

April 8, 1987

Docket Nos.: STN 50-528  
and STN 50-529

Mr. E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.  
Executive Vice President  
Arizona Nuclear Power Project  
Post Office Box 52034  
Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034

Dear Mr. Van Brunt:

Subject: Issuance of Amendment No. 15 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-41 for Palo Verde, Unit 1, and Amendment No. 9 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-51 for Palo Verde, Unit 2

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 15 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-41 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1, and Amendment No. 9 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-51 for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2. The amendments consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application transmitted by letter dated January 19, 1987.

The amendments revise Table 3.6-1 in the Technical Specifications to remove the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) from the list of valves that are subjected to the requirements of Specification 3/4.6.3, "Containment Isolation Valves," since Specification 3/4.7.1.5, "Main Steam Line Isolation Valves," specifically provides operability and surveillance requirements for the MSIVs which are consistent with the assumptions used in the Palo Verde safety analyses.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation supporting the amendments is enclosed.

Sincerely,

SI

E. A. Licitra, Project Manager  
PWR Project Directorate No. 7  
Division of PWR Licensing-B

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 15 to NPF-41
2. Amendment No. 9 to NPF-51
3. Safety Evaluation

cc: See next page

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EAL Licitra/es  
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DIR:PD7  
GWR  
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Mr. E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.  
Arizona Nuclear Power Project

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, ET AL.

DOCKET NO. STN 50-528

PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 15  
License No. NPF-41

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment, dated January 19, 1987, by the Arizona Public Service Company (APS) on behalf of itself and the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, El Paso Electric Company, Southern California Edison Company, Public Service Company of New Mexico, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, and Southern California Public Power Authority (licensees), complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public;
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the enclosure to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-41 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 15, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in this license. APS shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



E. A. Licitra, Project Manager  
PWR Project Directorate No. 7  
Division of PWR Licensing-B

Enclosure:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: April 8, 1987

April 8, 1987

ENCLOSURE TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 15

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-41

DOCKET NO. STN 50-528

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change. Also to be replaced are the following overleaf pages to the amended pages.

Amendment Pages

3/4 6-30  
B 3/4 6-4

Overleaf Pages

3/4 6-29  
B 3/4 6-3

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)  
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

VALVE NUMBER	PENETRATION NUMBER	FUNCTION	MAXIMUM ACTUATION TIME (SECONDS)
E. SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES			
SIA-PSV 151#	23	Containment recirculation sump to containment spray, LPSI and HPSI headers 1A & 1B	N.A.
SIB-PSV 140#	24	Containment recirculation sump to containment spray, LPSI and HPSI headers 2A & 2B	N.A.
SIB-PSV 189	26	From shutdown cooling RC Loop 2	N.A.*
SIA-PSV 179	27	From shutdown cooling RC Loop 1	N.A.*
SIE-PSV 474	28	Safety injection drain relief	N.A.

\*Valves also covered by Specification 3/4.4.8.3

#Not Type C Tested

TABLE 3 6-1 (Continued)  
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

VALVE NUMBER	PENETRATION NUMBER	FUNCTION	MAXIMUM ACTUATION TIME (SECONDS)
F. NORMALLY OPEN - ESF ACTUATED CLOSED			
SGE-UV 169#	1 & 2	Main steam isolation bypass	N.A.
SGE-UV 183#	3 & 4	Main steam isolation bypass	N.A.
SGA-UV 1133#	1-4	Steam trap/bypass	N.A.
SGA-UV 1134#	1-4	Steam trap/bypass	N.A.
SGB-UV 1135A#	1-4	Steam trap/bypass	N.A.
SG8-UV 1135B#	1-4	Steam trap/bypass	N.A.
SGB-UV 1136A#	1-4	Steam trap/bypass	N.A.
SGB-UV 1136B#	1-4	Steam trap/bypass	N.A.
SGA-UV 174#	8	Steam generator feedwater	N.A.
SGA-UV 132#	8	Steam generator feedwater	N.A.
SGB-UV 137#	10	Steam generator feedwater	N.A.
SGA-UV 177#	10	Steam generator feedwater	N.A.
SGB-UV 130#	11	Downcomer FIV	N.A.
SGA-UV 172#	11	Downcomer FIV	N.A.
SG8-UV I35#	12	Downcomer FIV	N.A.

#Not Type C tested



## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

The 42-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are required to be closed during plant operation since these valves have not been demonstrated capable of closing during a LOCA or steam line break accident. Maintaining these valves closed during plant operations ensures that excessive quantities of radioactive materials will not be released via the containment purge system. To provide assurance that the 42-inch valves cannot be inadvertently opened, they are sealed closed in accordance with Standard Review Plan 6.2.4 which includes mechanical devices to seal or lock the valve closed, or prevent power from being supplied to the valve operator.

The use of the containment purge lines is restricted to the 8-inch purge supply and exhaust isolation valves since, unlike the 42-inch valves, the 8-inch valves will close during a LOCA or steam line break accident and therefore the site boundary dose guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event of an accident during purging operations.

Leakage integrity tests with a maximum allowable leakage rate for purge supply and exhaust isolation valves will provide early indication of resilient material seal degradation and will allow the opportunity for repair before gross leakage failure develops. The 0.60 L<sub>v</sub> leakage limit shall not be exceeded when the leakage rates determined by the leakage integrity tests of these valves are added to the previously determined total for all valves and penetrations subject to Type B and C tests.

#### 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS

##### 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the containment spray system ensures that containment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

The containment spray system and the containment cooling system are redundant to each other in providing post-accident cooling of the containment atmosphere. However, the containment spray system also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere and therefore the time requirements for restoring an inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment.

##### 3/4.6.2.2 IODINE REMOVAL SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the iodine removal system ensures that sufficient N<sub>2</sub>H<sub>4</sub> is added to the containment spray in the event of a LOCA. The limits on N<sub>2</sub>H<sub>4</sub> volume and concentration ensure adequate chemical available to remove iodine from the containment atmosphere following a LOCA.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the containment automatic isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of GDC 54 through GDC 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

The only valves in Table 6.2.4-1 of the PVNGS FSAR that are not required to be listed in Table 3.6-1 are the following: main steam safety valves, main steam atmospheric dump valves, and main steam isolation valves. The main steam safety valves have very high pressure setpoints to actuate and are covered by Specification 3/4.7.1.1. The atmospheric dump valves and the main steam isolation valves are covered by Specifications 3/4.7.1.6 and 3/4.7.1.5, respectively.

#### 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL

The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit (or the purge system) is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with (1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water and (3) corrosion of metals within containment. These hydrogen control systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA," March 1971.

There is a hydrogen monitor and a oxygen monitor in the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS). There is a line from the two containment hydrogen monitors to the PASS which allows the licensee to monitor hydrogen concentration in the containment following an accident with the PASS. An OPERABLE hydrogen monitor in the PASS allows the licensee to enter Modes 1 and 2 with one containment hydrogen monitor inoperable. For the hydrogen monitor in PASS to be OPERABLE, the valves in the piping to the monitor must be OPERABLE.

The use of ANSI Standard N509 (1980) in lieu of ANSI Standard N509 (1976) to meet the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, Positions C.6.a and C.6.b, has been found acceptable as documented in Revision 2 to Section 6.5.1 of the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800).



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, ET AL.

DOCKET NO. STN 50-529

PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 9  
License No. NPF-51

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment, dated January 19, 1987, by the Arizona Public Service Company (APS) on behalf of itself and the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, El Paso Electric Company, Southern California Edison Company, Public Service Company of New Mexico, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, and Southern California Public Power Authority (licensees), complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public;
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the enclosure to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-51 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 9, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in this license. APS shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



E. A. Licitra, Project Manager  
PWR Project Directorate No. 7  
Division of PWR Licensing-B

Enclosure:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: April 8, 1987

April 8, 1987

ENCLOSURE TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 9

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-51

DOCKET NO. STN 50-529

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change. Also to be replaced are the following overleaf pages to the amended pages.

Amendment Pages

3/4 6-30  
B 3/4 6-4

Overleaf Pages

3/4 6-29  
B 3/4 6-3

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VALVE NUMBER	PENETRATION NUMBER	FUNCTION	MAXIMUM ACTUATION TIME (SECONDS)
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SIA-PSV 151#	23	Containment recirculation sump to containment spray, LPSI and HPSI headers 1A & 1B	N.A.
SIB-PSV 140#	24	Containment recirculation sump to containment spray, LPSI and HPSI headers 2A & 2B	N.A.
SIB-PSV 189	26	From shutdown cooling RC Loop 2	N.A.*
SIA-PSV 179	27	From shutdown cooling RC Loop 1	N.A.*
SIE-PSV 474	28	Safety injection drain relief	N.A.

\*Valves also covered by Specification 3/4.4.8.3.

#Not Type C tested.

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)  
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

VALVE NUMBER	PENETRATION NUMBER	FUNCTION	MAXIMUM ACTUATION TIME (SECONDS)
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SGE-UV 183#	3 & 4	Main steam isolation bypass	N.A.
SGA-UV 1133#	1-4	Steam trap/bypass	N.A.
SGA-UV 1134#	1-4	Steam trap/bypass	N.A.
SGB-UV 1135A#	1-4	Steam trap/bypass	N.A.
SGB-UV 1135B#	1-4	Steam trap/bypass	N.A.
SGB-UV 1136A#	1-4	Steam trap/bypass	N.A.
SGB-UV 1136B#	1-4	Steam trap/bypass	N.A.
SGA-UV 174#	8	Steam generator feedwater	N.A.
SGB-UV 132#	8	Steam generator feedwater	N.A.
SGB-UV 137#	10	Steam generator feedwater	N.A.
SGA-UV 177#	10	Steam generator feedwater	N.A.
SGB-UV 130#	11	Downcomer FIV	N.A.
SGA-UV 172#	11	Downcomer FIV	N.A.
SGB-UV 135#	12	Downcomer FIV	N.A.

#Not Type C tested.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

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The use of the containment purge lines is restricted to the 8-inch purge supply and exhaust isolation valves since, unlike the 42-inch valves, the 8-inch valves will close during a LOCA or steam line break accident and therefore the site boundary dose guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event of an accident during purging operations.

Leakage integrity tests with a maximum allowable leakage rate for purge supply and exhaust isolation valves will provide early indication of resilient material seal degradation and will allow the opportunity for repair before gross leakage failure develops. The 0.60 L<sub>a</sub> leakage limit shall not be exceeded when the leakage rates determined by the leakage integrity tests of these valves are added to the previously determined total for all valves and penetrations subject to Type B and C tests.

#### 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS

##### 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the containment spray system ensures that containment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

The containment spray system and the containment cooling system are redundant to each other in providing post-accident cooling of the containment atmosphere. However, the containment spray system also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere and therefore the time requirements for restoring an inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment.

##### 3/4.6.2.2 IODINE REMOVAL SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the iodine removal system ensures that sufficient N<sub>2</sub>H<sub>4</sub> is added to the containment spray in the event of a LOCA. The limits on N<sub>2</sub>H<sub>4</sub> volume and concentration ensure adequate chemical available to remove iodine from the containment atmosphere following a LOCA.



## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the containment automatic isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of GDC 54 through GDC 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

The only valves in Table 6.2.4-1 of the PVNGS FSAR that are not required to be listed in Table 3.6-1 are the following: main steam safety valves, main steam atmospheric dump valves, and main steam isolation valves. The main steam safety valves have very high pressure setpoints to actuate and are covered by Specification 3/4.7.1.1. The atmospheric dump valves and the main steam isolation valves are covered by Specifications 3/4.7.1.6 and 3/4.7.1.5, respectively.

#### 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL

The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit (or the purge system) is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with (1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water and (3) corrosion of metals within containment. These hydrogen control systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA," March 1971.

The use of ANSI Standard N509 (1980) in lieu of ANSI Standard N509 (1976) to meet the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, Positions C.6.a and C.6.b, has been found acceptable as documented in Revision 2 to Section 6.5.1 of the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800).



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 15 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-41  
AND AMENDMENT NO. 9 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-51  
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, ET AL.  
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2  
DOCKET NOS. STN 50-528 AND STN 50-529

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated January 19, 1987, the Arizona Public Service Company (APS) on behalf of itself, the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, Southern California Edison Company, El Paso Electric Company, Public Service Company of New Mexico, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, and Southern California Public Power Authority (licensees), requested changes to the Technical Specifications for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 (Appendices A to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-41 and NPF-51, respectively). The application requests the deletion of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) from Table 3.6-1 in the Specifications.

2.0 DISCUSSION

In order to ensure proper containment isolation following an accident, such as a loss of coolant accident, and to preclude unacceptable radiological releases to the environment, the automatic valves listed in Table 3.6-1, which is a part of Specification 3/4.6.3, receive operability verification as identified in the specification. However, the limiting conditions for operation and action statements of Specification 3/4.6.3 are written assuming each identified containment penetration in Table 3.6-1 has two (redundant) containment isolation valves. This is not the case with the main steam lines where the requirements of GDC 57 permit a single MSIV for each penetration. The current requirements of Specification 3/4.6.3 would force entry into Specification 3.0.3, and a corresponding immediate plant shutdown, whenever an MSIV is determined to be inoperable from testing which is normally conducted during power operation. This results because a redundant valve is not available to secure the penetration and allow continued plant power operation while repairs are made.

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The above requirements are in conflict with existing Specification 3/4.7.1.5 which specifically governs operability of the MSIVs. This specification permits power operation for four hours to restore an inoperable MSIV to operable status before shutdown is required. Because of these considerations, the licensees have requested that the MSIVs be removed from Table 3.6-1 of the Technical Specifications.

### 3.0 EVALUATION

The existing Specification 3/4.7.1.5 is consistent with the CE Standard Technical Specifications for ensuring MSIV operability (closure) on receipt of a main steam isolation signal (MSIS). An MSIS is generated by a high containment pressure, low steam generator pressure, or high steam generator level signal. These signals are accounted for in the Palo Verde accident analyses and are unaffected by the proposed change. Thus, the design basis accident analyses assumptions for containment isolation, and prevention of unacceptable releases of radioactivity to the environment, are not affected by elimination of the MSIVs from Table 3.6-1. Further, deletion of the MSIVs from Table 3.6-1 will potentially reduce the challenges to the plant by permitting additional time to take corrective action upon indication of an inoperable MSIV rather than initiating a shutdown by entering Specification 3.0.3 directly. It was the staff's intent to permit MSIV repair for a limited time period and not impose the action statement in Specification 3.0.3, whenever an MSIV was inoperable.

Based on the above, the staff concludes that the operability of the MSIVs in accordance with the design basis accident analyses is adequately assured by existing Specification 3/4.7.1.5. Thus, deletion of the MSIVs from Table 3.6-1 in Specification 3/4.6.3 will not adversely affect post-accident containment isolation capability nor the prevention of unacceptable releases of radioactivity to the environment. Further, the proposed change eliminates conflicting specification requirements and is consistent with the standard technical specifications which are intended to provide a limited time in which to restore an inoperable valve to operable status. The staff, therefore, finds the proposed change acceptable.

### 4.0 CONTACT WITH STATE OFFICIAL

The Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency has been advised of the proposed determination of no significant hazards consideration with regard to this amendment request. No comments were received.

## 5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

These amendments involve changes in the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued proposed findings that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such findings. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Sec. 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need to be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

## 6.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. We, therefore, conclude that the proposed changes are acceptable.

Principal Contributor: J. Wermiel

Dated: April 8, 1987

April 8, 1987

ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 15 TO FACILITY OPERATING  
LICENSE NPF-41 AND FOR PALO VERDE UNIT 1 AND AMENDMENT NO. 9  
TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-51 FOR PALO VERDE UNIT 2

DISTRIBUTION

Docket File 50-528/529

NRC PDR

Local PDR

PD7 Reading

FMiraglia

JLee (5)

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EJordan

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JPartlow

TBarnhart (8)

WJones

WRegan

ACRS (10)

OPA

RDiggs, LFMB

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GWKnighton

MDavis

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