




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June 7, 2002

Ellis W. Merschoff
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Subject: Owner Controlled Area Public Notification
River Bend Station - Unit I
License No. NPF-47
Docket No. 50-458

File Nos.: G9.5, G15.4.1
RBG-45976
RBF1-02-0099

Dear Mr. Merschoff:

Entergy Operations, Incorporated (EOI) River Bend Station (RBS), is providing this letter as a supplement to our May 31, 2002 submittal regarding the preliminary yellow finding associated with owner controlled area evacuation issues at RBS. This supplement provides clarification points on issues discussed at the June 3, 2002 regulatory conference in Arlington, Texas.

Attachment 1 addresses several of the key points discussed in the June 3, 2002 meeting regarding an OCA evacuation of the public by security and the RBS conclusion of reasonable assurance that an entire OCA evacuation would occur. Attachment 2 summarizes our understanding of the context of our Licensing Basis and the standard of reasonableness applied by the regulations. Attachment 3 provides correction to a typographical error in our May 31st letter. We will provide further information requested relative to the industry survey referenced in our May 31st letter and discussed in our presentation at the June 3rd meeting, in the near future.

The clarifying information provided in this letter further substantiates a conclusion of no adverse impact on public health and safety, as stated in our May 31st letter. If the NRC decision were to conclude that this issue warrants a yellow or white finding on these matters, EOI continues to believe the issue would then be subject to the provisions of the backfit rule.

I hope this information helps to provide further clarification regarding the RBS position on the subject finding. Should you have any questions regarding the attached information, please contact Mr. Joe Leavines of my staff at (225) 381-4642.

Sincerely,



RJK/rlb
attachments

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Attachment 1

River Bend Station (RBS) Key OCA Evacuation Points

Introduction

During the Regulatory Conference held June 3, 2002, EOI discussed the procedures, training and skill sets of the Security Officers and ERO members relative to successful completion of an Owner Controlled Area (OCA) evacuation.

We presented the skills and training of our security officers in great detail. We believe, however, that we did not clearly convey the simple nature of physically conducting a security sweep of the OCA that would be performed during an evacuation of the entire OCA. Information relative to this activity is contained in SPI-30 "Security Motor Patrol", which was included as a part of the June 3, 2002 presentation package.

We are confident that RBS has always had the capability to perform an effective sweep and evacuation of the entire OCA. We will briefly summarize the training, procedure requirements, and skills and then describe the daily activities applicable to the task and the conduct of an OCA sweep.

Summary

The River Bend Emergency Implementing Procedures (EIP's) define an OCA Evacuation¹ such that the Emergency Response Organization is clear on the area boundaries to be evacuated, and that the evacuation instructions include every person in the OCA. Roles and responsibilities are also defined in the EIP's.

An Owner Controlled Area evacuation is initiated at a SAE/GE when the Emergency Director issues an instruction to Security to evacuate the entire OCA. The Security Coordinator/Security Shift Supervisor then directs security officers to evacuate the OCA. Security officers are directed to start at a designated point after being briefed, to ensure that the sweep is coordinated and comprehensive.

¹ **"Owner Controlled Area Evacuation** - The withdrawal of all non-essential personnel, visitors, and contractor personnel (excluding security) from the entire Owner Controlled Area. Non-essential personnel are defined as all station personnel not performing emergency organization duties. The Owner Controlled Area, which includes the Protected Area, is all land owned and controlled by River Bend Station [emphasis added], an area from the Mississippi River to U.S. Hwy. 61, and from West Feliciana Parish (WFP) 7 (Powell Station Road/State Highway 965) on the South to the North boundary of the River Bend Site property."

The officers proceed around the circular road net and along the branch roads looking for nonessential personnel, members of the public and parked vehicles and checking buildings. Visitor parking at the station is limited to parking lots and designated parking stations adjacent to the station road network. Each building is entered and the evacuation message given. Directions to travel for evacuation are simple, owing to the simple layout of the roads through the OCA.

The Security officers are completely familiar with the roads, buildings, and parking areas in the OCA. They have conducted motor patrols on the same roads either continuously or on a multiple time per shift basis for the life of the plant. This is a 7-day per week duty. Officers are detailed from each shift to perform this duty and are likely to be the ones conducting the evacuation, if required. Patrolling the entire OCA road network is a routine task frequently performed by security officers, utilizing SPI-30 on a daily basis, which requires the patrols to proactively discover, evaluate and report:

- Groupings of personnel or vehicles
- Vehicles, personnel or objects in the vicinity of security fencing, alarm zones or PA buildings
- Erratic behavior or driving
- Abandoned, unattended, or illegally parked vehicles
- Changes in the condition of facilities located in the OCA

The officers direct removal of personnel from the property as required.

SPI-30 also stipulates security officer response to individuals engaged in various activities on the property. This would include individuals trespassing for hunting or fishing in the OCA. Security officers on patrol can readily see vehicles and are knowledgeable of public activities and locations in the OCA. Security officer ongoing awareness of where sportsmen are located in the woods has even led to security officers offering to help tag and transport harvested deer to the roadside.

Therefore, the Security officers are exposed on a daily basis to the buildings and locations where members of the public may be found. They are required to interact with members of the public encountered during these patrols on the property. In the event of an OCA evacuation, the security officers on patrol are already familiar with the locations of buildings and vehicle-parking areas occasionally used by members of the public. It is not only true that officers would be aware of the locations where public may generally be found; it is likely they would know the particular location of public through patrol observations performed just prior to the evacuation order.

Security officers interact every day with the public in and around the OCA as they investigate, evaluate, initiate removal of public when warranted, and provide assistance to the public when necessary.

In addition, various site facilities have been utilized for public use since original licensing of the station, which is reflected in the original Emergency Implementing Procedure, EIP-2-026, "Evacuation".

Visitor parking at the station is limited to parking lots and designated parking stations adjacent to the station road network. The site is heavily wooded and there are limited locations where vehicles can park along the road adjacent to the wooded areas.

Discussion

The River Bend OCA evacuation strategy has remained unchanged since initial approval. The original revision of Emergency Implementing Procedure EIP-2-026, "Evacuation", defined an Owner Controlled Area evacuation as "...the withdrawal of all non-essential **personnel** from the entire owner controlled area." Instructions for the Emergency Director (ED) required the ED to "Request that Security Officers make a tour of the Owner Controlled Area....to warn **anyone** present in the Area to evacuate immediately." Security Officers assigned to evacuate the OCA were directed to "Traverse the Owner Controlled Area as directed....making announcements concerning the emergency and directing **individuals** to leave the area immediately." It is clear that from the initial procedure reviewed at the time of licensing, that various terms such as people, personnel, anyone, and individuals have been used interchangeably to mean all persons inside the OCA.

The initial revision of procedure EIP-2-026, "Evacuation", did not list any buildings on the site. Therefore, the subsequent partial building listings in EIP-2-018, "Technical Support Center", are an enhancement to the original approved evacuation procedure. The partial building listings were provided in the Security Coordinator OCA Evacuation instructions as an improvement to remind security officers not to assume the gaitronics Public Address (PA) system would notify people in buildings. The Security Coordinator is directed to "Direct security officers to sweep the Owner Controlled Area outside of the protected area to ensure personnel are aware of the evacuation order. Some areas such as the warehouse, MA-1/2, Field Administration, and Training Center may not hear the evacuation order on the gaitronics." It is apparent that the partial listing within the instruction was not intended to definitively list buildings to be evacuated, rather the instruction as a whole was added as an enhancement to remind security they are responsible for ensuring evacuation of all buildings and that crediting the gaitronics PA system for evacuation notification is not acceptable.

In addition to entering buildings, security officers drive along the site road network to warn and evacuate everyone encountered. They have been trained to repeat their sweep to assure people have evacuated. From October 1990 until November 2001, there was the possibility that members of the Sportsman's Club could be on the OCA property. The OCA property is posted to limit access to club members. Members of the Sportsman's Club abided by the club charter. The charter required members to abide by the following rules:

- Members are limited to full-time or retired Entergy employees. The club President and Vice-President are required to be River Bend employees.
- Check-in and check-out procedures are required and include:
 - A logbook is kept to maintain a record of all personnel entering company property on Club business.
 - The logbook must have the time entering the woods recorded and the map must be appropriately pinned for hunting, fishing, scouting, club work or any other activity. When returning, the time must be logged when exiting the woods and the pin removed from the map at that time.
 - The logbook shall be located in a prominent place at all times.
- All members must have a River Bend Sportsman's Club (RBSC) ID card in their possession and a visible RBSC window decal/brightly colored sign on their vehicle.
- All members are required to park in pre-designated areas (along and adjacent to the routinely patrolled road network).

Security officers can readily determine sportsmen's location(s) during sweeps by noting vehicles parked along the roadways in the designated parking area(s). As vehicles are encountered, security officers stop and make announcements utilizing loudspeaker equipment. Security officers have available, as an additional tool, the logbook and pinned map in the Sportsman's Club that shows locations of sportsmen in the woods.

Security Officers are directed to sweep the OCA in EIP-2-018, "Technical Support Center", to complete the OCA evacuation. Sweeping is a very simple process carried out by traversing the site road network, which simply consists of a roughly circular main road network around the station. The network is composed of the Plant Access Road (Power Station Road) and Highway 965 (Powell Station Road) which intersect Highway 61. Other roads in the OCA, such as the River Access Road, all connect to the circular road network. Security traverses the road network to implement an evacuation by stopping at all buildings, vehicles, and persons encountered as they sweep the area along the road network. Routine patrols of the OCA road network have been performed at a minimum frequency of several times per shift since initial licensing. RBS security officers are highly knowledgeable of the OCA. They have been in RBS Security for an average of 10 years. They have performed rotating assignments that include OCA patrolling per SPI-30 and are very familiar with the OCA.

In addition, the overall size of the non-essential personnel population on the property, which would include the public, has significantly decreased since original licensing. In 1985, upon initial licensing, there were over 3000 utility and contract workers on site, whereas there are approximately 800 (approximately 600 EOI and 200 contract) today. Overall, there has been a dramatic reduction in the number of people who would require notification and evacuation under fundamentally the same OCA evacuation program.

Facility changes have occurred since original construction as well. Numerous construction trailers and lay-down work areas in service during the early days of the

plant have been removed. Some of the buildings that remain, such as the West Feliciana Community Development Center, have been occupied by individuals from Human Resources, other utility employees or the public over the years. The current Activity Center was initially called the Energy Center and was designated for public access and education. The Energy Center was originally utilized for public use and visitation when the station was licensed, and is shown on Figure 1 of EIP-2-026, Revision 0. The notification and OCA evacuation strategy for the facilities remains unchanged regardless of the specifics of the individual occupancy.

In ERO drills, Joint Information Center (JIC) personnel field drill questions from the public and the media. One of the pre-scripted questions available for selection from the Controller Notebook by the JIC phone team controller states "My brother is out hunting somewhere around the River Bend plant, can someone go find him and get him out of there before he gets hurt?" This question and others related to the public have been used for years to train station ERO personnel. Posing this question to JIC personnel would cause the information request to be relayed to the TSC Security Coordinator in order for Protective Actions to be taken for the affected public. Inclusion of the questions in the database and drills indicates a historical site awareness of required actions regarding members of the public in the OCA.

A January 2002 drill was used to validate existing processes and procedures without providing additional training to security officers in this area. Security successfully accomplished the following drill objectives:

- ✓ Demonstrate the capability to alert and fully mobilize personnel required to conduct an OCA evacuation.
- ✓ Demonstrate the capability to communicate with all appropriate emergency personnel.
- ✓ Demonstrate the adequacy of vehicles, equipment, and procedures for evacuating the OCA.
- ✓ Demonstrate the capability to notify non-essential personnel in the OCA of the need to evacuate in a timely manner.
- ✓ Demonstrate the ability to manage and control personnel response, directing response actions as necessary, and performing actions in accordance with appropriate procedures and instructions.

Conclusion

- Security officers sweep the River Bend Owner Controlled Area road network to evacuate the entire Owner Controlled Area. Security traverses the road network to implement an evacuation by stopping at all buildings, vehicles, and persons encountered as they systematically sweep along the road network.
- Sweeping the OCA is performed by traversing the road network surrounding the station.

- SPI-30 stipulates security officer response to individuals engaged in various activities on the property. This would include sweeps of the OCA road network. Security officers are assigned this duty on each shift, every day of the week.
- A redundant system is available as a tool to locate sportsmen in wooded areas.
- River Bend has used terms such as *personnel*, *anyone*, and *individuals* interchangeably to refer to all persons in the OCA since approved by the NRC during initial licensing.
- The partial building list in EIP-2-018 was added as an enhancement to the original procedures to ensure security sweeps are utilized for notification and evacuation rather than crediting the gaitronics system for notification.
- The potential numbers of current evacuees (persons) and building/trailer locations are dramatically less than when the station was originally licensed.
- Facilities in the OCA, such as the Activity Center/Energy Center, have been utilized by the public since initial licensing, and public presence was reflected in the original evacuation procedure.
- Drills have trained ERO members by simulating scenarios where protective actions would have to be developed for members of the public in the OCA.
- A successful drill was performed in January 2002 to validate existing processes and procedures without providing additional training to security officers performing the OCA sweep.

Sweeping the OCA to proactively seek out the locations of all individuals on the property is a routine task performed by security officers. Awareness of, and interfacing with, the public on the OCA property is a repetitive function performed by patrolling security officers on every shift. Patrolling officers seek out, monitor and remain aware of individuals and activities within the OCA. Routine OCA patrols which are performed frequently, if not continuously, traverse the OCA road network. Patrolling activities closely mimic the sweeping actions that would be required in an evacuation.

River Bend procedures, training, skills, and routine patrol activities demonstrate the station has always possessed the means to effectively warn, advise and evacuate all individuals in the entire Owner Controlled Area.

Attachment 2

Regulatory Basis Context - Standard of Reasonableness

When the NRC reviewed the RBS emergency plan, a standard of reasonableness was applied as discussed in NUREG 0654 that resulted in approval of the plan as issued in the NRC's Safety Evaluation Report in NUREG-0989, dated May 1985. Therefore, the RBS licensing basis was approved based on a standard of reasonableness and the plan met that standard. This perspective is further reinforced by the requirements of 10CFR50.54 (q) that requires all changes to emergency plans be reviewed to determine if the change decreases the effectiveness of the plan. This review requires the evaluator to establish the basis for the original condition and use the licensing basis as a measure of any decrease in effectiveness for the subject change. Since the approved licensing basis was established based on a standard of reasonableness, this established the basis for effectiveness to judge any potential decreases per 10CFR50.54 (q). Therefore, the level of detail required in procedures was established at initial licensing of RBS by the use of this standard of reasonableness.

During an inspection or while performing changes under 10CFR50.54(q), one must rely on not only NRC regulations and guidance but, the licensing basis of the plant to establish what was considered effective at initial licensing. RBS believes the NRC's preliminary conclusions go beyond the reasonableness standard and are closer to a standard of excellence which is beyond the regulations and licensing basis. This provides the basis for EOI's conclusion that the NRC's preliminary finding is based on a new and different performance standard regarding the level of detail in emergency procedures.

Attachment 3

Correction of Typographical Error in RBF1-02-0095 Dated May 31, 2002

Change page 26 of 38, paragraph 3 to read:

“Based on this level of training and related tasks, RBS does **not** agree that the information in the NRC’s inspection report 50-458/02-05, sections A.1.a.iii supports a conclusion that Security officers would not effectively deliver an evacuation message. In addition, RBS disagrees that Security personnel do not demonstrate essential skills related to an OCA evacuation (section A.1.a.vii).”