Docket No. 50-458 May 19, 1994

Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
ATTN: Mr. John R. McGaha, Jr.
Vice President - Operations
Post Office Box 220
St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775

Dear Mr. McGaha:

SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1 - AMENDMENT NO. 73 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47 (TAC NO. M89035)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 73 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 for the River Bend Station, Unit 1. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated March 3, 1994.

The amendment revises the technical specifications in accordance with the guidance provided by Generic Letter 93-08, "Relocation of Technical Specification Tables of Instrument Response Time Limits."

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:
Robert G. Schaaf, Acting Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-1
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 73 to NPF-47
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

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OPA				

*See previous concurrence

OFC	LA/PD4-1	(A)PM/PD4-1	OGC*	D/PD4-1
NAME	PNoonan	RSchaaf/vw	RBachmann	WBeckner
DATE	5/17/94	5/18/94	4/21/94	5/19/94
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

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Robert G. Schaaf, Acting Project Manager
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See next page

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UNITED STATES
N CLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY**

CAJUN ELECTRIC POWER COOPERATIVE AND

ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-458

RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 73
License No. NPF-47

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Gulf States Utilities* (the licensee) dated March 3, 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

---

* EOI is authorized to act as agent for Gulf States Utilities Company, which has been authorized to act as agent for Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.

**Gulf States Utilities Company, which owns a 70 percent undivided interest in River Bend, has merged with a wholly owned subsidiary of Entergy Corporation. Gulf States Utilities Company was the surviving company in the merger.

E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 73 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. EOI shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

William D. Beckner

William D. Beckner, Director
Project Directorate IV-1
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: **May 19, 1994**

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 73

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47

DOCKET NO. 50-458

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE	INSERT
xxiii	xxiii
3/4 3-1	3/4 3-1
3/4 3-6	3/4 3-6
3/4 3-10	3/4 3-10
3/4 3-11	3/4 3-11
3/4 3-24	3/4 3-24
3/4 3-25	3/4 3-25
3/4 3-30	3/4 3-30
3/4 3-30a	3/4 3-30a
3/4 3-40	3/4 3-40

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF TABLES (Continued)

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.1 As a minimum, the reactor protection system instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3.1-1.

ACTION:

a. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for one trip system, place the inoperable channel(s) and/or that trip system in the tripped condition* within one hour.

b. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for both trip systems, place at least one trip system** in the tripped condition within one hour and take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.1-1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.1.1 Each reactor protection system instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.1.1-1.#

4.3.1.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months.***

4.3.1.3 THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each required reactor tirp functional unit shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months. Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing. Each test shall include at least one channel per trip system such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip system.

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* An inoperable channel need not be placed in the tripped condition where this would cause the Trip Function to occur. In these cases, the inoperable channel shall be restored to OPERABLE status within 2 hours or the ACTION required by Table 3.3.1-1 for that Trip Function shall be taken.

** The trip system need not be placed in the tripped condition if this would cause the Trip Function to occur. When a trip system can be placed in the tripped condition without causing the Trip Function to occur, place the trip system with the most inoperable channels in the tripped condition; if both systems have the same number of inoperable channels, place either trip system in the tripped condition. The requirement to place a trip system in the tripped condition does not apply to Functional Units 6 and 10 of Table 3.3.1-1.

***Logic System Functional Test period may be extended as identified by note 'p' on Table 4.3.1.1-1.

\# Channel Calibration period may be extended as identified by notes 'o' and 'q' on Table 4.3.1.1-1.

TABLE 3.3.1-1

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	APPLICABLE OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS	MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM (a)	ACTION
1. Intermediate Range Monitors:			
a. Neutron Flux - High	2 3, 4 5(b)	3 3 3	1 2 3
b. Inoperative	2 3, 4 5	3 3 3	1 2 3
2. Average Power Range Monitor (c):			
a. Neutron Flux - High, Setdown	2 3, 4 5(b)	3 3 3	1 2 3
b. Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power - High	1	3	4
c. Neutron Flux - High	1	3	4
d. Inoperative	1, 2 3, 4 5	3 3 3	1 2 3
3. Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High	1, 2(d)	2	1
4. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3	1, 2	2	1
5. Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8	1(e)	2	4
6. Main Steam Line Isolation Valve - Closure	1(e)	4	10
7. Main Steam Line Radiation - High	1, 2(d)	2	5
8. Drywell Pressure - High	1, 2(f)	2	1

TABLE 3.3.1-1 (Continued)

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

TABLE NOTATIONS

(a) A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 2 hours for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped condition provided at least one OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.

(b) Unless adequate shutdown margin has been demonstrated per Specification 3.1.1, the "shorting links" shall be removed from the RPS circuitry prior to and during the time any control rod is withdrawn*.

(c) An APRM channel is inoperable if there are less than 2 LPRM inputs per level or less than 11 LPRM inputs to an APRM channel.

(d) This function is not required to be OPERABLE when the reactor pressure vessel head is removed per Specification 3.10.1.

(e) This function shall be automatically bypassed when the reactor mode switch is not in the Run position.

(f) This function is not required to be OPERABLE when DRYWELL INTEGRITY is not required.

(g) With any control rod withdrawn. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

(h) This function shall be automatically bypassed when turbine first stage pressure is ≤ 187 psig,** equivalent to THERMAL POWER less than 40% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

*Not required for control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.
**To allow for instrumentation accuracy, calibration and drift, a setpoint of ≤ 177 psig turbine first stage pressure shall be used.

Table 3.3.1-2 has been deleted.

TABLE 4.3.1.1-1 (Continued)

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

(f) The LPRMs shall be calibrated at least once per 1000 effective full power hours (EFPH) using the TIP system.

(g) Calibrate Rosemount trip unit setpoint at least once per 31 days.

(h) Verify measured drive flow to be less than or equal to established drive flow at the existing flow control valve position.

(i) This calibration shall consist of verifying the simulated thermal power time constant is within the limits specified in the COLR.

(j) This function is not required to be OPERABLE when the reactor pressure vessel head is removed per Specification 3.10.1.

(k) With any control rod withdrawn. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

(l) This function is not required to be OPERABLE when DRYWELL INTEGRITY is not required per Specification 3.10.1

(m) Verify the Turbine Bypass Valves are closed when THERMAL POWER is greater than or equal to 40% RATED THERMAL POWER.

(n) The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall include the turbine first stage pressure instruments.

(o) The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall exclude the flow reference transmitters; these transmitters shall be calibrated at least once per 18 months, except that this test may be performed during the fifth refueling outage scheduled to begin April 16, 1994.

(p) This period may be extended to the completion of the fifth refueling outage scheduled to begin April 16, 1994.

(q) CHANNEL CALIBRATION may be performed during the fifth refueling outage scheduled to begin April 16, 1994.

3/4.3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.2 The isolation actuation instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.2-2.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3.2-1.

ACTION:

a. With an isolation actuation instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3.2-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

b. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE channels per Trip System requirement for one trip system, place the inoperable channel(s) and/or that trip system in the tripped condition* within one hour.

c. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for both trip systems, place at least one trip system** in the tripped condition within one hour and take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.2-1.

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* An inoperable channel need not be placed in the tripped condition where this would cause the Trip Function to occur. In these cases, the inoperable channel shall be restored to OPERABLE status within 2 hours or the ACTION required by Table 3.3.2-1 for that Trip Funciton shall be taken.

**The trip system need not be placed in the tripped condition if this would cause the Trip Function to occur. When a trip system can be placed in the tripped condition without causing the Trip Function to occur, place the trip system with the most inoperable channels in the tripped condition; if both systems have the same number of inoperable channels, place either trip system in the tripped condition.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.2.1 Each isolation actuation instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.2.1-1.**

4.3.2.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months.*

4.3.2.3 The ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each required isolation trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one channel per trip system such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months, where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific isolation trip system.

* Logic System Functional Testing period may be extended as identified by note c on Table 4.3.2.1-1.

**Channel Calibration period may be extended as identified by note 'd' on Table 4.3.2.1-1.

TABLE 3.3.2-1

ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

TRIP FUNCTION	VALVE GROUPS OPERATED BY SIGNAL***	MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM (a)	APPLICABLE OPERATIONAL CONDITION	ACTION
1. PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION				
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2	1, 7, 8, 9(b)(c)(j), 15, 16	2	1, 2, 3	20
b. Drywell Pressure - High	1, 3, 8(b)(c)(j)	2	1, 2, 3	20
c. Containment Purge Isolation Radiation - High	8	1	1, 2, 3	21
2. MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION				
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1	6	2	1, 2, 3	20
b. Main Steam Line Radiation - High	6, 9(d)	2	1, 2, 3	23
c. Main Steam Line Pressure - Low	6	2	1	24
d. Main Steam Line Flow - High	6	2/MSL	1, 2, 3	23
e. Condenser Vacuum - Low	6	2	1, 2**, 3**	23
f. Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature - High	6	2	1, 2, 3	23
g. Main Steam Line Tunnel Δ Temperature - High	6	2	1, 2, 3	23
h. Main Steam Line Area Temperature High (Turbine Building)	6	2/area	1, 2, 3	23

TABLE 3.3.2-2 (Continued)

ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS

TRIP FUNCTION	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
6. RHR SYSTEM ISOLATION (Cont'd)		
e. Reactor Vessel (RHR Cut-in Permissive) Pressure - High	≤ 135 psig	≤ 150 psig
f. Drywell Pressure - High	≤ 1.68 psig	≤ 1.88 psig
7. MANUAL INITIATION	NA	NA

* See Bases Figure B 3/4 3-1.

Table 3.3.2-3 has been deleted.

Table 3.3.2-3 has been deleted.

TABLE 4.3.2.1-1

ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

TRIP FUNCTION	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS IN WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED
1. PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION				
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Level 2	S	M	$R^{(b)}$	1, 2, 3
b. Drywell Pressure - High	S	M	$R^{(b)}$	1, 2, 3
c. Containment Purge Isolation Radiation - High	S	M	R	1, 2, 3
2. MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION				
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low Level 1	S	M	$R^{(b)}$	1, 2, 3
b. Main Steam Line Radiation - High	S	M	R	1, 2, 3
c. Main Steam Line Pressure - Low	S	M	$R^{(b)}$	1
d. Main Steam Line Flow - High	S	M	$R^{(b)}$	1, 2, 3
e. Condenser Vacuum - Low	S	M	$R^{(b)}$	1, 2**, 3**
f. Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature - High	S	M	R	1, 2, 3
g. Main Steam Line Tunnel Δ Temperature - High	S	M	R	1, 2, 3
h. Main Steam Line Area Temperature-High (Turbine Building)	S	M	$R^{(b)}$	1, 2, 3

TABLE 4.3.2.1-1 (Continued)

ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

TRIP FUNCTION	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS IN WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED
6. RHR SYSTEM ISOLATION				
a. RHR Equipment Area Ambient Temperature - High	S	M	R	1, 2, 3
b. RHR Equipment Area Δ Temperature - High	S	M	R	1, 2, 3
c. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Level 3	S	M	R(b)	1, 2, 3
d. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low Level 1	S	M	R(b)	1, 2, 3
e. Reactor Vessel (RHR Cut-in Permissive) Pressure - High	S	M	R(b)(c)(d)	1, 2, 3
f. Drywell Pressure - High	S	M	R(b)	1, 2, 3
7. MANUAL INITIATION	NA	M	NA	1, 2, 3

*When handling irradiated fuel in the Fuel Building.
**When the reactor mode switch is in Run and/or any turbine stop valve is open.
(a) Each train or logic channel shall be tested at least every other 31 days.
(b) Calibrate trip unit setpoint at least once per 31 days.
(c) May be performed during the fifth refueling outage scheduled to begin April 16, 1994.
(d) CHANNEL CALIBRATION may be performed during the fifth refueling outage scheduled to begin April 16, 1994.

3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3 The emergency core cooling system (ECCS) actuation instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.3-2.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3.3-1.

ACTION:

a. With an ECCS actuation instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3.3-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

b. With one or more ECCS actuation instrumentation channels inoperable, take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.3-1.

c. With either ADS trip system "A" or "B" inoperable, restore the inoperable trip system to OPERABLE status:

   1. Within 7 days, provided that the HPCS and RCIC systems are OPERABLE, or

   2. Within 72 hours, provided either the HPCS or the RCIC system is inoperable.

   Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and reduce reactor steam dome pressure to less than or equal to 100 psig within the following 24 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.1 Each ECCS actuation instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCITONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.3.1-1.##

4.3.3.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months.##

##Channel Calibration and Logic System Functional testing period may be extended as identified by note b on Table 4.3.3.1-1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.3 At least once per 18 months##, the ECCS RESPONSE TIME of each required ECCS trip function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit. Each test shall include at least one channel per trip system such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months##, where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ECCS trip system.

##ECCS Response time testing period may be extended to the completion of the fifth refueling outage scheduled to begin April 16, 1994.

TABLE 3.3.3-2 (Continued)

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS

TRIP FUNCTION	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
D. LOSS OF POWER (continued)		
2. Division III		
a. 4.16 kv Standby Bus Undervoltage (Sustained Undervoltage)	a. 4.16 kv Basis - 3045 ± 153 volts	3045 ± 214 volts
	b. 3 ± 0.3 sec. time delay	3 ± 0.33 sec. time delay
b. 4.16 kv Standby Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage)	a. 4.16 kv Basis - 3777 ± 30 volts	3777 ± 75 volts
	b. 60 ± 6 sec. time delay (w/o LOCA)	60 ± 6.6 sec. time delay
	c. 3 ± 0.3 sec. time delay (w/LOCA)	3 ± 0.33 sec. time delay

*See Bases Figure B 3/4 3-1.

**(Bottom of CST is at EL 95'1".) The levels are measured from the instrument zero level of EL 98'6".

#(Bottom of suppression pool is at EL 70'.) The levels are measured from the instrument zero level of EL 89'9".

##These are inverse time delay voltage relays or instantaneous voltage relays with a time delay. The voltages shown are the maximum that will not result in a trip. Lower voltage conditions will result in decreased trip times.

Table 3.3.3-3 has been deleted.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 73 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47

ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.

RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-458

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated March 3, 1994, Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee), submitted a request for changes to the River Bend Station, Unit 1 Technical Specifications (TS). The requested amendment would change the TS to modify the requirements of TS 3.3.1, TS 3.3.2, and TS 3.3.3 and relocate Tables 3.3.1-2, 3.3.2-3, and 3.3.3-3, which provide the response time limits for the reactor protection system (RPS), isolation actuation system (IAS) and emergency core cooling system (ECCS) instruments, from the TS to the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR). The licensee has stated that the next update of the USAR will include these tables. The NRC provided guidance to all holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power reactors on the proposed TS changes in Generic Letter 93-08, "Relocation of Technical Specification Tables of Instrument Response Time Limits," dated December 29, 1993.

2.0 BACKGROUND

The NRC staff undertook efforts in the early 1980's to address problems related to the content of nuclear power plant technical specifications. These projects have resulted in the issuance of various reports, proposed rulemakings, and Commission policy statements. Line item improvements became a mechanism for technical specification improvement as part of the implementation of the Commission's interim policy statement on technical specification improvements published on February 6, 1987 (52 FR 3788). The final Commission policy statement on technical specification improvements was published July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132). The final policy statement provided criteria which can be used to establish, more clearly, the framework for technical specifications. The staff has maintained the line item improvement process, through the issuance of generic letters, in order to improve the content and consistency of technical specifications and to reduce the licensee and staff resources required to process amendments related to those specifications being relocated from the TS to other licensee documents as a result of the implementation of the Commission's final policy statement.

Section 50.36 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations establishes the regulatory requirements for licensees to include technical specifications as part of applications for operating licenses. The rule requires that technical specifications include items in five specified categories: (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings; (2) limiting conditions for operation; (3) surveillance requirements; (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls. In addition, the Commission's final policy statement on technical specification improvements and other Commission documents provide guidance regarding the required content of technical specifications. The fundamental purpose of the technical specifications, as described in the Commission's final policy statement, is to impose those conditions or limitations upon reactor operation necessary to obviate the possibility of an abnormal situation or event giving rise to an immediate threat to the public health and safety by identifying those features that are of controlling importance to safety and establishing certain conditions of operation which cannot be changed without prior Commission approval.

The Commission's final policy statement recognized, as had previous statements related to the staff's technical specification improvement program, that implementation of the policy would result in the relocation of existing technical specification requirements to licensee controlled documents such as the USAR. Those items relocated to the USAR would in turn be controlled in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, "Changes, tests and experiments." Section 50.59 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides criteria to determine when facility or operating changes planned by a licensee require prior Commission approval in the form of a license amendment in order to address any unreviewed safety questions. NRC inspection and enforcement programs also enable the staff to monitor facility changes and licensee adherence to USAR commitments and to take any remedial action that may be appropriate.

3.0 EVALUATION

The licensee has proposed changes to TS 3.3.1, TS 3.3.2, and TS 3.3.3 that remove the references to Tables 3.3.1-2, 3.3.2-3, and 3.3.3-3 and deletes these tables from the TS. The licensee committed to relocate the tables on response time limits to the USAR in the next periodic update.

Tables 3.3.1-2, 3.3.2-3, and 3.3.3-3 contain the values of the response time limits for the RPS, IAS, and ECCS instruments. The limiting conditions for operation for the RPS, IAS, and ECCS instrumentation specify these systems shall be operable with the response times as specified in these tables. These limits are the acceptance criteria for the response time tests performed to satisfy the surveillance requirements of TS 4.3.1.3, TS 4.3.2.3, and TS 4.3.3.3 for each applicable RPS, IAS, and ECCS trip function. These surveillances ensure that the response times of the RPS, IAS, and ECCS instruments are consistent with the assumptions of the safety analyses performed for design basis accidents and transients. The changes associated with the implementation of Generic Letter 93-08 involve only the relocation of the RPS, IAS, and ECCS response time tables but retain the surveillance requirement to perform response time testing. The USAR will now contain the acceptance criteria for the required RPS, IAS, and ECCS response time surveillances. Because it does not alter the TS requirements to ensure that the response times of the RPS, IAS, and ECCS instruments are within their limits, the staff has concluded that relocation of these response time limit tables from the TS to USAR is acceptable.

The staff's determination is based on the fact that the removal of the specific response time tables does not eliminate the requirements for the licensee to ensure that the protection instrumentation is capable of performing its safety function. Although the tables containing the specific response time requirements are relocated from the technical specifications to the USAR, the licensee must continue to evaluate any changes to response time requirements in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. Should the licensee's determination conclude that an unreviewed safety question is involved, due to either (1) an increase in the probability or consequences of accidents or malfunctions of equipment important to safety, (2) the creation of a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously, or (3) a reduction in the margin of safety, NRC approval and a license amendment would be required prior to implementation of the change.

The staff's review concluded that 10 CFR 50.36 does not require the response time tables to be retained in technical specifications. Requirements related to the operability, applicability, and surveillance requirements, including performance of testing to ensure response times, for RPS, IAS, and ECCS systems are retained due to those systems' importance in mitigating the consequences of an accident. However, the staff determined that the inclusion of specific response time requirements for the various instrumentation channels and components addressed by Generic Letter 93-08 was not required. The response times are considered to be an operational detail related to the licensee's safety analyses which are adequately controlled by the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. Therefore, the continued processing of license amendments related to revisions of the affected instrument or component response times, where the revisions to those requirements do not involve an unreviewed safety question under 10 CFR 50.59, would afford no significant benefit with regard to protecting the public health and safety. Further, the response time requirements do not constitute a condition or limitation on operation necessary to obviate the possibility of an abnormal situation or event giving rise to an immediate threat to the public health and safety, in that the ability of the RPS, IAS, and ECCS systems to perform their safety functions are not adversely impacted by the relocation of the response time tables from the TS to the USAR.

The staff issued an amendment to the River Bend Station license on February 18, 1994, to revise the TS to permit certain surveillance requirement intervals to be extended to the fifth refueling outage, which began on April 16, 1994. The February 18, 1994, amendment included footnotes to the surveillance requirements of TS 4.3.1.3, TS 4.3.2.3, and TS 4.3.3.3 which referenced the tables deleted by this amendment. These footnotes were not reflected in the licensee's March 3, 1994, submittal, which was prepared by the licensee prior to issuance of the February 18, 1994, amendment. The footnotes associated with TS 4.3.1.3 and TS 4.3.2.3 are no longer required and may be deleted, as the plant is in an operational condition in which the requirements are no longer applicable, and they are required to be performed prior to returning to an operational condition in which the requirements will apply. The footnote associated with TS 4.3.3.3 has been revised to relocate the required information regarding the surveillance interval extension from Table 3.3.3-3 to the footnote. These administrative changes have been discussed with the licensee and are acceptable to the staff.

These TS changes are consistent with the guidance provided in Generic Letter 93-08 and the TS requirement of 10 CFR 50.36. The staff has determined that the proposed changes to the TS for the River Bend Station, Unit 1, are acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Louisiana State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (59 FR 12380). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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Date: May 19, 1994