ACTUATION TIME (SECONDS)
F. NORMALLY OPEN - ESF ACTUATED CLOSED			
SGE-UV 169#	1 & 2	Main steam isolation bypass	N.A.
SGE-UV 183#	3 & 4	Main steam isolation bypass	N.A.
SGA-UV 1133#	1-4	Steam trap/bypass	N.A.
SGA-UV 1134#	1-4	Steam trap/bypass	N.A.
SGB-UV 1135A#	1-4	Steam trap/bypass	N.A.
SGB-UV 1135B#	1-4	Steam trap/bypass	N.A.
SGB-UV 1136A#	1-4	Steam trap/bypass	N.A.
SGB-UV 1136B#	1-4	Steam trap/bypass	N.A.
SGA-UV 174#	8	Steam generator feedwater	N.A.
SGB-UV 132#	8	Steam generator feedwater	N.A.
SGB-UV 137#	10	Steam generator feedwater	N.A.
SGA-UV 177#	10	Steam generator feedwater	N.A.
SGB-UV 130#	11	Downcomer FIV	N.A.
SGA-UV 172#	11	Downcomer FIV	N.A.
SGB-UV 135#	12	Downcomer FIV	N.A.

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#Not Type C tested



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 17 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-41
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, ET AL.
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 1
DOCKET NO. STN 50-528

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated October 2, 1986, the Arizona Public Service Company (APS) on behalf of itself, the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, Southern California Edison Company, El Paso Electric Company, Public Service Company of New Mexico, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, and Southern California Public Power Authority (licensees), requested changes to the Technical Specifications for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 (Appendix A to Facility Operating License NPF-41). The application requests that Technical Specifications 3/4.6.1 and 3/4.6.2 be revised to be consistent with those same Specifications in the Palo Verde, Unit 2 and Unit 3 Technical Specifications (Appendices A to Facility Operating Licenses NPF-51 and NPF-65, respectively) previously reviewed and approved by the staff.

2.0 DISCUSSION

The performance of the existing containment spray system for PVNGS, Unit 1 is based on a single train flowrate of 3,740 gpm. In order to increase the containment spray performance margin for technical specification surveillance testing and to account for a possible future reduction of flowrate, the licensees performed an analysis based on an assumed reduced flowrate of 3,525 gpm for the containment spray pump. The resultant containment peak accident pressure, based on this new assumed flowrate, increased from 49.2 to 49.5 psig, which is well within the containment design pressure of 60 psig.

All except one of the changes in the Technical Specifications requested by the licensees result from the revised containment pressure analysis. The remaining change involves a clarification for the containment air lock door. Specifically, the proposed revisions to the Technical Specifications consist of the following:

- (a) Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.6.1.2.a, 3.6.1.3.b and Surveillance Requirements 4.6.1.1.c, 4.6.1.2.a, 4.6.1.2.d, 4.6.1.3.b and associated Bases sections: change the containment peak accident pressure (Pa) from 49.2 psig to 49.5 psig based upon the results of the revised containment analyses. Also, the reduction in flowrate does not adversely affect the evaluation of ECCS performance since that evaluation is based on a maximum flowrate to obtain the minimum containment backpressure. In addition, the flowrate reduction has a minimal effect on the containment temperature analysis and does not increase the environmental qualification temperature envelope for affected equipment.
- (b) Surveillance Requirement 4.6.2.1.b: change the containment spray pump differential pressure requirement from 273 psid to 257 psid. This change is in accordance with the assumptions used in the revised containment analyses where the containment spray pump flowrate was reduced in order to increase operating margins. This change is also based upon the results of the revised containment analyses.
- (c) Action Statement a.1 of Limiting Condition for Operation 3.6.1.3: add a clarification note to the Action Statement to allow for the opening of the outer containment air lock door to facilitate the repair of an inoperable inner air lock door. The clarification also limits the allowable time spent with the outer air lock door open to one hour per year.

3.0 EVALUATION

The staff's evaluation of the licensees' proposed amendment request is presented in the following discussion.

Item (a) of the proposed changes is a result of the reduction of the flowrate of the containment spray system from 3,740 gpm to 3,525 gpm. This change in the flowrate results in an increase of containment peak accident pressure from 49.2 to 49.5 psig. Since the increase in pressure is still well within the containment design pressure of 60 psig, it does not present a concern to the integrity of the containment structure. Therefore, this proposed change is acceptable.

Item (b) is in accordance with the assumptions used in the revised containment analyses and the reduced containment spray pump flowrate as explained in Item (a). During the pre-operational and surveillance tests, it has been observed that there is a very small margin between the technical specification requirements for containment spray pump differential pressure (273 psid at the minimum recirculation flow) and the actual test results. In order to avoid plant unavailability, the licensees propose to change the differential pressure for containment spray pump to 257 psid. This proposed change is consistent with the containment spray system flow assumption of 3,525 gpm used in the revised containment analyses and, therefore, is acceptable.

Item (c) of the proposed changes allows for the opening of the outer containment air lock door to facilitate the repair of an inoperable inner air lock door. Generally, an inoperable inner air lock door is a closed door that has not met the surveillance leakage testing requirements for operability. Since the cumulative time for an open outer door is limited to one hour per year and the inoperable inner door would normally be closed, the proposed change is acceptable.

The staff had previously reviewed and approved the above changes for Palo Verde, Units 2 and 3, which are identical to Palo Verde, Unit 1, prior to issuing the Technical Specifications for Units 2 and 3. The proposed changes on Unit 1 make these portions of the Unit 1 Technical Specifications consistent with those previously approved on the Unit 2 and Unit 3 Technical Specifications.

Therefore, the staff concludes that the proposed changes to the Palo Verde, Unit 1 Technical Specifications are acceptable.

4.0 CONTACT WITH STATE OFFICIAL

The Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency has been advised of the proposed determination of no significant hazards consideration with regard to this request for changes to the Technical Specifications. No comments were received.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

This amendment involves a change in the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued proposed findings that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such findings. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Sec. 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR Section 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need to be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. We, therefore, conclude that the proposed changes are acceptable.

Principal Contributor: R. Lipinski

Dated: June 3, 1987

DISTRIBUTION

Docket File 50-528

NRC PDR

Local PDR

PD5 Reading

GMHolahan

JLee (5)

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EJordan

JPartlow

TBarnhart (4)

WJones

EButcher

RLipinski

ACRS (10)

GPA/PA

ARM/LFMB

MDavis