

December 3, 1991

Docket No. 50-458

Gulf States Utilities
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Dear Mr. Deddens:

SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1 - AMENDMENT NO. 62 TO FACILITY
OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47 (TAC NO. 81035)

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 62 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 for the River Bend Station, Unit 1. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated June 26, 1991.

✓ The amendment modifies Table 4.8.1.1.2-1 of the Technical Specifications (TS) related to the testing frequency of the Emergency Diesel Generators so as to allow returning to a regular monthly testing schedule from an increased test frequency when seven consecutive failure-free demands have been performed and the number of failures in the last 20 valid demands has been reduced to less than or equal to one regardless of which failure criteria in Table 4.8.1.1.2-1 had resulted in the increased testing frequency.

✓ This amendment also revises TS 4.8.1.1.3, "Reports", to allow failure statistics to be kept on a per-diesel-generator basis rather than on a per-nuclear-unit basis for the purpose of reporting failures.

A copy of our Safety Evaluation is enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By

Douglas V. Pickett, Project Manager
Project Directorate IV-2
Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

- 1. Amendment No. 62 to NPF-47
- 2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

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Mr. James C. Deddens

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December 3, 1991

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-458

RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 62
License No. NPF-47

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Gulf States Utilities Company (the licensee) dated June 26, 1991, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 62 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. GSU shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and to be implemented within 60 days of date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Suzanne C. Black, Director
Project Directorate IV-2
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 3, 1991

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 62

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47

DOCKET NO. 50-458

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The overleaf pages are provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE

3/4 8-10
3/4 8-11
B 3/4 8-2
B 3/4 8-3

INSERT

3/4 8-10
3/4 8-11
B 3/4 8-2
B 3/4 8-3

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

10. Verifying the diesel generator's capability to:
 - a) Synchronize with the offsite power source, while the generator is loaded with its emergency loads, upon a simulated restoration of offsite power,
 - b) Transfer its loads to the offsite power source, and
 - c) Be restored to its standby status.
11. Verifying that, with the diesel generator operating in a test mode and connected to its bus, a simulated ECCS actuation signal overrides the test mode by (1) returning the diesel generator to standby operation and (2) automatically energizing the emergency loads with offsite power.
12. Verifying that the automatic load sequence timers are OPERABLE with the interval between each load block within $\pm 10\%$ of its design interval for diesel generators 1A, 1B and 1C.
13. Verifying that the following diesel generator lockout features prevent diesel generator starting only when required:
 - a) For Diesel Generators 1A and 1B:
 - 1) Loss of control power to diesel control panel.
 - 2) Starting air pressure below 150 psi.
 - 3) Stop-solenoid energized.
 - 4) Diesel in the maintenance mode (includes barring device engaged).
 - 5) Overspeed trip device actuated.
 - 6) Generator backup protection lockout relay tripped.
 - b) For Diesel Generator 1C:
 - 1) Diesel generator lockout relays not reset.
 - 2) Diesel engine mode switch not in "AUTO" position.
 - 3) Diesel generator output breaker closed before start of diesel.
 - 4) Diesel generator output breaker in racked-out position.
 - 5) †Diesel generator regulator mode switch not in "AUTO" position.
 - 6) Insufficient starting air pressure.
 - 7) Loss of dc power to diesel generator controls.
- g. By verifying the Division III diesel generator ambient room temperature to be $\geq 40^{\circ}\text{F}$:
 1. At least once per 24 hours with the last reported room temperature $\geq 50^{\circ}\text{F}$, or

†Item 5) does not electrically block diesel generator from emergency starting; however, it will affect the loading and operation of the diesel.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

2. At least once per 12 hours with the last reported room temperature < 50°F.
- h. At least once per 10 years, or after any modifications which could affect diesel generator interdependence, by starting all three diesel generators simultaneously, during shutdown, and verifying that all three diesel generators accelerate to at least 450 rpm for diesel generators 1A and 1B and 900 rpm for diesel generator 1C in less than or equal to 10 seconds.
- i. At least once per 10 years by:
 1. Draining each fuel oil storage tank, removing the accumulated sediment, and cleaning the tank using a sodium hypochlorite or equivalent solution, and
 2. Performing a pressure test of those portions of the diesel fuel oil system designed to Section III, subsection ND of the ASME Code, in accordance with ASME Code Section XI Article IWD-5000.

4.8.1.1.3 Reports - All diesel generator failures, valid or non-valid, shall be reported to the Commission, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, within 30 days. Reports of diesel generator failures shall include the information recommended in Regulatory Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, August 1977. If the number of failures in the last 100 valid tests of any diesel generator, is greater than or equal to 7, the report shall be supplemented to include the additional information recommended in Regulatory Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, August 1977.

TABLE 4.8.1.1.2-1

DIESEL GENERATOR TEST SCHEDULE

<u>Number of Failures in Last 20 Valid Tests*</u>	<u>Number of Failures in Last 100 Valid Tests*</u>	<u>Test Frequency</u>
≤ 1	≤ 4	Once per 31 days
≥ 2	≥ 5	Once per 7 days**

*Criteria for determining number of failures and number of valid tests shall be in accordance with Regulatory Position C.2.e of Regulatory Guide 1.108, but determined on a per diesel generator basis.

For the purposes of determining the required test frequency, the previous test failure count may be reduced to zero if a complete diesel overhaul to like-new condition is completed, provided that the overhaul, including appropriate post-maintenance operation and testing, is specifically approved by the manufacturer and if acceptable reliability has been demonstrated. The reliability criterion shall be the successful completion of 14 consecutive tests in a single series. Ten of these tests shall be in accordance with the routine Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.5 and four tests in accordance with the 184-day testing requirement of Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.5. If this criterion is not satisfied during the first series of tests, any alternate criterion to be used to transvalue the failure count to zero requires NRC approval.

**This test frequency shall be maintained until seven consecutive failure free demands have been performed and the number of failures in the last 20 valid demands has been reduced to one or less.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

A.C. SOURCES - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.1.2 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

- a. One circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system, and
- b. Diesel generator 1A or 1B, and diesel generator 1C when the HPCS system is required to be OPERABLE, with each diesel generator having:
 1. A day fuel tank containing a minimum of 316.3 gallons of fuel,
 2. A fuel storage system containing a minimum of 45,495 gallons of fuel, and
 3. A fuel transfer pump.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4, 5, and *.

ACTION:

- a. With less than the above required A.C. electrical power sources OPERABLE, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, handling of irradiated fuel in the primary or secondary containment, operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel, and crane operations over the spent fuel storage pool when fuel assemblies are therein. In addition, when in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5 with the water level less than 23 feet above the reactor pressure vessel flange, immediately initiate corrective action to restore the required power sources to OPERABLE status as soon as practical.
- b. With diesel generator 1C of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, restore the inoperable diesel generator 1C to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or declare the HPCS system and the C SSW pump inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specifications 3.5.2, 3.5.3 and 3.7.1.1.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

*When handling irradiated fuel in the primary containment or Fuel Building.

3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.8.1, 3/4.8.2 and 3/4.8.3 A.C. SOURCES, D.C. SOURCES and ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of the A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during operation ensures that sufficient power will be available to supply the safety related equipment required for the safe shutdown of the facility and the mitigation and control of accident conditions within the facility. The minimum specified independent and redundant A.C. and D.C. power sources and distribution systems satisfy the requirements of General Design Criterion 17 of Appendix "A" to 10 CFR Part 50.

The ACTION requirements specified for the levels of degradation of the power sources provide restriction upon continued facility operation commensurate with the level of degradation. The OPERABILITY of the power sources is consistent with the initial condition assumptions of the safety analyses and is based upon maintaining OPERABLE at least Division I or II of the onsite A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during accident conditions coincident with an assumed loss of offsite power and single failure of the other onsite A.C. or D.C. source. Division III supplies the high pressure core spray (HPCS) system and the standby service water pump 1SWP*P2C with its auxiliaries.

The A.C. and D.C. source allowable out-of-service times are based on Regulatory Guide 1.93, "Availability of Electrical Power Sources," December 1974, as modified by plant-specific analysis and diesel generator manufacturer's recommendations. When diesel generator 1A or 1B is inoperable, there is an additional ACTION requirement to verify that all required systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices, that depend on the remaining OPERABLE diesel generator 1A or 1B as a source of emergency power, are also OPERABLE. This requirement is intended to provide assurance that a loss of offsite power, during the period that diesel generator 1A or 1B is inoperable, will not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems. The term verify, as used in this context, means to administratively check, by examining logs or other information, to determine if certain components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It does not mean to perform the surveillance requirements needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the component.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum specified A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems, during shutdown and refueling, ensures that the facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended time periods and sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status.

The surveillance requirements, for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the diesel generators, are in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9, "Selection of Diesel Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power Supplies," March 10, 1971, and Regulatory Guide 1.108, "Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, August 1977, as modified by plant-specific analysis and diesel generator manufacturer's recommendations.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

BASES

A.C. SOURCES, D.C. SOURCES and ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS (Continued)

Generic Letter 84-15 prescribed increasing the surveillance test frequency where previous testing indicated a reliability of less than or equal to 0.95/demand until restored reliability was demonstrated. It also considered a prescriptive testing program which included seven consecutive successful demands without a failure of the DG.

The test frequency of Table 4.8.1.1.2-1 is based on the criteria goals of an overall reliability of $> 95\%$ and to attain $\geq 90\%$ prior to returning to monthly testing. There is a requirement to return to weekly testing if the number of failures is greater than or equal to 2 in 20 or 5 in 100. The note to the table (footnote "**") explains that whenever failures in excess of one in 20 or five in 100 last valid tests an accelerated test frequency must be maintained. This weekly (accelerated) test schedule is continued until two conditions have been satisfied. First, seven consecutive successful tests have been accumulated, and second, the failures in the most recent 20 tests have been reduced to one or less. Seven successful tests indicate a reliability of at least 0.90/demand. Continuing the accelerated testing until the number of failures is one or less out of 20 adds further assurance that the DG reliability has not degraded below the 0.90/demand level. After each failure the criteria will be reviewed for reentry into once per weekly testing.

The surveillance requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the unit batteries are in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.129 "Maintenance Testing and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants", February 1978, and IEEE Std 450-1975, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations."

Verifying average electrolyte temperature above the minimum for which the battery was sized, total battery terminal voltage on float charge, and connection resistance values, and performing battery service and discharge tests, ensures the effectiveness of the charging system and the ability to handle high discharge rates, and compares the battery capacity at that time with the rated capacity.

Table 4.8.2.1-1 specifies the normal limits for each designated pilot cell and each connected cell for electrolyte level, float voltage and specific gravity. The limits for the designated pilot cells float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and .015 below the manufacturer's nominal full charge specific gravity, or a battery charger current that had stabilized at a low value, is characteristic of a charged cell with adequate capacity. The normal limits for each connected cell for float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and not more than .020 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity with an average specific gravity of all the connected cells not more than .010 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity, ensures the OPERABILITY and capability of the battery.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

BASES

A.C. SOURCES, D.C. SOURCES and ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS (Continued)

Operation with a battery cell's parameter outside the normal limit but within the allowable value specified in Table 4.8.2.1-1 is permitted for up to 7 days. During this 7 day period: (1) the allowable values for electrolyte level ensures no physical damage to the plates so that they retain an adequate electron transfer capability; (2) the allowable value for the average specific gravity of all the cells, not more than .020 below the manufacturer's recommended full charge specific gravity, ensures that the decrease in rating will be less than the safety margin provided in sizing; (3) the allowable value for an individual cell's specific gravity ensures that an individual cell's specific gravity will not be more than .040 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity and that the overall capability of the battery will be maintained within an acceptable limit; and (4) the allowable value for an individual cell's float voltage, greater than 2.07 volts, ensures the battery's capability to perform its design function.

3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

Containment electrical penetrations, penetration conductors, main control room lighting, and RPS alternate source of power are protected by either de-energizing circuits not required during reactor operation or demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the overcurrent protection circuit breakers and/or motor starters by periodic surveillance.

The surveillance requirements applicable to lower voltage circuit breakers and/or motor starters provide assurance of breaker and starter reliability by testing at least one representative sample of each manufacturer's brand of circuit breaker and/or starter. Each manufacturer's molded case and metal case circuit breakers and/or more starters are grouped into representative samples which are tested on a rotating basis to ensure that all breakers and/or starters are tested. If a wide variety exists within any manufacturer's brand of circuit breakers and/or motor starters, it is necessary to divide that manufacturer's breakers and/or starters into groups and treat each group as a separate type of breaker or starter for surveillance purposes.

Specific surveillance tests on the bypass circuits of motor-operated valves' thermal overload protection is not required at River Bend because the circuits are integral with the starting circuits of the motor operated valves and are therefore tested during functional tests of the valves. For the motor operated valve thermal overloads not bypassed, the thermal overloads are tested under Specification 4.8.4.1.a.3. These surveillance requirements are in accordance with RG 1.106, "Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor Operated Valves," Revision 1, March 1977.

The reactor protection system (RPS) electric power monitoring assemblies provide redundant protection to the RPS, and to other systems that receive power from the RPS buses, by acting to disconnect the RPS from the power source circuits in the presence of an electrical fault in the power supply.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 62 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47
GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY
RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1
DOCKET NO. 50-458

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated June 26, 1991, Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU) (the licensee) requested an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 for the River Bend Station, Unit 1. The proposed amendment would relocate the footnote concerning test frequency for the diesel generators in Technical Specification (TS) Table 4.8.1.1.2-1 and would modify the reporting requirements of TS 4.8.1.1.3 to be on a per-diesel-generator basis rather than a per-nuclear-unit basis.

2.0 BACKGROUND

TS Table 4.8.1.1.2-1, "Diesel Generator Test Schedule" defines the test frequency for an individual diesel generator based on the number of valid failures in the last 20 and last 100 valid tests. A note to the table explains that for the case of 2 or more failures in the last 20 valid tests, the increased test frequency shall be maintained until 7 consecutive failure-free demands have been performed and the number of failures in the last 20 valid demands has been reduced to less than or equal to one. No such provision currently exists for exiting from the increased testing frequency requirements when 5 or more failures occur in the last 100 valid tests. Thus, a diesel generator which experienced 5 or more failures in the last 100 valid tests could be required to maintain the increased testing frequency significantly longer than in the previous case after repairs had restored the diesel generator to its former reliability. The licensee's proposed change seeks to use the same criteria for demonstration of restored reliability regardless of the circumstances which resulted in the increased testing frequency requirement.

3.0 EVALUATION

The licensee's proposal seeks to avoid the possibility of a situation occurring which would require continued diesel generator testing even after demonstrating that reliability has been restored. Such testing is deemed by the licensee to be excessive and not in keeping with the intent of Generic Letter (GL) 84-15, "Proposed Staff Actions to Improve and Maintain Diesel Generator Reliability," July 2, 1984. The intent of the GL was to provide guidance on improving diesel

generator reliability by reducing the number of cold fast starts for diesel generators, obtaining diesel generator reliability data, and attaining and maintaining a diesel generator reliability goal. Enclosure 1 to GL 84-15 described the basis for reducing cold fast starts and its resultant improvement in diesel generator reliability and also discussed the correlation between excessive diesel generator testing (other than cold fast starts) and its resultant degradation of diesel engines.

Enclosure 3 to GL 84-15 described an acceptable example of a performance program for attaining and maintaining diesel generator reliability above the threshold level of concern. It included increased surveillance frequency where previous testing indicated a reliability of less than 0.90/demand until restored reliability was demonstrated.

While increased testing frequency was and still is determined by the staff to be an acceptable method to demonstrate restored reliability of the diesel generator, the discussions in Enclosure 1 to GL 84-15 regarding reduction of unnecessary testing and changes to the Standard TS as described in Appendix A of GL 84-15, such as changing the previous 3-day test frequency to 7 days, clearly indicated that unnecessary diesel generator testing should be avoided if other methods of demonstrating and/or restoring diesel generator reliability exist.

Increasing the test frequency would provide a faster accumulation of test data upon which to judge the reliability of the diesel. This additional data could then be used to distinguish between failures which occur close together simply due to random chance and such failures that are indicative of an abrupt decline in the actual reliability. The weekly test schedule would be continued until two conditions have been satisfied. First, seven consecutive successful tests have been accumulated. Second, the failures in the most recent 20 tests have been reduced to one or less. Seven successful tests indicated a reliability of at least 0.90/demand but only at the 50 percent confidence level. Continuing the accelerated testing until the number of failures is 1 out of 20 provides assurance that the diesel generator reliability has been restored to .95/demand which is the desired goal. This relaxation to the normal testing interval of once per 31 days upon satisfying the two conditions above was only intended for the case where 2 or more failures occurred in the last 20 starts, not the case where 5 or more failures occurred in the last 100 starts.

In summary, the licensee's submittal has demonstrated consistency with the staff's position established in GL 84-15 regarding diesel generator reliability and testing. The footnote in TS Table 4.8.1.1.2-1 provides criteria for resuming monthly testing of the diesel generators. The criteria demonstrates that proper corrective action to restore diesel generator reliability has been taken. The proposed change to this table will permit the licensee to resume monthly testing based on the previous 20 valid test starts as opposed to the previous 100 test starts. The staff has previously approved similar technical specification changes for the Perry and Clinton facilities. Therefore, based on the staff's review, we find the proposed changes to TS Table 4.8.1.1.2-1 acceptable.

The licensee's request to modify the reporting requirements of TS 4.8.1.1.3 from a per-nuclear-unit basis to a per-diesel-generator basis is in keeping with the guidance of GL 84-15 for determining failure rates on each diesel generator at a site. The change in reporting criteria to a per-diesel-generator requirement would be consistent with the testing criteria and would avoid the need for a dual counting system, one for failures and one for reports. Therefore, the staff considers this change acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Louisiana State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (56 FR 49918). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: Donna Skay, NRR
Douglas Pickett, PDIV-2/NRR
Om Chopra, SELB/NRR

Date: December 3, 1991