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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

April 28, 1988

Docket No. 50-277 278

Dellection to Amat. 132 to DPR-56

ED NOT REMOVE

Mr. Edward G. Bauer, Jr. Vice President and General Counsel Philadelphia Electric Company 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19101

Dear Mr. Bauer:

SUBJECT: CORRECTION LETTER FOR ERRORS IN LICENSE AMENDMENT NOS. 129 AND 132 UNITS 2 AND 3

RE: PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION, UNIT NOS. 2 AND 3

On September 11, 1987 the Commission issued amendment number 123 for Unit 2 which made changes in the expression for the trip level setpoint for the APRM High Flux parameter on Technical Specification Table 3.1.1, page 37. The expression as modified read "(0.58W + 62 - 0.58 delta W)" multiplied by "FRP/MFLPD" with footnotes (12) and (13) being listed as applicable.

On March 3, 1988 the Commission issued amendment number 129 for Unit 2 which changed the main steamline high radiation setpoint in Table 3.1.1, page 38, and also made administrative changes to pages 37 and 38 of Table 3.1.1 to add a numbering sequence for the parameters in the table. In updating the previously provided copy of the Table 3.1.1, page 37, to reflect the amendment no. 129 changes the staff inadvertently left out part of the APRM High Flux trip level setting expression. Specifically, the portion "FRP/MFLPD" with notations to footnotes (12) and (13) was not included.

We are providing this letter to clarify that the expression "(0.58W + 62 - 0.58 delta W) FRP/MFLPD" with notations to footnotes (12) and (13) was not changed by amendment no. 129 to the Unit 2 facility license. Accordingly, the attached corrected Technical Specification page 37 is provided for amendment number 129.

Also, in amendment no. 129 for Unit 2 and amendment no. 132 issued for Unit 3 on March 3, 1988 the staff included page no. 47 of the BASES section of the Technical Specification for document completeness. The version of page 47 included in this amendment did not reflect changes to the page made by

amendment no. 65 to Unit 2 and amendment no. 64 to Unit 3 issued on March 26, 1980. Therefore, page no. 47 provided with the license amendment package of March 3, 1988 for both Units 2 and 3 should be replaced with the attached page 47 for both Units 2 and 3.

We regret any inconvenience this may have caused your staff.

Sincerely,

Martin

Robert E. Martin, Project Manager Project Directorate I-2 Division of Reactor Projects I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures: Technical Specification Pages 37 and 47 for Unit 2 and Page 47 for Unit 3

cc w/enclosures
See next page

Mr. E. G. Bauer, Jr. Philadelphia Electric Company

cc:

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PBAPS Unit 2

	TEDIO 3.1.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (SCRAM) INSTRUMENTATION REQUIREMENT								
	Item	Minimum No of Operabl Instrument Channels per Trip System (1)	Trip Function	Trip Loval Sotting	Operable	n Must be		Number of Instrument Channels Provided by Design	Action (1)
	1	1	Mode Switch In Shutdown	<u></u>	×	X	X	1 Mode Switch (4 Sections)	A
	2	1	Manuel Scram		×	×	x	2 Instrument Channels	•
	3	3	IRM High Flux	<120/128 of Full Scale	×	×	(5)	8 Instrument Channels	A
	4	3	IRM Inoperative		×	X	(5)	8 Instrument Channels	•
	8	2	APRM High Flux	(0.58₩+62-0.58\) \	W) N		X	<pre>§ Instrument Channels</pre>	A or B
	•	2	APRM Inoperative	(11)	×	*	X	<pre>6 Instrument Channels</pre>	A or B
	'	2	APRM Downscale	≥2.5 Indicated on Scale			(10)	8 Instrument Channels	A or B
	•	2	APRM High Flux in Startup	<u>≤</u> 18% Pewer	×	X		6 Instrument Channels	A
	•	2	High Reactor · Pressure	<u><</u> 1055 ps19	×(9)	X	X	4 Instrument Channels	A
	10	2	High Drywell Pressure	<u>≤</u> 2 paig	×(8)	X(8)	X	4 Instrument Channels	A
	11	2	Reactor Low Water Lovel	≥0 in. Indicated Level	X	×	x	4 Instrument Channels	A

Table 3.1.1

Amendment No. 25, 34, 92, 78, 78, 123, 129 -37-

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2.1 BASIS

The reactor protection system automatically initiates a reactor scram to:

 \mathbf{N} Preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding.

- 2. Preserve the integrity of the reactor coolant system.
- 3. Minimize the energy which must be absorbed following a loss of coolant accident, and prevent inadvertant criticality.

This specification provides the limiting conditions for operation necessary to preserve the ability of the system to perform its intended function even during periods when instrument channels may be out of service because of maintenance. When necessary, one channel may be made inoperable for brief intervals to conduct required functional tests and calibrations.

The reactor protection system is of the dual channel type (Reference subsection 1.2 FSAR). The system is made up of two independent trip systems, each having two subchannels of tripping devices. Each subchannel has an input from at least one instrument channel which monitors a critical parameter.

The outputs of the subchannels are combined in a 1 out of 2 logic; i.e, an input signal on either one or both of the subchannels will cause a trip system trip. The outputs of the trip systems are arranged so that a trip on both systems is required to produce a reactor scram.

This system meets the intent of IEEE - 279 for Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems. The system has a reliability greater than that of a 2 out of 3 system and somewhat less than that of a 1 out of 2 system.

With the exception of the Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) channels, the Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) channels, the Main Steam Isolation Valve closure and the Turbine Stop Valve closure, each subchannel has one instrument channel. When the minimum condition for operation on the number of operable instrument channels per untripped protection trip system is met or if it cannot be met and the affected protection trip system is placed in a tripped condition, the effectiveness of the protection system is preserved.

The APRM instrument channels are provided for each protection trip system. APRM's A and E operate contacts in one subchannel and APRM's C and E operate contacts in the other subchannel. APRM's B, D and F are arranged similarly in BASIS

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This specification provides the limiting conditions for operation necessary to preserve the ability of the system to perform its intended function even during periods when instrument channels may be out of service because of maintenance. When necessary, one channel may be made inoperable for brief intervals to conduct required functional tests and calibrations.

The reactor protection system is of the dual channel type (Reference subsection 7.2 FSAR). The system is made up of two independent trip systems, each having two subchannels of tripping devices. Each subchannel has an input from at least one instrument channel which monitors a critical parameter.

The outputs of the subchannels are combined in a 1 out of 2 logic; i.e, an input signal on either one or both of the subchannels will cause a trip system trip. The outputs of the trip systems are arranged so that a trip on both systems is required to produce a reactor scram.

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