

September 7, 1993

Docket No. 50-483

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Dear Mr. Schnell:

SUBJECT: CORRECTION TO AMENDMENT NO. 83 - CALLAWAY PLANT, UNIT NO. 1

Amendment No. 83, issued on August 5, 1993, inadvertently added or deleted words to Pages 3/4 4-34 and B 3/4 4-2. The pages are reissued with the appropriate overleaf pages. We are sorry for an inconvenience this oversight may have caused.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

L. Raynard Wharton, Project Manager
Project Directorate III-3
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:
As stated

cc: w/enclosure
See next page

OFFICE	PDIII-3:LA:DRPW	PDIII-3:PM:DRPW	PDIII-3:PD:DRPW
NAME	MRushbrook/mmr/bj	LRWharton	JHannon
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DRP

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Unit No. 1

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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

PRESSURIZER

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.9.2 The pressurizer temperature shall be limited to:

- a. A maximum heatup of 100°F in any 1-hour period,
- b. A maximum cooldown of 200°F in any 1-hour period, and
- c. A maximum spray water temperature differential of 583°F.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

With the pressurizer temperature limits in excess of any of the above limits, restore the temperature to within the limits within 30 minutes; perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the pressurizer; determine that the pressurizer remains acceptable for continued operation or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce the pressurizer pressure to less than 500 psig within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.9.2 The pressurizer temperatures shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 30 minutes during system heatup or cooldown. The spray water temperature differential shall be determined to be within the limit at least once per 12 hours during auxiliary spray operation.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.9.3 At least one of the following groups of two Overpressure Protection devices shall be OPERABLE when the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is not depressurized with an RCS vent of greater than or equal to 2 square inches:

- a. Two residual heat removal (RHR) suction relief valves each with a Setpoint of 450 psig \pm 3%, or
- b. Two power-operated relief valves (PORVs) with Setpoints which do not exceed the limit established in Figure 3.4-4, or
- c. One RHR suction relief valve and one PORV with Setpoints as described above.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 3 when the temperature of any RCS cold leg is less than or equal to 368°F, MODES 4 and 5, and MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head on.

ACTION:

- a. With one of the two required overpressure protection devices inoperable in MODES 3 or 4, restore two overpressure protection devices to OPERABLE status within 7 days or depressurize and vent the RCS with an RCS vent of greater than or equal to 2 square inches within the next 8 hours.
- b. With one of the two required overpressure protection devices inoperable in MODES 5 or 6, restore two overpressure protection devices to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or depressurize and vent the RCS with an RCS vent of greater than or equal to 2 square inches within the next 8 hours.
- c. With both of the two required overpressure protection devices inoperable, depressurize and vent the RCS with an RCS vent of greater than or equal to 2 square inches within 8 hours.
- d. In the event either the PORVs, or the RHR suction relief valves, or the RCS vent(s) are used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs, or the RHR suction relief valves, or RCS vent(s) on the transient, and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.
- e. The provision of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

The plant is designed to operate with all reactor coolant loops in operation and maintain DNBR above the safety analysis DNBR limits during all normal operations and anticipated transients. In MODES 1 and 2 with one reactor coolant loop not in operation this specification requires that the plant be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

In MODE 3, two reactor coolant loops provide sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat even in the event of a bank withdrawal accident; however, single failure considerations require that three loops be OPERABLE. A single reactor coolant loop provides sufficient heat removal if a bank withdrawal accident can be prevented, i.e., by opening the Reactor Trip System breakers.

In MODE 4, and in MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops filled, a single reactor coolant loop or RHR loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations require that at least two loops (either RHR or RCS) be OPERABLE.

In MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops not filled, a single RHR loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations, and the unavailability of the steam generators as a heat removing component, require that at least two RHR loops be OPERABLE.

The operation of one reactor coolant pump (RCP) or one RHR pump provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification and produce gradual reactivity changes during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. The reactivity change rate associated with boron reduction will, therefore, be within the capability of operator recognition and control.

The restrictions on starting a reactor coolant pump in MODES 4 and 5 are provided to prevent RCS pressure transients, caused by energy additions from the Secondary Coolant System, which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50. The RCS will be protected against overpressure transients and will not exceed the limits of Appendix G by restricting starting of the RCPs to when the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 50°F above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures.

BASES**3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES**

The pressurizer Code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig. Each safety valve is designed to relieve 420,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown. In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating RHR loop, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization. In addition, the Overpressure Protection System provides a diverse means of protection against RCS overpressurization at low temperatures.

During operation, all pressurizer Code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig. The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum surge rate resulting from a complete loss-of-load assuming no Reactor trip and also assuming no operation of the power-operated relief valves or steam dump valves.

Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code.

3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER

The 12-hour periodic surveillance is sufficient to ensure that the parameter is restored to within its limit following expected transient operation. The maximum water volume also ensures that a steam bubble is formed and thus the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system. The requirement that a minimum number of pressurizer heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability of the plant to control Reactor Coolant System pressure and establish natural circulation.

3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES

The power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and steam bubble function to relieve RCS pressure and prevent a high pressurizer pressure reactor trip during all design transients up to and including the design step load decrease with steam dump. Operation of the PORVs minimizes the undesirable opening of the spring-loaded pressurizer Code safety valves. Each PORV has a remotely operated block valve to provide a positive shutoff capability should a relief valve become inoperable.

The PORVs are equipped with automatic actuation circuitry and manual control capability. Because no credit for automatic operation is taken in the FSAR analyses for MODE 1, 2 and 3 transients where operation of the PORVs has a beneficial impact on the results of the analysis, the PORVs are considered OPERABLE in either the manual or automatic mode. The automatic mode is the preferred configuration, as this provides pressure relieving capability without reliance on operation action.