

Docket



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

February 2, 1994

Docket No. 50-458

Entergy Operations, Inc.  
River Bend Station  
ATTN: Mr. John R. McGaha, Jr.  
Vice President - Operations  
Post Office Box 220  
St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775

Dear Mr. McGaha:

SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1 - AMENDMENT NO. 71 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47 AND EXEMPTION TO APPENDIX J TESTING FREQUENCY (TAC NOS. M88284 AND M88285)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Exemption and Amendment No. 71 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 for the River Bend Station, Unit 1. The Exemption extends the testing interval for Appendix J, Type C leak rate testing, in response to your request dated November 18, 1993, (RBG-39426) as supplemented by letter dated December 21, 1993 (RBG-39796). The amendment consists of revising the technical specifications (TS) in response to your application dated November 18, 1993, (RBG-39425) as supplemented by letters dated December 21, 1993 (RBG-39796) and January 28, 1994 (RBG-39971).

The Exemption to Appendix J, Type C leak rate testing, provides an extension of 29 days to allow the testing of 20 containment isolation valves to be delayed until the refueling outage that is scheduled to start April 16, 1994. The amendment permits extending the time to perform leak rate testing of certain containment isolation valves so that the testing can be performed during the refueling outage, rather than requiring an earlier shutdown solely to perform the testing. In addition, the proposed amendment would revise the requirement to leak test the reactor coolant pressure isolation valves every 18 months or prior to returning a valve to service, and instead, require the valves to be tested in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

Your letter dated January 28, 1994, requested early issuance of this amendment because insufficient time exists for the Commission's usual 30-day notice without River Bend being required to shutdown due to inability to perform the surveillance procedure with the unit in operation.

The Exemption has been forwarded to the Office of the Federal Register for publication. A copy of our Safety Evaluation is enclosed. The Notice of

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Issuance and Final Determination of No Significant Hazards Consideration and Opportunity for Hearing will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By

Robert G. Schaaf, Acting Project Manager  
Project Directorate IV-2  
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

- 1. Exemption
- 2. Amendment No. to NPF-47
- 3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:  
See next page

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subject to inserted language.

cc w/enclosures:

Winston & Strawn

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

In the Matter of	)	
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.	)	Docket No. 50-458
(River Bend Station, Unit 1)	)	

EXEMPTION

I.

On November 20, 1985, the Commission issued Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 to Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU) and Cajun Electric Power Cooperative (the licensees) for River Bend Station, Unit 1. The license provided, among other things, that the facility is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission.

II.

Appendix J of Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, "Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Reactors," Section III.D.3 requires that Type C leak rate tests be performed each reactor shutdown for refueling, but in no case at intervals to exceed 2 years.

By letter dated November 18, 1993, as supplemented by letter dated December 21, 1993, GSU requested a one-time exemption to the schedular requirements for performing Appendix J, Type C, leak rate testing. River Bend was last shutdown for refueling from March 12, 1992, to September 8, 1992 and the Type C local leak rate testing was performed. River Bend experienced several forced outages since then which, combined with the 6-month refueling outage have impacted the 24-month surveillance interval required by Technical Specifications. Consequently, the first of these surveillances are due to be

performed 29 days before the next scheduled refueling outage. This exemption would provide an extension of 29 days to allow the testing of 20 containment isolation valves to be delayed until the upcoming refueling outage currently scheduled to begin April 16, 1994. This would allow the licensee to avoid the thermal transients and personnel exposures associated with shutting the plant down solely to perform leakage testing. The licensee will make a good faith effort to complete the surveillance tests within the current frequency if an outage of sufficient length occurs prior to the refueling outage.

The licensee has demonstrated that the valves in question are not subject to degradation based on the results of leakage tests from the previous refueling outage. These tests showed that substantial margin existed between the allowed leakage and the as-left leakage and that the affected valves provide only a small contribution to the overall allowable leakage rate.

### III.

Section 50.12 of the Commission's regulations permit the granting of an exemption from the regulations when special circumstances are present. According to 50.12(a)(2)(ii), special circumstances are present whenever application of the regulation in question is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.

The underlying purpose of Appendix J, Section III.D.3 is to assure a leak tight containment to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The past leak rate data and available margin to that allowed by the Technical Specifications is sufficient to assure that the underlying purpose of Appendix J, Section III.D.3 is fulfilled. Therefore, the staff has determined that the special circumstances as described in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist in

that the application of the regulation is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.

IV.

Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, this exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common defense and security.


Accordingly, the Commission hereby grants an exemption from 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Section III.D.3.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the granting of the Exemption will have no significant impact on the environment (58 FR 68969).

This Exemption is effective upon issuance.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day of February 1994.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



John A. Zwolinski, Acting Director  
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY\*\*

CAJUN ELECTRIC POWER COOPERATIVE AND

ENERGY OPERATIONS, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-458

RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 71  
License No. NPF-47

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Gulf States Utilities\* dated November 18, 1993, as supplemented by letters dated December 21, 1993, and January 28, 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

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
\* EOI is authorized to act as agent for Gulf States Utilities Company, which has been authorized to act as agent for Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.

\*\*Gulf States Utilities Company, which owns a 70 percent undivided interest in River Bend, has merged with a wholly owned subsidiary of Entergy Corporation. Gulf States Utilities Company was the surviving company in the merger.

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- E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 is hereby amended to read as follows:
- (2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan
- The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 71 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. EOI shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Elinor G. Adensam, Assistant Director  
for Region IV & V Reactors  
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 2, 1994

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 71

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47

DOCKET NO. 50-458

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change. The overleaf pages are provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE

3/4 4-12  
3/4 6-5

INSERT

3/4 4-12  
3/4 6-5

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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#### 3.4.3.2 Reactor coolant system leakage shall be limited to:

- a. No PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE.
- b. 5 gpm UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE.
- c. 25 gpm total leakage (averaged over any 24-hour period).
- d. 0.5 gpm per nominal inch of valve size up to a maximum of 5 gpm leakage at a reactor coolant system pressure of  $1025 \pm 15$  psig from any reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve specified in Table 3.4.3.2-1.
- e. 2 gpm UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE increase within any period of 24 hours or less (Applicable in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 only).

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.

#### ACTION:

- a. With any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours.
- b. With any reactor coolant system leakage greater than the limits in b and/or c, above, reduce the leakage rate to within the limits within 4 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- c. With any reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve leakage greater than the above limit, isolate the high pressure portion of the affected system from the low pressure portion within 4 hours by use of at least two other closed manual, deactivated automatic or check\* valves, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- d. With one or more of the high/low pressure interface valve leakage pressure monitors shown in Table 3.4.3.2-2 inoperable, restore the inoperable monitor(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or verify the pressure to be less than the alarm point at least once per 12 hours; restore the inoperable monitor(s) to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
- e. With any reactor coolant system UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE increase greater than the limits in e., above, within 4 hours identify the source of leakage as not IGSCC susceptible material or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

\* Which have been verified not to exceed the allowable leakage limit at the last refueling outage or after the last time the valve was disturbed, whichever is more recent.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.4.3.2.1 The reactor coolant system leakage shall be demonstrated to be within each of the above limits by:

- a. Monitoring the drywell atmospheric particulate radioactivity at least once per 12 hours,
- b. Monitoring the sump flow rates at least once per 12 hours,
- c. Monitoring the drywell air coolers condensate flow rate at least once per 12 hours, and
- d. Monitoring the reactor vessel head flange leak detection system at least once per 24 hours.

4.4.3.2.2 Each reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve specified in Table 3.4.3.2-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by leak testing pursuant to Specification 4.0.5 including paragraph IWV-3427(B) of the ASME Code and the RBS Inservice Test Program and verifying the leakage of each valve to be within the specified limit.

The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3.

4.4.3.2.3 The high/low pressure interface valve leakage pressure monitors shall be demonstrated OPERABLE with alarm setpoints per Table 3.4.3.2-2 by performance of a:

- a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days, and
- b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- b. If any periodic Type A test fails to meet 0.75 La, the test schedule for subsequent Type A tests shall be reviewed and approved by the Commission. If two consecutive Type A tests fail to meet 0.75 La, a Type A test shall be performed at least every 18 months until two consecutive Type A tests meet 0.75 La, at which time the above test schedule may be resumed.
- c. The accuracy of each Type A test shall be verified by a supplemental test which:
1. Confirms the accuracy of the test by verifying that the difference between the supplemental test data and the Type A test data is within 0.25 La. The formula to be used is:  
 $[Lo + Lam - 0.25 La] \leq Lc \leq [Lo + Lam + 0.25 La]$  where  $Lc$  = supplemental test results;  $Lo$  = superimposed leakage;  $Lam$  = measured Type A leakage.
  2. Has duration sufficient to establish accurately the change in leakage rate between the Type A test and the supplemental test.
  3. Requires the quantity of gas, injected into the primary containment or bled from the primary containment during the supplemental test, to be between 0.75 La and 1.25 La.
- d. Type B and C tests shall be conducted with gas at Pa, 7.6 psig\*, at intervals no greater than 24 months\*\* except for tests involving:
1. Air locks,
  2. Main steam positive leakage control system (MS-PLCS) valves and PVLCS valves,
  3. Penetrations using continuous leakage monitoring systems,
  4. Primary containment isolation valves in hydrostatically tested lines per Table 3.6.4-1 which penetrate the primary containment, and
  5. Purge supply and exhaust isolation valves with resilient material seals.
- e. Air locks shall be tested and demonstrated OPERABLE per Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.4.
- f. Total sealing air leakage into the primary containment, at a test pressure of 11.5 psid for MS-PLCS valves and 33 psid for penetration leakage control system sealed valves, shall be determined by test at least once per 18 months\*\*. This leakage may be excluded when determining the combined leakage rate, 0.6 La.

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\*Unless a hydrostatic test is required per Table 3.6.4-1.

\*\*A one-time schedular extension has been granted to allow this test to be performed during the refueling outage following the fifth cycle, scheduled to begin April 16, 1994.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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- g. Type B tests for electrical penetrations employing a continuous leakage monitoring system shall be conducted at Pa, 7.6 psig, at intervals no greater than once per 3 years.
- h. Leakage from isolation valves that are sealed with the PVLCS shall be tested once per 24 months with the valves pressurized to at least Pa, 7.6 psig. This leakage may be excluded when determining the combined leakage rate, 0.6 La.
- i. Primary containment isolation valves in hydrostatically tested lines per Table 3.6.4-1 which penetrate the primary containment shall be leak tested at least once per 18 months\*.
- j. Purge supply and exhaust isolation valves with resilient material seals shall be tested and demonstrated OPERABLE per Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.9.3.
- k. The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable to Specifications 4.6.1.3.a, 4.6.1.3.d, 4.6.1.3.g, and 4.6.1.3.h.

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\*This test may be performed during the refueling outage following the first cycle, scheduled to begin September 15, 1987.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO APPENDIX J EXEMPTION REQUEST AND AMENDMENT NO. 71 TO  
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47  
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.  
RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1  
DOCKET NO. 50-458

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letters dated November 18, 1993, as amended by letters dated December 21, 1993, and January 28, 1993, Gulf States Utilities (GSU) requested a one time exemption to the schedular requirements for performing Appendix J, Type C, leak rate testing and an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 for the River Bend Station, Unit 1. The requested changes would provide a one-time temporary revision to Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.2.2, "Reactor Coolant System Operational Leakage" and Surveillance Requirements 4.6.1.3d and 4.6.1.3f, "Primary Containment Leakage." The December 21, 1993, and January 28, 1994, supplemental letters provided clarifying information and did not change the initial no significant hazards consideration determination.

2.0 EVALUATION

Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 50, Appendix J, "Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing For Water-Cooled Reactors," Section III.D.3, requires that Type C leak rate tests be performed each reactor shutdown for refueling, but in no case at intervals to exceed 2 years. Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.3d reiterates the requirement to perform Appendix J, Type C, leak rate testing, at intervals no greater than 24 months. The proposed change would allow 20 valves to be tested after the plant is shutdown for the refueling outage that is scheduled to begin April 16, 1994, an extension of 29 days. This allows the licensee to avoid the thermal transients and personnel exposures associated with shutting the plant down solely to perform leakage testing.

Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.3f requires that the total sealing air leakage into the primary containment from the main steam positive leakage control system (MS-PLCS) valves and the penetration valve leakage control system (PVLCS) be determined by test at least once per 18 months. The proposed change would allow 11 valves sealed by the PVLCS to be tested after the plant is shutdown for the refueling outage, a maximum of 73 days later than allowed by the current technical specifications.

Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.2.2 requires that each reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve specified in Table 3.4.3.2-1 be leak tested once per 18 months and prior to returning the valve to service following maintenance, repair, or replacement work on the valve that could affect its leakage rate. The proposed amendment would delete Surveillance Requirements 4.4.3.2.2a and 4.4.3.2.2b, replacing them with a requirement to leak test the valves in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. This change would require that the pressure isolation valves be tested in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, rather than specifying an 18-month cycle.

The inservice testing program is required to be established per 10 CFR 50.55a, which incorporates the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (the Code). Section XI of the Code provides the inservice testing requirements for certain pumps and valves in nuclear power plants and is referenced in TS 4.0.5. Section XI of the Code requires that leakage testing of valves with specified leakage criteria be performed every two years and following repair, replacement, or maintenance that would impact the leakage acceptance criteria. A 25 percent extension to this testing interval is allowed by TS 4.0.2, providing an overall interval of 30 months in which to do the testing. However, it should be noted that pressure isolation valves can only be leak tested when the reactor is in cold shutdown and are normally tested during refueling outages, which for River Bend is an 18-month cycle. The revision would permit extending the testing of 5 valves to the upcoming refueling outage, a delay of 65 days later than allowed under the current technical specification.

The proposed change to TS 4.4.3.2.2 is consistent with the revised Standard Technical Specifications and is acceptable to the staff for the reasons stated above.

Based on the short duration of the requested extension, the staff has concluded that the proposed technical specification changes are acceptable. The staff has also determined that the application of Appendix J is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. In addition, the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common defense and security. Based on the limited time necessary to reach the refueling outage, the staff finds the exemption acceptable.

### 3.0 CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES

In a letter dated January 28, 1994, the licensee requested early issuance of this amendment because unless approved, Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.3.f (flow test of MS-PLCS and PVLCs leakage into containment) will exceed its surveillance interval on February 2, 1994, and will require that the plant be shutdown in order to safely perform the test.

On January 27, 1994, during a review of previously completed test records, the licensee discovered that the surveillance interval information for TS 4.6.1.3.f was not correct. This error would result in four valve stem leakage paths exceeding their 18-month surveillance interval, including the 25 percent allowance of Technical Specification 4.0.2, on February 2, 1994. At the time of the November 18, 1993 and December 21, 1993 submittals, the licensee believed that February 7, 1994, was the necessary date for approval of all surveillance interval extensions. The review on January 27, 1994, indicated that the amendment must be issued by February 2, 1994, to avoid an unplanned outage.

Accordingly, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5), the Commission has determined that there are emergency circumstances warranting prompt approval of the proposed change.

#### 4.0 FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION

The Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92 state that the Commission may make a final determination that a license amendment involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of that facility in accordance with the amendment would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or
2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or
3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

This amendment has been evaluated against the standards in 10 CFR 50.92. It does not involve a significant hazards consideration because:

1. One of the proposed technical specification changes requests a one-time only extension of the surveillance intervals for the surveillance requirements of TS 4.6.1.3f, leak rate testing of valves sealed by the main steam positive leakage control system (MS-PLCS) and the penetration valve leakage control system (PVLCS). The revision would permit 11 containment isolation valves to be tested a maximum of 73 days later than required by the current technical specification.

To permit the one-time extension of the surveillance interval for leak rate tests of containment isolation valves, TS 4.6.1.3d must also be revised to permit the interval for Type C leak rate tests to exceed 24 months. This change is consistent with an associated exemption request. The exemption request and this revision would permit 20 valves to be tested a maximum of 29 days later than required by the current technical specifications.

The proposed amendment would also revise Surveillance Requirements 4.4.3.2.2a and 4.4.3.2.2b, replacing the requirement to leak test the reactor coolant pressure isolation valves every 18 months or prior to returning a valve to service, with a requirement to leak test the valves in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. This change would require that the pressure isolation valves be tested in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, resulting in the valves being tested at least every refueling outage, rather than specifying an 18-month cycle. The revision would permit 5 valves to be tested a maximum of 65 days later than allowed under the current technical specification.

Based on the short duration of the requested extensions, the extensions will not significantly increase the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident.

2. The proposed changes permit extension of the surveillance intervals for leak rate testing of containment isolation valves and reactor coolant system pressure isolation valves. In that the requested extension durations are small as compared to the overall interval allowed by TS, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously analyzed.
3. The proposed TS changes permit extension of the surveillance intervals for leak rate testing of containment isolation valves and reactor coolant system pressure isolation valves. In that the requested extension durations are small as compared to the overall interval allowed by TS, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

## 5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Louisiana State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

## 6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (59 FR 616). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

7.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Edward T. Baker, NRR

Date: February 2, 1994