October 7, 1994

Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
ATTN: Mr. John R. McGaha, Jr.
Vice President - Operations
Post Office Box 220
St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775

SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1 - AMENDMENT NO. 75 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47 (TAC NO. M90345)

Dear Mr. McGaha:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 75 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 for the River Bend Station, Unit 1. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated September 12, 1994, as supplemented by letter dated September 30, 1994.

The amendment revises TS 3/4.2.2, "APRM Setpoints," to permit operation in accordance with the Boiling Water Reactor Owners' Group (BWROG) guidelines on improved BWR thermal-hydraulic stability.

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

David L. Wigginton, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-1
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-458

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 75 to NPF-47
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

October 7, 1994

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A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

William Bateman Jr

David L. Wigginton, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-1
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
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River Bend Station

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY**

CAJUN ELECTRIC POWER COOPERATIVE AND

ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-458

RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No.75
License No. NPF-47

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Gulf States Utilities* (the licensee) dated September 12, 1994, as supplemented by letter dated September 30, 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

---

* EOI is authorized to act as agent for Gulf States Utilities Company, which has been authorized to act as agent for Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.

**Gulf States Utilities Company, which owns a 70 percent undivided interest in River Bend, has merged with a wholly owned subsidiary of Entergy Corporation. Gulf States Utilities Company was the surviving company in the merger.

E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 75 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. EOI shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

William D. Beckner, Director
Project Directorate IV-1
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: October 7, 1994

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 75

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47

DOCKET NO. 50-458

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE	INSERT
B 2-7	B 2-7
3/4 2-7	3/4 2-7
3/4 2-7a	3/4 2-7a

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS (Continued)

Average Power Range Monitor (Continued)

The APRM trip system is calibrated using heat balance data taken during steady state conditions. Fission chambers provide the basic input to the system and therefore the monitors respond directly and quickly to changes due to transient operation for the case of the Neutron Flux-High setpoint; i.e., for a power increase, the THERMAL POWER of the fuel will be less than that indicated by the neutron flux due to the time constants of the heat transfer associated with the fuel. For the Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power-High setpoint, a time constant is introduced into the flow biased APRM in order to simulate the fuel thermal transient characteristics. A more conservative maximum value is used for the flow biased setpoint as shown in Table 2.2.1-1.

The APRM setpoints were selected to provide adequate margin for the Safety Limits and yet allow operating margin that reduces the possibility of unnecessary shutdown. The flow referenced trip setpoint must be adjusted by the specified formula in Specification 3.2.2 in order to maintain these margins.

3. Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure-High

High pressure in the nuclear system could cause a rupture to the nuclear system process barrier resulting in the release of fission products. A pressure increase while operating will also tend to increase the power of the reactor by compressing voids thus adding reactivity. The trip will quickly reduce the neutron flux, counteracting the pressure increase. The trip setting is slightly higher than the operating pressure to permit normal operation without spurious trips. The setting provides for a wide margin to the maximum allowable design pressure and takes into account the location of the pressure measurement compared to the highest pressure that occurs in the system during a transient. This trip setpoint is effective at low power/flow conditions when the turbine control valve fast closure and turbine stop valve closure trips are bypassed. For a load rejection or turbine trip under these conditions, the transient analysis indicated an adequate margin to the thermal hydraulic limit.

4. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low

The reactor vessel water level trip setpoint has been used in transient analyses dealing with coolant inventory decrease. The scram setting was chosen far enough below the normal operating level to avoid spurious trips but high enough above the fuel to assure that there is adequate protection for the fuel and pressure limits.

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS (Continued)

5. Reactor Vessel Water Level-High

A reactor scram from high reactor water level, approximately two feet above normal operating level, is intended to offset the addition of reactivity effect associated with the introduction of a significant amount of relatively cold feedwater. An excess of feedwater entering the vessel would be detected by the level increase in a timely manner. This scram feature is only effective when the reactor mode switch is in the Run position because at THERMAL POWER levels below 10% to 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER, the approximate range of power level for changing to the Run position, the safety margins are more than adequate without a reactor scram.

6. Main Steam Line Isolation Valve-Closure

The main steam line isolation valve closure trip was provided to limit the amount of fission product release for certain postulated events. The MSIV's are closed automatically from measured parameters such as high steam flow, high steam line radiation, low reactor water level, high steam tunnel temperature and low steam line pressure. The MSIV's closure scram anticipates the pressure and flux transients which could follow MSIV closure and thereby protects reactor vessel pressure and fuel thermal/hydraulic Safety Limits.

7. Main Steam Line Radiation-High

The main steam line radiation detectors are provided to detect a gross failure of the fuel cladding. When the high radiation is detected, a trip is initiated to reduce the continued failure of fuel cladding. At the same time the main steam line isolation valves are closed to limit the release of fission products. The trip setting is high enough above background radiation levels to prevent spurious trips yet low enough to promptly detect gross failures in the fuel cladding.

8. Drywell Pressure-High

High pressure in the drywell could indicate a break in the primary pressure boundary systems or a loss of drywell cooling. The reactor is tripped in order to minimize the possibility of fuel damage and reduce the amount of energy being added to the coolant and to the primary containment. The trip setting was selected as low as possible without causing spurious trips.

9. Scram Discharge Volume Water Level-High

The scram discharge volume receives the water displaced by the motion of the control rod drive pistons during a reactor scram. Should this volume fill up to a point where there is insufficient volume to accept the displaced water, control rod insertion would be hindered. The reactor is therefore tripped when

3/4.2.2 APRM SETPOINTS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.2 The APRM flow biased simulated thermal power-high scram trip setpoint (S) and flow biased neutron flux-upscale control rod block trip setpoint (S_{RB}) shall be established according to the following relationships:

a. Two Recirculation Loop Operation

Trip Setpoint	Allowable Value
$S \leq (0.66W + 48\%)T$	$S \leq (0.66W + 51\%)T$
$S_{RB} \leq (0.66W + 42\%)T$	$S_{RB} \leq (0.66W + 45\%)T$

b. Single Recirculation Loop Operation

Trip Setpoint	Allowable Value
$S \leq (0.66W + 42.7\%)T$	$S \leq (0.66W + 45.7\%)T$
$S_{RB} \leq (0.66W + 36.7\%)T$	$S_{RB} \leq (0.66W + 39.7\%)T$

where: S and S_{RB} are in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER,
W = Loop recirculation flow as a percentage of the loop recirculation flow which produces a rated core flow of 84.5 million lbs/hr.

$$T = \frac{3 \times FRTP + 1}{4 \times CMFLPD}$$ provided CMFLPD $\leq 0.6 \times$ FRTP + 0.4, otherwise

$$T = \frac{FRTP}{CMFLPD}$$

T is applied only if less than or equal to 1.0.

FRTP is the FRACTION OF RATED THERMAL POWER.
CMFLPD is the CORE MAXIMUM FRACTION OF LIMITING POWER DENSITY.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, when THERMAL POWER is greater than or equal to 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION:

With the APRM flow biased simulated thermal power-high scram trip setpoint and/or the flow biased neutron flux-upscale control rod block trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Value column for S or S_{RB}, as above determined, initiate corrective action within 15 minutes and adjust S and/or S_{RB} to be consistent with the Trip Setpoint value * within 6 hours or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.

*With T < 1.0, rather than adjusting the APRM setpoints, the APRM gain may be adjusted such that the adjusted APRM readings result in a calculated T ≥ 1.0 when the APRM reading is substituted for FRTP, provided that the adjusted APRM reading does not exceed 100% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and a notice of the adjustment is posted on the reactor control panel.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.2 The FRTP and CMFLPD shall be determined, the value of T calculated, and the most recent actual APRM flow biased simulated thermal power-high scram and flow biased neutron flux-upscale control rod block trip setpoints verified to be within the above limits or adjusted, as required:

a. At least once per 24 hours,

b. Within 12 hours after completion of a THERMAL POWER increase of at least 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and

c. Initially and at least once per 12 hours when the reactor is operating with $T \leq 1.0$.

d. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 75 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47

ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.

RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-458

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated September 12, 1994, as supplemented by letter dated September 30, 1994, Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) (Appendix A to Facility Operating License No. NPF-47) for the River Bend Station, Unit 1. The proposed changes would revise TS 3/4.2.2, "APRM Setpoints," to permit operation in accordance with the Boiling Water Reactor Owners' Group (BWROG) guidelines on improved BWR thermal-hydraulic stability.

The proposed amendment would revise the formula for calculating the average power range monitor (APRM) flow biased simulated thermal power-high reactor trip and flow biased neutron flux-upscale control rod block trip setpoints T-factor specified in TS 3/4.2.2. The proposed changes are necessary to support implementation of recommendations contained in NRC Generic Letter 94-02, "Long-Term Solutions and Upgrade of Interim Operating Recommendations for Thermal-Hydraulic Instabilities in Boiling Water Reactors."

2.0 BACKGROUND

The licensee requested changes to the River Bend Station (RBS) TS Section 3/4.2.2, APRM Setpoints. This change requested a change to the slope of the APRM flow-biased scram and rod block lines (AFBSL).

The requested change will allow the licensee to operate the facility with a larger axial peaking factor than currently authorized. The licensee requested this change to meet the most conservative option of the BWROG's Guidelines for Stability Interim Corrective Action. This option recommends that a four-foot core-average boiling boundary (FFBB) be maintained in the core. The core-average boiling boundary is the axial elevation of the transition from sub-cooled to saturated fluid conditions on a core-average basis. Maintaining FFBB minimizes the potential of operating in or near the Instability Region, thereby minimizing the potential for core power oscillations. To maintain FFBB, the licensee needs to operate with a total peaking factor (TPF) larger than currently authorized for this facility.

Specification 3/4.2.2 of the River Bend TSs requires adjusting the APRM setpoints whenever the "T-factor" is less than or equal to 1.0. By

definition, T-factor is the ratio of Fraction of Rated Thermal Power (FRTP) to Core Maximum Fraction of Limiting Power Density (CMFLPD). Thus, when CMFLPD $\geq$ FRTP (T $\leq$ 1.0), the APRM setpoints must be adjusted. High CMFLPD is the result of a large Linear Heat Generation Rate (LHGR) which corresponds to a large TPF. When a large TPF causes the T-factor to be less than or equal to 1.0, the TSs require adjustment of the APRM setpoints. The licensee's proposal would change the slope of AFBSL allowing a larger CMFLPD. However, if CMFLPD becomes much larger than desired for a given FRTP, the proposed change would maintain the current T-factor definition, thus applying the more restrictive AFBSL setpoint at higher TPF.

3.0 EVALUATION

The BWROG Guidelines for Stability Interim Corrective Action proposed five options. The option pursued by the licensee, maintaining FFBB, is considered acceptable based on review conducted by consultants and the NRC staff, and appears to be the most conservative option proposed by the BWROG.

To maintain FFBB, the licensee needs to obtain a higher peaked axial power shape resulting in a higher axial peaking factor. With limited control over radial peaking factor and no operational control over the local peaking factor, the higher axial peaking factor would result in a higher CMFLPD. When operating at less than rated thermal power (FRTP < 1.0), the T-factor could become less than one when the axial peaking factor becomes large.

To avoid having to adjust the AFBSL downward at higher TPF, one alternative is to change TS 3/4.2.2. This section requires changing the APRM setpoints when T $\leq$ 1.0 (which requires adjusting the AFBSL downward). By adjusting the AFBSL, control rod blocks occur at earlier steps, potentially preventing continuation of startup. To startup with slightly larger TPF than previously authorized, there is a need to change TS 3/4.2.2.

Plants analyzed for certain operational strategies, such as Maximum Extended Operating Domain (MEOD), Maximum Extended Load Line Analysis (MELLA), Extended Load Line Limit Analysis (ELLA), or using the General Electric "ARTS" program, are independent of the AFBSL. For plants authorized to use these operational strategies, no credit is taken for the AFBSL in any analyzed transients. Since no credit is taken for the AFBSL, the plants will be safe even during and after the analyzed transients.

For this plant, the staff needed to ascertain that operation above the existing AFBSL is safe. Since this plant has not been analyzed for any of the operational strategies noted above (MEOD, MELLA, or ELLA), no analysis exists verifying operation beyond the AFBSL to be safe. Therefore, the staff requested that the licensee verify that no credit is taken for the AFBSL in any of their analyses.

In a letter dated September 30, 1994, the licensee stated that the current safety analyses take no credit for the APRM flow-biased scram. With no credit taken for the AFBSL in the analyzed transients, and by not having to adjust

the AFBSL downward, the plant would be safe with slightly higher total peaking factor in analyzed transients. Therefore, the request to change the slope of the "T" line can be granted.

This request is to change the slope of the line to above the existing line (Original T=1 Line) to a new line (Modified T=1 Line), but below a bounding (Peaking Upper Bound) line. The proposed equation for the new line is:

$$T = \frac{3 \times FRTP + 1}{4 \times CMFLPD} \quad \text{provided } CMFLPD \leq 0.6 \times FRTP + 0.4$$

otherwise,

$$T = \frac{FRTP}{CMFLPD}$$

With the proposed definition, CMFLPD can increase to a value without causing the T-factor to become less than 1.0, without requiring applying the APRM setpoint change. The adjusted upward line for the new setpoint change requirement is called the Modified T=1 Line, and is about half way between the Original T=1 line and Peaking Upper Bound (PUB) line. Above the PUB line, the definition of the T-factor reverts back to the current, more restrictive definition.

Since the licensee verified that in the analyzed transients and accidents credit is not taken for the AFBSL, the necessity to rely on these lines become diminished. By operating with a higher axial peak, the plant maintains a four-foot core-average boiling boundary, which reduces the potential of experiencing core power oscillations. The staff concludes that the proposed TS change does not adversely affect plant safety and will result in a net benefit to the safe operation of the facility and, therefore, is acceptable.

4.0 FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION

River Bend Station experienced a reactor scram on September 8, 1994. In order to startup the reactor while implementing the recommendations of GL 94-02, the licensee requires the requested TS amendment prior to restarting the facility from the current outage. Therefore, in their letter dated September 12, 1994, the licensee requested that this amendment be issued on an exigent basis. The request for exigent action was based on the licensee's expectation that the facility would be returned to power operation in a relatively short period of time following the reactor scram.

The licensee's outage plan included inspection of reactor vessel internal components as part of their investigation into the cause of the scram, as well as in-core sipping of all fuel assemblies to locate and replace an assembly with a leaking fuel pin. The staff estimated that these outage activities would extend beyond the public comment period provided by an exigent notice, and therefore chose to issue an individual 30-day Federal Register notice to provide the maximum time period possible for public comment.

The Federal Register notice was published on September 22, 1994, and provides a public comment period which expires on October 21, 1994. The Federal Register notice provides that, should circumstances change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The licensee has completed their investigation into the reactor scram cause and is currently preparing to commence reactor startup on approximately October 9, 1994. Failure to issue this TS change would prevent the licensee from starting up the plant utilizing NRC staff recommendations which will reduce the potential for experiencing core power oscillations. The current status of the facility represents a change in circumstances, in that it was not anticipated that the licensee would be prepared to restart the facility prior to completion of the 30-day notice period.

The Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92 state that the Commission may make a final determination that a license amendment involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of occurrence of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The Commission has determined that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration per 10 CFR 50.92, based on the licensees's analysis provided in their September 12, 1994, letter and presented below:

1. The request does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

   This change only redefines the APRM setpoints T-factor. The modified APRM setpoints T-factor does not change or affect operator required actions in relation to the APRM setpoints T-factor and is only applied at different power peaking for given reactor power. Therefore, this change only affects the precursors to events that can be initiated as a result of different power peaking. The only event affected is the formation of coupled thermal-hydraulic and neutronic oscillations (reactor stability). Since the modified APRM setpoints T-factor allows power distributions which permit the application of stability controls to increase stability margin, the probability for initiation of reactor instability is significantly reduced. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability of any event previously evaluated.

   The consequence of a reactor instability event is minimized since the initial reactor conditions are associated with very stable power distributions. These stable conditions are established using stability controls which are permitted with the modified APRM setpoints T-factor. Since the initial reactor conditions are very stable, the severity of a postulated reactor instability event is

significantly diminished. In addition, the modified APRM setpoints T-factor is confirmed to provide adequate LHGR [linear heat generation rate] protection at off-rated conditions for other anticipated events. Protection of other thermal limits for all limits for all previously analyzed events is accomplished by specific limits that are independent of the APRM setpoints T-factor. These are the power and flow dependent MCPR [minimum critical power ratio] Operating Limits which provide protection from fuel dryout and the rated MAPLHGR [maximum average planar linear heat-generation rate] limit which provides protection of the peak clad temperature for the DBA [design-basis accident] LOCA [loss-of-coolant accident]. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the consequences of any event previously evaluated.

The proposed change in APRM setpoints T-factor permits implementation of appropriate reactor stability controls and maintains adequate off-rated LHGR margin for all operating conditions. This change, therefore, does not involve a significant increase in the probability and consequences of any event previously evaluated.

2. The request does not create the possibility of occurrence of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

   This change only redefines the APRM setpoints T-factor. The proposed changes do not involve any new modes of operation or any plant modifications. The ability to implement reactor stability controls do not result in any new precursors to an accident. Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different type of accident from any accident previously analyzed.

3. The request does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

   The change in the APRM setpoints T-factor definition allows the implementation of reactor stability controls during reactor operation at off-rated conditions which significantly improve the reactor stability performance. This is accomplished by achieving very stable power distributions outside the stability excluded region. Since the initial reactor conditions are very stable, the severity of a postulated reactor instability event is significantly diminished.

   The modified APRM setpoints T-factor accommodates higher power peaking to support the required stability controls. The modified APRM setpoints T-factor has been confirmed to provide adequate LHGR protection. Operation with higher peaking without APRM gains or flow bias trip setpoints adjustment does not involve a reduction in a margin of safety because the higher power peaking resulting from the APRM setpoints T-factor modification are below applicable LHGR

limits. For power peaking conditions that result in APRM setpoints T-factor less than one, an adjustment to the APRM gains or trip setpoints is made to provide additional LHGR protection. Additionally, an upper bound is placed on power peaking by the modified APRM setpoints T-factor definition. Therefore, the modified APRM setpoint T-factor does not involve a reduction in a margin of safety because the higher power peaking resulting from the APRM setpoints T-factor modification is below applicable LHGR limits.

Protection of other thermal limits for all previously analyzed events is accomplished by specific limits that are independent of the T-factor. These are the power and flow dependent MCPR Operating Limits which provide protection from fuel dryout and the rated MAPLHGR limit which provides protection of the peak clad temperature for the DBA LOCA. The proposed change does not result in an increase in core damage frequency. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety evaluated.

5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Louisiana State Official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has made a final determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

7.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Kombiz Salehi

Date: October 7, 1994