

September 27, 1990

Docket No. 50-458

DISTRIBUTION:

Gulf States Utilities  
ATTN: Mr. James C. Deddens  
Senior Vice President (RBNG)  
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Dear Mr. Deddens:

SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1 - AMENDMENT NO. 49 TO FACILITY  
OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47 (TAC NO. 72838)

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 49 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 for the River Bend Station, Unit 1. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated March 21, 1989 and supplemented by letter dated August 3, 1990.

The amendment revises the Limiting Condition for Operation Action statement, surveillance requirements, and Bases for TS 3/4.7.4 relating to snubbers. The changes eliminate redundant requirements in the TSs and refer to implementation of the Inservice Inspection (ISI) Plan to fulfill inspection requirements as they apply to snubbers. The amendment is being approved on the basis of: (1) it is plant specific to River Bend; (2) any change to the snubber section of the ISI plan will be submitted to the staff for prior review and approval; and (3) Gulf State Utilities will, if necessary, make changes to conform with the staff's position on snubbers when the Improved Standard TSs are issued.

A copy of our Safety Evaluation is enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By

Claudia M. Abbate, Project Engineer  
Project Directorate IV-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - III,  
IV, V and Special Projects  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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Enclosures:

- 1. Amendment No. 49 to NPF-47
- 2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:

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\*FOR PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES  
SEE ATTACHED ORC

CP-1

OFC	: PULV-2/LA	: PULV-2/FE	: EMB/BC	: OGC *	: PDIV-2/D	:	:
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September 27, 1990

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-458

RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 49  
License No. NPF-47

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Gulf States Utilities Company (the licensee) dated March 21, 1989, and supplemented by letter dated August 3, 1990, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 49 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. GSU shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Christopher I. Grimes, Director  
Project Directorate IV-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - III,  
IV, V and Special Projects  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 27, 1990

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 49

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47

DOCKET NO. 50-458

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain a vertical line indicating the area of change. The overleaf pages are provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE

3/4 7-10  
3/4 7-11  
3/4 7-12  
3/4 7-13  
3/4 7-14  
3/4 7-15  
3/4 7-16  
B 3/4 7-2  
B 3/4 7-3

INSERT

3/4 7-10  
3/4 7-11  
  
3/4 7-16  
B 3/4 7-2  
B 3/4 7-3

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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- c. At least once per 18 months by:
1. Performing a system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation and restart and verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position. Actual injection of coolant into the reactor vessel may be excluded.
  2. Verifying that the system will develop a flow of greater than or equal to 600 gpm in the test flow path when steam is supplied to the turbine at a pressure of 150 + 15, - 0 psig.\*
  3. Verifying that the suction for the RCIC system is automatically transferred from the condensate storage tank to the suppression pool on a condensate storage tank water level-low signal and on a suppression pool water level - high signal.

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\*The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable provided the surveillance is performed within 12 hours after reactor steam pressure is adequate to perform the tests.

PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.4 SNUBBERS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.7.4 All required snubbers shall be OPERABLE. The only snubbers excluded from this requirement are those installed on nonsafety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3, and OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5 for snubbers located on systems required OPERABLE in those OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS.

ACTION:

- a. With one or more required snubbers inoperable on a system, within 72 hours replace or restore the inoperable snubber(s) to OPERABLE status or declare the attached system inoperable and follow the appropriate ACTION statement for that system.
- b. Perform engineering evaluations per the applicable section of the approved ISI Program.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.7.4 Each snubber shall be demonstrated to be OPERABLE by implementing the examination and test requirements of the approved ISI Program and as indicated in Specification 4.0.5. Only a previously approved revision of the ISI Program may be implemented. Subsequent revisions to the program shall be submitted to the NRC in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g).

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PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.5 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.7.5 Each sealed source containing radioactive material in excess of either 100 microcuries of beta and/or gamma emitting material or 10 microcuries of alpha emitting material shall be free of greater than or equal to 0.005 microcuries of removable contamination.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

- a. With a sealed source having removable contamination in excess of the above limit, withdraw the sealed source from use and either:
  1. Decontaminate and repair the sealed source, or
  2. Dispose of the sealed source in accordance with Commission Regulations.
- b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.7.5.1 Test Requirements - Each sealed source shall be tested for leakage and/or contamination by:

- a. The licensee, or
- b. Other persons specifically authorized by the Commission or an Agreement State.

The test method shall have a detection sensitivity of at least 0.005 microcuries per test sample.

4.7.5.2 Test Frequencies - Each category of sealed sources, excluding startup sources and fission detectors previously subjected to core flux, shall be tested at the frequency described below.

- a. Sources in use - At least once per six months for all sealed sources containing radioactive material:
  1. With a half-life greater than 30 days, excluding Hydrogen 3, and
  2. In any form other than gas.

## 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.7.1 STANDBY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the service water system and ultimate heat sink ensure that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of these systems, assuming a single failure, is consistent, within acceptable limits, with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

#### 3/4.7.2 MAIN CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the main control room air conditioning system ensures that (1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system and (2) the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all design basis accident conditions. Continuous operation of the system with the heaters OPERABLE for 10 hours during each 31 day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The OPERABILITY of this system, in conjunction with control room design provisions, is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body or its equivalent. This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix "A", 10 CFR Part 50.

#### 3/4.7.3 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM

The reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system is provided to assure adequate core cooling, in the event of reactor isolation from its primary heat sink and the loss of feedwater flow to the reactor vessel, without requiring actuation of any of the Emergency Core Cooling System equipment. The RCIC system is conservatively required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor pressure exceeds 150 psig. This pressure is substantially below that for which the low pressure core cooling systems can provide adequate core cooling for events requiring the RCIC system.

The RCIC system specifications are applicable during OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3, when reactor vessel pressure exceeds 150 psig, because RCIC is the primary non-ECCS source of emergency core cooling when the reactor is pressurized.

With the RCIC system inoperable, adequate core cooling is assured by the OPERABILITY of the HPCS system which justifies the specified 14 day out-of-service period.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM (Continued)

The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that RCIC will be OPERABLE when required. Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation during reactor operation, a complete functional test requires reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage and to start cooling at the earliest possible moment.

#### 3/4.7.4 SNUBBERS

All snubbers are required OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the reactor coolant system and all other safety related systems is maintained during and following a seismic or other event that initiates dynamic loads.

A list of individual snubbers with detailed information of snubber location, size and system affected shall be maintained in accordance with the ISI Program. The accessibility of each snubber shall be based upon the accessibility of the snubber during plant operations (e.g., radiation level, temperature, atmosphere, location, etc.) The addition or deletion of any hydraulic or mechanical snubber shall be made in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50.

When a snubber is found inoperable, an engineering evaluation is performed, including the determination of the snubber mode of failure, in order to determine if any safety-related component or system has been adversely affected by the inoperability of the snubber. The engineering evaluation shall determine whether or not the snubber mode of failure has imparted a significant effect or degradation on the supported component or system.

To provide further assurance of snubber reliability, a representative sample of the installed snubbers will be functionally tested, during plant shutdowns, at 18 month intervals. Observed failures of these sample snubbers will require functional testing of additional units.

The service life of a snubber is evaluated in accordance with the Service Life Monitoring Plan in the ISI Program. The requirement to monitor the snubber service life is included to ensure that the snubbers periodically undergo a performance evaluation in view of their age and operating conditions. These records will provide statistical bases for future consideration of snubber service life. The requirements for the maintenance of records and of the snubber service life review are not intended to affect plant operation.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.7.5 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION

The limitations on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing, including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR 70.39(c) limits for plutonium. This limitation will ensure that leakage from byproduct, source, and special nuclear material sources will not exceed allowable intake values. Sealed sources are classified into three groups according to their use, with surveillance requirements commensurate with the probability of damage to a source in that group. Those sources which are frequently handled are required to be tested more often than those which are not. Sealed sources which are continuously enclosed within a shielded mechanism, i.e., sealed sources within radiation monitoring devices, are considered to be stored and need not be tested unless they are removed from the shielded mechanism.

#### 3/4 7.6 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of the fire suppression systems ensures that adequate fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where safety related equipment is located. The fire suppression systems consist of the water system, spray and/or sprinkler systems, Halon system and fire hose stations. The collective capability of the fire suppression systems is adequate to minimize potential damage to safety related equipment and is a major element in the facility fire protection program.

In the event that portions of the fire suppression systems are inoperable, alternate backup fire fighting equipment is required to be made available in the affected areas until the inoperable equipment is restored to service. When the inoperable fire fighting equipment is intended for use as a backup means of fire suppression, a longer period of time is allowed to provide an alternate means of fire fighting than if the inoperable equipment is the primary means of fire suppression.

The surveillance requirements provide assurance that the minimum OPERABILITY requirements of the fire suppression systems are met. An allowance is made for ensuring a sufficient volume of Halon in the Halon storage tanks by verifying the weight and pressure of the tanks.

In the event the fire suppression water system becomes inoperable, immediate corrective measures must be taken since this system provides the major fire suppression capability of the plant.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.7.7 FIRE-RATED ASSEMBLIES

The OPERABILITY of the fire barriers and barrier penetrations ensure that fire damage will be limited. These design features minimize the possibility of a single fire involving more than one fire area prior to detection and extinguishment. The fire barriers, fire barrier penetrations for conduits, cable trays and piping, fire dampers, and fire doors are periodically inspected to verify their OPERABILITY.

#### 3/4.7.8 AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING

The area temperature limitations ensure that safety-related equipment will not be subjected to temperatures in excess of their environmental qualification temperatures. Exposure to excessive temperatures may degrade equipment and can cause loss of its OPERABILITY.

#### 3/4.7.9 MAIN TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM

The main turbine bypass system is required to be OPERABLE consistent with the assumptions of the feedwater controller failure analysis in FSAR Chapter 15.

#### 3/4 7.10 STRUCTURAL SETTLEMENT

Structural settlement limitations are imposed and required to be verified so as to preserve the assumptions made in the static design of the major safety related structures.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 49 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47

GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY

RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-458

INTRODUCTION

By letter dated March 21, 1989, and supplemented by letter dated August 3, 1990, Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU) (the licensee) requested an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 for the River Bend Station (RBS), Unit 1, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(5)(ii). The proposed amendment would relocate part of the snubber Technical Specifications (TSs) to the Inservice Inspection (ISI) Plan while retaining the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) applicability and ACTION requirements in the TSs. The proposed amendment would reference the ISI Plan in the TSs. The detailed surveillance requirements regarding snubbers are contained in the RBS ISI Plan. Any changes to the section of the ISI Plan pertaining to snubbers will be submitted to the staff for prior review and approval.

EVALUATION

The requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g)(5)(ii) state that, "if a revised inservice inspection program for a facility conflicts with the technical specifications for the facility, the licensee shall apply to the Commission for amendment of the technical specifications to conform the technical specification to the revised program." The current RBS Snubber TS (3/4.7.4) differs from the RBS ISI Plan which was approved by NRC on October 20, 1987. These differences and other amendments to the TSs are discussed below.

(1) Limiting Condition for Operation

The licensee has proposed to add the word 'required' in the LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION and ACTION statement to limit this specification to only those snubbers that must be OPERABLE in the applicable operational mode(s) of the plant. There may be conditions where the system is required to be operable, but the snubber may not be required to be operable.

Current TSs require three evaluations to be performed within 72 hours. The proposed ACTION statement would be subdivided to delineate the time periods for the engineering evaluations previously required by item g to be completed. The proposed amendment would require the system operability evaluation to be performed within 72 hours while the cause of failure and common cause evaluations would not be required to be performed within 72 hours. These evaluations are addressed in further

detail by Section 12.2.9 of the current ISI Plan:

An evaluation to decide if the system or component meets design requirements. This evaluation is required before returning the system or component to service. An evaluation that returns a required snubber to operation without removing it also must be completed within 72 hours of determining it inoperable or the system ACTION must be followed.

An evaluation of the snubber to determine the cause of failure. This evaluation is not required before returning the system or component to service unless the snubber is to be repaired and returned to service.

A failure mode evaluation to determine if snubbers of the same design are subject to the same failure. No evaluation is required before returning the system or snubber to service.

(2) Detailed Surveillance Requirements

The following differences exist between the TS requirements and the RBS ISI Plan with regard to the classification, visual inspection and functional testing of snubbers. The licensee is proposing amendments to the TS so that the TS requirements would be identical to the ISI Plan.

Inspection Type

Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.7.4.a states that, "(a)s used in this specification, type of snubber shall mean snubbers of the same design and manufacturer, irrespective of (load) capacity." With regard to this definition, RBS has only one type of snubber installed. Therefore, in the RBS ISI Plan, load capacity is also considered as a criterion for snubber type classification for the purpose of establishing test sample scopes for functional testing.

The load capacity of a snubber is a design parameter. As such, test samples should correspondingly reflect this. The NRC approved ISI Plan incorporates this additional criterion for inspection type determination based on the following factors:

Based on data obtained from test agencies and industry surveys, snubbers of different load capacities have been found to fail functional testing at considerably different rates. The differences in failure rates are substantial enough to warrant considering load capacity as a separate aspect of test sample selection.

Snubbers of different load capacities have internal design differences which affect the manner in which the snubber translates linear motion to rotational motion. Although these design differences are minor, they have been shown to have an effect on snubber failure rates.

The combination of these two aspects of snubber failure rates as a function of load capacity prompted the inclusion of this test sample selection criterion in the RBS ISI Plan. Since only accessibility determines the scope of subsequent visual inspections, this additional criterion will have no impact on the scope of subsequent visual surveillances. This additional criterion for sample type selection has been approved by the NRC in Revision 2 to the RBS ISI Plan. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed criterion for snubber type classification acceptable.

### Visual Inspections

TS Surveillance Requirement 4.7.4.b currently requires that snubbers be classified as accessible or inaccessible during reactor operation. A baseline examination of all snubbers is required to be performed after four (4) months but within ten (10) months following commencement of initial power operation. If inoperable snubbers are found during visual inspections, subsequent visual inspections are required to be conducted in accordance with the following schedule:

<u>No. of Inoperable Snubbers of each Type Per Inspection Period</u>	<u>Subsequent Visual Inspection Period</u>
0	18 months +/-25%
1	12 months +/-25%
2	6 months +/-25%
3, 4	124 days +/-25%
5, 6, 7	62 days +/-25%
8 or more	31 days +/-25%

TS Surveillance Requirement 4.7.4.b allows accessible and inaccessible snubbers to be inspected independently according to the above schedule.

The RBS ISI Plan also requires that snubbers be classified as either accessible or inaccessible during reactor operation, and that the inspection schedule above be used for subsequent examinations of accessible snubbers. However, subsequent examination of inaccessible snubbers are allowed to be performed during the next reactor shutdown of sufficient duration as to provide accessibility. This provision was also included in Revision 2 of the Standard Technical Specifications. Further, Article IWF of ASME Section XI allows subsequent examinations of inaccessible snubbers to be delayed until the next inspection period. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed change to be acceptable.

### Functional Test Requirements

TS Surveillance Requirement 4.7.4.e currently allows the licensee to select one of the three sampling plans for snubber testing. One sample plan presently allowed by the TS and also the ASME Standard OMa, Part 4, 1988 Edition, requires an initial sample size of at least 10 percent of each

type of snubber to be tested each outage. The ISI Plan also allows the 10 percent plan and is selected as the bases for the examination schedule. The actual examinations during the last two outages were over 16 percent of each type of snubber required to meet the ASME Section XI requirement of 100 percent snubber testing in a 10-year period, again exceeding OMa-4 requirements. The present OMa-4 only requires additional test lot sizes to be one-half the size of the original sample. The present ISI Plan requires that additional sample lots are the same size as the initial samples thereby providing additional assurance of snubber operability. Thus, the staff finds the 10 percent plan acceptable.

Since 3/4.7.4 will remain in the RBS TS, the BASES will remain with the proposed modifications. The changes as discussed above will reference the ISI Plan instead of specific TS requirements.

In a telephone call on September 27, 1990, the licensee committed to submit any future changes to the ISI Plan pertaining to snubbers to the staff for review and approval.

#### SUMMARY

The amendments to TS 3/4.7.4 as proposed have been reviewed by the staff and found to be acceptable. Any future changes to the snubber section of the ISI Plan will be submitted to the staff for prior review and approval. Additionally, when the Improved Standard TSs are issued, GSU will, if necessary, make changes to conform to the staff's position regarding snubbers.

#### ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment involves a change in a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes in surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposures. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Section 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

#### CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such

activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. The staff therefore concludes that the proposed changes are acceptable.

Dated: September 27, 1990

Principal Contributor: J. Rajan, EMEB