

Mr. John R. McGaha, Jr.
Vice President Operations
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
P. O. Box 220
St. Francisville, LA 70775

November 12, 1996

SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1 - AMENDMENT NO.89 TO FACILITY
OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47 (TAC NO. M96403)

Dear Mr. McGaha:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 89 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 for the River Bend Station, Unit 1. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated August 1, 1996.

The amendment incorporates requirements for limiting the time that the hydrogen mixing isolation valves on the drywell are open. The requirements were contained in the old TSs and with the conversion to the Improved Standard Technical Specifications, the requirements were inadvertently changed. The amendment also changes the time from 7 days to 31 days to determine the cumulative time the valves are open.

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

David L. Wigginton, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-1
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-458

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 89 to NPF-47
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

November 12, 1996

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A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. Wigginton".

David L. Wigginton, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-1
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-458

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Mr. John R. McGaha
Entergy Operations, Inc.

River Bend Station

cc:

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

ENERGY GULF STATES, INC. **
CAJUN ELECTRIC POWER COOPERATIVE AND
ENERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
DOCKET NO. 50-458
RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 89
License No. NPF-47

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Entergy Gulf States, Inc.* (the licensee) dated August 1, 1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

* EOI is authorized to act as agent for Entergy Gulf States, Inc, which has been authorized to act as agent for Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.

**Entergy Gulf States, Inc., which owns a 70 percent undivided interest in River Bend, has merged with a wholly owned subsidiary of Entergy Corporation. Entergy Gulf States, Inc. was the surviving company in the merger.

- E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 is hereby amended to read as follows:
- (2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan
- The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 89 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. EOI shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



David L. Wigginton, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-1
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: November 12, 1996

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 89

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47

DOCKET NO. 50-458

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

REMOVE

3.6-45
3.6-68
3.6-69
3.6-70
B 3.6-81
B 3.6-82
B 3.6-133
B 3.6-134
B 3.6-135
B 3.6-136

INSERT

3.6-45
3.6-68
3.6-69
3.6-70
B 3.6-81
B 3.6-82
B 3.6-133
B 3.6-134
B 3.6-135
B 3.6-136

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
C. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.	C.1 Be in MODE 3.	12 hours

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.3.3.1 Operate each primary containment/drywell hydrogen mixing subsystem for ≥ 15 minutes.	Every COLD SHUTDOWN, if not performed within the previous 92 days.
SR 3.6.3.3.2 Verify each primary containment/drywell hydrogen mixing subsystem flow rate is ≥ 600 cfm.	18 months

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. (continued)	<p>A.2</p> <p>-----NOTE----- Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means. -----</p> <p>Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated.</p>	<p>Prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days</p>
B. One or more penetration flow paths with two drywell isolation valves inoperable.	<p>B.1</p> <p>Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured.</p>	<p>4 hours</p>
C. One or more Hydrogen Mixing penetration flow paths not within the limitations specified in SR 3.6.5.3.6	<p>C.1</p> <p>Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured.</p>	<p>Immediately</p>
D. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.	<p>D.1 Be in MODE 3.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>D.2 Be in MODE 4.</p>	<p>12 hours</p> <p>36 hours</p>

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.5.3.1	Verify each 24 inch drywell purge isolation valve is sealed closed.	31 days
SR 3.6.5.3.2	<p>-----NOTE----- Not required to be met when the primary containment/drywell hydrogen mixing inlet or outlet valves are open for pressure control.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Verify each primary containment/drywell hydrogen mixing isolation valve is closed.</p>	31 days
SR 3.6.5.3.3	<p>-----NOTES-----</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means. 2. Not required to be met for drywell isolation valves that are open under administrative controls. <p>-----</p> <p>Verify each drywell isolation manual valve and blind flange that is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed.</p>	Prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4, if not performed in the previous 92 days

(continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.5.3.4	Verify the isolation time of each power operated and each automatic drywell isolation valve is within limits.	In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program
SR 3.6.5.3.5	Verify each automatic drywell isolation valve actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated isolation signal.	18 months
SR 3.6.5.3.6	Verify the cumulative time that the primary containment/drywell hydrogen mixing inlet or outlet penetrations are open to be ≤ 5 hours per 365 days in Modes 1 and 2 and ≤ 90 hours per 365 days in Mode 3.	31 days

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

B.1 and B.2

With two primary containment/drywell hydrogen mixing subsystems inoperable, the ability to perform the hydrogen control function via alternate capabilities must be verified by administrative means within 1 hour. The alternate hydrogen control capabilities are provided by one division of the hydrogen igniters. The 1 hour Completion Time allows a reasonable period of time to verify that a loss of hydrogen control function does not exist. The verification may be performed as an administrative check by examining logs or other information to determine the availability of the alternate hydrogen control system. It does not mean to perform the surveillances needed to demonstrate OPERABILITY of the alternate hydrogen control system. If the ability to perform the hydrogen control function is maintained, continued operation is permitted with two primary containment/drywell hydrogen mixing subsystems inoperable for up to 7 days. Seven days is a reasonable time to allow two primary containment/drywell hydrogen mixing subsystems to be inoperable because the hydrogen control function is maintained and because of the low probability of the occurrence of a LOCA that would generate hydrogen in amounts capable of exceeding the flammability limit.

C.1

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**

SR 3.6.3.3.1

Operating each primary containment/drywell hydrogen mixing subsystem from the control room for ≥ 15 minutes ensures that each subsystem is OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that blockage, fan failure, or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action. The frequency is restricted to COLD SHUTDOWN conditions to limit the opening of the hydrogen mixing inlet and outlet valves during MODES 1, 2,

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.3.3.1 (continued)

and 3, because these valves have never been demonstrated capable of closing during accident conditions in the drywell (Reference 3). The 92 day frequency is consistent with operating experience, the known reliability of the fan and controls, and the two redundant subsystems available.

SR 3.6.3.3.2

Verifying that each primary containment/drywell hydrogen mixing subsystem flow rate is ≥ 600 cfm ensures that each subsystem is capable of maintaining drywell hydrogen concentrations below the flammability limit. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage when the drywell boundary is not required. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES

1. Regulatory Guide 1.7, Revision 2.
 2. USAR, Section 6.2.5.
 3. CR 96-0767.
-

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

B.1

With one or more penetration flow paths with two drywell isolation valves inoperable, the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, a blind flange, and a check valve with flow through the valve secured. The 4 hour Completion Time is acceptable due to the low probability of the inoperable valves resulting in excessive drywell leakage and the low probability of the limiting event for drywell leakage occurring during this short time frame. The Completion Time is reasonable, considering the time required to isolate the penetration, and the probability of a DBA, which requires the drywell isolation valves to close, occurring during this short time is very low.

C.1

With one or more hydrogen mixing penetration flow path not within the limitations specified in SR 3.6.5.3.6, the penetration flow paths for hydrogen mixing must be isolated immediately. Since the hydrogen mixing valves have never been demonstrated capable of closing under accident conditions in the drywell, closing the valves ensures drywell integrity should the limitations of SR 3.6.5.3.6 be exceeded.

D.1 and D.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

(continued)

BASES

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**

SR 3.6.5.3.1

Each 24 inch drywell purge isolation valve is required to be verified sealed closed at 31 day intervals. This Surveillance is required since the drywell purge isolation valves are not qualified to close under accident conditions. This SR is designed to ensure that a gross breach of drywell is not caused by an inadvertent or spurious drywell purge isolation valve opening. Detailed analysis of these 24 inch drywell purge valves failed to conclusively demonstrate their ability to close during a LOCA in time to support drywell OPERABILITY. Therefore, these valves are required to be in sealed closed position during MODES 1, 2, and 3. These 24 inch drywell purge valves that are sealed closed must have motive power to the valve operator removed. This can be accomplished by de-energizing the source of electric power or removing the air supply to the valve operator. In this application, the term "sealed" has no connotation of leakage within limits. The Frequency is based on purge valve use during unit operations.

SR 3.6.5.3.2

This SR ensures that the primary containment/drywell hydrogen mixing isolation valves are closed as required or, if open, open for an allowable reason for limited periods of time. This SR has been modified by a Note indicating the SR is not required to be met when the primary containment/drywell hydrogen mixing inlet or outlet valves are open for pressure control. The 31 day Frequency is consistent with the valve requirements discussed under SR 3.6.5.3.1.

SR 3.6.5.3.3

This SR requires verification that each drywell isolation manual valve and blind flange that is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that drywell bypass leakage is maintained to a minimum. Due to the location of these devices, the Frequency specified as "prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4, if not performed in the previous 92 days," is appropriate because of the inaccessibility of the devices and because these devices are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.

Two Notes are added to this SR. The first Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to

(continued)

BASES

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)**

SR 3.6.5.3.4

be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these devices, once they have been verified to be in their proper position, is low. A second Note is included to clarify that the drywell isolation valves that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time that the devices are open.

Verifying that the isolation time of each power operated and each automatic drywell isolation valve is within limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures the valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analysis. The isolation time and Frequency of this SR are in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

SR 3.6.5.3.5

Verifying that each automatic drywell isolation valve closes on a drywell isolation signal is required to prevent bypass leakage from the drywell following a DBA. This SR ensures each automatic drywell isolation valve will actuate to its isolation position on a drywell isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.1.6 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power, since isolation of penetrations would eliminate cooling water flow and disrupt the normal operation of many critical components. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass this Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.6.5.3.6

This SR ensures that the hydrogen mixing valves remain closed during Modes 1, 2, and 3, or, if open, are only open for a limited period of time over a 365 day cycle. Since

(continued)

BASES

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)**

SR 3.6.5.3.6

the hydrogen mixing isolation valves have never been demonstrated capable of closing under accident conditions in the drywell, this SR applies restrictions to the opening of these valves (Reference 3). The frequency of this SR is consistent with the frequency of SR 3.6.3.2 and allows the administrative tracking of the hours open to be performed concurrently with the isolation valve closure verification.

REFERENCES

1. USAR, Section 6.2.4.
 2. USAR, Table 6.2-40.
 3. CR 96-0767.
-



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 89 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47

ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.

RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-458

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated August 1, 1996, Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (Appendix A to Facility Operating License No. NPF-47) for the River Bend Station, Unit 1. The proposed changes would revise the technical specifications (TSs) to incorporate requirements for limiting the time that the hydrogen mixing isolation valves on the drywell are open. The requirements were contained in the old TSs and with the conversion to the Improved Standard Technical Specifications, the requirements were inadvertently changed. The proposed action is to restore requirements to meet the licensing basis for the River Bend Station. The proposed amendment would also change the time from 7 days to 31 days to determine the cumulative time the valves are open.

2.0 BACKGROUND

The licensing basis for the drywell hydrogen mixing system was established during the licensing of the River Bend Station and is documented in NUREG-0989 "Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of River Bend Station" Supplement 2, dated August 1985. The Containment Purge System is addressed in section 6.2.4.3; the hydrogen mixing system for drywell pressure control was found acceptable as follows:

"The concern regarding the use of the hydrogen mixing system for drywell pressure control is the potential of it becoming a suppression pool bypass leakage path. The applicant stated that the suppression pool bypass area with the 6-inch hydrogen mixing system inlet valve open is 0.20 ft sq which is bounded by the allowable bypass leakage. Therefore, the staff finds the applicant's proposal to use the hydrogen mixing system for drywell pressure control to be acceptable. However, since the applicant has not demonstrated that these valves are capable of closing under accident conditions in the drywell, certain restrictions apply. Technical Specification 3.6.6.2 specifies that in Operating Modes 1 and 2, the total number of hours used should not exceed 5 hours/365 days and in Operating Mode 3 the number of hours should be limited to 90 hours/365 days".

By license amendment number 81 issued July 20, 1995, the River Bend Station technical specifications were converted to the new Improved Standard Technical Specification format and content. During the conversion of the TSs to the improved, the licensee inadvertently adopted the new format for the hydrogen mixing valves and dropped the standing requirement for limiting the valves open during Modes 1, 2, and 3. The staff also inadvertently adopted the licensee's submittal and issued the new TSs without the requirements to continue to meet the licensing basis.

3.0 EVALUATION

The licensing basis for operation of the drywell hydrogen mixing valves has not changed and remains valid. The licensee has not demonstrated that the valves are capable of closing under accident conditions in the drywell and the restrictions continue to apply. The prior TSs were imposed at the time of licensing and should continue. The licensee's proposal to revise the new TSs is consistent with the prior TSs and the licensing basis for the facility and is acceptable.

The licensee also proposes to change the time for determining the cumulative time the valves are open from 7 days to 31 days. Under the restrictions to minimize the open time for the valves, any opening is rare. TSs 3.6.5.3.1 requires that the valves be verified to be closed every 31 days. The licensee proposes to combine the period for verifying the valves to be closed with the period for determining the cumulative open time for the valves. Since the valves are maintained closed and any opening would be controlled (and accounted for) in order to limit the cumulative time and stay within the TSs, the requirement to determine the cumulative time every 7 days is also overly conservative. The determination for cumulative time is an accounting process with no direct requirement to verify the opening or closing of the valves. Having the accounting of cumulative time for opening accomplished at the same time as the required verification of valve position, the licensee is directed to more than one action on the same valves at the same time. We agree with the licensee that accounting of cumulative time for opening of the valves every 31 days is reasonable and is acceptable.

We have reviewed the technical specifications proposed by the licensee and find them acceptable. We have also reviewed the Bases provided by the licensee and the proposed changes are approved.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Louisiana State Official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no

significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (61 FR 50343). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: David Wigginton

Date: November 12, 1996