August 26, 1997

Mr. John R. McGaha, Jr.
Vice President - Operations
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
P. O. Box 220
St. Francisville, LA 70775

SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1 - AMENDMENT NO. 95 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47 (TAC NO. M93991)

Dear Mr. McGaha:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 95 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 for the River Bend Station, Unit 1. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated October 26, 1995 and supplemented by letters dated April 7 and July 30, 1997.

The amendment revises the TSs for 16 editorial changes and deletes the requirement for a program to prevent and detect Asiatic Clams (Corbicula) in the service water system.

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,
ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:
David L. Wigginton, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-1
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-458

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 95 to NPF-47
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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T. Harris			

Document Name: RB93991.AMD *See previous concurrence

OFC	PM/PD4-1	LA/PD4-1	PSGB*	SCSB*	OTSB	OGC
NAME	DWigginton/v	CHawes	LCunningham	CBerlinger	WBeckner	RBachmann
DATE	8/12/97	8/15/97	04/08/96	07/01/97	8/17/97	8/15/97
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

August 26, 1997

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Vice President - Operations
Entergy Operations, Inc.
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY**

CAJUN ELECTRIC POWER COOPERATIVE AND

ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-458

RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No.95
License No. NPF-47

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Gulf States Utilities* (the licensee) dated October 26, 1995 and supplemented by letters dated April 7 and July 30, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

---

* EOI is authorized to act as agent for Gulf States Utilities Company, which has been authorized to act as agent for Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.

**Gulf States Utilities Company, which owns a 70 percent undivided interest in River Bend, has merged with a wholly owned subsidiary of Entergy Corporation. Gulf States Utilities Company was the surviving company in the merger.

E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 95 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. EOI shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

David L. Wigginton, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-1
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: August 26, 1997

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 95

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47

DOCKET NO. 50-458

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

REMOVE	INSERT
3.2-4	3.2-4
3.3-22	3.3-22
3.3-69	3.3-69
3.3-71	3.3-71
3.3-74	3.3-74
3.4-31	3.4-31
3.6-47	3.6-47
3.6-50	3.6-50
3.6-55	3.6-55
3.8-13	3.8-13
3.8-17	3.8-17
3.8-39	3.8-39
5.0-16	5.0-16
5.0-21	5.0-21

3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

3.2.4 Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Gain and Setpoints

LCO 3.2.4

a. T shall be $\geq$ 1.0; or

b. Each required APRM setpoint specified in the COLR shall be made applicable; or

c. Each required APRM gain shall be adjusted such that the adjusted APRM readings result in a calculated T $\geq$ 1.0 when the APRM reading is substituted for Fraction of Rated Thermal Power (FRTP).

APPLICABILITY: THERMAL POWER $\geq$ 25% RTP.

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. Requirements of the LCO not met.	A.1 Satisfy the requirements of the LCO.	6 hours
B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.	B.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER to < 25% RTP.	4 hours

Table 3.3.3.1-1 (page 1 of 1)
Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation

FUNCTION	REQUIRED CHANNELS	CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION D.1
1. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure	2	E
2. Reactor Vessel Water Level–Wide Range	2	E
3. Reactor Vessel Water Level–Fuel Zone	2	E
4. Suppression Pool Water Level	2	E
5. Suppression Pool Sector Water Temperature	2[(a)]	E
6. Drywell Pressure	2	E
7. Primary Containment Pressure	2	E
8. Drywell Area Radiation	2	F
9. Primary Containment Area Radiation	2	F
10. Drywell H_2 Analyzer	2	E
11. Containment H_2 Analyzer	2	E
12. Penetration Flow Path, Automatic PCIV Position	2 per penetration flow path [(b)(c)]	E

(a) Monitoring each of two sectors.

(b) Not required for isolation valves whose associated penetration flow path is isolated.

(c) Only one position indication channel is required for penetration flow paths with only one control room indication channel.

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION		COMPLETION TIME
C. As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.7.1-1.	C.1	Declare associated CRFA subsystem inoperable.	1 hour from discovery of loss of CRFA initiation capability in both trip systems
	AND		
	C.2	Place channel in trip.	12 hours
D. As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.7.1-1.	D.1	Declare associated CRFA subsystem inoperable.	1 hour from discovery of loss of CRFA initiation capability in both trip systems
	AND		
	D.2	Place channel in trip.	6 hours
E. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B, C, or D not met.	E.1	Place the associated CRFA subsystem in emergency mode.	1 hour
	OR		
	E.2	Declare associated CRFA subsystem inoperable.	1 hour

Table 3.3.7.1-1 (page 1 of 1)
Control Room Fresh Air System Instrumentation

FUNCTION	APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS	REQUIRED CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM	CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION A.1	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	ALLOWABLE VALUE
1. Reactor Vessel Water Level – Low Low, Level 2	1,2,3	2	B	SR 3.3.7.1.1 SR 3.3.7.1.2 SR 3.3.7.1.3 SR 3.3.7.1.4 SR 3.3.7.1.5	≥ -47 inches
2. Drywell Pressure – High	1,2,3	2	C	SR 3.3.7.1.1 SR 3.3.7.1.2 SR 3.3.7.1.3 SR 3.3.7.1.4 SR 3.3.7.1.5	≤ 1.88 psid
3. Control Room Local Intake Ventilation Radiation Monitors	1,2,3 (a),(b)	1	D	SR 3.3.7.1.1 SR 3.3.7.1.2 SR 3.3.7.1.4 SR 3.3.7.1.5	≤ 0.97×10^{-5} μCi/cc

(a) During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

(b) During CORE ALTERATIONS and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment.

Table 3.3.8.1-1 (page 1 of 1)
Loss of Power Instrumentation

FUNCTION	REQUIRED CHANNELS PER DIVISION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	ALLOWABLE VALUE
1. Divisions 1 and 2 – 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage			
a. Loss of Voltage – 4.16 kV basis	3	SR 3.3.8.1.1 SR 3.3.8.1.2 SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4	≥ 2850 V and ≤ 3090 V
b. Loss of Voltage – Time Delay	3	SR 3.3.8.1.2 SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4	≥ 2.67 seconds and ≤ 3.33 seconds
c. Degraded Voltage – 4.16 kV basis	3	SR 3.3.8.1.1 SR 3.3.8.1.2 SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4	≥ 3605 V and ≤ 3875 V
d. Degraded Voltage – Time Delay, No LOCA	3	SR 3.3.8.1.2 SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4	≥ 53.4 seconds and ≤ 66.6 seconds
e. Degraded Voltage–Time Delay, LOCA	3	SR 3.3.8.1.2 SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4	≥ 2.67 seconds and ≤ 3.33 seconds
2. Division 3 – 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage			
a. Loss of Voltage – 4.16 kV basis	2	SR 3.3.8.1.1 SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4	≥ 2831 V and ≤ 3259 V
b. Loss of Voltage – Time Delay	2	SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4	≥ 2.67 seconds and ≤ 3.33 seconds
c. Degraded Voltage – 4.16 kV basis	2	SR 3.3.8.1.1 SR 3.3.8.1.2 SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4	≥ 3702 V and ≤ 3852 V
d. Degraded Voltage – Time Delay, No LOCA	2	SR 3.3.8.1.2 SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4	≥ 53.4 seconds and ≤ 66.6 seconds
e. Degraded Voltage – Time Delay, LOCA	2	SR 3.3.8.1.2 SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4	≥ 2.67 seconds and ≤ 3.33 seconds

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.4.11.8	----------NOTE---------- Only required to be met in single loop operation during increases in THERMAL POWER or recirculation loop flow with the recirculation loop flow in the operating loop ≤ 50% of rated recirculation loop flow or THERMAL POWER ≤ 30% of RTP. ---------- Verify the difference between the bottom head coolant temperature and the RPV coolant temperature is ≤ 100°F.	Once within 15 minutes prior to an increase in THERMAL POWER or an increase in loop flow
SR 3.4.11.9	----------NOTE---------- Only required to be met in single loop operation during increases in THERMAL POWER or recirculation loop flow with the recirculation loop flow in the operating loop ≤ 50% of rated recirculation loop flow, or THERMAL POWER ≤ 30% of RTP, and the idle recirculation loop not isolated from the RPV. ---------- Verify the difference between the reactor coolant temperature in the recirculation loop not in operation and the RPV coolant temperature is ≤ 50°F.	Once within 15 minutes prior to an increase in THERMAL POWER or an increase in loop flow

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.4.1.2	Verify all secondary containment equipment hatches are closed and sealed and loop seals filled.	31 days
SR 3.6.4.1.3	Verify each secondary containment access door is closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit.	31 days
SR 3.6.4.1.4	Verify each standby gas treatment (SGT) subsystem will draw down the shield building annulus and auxiliary building to $\geq$ 0.5 and $\geq$ 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge in $\leq$ 18.5 and $\leq$ 13.5 seconds, respectively.	18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS
SR 3.6.4.1.5	Verify each fuel building ventilation subsystem will draw down the fuel building to $\geq$ 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge in $\leq$ 12.5 seconds.	18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS
SR 3.6.4.1.6	Verify each SGT subsystem can maintain $\geq$ 0.5 and $\geq$ 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge in the shield building annulus and auxiliary building, respectively, for 1 hour.	18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS
SR 3.6.4.1.7	Verify each fuel building ventilation subsystem can maintain $\geq$ 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge in the fuel building for 1 hour.	18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.4.2.1	Verify the isolation time of each required power operated automatic SCID is within limits.	92 days
SR 3.6.4.2.2	Verify each required automatic SCID actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated automatic isolation signal.	18 months

3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3.6.4.5 Fuel Building

LCO 3.6.4.5 The fuel building shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.

ACTIONS

----------NOTE----------
LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. Fuel building inoperable.	A.1 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.	Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.4.5.1	Verify fuel building vacuum is $\geq$ 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge.	24 hours
SR 3.6.4.5.2	Verify all fuel building equipment hatch covers are installed.	31 days
SR 3.6.4.5.3	Verify each fuel building access door is closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit.	31 days

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.8.1.16	----------NOTE---------- This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. ---------- Verify, with a DG operating in test mode and connected to its bus, an actual or simulated ECCS initiation signal overrides the test mode by: a. Returning DG to ready-to-load operation; and b. Automatically energizing the emergency loads from offsite power.	18 months
SR 3.8.1.17	----------NOTE---------- This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, or 3. However, credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. ---------- Verify sequence time is within ± 10% of design for each load sequencer timer.	18 months

(continued)

3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3.8.2 AC Sources—Shutdown

LCO 3.8.2 The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. One qualified circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems—Shutdown";

b. One diesel generator (DG) capable of supplying one division of the Division I or II onsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by LCO 3.8.10; and

c. One qualified circuit, other than the circuit in LCO 3.8.2.a, between the offsite transmission and the Division III onsite Class 1E electrical power distribution subsystem, or the Division III DG capable of supplying the Division III onsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution subsystem, when the Division III onsite Class 1E electrical power distribution subsystem is required by LCO 3.8.10.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5,
During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment or fuel building.

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
C. One or more Division I or II DC electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable.	C.1 Restore Division I and II DC electrical power distribution subsystems to OPERABLE status.	2 hours AND 16 hours from discovery of failure to meet LCO
D. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, or C not met.	D.1 Be in MODE 3. AND D.2 Be in MODE 4.	12 hours 36 hours
E. One or more Division III AC or DC electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable.	E.1 Declare High Pressure Core Spray System and Standby Service Water System pump 2C inoperable.	Immediately
F. Two or more divisions with inoperable distribution subsystems that result in a loss of function.	F.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.	Immediately

5.5 Programs and Manuals

5.5.11 Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program (continued)

c. The Bases Control Program shall contain provisions to ensure that the Bases are maintained consistent with the USAR.

d. Proposed changes that do not meet the criteria of either Specification 5.5.11.b.1 or Specification 5.5.11.b.2 above shall be reviewed and approved by the NRC prior to implementation. Changes to the Bases implemented without prior NRC approval shall be provided to the NRC on a frequency consistent with 10 CFR 50.71(e).

5.5.12 DELETED

5.5.13 Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program

A program shall be established to implement the leakage rate testing of the containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions. This program shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program," dated September 1995.

The peak calculated containment internal pressure for the design basis loss of coolant accident, P_a, is 7.6 psig.

The maximum allowable primary containment leakage rate, L_a, at P_a, shall be 0.26% of primary containment air weight per day.

The Primary Containment leakage rate acceptance criterion is ≤ 1.0 L_a. During the first unit startup following testing in accordance with this program, the leakage rate acceptance criteria are ≤ 0.60 L_a for the Type B and Type C tests and ≤ 0.75 L_a for Type A tests.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 do not apply to test frequencies specified in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

5.7 High Radiation Area

5.7.2 (continued)

the immediate work areas and the maximum allowable stay times for individuals in those areas. In lieu of the stay time specification of the RWP, direct or remote (such as closed circuit TV cameras) continuous surveillance may be made by personnel qualified in radiation protection procedures to provide positive exposure control over the activities being performed within the area.

5.7.3 In addition to the requirements of Specification 5.7.1, for individual high radiation areas with radiation levels of ≥ 1000 mrem/hr, accessible to personnel, that are located within large areas such as reactor containment, where no enclosure exists for purposes of locking, or that is not continuously guarded, and where no enclosure can be reasonably constructed around the individual area, that individual area shall be barricaded and conspicuously posted, and a flashing light shall be activated as a warning device.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 95 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47

ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.

RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-458

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated October 26, 1995, Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) (Appendix A to Facility Operating License No. NPF-47) for the River Bend Station, Unit 1. The proposed changes revise the TSs for sixteen editorial changes and deletes the requirement for a program to prevent and detect Asiatic Clams (Corbicula) in the service water system (SWS). By letter dated April 7, 1997, the licensee responded to our May 20, 1996, request for additional information. By letter dated July 30, 1997, the licensee provided further clarification information on the TS and bases to assure they conform to the industry standard. The information in the April 7 and July 30, 1997, letters provided clarification information and did not change the initial no significant hazards determination.

2.0 BACKGROUND

By Amendment No. 81 dated July 20, 1995, the TSs for the River Bend Station were replaced with a set of TSs based on NUREG-1434, "Improved BWR-6 Technical Specifications," dated September 1992. The improved technical specifications (ITSs) were implemented at River Bend on October 1, 1995. Between July and October 1995, the licensee had performed training on the new ITS and in the course of training and implementation, some 16 editorial changes were discovered which would make the ITS more correct with plant design and operation, correct typographical errors, or to be consistent with the writers guide for the ITS. The licensee now proposes to revise the ITS for River Bend to incorporate the editorial changes.

The original design of the River Bend Station included water makeup from the Mississippi River. During early operation of the facility, the licensee encountered problems with Asiatic Clams which were introduced to the SWS from water makeup from the Mississippi River. The facility was modified so that water makeup now comes from demineralized water or well water which is used to eliminate the source of Asiatic Clams. The licensee also proposes to eliminate the program for Corbicula prevention and detection for the SWS.

3.0 EVALUATION

The licensee's proposed editorial changes are as follows:

1) LCO 3.2.4 on page 3.2-4 is modified to add "Fraction of Rated Thermal Power" at the first place in the TS in accordance with the writers guide. This change is acceptable.

2) Table 3.3.3.1-1, Function 12 on page 3.3-22 is modified to add "automatic" for the primary containment isolation valve (PCIV) Position to be consistent with Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) position indication requirements. The licensee in a letter dated May 7, 1997, responded to our request for additional information on the PAM PCIV position indication. This clarification that only automatic valves are addressed in the TS table also makes the specification consistent with other BWR-6 TSs; NUREG-1434 Revision 0 does not include the Penetration Flow Path, PCIV position in the table. On the basis of consistency with requirements and consistency with other similar plant TSs, this change is acceptable.

3) LCO 3.3.7.1 on page 3.3-69 is revised to include wording which is consistent with other required action wording. The use of "emergency mode" in place of "the isolation mode of operation" is an enhancement for the operators and is acceptable.

4) Table 3.3.7.1-1 on page 3.3-71 is modified to include the distinction of local intake monitors from other monitors. This reflects accurate plant design and is acceptable.

5) Table 3.3.8.1-1 on page 3.3-74 is corrected for seconds in place of minutes, accurately reflects plant design, and is acceptable.

6) Surveillance Requirements (SRs) 3.4.11.8 and 3.4.11.9 are corrected to indicate THERMAL POWER is limited to "less than or equal to" 30% of related thermal power (RTP). This modification incorporates the previous or old TS requirements, corrects a typographical error, and is acceptable.

7) SR 3.6.4.1.2 on page 3.6.47 is modified to add the requirement to verify loop seals are also filled. This change is to cover all potential leakage paths, is consistent with plant design and is, therefore, acceptable.

8) SR 3.6.4.2.1 on page 3.6-50 is deleted on the basis that River Bend does not have any secondary containment isolation manual dampers (SCID) or blind flanges that are required to be closed during accident conditions. This is consistent with plant design and requirements and is acceptable. SRs 3.6.4.2.2 and 3.6.4.2.3 are renumbered.

9) The new SR 3.6.4.2.1 on page 3.6-50 is modified to add reference to "required" SCIDs to allow distinguishing which SCIDs apply when handling fuel in the fuel building. The plant design includes SCIDs between the secondary containment and the fuel handling building and between the secondary building and the auxiliary building. The integrity of the buildings are controlled during operating modes and when handling fuel. The operation of the SCIDs is required in Modes 1, 2, and 3 and when fuel handling and can be different between the buildings. The licensee proposal

is to distinguish between building integrity requirements and apply surveillance requirements on the appropriate SCIDs as necessary. We agree with this process. The licensee's revised wording in the July 30, 1997, letter provides further clarification and is in conformance with the industry's standard language for "power operated" SCIDs. These changes are acceptable.

10) The new SR 3.6.4.2.2 on page 3.6-50 is modified to include the differention on SCIDs when handling fuel; i.e., by adding "required" to distinguish when handling fuel. This is the same as in item 9) above and is acceptable.

11) SR 3.6.4.5.2 on page 3.6-55 is modified to correct for plant design. The River Bend facility does not have shield blocks in the fuel building, but does have hatch covers. This correction is acceptable.

12) LCO 3.6.5.2 on page 3.6-62 was proposed to be changed to correct the "Note" to "Notes" indicating there are more than one. This was approved by Amendment No. 87.

13) SR 3.8.1.17 on page 3.8-13 is changed to delete the "1.". This is consistent with the writer guide to not use numbers where there is only one item. This is acceptable.

14) LCO 3.8.2.a on page 3.8-17 is changed to delete the "and" in agreement with the writers guide. This is acceptable.

15) LCO 3.8.9 Condition E on page 3.8-39 is modified to delete reference to "AC vital buses". The River Bend facility does not have any Division III AC vital buses. This is acceptable.

16) Administrative Controls 5.7.3 on page 5.0-21 is changed by deleting the words "cannot be" and adding the words "is not" to reflect that any area can be guarded, but some areas are best guarded by means other than a guard. Amendment No. 81 provides an option to the licensee of guarding or enclosing high radiation areas. The proposed change clarifies that option for the licensee and is acceptable.

The licensee also proposes to delete the Asiatic Clams (Corbicula) detection and prevention program from the TSs. This program was necessary before plant modifications were made that allowed SWS makeup to come from demineralized water or from well water. Those modifications made the Corbicula program in the TSs unnecessary because the new makeup arrangements can be closed loop and not susceptible to the larvae uptake from the Mississippi River. In addition, inspections of the safety related heat exchangers, where Corbicula infestations are likely to occur, have not revealed any evidence of clam infestations. The licensee will continue to treat the SWS and Standby Cooling Tower basin for biofouling without the need for a Corbicula detection and prevention program. We agree with the licensee and find the deletion of the Asiatic Calm (Corbicula) program to be acceptable. Therefore, Section 5.5.12 "Biofouling Prevention and Detection" is deleted.

The licensee provided changes to the Bases to reflect the above proposed changes to the TSs. The revised Bases are consistent with the TS changes and are acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Louisiana State Official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (60 FR 62492). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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